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The Complete Mind

A Hungarian Debate on the Nature of the Body-Mind Union from 1685¹

Introduction

I divide my paper into two parts. In the first part, I provide an outline of the cultural and confessional institutions surrounding the sources to be analysed from the perspective of our conference topic. The second part of the paper analyses the problem of a real distinction of mind against the background of its conceivability in the sources described in the first part.

The sources and their intellectual background in Transylvania

The previous Mediaeval Kingdom of Hungary was divided into three parts in the period between 1541 and 1686. The largest part containing the Southern and Middle territories belonged to the Ottoman Empire, whereas the Northern part called Upper Hungary, was under the rule of the Habsburg Monarchy. The third part called the Principality of Transylvania, was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. Although Transylvania had to pay annual tax to Istanbul, it could maintain its political, cultural and confessional self-governance. In the second half of the 16th Century, the most important philosophical phenomena of Transylvanian cultural history emerged within the philosophical reflections of radical Protestant thinkers.² Contrary to the preceding decades, 17th century Transylvanian developments of philosophy were predominantly under the influence of the culture and institutions of Calvinist religiosity.

¹ The research was supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA 125012 ‘The Cartesian Mind between Cognition and Extension’ and OTKA 137963 ‘History of Hungarian Philosophy in Early Modernity (1570–1710)’)

² Cf. Simon, József: *Die Religionsphilosophie Christian Franckens (1552–1610?): Atheismus und radikale Reformation im Frühneuzeitlichen Ostmitteleuropa*. Wolfenbütteler Forschungen 117. Wiesbaden, Verlag Harrassowitz, 2008.

The persons and sources to be discussed in what follows belonged to the cultural history of the third part, that is, Transylvania. Although there were no universities in the Principality³, young people attended several high schools with manifold educational profile. These high schools provided preliminary knowledge for further studies at universities abroad. Due to the strong Calvinist orientation of education, the main target of *peregrinatio academica* was the Low Countries. Generations of the Transylvanian cultural elite visited the universities of Leiden, Utrecht, Franeker or Groningen; more than 1500 Hungarian students' matriculation is documented in sources relating the history of Dutch universities in the 17th Century.⁴ Most of these students were of Transylvanian origins. The most intensive presence of Transylvanian students at the universities of the Low Countries coincides with the period of a rising popularity of Cartesian philosophy in the Netherlands from 1650 onwards. Obviously, not all students became Cartesian; however, all of them articulated their own cultural identities after being exposed to the Dutch cultural milieu. They imported Dutch cultural patterns emerging in the conflicts between the new philosophy and Calvinist scholasticism: they witnessed the early Utrecht crisis in the 1640's⁵, the *status quo* of teaching Cartesian philosophy under the de Witt era in the 1650's⁶, they shared either the scientific fascination for or the orthodox reservation against the posthumous publication of Descartes' *De homine* in 1662 in Leiden⁷, they drew their own either affirmative or distanced conclusion from the Leiden condemnation of Cartesian arguments in 1676,⁸

³ The only Hungarian university of the period was established by the Jesuit Péter Pázmány (1570–1637) in Nagyszombat (Habsburg territory of Upper Hungary) in 1635.

⁴ Tonk, Sándor – Szabó, Miklós: *Erdélyiek egyetemjárása a korai újkorban 1521–1700*. [Transylvanians *Visiting Universities* in the Early Modern Era, 1521–1700], Szeged, JATE Press, 1992.

⁵ Veerbek, Theo: „Descartes and the Problem of Atheism: the Utrecht Crisis.” *Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis / Dutch Review of Church History*. 71 (1991) / 2, 211–223.

⁶ Bunge, Wiep van: *From Stevin to Spinoza. An Essay on Philosophy in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Republic*. Leiden-Boston-Köln, Brill, 2001, 66–74.

⁷ Descartes, René: *De Homine / Figyris Et Latinitate* Donatus A Florentio Schuyt, Leiden, Moyardus. 1662.

⁸ Schmaltz, Tad M.: *Early Modern Cartesianisms: Dutch and French Constructions*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016.

and may have heard about the divergent forms of reactions on Spinoza's philosophy before and after 1677⁹, and so on.

Let us approach the sources relevant for the present paper from the perspective of a controversy. At the Reformed Synod in Radnót (1673), four persons were cited to ecclesiastical tribunal: Márton Dézsi¹⁰ (1630–1691), professor of theology in the College of Nagyenyed (Aiud, Romania, in German: Straßburg am Mieresch), István Pataki¹¹ (1641–1693), professor of theology and philosophy in the College of Kolozsvár (Cluj, Romania, in German: Klausenburg), Pál Hunyadi (ca. 1642–1685), Calvinist preacher in Nagyenyed and Pál Csernátoni¹² (ca. 1633–1679), professor of philosophy in the College of Nagyenyed. The two theological professors and the preacher were accused of promulgating Cocceian theology, while Csernátoni, professor of philosophy was accused of Cartesianism. Unfortunately, we do not have the original protocols of the Synod and later accounts fail to inform us about the philosophical content of the controversy.¹³ But one thing is clear: the accusations followed the patterns of the Dutch scene of coupling Cartesian philosophy with Cocceian theology.¹⁴ Persons on both side of the conflict, the accusers as well as the accused gained their decisive cultural experience in the Low Countries. Among the prosecutors, we find János Pósaázi (1628–1686), the Calvinist refugee and former professor of physics in the College of Sárospatak.¹⁵ Due to the intervention of secular Calvinist politicians, the prosecuted were acquitted of the

⁹ Douglas, Alexander X.: *Spinoza and Dutch Cartesianism. Philosophy and Theology*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015.

¹⁰ Zoványi Jenő: „Dézsi Márton.” *Protestáns Szemle*, 2 (1898), 79–90.

¹¹ Dienes Dénes: „Pataki Tóth István.” *Református Szemle*, 106 (2013) / 1, 63–72.

¹² Herepei János: Csernátoni Pál és a Bethlen fivérek [Pál Csernátoni and the Bethlen brothers]. In: Keserű Bálint et al. (eds.): *Adattár XVI-XVII. századi szellemi mozgalmaink történetéhez*. Vol. III. Szeged, 1971, 400–403.

¹³ The controversy is summarized in Zoványi Jenő: „Dézsi” (cf. n. 8). For a bibliography of further 18th century accounts of the events in 1673 cf. *ibid.*

¹⁴ For the problem of theoretical affinities between Cartesian philosophy and Cocceian theology see Asselt, Willem J. van: *The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius (1603–1669)*. Leiden, Brill, 2001, 72–105; Wall, Ernestine van der: Cartesianism and Cocceianism: A Natural Alliance? In: M. Magdelaine et al. (eds.): *De l'Humanisme aux Lumières, Bayle et le protestantisme: Mélanges en l'honneur d'Elisabeth Labrousse*. Paris, Voltaire Foundation, 1996, 445–55.

¹⁵ The reformed College in Sárospatak fell victim to violent process of the Counter-Reformation in Upper Hungary.

charges.¹⁶ Under somewhat obscure circumstances, the anti-Cartesian decree from 1673 was affirmed by Prince Mihály Apafi (1632–1690) in 1680.¹⁷ Although this later protocol of affirmation contains none of the condemned *philosophical* theses either, the statement against the new philosophy was supplemented by a novel charge in this source. Csernátoni, the Cartesian professor was accused of representing “*libertas philosophandi*”. Without any specification, Cartesianism was condemned together with Cocceianism again.

With the publication of the *Syllabus Assertionum* in 1685, János Pósa-házi¹⁸ continued the attack on Cartesianism. His issue contained 76 condemned assertions, of which 44 concerned Cocceian theology; the remaining 32 theses are quotations from Descartes’ works. Each condemned assertion is followed by observations attesting to Pósa-házi’s caveats. His publication of 1685 bears the long title:

*Syllabus of assertions, theses and hypotheses by which certain theological and philosophical innovators disturb the schools and churches in these days in the Low Countries, Hungary and Transylvania – collected from their own writings, with their complementary censure.*¹⁹

¹⁶ Cf. Bethlen, Miklós: *The Autobiography of Miklós Bethlen*. Transl. by Bernard Adams. London, Paul Kegan, 2004, 278.

¹⁷ Zoványi Jenő: „A radnóthi zsinat végzései” [The Decrees at the Synode of Radnót]. *Protestáns Közlöny*, 1889/38–39, 344 and 362–364.

¹⁸ Pósa-házi studied at the University of Utrecht between 1652–1657. He attended Gisbert Voetius’ (Gijsbert Voet, 1589–1676) theological lectures as well as Henricus Regius’ (Hendrik de Roy, 1598–1679) and Jan de Bruyn’s (1620–1675) courses treating physics and natural philosophy. Consequently, his intellectual profile proved to be Janus-faced indeed; on the one hand, after composing his dissertation about the nature of fluid bodies in Utrecht, he wrote one of the first comprehensive treatments of physics in Hungary/Transylvania; on the other hand, he participated in confessional debates as a representant of the most extreme orthodox Calvinist polemic. Cf. Zemplén Jolán *A magyarországi fizika története 1711-ig* [History of Physics in Hungary up to 1711]. Budapest, Akadémiai, 1961, 275–286.

¹⁹ Pósa-házi, János: *Syllabus Assertionum Thesium, & Hypothesium illarum (e multis) quibus Noetorici quidam Theologi & Philosophi hoc tempore in Belgio, Hungaria & Transylvania, scholas & Ecclesias turbant, ex propriis ipsorum scriptis collectus, cum succincta ad illas Animadversiones* [Cluj] M.DC.LXXXV.– All transcriptions and translations are of mine, except for the quotations from Descartes’ original texts in the sources, where I use the standard CSM versions.

The title announces excerpts from the texts of “current authors” (*hoc tempore*) that “disturb the schools and churches in these days in the Low Countries, Hungary and Transylvania”. There is an obvious contradiction between Pósa-házi’s reference to current authors and texts on the one hand, and his quotations from Descartes’ works providing precise page numbers in the editions²⁰, on the other. This contradiction raises several historical and philological questions. Who are the current innovators dealing with Descartes’ philosophy in the Low Countries, Hungary and Transylvania, respectively? What kind of texts were written by them offering Pósa-házi a chance of quoting Descartes verbatim, in order to refute them? Had Pósa-házi already completed his list of condemned assertions by the time of the Reformed Synod of Radnót in 1673, or did he compose the text as late as the 1680’s?

Instead of investigating these issues, let us compare Pósa-házi’s censure with the text of the famous Leiden condemnation in 1676. Originally, the Leiden decree was an internal affair of the Dutch university, and its text was first published by Molhuysen in 1913,²¹ based on the original documents of the University. However, there were several responses to the condemnation quoting the disapproved arguments either in Dutch²² or in Latin.²³

Article 12 in the Leiden condemnation draws on the Cartesian view concerning the infinity of extension and condemns the impossibility multiple universes based on this fact. The equivalent text in Pósa-házi’s *Syllabus* is Asser-

²⁰ The accuracy of Pósa-házi’s references enables us to identify the editions of Descartes’ works he relied on. These are the following: *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, Amstelodami, Elzevir, 1650; *Principia Philosophiae*, Amstelodami, Elzevir, 1644 and Desmaret’s Latin version of the *Discours: Dissertatio de Methodo* in: Renati Des-Cartes Opera Philosophica, Amstelodami, Elzevir, 1650. However, I will refer to Descartes’ works according to the standard editions: *Oeuvre de Descartes*. Publ. par Charles Adam, Paul Tannery, Paris, Cerf, 1896– [AT]. For Descartes’s text in English, I used their standard translation: *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, transl. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge University Press 1995, vol. I–III [CSM].

²¹ Molhuysen, Philip Christiaan: *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der Leidsche Universiteit*. Vol. 3. The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1918, 317–318.

²² Heidanus, Abraham: *Consideratien over eenigesaecken onlanghs voorgevallen...* Amsterdam, Someren, 1676, 51ff.

²³ Velde, Abraham van de: *De wonderen des Allerhoogsten*, Amsterdam, Hoorn, 1677, 477–478.

tion 76, which denounces Descartes' sentence stating the infinity of the world as corporal substance in the *Principles of Philosophy* Part 2. § 21.²⁴ Article 14 asserts that “[n]othing constitutes human nature beyond thought,”²⁵ whereas Article 13 elaborates on this theme as follows: “The soul of man is nothing other than thought, and that being taken away, man might still live and move.” Obviously, there are several Cartesian themes included in this statement – they are treated separately in Pósaquí's *Syllabus*. Assertion 47 cites Descartes' claim that “The mind's nature consists only in thinking”, based on *Principles of Philosophy* Part. I. § 8 and *Meditations passim*.²⁶ Instead of ascribing biological life to certain mechanical bodies of the extended world, devoid of consciousness, the Hungarian condemnation focuses on the real distinction between mind and body in several assertions (to be discussed below). Article 16 concerns the freedom of human will, a hot topic in the Low Countries *vis-à-vis* the theological challenge of Remonstrant thinkers: “The will of man is absolutely free and undetermined and as equally infinite with regard to its object as the will of God.” The Leiden curators denounced the comparison of human will with the divine one, together with their common feature of being totally independent of their objects. Pósaquí's version of refusing the indifference of human will targets Descartes' claim that “we have such close awareness of the freedom and indifference which is in us, that there is nothing we can grasp more evidently or perfectly”²⁷. In Article 17, the Leiden curators condemn the sentence: “We have a faculty by which we might take care never to err, error really being only in the will.” The first part of the denounced sentence in Leiden corresponds to Pósaquí's assertion 61 quoting Descartes' *Principles of Philosophy* part. I. § 6: “Hence we are able to take precautions against going wrong on any occasion.”²⁸, whereas the second part corresponds to Pósaquí's

²⁴ Pósaquí: *Syllabus*, [e4]: Cognoscimus hunc Mundum seu substantiae corporeae Universitatem nullos extensionis suae fines habere. Idem 2. Part. Princip. §. 21. – Cf. AT VIII-1, 52.

²⁵ For the English version, I consulted Tad M. Schmaltz: *Early Modern Cartesianisms*, 40–41.

²⁶ Pósaquí: *Syllabus*, D2: Mentis natura consistit in sola cogitatione. Idem I. Part. Princip. §. 8. et passim in Meditationibus. – Cf. AT VIII-1, 7.

²⁷ Pósaquí: *Syllabus*, E3^v: Libertatis et indifferentiae, quae in nobis est, nos ita conscios esse, ut nihil sit quod evidentius et perfectius comprehendimus. I. Part. Princip. § 41. – Cf. AT VIII-1, 20; CSM I, 206.

²⁸ Pósaquí: *Syllabus*, [D4^v]: Cavere possumus ne unquam erremus. Idem I. Part. Princip. § 6. – Cf. AT VIII-1, 6; CSM I, 194.

assertion 56 relying on Descartes' *Principles of Philosophy* Part I., § 38: "The fact that we fall into error is a defect in the way we act or in the use we make of our freedom, but not a defect in our nature. For our nature remains the same whether we judge correctly or incorrectly."²⁹ Article 18 of the Leiden condemnation focuses on Cartesian holistic doubt: "Everything is to be doubted, even the existence of God, and so to be doubted that it is held to be false." Just like Article 18 in Leiden, assertions 50³⁰ and 51³¹ in Pósaquí's *Syllabus* quote the famous starting passage of the *Principles of Philosophy*, addressing the necessity of methodological doubt, and Descartes's claim following it immediately in § 2., to the effect that all that is doubtful must be considered false. Whereas the Leiden curators condemned the tenet that "Men have an adequate idea of God", Pósaquí denounced the argument for God's existence based on this idea, summarising *Principles of Philosophy* Part. I, § 13–14 as follows: "My mind discovers within itself the ideas of many things, among them one idea – the idea of a supremely intelligent, supremely powerful and supremely perfect being – which stands out all the others, i. e., the idea of God; from this manifestly follows that the most perfect being, i. e., God, exists."³²

However, there are essential differences between the two lists of Cartesian tenets criticised. The themes of arguments for God's existence, the relationship between divine creation and conservation, the innateness of ideas and the *cogitio* argument are discussed by Pósaquí in length, whereas none of these are to be found in the Leiden decree. Instead, the Leiden curators condemn the appli-

²⁹ Pósaquí: *Syllabus*, D3^v: Quod in errores incidamus, defectus quidem est in nostra actione sive in usu libertatis, sed non in nostra natura, utpote quae eadem est, cum non recte, quam cum recte judicamus. Idem I. part. Princip. §. 38. – Cf. AT VIII-1, 19; CSM I, 205.

³⁰ Pósaquí: *Syllabus*, D2^v: Veritatem inquirenti semel in vita de omnibus, quantum fieri potest, esse dubitandum. Idem I. Part. Princip. §. 1. – Cf. AT VIII-1, 5; CSM I, 193.

³¹ Pósaquí: *Syllabus*, D3: Dubia etiam pro falsis habenda sunt. Idem I. Part. Princip. §. 2. Item Medit. Pag. 5. ratio persuadet, non minus accurate ab iis quae non plane certa sunt atque indubitata, quam ab aperte falsis, assensionem esse cohibendam. – Cf. AT VIII-1, 5 and AT VII, 18; CSM I, 193 and CSM II, 12.

³² Pósaquí: *Syllabus*, E^v: Mens mea invenit apud se multarum rerum ideas, et inter illas diversas ideas unam entis summe intelligentis, summe potentis, et summe perfecti, quae omnium longe praecipua est, id est, Dei, et ex eo plane concluditur Ens summe perfectum, id est Deum existere. Idem I. Part. Princip. §. 13. 14. – Cf. AT VIII-1, 9–10; CSM I, 197–198.

cation of Cartesian epistemological criteria to theological exegesis, while Pósa-házi fails to refer to exegetical methodology whatsoever, such as presented most notably in Ludowijk Meyer's *Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres* (1666). The Leiden decree contains no explicit condemnation of remonstrant thought.³³ Pósa-házi's *Syllabus*, however, directly derives the danger of remonstrant ideas from the very concept of Cartesian indifferentism.

Church historians have long been aware of the fact that there was a contemporary response to Pósa-házi's publication. Being a defence of Cartesian philosophy, this response was never published. The text is preserved by an early manuscript copy,³⁴ entitled as follows:

*Vindications of the Cartesian assertions against the censure of most illustrious János Pósa-házi, Rector of the School of Alba Iulia (Gyulafehérvár)*³⁵

The manuscript records neither the name of its author nor the name of the person preparing the copy of the text. Pál Csernátoni, the main target of the philosophical part of the decree of the Synod of Radnót in 1673 and its princely affirmation in 1680, had been dead for 6 years when Pósa-házi's *Syllabus* was printed. Consequently, he could not have been the author of the reply to Pósa-házi's censure. However, the intellectual level of the *Vindica-*

³³ It requires serious interpretative efforts to detect remonstrant ideas concerning human free will in the Leiden decree. See Schmaltz, Tad M.: Cartesian Freedom in Historical Perspective. In: G. McOuat et al. (eds.): *Descartes and the Modern*. Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Press, 2008, 127–150.

³⁴ The copy is preserved in the Archive of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Sign.: MTAK, Egyházi és Bölcsészeti kéziratok ms. 16. For philological details, see Levente Nagy: Bethlen Miklós és az erdélyi cocceianizmus a 17. század második felében [Miklós Bethlen and Transylvanian Coccejanism in the 2nd Half of the 17th century]. In: Balázs Mihály-Bartók István (eds.): *A felvilágosodás előzményei Erdélyben és Magyarországon (1650–1750)* [Antecedents of Enlightenment in Hungary and Transylvania]. Szeged, SZTE, 2016, 186–205. I am deeply indebted to Levente Nagy for providing me a digital copy of the manuscript.

³⁵ *Vindiciae Assertionum Cartesianarum adversus Animadversiones Clarissimi Domini Johannis Pósa-házi Rectoris Scholae Albeniensis*. – As to the transcription of the manuscript, I am indebted to Dániel Schmal for suggestions and corrections.

tions leaves no doubt concerning the author's profound knowledge of Cartesian metaphysics.³⁶

In what follows, I discuss assertion 70 and 46, with their censure in Pósa-házi's *Syllabus* and the response to these proposed by Anonymous.

Conceivability, real distinction and completeness of mind

Pósa-házi's Assertion 70

Assertion 70 condemned in Pósa-házi's *Syllabus* reads:

All the things that we clearly and distinctly conceive of as different substances (as we do in the case of mind and body) are in fact substances which are really distinct one from the other. Idem [i.e. Descartes – JS] in the *Synopsis* of the *Meditations* and in the 6th *Meditation*.³⁷

At first, Pósa-házi allows for a real distinction between mind and body, but rejects Descartes' claim that the *conceptual* distinction between the ideas of body and mind should entail their real distinction. He seems to follow the Caterus' statements at the end of the First Set of Objections, where the Scotist theologian asserts that „the supposed distinction between the soul and the body appears to be based on the fact that the two can be distinctly conceived apart from each other”³⁸. Caterus refers to Duns Scotus' theory of formal distinction, in terms of which „for one object to be distinctly conceived of apart from

³⁶ In what follows, I refer to the author of the *Vindications* simply as “Anonymous”. – Without going into philological detail, one might suggest István Pataki (1641–1693) as the most probably candidate for the authorship of the *Vindications*. For a general overview of his biography see Dienes, Dénes: „Pataki Tóth István”, *Református Szemle*, 106 (2013) / 1, 63–72. Although he was accused for theological reasons in 1673, we have information about his lecturing on philosophy for twenty years in the reformed College in Cluj. Cf. Szinnyei József: *Magyar írók élete és munkái* (Lives and Works of Hungarian Authors). Vol. 10. Budapest, Hornyánszky, 1905, 485–486.

³⁷ Pósa-házi: *Syllabus*, E3: *Quae clare et distincte concipiuntur ut substantiae diversae, sicuti concipiuntur Mens et Corpus, esse revera substantias realiter a se mutuo distinctas. Idem in synopsi Medit. pag. 2. et Medit 6.* – Cf. AT, VII, 13; CSM II, 9.

³⁸ AT VII, 100; CSM II, 72.

another, there need only be what he calls a formal and objective distinction between them".³⁹ This is a weaker kind of ontological distinction than the real separation assumed by Descartes. Pósaquí omits Caterus' allusion to Scotus, but illustrates the failure of the conceivability argument for real distinction by the same example as the author of the first objections. Even though we can conceive of God's justice and mercy apart from each other, they exist as one and the same thing identical with God, the simplest entity.⁴⁰

Pósaquí's second problem with Descartes' conceivability argument concerns the conceptions of *modes*.⁴¹ He refers to the *Principia Philosophiae* book I. § 61 in order to demonstrate that Descartes himself was convinced of the separate conceivability of a substance without its mode. As there is only a modal difference between the substance and its mode, the distinct conceivability of a substance and its mode does not necessarily entail their real distinction. Obviously, Pósaquí's objection here fails to meet the requirement stated by Descartes' disapproved passage, which assumes a real distinction only for *substances* conceived of separately.

The third objection imports Regius's well-known claim that a real distinction between the mind and the body exceeds the reach of philosophical speculations and relies on the theological authority of the Holy Scripture.⁴² As to the general character of Pósaquí's reference, it is unclear whether he directly alludes to Regius⁴³ or he is aware of Regius' views from Descartes' account in his

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Pósaquí: *Syllabus*, E3^v: Falsum est omnia realiter inter se differre, quorum unum sine altero clare & distincte concipi potest. In Deo clarum & distinctum possum habere conceptum de ipsius justitia, non concepta illius misericordia; ergone justitia & misericordia realiter in Deo & differunt?

⁴¹ Ibid.: Ita, unum modum absque alio possumus concipere, ut Author ipse ait, I. Part. Princip. §. 61. non tamen vel ipsemet dixerit distinctionem realem entitativam intercedere inter modum & modum ejusdem substantiae. Cf. AT VIII-1, 29–30; CSM I, 213–214.

⁴² Pósaquí: *Syllabus*, E3^v-[E4]: Malim in hac parte Cl. Henrici Regii medici & Philosophi Ultrajectini, Praeceptoris quondam nostri, modestiam amplecti, qui in abstrusissima hac quaestione, maluit ad sacram divinae revelationis anchoram confugere, quam angustae rationis decempeda eam metiri.

⁴³ Regius, Henricus: *Fundamenta physices*, Amstelodami, Elzevir, 1646, 246: Quod autem mens revera nihil aliud sit quam substantia, sive ens realiter a corpore distinctum, & actu ab eo separabile, & quod seorsim per se subsistere potest, id in Sacris literis nobis clarissime est revelatum.

“Comments on a Certain Broadsheet”⁴⁴ (1648). The thesis of the incompetence of natural reasoning for establishing real distinction and of accepting it following scriptural authority was incorporated in the chapter ‘On Man’ in Regius’ *Fundamenta Physices and Philosophia naturalis*⁴⁵. On the other hand, Pósa-házi might have had access to Regius’ teachings in Descartes’ “Comments on a Certain Broadsheet” which had been published in the editions of the *Meditations* in 1650 and afterwards. However, Pósa-házi’s warm words presenting Regius as his former teacher suggest that he might have had personal experience of the Dutch philosopher’s statement in this question as well.

According to Regius’ well-known view, natural philosophical reasoning cannot have epistemic certainty about the ontological status of the mind. “So far as the nature of things is concerned, the possibility seems to be open that the mind can be either a substance or a mode of a corporeal substance”⁴⁶. Regius rules out the conceivability argument, too: even if “thinking and extension are attributes, which are present in certain substances, as in subjects [...], there is no reason why the mind should not be a sort of attribute co-existing with extension in the same subject, though the one attribute is not included in the concept of the other. For whatever we can conceive of can exist.”⁴⁷

If we take Pósa-házi’s positive reference to Regius seriously, we must attribute to him some philosophical statements alien to orthodox Calvinism, to which he openly confesses himself. 1) The mind is really distinct from the body, even if we do not have cogently convincing arguments for its real distinction and accept this thesis on the authority of the Scripture. In this sense, mind is not the form or first actuality of organic body as was affirmed even in the scholastic Protestant *philosophical* thought. 2) The view that the conceivability argument fails to prove the real distinction between mind and body, does not entail the total invalidity of this kind of argumentation. When Regius claims that mind *can* be an attribute co-existing with extension, then he relies on the

⁴⁴ AT VIII-2, 343: Quod autem mens revera nihil aliud sit quam substantia, sive ens realiter a corpore distinctum, & actu ab eo separabile, & quod seorsim per se subsistere potest, id in Sacris Literis, plurimis in locis, nobis est revelatum. Atque ita, quod per naturam dubium quibusdam esse potest, per divinam in Sacris revelationem nobis jam est indubitatum.

⁴⁵ Cf. Regius, Henricus: *Philosophia Naturalis* 1661, Amsterdam, Elzevir, 398–406.

⁴⁶ Regius: *Programma*, AT VIII-2, 341; CSM I, 294.

⁴⁷ Regius: *Programma*, AT VIII-2, 341–342; CSM I, 294–295.

theory of real co-existence of separately conceived properties. To argue for this is a completely different style of philosophising than the direct ontological argumentation for the substantial form theory accepted by reformed Orthodoxy.

In whatever way might Pósházi have read Regius' philosophy, he explores one passage in which Descartes himself endorses the divine origin of the body-mind real distinction. Pósházi quotes the following extract from Descartes' reply to the Second Set of Objections:

But Descartes also, since he had nothing to say to the most learned author of the Second Replies, eventually fled hither; Second Replies, page 81. But if your question concerns the absolute power of God, and you are asking whether he may have decreed that human souls cease to exist precisely when the bodies which he joined to them are destroyed, then it is for God alone to give the answer. And since God himself has revealed to us that this will not occur, there remains not even the slightest room for doubt on this point.⁴⁸

Pósházi obviously misunderstands the context of Descartes' answer to Mersenne, since Mersenne's disapproval is related to Descartes' silence about the immortality of the human soul or mind in the *Meditations*. Descartes' appeal to God's absolute power and revelation is adduced in support of the thesis of *immortality*, rather than that of a *real distinction*. That is to say, he addresses the problem of the annihilation of the mind together with the death of the body. According to Descartes, the mind *may* cease to exist at the death of the body, even if there is a real distinction between them. However, death as an insignificant change in the state of the body *probably* does not imply the perishing of the distinct mind as well; but despite this probability, the authority of the Holy Scripture assures us that the mind is immortal.

⁴⁸ Pósházi: *Syllabus*, [E4]: Sed & Cartesius, cum nihil haberet quod responderet Doctissimo secundarum Objectionum Authori, tandem huc confugit, Object. secund. pag. 81. *Si de absoluta Dei potestate quaeratur, an forte decreverit ut humanae animae iisdem temporibus esse desinant, quibus corpora quae illis adjunxit, destruuntur, solius Dei respondere. Cumque jam ipse nobis revelaverit is non futurum, nulla plane vel minima est occasio dubitandi.* Cf. AT VII, 154; CSM II, 109.

The answer of the Anonymous author of the *Vindications* asserts categorically that there is no other indubitable way of establishing a real distinction than Descartes' argument from conceivability. Interestingly enough, Anonymous refers to Pierre Ramée's conception in confirming Descartes' procedure:

Descartes' demonstration is pious, honest and solid. We have no other measure for establishing this distinction. Ramée⁴⁹ claimed that things are distinct from each other by the form or their essential property (*proprietas*). This is the true and unique principle of individuation, [...] because where you discover two plainly mutually distinct features (*characteres*) in two things, you can properly claim that they are mutually distinct [things] from each other in reality.⁵⁰

However, the explanation of the essential properties of a substance as items responsible for the principle of individuation of the latter, remains consonant with Descartes' intention. According to Anonymous, we have no direct access to substances in order to claim the kind of distinction between them; however, we can plainly conceive of „mutually distinct features”. Implicitly, through conceiving of essential properties we conceive of substances bearing these pro-

⁴⁹ Pierre Ramée's (1515–1572) works were extremely popular in the Calvinist colleges of Transylvania during the 17th century. Anonymus may refer to Ramée's *Dialectics* or commentary on Aristotle's *Organon*, cf. Ramée, Pierre: *Dialecticae libri duo*, Spira [Speyer], Albinus, 1595, 18: Forma, est causa, per quam res est, id quod est: ideoque hinc a caeteris rebus distinguitur: & forma simul cum re ipsa generatur; Idem: *Scholarum dialecticarum seu animadversionum in Organum Aristotelis, libri XX*. Frankfurt, apud Andrae Wecheli heredes, et al, 1604, lib. 3., cap. 4., 91: Etenim inquis, homo & leo, forma communi differunt. Et Cato inquam, & Cicero, forma quoque propria differunt: nec numeri differentia, quam inducis, aliud est, quam propriae & individuae formae differentia: specieique & formae, ut communis & dividuae, sic propriae & individuae differentia sua est.

⁵⁰ *Vindiciae*, 91^r: Demonstratio Cartesij pia et honesta est et solida, nec ullam habemus aliam distinctionis instituendae libellam, per formam res a se distinguuntur ait Ramus, sive per essentialem suam proprietatem. Hoc est verum et unicum individuationis principium [...], iam ubi duabus rebus duos plane diversos invicem characteres reperisti, eas certe realiter a se mutuo distinctas merito pronuntiasti.

perties. If two properties can be conceived of independently from each other, and the substances bearing them are conceived of as mutually exclusive from the perspective of the given conceived properties, then the two substances are truly distinct substances in reality. In this way, the anonymous author rules out Caterus' Scotist objection, which lies hidden behind Pósházi's criticism as well as Regius' claim for the insufficiency of natural reasoning for establishing real distinction. Reflecting on Caterus' example of divine mercy and divine justice, the answer just confirms the identity of the underlying substance of both essential properties conceived of in the finite human mind. Here, the counter-argument emphasises the limitations of human thinking regarding transcendence, rather than Descartes' claim at the end of the First Replies that the clear and distinct conceptions of mercy and justice as divine attributes include the identity of the substance in which they are inherent.⁵¹ It is impossible to conceive of divine mercy as God's essential attribute while excluding the inherence of divine justice in the same substance.

Anonymous' answer to Pósházi's Assertion 70 makes no use of Descartes' terminological innovation in the First and Fourth Replies. In the Replies, Descartes found a new term for describing the kind of idea that meets the requirement of a conceivability argument for real distinction. The idea in question is called "complete idea" of a substance, which, in turn, is identical with "the idea of a complete substance" conceived of through its essential properties. Pósházi explicitly addresses Descartes' conception of completeness in Assertion 46.

Pósházi's Assertion 46

According to Article 46, "[t]he mind is a complete thing."⁵² Pósházi refers explicitly to Descartes' Replies to the First Set of Objections and provides the exact page number from the 1650 edition of the *Meditations*.

⁵¹ Ibid.: Et licet attributa divina respectu et a parte Dei sint unus idemque simplicissimus Deus; at certe in mente nostra finita conceptus unius attributi, non est conceptus alterius diversi, sed ab eo realiter differens, quod ad obj. 2. adfert Author, pie et candide respondet in re tam abscondita.

⁵² Pósházi, Syllabus, 1685, D2: Mens est res completa. Idem Respons. ad Objectiones primas, pag. 63. – Cf. AT VII, 121, CSM II, 86.

The first objection against Descartes' claim for the completeness of the mind concerns the body-mind union. If mind and body are complete, then what comes from body and mind is not an unique entity which is one *per se*, but an entity merely one *per accidens*, such as a heap, a pile of stones, a bundle of wood, and the like.⁵³

The argument is based on the definition of "complete substance": "From a philosophical point of view, that is complete which is not ordained to the constitution of another thing, in the manner of a part"⁵⁴. Mind and body are either one, constituting a unique whole *per se* and are thus incomplete, or are complete and thus are not one, i.e., do not constitute a unique whole *per se*.

The second objection against the Cartesian completeness of the mind follows from the first one. If human beings are composites of mind and body and if this proves to be accidental, then

the mind surrounding the body – often called as *an adjunct* to the body by Descartes – is not an essential part of a human being.⁵⁵

Pósaázi draws upon Descartes' famous formulation in the *Preface to the Reader* to the *Meditations*:

it follows from the fact that I am aware of nothing else (except cogitation or cogitating mind⁵⁶) belonging to my essence, that nothing else does in fact belong to it.⁵⁷

The objection takes it for granted that the mind or rational soul is an essential attribute of a human being, but also assumes that there is no human being

⁵³ Ibid.: [...] *tum ex corpore & mente non sit ens unum per se, sed unum per accidens tantum; ut est acervus, strues lapidum, fasciculus lignorum, & similia.*

⁵⁴ Ibid.: *Completum enim illud est philosophice, quod ad alterius constitutionem per modum partis non est ordinatum.*

⁵⁵ Ibid.: [...] *Corpus quod mens circumgestat, & quam non semel Cartesius vocat Adjunctum corporis, non esse partem hominis essentialem.*

⁵⁶ Pósaázi's addition.

⁵⁷ Ibid. *Ex eo quod nihil aliud (praeter cogitationem seu mentem cogitantem) ad essentiam meam pertinere cognoscam, sequitur etiam nihil aliud revera ad illam pertinere.* Cf. AT VII, 8; CSM II, 7.

without a body. Pósházi omits the first step of conceivability in Descartes argument and disapproves of arguing *from* the thesis of mind as essentially thinking substance *to* the thesis of human being as essentially thinking entity, that is the identification of human being and human essence with mind and cogitation, respectively. The objection is theologically motivated: if Descartes' concept of human nature is valid, then

the heterodox thinker easily concludes that the body does not belong to the essence of human being; consequently, it will either simply perish or at least not resurrect as numerically identical.⁵⁸

Locating human essence exclusively in mind undermines the theological thesis of the resurrection of mind and body as a numerically identical entity. At the very moment of resurrection *either* only the mind persists without being conjoined with any kind of body *or* the mind constitutes a new accidental human being conjoined with an entirely new body. If resurrection is the restoration of the individual human essence, and if human essence consists in cogitation alone, then the very same body will never be entailed in the resurrection of the individual. However, Pósházi insists on the opposite view: human beings are essentially composites of mind and body and mind belongs to the essence of human beings through partaking in the essential human composite of mind and body. Thus, the mind will recover its formal, numerical identical body at the very moment of resurrection.

Anonymus' defence of Assertion 46

Anonymus' first observation rebukes Pósházi for misinterpreting the passage quoted. According to Anonymus, Descartes' intention is to demonstrate that „the mind is a complete thing even if it is not arranged by bodily properties of figure and movement”⁵⁹. Of course, our unknown author allows for the com-

⁵⁸ Ibid.: [...] facile infert Heterodoxus, ergo corpus non pertinet ad essentiam hominis, & consequenter vel simpliciter interibit, vel saltem idem numero non resurget.

⁵⁹ Vindiciae, 81^r: [...] mentem esse rem completam, etiamsi non sit instructa proprietatibus corporis, figura, motu [...].

pleteness of body as well, because „it is endowed with its own properties”⁶⁰. This leads to an alternative definition of completeness:

But one has to keep in mind that a complete thing, properly speaking, is not what is not ordained to constitute another thing, but what is entirely endowed with its own properties, and that no other thing is required for the complete notion of any entity.⁶¹

The situation is clear: Pósházi and Anonymous import two different definitions of completeness. We did not identify the source of Pósházi’s definition above, about which he states that this is the definition of completeness given by Philosophers. However, the wording of the objection reveals that Pósházi relies on the Scholastic view established by Francisco Suárez in the 33rd disputation of his *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. The relevant passage is the following:

[...] in a physical sense, a complete substance is that which in itself is not ordained to the real composition or constitution of another substance.⁶²

In applying the criterion of completeness on the human rational soul, Suárez endorses the essential incompleteness of mind: even in its separate state, mind „has an incomplete essence which by its own nature is set up to make another essence complete; hence it is always an incomplete substance.”⁶³ Note that Suárez’ definition was adopted by confessional schools of philosophy: the Lu-

⁶⁰ Vindiciae, 81^v: [...] ipsum corpus quoque esse ens completum, quatenus proprietatibus suis est ornatum.

⁶¹ Ibid.: Sed meminisse oportebat, non id esse proprie loquendo completum, quod ad alterius constitutionem non est ordinatum, sed quod proprietatibus suis essentialibus plene est instructum, nec aliud in quovis ente completi notio poscit.

⁶² Suárez, Francisco: *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp., XXXIII, sect. I., 6. In: *R. P. Francisci Suarez e Societate Jesu Opera Omnia*. Tom. 26. Paris, Vives, 1866, 332: [...] illam esse substantiam completam physice quae per se ad alterius substantiae realem compositionem seu constitutionem non ordinatur.

⁶³ Ibid. sect. I, 11 (Opera, Tom. 26, 333–334): Est enim pars non integralis, sed essentialis, habetque incompletam essentiam, natura sua institutam ad complendam aliam, et ideo semper est substantia incompleta. Cf. Ariew, Roger (ed.): *Descartes’ Meditations. Background and Source Materials*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 49–50.

theran Christoph Scheibler's (1589–1653) *Metaphysics*⁶⁴ as well as the Calvinist Clemens Timpler's (1563–1624) *Methodological System of Metaphysics*⁶⁵ rely on the Suárezian treatment of completeness. What's more, the Orthodox Calvinist Jacobus Revius (1586–1658) made use of Suárez' definition while criticizing Descartes in his notorious *Scale of Cartesian Philosophy* (Leiden 1650)⁶⁶ exactly on the same topics as Pósaquí in his 1685 publication.

Complying with Descartes' intention, Anonymous rejects the Scholastic definition and agrees with the Descartes of the Second and Fourth Replies. From a metaphysical point of view, completeness requires only that the substance in question „is entirely endowed with its own properties”. Essential properties accounting for the real distinction of a substance in Counterargument 70 appear as guarantees for substantial completeness. In the refutation of Article 70, the criterion of essential properties for a real distinction is their conceivability. Similarly, the Hungarian anonymous author connects the definition of completeness to the conceivability of essential properties in his answer to Assertion 46 as well.

A complete thing [...] is entirely endowed with its own properties and *no other thing is required for the complete notion of any entity*.⁶⁷

The limitation of the completeness-criterion to the possession of essential attributes and the removal of the idea of a constitutive relation to another substance come at the price of entailing the theoretical issue of conceivability. This line of thought follows very strictly Descartes' motifs for introducing the completeness-criterion in the First and Fourth Replies. As to the conceivability of attributes, the completeness-criterion provides us with deeper ontological commitments than the norm of *clear and distinct* ideas. One can have a clear and distinct idea of shape as inherent in bodily entities as well as an idea of motion as inherent in likewise bodily entities, but the *complete* idea of a shaped body must entail its moving nature as well. Descartes aims at a metaphysical separation of the entities bearing the attributes of thinking and extension conceived

⁶⁴ Scheibler, Christoph: *Metaphysica dvobus libris*. Genevae, Stoër, 1636, 143–150 (lib. 1, cap. 12.).

⁶⁵ Timpler, Clemens: *Metaphysicae Systema Methodicum*. Hanoviae, Antonius 1614, 354–355 (lib. 4, cap. 1, probl. 8.).

⁶⁶ Revius, Jacobus: *Statera Philosophiae Cartesianae*. Leiden, Leffen, 1650, 170–171.

⁶⁷ Cf. note 61! (Italics not in the original.)

of clearly and distinctly: their clear and distinct conceivability cannot assure us of this ontological separability. This is why Descartes, responding to Caterus' and Arnauld's critiques of ontological commitments based on pure, *clear and distinct* conceivability, introduces the criterion of *complete* conceivability beyond the norm of clearness and distinctness.⁶⁸ His Hungarian defender draws upon this theoretical necessity in 1685.

As a matter of fact, the apparently unimportant introductory note anticipates this point, when Anonymous repudiates Pósaquí for quoting Descartes' passage in an intentionally mutilated form:

Mr. Censor's hesitation in such a plain question is surprising, however it is much more surprising and smells of deceit that he quoted the passage in a mutilated form in order to satisfy his hatred far more easily.⁶⁹

The manuscript does not explain in what way Pósaquí altered the original text. In the passage in question, Descartes writes that „I understand the mind to be a complete thing”⁷⁰. The alteration in Pósaquí's shortened phrase „the mind is a complete thing” attests to the dismissal of the very act of conceiving. To have a complete idea of an attribute inherent in a substance means that the conceived substance is a complete substance, which in turn results in its real distinction.

Against this background, Anonymous maintains the possibility of uniting a complete thing with other entities:

⁶⁸ There are different accounts of the theoretical efficacy of Descartes' terminological innovation in the Replies. Cf. Wilson, Margaret: „The Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness.” *Nous* 10 (1976) / 1, 3–15; Schmaltz, Tad. M.: „Descartes and Malebranche on Mind and Mind-Body Union.” *The Philosophical Review* 101 (1992) / 2, 281–325; Hoffmann, Paul: „Descartes's Theory of Distinction.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 64 (2002) / 1, 57–78; as well as Almog, Joseph: *What Am I? Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002 and Rozemond, Marlene: *Descartes' Dualism*. Cambridge MA-London, Harvard University Press, 1998 (esp. pp. 11–37).

⁶⁹ *Vindiciae*, 81^v: Mirum est Dominum censorem haerisse in re tam plana, et majus mirum ac fraudem olet mutilatum citavisse textum ad facilius scil. conciliandum ei odium.

⁷⁰ CSM II, 86; cf. AT VII, 121: [...] intelligo mentem esse rem completam [...].

What's more, it is not contrary to a complete entity to be ordained to compose another thing in this sense, although only in an assessorily/adjunctive manner.⁷¹

The mode of body-mind unity is described as a „mere accessorium”, corresponding to the accidental mode of composition criticized by Pósaázi. However, the composition of a human being in one and the same person from two complete substances of mind and body is assured by divine omnipotence. This recourse to the theological thesis of divine power is compensated by the observation that using the right reason for establishing the ontological status of mind and body complemented by divine omnipotence for uniting them is much more plausible than paying attention to the definitions of the schools.⁷²

But this is not the last word of our unknown defender of Cartesianism. He or she is convinced that the union of a complete thing with another thing is not absurd at all. For this thesis, the mind's union with the body is illustrated by plants in which sprouting vigour (*herbescens viriditas*) is united with extended body.

Second, he states that if Descartes' claim is valid, the mind would not be an essential part of a human being, but only an attached part; [but then] the sprouting vigour would not belong to the essence of a living plant either, because the former had already existed, subsisted and had been endowed by its own properties before the latter.⁷³

Although the key point of this example is not entirely clear, it might be resolved as follows. The accidental union of the vital vegetative power with the body of a plant is a composite constituting an ordinary substance. However, the instantiation of the vital power in this individual plant cannot modify the original essence of the power in question. The vital power had been endowed

⁷¹ Vindiciae, 81^v: [...] nec ad aliud componendum ordinari ab ente, hoc sensu, completo alienum est, licet id mere accessorium.

⁷² Ibid.: [...] certe hominem in unam personam ex duabus substantijs evaluisse ex mero opificis arbitrio pendit. Quid Scholarum Definitiones de completo et similibus notionibus dicant, non tamen curamus quam quod rationi magis est consentaneum?

⁷³ Ibid.: Dicit 2. Mentem, si Cartesii haec sententia stet, non fore partem hominis essentialem, sed adjunctum merum; herbescens viriditas non pertineat ad essentiam viventis plantae, quia jam ante extitit, substitit et proprietatibus suis ornata fuit.

with its essential properties independent of (and before) its unification with the given plant. The vital power is complete and cannot contribute to the essence of the individual plant with which it is united. But this separation of the essence of the vital power from the essence of the individual plant does not annihilate the very existence of the given plant as a composite being. Although it has a separate essence, the vital power as a superior part essentially organizes the structure of the composite plant. Therefore, human beings are ordinary composites of complete minds and bodies, whereas the accidental or assessorial mode of their unity allows for the thesis that the mind is a superior constituent of the composite human being.⁷⁴

Further, our anonymous author denies the close relationship between the essence of thinking mind on the one hand, and the essence of a human being as a composite of mind and body.

I could hardly abstain myself from laughing while reading what he thirdly asserts, notably, that if nothing except thinking belongs to *my essence, in so far as I am a thinking mind*, it follows that nothing else belongs to the *essence as a human being*, not even the body itself.⁷⁵

The reason for the sarcastic denial of this consequence lies in the shift between „my essence as a thinking mind” and „the essence of human being”. The mind constitutes the superior part of human essence present in the body-mind union, and the composite human being is capable of thinking. Nevertheless, though the capacity of thinking is a feature of a human being, we cannot *completely* conceive of thinking as an essential propriety of human essence, that is, we cannot conceive of thinking as essential property of a *complete* human being. Complete conceiving works for establishing the complete existence of the mind, but it cannot work for establishing the existence of a human being without a body.

⁷⁴ Vindiciae, 82^r: In homine cum et haec omnia observamus, ac insuper superpondij loco maxime Rationem, Animam ejus, imo ipsum totum hinc denominamus rationalemque vocamus, et cum de eo loquimur, frequentius ea, quae mentis, potioris ejus partis sunt, urgemus.

⁷⁵ Ibid: Dicitur 3. quod dum lego vix risum teneo: si ad essentiam meam quatenus sum mens cogitans, nihil praeter cogitationem pertinet, sequitur nihil praeterea ad essentiam hominis pertinere, nec corpus ipsum [...].

In sum, Descartes' Hungarian defender concludes that the metaphysical completeness of mind does not imply the exclusion of body from a human composite being and from the essence of human nature. Indeed, such a view is absurd, especially in the form Pósaquí attributes to the allegedly heterodox thinker, who holds the view that

the body does not belong to the essence of a human being; consequently, it will either simply perish or at least not resurrect as numerically identical.⁷⁶

The absurdity is demonstrated by the striking simile closing the answer to Pósaquí's Assertion 46. The perishing of the body after departing from the union with the mind, and hence the impossibility of resurrection, follow *no more* from the completeness of the mind *than*

the conclusion of the imminent perishing of the Ottoman Empire from the very fact that the Ethiopians are black.⁷⁷

In terms of the simile, the composite human being consisting of body and mind is like the Ottoman Empire consisting of different nations. The mind with its essential property of thinking corresponds to the Ethiopians with their essential property of the color of their skin. Mind takes part in constituting the composite human being with body, just as Ethiopians take part in constituting the composite unity of Ottoman Empire with people of other origins (with other skin color, or distinctive features, may these be essential or mere accidental properties). According to Anonymous, Pósaquí ascribes to the heterodox thinker the denial of resurrection of an identical human being with body as its essential part, as a consequence of the completeness of the mind. The inference is absurd, because the essential attribute of a *complete* part of the unity has no impact on the essence of the unity as a whole. Anonymous' simile calls attention to composites containing at least one complete substance. After dissociating from the mind, the body may or may not entirely perish: from the essence of the mind, i.e., from its completeness nothing follows on the essence of the body-mind unity. From the essential property of the black color of the Ethiopians' skin follows nothing on the essence of the composite containing them. The Ottoman Empire may or may not imminently cease to exist, whether or not the Ethiopians are black. One

⁷⁶ See note 58 above.

⁷⁷ *Vindiciae* 82r: [...] si quis Turcicum imperium cito perituum ex inde inferret, quia Aethiopes sunt nigri.

cannot conceive of any Ethiopian without attributing black color to her skin, but can conceive of the Ottoman Empire either as enduring in time or as imminently perishing. In fact, one does not really know whether one can conceive of any property belonging necessarily to the composite of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the logical upshot of the simile is independent of an answer to this dilemma: *even if* one could completely conceive of an essential attribute of the Ottoman Empire – for example, of its enduring existence as numerically identical –, the Ethiopians' essential attributes would have nothing to do with the essential attribute of the whole Empire.

Afterword

Ironically enough, the very historical reason for the *Vindications* to remain unpublished was the imminent perishing of Ottoman rule in Hungary and Transylvania during the military actions from 1686 onwards. The cultural situation of Cartesianism went through a rapid change. The confessional and politically motivated accusations against Cartesian philosophy lost their cultural weight. The new coordinates of intellectual and confessional identities were provided by the incorporation of the Principality of Transylvania into the Habsburg Empire. During this process from the 1690's onwards, the Reformed Church had to struggle for its very existence in the context of Habsburg confessional policy – with or without the Cartesians within its own circle. Just like in other countries, the metaphysical aspects of Cartesianism were no longer challenged on confessional grounds, but rather by philosophical trends with *empirical* tendencies.

However, the Reformed Synod of Radnót in 1673, the princely affirmation of its decrees in 1680 and Pósaquí's *Syllabus* in 1685 demonstrate that Cartesian philosophy was an important factor in the cultural politics of Transylvania in the second half of the 17th century. Behind the scene of public discussion and conflict, we may assume an intensive process of introducing Cartesian thought into the curricula provided by the leading colleges of the Principality. My case study on the Cartesian theme of the complete mind, as developed in Pósaquí's *Syllabus* and in Anonymus' *Vindiciae*, is meant to demonstrate the remarkable familiarity with Descartes' philosophy on both sides of the controversy in 1685. This uncharted development must be subjected to further research, for it may prove to be an important chapter in the history of philosophy in Hungary.

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