DÉNES A. JÁNOSSY

GREAT BRITAIN AND KOSSUTH.

I.

Kossuth influenced by Count Széchenyi's literary propaganda for British institutions. — Kossuth's progress in English during his imprisonment in Buda. — His advocacy of Bentham's humanitarian theories. — His endeavours to create industrial enterprises, credit, free trade and a free press. — Blackwell's plan to increase Hungarian agricultural exports. —Kossuth opposes Blackwell's plan.

Britain always attracted Continental Europe, where feudalism still prevailed. Her splendid principles of government were indeed deeply rooted. After much bloodshed, at the end of the seventeenth century Britain could boast of equality of rights and a constitution, having reached the zenith of a development which served the welfare of her own people as well as those of Continental Europe.*

France was the first to follow Britain's lead, the France

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* SOURCES AND ABBREVIATIONS.

I. Official Records.

Public Record Office, London	P. R. O. London
Foreign Office Records	F. O.
Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris	A. d. M. A. E. Paris
L'Angleterre, Rapports, Dépêches	
La Turquie, Rapports, Dépêches	
La Turquie, Mémoires et documents, 1838—1855. Provinces Slaves	
Preussisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem	P. G. St. A. Berlin-Dahlem
Bunsen's Immediatberichte aus London	
Geheime Präsidialregistratur d. kgl. Polizei-Präsidiums, Berlin	

where the abuses of feudalism had by this time deprived her people of political, social and moral sense. The ideals of the French revolution spread rapidly all over the Continent; nevertheless, it was only very slowly that they penetrated into Hungary, where, until 1848, feudalism prevailed. This is easily accounted for. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Napoleon's campaigns had engaged the nation's attention, and the repercussions of the French revolution awoke no echo in Hungary. France had no constitution, but feudal Hungary enjoyed a very ancient one similar to that of old feudal Britain. Consequently, this ancient constitution only needed to be reformed, like that of Britain, and not, as in France, to be created a fresh. There is no doubt that the British example seemed the proper one to follow

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Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Wien	H. H. St. A. Wien
Archiv d. k. u. k. Ministeriums des Äussern	
Kabinettsarchiv, Nachlass Schwarzenberg	
Actes de Haute Police	
R. Archivio di Stato, Torino	A. St. Torino
Lettere ministri, Gran Bretagna	
Lettere ministri, Porta Ottomana	
M. kir. Országos Levéltár (Public Record Office), Budapest	P. R. O. Bpest
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	M. F. A.
Ministry of Finance	M. F.
Committee on National Defence	C. N. D.

II. Private Letters and Collections.

1. In Public Record Office, Budapest:	
Kossuth Papers. Kossuth's literary legacy. Official and Private Correspondence	Ko. Pp.
Vörös Papers. Official and Private Correspondence collected by Kossuth's secretary Anthony Vörös	Vö. Pp.
Miscellaneous Papers ex 1848/49. Collection of papers dealing with history of the struggle for independence. (Purchases and Donations)	Miscell. Pp.
Tanárky's MSS. Diary (the manager of Pulszky's real estate)	
2. National Museum, Budapest	N. M. Bpest.
Manuscript Department, Private Letters	MSS Dpt.

in the judgment of those who advocated a reformed constitution in Hungary.

A young rich and spirited member of the Hungarian aristocracy, Count Stephen Széchenyi made great propaganda at home in support of this conviction. Between 1815 and 1830 he spent much time in Britain and brought back to his own country an unbounded admiration for British constitutional liberty.[1] During his first visit, on November 1, 1815, he wrote to his father: "... Even the humblest servant here has the same right and claim to prosperity as the richest people have. This equality, the like of which I never dreamed of, but which now I see exists, is a tremendous boon for this country. The peculiar relationship between squire and servant, on which every man's rights are based, is not to be found in any other country. The island, the character of its people, and many other circumstances facilitate their existence ..."[2]

Széchenyi seized upon every idea that was likely to lift Hungary out of her state of backwardness. In order to awaken national consciousness he began to write. He searched for means to improve the situation of his country. All his efforts were concentrated on the hope that Hungary, once awakened, would force the chauvinist absolutistic government of Vienna to revise on the ancient Hungarian constitution on liberal lines. Hungary at that time was an agricultural country, as Britain had been in the eighteenth century. Britain's example should go to prove that, even in an agricultural country, all classes of society could become prosperous by the application of a system of intensive production coupled with manufacturing industries, an organized credit-system and free trade, all of which were the motive power behind the prosperity of the human race. Deeply imbued with these principles of national economy, he first published in 1828 a pamphlet on "Horses", which was followed in 1830 by his work on "Credit"[3] which created a great sensation all over the country.

In conservative circles he was sneered at as an Anglomaniac. But this had no effect, for his popularity was growing rapidly and

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[1] Angyal Dávid, *Gróf Széchenyi István történeti eszméi* (Count Stephen Széchenyi's historical ideas). Bpest, 1923 p. 75.

[2] Viszota, Julius, *Gróf Széchenyi István írói és hírlapi vitája Kossuth Lajossal* (Polemics between Count Stephen Széchényi and Lewis Kossuth in Letters and in the Press). Bpest, 1927, vol. I, p. IV.

[3] Iványi-Grünwald, Adalbert, *Gróf Széchenyi István, Hitel* (Count Stephen Széchenyi, "Credit").

he became the centre of interest during the reform-session of the Hungarian Diet, which was held in Pressburg from 1832 to 1836.

As against the criticism he had to face, however, he gained much satisfaction from the enthusiasm of his admirers. Among the latter was a young lawyer, Lewis Kossuth, who was living at that time in the county of Zemplén and who, after reading Széchenyi's "Credit" with eager interest, believed that he recognized in British institutions the lines along which the Hungarian constitution ought to be reformed. Kossuth also attended the reform-session of the Lower House (1832—36) as the deputy of the absent Baron Samuel Vécsey, and he insistently demanded a free press, in order to inform the public of what was going on in Pressburg. When the Vienna Government vetoed his intention to print a report of the debates, he had handwritten copies of his manuscripts prepared by friends, and these were distributed among the magistrates of the counties. As a result of this defiance he was arrested in 1837 and charged with high treason.

Kossuth presumably began his English studies during the session of the Diet.[4] He had plenty of time in prison to acquire a fair knowledge of the language. He spent his time in reading. His interest was particularly concentrated on the works of British economists, which he read partly in English, and partly in French or in German translations. He made precise notes from Mc Culloch and Whateley and studied very carefully the books of Jeremiah Bentham.[5] He followed with eager enthusiasm the polemics initiated by the German economist Frederik List against the theories of Mc Culloch and Whateley. Contrary to List's opinions, Kossuth took the side of the British economists and pleaded for free trade, from which he hoped for the prosperity created by the reconciliation of the interests of British agriculture and manufacturing industry. Strongly advocating Bentham's theory[6] of the duty of society to make as many people as possible happy, he decided, once he was free, to leave no stone unturned in his efforts to create a reformed Hungary.

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[4] Cf. his letter from prison to his mother "... Should I receive French books, would you please let me have a dictionary. During the last three years I have been reading much English. It is possible that I am out of practice in French ..." Buda, Dec. 24, 1837, Vö. Pp. no. 233. Public Record Office, Budapest.

[5] Cf. Kossuth's fragmentary notes. Vö. Pp. no. 234. P. R. O. Bpest.

[6] Cf. Angyal's op. cit. concerning Bentham's influence on Széchenyi p. 103.

But apart from this specialized interest in national economy, he also studied very carefully the causes of British industrial prosperity, as well as British social and educational institutions. Even before his imprisonment he made propaganda for British Kindergartens and in his solitude translated Wilderspin's work dealing with the system into Hungarian[7] thus making the Hungarian public acquainted with the benefits of that British institution.

But in addition all this he also found time to educate himself in history and literature. He read Thomas Moore, Gibbon, Hume, Ferguson, Washington Irving, Cooper and Bulwer[8] and the entire works of Shakespeare.[9] His metrical translation of Macbeth is a masterly piece of work, but was never finished, because while still in prison he heard that it had been translated and published by another.[10]

On May 13, 1841, he was set free under an amnesty. He then displayed a quite extraordinary activity, which showed the influence of the British economists. Chance permitted him to spread his ideas through the medium of the press and the public was stirred up in favour of the reforms to come. The owner of the daily paper "Pesti Hírlap"[11] offered him an editorship, and from that time on he wrote a series of fiery editorials full of quotations from British authors. The headings alone were enough to interest the public. "Want of Money", "Banking", "The Whip for ever"[12] were parallels to Bentham's theories.[13]

The "Pesti Hírlap" rapidly became the most popular paper in Hungary. The following advertisement, printed in the issue of June 16, 1841, is undoubtedly without parallel in the history of the press: "The numbers of the first half-year are out of print; the second edition has already been issued". In consequence of

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[7] Cf. his letter to his mother, Buda, Nov. 3, 1837. Vö. Pp. no. 233. P. R. O. Bpest.

[8] Cf. his letter to his mother, Buda, Dec. 24, 1937. Vö. Pp. no. 233. P. R. O. Bpest.

[9] Viszota op. cit. contains a list of the books he was allowed to read during his imprisonment, pp. 685—689.

[10] Kossuth's own remarks on his MSS fragment of Macbeth. Vö. Pp. no. 234. P. R. O. Bpest. — Further, Hegyaljai Kiss Géza, *Kossuth L. Macbeth fordítása* (The Translation of Macbeth by L. K.). Bpest Review, 1934.

[11] Pester Gazette.

[12] I. e. for serfdom.

[13] Cf. his *Book of Fallacies* and the *Théorie des peines et des récompenses* which Kossuth read in a French translation.

the great demand for Kossuth's editorials a newspaper had to be reprinted in order to satisfy the public's interest![14]

Since British wealth was based on industry he launched a campaign to establish industrial concerns in Hungary. His slogan became a struggle to achieve industrial independence from Austria by building up a scheme of national autarchy.

He organized a society for the protection of home industries whose branches formed a network all over the country. When the manufacturing industry had grown in strength, the time would come for free trade. It would be the task of the newly established Hungarian Commercial Association to offer credit. His efforts were successful, and the first industrial exhibition was opened in Pest in 1842, and proved that spirit of enterprise was not lacking.

He did not overlook the needs of agriculture. The production was old-fashioned, did not pay and was in a state of overproduction being able to place only small proportion in the markets of Austria. New openings for export seemed to be the first corollary of any improvement in this situation. It was discussed by the Pester Club, founded by Count Széchenyi on British lines.

Kossuth was prevented from being elected to the Club by the jealousy of Széchenyi, who was anxious to check his growing influence and his efforts to carry out progressive reforms; compared to these, his own ideas seemed entirely out of date. Nevertheless, Kossuth was in permanent contact with many influential members of the Club and through this channel he was always well informed of their activities.

Blackwell, the Pest correspondent of the British Legation in Vienna sent a memorandum to the members of the Club, advising them to organize the export of Hungarian agricultural products to Britain. At the world market prices it did not seem impossible to sell Hungarian corn in London on more reasonable terms than in Vienna, in spite of the prohibitive British tariffs, which greatly handicapped the import of continental products. For that purpose Blackwell proposed the establishment of a Hungarian commercial agency in London, and with the Club's support went to Britain to make the necessary preliminary arrangements.[15]

Kossuth was deeply interested in Blackwell's enterprise, though his reports gave little hope of rapid success. The export

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[14] Hegedüs, Roland, *Lewis Kossuth*, p. 58.

[15] Cf. his report *Aux Messieurs Souscripteurs du Casino*, London, July 25, 1842, Vö. Pp. no. 56. P. R. O. Bpest.

should be organized at home — he wrote to the Club[16] — before he could make positive offers to British commercial enterprises. Hungarian agriculture should consider first and foremost every aspect of a planned export, particularly how the products could be transported to a seaport, thus enabling British merchants to calculate their offers.

But Hungary had only one seaport, Fiume, which in Blackwell's opinion was far more distant from London than New York, as far as the transit-time was concerned. Blackwell therefore suggested that the Club should select either Hamburg or Rotterdam for the export rather than Fiume. The transport to the former could be arranged through the waterways of the Danube and the Elbe, to the latter only via the Danube and the Rhine. Anyway, British capital might well be interested in Hungarian mines, in road-building and organizing river navigation. All these fields for capital investment were preliminaries to inducing British capitalists to import Hungarian cereals.

Kossuth did not share Blackwell's opinion. In spite of the latter's arguments he insisted on making Fiume the centre of export to Britain. In the press, he popularised the opening of a new rail route between Pest and Fiume and the creation of a national merchant fleet. Hungarian ocean-going ships were to carry grain direct to London where, the prohibitive British tariffs were suspended, they might have a chance of selling profitably.

In spite of Széchenyi's resolution to follow Blackwell's advice, Kossuth persevered in his propaganda for that 'new deal' in foreign commerce which he regarded as a most essential object.[17] What was more, he commissioned Kreuter, a Bavarian engineer, to make plans and surveys for the projected railway line between Fiume and Vukovár, as being the first section of the route from Pest to the only seaport of the country.[18] Nevertheless, Kossuth's endeavours were without success. The government approved Széchenyi's conception and gave preference to roads and waterways over the "imaginative usefulness" of rail and sea navigation, taking account of the lack of capital available in the country, which would first have to be imported for investment in the building-up of commercial routes.

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[16] Cf ut supra.

[17] Pulszky, Francis, *Életem és korom* (My Life and Times). Bpest, vol I, p. 196.

[18] Cf. Kreuter's letters to Kossuth. Vienna, January 18, 20, 23, 1848. Vö. Pp. nos. 1142, 1143, 1144. P. R. O. Bpest.

II.

The revolution of 1848 breaks out. — Parliamentary system introduced in Hungary. — The cabinet council informs Britain of the constitutional reform is view. — Reforms prevented by nationalist movements in Servia and Wallachia. — Integrity of the Hapsburgh Monarchy endangered by the Pan-Slav Movement in Prague. — Hungary requests British mediation. — Belgrade's plan to separate Croatia and the southern territories from Hungary. — Vienna refuses to allow British consulate in Pest. — Hungary buys British arms for maintenance of the statusquo. — Austria's expected entrance into the German Bund. — Kossuth's plan for alliance with Germany in case of the dissolution of the Austrian Empire. — Hungary's diplomatic agents in Frankfort, Paris and London. — The Agent Szalay refused by Palmerston and Eddisbury.

In February 1848 the rumours of a revolution in Paris brought all commercial projects to a standstill. Kossuth as the leader of the opposition and representative of the county of Pest now concentrated all his efforts in the Diet on behalf of the parliamentary system instead of the feudal constitution. But it seemed as if he could not foresee the consequences of his propaganda and overpowering oratory which fascinated all his followers in the opposition ranks.

In March the revolt broke out in Pest. The King formed the first responsible cabinet, whose premier was Count Lewis Batthyány with Kossuth as Minister of Finance. Events moved rapidly. While the Cabinet was busy preparing reform-bills for Parliament it did not omit to inform the Western Powers of the great constitutional changes which were taking place in the Danube Basin.[19]

The cabinet wanted to send a message to the British government. The Hapsburgh Monarchy was traditionally regarded by the latter as a natural ally of Britain against Russia, therefore the Hungarian cabinet laid particular stress on proving that the reform-bills were devoid of any revolutionary character. If carried

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[19] Cabinet Council, Pest, April 12, 1848, Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs no. 2. P. R. O. Bpest.

out, they would not weaken the Monarchy nor lessen the intrinsic value of Austria as an ally of Britain.

Besides this, there was another fact which could not kept a secret from Downing Street. If the rumours of nationalist movements on the Lower Danube, in the Servian and Wallachian Principalities — then under Turkish rule — proved to be true, their moral effect upon the Croats, Servians and Wallachians of Hungary might be incalculable. Anyway, this movement might check the execution of the reforms and result in the dissolution of Austria, and troubles in Turkey; it might even lead to a European war. The cabinet therefore implored Palmerston to use his influence for the reestablishment of order in the Servian and Wallachian Principalities.

Prince Esterházy, the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was authorized by the cabinet to inform Viscount Ponsonby, the British Minister in Vienna of this anxiety. The latter expressed his appreciation of the cabinet's endeavours to keep the peace with all its southern and eastern neighbours and spoke very favourably of the commercial intercourse which might possibly follow the adoption of the reformed constitution.[20] As to the movements in the Principalities, Ponsonby felt embarrassed as to what advice should he give his government. He could not conceal his doubts as to the propriety of Britain exerting her influence in interest of order and peace during the disturbances.[21]

Unfortunately the anxiety of the Hungarian Cabinet was only too well founded. The Pan-Slav Congress convoked in Prague for May 31, 1848, had undoubtedly for its object the disruption of Austria. As soon as the aims of this Congress were known to the Hungarian Cabinet, Kossuth, together with Szemere, the Minister of the Interior, asked for Esterházy's intervention with the Austrian Cabinet in order to comply with the wishes of the discontented party in Galicia. Everything must be sacrified for peace, declared the Hungarian Cabinet, for the integrity of the Monarchy must be saved from Panslavism.[22]

The reason why the Cabinet of Batthyány stood so firmly

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[20] Esterházy—Batthyány, Vienna, April 20, 1848. M. F. A. no. 2. P. R. O. Bpest.

[21] Esterházy—Batthyány, Vienna, May 13, 1848. Committee on National Defence, no. 238/e ex 1848. P. R. O. Bpest.

[22] Batthyány—Esterházy, Pest, May 16, 1848, C. N. D. no. 2/e, P. R. O. Bpest.

for order and peace, was its uneasiness as to the future of Austria. No one could foresee whether she could enforce her authority in the German Bund as well as in Lombardo-Venetia. The Pan-Slav Congress in Prague indicated in definite terms the future of Austria. In fact, the Slavonic elements of the Monarchy raised loud objections to her entering into the German Bund. If she did so, they felt themselves cheated of their hopes of taking over the rule of Empire on the grounds of their majority. In a future confederacy of races under the Monarchy they demanded priority.

In the event of a separation of the Slavonic races from Austria for the purpose of constituting an independent Slavonic block, the situation of Hungary would have been regarded as desperate by the Hungarian Cabinet. In its opinion the dissolution of Austria would finally result in the entrance of her remaining German territories into the Bund. Consequently, Hungary would necessarily find herself in an abyss between the German and Slavonic blocks, with a tendency to constrain her to enter the sphere of interest of one or the other.

This conception impelled the Cabinet to continue its policy of carrying on the constitutional reforms already sanctioned by Emperor Ferdinand, extending them to all branches of the administration. Even the national defence was to be included under this scheme. It was already rumoured that the Servians' and Croats' decision to separate from Hungary, owing to their attitude in their National Assembly held in Karlović, on May 13, 1848 plainly expressed this resolution as a common desire of the Southern Slavs of Hungary.

The resolution of the Karlović Assembly was corroborated by General Hrabowski, the commander in chief of the fortress of Pétervárad, who added to his report that Belgrade was considered as the centre of these separatist movements, whence the strong instigation began. The Servian Principality wanted to set up a Yougoslav kingdom, in which Southern Hungary would be included.[23]

On receipt of Hrabowski's report, the Hungarian Cabinet acted immediately. It requested the Sovereign to allow the raising of a national guard of ten thousand men until Hungarian regiments stationed abroad in Galizia and Lombardy could be ordered back.

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[23] Hrabowski—Archduke Stephen, Peterwardein, May 13, 1848. Präs. 454. C. N. D. 191/e. P. R. O. Bpest.

But for an armed resistance to the Southern Slav movement the Cabinet needed military equipment, which could not be produced at home on account of the lack of suitable factories. This they hoped to obtain from Britain, whose diplomatic representative had recently communicated to Esterházy Palmerston's satisfaction at the peaceful reforms mentioned before.[24]

This announcement of Ponsonby's gave the Cabinet a welcome opportunity again to urge him to establish a British consulate in Pest, already promised by Palmerston but until then frustrated by the Cabinet in Vienna, which was always jealous of Hungary's relations with British commerce.[25]

Kossuth in particular was quite confident in Britain's resolute policy over the maintenance of the status quo of the Austrian Empire. This would possibly have meant Palmerston's readiness to support Hungary's resistance to the Southern Slav separatist tendencies. But Batthyány's Cabinet had absolutely no time for consideration. Without waiting for Palmerston's answer about the consulate or for his assent in the matter of military equipment, the Cabinet sent Lieutenant Samuel Sztankay to London to purchase arms.

In any case, these military preparations were not directed by disloyalty towards the Emperor, although Vienna and Prague looked askance at them. Kossuth supported the maintenance of the Monarchy by every means in his power, and stood firm for his Sovereign in spite of being thoroughly entangled with the equipment business, which he had to finance in his capacity as a member of the Cabinet. "We want to transfer the centre of gravity of the Monarchy to Hungary" — he wrote on June 17th, to Pázmándy, the Commissioner of the Cabinet at the German Bund in Frankfort. — "The King is expected to come here this month and he will stay with us with God's help. We have to direct the Austrian diplomacy. Premier Batthyány was requested by the Cabinet to go to the Court in Innspruck."[26] On the same day he wrote to his intimate friend Pulszky, Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Vienna: "Please, discuss that matter with the diplomatic representatives. They

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[24] Esterházy—Batthyány, Vienna, May 13, 1848, no. 389. — C. N. D. Pest, May 16, 1848, no. 191/e. P. R. O. Bpest.

[25] Klauzál Gabriel, Minister of Commerce—Esterházy, Pest, April 26, 1848, no. 61. P. R. O. Bpest.

[26] Kossuth's own draft. Vö. Pp. no. 1051. P. R. O. Bpest.

should be carefully prepared. When the King arrives, they should also come here."[27]

In this chaotic state of things Kossuth planned to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the German Bund for counterbalancing the accumulated tendencies of the Slav elements. Kossuth's plan was founded on the Bund's interest in preventing the establishment of an enlarged independent Czech state supported by Russia. Nevertheless, he was afraid of this plan being misconstrued in Paris and London. He called Pázmándy's attention to this possibility, which would have to be considered in Frankfort if the preliminary negotiations were to begin. He considered through what channels France's and Britain's support could be secured for a guarantee of Hungary's integrity in the event of her being in danger from the Slavonic forces of disruption.[28]

No doubt, ideas might sometimes coincide. In fact, Pázmándy and his deputy, Szalay[29] were of the same conviction. Szalay urged the Premier to send agents immediately to Paris and London in order to inform the respective governments of the aims of the Hungarian Cabinet, and to request their support in any form they were willing to offer. There was no hope of help from Austrian diplomatists residing at that time in Britain and France on account of the hostile attitude shown by Vienna and Prague towards Hungary's preparations, which were directed towards building up her independent administrative and military equipment.

It is characteristic of the unsettled administration of the period that the Hungarian agents in Frankfort reported alternatively to Batthyány or Kossuth or even to Szemere. The instructions were usually given by Kossuth together with Szemere who acted on behalf of Premier Batthyány. Now, Szalay was called upon by these ministers to hasten to London[30] and to report to Palmerston on the events in Hungary. Upon his return he was to visit Paris and speak with Lamartine in the same sense as with

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[27] His own draft. Pest, June 7, 1848. Vö. Pp. no. 1050. P. R. O. Bpest.

[28] Ibidem.

[29] Cf. Flegler, Alexander, *Erinnerungen an Ladislaus Szalay*. Leipzig, 1866, pp. 14—19; Angyal, David, *Szalay László emlékezete* (Recollections of Ladislaus Szalay). Commemorative address delivered at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Bpest, 1914, vol. XVI, no. 11; Károlyi, Árpád, *Gróf Batthyány Lajos főbenjáró pöre* (Capital charge against Count Lewis Batthyány). Bpest, 1932, vol. I, chapt. XIV.

[30] Károlyi, op. cit. vol. I, p. 323.

Palmerston. These statesmen were to be convinced of the consequences which might result from the overthrow of the Monarchy which was threatened by the Slavonic nationals. And they were also to be remained that any political rearrangement in the Danube Basin would undoubtedly run counter to the interests of the Western Powers.

Szalay went first to Paris, where the revolution of June 1848 culminated. Unfortunately he had no chance to meet Lamartine or Bastide[31] and consequently returned to Frankfort without continuing his voyage to Britain.

But Kossuth attached great importance to Britain's expected assistance. He tried to get in touch with Palmerston through his personal agent, the evangelical pastor, Theodore Wimmer, and hoped by this intermediary to negotiate a loan.[32]

Kossuth's speech in the House of Commons on July 11th, 1848, shows his unbounded expectations from Palmerston's assistance. His imaginative character is well expressed by his utterances, which depicted Palmerston's mere courteous message to the Hungarian Cabinet as a great diplomatic success, although it lacked any political significance.[33]

Premier Batthyány disapproved of Kossuth's individual actions in diplomatic and in military matters. Again, Kossuth regarded Batthyány's administrative aims as too conservative. Kossuth was the man of rapid action. As a result of his impulsive character he also gave orders to Pastor Wimmer for the purchase of arms in London, though he was cognizant of Batthyány's instructions to Lieutenant Sztankay, as well as of his request to the British Government to permit the manufacture of the recently-discovered rocket of Congreve in Hungary. Batthyány was glad to have a British officer in Pest who might have been able to undertake the instruction in the handling of the rockets.[34]

The overlapping orders of Batthyány and Kossuth greatly

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[31] Szalay—Eötvös, Minister of Education, Paris, June 26, 1848, cf. Szalay, Baron Gabriel, *Szalay László levelei* (Letters of Ladislaus Szalay). Bpest, 1913, pp. 125—126.

[32] Cf. his letter to Wimmer. Kossuth's draft. Pest, Aug. 15, 1848. Vö. Pp. no. 1066. P. R. O. Bpest.

[33] Cf. Kossuth's speech in Janotyckh v. Adlerstein, Archiv des ungarischen Ministeriums, Altenburg, 1851, vol. II, p. 58.

[34] Batthyány—Pulszky, Pest, Aug. 8, 1848. — C. N. D. no. 481/. P. R. O. Bpest.

embarrassed the London firm Fry, Cotton and Trueman, who were charged by both ministers with the delivery of military equipment. The firm did not conceal its opinion of the employment of two agents, which would greatly increase the price of goods to be delivered to Hungary.[35]

But it was in vain that Batthyány protested against Kossuth's arbitrary behaviour, and Kossuth consequently acted without the assent of the Cabinet. Kossuth's attitude necessarily led to growing antagonism between the two statesmen, which finally resulted in their mutual estrangement.

Wimmer was in fact unsuccessful in business matters and we doubt wether he had the chance to see Palmerston at all. Fry, Cotton, Trueman and Co. were brokers but not manufacturers. They only dealt in useless arms and could not even guarantee their delivery to Hungary although the latter was the most important point of the business. The Banus of Croatia, Jellašić was already on the march with his troops towards Pest and the Hungarian national guard needed arms very rapidly. The campaign with the Southern Slavs was a sharp one.

If it is admitted that Kossuth deserve censure for his arbitrary conduct in business matters, the same is not true of him in politics, although he had a particular inclination to political romanticism, as he actually showed in all his dealings during the last months of his public service.

We cannot wonder at his misconstrued hopes as to Palmerston's attitude towards Hungary. Count Ladislaus Teleki and Ladislaus Szalay, the Agents of Hungary in Paris and Frankfort, entertained a similar false opinion in that matter. This attitude seems to be a common mistake usually made by revolutionary governments as well as by their diplomatists. They have a firm belief in the accomplishment of what they aim at. Otherwise they would lack moral force to fight for their principles with short-sighted optimism.

According to this political psychology, Szalay applied to Kossuth, who became the head of the Committee for National Defence, organized by decision of Parliament. Premier Batthyány resigned and Kossuth took over the administration in his stead. Szalay requested Kossuth[36] to be commissioned with the agency

[35] Cf. the firm's letter to Wimmer, London, Aug. 29, 1848. Prince Schwarzenberg Papers, Fasz. VIII. H. H. St. A. Wien.

[36] Cf. Szalay—Kossuth, Lüttich, Oct. 17, 1848, Schwarzenberg Pp. Fasz. VIII. H. H. St. A. Wien.

in London. Kossuth agreed. But knowing Britain's practical sense, he imagined to secure Palmerston's mediation in the matter of promising preferences in commercial intercourse.[37] Nothing could better characterize Kossuth's misconstrued judgment of the situation than his hope that Hungary's independence would be recognized by Britain. But Palmerston refrained from receiving Szalay, still less was he willing to negotiate with him. His neutral attitude — that seemed to be ironical to Szalay — was properly expressed by his Under-Secretary, Eddisbury, who advised Szalay to apply to Baron Koller, the Austrian Minister in London. "The British Government has no knowledge of Hungary" — wrote Eddisbury — "except as one of the component parts of the Austrian Empire."[38]

But Szalay did not give in easily. He got in touch with Bunsen, the Prussian Minister in London, who was on intimate terms with Palmerston. Then he asked for the recommendation of Prince Leiningen, the Premier of the Central Government in Germany, who was a half-brother of Queen Victoria. He sent another memorandum to Palmerston, in which he explained the psychological background of recent events. The fight arose for the maintenance of the constitution. It could not be stamped as a mere revolution. Besides, he could not apply to Koller for Austria was at war with Hungary — as he wrote in that memorandum.

Eddisbury's answer was strictly negative; it discouraged Szalay and induced him to give up his endeavours. "Hungary has to pay for the Cabinet's carelessness in having failed to inform the foreign press systematically of the true state of things in Hungary" — he wrote bitterly to Teleki.[39] No doubt, the British press informed the public about events in remote parts of the Globe better than about the struggle that raged in the Danube Basin. It was an unusual event when the *London Times* published, on the New Year's Eve of 1849, a long letter about the situation in Hungary. Upon reading it the Austrian chargé d'affaires was much

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[37] Instructions for Szalay, Bpest, Nov. 12, 1848. Correspondence relative to the Affairs of Hungary. Presented to both Houses of Parliament. 1847—49. London, pp. 106—107; Sproxton, Charles, *Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution*. Cambridge, 1919, pp. 44—45.

[38] Correspondence, p. 107; Koller—Schwarzenberg, Rapport no. 1. A—B. London, Jan. 2, 1849; Rapp. no. 6. D. Jan. 14, 1849. H. H. St. A. Wien.

[39] London, Dec. 21, 1848, cf. Horváth Michael, *Magyarország függetlenségi harcának története* (History of the Hungarian struggle for independence). 1848—49. Bpest, 1865, vol. II, p. 47.

annoyed and anxiously reported the fact to the Vienna Government.[40] Otherwise he was thoroughly satisfied with Eddisbury's attitude and wished to hear of the same treatment from the French Government for Teleki.[41]

III.

Szalay's successor, Francis Pulszky, diplomatic agent in London. — The war in full swing in Hungary against the South Slavs and the Austrians. — Rumours of the impending Russian intervention. — Lord Eddisbury's relative, Capt. F. W. Brown in service of the Hungarians. — Pulszky's efforts to gain over public opinion through the press. — His collaborators, D. J. Vipan, M. J. Kemble, Ll. W. Birkbeck, Toulmin Smith, Ch. F. Henningsen, F. W. Newman. — Unfavourable impressions in London and Paris caused by the dethronement of the Hapsburghs by the Hungarian Government. — Kossuth, Governor of Hungary. — The Russian intervention. — Cobden's agitation against Russia.

Upon receiving intelligence of Szalay's failure, Teleki became embittered and his moods varied between gloomy pessimism and bright optimism. When Pulszky visited him on his way to London, he made great efforts to dissuade him from his purpose.[42] Again, when it rumoured in Paris that Palmerston had decided to send a note of protest to the Russian Cabinet on account of the sudden and violent invasion of Wallachia by Russian troops, he became full of optimism. Although he was well aware of Palmerston's axiom of regarding Austria's integrity as the greatest guarantee against German and Russian expansion,[43] he still thought that Palmerston, indignant at the Russian advance, would necessarily take the side of Hungary. His correspondents sent him good news from London. Lady Palmerston seemed to be in favour of the Hungarian cause, giving utterance to her opinion "que les Hongrois sont dans leur bons droits".[44] Teleki regarded her influence upon

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[40] Bericht no. 85/A. London, Dec. 31, 1848. H. H, St. A. Wien.

[41] Bericht no. 1. A—B. Jan. 2, 1849. H. H. St. A. Wien.

[42] Pulszky, op. cit. vol. II, p. 436.

[43] Pulszky—Kossuth, Paris, Febr. 26, 1859, Vö. Pp. no. 1351. P. R. O. Bpest.

[44] Teleki—Kossuth, Paris, March 7, 1849, Vö. Pp. no. 1419. P. R. O. Bpest.

the attitude of London society as of considerable importance. If so, Pulszky's chances might still become promising. He was duly supported in his judgement by Capt. Fred. W. Brown, a near relative of Palmerston's Under-Secretary, Lord Eddisbury. Brown spoke very firmly about the anti-Russian feelings of the British public.

Besides this, Brown offered his services to Kossuth on behalf of the Hungarian cause. Teleki gladly nominated him to the rank of Major in the Hungarian Army and sent him direct to Kossuth through the Austrian lines. "You have never met a more faithful person" — he wrote to Kossuth[45] — "Brown is a real antique character. You will never find a more enthusiastic Hungarian than this Englishman. I am ready to answer for his loyalty." In fact, Brown crossed the Austrian lines by a gallant ride and handed Teleki's reports safely to Kossuth, who sent him to Constantinople to negotiate with the Porte. Kossuth thought that Brown would succeed in gaining the Porte's support for Hungary.

Meanwhile Pulszky reached London by entering the island with a false passport, and started work immediately. Taught by Szalay's experience, he concentrated all his efforts on informing the British public of Kossuth's rôle, as well as of the aims of the Hungarian struggle. He endeavoured to make Britain acquainted with the Hungarian point of view and wished to show the background of the movement in a fair manner which had never been done by the Austrian press, whose information was usually translated by the British press. The Viennese news spoke only of Hungarian revolt which must be suppressed for the sake of law and order. These reports only referred to victories over the Hungarians in revolt.

To counteract the false impression inspired by the Austrian Government, Pulszky incessantly stressed the fact that Kossuth was only fighting for constitutional reforms, for the parliamentary system sanctioned by the Sovereign. He was faithful to the Hapsburghs, and supported them in spite of the intrigues stirred up by court circles, who did not cease to egg on the Servians and Croats against Hungary. This was indeed true. The court camarilla was doing all it could to counteract the constitutional reforms. It was cognizant of the fact that if these reforms were once carried through, a similar process could not be avoided in Austria where absolutism

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[45] Vide ut supra.

still prevailed. In this case, court circles must resign the power and influence they exerted hitherto.

In order to understand "the opposite views" Pulszky wanted to promulgate his own ideas in the press. First of all he tried to gain the confidence of those who did not regard him as a political agent in his new capacity, but only saw his fidelity to his studies. Since his early youth he had devoted himself to archeological studies, and now he was seeking to renew his former relations with D. J. Vipan, the archeologist.

Before this time of turmoils Mrs. Pulszky had been on friendly terms with the daughter of Lord Landsdowne, the President of the Council. Through this channel he received invitations to Landsdowne's family and became acquainted by his help with Sir Charles Lyell, a geologist of high reputation. By friendly recommendations he got in touch with the young historian, Mitchell John Kemble who again introduced him to Lloyd William Birkbeck and Toulmin Smith, barristers-at-law.

Informed by Pulszky of the present state of things, this small circle of well-wishers and friends became highly interested in the Hungarian cause and with their firmness and perseverance, so characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon, promoted Pulszky's attempted approach to the press. Even Vipan, Kemble, Birkbeck, T. Smith, as well as C. H. Henningsen, a reporter on the *Daily News,* and Francis W. Newman, brother of the subsequent Cardinal Newman, offered him their services to write articles about Hungary and place them in the papers. But apart from this generous help of friends, Pulszky's success with the press was due to the commencement of the military operations in Hungary. Henceforth the British public showed a growing interest in news from the Lower Danube, and the papers gladly accepted articles about the situation. Particularly the *Daily News,* the organ of Cobden's party, was very attentive to Pulszky and published his article, entitled "Fallacies", in which he endeavoured to refute the falsehoods spread by the Vienna press. Besides this, Palmerston's organ, the *Globe,* the radical *Sun* and Cobden's *Express,* also published pro-Hungarian articles. Again the *Examiner, Spectator, Observer* and Douglas' *Herald* printed many articles on the same lines in their Sunday issues. Among the monthly magazines the Tory *Blackwood* and *Frazer,* and the Quarterly Whig *Edinburgh Review* accepted articles from Pulszky and his friends.

This Hungarian News Centre proved with much tact and success the fact of Hungary's having been forced into the struggle

by the court party around the Emperor, and the weakness of the latter who had been influenced to tolerate General Jellačić's insurrection against the Hungarian administration. When the struggle for national defence began, Pulszky wrote impressive articles about the movements of the Hungarian army, expounded the rôle of the foreign legions, and familiarized the public with bibliographies of leading personages of the army and administration.

But he had to face the difficulty of being shut off from the permanent news service from home. He could not compete with the daily service of the Vienna press, nor could he send reports to Kossuth about the changing public opinion. Again, Kossuth sorely missed the necessity of contact with him. The only route by which they could have communicated led through Constantinople or via the island of Candia. There is no doubt that these reports or instructions were always out of date when they reached the addressees. The only channel open to Pulszky led him to Paris, where a few of his compatriots lived and endeavoured more or less successfully to keep up contact with friends at home. This means that he was entirely dependent on his own inventive faculty.[46]

Left alone, he received with great consternation the news of the dethronement of the Imperial House, decreed by Parliament in a session in Debrecen on April 14, 1849. It seemed unlikely to him that Kossuth would be elected Governor of Hungary. No doubt, this news created an unfavourable impression in Britain, where the public adhered to the monarchical system and general opinion tended to the hope that even in France the President of the Republic would very soon become Emperor.[47]

Pulszky himself was convinced that republican principles could not take root on the Continent, consequently the republican tendencies in Hungary seemed to be devoid of any prospect of practical utility. Pulszky did not identify himself with this republican spirit. Nevertheless, he worked for his government and continued his press campaign without intermission, for he considered himself as a representative of his county's interest and not of its present supreme authority.

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[46] It is characteristic of the want of reliable communication between Kossuth and his agents abroad that his instruction, sent to Paris on December 24, 1848, for Count Teleki, reached the addressee only on March 14, 1849. Cf. the letter of Fred. Szarvady, secretary to Teleki, addressed to Kossuth, Paris, March 15, 1849. Vö. Pp. no. 1379. P. R. O. Bpest.

[47] Pulszky, op. cit. vol. II, p. 452.

The Russian intervention was known in Britain at an earlier date than it was to Kossuth and his administration. As soon as it proved to be true, Cobden became one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the pro-Hungarian movement, though formerly he always took the part of Russia, which he never excluded from his scheme for free trade. His generous character was indignant at realizing the expansive and violent means used by Russian politics. He was in favour of fair play and mutual respect, even in politics. Having been informed of the Russian plan of negotiating a considerable loan in Britain, Cobden was convinced of Russia's decision to spend that money on military equipment and not for railway building, as was avowed when putting out feelers in Britain's financial circles. He agitated against Russia and warned the financial market against promoting her expansionist policy.[48]

IV.

Britain's advice: Hungary should come to terms with Austria. — Prince Czartorisky, the Head of the Polish Emigration, suggests agreement with the South Slavs. — His mediation between Croatia, Servia and Hungary through Count Bystrzonowski. — Beöthy commissioned by Kossuth to conclude a commercial treaty with Britain. — Bikkessy's mission to London. — Kossuth requests Britain's help to prevent Russian intervention. — Pulszky's unfounded hope of recognition of independent Hungary. — Palmerston does not want to encourage the independence of Hungary and Poland.

Meanwhile Kossuth, surrounded by the attacking troops of Austrians, Croats and Servians preached a crusade for preserving Hungary's integrity. The only hope he had in the Western Powers' mediation proved to be vain. Teleki wrote him from Paris about the opinion of British statesmen, who suggested Kossuth should come to terms with Austria. Their idea was that the necessary atmosphere for such terms might be created by an overwhelming victory which the Hungarians must gain over the combined forces of ther opponents. Again, Teleki added to this counsel that it would be wise to be reconciled with the Servians.[49]

But Teleki's letter reached him too late. After the dethronement and the Russian intervention there was no chance of Austria's

[48] Pulszky, vol. II, p. 456.

[49] Paris, March 7, 1849. Vö. Pp. no. 1419. P. R. O. Bpest.

willingness to enter into any negotiation whatsoever. Hungary had to give in herself unconditionally. As to the Servians, he also considered it advisable to negotiate with them, and instructed Count Casimir Batthyány, his Minister for Foreign Affairs for the purpose. But there was little hope of a genuine accord, because Count Bystrzonowski, a secret agent of Prince Czartorisky sent by Bastide to Belgrade, Zagreb and Pest for preliminary mediation between the contestating parties, promised arbitrary and far-reaching territorial concessions to the Servian Government, which Kossuth could not accept without agreeing to Hungary's dismemberment.[50]

Then again Kossuth turned to Britain. The only free route from Hungary led through the Wallachian Principality. He therefore instructed Edmund Beöthy, his Consul-General in Bucarest, to get in contact with the British Vice-Consul there and to request his mediation for commercial negotiations for a treaty between their respective countries.[51]

He then sent Lieutenant-Colonel Alois Bikkessy to London with instructions to inform Palmerston personally about the dethronement of the Hapsburghs and his elections to the governorship.[52] Bikkessy was also commissioned to initiate commercial negotiations, but Pulszky refused to support Bikkessy's mission, for he was warned by British friends that such beginnings would presumably be followed by Palmerston's declining to hold any further intercourse with him. Besides, the translation of the voluminous documents into English required much time, and he succeeded only at the end of July in receiving permission for Bikkessy to be introduced to Palmerston. The Secretary of State in his private mansion listened with interest to Bikkessy's representations without expressing any sort of opinion about them.[53]

During this time Pulszky received voluminous instructions,

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[50] Cf. Bastide to Bystrzonowski, Paris, Sept. 30, 1848, Turquie, Mémoires et documents 1838—55, vol. 60. Provinces Slaves, A. d. M. A. E. Paris: cf. further Fabre's and Limperani's the French consuls' despatches, Belgrade, Jan. 19, 1849, no. 40; Febr. 27, 1849, no. 43, June 29, 1849, no. 6, vol. III, 1848—49. Belgrade, Turquie. Ut supra.

[51] C. D. N. no. 5877, April 20, 1849. P. R. O. Bpest.

[52] Bikkessy—Kossuth, Herrmannstadt, May 1, 1849. — Cf. C. N. D. no. 6864/k. P. R. O. Bpest.

[53] Cf. Bikkessy—Palmerston, London, July 19, 1849. Corresp. pp. 255—265; Pulszky, vol. II, p. 453.

which he submitted to Downing Street.[54] From their contents he realized the full extent and consequences of the Russian intervention. Also he learnt his government's points which he had to explain to Palmerston. Kossuth requested an explicit statement from Palmerston to Russia and Austria on behalf of the principle of non-intervention. As a diplomatic formality to announce his attitude, Kossuth suggested that Palmerston should send a resolute protest to the Absolute Powers against their intervention.

Count Batthyány called Palmerston's attention to the intended expansion of Russia upon the Lower Danube, the Principalities and Turkey, with the purpose of shutting off their markets from Britain.[55] If Hungary succeeded, Britain would find in her a very promising market. In that case she would be freed from Austria's economic encirclement which she had now to endure for the sake of being exploited by Austrian manufactories. If Hungary fell, Russia would find the way open through her and through the Balkans to acquire the commerce of the Near East, which would be detrimental to British interests. Besides, was it not a peculiar fact that Austria, Britain's ally, had always charged British goods with high import duties? What of the federal value of Austria, who did not respect her ally's interests?[56]

It was very wise of Pulszky that he never presented this note at Downing Street. Its trend of thought and the reiterated request for commercial intercourse was indeed contrary to the principle of neutrality explained in his introduction, where that the Hungarian Government thanked Palmerston in advance. For this reason he confined himself to the interpretation of his instructions by occasionally presenting the credentials he received after nearly a year's stay in London.[57] The documents did not help the Hungarian cause but were still useful in showing the high hopes Kossuth's Government entertained in regard to Britain's attitude and influence.

In spite of Pulszky's representations, Palmerston of course persisted in the point of view he had taken since the beginning of

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[54] Pulszky's instructions dated from Debrecen, May 15, 1849, F. O. 7/375. P. R. O. London. — See appendix no. 1.

[55] Debrecen, May 19, 1849. Miscell. Pp. no. 1848/49. P. R. O. Bpest.

[56] In fact the British textile industry found illegal access to Lombardy and Venetia. Prague and Brünn were roused by this keen competition and urged the Vienna Government to remove it. Compare the minute of the Cabinet Council no. 3146 ex 1848, cited by Károlyi, vol. II, p. 352.

[57] Debrecen, May 15, 1849. Both in original in P .R. O. London.

the conflict between Austria and Hungary. He could not consider independent Hungary as of the same political weight as was represented by the Austrian Empire. In case of the latter's dissolution a smaller Austria, dismembered from her Slavonic provinces, could not be foreseen as a balance to Hungary. Again, he did not want to promote Austria's incorporation into the German Bund nor did want the latter's degradation to a vassal of Russia. Consequently, Austria as a balance to an independent Hungary, which formed together the traditional wall against Russian expansion, seemed to become an unforeseen factor in continental politics, particularly in those of the Danube Basin. On the other hand he did not want to encourage the creation of an independent Poland, intended to keep the balance instead of Austria with an independent Hungary. He considered that such an extensive re-arrangement of Eastern Europe could not be made without provoking a European conflagration.[58]

Pulszky reported to his government very thoroughly on the principles expressed to him by Palmerston. Nevertheless, he was glad to write the steps he understood Palmerston to be making against Russian intervention. In his unbounded optimism he attributed to Downing Street's politics the idea that Kossuth still had free access to the East through the Wallachian Principality. Even the friendly attitude of the Sublime Porte he ascribed to British influence. It can hardly be understood how Pulszky was induced to that unfounded optimism. "I have every reason to believe" — he wrote to Kossuth and Batthyány — "that London will recognize our de facto government very soon . . . A considerable success against the Russians, the taking of the port Fiume or in case of military misfortune at least brave endurance would create a great impression upon the Western Powers. I suppose Russia wants to have the port of Cattaro from Austria as an equivalent for her intervention. I wish I could find out the secret which seems to be hidden behind the screen. Anyway, I am convinced, Britain will take a hand in the war. Besides, I have been always received with particular kindness by Palmerston; he is our best friend in the cabinet."[59]

Pulszky's reports must have necessarily increased Kossuth's unfounded optimism. It was only too true that Palmerston detested

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[58] Pulszky—Batthyány, Paris, June 16, 1849. Miscell. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[59] Pulszky's second letter from Paris of the same date. Miscell. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

Prince Schwarzenberg for his violent political methods, but this fact did not make him feel himself constrained to protest against Schwarzenberg's attitude in invoking Russian aid.

Having been informed of the first Russian invasion of Transylvania in January 1849 and of Sir Stratford Canning's statements in Constantinople, he took note of them without giving utterance to his opinion in any way. On February 9th he received Count Nesselrode's note concerning the invasion of Transylvania by Russian troops, under the pretext of humanity "by protecting two cities against spoliation and the massacre of the Hungarians".[60] Again, Palmerston had nothing to say.

On May 1849 when the Russian intervention followed, he wrote to Buchanan, the British Minister in St. Petersburgh: "Much as Her Majesty's Government regret this interference of Russia the causes which have led to it and the effect it may produce, they nevertheless have not considered the occasion to be that which at present calls for any formal expression of the opinion of Great Britain on the matter . . ."[61] And when he discussed this matter with the Russian Minister in London, he remarked: "Make an end to it very quickly". No wonder that Brunnow at once reported this significant statement to Nesselrode.[62]

Palmerston was strongly backed in this opinion by the anti-Magyar propaganda widely favoured by large conservative circles in London society. This movement was headed by Princess Metternich, the wife of the former Austrian chancellor, who took refuge in Britain in the spring of 1848. Then again Countess Colloredo the wife of the Austrian Minister in London and Lady Jersey, the mother-in-law of Prince Esterházy, former Minister for Foreign Affairs in the first Hungarian Cabinet, distinguished themselves by their activities. One heard further of the strong anti-Magyar attitude of Leopold, the Belgian King, whose opinion was much respected at the British Court. Pulszky was cognizant of these facts, which caused him much uneasiness.[63]

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[60] Irányi—Chassin, *Histoire politique de la révolution de Hongrie.* 1847—1849. pp. 471—472.

[61] Correspondence etc. London, May 7, 1849.

[62] London, May 18, 1849. H. H. St. A. Wien.

[63] Cf. his letter to Batthyány ut supra.

V.

Activities of Bernal Osborne, Lord Brougham, J. Hume, Monckton Milnes, Roebuck, Thompson and J. Mc. Gregor on behalf of Hungary. — Lord Claude Hamilton's arguments with B. Osborne and M. Milnes on the Hungarian constitution. — Palmerston's great neutral speech. — Hundred members of Parliament pay homage to him in procession. — A Parliamentary Relief Committee formed under Lord Nugent for Hungarian refugees. — Speeches of Cobden, Osborne and Dudley Stuart at the Hungarian meeting in London. — The meeting demands recognition of Kossuth's de facto government. — The resolution before the House of Lords. Lord Brougham against Cobden. — Second meeting in Marylebone presided over by Dudley Stuart. — Pulszky's unchanged optimism. Kossuth's efforts for recognition of his government. — Palmerston under pressure of Parliament and public opinion. His endeavours to intervene on behalf of Hungary.

No one could have denied the European importance of the Russian intervention; even the British Parliament could not have passed it over. The first move was made in the matter by R. Bernal Osborne[64] on May 11th in the House of Commons. He asked Palmerston whether there was any treaty that bound Britain to tolerate the entrance of the Russian troops into Hungary. Was the Government willing to mediate between Austria and Hungary in order to come to a reasonable compromise, or was it to allow the Russian advance in silence?[65]

This speech was followed by laughter. A great many of the members had no clear conception of what had happened on the Danube. Palmerston gave an immediate answer. Russia interfered at Austria's request, therefore he did not see how he could intervene in the matter because Austria did not show any signs of needing British mediation. There was no treaty however that would oblige Britain to guarantee Hungarian integrity.[66]

A few days after, on May 15th, Lord Brougham asked the Government in the House of Lords whether it had received reliable intelligence of the entrance of the Russian troops into a "province"

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[64] Middlesex.

[65] Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 105, p. 326.

[66] Kropf, Lewis, *Anglia és a magyar forradalom* (England and the Hungarian Revolution). Bpesti Szemle (Bpest Review) 1904, pp. 10—11.

of Austria. The Marquess of Landsdowne answered in the affirmative but the Government had not considered it proper to be anxious if one European power needed another's help for restoring order in one of its provinces.

The House of Commons dealt with the matter again on July 6th., on the motion of J. Hume[67] but Lord Russell assured the members that Russia had no intention of occupying Hungary.[68]

With this statement by the Premier the Hungarian question was not passed over finally. On July 21st, B. Osborne explained that the Hungarian struggle had no relation whatever with the French socialist revolution. Kossuth was a representative of religious and civil liberty, just as Washington was. He was fighting for principles which had always been traditionally popular in British public opinion. That was why liberal society was dissatisfied with Palmerston's policy as looking with indifference upon the struggle in Hungary.[69] He explained with distinct ability the political relations between Austria and Hungary by particularly stressing the independent political structure of Hungary during the whole time she had been linked with Austria, since the year 1526. Her constitution had been laid down only seven years after the British constitution.

Osborne was backed by his political friends. M. Milnes[70] later Lord Houghton stressed the European significance of the Russian step, Roebuck[71] urged the Government to condemn the intervention. Or would they wait until Russian expansion reached Constantinople and through Turkey even endangered British interests in Egypt or India? Colonel Thompson[72] protested against Russian despotism, which desired to play a considerable rôle in European policy. "What would have become of Britain in the year of 1688" — he said — "if our grandfathers had been crushed by foreign troops just as has happened now in Hungary?" J. Mc Gregor[73] emphatically agreed with the statements of his friends.

But these pleas for Hungary could not be made without contradiction. Lord Claude Hamilton started a keen debate with Osborne as to the social value of the Hungarian constitution. He

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[67] Montrose, Scotland.
[68] Hansard, vol. 106, p. 1397.
[69] Hansard, vol. 107, pp. 785, 786.
[70] Pontrefact.
[71] Cf. Roebuck, John Arthur, *Life and Letters of* —. London, 1897, p. 231.
[72] Bradford.
[73] Glasgow.

ridiculed Milnes' speech and considered that the poet but not the politician supported Hungary. He denied the "infame" Kossuth's liberal sense; on the contrary he branded the latter as the representative of a feudal nobility which did not pay taxes, nor maintain human relations with the peasantry. Hamilton concluded that he did not care a nap for such a constitution.

He was apparently not aware of the nobility's contribution, which had already been a fact in many instances during the last fifteen years. Nor did he seem to have any knowledge of Kossuth's reform-plans for the constitution, for general tax-paying, for the abolition of all privileges of the nobility and finally for the liberation of the peasantry.

Osborne had no opportunity to refute Hamilton's statements, Palmerston began to speak.[74] It would be an endless discussion — he said — whether Austria is still to be regarded as an ally to Britain or not. But all arguments were of no use if they were directed against a state with which Britain considers herself to be on friendly terms. With a left-handed compliment he ascertained the fact that Austria was compelled to break her alliance with Britain. The cause of it was the irresistible pressure of her needs and — not her fault. The matter of her alliance therefore stood like that.

The political situation in Middle Europe, was very serious. If Hungary succeeded, Austria could not keep the position for which Britain needed her. If Hungary fell, Austria would lose her right arm. Every man who fell in the ranks of the Hungarians must be regarded as an Austrian soldier "deducted from the defensive forces of the Empire". Britain wanted peace and would be glad to see any chance of a mutual agreement between the contesting parties. He was constrained to cite the warnings of Stratford Canning, who said that those who want to impede reforms only because they represent innovations, will sooner or later be compelled to accept innovations when they have ceased to be reforms.[75] Nevertheless, Britain was always ready for mediation but her readiness could not be construed into armed intervention.

Palmerston's speech met with general approval. Especially

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[74] Cf. George, Henry Francis, *Opinion and Policy of the Right Honourable Viscount Palmerston.* London, 1852, pp. 483—90; Granville, Stapleton Augustus, *Intervention and non Intervention or the foreign policy of Great Britain from 1790 to 1865.* London, 1866, p. 116.

[75] Cf. Pauli, Reinold, *Geschichte Englands seit der Friedensschlüssen von 1814 und 1815.* 1875, vol. III, p. 389.

the left wing of the Liberals and the Radical Party became quite enthusiastic. Nearly a hundred members paid homage to him in a great procession. At the same time a Parliamentary Relief Committee was formed to meet the needs of the Hungarian refugees. In this Committee Lord Nugent took the chair.[76]

Upon receiving intelligence of this debate, Pulszky endeavoured to arrange a meeting in London. But it was difficult to get someone in public authority to take the chair. Finally he succeeded in getting Salomon David, an alderman of the City. The meeting was held at the Old London Tavern in Bishopsgate-street, where Cobden reiterated his former campaign against granting credit to Russia and demanded from the city bankers the same reservedness towards Austria. He made up for his absence from the debate of July 21st when he was invited by the Lord Mayor. Osborne called for cheers for Kossuth. Dudley Stuart presented a resolution for the recognition of Kossuth's de facto government. Then he proposed the meeting should petition the House of Lords for intervention with the Austrian Government. He said that political honesty and mutual commercial interest require the adoption of this resolution.[77]

Lord Beaumont willingly undertook its presentation to the House of Lords but he did not find a reception for it. The Tory Lord Brougham keenly criticised Cobden's speech demanding the refusal of credits.[78] Cobden's campaign was a got-up affair, he said. There is no doubt, if God and devil were anxious to negotiate a loan and the City could close with devil on more reasonable terms, the devil would get the loan.[79]

With these words Lord Beaumont succeeded in turning the House's interest from the meeting's resolution. It was therefore resolved without debate to lay it on the table of the House.[80] The reason for this resolution was properly indicated by Palmerston's

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[76] Members of the committee were: Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart, Charles Lushington, Francis Mowatt,, William Scholefield, William Ewart, Monckton Milnes, Ralph Bernard Osborne, Duncombe, Moffart, Marshall. The first collection brought in L 308 ls 4d. Cf. Daily News, July 21, 1849.

[77] Kropf, p. 218; Daily News no. 986. July 24, 1849.

[78] Hansard, vol. 107, p. 962.

[79] Pulszky, p. 456.

[80] Collorado—Schwarzenberg, Bericht no. 32. London, July 26, 1849. H. H. St. A. Wien.

former speech which he delivered in the House of Commons, clearly explaining the Government's attitude.

Besides, there was another meeting for the working classes, held in Marylebone, where Dudley Stuart presided and Hume, Milnes, Col. Thompson and Wyld, all members of Parliament, addressed the public. The meeting adopted the same resolution as had been proposed in London for the recognition of Kossuth's de facto government.

These two meetings were followed by many others held in Westminster, Kensington, and, on August 7th, in Edinburgh with the assistance of the city-councils. An inducement to these manifestations was given by the *Daily News,* which published in extenso the declaration of independence.[81]

As soon as these Hungarian moves became known in Paris, Teleki hastened to the British capital in order to assist Pulszky in his campaign in the press and by meetings for the Hungarian cause. They were also invited to the dinner given by the Lord Mayor to the members of the Parliamentary and Financial Reform Association. Addressing the guests, Pulszky spoke about the possible exchange of British manufactured goods for the agricultural products of Hungary, and Teleki explained the similitude of the British and Hungarian constitutions.[82]

After the dinner both were full of confidence. "Palmerston is still our good friend" — wrote Pulszky to Kossuth — "he detests the Austrian Government and he did not hide his opinion from me... Cobden, the Head of the Peace Party, is a faithful ally of ours; he is even interested in military matters. No one was so useful as he to Hungary though Russia and Austria particularly calculated on his help."[83] "Do'nt worry, the recognition is sure to come... the public took our part more enthusiastically than that of the Poles, Greeks or Italians..." "If we could hold out until the coming winter, the public will force the Government, which wants to avoid war by all possible means..."[84]

These letters, entrusted to Henningsen, were only delivered to Kossuth in Widdin, Turkey, after the defeat in Hungary. Kos-

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[81] July 27, 1849, no. 989.
[82] Daily News: July 26, 1849, no. 988.
[83] London, Aug. 7, 1849. Miscell. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.
[84] London, July 27, 1849. Miscell. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

suth himself hoped for Britain's support until the beginning of August. Even at the end of June he instructed Francis Duschek, his Minister of Finance, to make preliminary arrangements for a commercial treaty with Britain.[85] Then about the middle of July he urged Pulszky to arrange for the recognition of the government. In that desperate state of things he was ready to offer Hungary's crown to a person chosen by the British Government. Kossuth thought of one of the descendants of the Coburg-Kohary family.[86] In case of a British refusal he was even prepared to accept a member of the dethroned House of Hapsburgh, with the exception of Francis Joseph. Further he expressed his readiness to enter into a federation with Turkey in order to restore the balance of power in Eastern Europe by that means instead of the dissolution of Austria. This overhasty change of political combinations indicates his presentiment of the collapse, which had actually drawn very near.[87]

But all his endeavours were in vain. Though Palmerston decided in August under pressure of public opinion to mediate in Vienna[88] Schwarzenberg was not willing to read his notes. He went to Warsaw and requested the Tsar to send more troops to Hungary, for he wanted to obtain her capitulation by force of arms. In the meantime Palmerston endeavoured to induce Prussia and France to assist him in his mediation, but neither Schleinitz nor Tocqueville were ready to join in his action[89].

On August 13th Stephen Görgey, commander in chief of the Hungarian army, laid down his arms before Prince Paskievich, the Russian Generalissimo. So Palmerston's mediation came too late. Even Schwarzenberg's journey to Warsaw became superflous: Tocquille and Schleinitz had rightly estimated the course of events.

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[85] Pest, June 24, 1849. M. F. no. 696. P. R. O. Bpest.

[86] Cf. his ideas on this plan in a letter addressed to the Polish general Bem, former commander of the Hungarian forces in Transylvania. Tergova, Aug. 14, 1849. Published by Horváth Michael, vol. III, pp. 517—18.

[87] Batthyány—Pulszky, Szeged, July 14, 1849; Pulszky, vol. I, p. 503; Sproxton, pp. 74—75.

[88] Károlyi, vol. I, p. 547.

[89] Schleinitz to Bunsen, the Prussian Minister in London, Varia de Prussie, Berlin, Aug. 20, 1849; Bericht no. 94, Paris, Aug. 11, 1849. H. H. St. A. Wien.

VI.

Impression in London on Görgey's surrender. — Kossuth's flight to Turkey with the assistance of the British consul in Belgrade. — Chaos in Constantinople. — Russian and Austrian démarche to the Porte for extradition of Polish and Hungarian refugees. — Rumours of the Porte's advice to Kossuth and his compatriots to become Mussulmen. — Kossuth's resistance. Makes his will. Ready to die. — Stratford Canning against religious pressure by the Porte. — Kossuth implores Canning's and Aupick's, his French colleague's, assistance.

The intelligence of Görgey's surrender first reached London on August 21st and created a great sensation, for its reasons were not immediately clear. Plenty of rumours of doubtful authenticity went round. One heard much of the Polish troops which were alleged to have caused the collapse. Though they did not have a large share in the national defence, yet their presence might well have contributed to the Russian intervention. The Globe openly expressed its disappointment at the turn of affairs and said, if Austria abused her victory — which in fact Russia had gained — British sympathy for Hungary would not cease.[90]

Among the London diplomatists the Hungarian question had also been discussed. When questioned Baron Brunnow, the Russian Minister apologized for Russia's attitude. Shortly before the surrender of Görgey, Brunnow was authorized by Nesselrode to declare that Russia would not help Austria to abolish Hungarian independence. The intervention purported only to save the internal régime in Russia, which seemed to be seriously endangered by the Hungarian rising.[91]

The sympathy was general in Britain, with the exception of the conservatives. Sixten members of Parliament headed by Lord Fitzwilliam sent a memorandum to Russell and Palmerston requesting their intervention.[92] The sympathy-meeting arranged by

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[90] D'Isola, Sardinian chargé d'affaires—D'Azeglio, Minister for Foreign Affairs, London, Aug. 29, 1849. Lettere ministri. Gran Bretagna, no. 41. Archivio di Stato, Torino.

[91] E. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Minister in London—Tocqueville. Report no. 40. London, Aug. 15, 1849. Angleterre, vol. 674. A. d. M. A. E. Paris.

[92] Daily News: Aug. 29, 1849, no. 1017.

Dudley Stuart and Cobden[93] adopted resolutions in the same sense. As soon as the executions of Hungarian generals and the violent administrative methods started by Austria became known to the public, Cobden addressed an open letter to Bach, the Austrian Minister of the Interior condemning his system indignantly.[94]

The Hungarian army, faced with superior Russian and Austrian troops could not but retreat on all fronts. In the meantime Kossuth's Government took refuge in Arad but it felt uneasy at being under Görgey's influence. In consequence of this situation Görgey demanded from Kossuth to be given full power to carry on all military and civil affairs, supposing that he would thus have the means of holding out to the end. Kossuth agreed. He thought of death and felt that if Hungary fell he must himself sacrifice his own life.

But some time later his vitality prevailed. He thought that he would be more useful alive to his country, even in disaster. Again it was in Britain that he thought of taking refuge. He wanted to fly. Lenoir-Zwierkowski, the Polish agent of Prince Czartorisky, procured a passport given by Fonblanque, the British Consul General in Belgrade. Under the fictitious name of "James Bloomfield" he crossed the Hungarian frontier.[95] But before he decided to risk the flight he raised the question at the Porte, whether he might consider himself free on Turkish territory. Omer Pasha, the commander in chief of the Turkish troops in the Wallachian Principality, assured him of the Porte's protection. There is no reason to believe — he answered — that the Porte would extradite him to the Vienna Government.[96]

In fact he continued his journey as far as Viddin without any hindrance, but he was told there by Zia Pasha that he must await the Porte's new decision. Kossuth had misgivings. He therefore asked Sir Stratford Canning and General Aupick, the British and French Ministers in Constantinople, to intervene on behalf of his freedom.[97]

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[93] Hammersmith, cf. Daily News, Aug. 31; Norwich, ibidem, Sept. 12. London Tavern, ibidem, Oct. 9; Bristol, ibidem, Oct. 11.

[94] Daily News: Nov. 20, 1849, no. 1088. See appendix, no. 3.

[95] Lenoir—Count Zamoyski, Zamoyski Papers. Belgrade, Aug. 17, 1849 — cited by Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 451, 452.

[96] Kossuth—Omer Pasha, Kalafat, Aug. 22, 1849 — Hajnal, vol. I, p. 453.

[97] Kossuth—Canning, Viddin, Aug. 22, 1849 — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 455—458.

There was real anarchy in Constantinople. The most contradictory news was eagerly received by the public. Neither Count Julius Andrássy, the former agent of Kossuth at the Porte, who replaced the gallant Major Brown, nor Czajkowski, the agent of Prince Czartorisky could see clearly in this chaos of politics. Both turned to Canning and both understood Canning's information in a different manner. Czajkowski was glad to learn that Vienna already accepted Palmerston's mediation and that Ponsonby was en route to Warsaw following Schwarzenberg. But Russia did not accept the mediation and the Tsar ordered Paskievich to force the total destruction of the Hungarian armies.[98] According to Andrássy's information, Canning did not know anything about mediation. He was pleased to write Kossuth of the Porte's decision to take him under its protection. He thought he was to be confined for a while on the island of Candia until he could continue his voyage to Britain. This time would come when the Porte had settled the matter of the refugees with Russia and Austria.

Events moved rapidly. The Tsar sent Prince Radzivil to the Sultan with an autograph letter demanding the extradition of the Polish refugees. As to the Hungarians, he explained that their departure from Viddin would be considered as a casus belli.

None of the Turkish statesmen was prepared for this démarche. There was great consternation among the members of the Great Council, who demanded from the Government in a violent session the extradition of all the refugees. Opinions among the ministers were divided, but the majority voted against extradition.

Andrássy at once reported this bad news to Kossuth. Only his conversion to Islam, together with that of his fellows-refugees, could save them from extradition in case of the Porte being unable to avoid the united Russo-Austrian demands. This was the advice that some of the ministers forwarded to Kossuth.[99]

Upon receiving Andrássy's letter Kossuth was much depressed. He invoked the immediate support of Palmerston,[100] for he only relied upon Britain, "in that great and glorious nation the natural supporter of justice and humanity in the world".

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[98] Czajkowski—Count Zamoyski, Constantinople, Aug. 27, 1849 — Hajnal, vol. I, p. 457.

[99] Andrássy—Kossuth, Constantinople, Sept. 11, 1849 — Hajnal, vol. I, p. 472.

[100] Cf. Korn, Philipp, *Neueste Kronik der Magyaren.* Hamburg, 1851, pp. 99 et seq.

"Though I have finished my political career" — he wrote — "still I have before me the duties of honour. Once governor of a generous country, I leave no heritage to my children. They shall have at least my unsullied name. I am ready to die. The will of God may be fulfilled . . ."[101]

These words were no mere phrases: they truly expressed his absolute depression. He made a will in favour of his family and entrusted it to his fellow-refugee, the Count Richard Guyon, who was of Polish origin but a British subject, whose release seemed to be certain by British diplomatic intervention.[102]

But it was difficult to find a reliable courier to forward his letter to Palmerston. By chance he was relieved of these cares by Roger Casement, a former officer of the British army, who accepted the task and handed Kossuth's letter over to Palmerston in ten days from his departure from Viddin.[103] He then wrote to Reschid Pasha[104] the Grand Vizier and to the ministers Canning[105] and Aupick[106] in the sense of his letter to Palmerston.

The situation was indeed grave. Austria was as impatient as Russia in demanding extradition.[107] It happened in February 1849 when Count Stürmer, the Austrian Internuncio in Constantinople,

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[101] Viddin, Sept. 20, 1849. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[102] Kossuth—Guyon, Viddin, Oct. 8, 1849. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[103] Roger Casement, an Irishman stationed in the East Indies but resigned his commission and returned to Britain where he attended a meeting held in London on behalf of the Hungarian cause. At the request of Dudley Stuart who presided at the meeting he undertook to deliver to Kossuth the address of the meeting, but reached Hungary only after the surrender of Világos. He therefore continued his journey to Turkey and happened to be in Viddin when Kossuth was looking for a courier to Palmerston. — Kossuth met Casement once again in Hatford, Conn. USA. during his trip in the New England States on April 13, 1852, but he disappeared before Kossuth could recognize him. His son was Sir Roger Casement (1864—1916). Cf. *Kossuth in New England: a full account of the Hungarian governor's visit to Massachusets.* Boston, 1852. Edited by Robert Carter, pp. 20—22; see further Kropf, *Roger Casement* in the Bpesti Szemle (Bpest Review), May, 1905, pp. 268—275; Kossuth, Lewis, *Irataim* (Writings) , vol. III, chapt. IV; United Irishman, *Kossuth's Irish Courier,* February 25, 1905.

[104] Shoumla, Nov. 26, 1849. — Tecco—D'Azeglio. Enclosure to Rapp. no. 744, Constantinople, January 15, 1850, Legatione di Porta Ottomana, A. St. Turin.

[105] Hajnal, vol. I, p. 474.

[106] Viddin, Oct. 16, 1849, Turquie, vol. 302. A. d. M. A. E. Paris.

[107] Temperley, Harold, The Crimea. London, 1936, pp. 261 et seq.

raised the question with Aali Pasha,[108] the Foreign Minister as to the attitude of the Porte in case of the Hungarian leaders taking refuge within the Turkish dominions. Stürmer then acted upon instruction received from Prince Windischgrätz, the Austrian Generalissimo. The question was based on a treaty made between the two powers in 1739. It contained the mutual obligation to deny refuge to rebels and to punish them in the event of their capture on their respective territories.

Stürmer must have understood that the extradition of Hungarian refugees according to that treaty could be demanded, all the more because the Austrian Government had a few years ago refused to extradite the Bosnian and Herzegovinian insurgents who took refuge on Austrian territory.

Then Stürmer sought for another solution. In conformity with the peace of Belgrade made in 1739, the diplomatic representatives of Austria were authorized to exercise jurisdiction over Austrian subjects living in Turkish territory. Now, if the Porte were willing to help the Austrians on this basis to capture the refugees, Austria would have attained the aim she was striving for.

Without a mutual agreement as to the interpretation of the treaty having been reached, the collapse came and Stürmer now formulated his previous demand for the actual extradition of Kossuth and his comrades. But the Sultan made it clear that he could not comply with his demand. He promised Stürmer to guard the refugees in Viddin as long as they might endanger the restoration of order in the Austrian Empire.[109]

On the other hand, Russia had in fact a good right to claim the extradition of the Polish refugees. In conformity with the stipulations of the treaty of 1774, both powers agreed to remove or to extradite mutually their respective subjects if they took refuge on the contracting party's territory and committed any crime or treason.

Canning was informed by the Porte of all particulars of the negotiations. He was sure the Turkish Ministers would never take any decisive step without asking his opinion. In this diplomatic contest he again took a prominent rôle. The Porte raised the questions to him and to the French Minister: 1. Are the refugees

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[108] Rosen, G., *Geschichte der Türkei von dem Siege der Reform im Jahre 1826 bis zum Pariser Tractat vom Jahre 1856.* Leipzig, 1867, vol. II, pp. 126—131: Stellung der Pforte z. d. ungar. Aufstande. Die Flüchtlingsfrage.

[109] Rapport no. 37 litt. C — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 722—724.

to be considered as political emigrants? 2. May the Porte rely upon Britain's and France's support in case of the present strained relations being followed by war? Both questions were answered by the ministers positively in the affirmative.[110]

With the existing intimate relations, it now happened for the first time in many years that the Porte did not ask Canning's opinion as to the advice given to the refugees to become converts to Islam. Canning felt deeply offended in his religious sense when he learned this fact from Kosuth's imploring letter. He did not like to joke or to make politics about religious questions. In fact, Aali alluded to that in a conversation with him, a few weeks before. He then protested in very "pointed terms" that Kossuth should have "the eventual alternative of death by the hand of the executioner or escape by means of conversion to Islam."[111]

Upon receiving Kossuth's letter he protested again and succeeded. Reschid explained that the Porte's advice concerning conversion would only be regarded as an "error" committed against the refugees. Again he accepted Canning's proposal to move Kossuth from Viddin to Shoumla as soon as the diplomatic coolness with Russia and Austria had abated.[112]

Canning had already succeeded some weeks before in encouraging the Porte's resistance upon the receipt of the Tsar's letter, as well as of the démarches presented by Titov, the Russian Minister, and Stürmer. It required much firmness from the Porte to be courageous enough to take neutral attitude. The Porte then answered the Russian and Austrian representatives: the Sultan cannot say yes, on the other hand he cannot say no. But he protests already in advance if anyone assumes his answer to be negative.[113]

After long hesitation the Porte decided not to hand over the refugees, but it wanted time to gain the support of Britain and France. And this was exclusively Canning's merit. He was himself convinced of it and did not fail to express it plainly to Palmerston "If I would have ceased even for a moment to support the Porte" — he wrote to Palmerston — "I am sure, it would have yielded

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[110] Andrássy—Kossuth, Sept. 24, 1849. — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 489—492.

[111] Canning—Palmerston, Oct. 5, 1849, no. 298. F. O. 78/780, P. R. O. London.

[112] Ut supra.

[113] Rapport no. 38. litt. G. — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 736—737.

to the démarches."[114] But the refugees had of course not the least idea that their lives were saved by Canning's firmness.

VII.

Canning calls for British Mediterranean Squadron. — diplomacy in St. Petersburgh and Vienna. — Uneasiness of Russian and Austrian Ministers in London. — Difficulties arising from the entrance of the Squadron into the Dardanelles. — Impression made upon St. Petersburgh and Vienna. — The demand of extradition given up by the Absolute Powers. — The Porte's agreement with Nesselrode on the detention of the Polish refugees. — Aali encouraged by Canning to resist Austrian demands. — Rumours started by Stürmer of Kossuth's liberation by the British Consul in Varna. — Stürmer wants to hide the attempt to murder Kossuth. — Canning's intervention comes in time. — The Porte's agreement with Austria concerning detention. — Canning alleviates the refugees' voyage to Asia Minor.

Canning maintained his courageous attitude all the time during the diplomatic campaign. The British Blue Book shows that he sollicited Admiral Parker — upon his own responsibility — to send the Squadron to be put at the disposal of the Embassy.[115] Palmerston was also indignant at the demand of the Absolute Powers and resolved immediately to support Turkey in maintaining her sovereignty. Russell, Landsdowne and Grey shared his opinion as far as the Turkish sovereignty was concerned, though they were far from being as enthusiastic for the refugees as Palmerston. What is more, Russell did not refrain from qualifying the Hungarian refugees as rebels.[116] Nevertheless upon Palmerston's explanation the Cabinet agreed to Canning's measures and requested the First Lord of the Admirality to give orders to the Mediterranean Squadron.

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[114] Therapia, Sept. 17, 1849; Ashley, Evelyn, *The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston.* 1876, vol. II, p. 150; Alter, Wilhelm, *Die auswärtige Politik der ungar. Revolution.* Berlin, 1912, p. 228.

[115] Correspondence no. 14. Enclosure. Therapia: Sept. 17, 1849.

[116] Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Minister in London to Tocqueville. Rapp. no. 65, London, Sept. 29, 1849, Angleterre, vol. 674. A. d. M. A. E. Paris.

Of course the importance of this measure would have been much greater if France had shown willingness to cooperate. Callimachi, the Turkish Minister in Paris had already called — by order of the Porte — for the French Cabinet's moral and material support.[117] Tocqueville sent him an encouraging letter. Palmerston, being aware of the grave situation, acted immediately. By his order Normanby, the British Minister in Paris, redoubled his efforts to gain over Napoleon for a joint demonstration. The French Cabinet hesitated. General Changarnier opposed the British call. After the bloody fighting in the near past he wanted to have peace at any price. Peace seemed to be in jeopardy if France brought on dissension in the Oriental question by sending her Squadron to partake in a demonstration. Finally Napoleon's will prevailed and on October 10th the Cabinet voted for cooperation with Britain.[118] As to the period of this demonstration, the French President suggested to Normanby that discretionary power should be given to Canning and Aupick for the return of the fleets from the Dardanelles.[119]

Palmerston and Canning did not let slip the opportunity to express their dislike of Schwarzenberg in order to be revenged for the latter's brusque refusal of British mediation. Even at the time when Kossuth took refuge in Turkey, Palmerston wrote to Canning in an indignant manner about Austrian policy, which would treat the emigrant Hungarians like "thieves and brigands".[120] Even in diplomatic circles Palmerston did not conceal his opinion, which was commented on with regret by Count Colloredo, the Austrian Minister in London. He urgently requested Schwarzenberg to relieve him of his office, which had become "a mere sinecure", for he could not maintain his relations with Downing Street any longer.

Palmerston behaved very skillfully towards Colloredo. Upon

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[117] Callimach—Tocqueville, Paris, Oct. 5, 1849. Copy. F. O. 27/848. P. R. O. London.

[118] Another brilliant officer, Capt. Townley undertook to deliver Palmerston's despatch concerning France's assistance to Canning. Cf. Sir Ward, A. W. and Gooch, J. P., *The Cambridge history of British Foreign Policy. 1783—1919.* Cambridge, 1922—23, vol. II: *Hungary and Kossuth,* pp. 309—321.

[119] Normanby—Palmerston, no. 535, Paris, Nov. 13, 1849. F. O. 27/848. P. R. O. London.

[120] Correspondence, London, Sept. 24, 1849.

the question raised by the latter, why he suported Turkey, he answered that he acted only upon the request of the Porte. Again Fuad Effendi, the Sultan's extraordinary envoy to the Tsar, who had the task of giving a detailed account to the latter of the causes which led the Sultan to a negative answer, reported in an entirely different manner about Palmerston. He said, Palmerston supported the Porte of his own accord. Contrary to Fuad Effendi's word's, Aali had good reason to deny that support to Stürmer. He did not want to give evidence of the Porte's helplessness and strove anxiously to hide the apparent weakness of her sovereignty.

The truth was that Palmerston acted upon Aali's request when he tried to induce the Russian and Austrian Cabinets to show more inclination to give way over the extradition. It was a thankless task for the British diplomatic representatives to make this attitude understood in Vienna and in St. Petersburgh, but all the same more easy to carry into effect than to announce the united action of the British and French Squadron in the Bosphorus. Ponsonby particularly had to solve the problem of the manner in which to convey to Schwarzenberg Palmerston's advice. The British Foreign Secretary thought that it would be profitable for Austria to support Turkey against Russia. Austria was on the way to commit the greatest faux pas — he said — for she wanted to unite Britain and France in her own attitude.

He then wrote to Bloomfield, the British Minister in St. Petersburgh, asking him to express his peaceful intentions to Nesselrode. The appearance of the Squadrons in the Bosphorus did not signify inimical feelings towards Russia.[121] Again in London he said to Brunnow, the Russian Minister, he should not attach particular importance to the Squadron's appearance. It was only a bottle of smelling-salts put under a frightened woman's nose . . .[122]

Brunnow understood the joke, still he felt that men of war are "peculiar messengers" of peace. But diplomatic circles did not find anything new in Palmerston's habit of joking with affairs which annoyed Colloredo so much.[123] And when the London press printed sensational reports about the entrance of the Squadrons into the Straits, Baron Koller, the Austrian chargé d'affaires, again asked the Foreign Secretary for acceptable reasons for it. Again

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[121] Correspondence, no. 62.

[122] Ashley, vol. II, p. 163. — Correspondence, no. 52.

[123] Cf. Colloredo—Schwarzenberg, Oct. 22, 1849, Private letter. England, Varia, H. H. St. A. Wien.

Palmerston answered in an evasive manner. He spoke of the inclemency of wheather which induced Admiral Parker, whose Squadron was staying only *accidentally* in the Beshika Bay, to request the Turkish authorities to grant him harbourage within the fortresses of the Straits.[124]

Palmerston had no doubt a peculiar sense of humour. Still he noticed himself that his answer to Koller might lead to ineffectual discussions. The treaty of 1841 between the five Powers interested in the Straits did not render it possible that a man of war should anchor in peace-time within the outer fortresses of the Straits. In fact it was not Palmerston's intention that Squadrons should anchor within the fortified Straits. He did not fail to express his displeasure to Canning. His plans were frustrated by the Squadron's entrance within the fortified zone due to the inclement weather. But if by chance it happened he left it to Canning's judgment to appoint the time of its withdrawal.[125] General Aupick received similar instruction as to the French Squadron's return.

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The arrival and entrance of the Squadrons in the Straits created great excitement in the Russian and Austrian diplomatic missions. After having suspended diplomatic relations with the Porte, both representatives felt themselves in very delicate position, for they had no chance to ask Aali for an explanation personally.

Even in St. Petersburgh and Vienna the news of the Squadrons made a deep impression. Neither of the Absolute Powers had any interest in piling up diplomatic defeats and helping by their continuous resistance the establishment of durable relations between Britain and France which would strengthen the influence of both powers at the Golden Gate. Therefore they decided to give up their demand for extradition and sought new ways for mutual understanding.

But the negotiations failed to make headway. They had to be conducted in writing because of the interrupted diplomatic relations. Schwarzenberg pressed the Porte to undertake the detention of the refugees and further to maintain it until internal order and peace were established in Hungary. Schwarzenberg wished to

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[124] Report no. 52. litt. A—B. England. H. H. St. A. Wien. — Hajnal, vol. II, p. 819.

[125] Correspondence no. 75, 76.

reserve the right to determine when this could be considered as done.

At the beginning of these negotiations the difficulties were almost insurmountable. Persuaded by Beaumont, the French Minister in Vienna, Mussurus, the Turkish Minister, was ready to accept the demand of Schwarzenberg on behalf of his Government, yet this agreement was disavowed by Aali, who acted with Palmerston's encouragement.[126]

The British Foreign Secretary would have preferred it if the Porte had made an agreement similar to that already made between Nesselrode and Fuad as to the fate of the Polish refugees. If this were done, the Porte would be enabled to expel all the refugees from its territory excepting a few leading politicians, among them of course Kossuth, whose detention could have been negotiated separately.

Aali was in a stronger position than Schwarzenberg. Upon the agreement with Nesselrode he resumed diplomatic intercourse with Titov, and consequently Stürmer became isolated. The latter urged Aali in vain to accept the preparatory agreement between Schwarzenberg and Mussurus. Canning stood firm behind Aali and pressed him to resist. Aali, he said, must not be the tool of Austria's vengeance.[127] Canning quarrelled a great deal with Aali, who understood only to a limited degree "where firmness is safer than concession".[128] He now urgently recommended Aali to refuse any Austrian control over the refugees if they were removed from the Balkans and presumably detained somewhere in Asia Minor.

Supported by Canning, Aali was now ready to undertake the detention of the refugees. As to its duration, he thought he had plenty of time to negotiate. Stürmer showed himself very anxious to supervise their transportation to the Near East. He requested Aali to exercise the greatest caution. He brought him news about the British Consul's alleged attempt in Varna to liberate Kossuth and Bem, the famous Polish general, while under way between Shoumla and Varna.[129]

No doubt Aali heard this "news" with ironical amusement.

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[126] Rapport no. 1, C. Constantinople, Jan. 2, 1850, Turkey, H. H. St. A. Wien.

[127] Rapport no. 1, c. Jan. 2, 1850. Turkey, H. H. St. A. Wien.

[128] Canning—Palmerston, Therapia: Dec. 24, 1849, no. 384. F. O. 78/783. P. R. O. London. See appendix, no. 5.

[129] Rapport no. 5, C. Jan. 16, 1850. H. H. St. A. Wien.

He was already well informed about the ineffective attempt to murder Kossuth. Jazmagy, the Dragoman of the Austrian Internuncio, engaged some Croats to commit the crime. Their plan was to induce Kossuth to attempt escape and then to murder him en route between Shoumla and Varna.

Canning was previously informed of this plot by Baron Tecco, his Sardinian colleague. Though he suspected its authenticity, he immediately informed Aali and Colonel Eduard Neal, the British Consul in Varna, in order that they might take precautionary measures. This was the truth of Neal's attempt to assist Kossuth's escape, so Stürmer informed the Porte.[130]

Apart from this "unsuccessful anxiety" of Stürmer, he used every opportunity to slander Kossuth. He called Aali's attention to Kossuth's alleged conspiracy with the emigrants living in the Western States. He charged him with setting up a particular tribunal in the camp at Shoumla whose activity was contradictory to Turkish and Austrian jurisdiction as exerted by the consular service on Ottoman territory. But Aali paid no attention to this. Nor had he any inclination to discuss Stürmer's recent demand for the prolongation of the refugees' confinement for five years.[131]

It was personal animosity which induced Stürmer to assume this attitude. He was instructed by Schwarzenberg to propose to Aali a period of less than five years for Kossuth's detention, yet he persevered. Aali would have been open to an agreement for one or two years but Canning positively reminded that "it would be the best to consult his own dignity and interest by adhering to his last proposition involved in question of months and not years".[132]

Aali became a "hard nut" for Canning and Stürmer. But the Turkish Minister preferred peace with both as far as it was attainable. He sent a circular note to the Turkish missions abroad informing them of the Porte's decision to oppose any entrance of men-of-war in the Straits. Of course this note was forwarded at a time when the British and French Squadrons had already

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[130] Canning—Palmerston, Therapia: Dec. 26, 1849, no. 387; Private letter from Dec. 28, 1849. F. O. 78/783, P. R. O. London.

[131] Cf. Lane-Poole Stanley, *Life of Sir Stratford Canning.* London, vol. II, pp. 203—205; Greer, Donald, *L'Angleterre, la France et la révolution de 1848.* Paris, p. 315.

[132] Canning—Palmerston, February 16, 1850, no. 50. F. O. 78/871. P. R. O. London.

left.[133] Aali wished with this note to outstrip the probable Russian and Austrian démarches. Yet with the object of expressing his gratitude for Palmerston's help, the note declared with oriental elasticity that the Squadron's entrance within the fortified zone of the Straits could not be considered as a breach of existing treaties: it only resulted from a vis major that could not have been avoided.

As to the details of the detention, the Cabinet Council resolved to conclude a preliminary agreement with Schwarzenberg as to its duration. Yet it wanted to take Canning's advice that the detention could not be prolonged for more than one year.[134] Reserving this point of view, Aali suggested to Stürmer that they should leave this contested point open in order at least to make the detention effective.[135]

This was the position when the order was given by the Porte to transport Kossuth and some of his compatriots, nominated by Stürmer, to Kutahia, in Asia Minor. They left Varna on February 20, 1850, by boat for Gemlek and then continued their voyage in carriages or on horseback. Canning requested Aali to postpone the long and tiring journey from Gemlek to Kutahia until the bad weather was over.[136] Aali agreed, and the party spent a month in a small port of Gemlek and arrived only on April 12th in Kutahia, where they had to stay for more than a year and a half.[137]

VIII.

Kossuth hopes for his early release and journey to Britain. —Projects in Viddin for the establishment of a refugee colony. — Kossuth annoyed with Canning's attitude in agreeing to his detention. — Plans for the recommencement of the struggle in Hungary. — Kossuth's memorandum to the Porte as to the presumable issue of her conflict with Russia. — His presentiment of war over the Oriental Question. — Henningen's mission to

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[133] Corresp. no. 119, 131; Rapp. No. 11, Constantinople, Febr. 6, 1850. H. H. St. A. Wien.

[134] Rapp. no. 13, B, Constantinople, Febr. 13, 1850. H. H. St. A. Wien.

[135] Rapp. no. 15, A—C, Constantinople, Febr. 20, 1850. H. H. St. A. Wien.

[136] Canning—Palmerston, Constantinople, March 15, 1850, F. O. 78/818. P. R. O. London; see further Canning—Kossuth, Constantinople, May 30, 1850. Ko. Pp. Bpest. Appendix no. 6.

[137] László's Diary, pp. 36—38.

London to procure a loan and military equipment. — Instructions for Pulszky to urge his release. — Palmerston's sympathy for Kossuth is dictated by humanity and not by political considerations. — Argument between the Times and the Daily News over the Hungarian Question. — Pro-Austrian attitude of the Morning Chronicle, the Herald and The Morning Post. — Motion of Lord Dudley Stuart in the House of Commons.

Kossuth had no exact knowledge of what had happened behind the scenes. Though Andrássy kept him informed of the results of the negotiations, the details were often unknown to him. For this reason Kossuth could not properly estimate the importance of the facts. This circumstance, as well as his impressionable character, often led him to a conclusion which was far beyond any reasonable deduction. He was susceptible to extreme sentiments. Now unbounded optimism overpowered him.

As soon as the dangers of conversion and extradition were over he was convinced that he would be able to leave Turkey for Britain. Impressed by Pulszky's letters, he considered British public opinion as still favourable to his cause. He did not imagine that Palmerston or Canning could not or would not bring about his immediate release. "In a few weeks I shall reach Britain" — he wrote to his wife — "and hope to save my country. But I am afraid to write about my projects and prospects for I do not want to reveal them to my country's executioners . . ."[138]

Henningsen was also responsible to a considerable extent for this optimistic view, because he spoke in persuasive terms of the bright prospects which he were ahead. Henningsen led him to believe that he was in close contact with Palmerston. On account of this Kossuth trusted him to intervene on his behalf with the Secretary of State.[139]

Apart from his impatiance while awaiting his release, he positively insisted on his compatriots' remaining in Turkey. He wanted to see them gathered in a colony where all of them could find proper conditions for living and were free of the fear of being separated. His idea was to organize them with military

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[138] Viddin, Nov. 1, 1849. Vö. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest. — Cf. Hajnal, vol. I, p. 525.

[139] Fonblanque—Palmerston, Belgrade, March 18, 1850. F. O. 78/826. P. R. O. London. Fonblanque asked Palmerston whether he was on intimate terms with Henningsen. Palmerston's answer was definitely negative. Compare his draft to Fonblanque, London, April 10, 1850. F. O. 78/826. Ibidem.

discipline in order to have them at his disposal as soon as the new insurrection broke out.

The Porte of course did not sympathize with Kossuth's project because its carrying into effect was considered as a permanent object of diplomatic démarches. Canning also shared this opinion and was not willing to support his aims.[140]

The beginning of November brought him the alarming news of his coming detention by the Porte in Asia Minor.[141] He wrote to Palmerston in an imploring tone and felt hurt by Canning's apparent indifference. He complained of Canning's attitude in considering him as a disturber of the peace and assisting in his removal from Europe. "It is a question of deportation and not internment" — he wrote to Henningsen — "that Canning has in view in collaboration with the Porte." ...„But, please, do not tell anybody that I am discontented with Canning's attitude..."[142]

In spite of this discouraging situation he did not cease to urge Pulszky to raise a subscription or to negotiate a loan — at least ten thousand Pounds — for preliminary preparations of war in Hungary. According to the usual emigrant's psychology, Kossuth was always full of visions of undoing what was already done. Then he wanted to use every means to return home. He decided to prepare an insurrection or an invasion if European politics would not enable him to liberate Hungary from the Austrian rule.

All these dreams and combinations depended upon Turkey's and Britain's tacit consent. It was clear to him that military invasion or the preparation of an insurrection could only be carried out from Turkish territory. On the other hand British sympathies seemed to him useful for influencing European public opinion in favour of violent methods.

As matters stood in Europe, Kossuth was convinced that the antagonism that existed between Russia and Turkey must necessarily lead to war. He deplored the failure of the Porte to use the question of the refugees as a pretext for war. Of course, the Porte was not prepared for that, yet Britain and France would have helped her in their own interests. His idea was that, in case of war, even the refugees themselves and the Slavonic provinces of the Ottoman Empire could have given considerable support to

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[140] Kossuth—Canning, Viddin, Nov. 2, 1849. — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 526—527.

[141] Andrássy—Kossuth, Constantinople, Nov. 1, 1849. — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 541—542.

[142] Shoumla, Dec. 7, 1849. — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 559—562.

the Porte. By missing this exceptional chance the Porte itself helped to strengthen Russia's faith in her ability to expand. If the huge roller of Panslavism started to move, the fate of European Turkey was definitively sealed.

Kossuth put his ideas in the form of a memorandum and hastened to communicate them to the Porte. He forwarded a copy to Henningsen and urged him to send at least ten thousand rifles to the British Consul in Varna. "I am convinced" — he wrote — "the war will break out next spring: it has to break out. I see the signs . . ."[143]

But when the internment was carried into effect, all these plans had to be abandoned. He complained bitterly of the change in the Porte's friendly feelings, but it had not cared for his incessant protests during the diplomatic campaign. Its dissatisfaction with Kossuth's attitude dated from his letter to Palmerston. General Aupick also shared the Porte's opinion and refrained from offering Kossuth further support because of his accusing manner towards the Porte.[144]

The Polish refugees also turned away from him. Czajkowski, the agent of Prince Czartoriski in Constantinople, wrote to Zamoyski, the former aide-de-camp of General Bem, that France could only consider the Hungarians in the same light as the Poles.[145]

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After recuperating from the fatigues of a long and weary journey to Kutahia, Kossuth again started his efforts for release. He incessantly implored Canning for aid, but the latter could do nothing but advise him to persevere.[146] Finding no success with the British Minister, he instructed Pulszky to present his views to Palmerston personally. If Downing Street was ready to provoke Russia on behalf of Greece, why did it not show a more resolute attitude on behalf of the Hungarian emigrants? "If the profession of diplomacy consists in creating general dissatisfaction which would practically mean that no one should be saved and no one

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[143] Kossuth—Henningsen, Shoumla, January 5, 1850. — Hajnal, vol. I, p. 632.

[144] Aupick—De la Hitte, Therapia: Dec. 5, 1849, Turquie, vol. 302. A. d. M. A. E. Paris.

[145] Constantinople, Jan. 11, 1850. — Cf. Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 643—45.

[146] Canning—Kossuth, Constantinople, May 6, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

should be damned but all should burn in purgatory, — then the British Cabinet shows itself expert in the matter. There is no doubt" — wrote Kossuth in his violent letter — "that Palmerston regards the Hungarian question as a negligeable affair. Anyway, the honourable Lord must known that no names cause more sleepless nights in Vienna than his and mine . . .[147]

Pulszky did not fail to express Kossuth's views in a more diplomatic form, but Palmerston said that the Sultan himself had pledged his word to the Emperor of Austria. For that reason he could not prevent the detention because he could not disown the Sultan. But it would not last very long, for the Porte had bound itself to a term of one year.

Further, Pulszky gave Kossuth to understand that his political plans were impracticable if he thought that Britain would support Turkey against Russia with armed force. Downing Street desired the victory of liberal principles against absolutism, but actually did nothing to assist them. Britain represented a separate part of the Globe with all her colonies, whose immense territories were greater than the European continent. Since her manufactured products were shut off from European countries excepting Portugal and Turkey, she isolated herself from the continent and took no interest in such small problems as that of the refugees. If Palmerston still showed interest in the Hungarian question, it was only due to his human feelings and not to political considerations. "C'est tout! In vain! Palmerston is an old man of sixty-six, Lord Landsdowne, the President of the Council, is seventy-two; the Whig party is already stricken in years! . . ." — he wrote in a tone of resignation to Kossuth.[148]

The only promise Palmerston would give Pulszky was his readiness to instruct Canning to use his influence for the alleviation of the lot of refugees. This the latter had already done, without instructions. When Kossuth's children were permitted to leave by the Austrian Empire to join their parents, Canning saw to it that they travelled in safety. He did his utmost for their welfare. Klezl was indignant on learning of Lady Canning's walks with them in the streets of Stambul.[149] Sandison, the British Consul in Brussa, also consoled Kossuth and advised him to plan his escape un-

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[147] Kossuth—Pulszky, Kutahia, May 17, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.
[148] London, July 30, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.
[149] Klezl—Schwarzenberg, Rapp. no. 6, A—D, June 15, 1850. H. H. St. A. Wien.

aided.[150] Though this letter was intercepted and never reached the addressee, it fully proves the writer's sympathy for him.

At the beginning of September 1850, Palmerston ordered the British Minister in Vienna to call Schwarzenberg's attention to the fact that the term of one year's detention was already up. Palmerston took the most favourable view on behalf of the refugees by reckoning the time as from their reaching Turkish territory. In view of the fact that the American Government had offered the Porte a free passage for the refugees to the United States, Palmerston now asked Schwarzenberg if he would be willing to advise the Porte to accept the American offer. Schwarzenberg naturally received the British message with displeasure and immediately ordered Klezl to counteract Canning's steps in this direction at the Porte by all possible means.[151]

There was still one circumstance which influenced Palmerston in his humanitarian feelings for the refugees. These were the pro-Magyar sympathies of the public which had been aroused chiefly by the Whig press in London.

The support of *The Daily News*, tendered to Pulszky during the struggle, was not withheld afterwards from the emigrants. It systematically refuted the anti-Magyar articles of *The Morning Chronicle* and *The Times* and attacked the former constantly, even from the beginning of the war. Since the summer of 1849 it had opposed *The Times*.

The pro-Austrian articles of the conservative press, particularly of *The Herald* and *The Morning Post*, arose from the sympathy they felt for conservative Austria. It was in a spirit of fair play that *The Daily News* did not enter into any dispute with the conservative press. It only rectified their errors concerning the struggle in Hungary. But the changing attitude of the leading liberal organs, particularly the utilitarianism of *The Times*, spurred on *The Daily News* to controversy. Since the beginning of September 1849 there had been a series of open letters, published under the heading "Austrian misrepresentations of the Hungarian cause", in which all the distorted items of *The Times* were thoroughly analyzed and refuted.[152] On October 3rd Cobden's

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[150] Sulejman Bey, the Turkish commander in Kutahia opened this letter and forwarded it to the Austrian authorities. Compare Rapp. no. 33—C, Sept. 18, 1850. H. H. St. A. Wien.

[151] Wien, Sept. 10, 1850. Türkei. H. H. St. A. Wien.

[152] See numbers 1026 et sqq. of the Daily News, Sept. 2, 1849.

organ printed the news of the arrival of Lackenbacher, a member of the Austrian police, whose task was to supply *The Times* with news material, among other items with a long list of Hungarians executed by Kossuth's government on account of their adherence to Austria. The Government of Vienna had list prepared for its own defence. It wanted to prove that the execution of Hungarian generals in Arad, Hungary, was only a justifiable ac of retaliation for the executions by the Hungarian Government.

The *Daily News* became the official press for Kossuth and his fellow emigrants. It published all the news it received from Turkey about their doings. Since Henningsen returned from Viddin, he thoroughly refuted in this paper *The Times*' calumnies against Kossuth.

Again Charles Pridham reiterated Cobden's call to the public to refuse any attempt originating from Austria to negotiate a loan.[153] Pulszky was also a diligent collaborator with *The Daily News* and argued for a long time with Lord Claude Hamilton, charging him with insufficient knowledge of Central-European history.

Apart from the press even Parliament did not fail to hear of the Hungarian cause. At the beginning of November, eighty-three members belonging mostly to the Liberal party, presented a memorandum to Russell and Palmerston, requesting them to offer their services to the Austrian Government on behalf of a settlement of the affairs still in dispute between the two parts of the Empire. Fully convinced that a fair settlement would greatly help to promote peace in Central Europe, they considered it as a necessity that such a settlement should be arrived at as soon as possible. Otherwise the existing antagonism must necessarily lead to a permanent estrangement which might be followed by incalculable consequences. The paramount interests at stake must undoubtedly induce the British Government again to offer Vienna its good offices, even if Austria did not ask for them.[154]

On February 7th, 1850, Lord Dudley Stuart delivered a speech in the House of Commons explaining the causes of the collapse on the authority of a pamphlet on Hungary prepared by Mrs. Pulszky.[155] He asked Palmerston to obtain the Queen's permission

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[153] Febr. 11, 1850, no. 1159.

[154] Times, Dec. 5, 1850. — See appendix no. 4.

[155] Hansard, vol. 108.

to publish the diplomatic correspondence which might prove to the House the Government's attitude on the question.

Claude Hamilton contradicted Dudley Stuart and objected the latter's outbursts against Austria. Only Disraeli supported Hamilton. There was no other member among the Peel party willing to defend Austrian absolutism.

Palmerston was rather unwilling to adopt Dudley Stuart's motion. Referring to this attitude *The Daily News* did not refrain from expressing an ironical opinion. It said that the Secretary of State seemed to prefer a "marriage de raison" with Russia and Austria.[156]

IX.

Kossuth complains of Palmerston's and Canning's refusal to intervene for his release. — Plans for "The North Eastern Federative States" consisting of Poland, integral Hungary and possibly of Turkey. — He hopes to find Palmerston's agreement that this would constitute an equivalent block in the event of the dissolution of Austria. — Wants to offer liberal selfgovernment to Servians and Wallachians of Hungary but not to offer them territorial sovereignty. — The Czech Palacky's manifesto published in London about the federation of nationalities within the boundaries of the Austrian Empire. — Austrians (Germans) and Magyars should resign their hegemony. — Hungarian emigrants in Paris think that Kossuth's federative plans cannot stop the union of Servians and Wallachians living in Hungary and Turkey. — Kossuth retains his plans for integral Hungary. — Wants to gain Cobden's support for the principle of "intervention for non-intervention".

Upon receiving Pulszky's intelligence about Palmerston's speech, Kossuth again showered complaints on Canning on account of his long detention; yet the latter refused to intervene. He told Kossuth "he had played high and lost. The consequences must be borne with resignation: he must abstain from further political activities".[157]

Kossuth was unable to take Canning's advice, which was indeed opposed to the psychology of the emigrants whose aims

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[156] Febr. 9, 1850, no. 1157.

[157] Kossuth—Pulszky, Kutahia, Nov. 5, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

were involuntarily concentrated on risking everything for the sake of getting home. Kossuth was also annoyed by Palmerston's failing to send instructions to Canning similar to those presented by the British Minister to Schwarzenberg for ending the emigrants' detention. He became persuaded that Palmerston had failed to send such instructions to Stambul, for he knew that the Porte would have deferred to it, knowing very well that Schwarzenberg would never have accepted. Consequently when Palmerston sent this note to Vienna, he did not intend to do anything but bow to public opinion. "Besides, the Grand Vizier has positively expressed to Baron Tecco his readiness to end the detention as soon as Canning supports my request. I sent a message in this sense to Canning, but he refrained from doing anything" — he wrote excitedly to Pulszky.[158]

The latter was also dejected. "The greater the sympathy of the public, the more inconvenient you become to the governments" — he answered Kossuth. — "If General Haynau, who hanged Hungarian generals, had not been so fiercely attacked by the workmen at Barclay and Perkins Brewery, Palmerston would have done much for you, I am sure. But then he saw how powerful you were even here in London. So he is waiting for the public sympathy to cease . . ."[159]

After this experience Kossuth lost all hope, excepting in the offer of the American Government to convey him and his associates to the New World.[160] But the matter was still in a preliminary stage between the respective governments, and its end and issue could no be foreseen. So he spent his time in weary waiting and worked out a scheme of political organization to use as a guide in negotiations for settling the problem of the cooperation of the nations.[161]

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Even in Viddin he dreamt of solutions which seemed capable of producing an honest settlement of the aspirations of the nations.

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[158] Ut supra.

[159] Nov. 21, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[160] Cf. Tecco—D'Azeglio, Constantinople, March 15, 1850. Rapp. no. 754. A. St. Torino.

[161] Cf. Hóman—Szekfű, *Magyar Történet* (History of Hungary). Bpest, vol. VII, p. 282 — also *Kossuth, six chapters by a Hungarian.* London, 1854, chapt. II; see the problem in its development by Wertheimer Eduard, *Kossuth's Projekt einer Donaukonföderation:* Österr. Rundschau, LXIII (1920), Heft 5.

In the long controversy which arose over the problem and shattered Hungary during the war, there were some points of view which he held to be basic. He regarded it as a fundamental that the Austrian Empire's fate was definitely sealed. She could not survive, for she had proved to be incapable of governing her provinces in a constitutional spirit. On the other hand he believed firmly in Turkey's revival if reasonable reforms were introduced, which would enable her to assume the rôle allotted to her in European politics. A powerful Turkey together with a great North Eastern Confederacy of States, consisting of integral Hungary and Poland, would constitute a remarkable political unit, and would replace very effectively the Austrian Empire. Its existence would demonstrate the real success of Palmerston's Eastern-European policy. The huge wall of defence running from the North to the South could successfully resist Russia's expansion towards the Adriatic Sea, which was to be anticipated from the Austrian Empire, since she had sold her independent position by invoking Russian aid. On the other hand, if Russia succeeded in persuading the Slavonic peoples of the Austrian Empire to adopt the spirit of Panslavism, no power on earth could stop her influence reaching the Adriatic Sea. In this case Russia's exclusion from the Dardanelles would become merely nominal because the Dardanelles would lose their importance in the Oriental Question.

As to the problem of the North Eastern Confederacy, he adhered firmly to the principle of Hungary's integrity. It was his sense of political honesty towards Turkey which induced him not to separate her Servian and Wallachian provinces. He stood for the principle of historical state rights, and did not favour the principle of nationality. He was convinced that a common cultural development, a common tradition of living together for many centuries, and common economic interests had a stronger amalgating power than the theory of races alone as fundamental for building up a state.[162] In the United States of America he found striking example of the correctness of his conviction.

As soon as he had established himself in Kutahia he studied the problem of state confederacy very carefully. He persisted in his original plan that he had worked out in Viddin and did not desire to weaken the Turkish Empire by creating new national

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[162] Cf. the memorandum of Count Zamoyski, Viddin, Nov. 10, 1849. — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 529—539.

states out of the Danubian Principalities.[163] Even the acceptance of Turkish sovereignty over Hungary was not unfamiliar to him, for he considered this possibility as a means for creating closer political contact among the Servians and Wallachians living on both sides of the Turkish-Hungarian boundaries, without changing the historical structure of these ancient states.

In the meantime there was a sensation among the emigrants in London, created by a manifesto issued by František Palacky, a well-known Czech historian of his age.[164] He regarded the federative problems of Middle-Europe from an opposite point of view to that expounded by Kossuth. Palacky preached the maintenance of the Austrian Empire. Yet he contested the assertion that the Austrian-[165]Magyar hegemony could not be maintained in a polyglot Monarchy. He suggested reshaping her into a state confederacy instead of creating independent federative states. Provision was made in his scheme for seven separate ministries (1. German, 2. Czechoslovak, 3. Polish-Russian, 4. Magyar, 5. Ruthenian, 6. South-Slav, 7. Italian) by accepting Vienna as a federative capital for the Monarchy.

In opposition to Teleki, the Wallachian emigrants in Paris were fighting for the establishment of an independent national state. They wanted to unite the Wallachian territories of Hungary and Turkey by separating them from their ancient political units.

Upon receiving intelligence of the Czech and Wallachian national schemes the Hungarians headed by Andrássy and Teleki held a conference in London and discussed the possibilities of satisfying their national aspirations in the event of Hungary's succeeding in gaining her independence.[166] They finally expressed their hopes of finding means for the maintenance of the Magyar supremacy by offering a wide measure of autonomy to all nationalities. But Szarvady, the secretary of Teleki, was dismayed on realizing the resolute attitude of the nationalities. He wrote to Kossuth[167] calling his attention to the spirit of opposition which became so strong among the Slavonic races that their union with their brethren living beyond the boundaries of Hungary could hardly be

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[163] Kossuth's remarks to Teleki's letter. Kutahia, June 15, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[164] Daily News: January 2, 1850, no. 1126.

[165] I. e. German.

[166] MSS. Diary of Julius Tanárky, London, January 10, 1850. P. R. O. Bpest.

[167] Paris, Jan. 27, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

avoided. It was the same with the Wallachians, he found. Consequently Kossuth's federative scheme, based on the exclusion of the Servians and Wallachians living outside Hungary, had no chance of being realized, for their national and racial spirit seemed to prevail over traditions and the raison d'état which culminated in the opinion that the maintenance of the Austrian Empire or at least of historical Hungary would offer them the advantages of a great, settled economic unit. This they could hardly find by creating numerous smaller independent states whose overwhelming national spirit would deprive them for generation of the advantages of a reasonable political and economic cooperation.

Again, Count Teleki, under Prince Czartorisky's influence,[168] showed willingness to offer independent provincial unity with autonomy to the nationalities, for he was convinced they would not feel satisfied until they reached this final objective. As to the acceptance of Turkish sovereignty over Hungary, which Kossuth had already in theory admitted, Teleki together with all the other emigrants was decisively against it. He felt supported in his resistance by Palmerston's, Cobden's and many other parliamentary members opinion that Britain could never concur in such a far-reaching extension of Turkish sovereignty.[169]

Contrary to Teleki's opinion, Sabbas Vukovich, the former Hungarian Minister of Justice, was in principle against any plan of federation. He thought it would be a great misfortune for Hungary because it would necessarily lead to the loss of the independence for which she had fought in the past. He wished to call Kossuth's attention to the probability that Hungary, in a confederation with newly-created Slavonic states, would undoubtedly be overpowered by them. Should Hungary's nucleus, the Magyar Land together with her territories where Servians and Wallachians lived, constitute a confederacy of states, the latter would constantly impose their will upon the Magyars, who must necessarily find themselves permanently in minority. Was it worth while to sacrifice Hungary's future to such chimeras as would make her fate more intolerable than under Hapsburgh's rule? — he asked in his letter to Kossuth.[170]

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[168] Russjan, Lucjan, *Polacy i sprawa polska na węgrzech w roku 1848—49* (The Poles and the Polish Question in Hungary, 1848—49). Warszawa, 1934, p. 287; further Handelsman Marcellus, Czartoriski, *Nicolas Ier et la Question du Proche Orient.* Paris, 1934, p. 114.

[169] Teleki—Kossuth, Paris, after June 15, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[170] Montmorency, Aug. 14, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

No doubt, Kossuth only wanted confederacy in order to replace by this means the Austrian Empire's rôle as allotted to her by British diplomacy. But apart from this point of issue, he was practically ready to offer the Servians and Wallachians extensive local and national self-government, stopping short only of provincial independence and national sovereignty.

It was not only the consideration that the Magyars would presumably be overshadowed by other nationalities in the event of their sharing their sovereignty with them. The reason for his negative attitude was based on a conviction that the territories claimed by the Servians and Wallachians were much mixed up with nationalities where Magyars were in minority, yet constituted a majority when combined with the Germans as against the Servians and Wallachians. Was there any sign of self-determination if this German-Magyar majority were to be delivered up to Servian or Wallachian minorities? — he wrote to Teleki.

Of course the whole theory would have an entirely different meaning if regarded from the national point of view of Servians and Wallachians. As already explained, they wanted to be united with their brethren living on Turkish territory. No doubt, in this united Hungarian-Turkish territory they constituted majority as against the German-Magyar minority. The latter's majority existed only as long as the newly-created political units were confined to historical Hungary.

In answering Teleki's plan of offering autonomous provinces to Servians and Wallachians, he wrote: "The carrying out of your ideas would result in an incessant turmoil among the races of Hungary. As a consequence of the geographical and gravitational relations, your ideas would neither help the federative scheme nor the southern counties would adhere to Servia, the eastern ones to Roumania, the Slovaks of the North to the Czechs, the Germans of the western counties to German-Austria and the Magyars — to death!" "I do not want to see a federalized Hungary. I wish to maintain one sovereign territory and federalize only this with other states like Poland or Turkey . . ."[171]

During these long and abortive arguments which went on intermittently — due to the considerable distance, — the emigrants in Paris realized the fact that the nationalities were not inclined to enter into any negotiations without the preliminary of their

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[171] Kossuth—Teleki, Kutahia, Aug. 22, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

national sovereignty being admitted. Ex-minister Vukovics and Szarvady were right in their presentiments. Consequently, the emigrants became convinced of the inexpediency of publishing Kossuth's scheme. They decided to discontinue their vain attempts at reconciliation.

* * *

Kossuth also realized the necessity of occupying himself with other problems, which seemed to bring him better results than that of Hungary's political reconstruction. Since the time he escaped he had always been seeking means to interpose another Russian intervention if Hungary happened to start a new fight for her independence.

Seing clearly Britain's overwhelming influence upon European politics, and the dependency of her government upon public opinion, he charged Teleki to induce Cobden to cooperate with him.

As it was the aim of Cobden and of his Peace Party to agitate for the maintenance of World Peace, why could he not induce the government to support this principle officially which would — no doubt — re-echo all round the world? Why could the government not adopt the principle of non-intervention as a practical means of enforcing peace?

But such a declaration could only be regarded as a first step towards raise interest in the civilized world. If Britain refrained from meddling in the domestic affairs of other states, this very honourable attitude did not imply that other states would also be willing to respect her awoved principle of non-intervention. On the contrary, Britain's reservedness might even instigate the despots of Europe to use their "charter of freedom" to oppress their people. Therefore Britain should declare that — while she would not interfere in the domestic affairs of the other states — she would not tolerate the intervenion of other states in a third state's internal affairs. Kossuth called his principle *„the intervenion for non-intervention"* which signified at least diplomatic activity as against diplomatic reservedness towards the mere adoption of this declaration, without entailing its practical assertion.[172]

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[172] Cf. Pivány, Eugène, *Mann Dudley Ambrus küldetése* (Mission of Ambrose Dudley Mann): Századok ("Centuries", Historical Periodical), Bpest, 1910, pp. 353—356. — Pivány thinks that Daniel Webster's speech delivered on January 19, 1824, in the House of Representatives of the American Congress might have had some influence upon Kossuth's theory of intervention. Webster in his speech assailed the intervention of foreign powers in the struggle of

Teleki must convince Cobden — wrote Kossuth the former[173] that the Peace Party would not promote peace with a passive challenge to non-intervention. The Party must win over the British public, and through the public the government, to adopt this active interpretation of the former principle. If so, world-peace will no longer be a mere phantom, and the people themselves will govern their own affairs. Monarchs will think twice before oppressing their people, for they will no longer be able to rely upon foreign assistance.

If Cobden were willing to propagate this principle as firmly as he was resolute in the Anti-Corn-Law affair, and would represent it in Parliament against the passive non-intervention preached by the Tory Graham, Russian expansion might be checked in a very effective manner and in this way Hungary would receive the greatest service she could hope from abroad. "Being thoroughly convinced of this principle's importance" — he wrote — "I regard it as my most important task to agitate for this as soon as I am set free. I shall do the same in America. By carrying this into effect, Hungary will be free and independent very soon."[174]

Teleki was ready to comply with his instructions.[175] He agreed with Kossuth's opinion that Palmerston could only be constrained by public opinion to tender more active support to the Hungarian cause. To begin with, he placed many articles in London and Paris to raise general interest.

As to Cobden, it was a difficult task to induce him to undertake such propaganda, because his conception of peace absolutely excluded any active interference in the internal affairs of foreign states. His negative attitude can best be characterized by the opinion he expressed several times to Edmund Beöthy, the former Consul General of Hungary in Bucarest. His generous and human feelings led him to offer shelter to this sick and aged man in his own residence. In spite of his expressed sympathy for the Hungarian cause, he repeatedly said to Beöthy that Kossuth was positively wrong in taking up arms to defend Hungary's constitutional rights. "He had had only right to use *vis inertiae* against Austria and the Croatian insurgents . . ."[176] Of course it can hardly

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Greece for independence, and condemned the declaration of the Troppau Congress upholding intervention.

[173] Cf. his cited letter, Kutahia, Aug. 22, 1850. Ko. Pp. P .R. O. Bpest.

[174] Ut supra.

[175] Montmorency, Sept. 17, 1850, no. 5. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[176] Tanárky's MSS. Diary, London, July 23, 1850. P. R. O. Bpest.

be said that Hungary was wrong in taking up arms. It is quite clear by the light of historical data that she was constrained to apply force on account of the treachery and intrigues of the court circles. But Cobden did not seem to accept this ultima ratio.

It was as a result of Cobden's political psychology that Teleki's efforts were totally ineffective. Only Kossuth succeeded in gaining his cooperation during his tour in England.

X.

Urquhart's visit to Kossuth. — Urquhart and Kossuth against Palmerston. — Their agreement in the Oriental Question. — Kossuth wants to convince the British public of the inappropriate policy pursued in the Near East by Palmerston. — Urquhart warns Kossuth against becoming entangled in Mazzini's Russian politics. — Algernon Massingberd's offer to finance a Hungarian colony in Asia Minor. — Kossuth depressed by Turkish ambiguity. — Pulszky's despairing letters from London. — Reservedness of British Conservatives towards Kossuth's democratic principles. — Palmerston presents his correspondence respecting the refugees to Parliament. — Pulszky's disappointment. — Urquhart's action in favour of Kossuth's release. — Palmerston's evasive utterances. — His attitude towards Turkey and the British public: ready to support refugees in Stambul but does not reveal his humanitarian feelings in public. — Canning agrees with Palmerston.

Kossuth was deeply depressed by the feeling of permanent uncertainty and soon almost worn out by this quixotic insistence on principles. In a few months he grew old and very irritable. During the monotonous days of his detention he only felt better when foreign visitors came to see him. There were two British travellers accompanied by Henningsen who presented themselves in the autumn of 1850. One was David Urquhart, member of Parliament ,and the other Algernon Massingberd, a young officer in the Blues who wanted to make his acquaintance while staying in the Ottoman Empire.[177]

Urquhart had spent several years in this country[178] in the capacity of a secretary attached to the British Embassy. When

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[177] Cf. László's Diary, vol. I, p. 47.

[178] Temperley, pp. 407—408.

Russia blockaded Circassia he encouraged Bell, a British merchant, to run the blockade with his boat in order to transport salt to the Circassians who were under the Sultan's protection. It was an arbitrary act, contrary to the attitude of Ponsonby, then British Minister to the Porte. Bell's boat was captured by the Russians. He applied to Parliament for indemnification but was refused. Following this act Urquhart was dismissed by Palmerston.

Urquhart considered himself as victimized by Palmerston, whom he assailed incessantly in pamphlets. He asserted in public that Palmerston had sacrificed British interests by dismissing him.

Palmerston was always ready to recognize the extraordinary services he rendered in Turkey to British interests. It was Urquhart's personal task to make the first commercial treaty between Britain and Turkey, which recognized the latter's particular importance for British foreign trade. Again, Urquhart was the first to proclaim that British interests required the support of the Porte, a point of view which was duly appreciated by the Secretary of State.[179]

At this time Urquhart was occupied with problems of ownership respecting Turkish Mosques and the Porte gratefully accepted his advice.[180] Now in Kutahia Kossuth met in him the firm friend of Turkey, who entertained the same distrust of Palmerston as he did. Both agreed too in their unconquerable hatred of Russia, which made them fast friends.

They discussed by day and night all the probabilities of the Near East and this resulted in a common policy to be pursued in time to come. Above all, the British public must be convinced that British interests in the Near East required Turkey's reconstruction. Further, Russia's anti-British tendency could not be too strongly stressed[181] which the London Press seemed to neglect. As to the Hungarian question, which constituted the background of the former main issues, it should be left in obeyance.

Kossuth wanted to inform Pulszky immediately about the results of their discussions, but unfortunately gave the latter contradictory instructions. He urged him to refrain from interfering with British internal politics. "In spite of Palmerston's anti-Magyar attitude" — wrote Kossuth — "we do not know when we have to

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[179] *Thirty years of foreign policy.* London, 1855. pp. 216 et sqq.

[180] Klezl—Schwarzenberg, Rapp. no. 21 C. Constantinople, Aug. 7, 1850. H H. St. A. Wien.

[181] Cf. László's Diary, vol. I, p. 78 concerning Urquhart's anti-Russian propaganda.

apply to the government or to those are likely to come in."[182] On the other hand he urged Pulszky to make propaganda in the press to the effect that Britain was not using her influence at the Porte properly to promote her own interests, but on behalf of those of Russia. Was it not curious that Turkish corn — thanks to the interference of the British Minister — was liable to a duty of twelwe per cent in transport from one Turkish port to another, while Russian corn could enter Turkish territory free of duty. As a result of this two-thirds of Stambul's population consumed Russian corn. After this, was there any sense in saying that Britain's influence was exerted properly in Stambul?[183]

In the meantime Urquhart returned to Constantinople and used all his efforts with the Porte to promote Kossuth's political aims, which tended to gain the Porte's assistance in the plans of confederacy as well as the new insurrection in Hungary. In undertaking this mission of Kossuth's he made conditions with the Hungarian leader. Urquhart was dissatisfied with Kossuth's attitude of making common cause with Poles and Italians who already asked him for cooperation.

Urquhart was of the opinion that the political outlook of these emigrants differed widely from that of the Hungarians, and this keeping together might possibly ruin the chances open to Kossuth. Particularly he warned him against any closer contact with Giuseppe Mazzini, the head of the Italian emigrants whose relations with Russia he regarded as beyond dispute.[184] Mazzini, a born revolutionary, fought only for the creation of "Italia Unita". Any means were good to attain this aim. "In case of failure to obtain support from Britain" — wrote Urquhart — "Mazzini may apply with success to the Russian cabinet." Urquhart was perfectly convinced that his information was only too true.

This possible approach of Mazzini to Russia was opposed to his and Kossuth's decided anti-Russian principles. But since he realized Kossuth's readiness to cooperate with Mazzini, he pledged his word to keep away from the Italian revolutionary. Now, should Kossuth decide on any change from their common platform, he was to inform Urquhart immediately.[185]

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[182] Kutahia, Nov. 5, 1850, Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[183] Ut supra.

[184] Urquhart—Kossuth, June 20, 1851, The Free Press, Sheffield, March 8, 1856.

[185] Cf. the common call of Mazzini, Arnold Ruge, Ledru Rollin and Albert Darász, members of the board of the "Comité central démocratique

Kossuth could not conceal his doubts to Urquhart as to the usefulness of basing the Hungarian question upon the Porte's support alone, because of its changing attitude which made it unreliable to negotiate with. "I must confess" — he wrote to Urquhart — "I fear politics at Constantinople to be so much envenomed by the habit of intrigues. The underminers of Turkey have insured their pernicious influence so well that even your energy, forced to waste precious time in the laborious task of persuading individuals at second, third, or fourth hand, will alas! prove too slow to attain a clear decision against the intrigues which of course you cannot fail to meet."[186]

During the time that Urquhart discussed with Reschid the re-establishment of Turkey's independence and the counteracting of Palmerston's present influence, Kossuth turned for a while from European politics in order to face every day problems that awaited immediate solution.

It was while still in Viddin he realized the necessity of making efforts to save his fellow emigrants from dispersion all over the world. But not only this point of view induced him to seek a solution of this problem. He wanted to have them living together in a military colony in organized legions ready to cross the Hungarian frontiers at any time. His project of the military colony could not have been realized in 1849 on account of the Porte's and Canning's resistance.[187]

From that time he worked continuously to bring this project to a satisfactory issue. When he heard of the Porte's decision to offer a large estate to Lamartine, as a token of the esteem of the Ottoman Empire, he urged Teleki to persuade the famous French writer and statesman to allow him a part of this estate for Hungarian colonization.

On the visit of Algernon Massingberd, this project was unexpectedly realized. Knowing Kossuth's ideas, he expressed his readiness to purchase a suitable estate in Asia Minor and was himself planning to undertake the military training of emigrants who were to settle in this colony. He offered Kossuth five hundred

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européen". London, Aug. 7, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest. Published by Kastner Eugenio, *Mazzini e Kossuth.* Firenze, 1929, pp. 3—4.

[186] Kutahia, December 17, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[187] Cf. Kossuth—Canning, Viddin, Nov. 2, 1849. — Hajnal, vol I, pp. 526—527.

rifles and wanted to organize a guard composed of thirty British subjects, properly trained in military service, to assist him in the management of the colony.[188]

Massingberd instructed Henningsen on the spot to procure the colony's technical equipment in London. Again Kossuth called upon Joseph Prick, the head of the Hungarian emigrants in Constantinople, to urge them to take part in the colonization.

But these high hopes failed on account of Prick's intractability; he made considerable propaganda for the colony and called his fellow refugees by posters to present themselves. As soon as the Russian and Austrian diplomatic representatives learnt of these posters, they protested at the Porte, which dutifully suppressed Prick's propaganda.[189]

The beginning of the year 1851 did not offer any prospects for the refugees. The Porte repeatedly gave evidence of its proverbial weakness. Although asserting that it would not keep Kossuth and his associates in detention for more than a year, beyond this it did not show the least firmness. No one could say from what date this one year's term was to be reckoned. If the Porte were willing to calculate it as from the date of their entering Turkish territory, the term had already elapsed a long time ago. Even if the one year were reckoned from the date of their detention, it was already at an end.

Knowing this, Kossuth came to the conclusion that he stood before a locked door. He could not remember one gesture of the Porte which could prove its reliability. When he crossed the frontier, the privileges of hospitality were promised him, yet he, together with his fellow refugees, was deprived of every advantage attained by their escape. Again in Shoumla it was the Porte which let the Austrian hirelings escape after their failure to murder him. Only ambiguity or a peculiarly slack attitude, always open to opposing influences, was the lot of the refugees. Through Canning's courtesy Kossuth learnt the peculiar instructions given by the Porte to Sulejman Bey, the Turkish commander in Kutahia: "... You must allow them[190] more latitude within their walls, ob-

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[188] Kossuth's personal notes without date; cf. further the original statutes of the colony. Kutahia, Dec. 1, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[189] László's Diary, vol. I, p. 59.

[190] The refugees.

serving in the meantime the necessary precautions but endeavouring to prevent their being aware of it . . ."[191]

He wrote long letters about this "humiliating" order to the Government of the United States of America and implored its help for his release. But of course it was a matter of doubt whether the American Government would renew the offer made last year to the Porte for his conveyance to the New World. The more he felt discouraged his "prison", the more he realized the truth of Urquhart's opinion that he could only rely upon the Porte, whose ambiguity had already extinguished his last faint hope.

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The intelligence he received from London was similarly hopeless, which again proved that Urquhart was right. In the opening session of Parliament the question of the emigrants was mentioned in the speech from the throne, but Palmerston's answer created general uneasiness among the refugees.[192] Nevertheless Pulszky was busy arranging meetings in Sheffield and Manchester. The petitions adopted on various occasions were usually presented to Palmerston, but Cobden doubted whether they were likely to effect Kossuth's release. At the beginning of 1851 Palmerston's position again became very strong and even the *Daily News* refrained from criticizing his foreign policy.

With the emigrants thus depressed Pulszky was inclined to overestimate the influence which the least sign of sympathy might exert over their future. "Your popularity did not cease" — he wrote to Kossuth[193] — "I must even confess I am afraid your popularity is greater than is desirable for you. The ministers would not like your coming here, because the people would prepare you a reception not even equalled by a King's visit to this country. Trust God, help yourself, for nobody else will help you. I have done my utmost, I cannot do any more . . ."

Pulszky's letter became even more pessimistic when he wrote about official Britain. In Parliament the aristocracy occupied the right wings of the Tory and Whig parties and had authority over their party friends. They had no fear of despotism, for they knew

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[191] Kossuth's draft to the Government of the USA, May 30, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[192] Vukovich and Teleki to Kossuth. Paris, March 6, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[193] London, January 30, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

that no power on earth could enforce it in Britain, where constitutional liberty prevailed. But they disapproved of the democratic movements on the Continent whose success in Britain would — no doubt — be followed by the end of their influence. Therefore the aristocratic factions were more anxious than anybody else that the wheel of victorious democracy would turn against the Conservative Powers on the Continent. Was it any wonder if they did not sympathize with Kossuth's democratic utterances? Influenced by their personal interests, they wanted to retain peace and order at any price. This common opinion of the aristocracy was challenged by the Whig Macaulay, who explained in his works that "it might be necessary to *sacrifice even liberty, in order to save civilization . . .*"[194] Cobden and his radicals awoved the same principle as the conservative aristocrats among the Tories and the Whigs. The radicals also preached peace at any price in order to promote free trade on the Continent.

Russell and Palmerston looked upon the helplessness of the Porte with indifference. Pulszky was terrified on hearing in Downing Street that the Porte had entered into new negotiations with Vienna concerning the prolongation of Kossuth's detention to five years.[195] When he read the diplomatic correspondence[196] which on Dudley Stuart's motion Palmerston presented to Parliament, he learned with resignation that he was indeed well informed upon Britain's foreign policy. He read between the lines that Palmerston never intended to exert an active influence upon the diplomatic contest between the Absolute Powers and the Porte. This supposition seemed to be proved by Palmerston's answer to the complaints of Pulszky: ". . . Il faut qu'il[197] fasse le mort; c'est le seul moyen de faire cesser sa situation pénible . . ."[198]

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Meanwhile Urquhart arrived in London and, true to his promises to Kossuth, immediately moved in Parliament on behalf of

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[194] Pulszky—Kossuth, London, March. 2, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[195] Pulszky—Kossuth, London, Febr. 23, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[196] Correspondence resp. Refugees from Hungary within the Turkish Dominions. Presented to both Houses of Parliament on February 28, 1851; Imrefi, *Die ungarischen Flüchtlinge in der Türkei.* Leipzig, 1851, p. 239.

[197] Kossuth. —

[198] Pulszky—Kossuth. London, March 9, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

his release.[199] Palmerston's answer seemed to support Pulszky's opinion that he was not interested in the question. He said that Austria and Turkey already agreed on the details of the detention. Turkey could release seventy-six of the refugees immediately. The remaining sixteen — among them Kossuth — were to be detained provisionally. It was desired by the British Government that even these sixteen should be set free very soon.[200]

After three weeks, on May 9th, Urquhart asked repeated questions, but did not receive any definite answer about Kossuth's detention from Palmerston.[201] In June he made a new attempt, and raised the question whether it was a fact that Kossuth and his fellow-refugees would not be permitted to return to Turkey if once set free. This was a delicate question, for Urquhart entertained the hope that Kossuth might settle in Constantinople and keep in contact with the Turkish Ministers after his release.

Palmerston's answer was in fact absolutely evasive, but still admitted that Kossuth would be handicaped in taking up his permanent residence in Stambul.[202] The Porte reserved itself the right — he said — to release Kossuth under this condition for it wanted to have peace at home and with its neighbours as well.

No one could deny that Palmerston's utterances in public led people to the conclusion that he wanted to maintain entire aloofness in the matter. It was his admirable political sense which induced him to screen his real attitude in question. There were reasons for him to do so. In view of the normal diplomatic relations he entertained with Austria, he could not have acted otherwise. Further the court's reservedness and the anti-Kossuth attitude of the Tory and Whig aristocrats constrained him to defer to their opinions.

But in his diplomatic correspondence with Canning we recognize an entirely different statesman from the one of his speeches. His instructions and letters are guided by indomitable hatred of Vienna as well as by most generous and human feelings for the refugees. This attitude cannot be realized from the documents published in the Blue Book because he withheld those documents which would have proved his very active influence in the question ,originating from his individuality and his aversion to

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[199] On March 14, 1851.
[200] Hansard, vol. 114, pp. 1317 et sqq.
[201] Hansard, vol. 116, pp. 769—770.
[202] Hansard, vol. 117, pp. 782—783.

unnecessary suffering.[203] But of course, this sympathy never went beyond British interests, being the "suprema lex" of all his actions. The Hungarian question was in fact a matter of subordinate importance in his Oriental politics; still he used every opportunity to annoy Vienna and encourage Stambul at the same time strengthening his influence with the Porte.

Palmerston was informed by Canning's report of April 25th that the Sultan had definitely resolved to free Kossuth and his associates on September 1st, yet he remained silent when Urquhart put a question in June. Palmerston even went so far as to offer the Porte a steamer to convey the refugees to Malta, in case they could not avail themselves of the frigate promised for that purpose by the U. S. Government.[204] Then he pondered over the propriety of ordering the Mediterranean Squadron in the Archipelago again to strengthen the Porte on behalf of Kossuth's liberation.[205]

Canning acted in exactly the same way as Palmerston. While he counselled Kossuth to be patient, he exerted all his influence with the Porte to secure tolerable conditions for the refugees. The Porte had not treated them well. Even the generals were accommodated in Kutahia two in a room and the treatment of the others was almost inhuman.[206] Canning was indefatigable in his efforts to alleviate their lot, although General Aupick regarded their prospects as very discouraging.[207] But Canning continued to tell Aali that the Porte had already fulfilled its obligations. The one year's term was over and internal order in Hungary undoubtedly restored. The Porte must not accept Vienna's idea that the Austrian Emperor was right in regarding the release of the refugees as a personal insult from the Porte — even if the one year's term was actually over. The attempt of Austria to create disorder in the Turkish provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria in order to take vengeance for the stand taken by Turkey who was already weary of showing indulgence towards Austrian demands, — was decidedly contrary to international law.

Owing to Canning's motives and firmness the Sultan decided

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[203] See unpublished material in the Foreign Office Records. Turkey F. O. 78/779 et sequ. P. R. O. London.

[204] Draft no. 130. F. O. 78/849 — cf. Further Correspondence, no. 39.

[205] Palmerston—Canning, Aug. 11, 1851, Draft no. 210. F. O. 78/850. P. R. O. London. See appendix no. 9.

[206] Further corresp. no. 1, 2.

[207] Canning—Palmerston, April 17, 1851. F. O. 78/854. Confidential. His observations on the Iradé as to the release of the refugees.

on resistance, and fixed September 1st for the refugees's release. "I find in the express engagement now contracted by his Majesty" — reported Canning to Palmerston — "a sufficient compensation for the four summer months during which the detention of the refugees is still to be continued . . ."[208] With this act the diplomatic contest was practically over.

XI.

Kossuth's depression. — Pulszky's unsuccesful attempt to help Kossuth's escape. — Henningsen's unreliability. — Kossuth decides to cooperate with Mazzini. — Arrival of Adriano Lemmi, Mazzini's confidential agent, in Kutahia. — His influence upon Kossuth. — Urquhart tries to get Batthyány to keep Kossuth away from Mazzini. — Urquhart's counsels to Kossuth. — How things were going on in Constantinople, as seen by Urquhart. — Cobden and Urquhart wish to use Kossuth to show up Palmerston's incomprehensible policy. — Kossuth's hesitation. — Urquhart tries to dissuade Kossuth from indiscrete publication of his negotiations with the Porte in the British press. — Pulszky reveals Canning as the author of the publication. — Urquhart despairs of succeeding in the establishment of political relations between the Porte and Kossuth. — Kossuth urges Canning and Marsh, the American Minister in Constantinople to assist his release.

All that happened behind the scenes in diplomacy remained unknown to the European public. And if Britain formed a wrong opinion about Palmerston's and Canning's policy, is there any wonder if Kossuth — impressed by Pulszky's exaggerated letters — was incapable of separating facts from sentiments? His solitude also contributed to his seeing the dark side, and solitude is a bad counsellor.

Kossuth accepted Pulszky's advice. He did not want to go on waiting inactively for things to develop, as Canning asked him to, but took the point of view that, however risky it was, he must help himself. He could not keep his pledged word to Urquhart because he had lost his faith in Turkey.

But again he had bad luck. Pulszky's letter brought him the distressing news of the unreliability of Henningsen, to whom he entrusted all his secret plans.

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[208] Constantinople, April 25, 1851, no. 135. F. O. 78/854. P. R. O. London.

At the beginning of 1850 Pulszky was informed by Kossuth of his plan to escape from Turkey. For that purpose the former started a subscription in London and the truest friends of the Hungarian cause, Dudley Stuart, Cobden, Gilpin, the Alderman of the City Council contributed to it. The money exceeded sixteen hundred Pounds to which was added the sum of forty thousand Francs given by Count Branicki, a rich Polish refugee, who was living at that time in Paris. Pulszky entrusted this considerable sum to Hennigsen, who could neither help Kossuth to escape nor render any account to his trustees.[209]

Kossuth learnt of Henningsen's unreliability only after he had charged him in Kutahia with various delicate missions which all ended unsuccessfully. E. g. his instruction for negotiating with the Grand Vizier as to the term of his detention or the technical equipment of the colony planned in Asia Minor, for which purpose Massingberd gave him considerable sums.

Nevertheless his cup was not yet full. But when Jazmagy, the notorious dragoman of the Austrian Internuncio who attempted to murder Kossuth in Shoumla, was furnished by the Porte with a passport in order to watch him in Kutahia, he lost finally faith in the Porte and refused help from Urquhart and Canning, although the latter was glad to tell him of his release in September.[210]

In this desperate state of mind he decided to cooperate with Mazzini.[211] The latter had been plotting Italy's unity since 1849 and already possessed a revolutionary fund of several million Lire. In spite of his promise to Urquhart he accepted the invitation of the Central European Democratic Committee in London to go on its board; the open and awoved aim was to destroy the monarchies.[212]

According to this decision Mazzini ordered his confidential collaborator, Adriano Lemmi, to Kutahia in order to establish direct contact between himself and Kossuth. Lemmi formerly represented Mazzini's interests in Constantinople and now entered on

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[209] Pulszky—Kossuth, April 5, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[210] Canning—Kossuth, Constantinople, April 30, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest. — See appendix no. 7.

[211] Baron Tecco had knowledge of Kossuth's planned contact with Mazzini but he was informed that Mazzini's approach did not lead to cooperation. Cf. Tecco—D'Azeglio, Constantinople, May 5, 1851, no. 826. A. St. Torino.

[212] Menghini Mario, *Luigi Kossuth nel suo carteggio con Giuseppe Mazzini.* Aquila, 1921, pp. 18 et sequ.

his new position with Kossuth in April 1851.[213] In a very short time he had gained decisive influence over Mrs. Kossuth and through her Kossuth himself. He also succeeded in isolating Kossuth from his fellow-refugees, particularly from Count Casimir Batthyány, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lazarus Mészáros, former Minister of War, and General Perczel. The aim of this isolation was to keep any influence away from Kossuth excepting that of Mazzini. In fact, since that time Kossuth's activities were concentrated exclusively on the revolutionary organization in Hungary in accordance with Mazzini's similar preparations in Italy.[214]

Without any knowledge of this turn of events Urquhart was waiting in vain for Kossuth's letters. When he left Kutahia in October last he already suspected Kossuth of accepting Mazzini's offer of a common revolutionary platform. His suspicion gained ground as he percieved in Constantinople the lack of caution shown by Kossuth in choosing his confidential collaborators, who were not worthy of such services. So he wrote to Batthyány and requested him to withhold Kossuth from communications which, in his opinion, could not promote their common plans. "You too, are necessary for Hungary" — he wrote. — "One without the other[215] is useless. You can do absolutely nothing without him. Without you he may struggle and agitate but not succeed. It requires then between you a union of powers, confidence and affection. The bar is on *his side,* not yours and the bar is his misplaced confidence. He estimates your talents, but not your character and so you cannot give him your confidence entirely nor he derive from you the strength you would otherwise afford him . . ."[216]

Urquhart was perfectly right, but instead of giving counsel to Batthyány he should rather have done so to Kossuth, who had already become estranged from the former owing to Lemmi's influence.

With no sign of life from Kossuth, he regularly sent his letters after he arrived in London in March 1851. He again requested him to refrain from politics and gave him to understand that he would

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[213] Cf. Batthyány—Urquhart, Paris, Oct. 29, 1851. The Free Press, Sheffield, March 8, 1856.

[214] Cf. Geheime Präsidialregistratur des königlichen Polizei-Präsidiums, Berlin. Tit. 94. Litt. U., no. 40. G. P. ST. A. Berlin-Dahlem.

[215] Kossuth.

[216] Constantinople, Jan. 13, 1851: The Free Press, Sheffield, March 8, 1856.

only remain a considerable factor in European politics as long as he was detained on Ottoman territory. At the moment he was set free, he would become a "negligeable quantity", which could in no way be counteracted by popular demonstrations in Britain. Urquhart's opinion derived partly from his own conviction, partly from the "news", grown almost to "legends", about Kossuth's person.

In well-informed circles of the Porte great scepticism prevailed as to the probable issue of the negotiations. One entertained the opinion that Canning, while urging Kossuth's release, was endeavouring to bury his political significance. He was acting in accordance with Metternich's counsels, which were revealed by the Paris press. Metternich considered it wise to disarm all nationalities living in Hungary, even those who fought for Austria, then to arrest all turbulent individuals and to banish them to America, where they could make happy themselves according to their own principles.

As to whether this counsel was accepted by Austria or not it does not matter. Yet Schwarzenberg acted in this sense and expelled a large number of individuals who had fought for Hungary. They were regularly furnished with passports, only good for America, under condition of being forbidden to return to the Austrian Empire.

This procedure was often discussed at the Porte along with the prospect that Palmerston might regard it as very reasonable on account of European peace, and even himself be willing to promote Kossuth's deportation to America or to Australia.

It was rumoured in Constantinople that these were the reasons why Canning urged the release of Kossuth. He would not hesitate to help Kossuth's escape. Again the sensitiveness of the Porte was touched by Canning's behaviour, which gave the impression that he would govern the Ottoman Empire himself. This very idea induced the Porte to discontinue Kossuth's detention, although his person was a strong card in Turkey's hands against the Powers interested in the question.[217]

However things might stand, this procrastination gave rise to various speculations. Urquhart believed the Turkish version. His conviction was confirmed by Palmerston's attitude in the question of the refugees. Urquhart's opinion was not alone among the ra-

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[217] Ladik Effendi—Urquhart, Constantinople, April 15, 1851: The Free Press, March 15, 1856.

dical members of Parliament. Cobden also shared his impression. "If there is any chance of that man[218] being unmasked" — he said to Urquhart — "it is Kossuth that will do it for he has more than any other man at this moment the ear of the European public and nothing will intimidate him once he has made up his mind . . ."[219] Urquhart decided to use all his efforts to induce Kossuth to write an open letter and reveal Palmerston's diplomacy in Stambul to the British public.

But before his letter reached Kossuth an unforseen event made him almost hostile towards the Hungarian leader. He read in the London papers the protest of Kossuth addressed to Reschid, in which he referred plaintively to the long term of his detention.[220] In this very letter Urquhart's name was mentioned several times.

Kossuth outlined Urquhart's opinion as being in favour of the maintenance of the Austrian Empire, and agreeing with Palmerston's principle as to her political mission in Middle-Europe. But being properly informed in Kutahia, he made up his mind and became convinced that the reestablishment of an independent Hungary was absolutely necessary "for the security not only of the future glory but of the existence of the Turkish Empire". Thus, his attachment to Turkey made him a friend of Hungary.[221]

What Kossuth said about Urquhart was absolutely true; nevertheless Urquhart did not like to see the summary of his discussions in print. He felt deeply compromised by this publication and complained of Kossuth's attitude in breaking his word. But of course he did not know that it was against Kossuth's intention to have his protest to the Porte published by the British press.

Atfer long inquiries Pulszky was successful in finding out the person who caused this indiscretion. Yet he could not change Urquhart's ill-humour. Namely, Kossuth's protest was usually shown by Reschid or Aali to Canning, who felt in this case particularly glad to forward a copy to the British press. With this act he wanted to give Urquhart a disagreable surprise for the incessant trouble he caused Palmerston in his Near East policy.

Deeply mortified by this indiscreet publication, Urquhart's

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[218] Palmerston.

[219] Urquhart—Kossuth, House of Commons, June 27, 1851: The Free Press. Ut supra.

[220] Pulszky—Kossuth, London, May 26, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[221] Kossuth's letter to Reschid. Kutahia, Febr. 15, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

estrangement towards Kossuth began, and took further nourishment from news received from Pulszky about a letter addressed by Kossuth to Marsh, the American Minister in Stambul.[222] In this letter he accused the Porte and the Turkish policy of causing his hopeless situation in terms which led one to conclude that he renounced any intention of a rapprochement with Turkey.

Urquhart was further informed by his Turkish friends that Kossuth had indeed entered into close relations with Mazzini. In a terse letter he asked Kossuth for an explanation[223] and made up his mind to discontinue his contact with Kossuth if rumours proved his changed attitude. The Turkophile Urquhart could not make common policy with a man who "fell in the net of the Russophile Mazzini".

Urquhart never received an answer to his letters. Kossuth's time was full with preparations for the insurrection planned for the spring of the coming year 1852. Besides, it was an open question whether he had ever received Urquhart's letters or at least some of them. None of them were preserved by Kossuth.

But apart from his busy correspondence with Mazzini he raised innumerable questions to Canning and Marsh. He wanted to know whether he would actually be released on September 1st. If so he would be glad to receive permission to break his voyage in Gibraltar, for he wished to spend a few days in Britain in order to arrange pressing matters there. These were his plans, made with Mazzini whom he wanted to talk with concerning the particulars of their common cause before he had to sail to the United States.

Meanwhile Lemmi was sent by Kossuth to Constantinople to forward his letters to the ministers. But being afraid that Kossuth's letters would do more harm than good, Lemmi retained them arbitrarily and tried to calm Kossuth by persuasive words: "Please, be quiet" — he wrote — "Brown who is in place of Marsh, entertains friendly feelings towards you, but he has to follow instructions received from Washington. No provision has been made for the break in your voyage, therefore he can give you no hope of realizing your plans.[224]

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[222] Urquhart—Kossuth, July 3, 1851: The Free Press. Ut supra.

[223] London, June 20, 1851: The Free Press. Ut supra. — See appendix no. 8.

[224] Lemmi—Kossuth, Constantinople, Aug. 11, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

XII.

Lawrence, the American Minister in London reveals to Pulszky the secret aims of the Absolute Powers concerning Kossuth. — Uneasiness of Austrian diplomatists in London. — Prince Paul Esterházy invited to Palmerston's reception. — He reassures Buol, the Austrian Minister about the importance of the Kossuth affair. — "Revolutions would have less importance, he said, if Continental Governments would redress their peoples' grievances." — Schwarzenberg's endeavours to have accepted his interpretations of the agreement with the Porte. — He threatens the Porte with recall of the Austrian Internuncio. — Schwarzenberg unsuccessful negotiations with Mussurus, the Turkish Minister in Vienna. — Klezl, the Austrian chargé d'affaires writes from Stambul: Aali is the most respectable liar in Turkey. — Schwarzenberg answers: he does not even deserve this honourable title.

In London Pulszky was just as desperate as Kossuth. He was convinced like Kossuth that the Porte would not keep its word about the release of the refugees. When he called upon Lawrence, the American Minister in London, to receive promising news, he learnt only dishartening facts. Lawrence informed him of the secret intention of the Absolute Powers to settle the Kossuth affair finally. They wanted to avoid his presence in Europe in the crisis to come. The general opinion was that he would attempt his escape from Asia Minor. In order to keep him quiet they let his wife escape and sent his children to him. Even the American Government was solicited by the Absolute Powers to make its proposal to the Porte. "It is already the end of June and you are still detained" — wrote Pulszky to Kossuth. — "They want you to keep there as long as they can and then to convey you to America. If you come to Britain they want to overwhelm you with distinction till May next . . ."[225]

Lawrence judged the situation fairly well, though he was wrong in asserting that the American Government was persuaded by European Powers to convey Kossuth to America. It was the motion of Senator Foote of Missisippi which induced the American Government to act on feelings of humanity. Besides, in a considerable part of Congress the opinion prevailed that America had to intervence on behalf of those who fought gallantly for democracy but fell in the conflict against European absolutism.

[225] London, June 24, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

A great many London diplomatists shared Lawrence's opinion and did not attach any particular importance to the Kossuth affair from the point of view of the European politics. Only the Austrian Legation lived in a state of permanent excitement in view of Kossuth's coming release. Baron Koller was rather perplexed by the contradictory news he received in Downing Street. Once Canning reported that Kossuth would travel directly to America. Another time he wrote of Kossuth's changed decision to go to London in order to meet fellow emigrants of the continental states.

The Austrian Legation did its utmost to counterbalance his presumable activities during his stay in Britain. Yet Koller's measures were greatly dependent upon the attitude of Palmerston whose intrinsic politics were not disclosed to the Austrian diplomatists. Count Buol, the successor to Baron Koller, was painfully surprised to meet Prince Paul Esterházy, the former Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Palmerston's residence[226] and to learn that Lawrence made no secret of his relations with the refugees.

When he asked Palmerston to explain the reasons of the invitation which Prince Esterházy was honoured with, he considered Palmerston's answer more evasive than friendly. Palmerston only said, his residence was neutral territory where the representatives of the most opposite principles might meet. Of course he regretted all that had happened in the past but he could not assume any responsibility as to whether such scenes might be repeated or not.

Almost every day brought some discouraging news for Buol. The answer given by Palmerston to the motion of Dudley Stuart was clear enough, that the Hungarian refugees were to be released on September 15th.[227] Buol was seeking the opportunity to receive from Palmerston personally more particulars about the pending affair, but the Secretary of State spent the summer season out of town; so he was prevented from seeing him until the end of September.

In a long discussion he had in Broadlands, in Palmerston's country residence, he realized the desire of the Secretary of State to avoid diplomatic controversies. Palmerston assured Buol that the demonstrations in prospect during Kossuth's stay in Britain

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[226] Buol—Schwarzenberg, London, June 24, 1851. Rapp. no. 2, A—D. Angleterre, H. H. St. A. Wien.

[227] Aug. 5. Hansard, vol. 118, pp. 888—9.

would neither exert any influence upon the government nor on the public. He decidedly refuted the reproach that he had anything to do with supporting continental refugees. Those, who entertain such an opinion" — he said — "apparently ignore that Parliament does not give legal power to the government to proceed against foreigners who did not come in conflict with the Alien Act. There is no reason to believe that Parliament would consent to any change in that matter proposed by the government. The only measures the government could make upon its own responsibility might be an explanation given to the refugees to avoid any collision with the law, in their own interest. "Believe me" — concluded Palmerston — "that revolutionary movements could be lowered to their real importance if foreign powers would not attach to them exaggerate significance and would rather redress their peoples' grievances"[228]

After this discussion Buol considered that he had Palmerston's open awoval that his "mauvais conseils" prevailed in Turkey. Buol was aware of the delicate point of the whole controversy, which consisted in the Porte's refusal to keep its promise concerning the stipulations of Schwarzenberg's *previous* agreement as to the release of the refugees. And Buol suspected Palmerston of having influenced the Porte to change its views.

Of course, the Porte had its own point of view. Namely, Schwarzenberg reserved himself the right to determine the period when he was willing to admit that the order in Hungary was properly restored. But the Porte had good reason to believe that this stipulation was only to prolong the detention ad infinitum. Already two and a quarter years had elapsed since the refugees came into the Ottoman Empire, and Schwarzenberg was not yet willing to give his consent to their release. Again, the Porte as well as the Western Powers considered this period long enough for the pacification of Hungary, even if Schwarzenberg were not willing to share their opinion.

Since diplomatic relations were interrupted between the respective powers, Baron Stürmer left his office in Stambul and in spite of the "official" reconciliation which took place some time later, Schwarzenberg did not send another diplomatic representative to the Sultan instead of Stürmer. Schwarzenberg wanted to use this opportunity to impose his will upon the Porte. For this

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[228] Buol—Schwarzenberg, London, Sept. 23, 1851. Rapp. no. 14. H. H. St. A. Wien.

purpose, Count Leonhard Rechberg-Rothenlöwen, the successor of Stürmer, was instructed to leave his position immediately if the Porte were not be willing to change its decision concerning the release of the refugees.[229]

In spite of this attempted intimidation, it became evident shortly that the Porte did not want to change its attitude. Being informed of Rechberg's unsuccessful steps, Schwarzenberg sent for Mussurus, the Turkish Minister in Vienna, and explained to him without reserve what he thought about the weakness of the Porte.[230] "Events prove clearly" — he said — " that the Porte takes heed of Britain's counsels concerning an affair which belongs exclusively to the Austrian and Turkish Governments. Mussurus should report to Stambul that Rechberg is not allowed to enter his office as a reprisal for the Porte's tenacity. After all, there is no use in sending a diplomatic representative to the Porte because Turkey's brain is substituted by Britain and Austria is represented properly in London. Schwarzenberg will find means to settle affairs concerning Turkey directly with Palmerston . . ."

But Austria failed again. Klezl, the Austrian chargé d'affaires could not but accept the present state of things and began to apologize for Aali, "the most respectabe liar in Turkey". The arrival of the American steamer Mississippi, sent for Kossuth by the U. S. A. Government, was reported by him in an ironical manner. And he did not conceal the amusing news of that boat's being stranded in the Bay of Smyrna where she was released from her dangerous position by the assistance of three steamers of the Austrian Lloyd!

With pretended good humour he wrote about the keen competition that existed between the British and French diplomatists for the conveyance of the refugees.[231] Canning offered the steamer "Growler", Da la Valette, the new French Minister, the "Ajaccio". Kossuth might have chosen among the powers with whose assistance he was "to start his political propaganda".

This ironical manner only served to veil Austrian weakness. Schwarzenberg had to make the best of the unavoidable events. Nevertheless his fury against the Turkish Ministers did not cease for months. "Aali does not even deserve to be called a "respectable

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[229] Despatch, Vienna, June 10, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.
[230] Despatch, Vienna, July 8, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.
[231] Rapp. no. 71, A—D. Sept. 3, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.

liar", he answered Klezl[232] and turned his attention to the West where Kossuth became the centre of interest.

XIII.

Kossuth's departure from Kutahia. — Controversies in Spezia with Capt. Long, of the Steam Frigate "Mississippi" and Commodore Morgan of the American Mediterranean Squadron. — Kossuth wants to break his passage to America in Marseilles. — Refusal of the French Government to permit his crossing France. — — Kossuth's Marseilles Letter. — The pro-Magyar British Press divided and partly disillusioned by the Marseilles Letter. — Diplomacy stirred up by Kossuth's appearance. — Ralph Abercromby's damning criticism of Kossuth's behaviour. — Reproaches of Baroche, the French Minister of the Interior on account of the imposing preparations at Southampton for Kossuth's reception. — Reservedness in St. Petersburgh. — Schwarzenberg's planned reprisals towards British travellers. — Palmerston's conciliatory despatches to Paris, Vienna and St. Petersburgh. — Buol's departure from Britain for the period of the Kossuth demonstrations.

The good news reached Kossuth as early as August 22nd that he was to make preparations for departure.[233] He left Kutahia with his fellow-refugees on September 1st. Thence they were transported by a Turkish steamer to the Dardanelles, the place of anchorage of the Steam Frigate Mississippi which had been ordered there by the American Government to convey them to the United States.[234]

Kossuth did not conceal his dissatisfaction when he was informed by Capt. Long of the orders of the American Navy Department to convey him directly to the New World.[235] When the Frigate anchored in Spezia to coal he explained the reasons for

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[232] Despatch, Vienna, Dec. 16, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.

[233] László's Diary, vol. I, p. 81.

[234] Cf. Baron Tecco—D'Azeglio, Rap. no. 843. Constantinople, Sept. 15, 1851. A. St. Torino.

[235] Official correspondence published by 32nd Congress, 1st Session. House of Representatives. Executive documents no. 78. — See also *Kossuth and the voyage of the Mississippi* with comments in the Evening Post Weekly, New York, Nov. 13, 1851; Official Documents. *M. Kossuth and the Mississippi.* The National Intelligencer, Washington, Febr. 21, 1852.

his complaint to Commodore Morgan[236] commander in chief of the American Mediterranean Squadron. He spoke to Morgan about the confusing and misleading tone of the Austrian press which culminated in the assertion that his release and conveyance to America had been stipulated by Austria. He said he must refute these false assertions. For that purpose he resolved to go directly to Britain where he expected to spend a few weeks and then to continue his voyage to America. By this act Kossuth desired to demonstrate his free will in accepting America's invitation, and also to give evidence that his voyage had no relationship whatever to Austrian stipulations.

He further spoke with Morgan of the discouraging news of Austria's planned entrance into the German Bund. Austria intended to amalgamate Hungary, Croatia, Lombardy and Venice with this Confederation. The matter had already been discussed at the Dresden Conference. Britain and France made representations, but they were refused by the Frankfort Parliament. The latter was resolved not to tolerate foreign interference in the "domestic" affairs of the Bund. The attitude of Frankfort was very soon re-echoed in Austria by the suspension of the constitution. Now, no legal bars exist — said Kossuth — to prevent Hungary's forced entrance into the Bund.

He had to protest in any case against this brutal policy. But he could not do it on American territory without infringing its traditional political principles as laid down in Washington's farewell address. These are still in force in the great Republic. It would be an act of ingratitude towards his American hosts. That is why he had to go to Britain and give utterance to his firm protests.

Morgan was in fact confused by Kossuth's explanations. He could not understand why he wanted to be mixed up in politics. When President Fillmore approved the joint resolution of Congress on March 3rd 1851 and the Mississippi was ordered to Asia Minor to convey the refugees to the United States, it was supposed that they wanted to emigrate and settle in the New World.[237] Kossuth however did not set forth his views on this point of the resolution, but incessantly requested facilities for his journey. This

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[236] Wertheimer, Eduard, *Ludwig Kossuth in Amerika:* Preussische Jahrbücher, 1925, pp. 253—57.

[237] Curti, Merle Eugene, *Austria and the United States 1848—1852.* Smith College Studies in History. Northampton Mass. 1926, vol. XI, no. 3, pp. 172—73.

attitude was taken as an unconditional acceptance of Congress' offer.

But apart from all this Morgan thought that he could not constrain the guest of the American people to continue his voyage against his will. He therefore complied with Kossuth's request to convey him to Marseilles, supposing that the French Government would permit him to cross France to London. In case of a French refusal, he instructed Capt. Long to convey Kossuth to Gibraltar[238] and to await his return from Britain. In this case Kossuth had to choose the route and awail himself of the regular Packet Boat that ran once a week between Gibraltar and Southampton.

As was to be expected, the French Government refused to permit Kossuth to travel through France. It had every reason for its attitude, because it wanted to avoid demonstrations with which the left wing elements would have honoured him.[239]

Kossuth objected to the government's order, which was sent to Suleau, the prefect of Bouche du Rhône. "I know the French people are not responsible for it and not identified with this act of the government" — he wrote in his manifesto. "I know that neither Louis Napoléon Bonaparte nor Faucher are considered to be identified with the French nation itself. Although the executive power is delegated to them, yet the honour of France is not in their keeping." Then he entrusted this fiery article to the *Peuple de Marseille*, a progressive daily paper which published it; but the issue was immediately confiscated.

After this unsuccessful experience, the Mississippi continued her voyage to Gibraltar, where a large correspondence was forwarded to Kossuth, containing the latest news from Britain about the plans for his reception. Kossuth eagerly read Pulszky's letter from Southampton. "There will be arrangements" — wrote Pulszky. — "Addresses are sent from every part. All the mayors of South Britain are expected to come... Still I am afraid the

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[238] As to the controversy which arose between Kossuth and Capt. Long in the Mediterranean ports see Kropf, Lewis, *Kossuth Lajos és Long kapitány* (Lewis Kossuth and Capt. Long): Budapesti Szemle (Budapest Review) 1903, pp. 318 et sequ.; — Marsh, the American Minister in Constantinople took Long's part. See his letter to H. J. Raymond, the Editor of the New York Times, Marsh, Caroline Crane, *Life and Letters of George Perkins Marsh.* New York, 1888, pp. 251—52.

[239] Moore, J. B., *Kossuth the Revolutionist:* Political Science Quarterly, New York, 1895, pp. 270 et sequ.

enthusiasm will abate; the people are growing tired with waiting so long . . ."[240]

There was no exaggeration in Pulszky's jubilation. Buol, the Austrian Minister, was compelled to report to Schwarzenberg that nearly every organ of the British press wrote with open or concealed sympathy of the Hungarian refugees, with the exception of *The Times*.[241] Only Kossuth's manifesto from Marseilles created discord in this harmony of sympathies, and divided the press. Some of the papers took offence at the inconsiderate tone of the manifesto, and doubted its authenticity. "Kossuth must have signed a manifesto" — they wrote — "whose effect he did not consider." Others again, decided to withdraw their sympathy from him should he speak in a similar manner in Britain. *The Times* accused him openly of being a conspirator like Mazzini or Louis Blanc. Again, *The Globe* wrote in a friendly tone in spite of the Marseilles incident.

Kossuth's appearance in the Mediterranean created great excitement among the diplomatists. Britain's representatives reported all details of his voyage very fully. Ralph Abercromby, the Minister at the Sardinian court, wrote a very disillusioned letter about him. His information was based on the intelligence received from Mc Kinney, his American colleague in Turin.[242]

Again, in Paris Baroche, Minister of the Interior, gave utterance to his consternation by speaking about the inconsiderate attitude of the prefect of Bouche du Rhône, who permitted Kossuth to land in Marseilles and thus caused demonstrations which resulted in grave popular disturbances. He complained further to Normanby, the British Minister in Paris, that the preparations in progress in Southampton for Kossuth's reception would no doubt encourage revolutionary elements all over the Continent.[243] But having learnt of the disapproval of the Marseilles manifesto expressed by a considerable section of the British press, Baroche became somewhat easier in his mind as to the consequences of Kossuth's British trip.[244]

Nesselrode was also greatly interested in matter and was glad

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[240] Southampton, Oct. 6, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[241] Rapp. no. 18, A—E. London, Oct. 11, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.

[242] Report no. 123. Turin, Sept. 28, 1851. Sardinia. F. O. vol. 179. P. R. O. London. — See appendix no. 10.

[243] Normanby—Palmerston, Paris, Oct. 6, 1851. Report no. 279. F. O. 27/903. P. R. O. London.

to be informed by Lord Seymour, the British Minister in St. Petersburgh, of what was going to happen as regards Kossuth. On Seymour replying that Kossuth would probably be met with the greatest cordiality, he did not express any further opinion . . .[245]

Magenis, the British Minister in Vienna, reported Schwarzenberg's plan of refusing British travellers' requests to enter Hungary. The reason of this government order was to apply reprisals for Palmerston's pro-Magyar attitude.[246]

The Secretary of State was aware of Schwarzenberg's annoyance and gave Magenis an ironical answer.[247] Still he did not regard Schwarzenberg's threats as worthy of diplomatic steps in Vienna.

To Normanby he wrote that the British Government only acted at request of the towns and counties in intervening at the Porte. After all it seemed only proper, if the British people was willing to arrange festivals in honour of Kossuth. But in the event of Kossuth's speeches, as he intended, being moderate and restrained, it was not likely that they would encourage European revolutionaries.[248] Mr. Baroche would have very little cause for anxiety.

On the other hand, if his speeches were of revolutionary character, the British people would no doubt, lose interest in him. Besides, there would be no one of any importance who would be willing to attend such festivals or dinners.[249]

He also tried to calm Nesselrode, and let him know via Seymour that in his opinion even the most turbulant emigrant would fail to create troubles in a country where tranquillity prevailed.[250] He thought the governments must be empowered to eliminate any apparent reasons for domestic dissatisfaction.

Anyway, Continental Powers must learn the impropriety of extraditing political refugees who lived quietly in Britain. How

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[244] Normanby—Palmerston, Paris, Oct. 10, 1851. F. O. 27/903. no. 283. P. R. O. London.

[245] Seymour—Palmerston. Report no. 42. Confidential. St. Petersburg. Russia. vol. 395. P. R. O. London. — See appendix no. 14.

[246] Vienna, Sept. 30, 1851. F. O. 7/388. no. 182. P. R. O. London.

[247] London, Oct. 14, 1851. Draft no. 285. Austria. F. O. 7/388. P. R. O. London. — See appendix no 13.

[248] Palmerston—Normanby, London, Oct. 17, 1851. no. 485. F. O. 27/896. P. R. O. London. — See appendix no. 17.

[249] Palmerston spoke in the same sense to Buol. Cf. the latter's report no. 20. A—C. London, Oct. 20, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.

[250] Palmerston—Seymour, London, Oct. 28, 1851. no. 53. Russia. vol. 930. P. R. O. London.

could it be otherwise? Britain could not undertake the duty of acting as judge between governments demanding the extradition of political refugees. Should Britain comply with their demands, she must be sure which one of the contesting parties was in the right, which was, practically, outside her province.

Besides this the Ministers of Austria, Russia and Prussia in London decided to present a common démarche to Palmerston. They had complained several times already of his liberal point of view in interpreting the British Aliens Act. They said that Britain's cooperative task should give support to Continental Powers which had to exert their utmost energies in the race of subversive activities. It might be admitted that Britain was not endangered by Continental revolutionary movements on account of her geographical situation. Still, it was in her own interest to help to keep the peace.[251]

In Palmerston's opinion the ministers took too serious a view of the rôle of the political refugees. He ridiculed them and said that all the refugees in Britain were not a match for a few thousand Pounds. Most of them were living in great poverty, striving for their daily bread. As to Kossuth, he was convinced that no one could find a Court in Britain which would be ready to banish him or forbid his return to Britain simply on account of statements charging him with revolutionary tendencies. Kossuth had no means of obtaining military or naval equipment. Besides, it was every government's task to defend its own territory against disturbances arising either at home or abroad.

Buol found that these statements were rather discouraging for continental diplomatists. He decided therefore to leave London while Kossuh was in Britain.[252] Otherwise he would have to face a very awkward situation as an involuntary eye-witness of demonstrations arranged in favour of Kossuth.

Schwarzenberg agreed with Buol's decision, for he wanted to avoid the appearance of having Buol interrupted his diplomatic activities. Of course, the public was informed of Buol's intention of leaving London "in order to meet his wife in Brussels and to go with her to Paris on private affairs" — which literally meant the date of Kossuth's departure for America.

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[251] Bunsen's political papers. Immediatbericht no. 119. London, Oct. 15, 1851. P. G. St. A. Berlin-Dahlem.

[252] Buol—Schwarzenberg. Rapp. no. 19. A—C. Oct. 15, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien. — See appendix no. 15.

XIV.

Kossuth's arrival in Southampton. — Palmerston invites Kossuth to Broadlands. — Mazzini and Ledru Rollin want to counteract this invitation. — Cobden's and Urquhart's counsels to Kossuth as to his political attitude in Britain. — Cobden refrains from forwarding Palmerston's invitation. — Kossuth declines Palmerston's and the socialist workers' invitation. — Favourable impression of his moderate speech in Southampton. — Kossuth festival in Winchester. — Cobden enchanted by his personality. — Cobden's readiness to give moral support to Kossuth. — Crosskey, the American Consul in Southampton forecasts Ango-American Alliance against Continental Despotism. — The Central Democratic Committee prepares Kossuth for the impending democratic revolution in France. — Kossuth's political platform and cooperation with the Radical Party. — Henningsen's relevations in the Times. — T. Smith's and F. W. Newman's literary propaganda for Kossuth. — His great speech at the public dinner in Southampton. — Walker, the Ex-Secretary of the American Treasury explains Crosskey's prediction: the Anglo-American Democratic Alliance will be ready for an armed intervention on behalf of oppressed liberty in Europe.

Kossuth bade farewell to the Mississippi in Gibraltar, then he changed boat and arrived on October 23rd in Southampton, where all Hungarian refugees of rank were gathered to take part in his festal reception. The thrilling scenes of their reunion overpowered the multitude, which eagerly occupied every vantage-point and following the example of the refugees shouted Hungarian "Éljen" with unbounded enthusiasm.[253] Andrews, the Mayor of Southampton, Dudley Stuart, Crosskey, the American Consul, and Pulszky were the first to greet him on board.

Pulszky wished to be the first to go on board, for he knew of Palmerston's invitation to Kossuth, which Dudley Stuart handed to the Hungarian leader. Palmerston wanted to see him at Broadlands, his country residence not far from Southampton.

Mazzini and Ledru Rollin also knew of this invitation. It was regarded by them as a misleading action by the aristocracy in order to compromise him in the eyes of democracy. If Kossuth accepted this invitation, they decided to turn against him and to discontinue their common action. Mazzini clearly explained this

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[253] Headley, *Life of Lewis Kossuth.* Auburn, 1852, p. 233.

point of view to Kossuth in a letter delivered by Pulszky, and warned him against losing the interest of the aristocracy, which in fact never really sympathized with his cause.[254]

Pulszky had further to convey Cobden's advice as to his attitude when invited to public demonstrations or dinners in Britain. Cobden, who gave him assurance of the support of the Radical Party[255] warned him against speaking at a public gathering if his political opponents were speaking at the same time. Otherwise he was in danger of being identified with partisan political tendencies which would spoil his chances in this country.[256]

It was really difficult for him to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of the sympathies of those who represented opposite political principles. It was just as difficult to find his way in the varying suggestions he received in his large correspondence. One of the most pecular suggestions was made by Urquhart who warned him against speaking to anybody before he could see him personally.[257]

Kossuth highly appreciated the advice of his British friends of the Radical Party. Mazzini's letter also made a great impression on him. In accordance with information received he decided to refuse Palmerston's kind invitation. He explained to Dudley Stuart his intention of informing the British public first of all of his political principles and of his country's true situation. If Palmerston were willing to receive him when he had made his public speeches, he would regard it as the greatest honour that could be conferred upon him.[258]

Of course this was clear enough for Dudley Stuart to understand Kossuth's aims. If Palmerston showed readiness to receive him after his public speeches, it would actually mean the Secretary of State's decision to endorse the political principles for which Kossuth was fighting.

Dudley Stuart was somewhat irritated by Kossuth's opinion, but he did not resign because of his lack of success, and requested Cobden to mediate. The latter was not willing to assume this

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[254] Pulszky, vol. II, pp. 66—67.

[255] Cobden—Pulszky, Midhurst, Sep. 22, 1851. N. M. MSSDpt. Bpest. — See appendix no. 11.

[256] Cobden—Pulszky, Midhurst, Oct. 4, 1851. N. M. MSSDpt. Bpest. — See appendix no. 12.

[257] Kossuth—Urquhart, Oct. 24, 1851: The Free Press. Sheffield, March 8, 1856.

[258] Pulszky, vol. II, p. 67.

rôle, for he did not belong to the followers of Palmerston. "You may depend upon it" — he answered Dudley Stuart — "Kossuth knows a great deal more about Lord Palmerston than you do . . ."[259]

Somehow or other this invitation was made public in the press. Through this channel Kübeck, the Austrian chargé d'affaires, also got to know of it, but he was sceptical of its authenticity. In fact, he knew of Palmerston's alleged promise to Buol that he would not receive Kossuth.[260] But Kübeck was in error. Palmerston promised only that he would not have an "official" meeting with Kossuth.

Anyway, it was not only the invitation of Palmerston which Kossuth refused. He showed a similar attitude towards the socialist workers, who wanted to honour him with a banquet in Southampton. Upon receiving his negative answer they returned to London very discontented.[261]

Besides this, Kossuth's charming manner fascinated all who came in contact with him. The progress he made in English since the surrender at Világos was a remarkable tribute to his genious. Even in Viddin he drafted his letters to Canning in French and only began in 1850 during his detention in Kutahia, to correspond regularly in English.

It created a great sensation in Southampton when his oratorical talents became known.[262] He first addressed the crowd from the balcony of the mayor's house. There was a sudden hush when he began to speak in a clear, mellow voice: "Seven weeks ago" — he said — "I was a prisoner in Kutahia. Now I am a free man because glorious England choose it, that England which the genious of mankind selected for a monument of its greatness and the spirit of freedom took to be its happy home . . ."[263]

With these opening words a man of profound feelings and gratitude was introduced to the crowd. On he same evening he

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[259] Bright John and Rogers James E. Thorold, *Speeches on questions of public policy of Richard Cobden.* 1903. See his speech in Manchester in 1857 on behalf of Bright's re-election to Parliament.

[260] Cf. Rapp. no. 24. London, Oct. 29, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.

[261] Bunsen's Immediatbericht no. 93. London, Oct. 25, 1851. G. P. St. A. Berlin-Dahlem.

[262] Cf. a description of Kossuth's powers as an orator by Mc Carthy Justin, *A history of our own times.* London, 1897, vol. II, pp. 139—141; By the same author, *Reminiscences.* New York—London, 1900, vol. I, p. 108; Hóman—Szekfű, *Magyar Történet* (History of Hungary). Bpest, vol. VII, p. 281.

[263] Headley, *Life,* p. 234.

fascinated his audience with similar flattering words. With his extraordinary tact he praised Queen Victoria's high personal qualities and with oratorical force said: It is a glorious sight to behold a Queen, representing popular liberty.[264]

With these words he at once gained the enthusiasm of his audience. Then he spoke about the British constitution and compared it with that of France, whose weakness he found in its centralization. He praised British self-government, which always offered effective protection against revolutionary tendencies. It was like Hungary, where the municipal institutions preserved the spirit of public life and constitutional liberty "against the open violence and secret intrigues of the House of Austria."[265]

Kossuth's great speech, which took more than an hour, was duly reported by the London press, which unanimously praised his moderate tone and the extraordinary modesty with which he deprecated all personal merit. He said that any special attention shown to his person could only be accepted by him as a token of sympathy for Hungarian liberty. Even in diplomatic circles the opinion prevailed that he had succeeded in changing the unfavourable impression which was created by the Marseilles incident.[266]

His first success had greatly contributed to his growing popularity. The City Council adopted the motion of Alderman Gilpin to make arrangements for his formal reception. But some time was needed for preparations. Kossuth was therefore requested to stay in Southampton for two days, which time was used by Mayor Andrews of Southampton to invite him to his country house at Winchester.

Cobden first met Kossuth in Winchester and discussed with him the political outlook being at that time very discouraging on account of the latent revolutionary movements which made all political combinations uncertain on the Continent. He warned Kossuth against Palmerston and renewed his advice to keep out of British internal politics.

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[264] *Kossuth in England, His progress and his speeches.* London, 1851.

[265] At the end of the meeting Kossuth was honoured by a Hungarian national flag sent to the Hungarian Government by the Magyars living in New York. But the flag was retained by the British Customs on account of the late payment of duties. When this affair was settled, the collapse came in Hungary and the British post-office was unable to forward it to the Hungarian Government; Headley, p. 240.

[266] Bunsen—Manteuffel, London, Oct. 25, 1851. Immediatbericht no. 93. G. P. St. A. Berlin-Dahlem.

Speaking about international law, he agreed with Kossuth that secret diplomacy and the principle of non-intervention were pressing problems. If the governments showed willingness to accept the principle of non-intervention, the reform of secret diplomacy could be avoided.[267]

Cobden was deeply impressed by Kossuth's personality. "Amiability, earnestness and disinterestedness were the most speaking characteristics of the man" — he wrote to Bright.[268] "Speaking phrenologically, I should say, he wants firmness. The head is very small in the animal organs behind the ear. Altogether he did not impress me with a sense of his power to the extent I looked for, yet he must possess it for otherwise he could not have acquired an ascendancy over the aristocratic party of his country when judging by the specimens I have seen amongst the refugees, he was brought into competition with men of no ordinary stamp. The secret of his influence lies, I suspect, in his eloquence. His speech at Winchester delivered within forty-eight hours of his arrival in England in a language with which he would have but little practical acquaintance, was the most extraordinary exploit I ever witnessed . . ."[269]

So it was. Yet he talked over his improvised speech with

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[267] Cobden—Bright, Nov. 4, 6, 1851. Morley John, *The Life of Richard Cobden.* 1896, vol. II, pp. 101—102.

[268] Oct. 29, 1851. Ut supra, p. 100.

[269] In the same enthusiastic manner he wrote a few days later to Sir Joshua Walmsley: ". . . I got your letter at the moment I was starting for Southampton to pay my respects to Kossuth. Otherwise I should have them answered earlier. I found the Hungarian leader at Winchester, in Andrew's house, where I passed part of a couple of days with him. He is very much what I pictured him: mild, pensive, earnest. In his features he is not unlike the lithographs, which however have given a romantic touch to the expression of his face and a depth of colour to his blue eye which does not quite fairly represent the original. He is a slight and delicate person; and if I must confess it, I should add, that his tout ensemble does not impress me with the idea of that power which he must undoubtedly have possessed to have been able to rise to the foremost place in a revolution, and to sway such human materials surrounded him in the Diet and the camp. I suspect that his eloquence and moral qualities were the main source of his strength. He is undoubtedly a genius both as an orator and a writer. His speech in English, at Andrew's dinner, for more than an hour, was delivered with scarcely a mistake. Under all circumstances it was one of the most marvellous performances I ever listened to. There was little attempt at oratorical display, but it was a masterly good English . . ." Walmsley, Joshua, *The life of Sir Joshua Walmsely.* By his son. London, 1879. Chapt. XXI, pp. 241—42. The letter dated from Nov. 10, 1851.

Cobden before he addressed the banquet's guests. He made his audience acquainted with the constitution, with the self-government of the counties which in Hungary became the strongholds of constitutional liberty. These counties played a prominent part in Hungarian history, because the reign of the eleven Hapsburghs who rose to royal dignity was "but an incessant series of violations against the constitution".

As to his own person, he said, all his life he had fought for practical self-government in which he was incessantly handicapped by the Court. In 1848 the Hungarian Government wanted to carry out reforms, only by constitutional means, in civil and military administration. He went to Vienna in order to get the consent of the Court. Everything was promised him there if he could only save Vienna from the impending revolution.

Within forty-eight hours there was order again. "This was one of the moments" — he said — "in which I, in my humble person, was a strange example of the various changes of human life. Myself, a humble unpretending son of modest Hungary, was in the condition that I had the existence of the House of Hapsburghs and all its crowns here in my hand . . .[270]

He ended his speech by saying that he always remained attached to the House of Hapsburgh until Russian intervention destroyed any hope of reconciliation. These last words were scarcely spoken when he was overcome by tears.

Cobden, in his subsequent speech, followed the thread of Kossuth's. "The fate of Hungary proves" — he said — "that among the nations the principle of non-intervention has to prevail. Nevertheless, it would be of no use, if only Britain would be willing to proclaim it alone; she has also to exert her influence to restrain other powers from accidental interventions."

Kossuth was exceedingly glad to have induced Cobden to make a public statement on behalf of the active interpretation of the principle of non-intervention. Then followed Crosskey, the American Consul in Southampton, who drew a rough sketch of the international politics he foresaw for the future. "The United States with their increasing power and dazzling future a new and different policy have to pursue by the necessities of their condition." As an ally of England they will be able to prevent the

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[270] Headley, p. 339.

Absolute Powers' intention of reviving the tragedy of the Hungarian war of independence.[271]

These two speakers said exactly what Kossuth considered as the nucleus of his political platform which he was ready to proclaim in Britain and, later, on his trip in the United States.

He always regarded constitutional liberty as the greatest sign of a well-balanced state machinery, which is the most effective guarantee of individual liberty. Britain and the United States being two paramount strongholds of constitutional liberty could not remain indifferent to the issue of a contest in Europe between the state systems of absolutism and constitutionalism. They must exert their full influence on behalf of the principle of constitutionalism.

As to the methods to be employed, Kossuth thought that the British and American public must influence their own governments to refrain from meddling in the domestic affairs of other states. This was but the first measure to help to gain the principle of constitutionalism. Beyond this, the Anglo-Saxon democracies must with all their moral and physical power constrain the other states to respect the principle of non-intervention. Now, having been successful in carrying into effect this second phase of democratic policy, no doubt constitutional liberty would gain ground everywhere over continental absolutism.

Kossuth's political theories were in accordance with the policy of the Radical Party. But Cobden requested him to refrain from making any comparison in his public speeches, although he took upon himself to proclaim Kossuth's principle of intervention for non-intervention, with the proviso that he confined himself within the limits of *passive* intervention. No doubt, the acceptance of Kossuth's principle by Britain and the United States would necessarily have signified the risk of *armed* intervention, supposing their inability to prevent the Absolute Powers from interference in the domestic affairs of other states.

Cobden could not give his consent to the application of force which he had so positively condemned at the Peace Convention in Frankfort. Nevertheless he was ready to endorse it, at least theoretically, by giving considerable moral support to Kossuth. "You are afraid" — he wrote to Bright — "that others will push our doctrines to the point of physical force. Even if they do that is no reason why we should cease to give moral power to Kossuth's

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[271] *Kossuth in England*, etc. 1851.

only chance by boldly proclaiming the right and justice of the Hungarians to settle their own domestic affairs . . ."[272]

But apart from Cobden and his Radicals there was a small but enthusiastic group of literary men who helped the Hungarian cause from the very time Pulszky arrived in Britain. Unfortunately his most active collaborators, J. D. Vipan and T. C. Banfield had already died when Kossuth visited Britain. But the others were constantly eager to promote his principles. Joshua Toulmin Smith, lawyer and recorder of Parliament, who published as early as 1849 the pamphlet "Parallels between the constitutional liberty of England and Hungary", advised Kossuth to stress the constitutional background of the late struggle in Hungary on every occasion. Charles F. Henningsen published also a pamphlet in which he attacked the editorials of *The Times.*[273] In informing the public of the misleading sources used by that organ, he charged the editor with the intention of creating a feeling adverse to Kossuth. This pamphlet was edited by Alderman Charles Gilpin, who was responsible for the resolution passed by the City Council on October 2nd concerning the official reception of Kossuth, and he himself published a leaflet about Hungary which was apparently printed for distribution during Kossuth's visit in Britain.[274]

Thadeus Delane, the editor-in-chief, was made uneasy by Henningsen's revelations concerning the 'inspired' news-service of *The Times,* but still he maintained his pro-Austrian attitude.[275]

Like Toulmin Smith and Henningsen, Francis W. Newman, the intimate friend of Pulszky, gave practical advice to Kossuth as to the manner of preparing his speeches.[276]

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[272] Midhurst, Nov. 6, 1851. — Morley, vol. II, p. 103.

[273] Oct. 9 and 17, 1851.

[274] *The sixth of October. In memory of the defenders of constitutional liberty in Hungary.* London, 1851. — Concerning the activity of Henningsen see the *Proceedings* in the Times, Oct. 3, 1851. — Henningsen, *Kossuth and the Times, By the author of the Revelations of Russia containing curious information respecting "Our own correspondents" of "The Times".* London, 1851.

[275] Cf. Delane's letters to Dasent, Vienna, Oct. 27—Nov. 3, 1851. in Dasent, Arthur Irwin's work: *John Thadeus Delane, editor of the Times. His Life and Correspondence.* 1908, vol. I, p. 114.

[276] Cf. his Mss.: Considerations to be surmounted before England can render any public aid to Hungary, respectfully addressed to the illustrious

With a critical eye on Kossuth's political expositions, he declared that speeches dealing with the history of national defence in Hungary or with the similarities of the British and Hungarian constitutions might keep up the public interest, but did not result in any practical benefit to the Hungarian cause. Kossuth must tell the British public the truth about the failures of British foreign policy which consisted in omitting the occasions to support Hungary.

Newman expected the same attitude from Kossuth as did Cobden or Urquhart: a severe criticism of Palmerston's policy. What could Kossuth have done in the existing circumstances? At one time he was warned not to interfere in British domestic politics and at another called upon to assail Palmerston's foreign policy. By chance he was prevented from pondering over all the contradictory advice he received, for his time was entirely taken up with social contacts and banquets. He adhered to the political programme he began in Southampton and Winchester.

Before he left Southampton there was a dinner on October 28th given in his honour by the Town Council. It was attended by several members of the Radical Party, among them Henry Charles Fitzroy, Dudley Stuart, B. M. Wilcox, E. A. J. Harris, J. Wyld who had spoken several times in Parliament since the war of independence in Hungary. C. T. B. Lawrence, the American Minister, whose absence was said to be due to ill health, was represented by his son, Capt. Lawrence, attaché at the Legation. Charles Gilpin was also present on behalf of the City Council of London. Further J. R. Walker, the late Secretary of the American Treasury, joined the party; he had come over from the United States to attend the Crystal Palace Exhibition.

When Mayor Andrews read Lawrence's letter of apology, unbounded enthusiasm arose. "I watched his career" — wrote Lawrence — "during his brilliant administration of affairs in Hungary and I have seen what he has done since; and I am now persuaded that he is eminently deserving the admiration of all lovers of constitutional government and freedom... He is now free through the joint efforts of the United States and Britain, two nations animated with the common desire to see it enjoyed by all civilized nations and now has the opportunity to see on the

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Lewis Kossuth by a warm admirer and well-wisher. K. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest. — See appendix no. 18.

shores of England the workings of a constitutional government and the happiness of a free people."[277]

On hearing this letter read, Kossuth was deeply moved and kissed Andrew's hand to express his everlasting gratitude.[278] Then Kossuth spoke with his marvellous, somewhat Oriental rhetoric. But all he said was more or less retrospective and lacked any invective. As a compliment to Cobden he explained the relations between free trade and constitutional liberty. Then, speaking about the attitude of European reaction towards the Anglo-American democracy, he called the attention of the audience to the existing barriers set up by reactionary governments, which threatened Anglo-American commercial interests.

After Kossuth, Walker spoke in the same sense as Crosskey at Winchester. His remarks were considered by a large section of the Whig press as of political importance. Walker was no political novice, for he had spent a long time working in the American Treasury. *The Daily News* said he had dealt all his life in realities; so his assertions could not be construed as visionary inventions.

Kossuth's liberation from Asia Minor — he said — was the first joint intervention of England and America in favour of freedom . . . But Anglo-Saxon Powers do not need to march up with cannons in order to save liberty. Their united moral power is strong enough to face European reaction successfully.[279]

Britain had a great problem to solve: she had to maintain liberty on the Continent. Should she need auxiliary forces from the United States in her efforts, the American People and Government would stand as one man behind Britain to help her to victory.

All that Kossuth heard in these days inspired him with unbounded optimism as to the political consequences of his trip. It was further increased by Mazzini's confidential communication that Ledru Rollin and Louis Blanc had already completed their imposing preparations for the coming French revolution. Napoléon's

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[277] London, Oct. 28, 1851. — Cf. Daily News: Oct. 29, 1851.

[278] Daily News: Oct. 30, 1851.

[279] *Speech of Hon. Robert J. Walker . . . at the Banquet given by Mayor Andrews etc. . . . to Lewis Kossuth. Oct. 28th, 1851.* London, Waterloo and Sons, 1851. — See further the editorial from the Daily News: Oct. 30, 1851; Illustrated London News: Nov. 1, 1851; The National Intelligencer (Washington): Dec. 17, 1851.

coup d'état was supposed to be imminent. In case of its breaking out, the democratic revolution would carry the day.[280]

Like the leaders of the national emigrants in London, he expected to stay for a while in Britain, for he thought he might be of assistance to French democracy by gaining over public opinion in Britain with his extraordinary oratory. Should French democracy be successful, the way would be open for the renewal of the struggle in Hungary. In this hope he went to London to receive the honours of the City-Council which were to be conferred upon him.

XV.

Kossuth's speech before the City Council. — Disillusionment of the Chartists and the working classes at his lionisation by civic elements. — Solidarity of the French democratic press with the British working classes in attacking him for refusing their public dinner. — Kossuth's aversion to the Chartist Leader Feargus O'Connor. — Accepts the worker's invitation to receive their addresses in Copenhagen House. — Attacked by the British conservative press for having accepted the workers' invitation. — The Times against Cobden. — Kossuth demonstrations in Southwark, Westminster, his fêting by the Parliamentary Reform Association. — Walter Savage Landor's enthusiasm. — Kossuth's reception and speeches in Birmingham and Manchester.

Kossuth's route from Eaton Place in London, where Algernon Massingberd offered him his residence, to the Guildhall was a triumphal procession.[281]

Accompanied by Aldermen Gilpin and Wire in a coach drawn by four greys he arrived at the place of the festival.[282] An immense

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[280] Pulszky, vol. II, p. 68.

[281] Cf. E. O. S., *Hungary and its revolutions, with a memoir of Lewis Kossuth.* 1854, p. 515. — Massingberd of the Blues sold his commission in the British Guards in order to put himself at the disposal of Kossuth for the approaching Hungarian insurrection. He also accompanied Kossuth to America and travelled with him as far as Pittsburg. Before Kossuth's arrival in Britain M. published a leaflet "Letter on Kossuth and the Hungarian Question, 1851." in which he reviewed the causes of the war. — Cf. Illustrated London News: Oct. 11, 1851, p. 442; The Economist: Oct. 4, 1851, p. 1161.

[282] D'Isola—D'Azeglio, London, Oct. 31, 1851. Rapp. no. 396. A. St. Torino.

multitude lined the streets and burned several copies of the Times. The people's trial was accompanied by loud groans.[283]

The speech he delivered before the City Council was again a rhetorical display, but contained almost the same principles as he had already proclaimed. But before closing his speech he directed to the bankers of the City the followings words: "If London is the regulator of public credit of the world" — he said — "and if a very considerable quantity of the loan shares of every government in the world are concentrated here, let me ask, where is the security of these loans? Is the security in the victory of the absolutist principle or is it in the victory of the principle of freedom? . . . The absolute governments need the money for immense costly armies and not less costly diplomatic intrigues. But every new loan, in whatever improductive manner applied, diminishes the resources out of which it should be paid. The prospect is inevitable bankruptcy!" Finally he asked the bankers to refuse the loan of eight million Pounds which Austria was asking for.

Of course, since Walker's political augury became his programme, he could not refrain from reiterating it: "I will again and again repeat to you these words" — he said — "I will repeat them with the faith of those martyrs of old which had moved the hills and the mountains. I will concentrate all the fire of my sentiments, all the blood of my heart, all the energy of my mind to raise these words high and loud, deep and solemn, till the almighty echo of the public opinion in repeating it becomes like a thundering trumpet before the sound of which the "Jericho" of human oppression falls . . ."[284]

All who believe in the soberness and self-control so characteristic of the Anglo-Saxons, would have been rather puzzled by seeing the indescribable enthusiasm and hearing the tremendous cheering with which Kossuth was honoured. The festive session was closed by passing a resolution that Kossuth's speech, printed and framed, should be hung up in the Guildhall.[285]

As soon as the leaders of the Chartists and the working classes heard of this they were greatly disappointed. They wanted

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[283] Daily News: Oct. 31, 1851.
[284] Headley, p. 360.
[285] *Kossuth in England*, p. 42.

to use his popularity for their own ends and now they felt outstripped by the enthusiasm of the middle classes.

Kossuth must have taken into consideration that their disappointment would be followed by serious consequences. Already in Southampton, when Kossuth refused the invitation of Thornton Hunt, the representative of the London workers, to a public dinner, this refusal was immediately reechoed by the Red Press in Paris. The solidarity among the left-wing press went so far that even democratic papers like the *"National"* considered it their duty to refuse every article favourable to the Hungarian cause. Irányi, the former collaborator of Count Teleki during the war of independence, anxiously wrote about this turn of the French press' attitude to Kossuth, asking him to reconsider his refusal to Thornton Hunt.[286]

Kossuth could not but yield to the pressure of the press, although he did not share Irányi's opinion of the presumable support of the masses. He never wanted to risk the sympathy of the bourgeoisie which retained the power of governing against all attempts of the working classes. Particularly in Britain, there was not the least prospect of a socialist-workers' government.

Yet he felt induced by Irányi's arguments to accept Thornton Hunt's offer to honour him with a public demonstration. Provision had been made for that purpose in Copenhagen House, where the workers' delegates intended to hand him their addresses of welcome. However, he asked Thornton Hunt to exclude the leader of the Chartists from the demonstration. He first met him in Southampton, where the ostentatious enthusiasm of Feargus O'Connor for the Hungarian leader, caused him great embarrassement.[287] Now, being properly informed of the aversion entertained by a large majority of the British public towards O'Connor's person, he did not want to compromise the cause he represented by the latter's participation.

Thornton Hunt did not keep his word. Instead of a gathering of a limited number of delegates he arranged an imposing demonstration. *The Globe* writes about a multitude of fifty thousand demonstrators who started their procession in Russell Square. In Copenhagen Fields where they assembled, their number was estimated at two hundred thousand. It was an embarrassing

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[286] Paris, Oct. 29, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[287] Gammage, R. G., *The History of the Chartist Movement*. London, 1864, vol. I, p. 403.

situation. Moreover, Kossuth felt provoked at seeing nearly all the Chartist leaders among the members of the committee for the arrangements. Bronterre O'Brien and Reynolds were present. Even O'Connor took his place among them. Only Jones was absent, for he did not wish to be excluded from among the speakers, as was intended.

No wonder that Kossuth was attacked again by the conservative press, whose condemnatory criticism was stronger than a few weeks ago when his Marseilles Letter caused so much comment.

Of course *The Times* found a new motive to make fun of him and lost no time in assailing Cobden and the Radicals. "What an absurd position we are in" — wrote Cobden about *The Times* — "so completely dictated to and domineered over by one newspaper that it requires a periodical revolt of the whole people to keep the despot in tolerable order . . ."[288] In fact, *The Times* sneered at the armed-intervention principle of Kossuth, and published a very sarcastic editorial on Cobden, who supported Kossuth in spite of his well-known anti-armament principles.[289]

The address of the workers was a peculiar one. "We have to state" — said their speaker — "that had the wishes of the working classes governmental aid, the intervention of Russia would not have been met alone by protests upon paper, but upon the field of action by the force of British arms."[290]

Though Kossuth was flattered by these words he did not overestimate their practical value. They might have been regarded as faithful expressions of the workers's sentiments but they lacked all political significance considering the imponderability of their representatives in Parliament. With his usual caution he read a properly prepared speech before the audience. He spoke about the abolition of class-privileges and of free trade as being a fundamental condition of the workers' acceptable standard of living. The attractive idea of these principles quite won over his audience. It would undoubtedly have had the same result with the Radicals if they had happened to be among the workers' delegates.

These demonstrations in Southampton, in the London Guildhall and in Copenhagen Fields were warmly re-echoed from the

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[288] Nov. 4, 1851. — Morley, vol. II, p. 101.

[289] Times: Nov. 4, 1851.

[290] *Kossuth in England*, p. 49.

country. He received many invitations from Wales, Scotland and Ireland requesting him to lecture about Central-European problems. It was a delicate task to decline these invitations. But their acceptance would have involved months that he could not spent in Britain, for he had to leave very soon for the United States. The American Minister urged him emphatically to continue his voyage. Otherwise he must be prepared to lose American sympathy, if people heard of the fêting with which he was honoured in Britain.[291] Then he was suffering severely from a cold since his arrival in Britain. It hindered him greatly in speaking. Besides, he had privilege of receiving the visit of James Clarke, the Queen's physician, who offered him his services as soon as he learnt of his illness.[292]

When he was en route from Asia Minor the boroughs of Southwark and Westminster had arranged meetings in his honour.[293] The Parliamentary Reform Association, presided over by Sir Joshua Walmesley, praised his merits and prepared an address of welcome for him.[294] Then he had to thank Edinburgh for having urged Palmerston in a most decisive manner to intervene on behalf of Hungary[295] and now the city invited him to deliver a lecture.[296] He entertained the same feelings of gratitude towards Glasgow and Leeds. Bristol presented him an address with three thousand signatures.[297] The aged poet, Walter Savage Landor welcomed Kossuth with an open letter when he learnt of his presidency and urged him to flight persistently against oppression.[298] Now he organized a reception committee in Bath and awaited for his visit. But Kossuth, being compelled to decline the hearty invitation, received from the aged poet the following answer: "The chief glory of my life is that I was the first in subscribing for the assistance of the Hungarians at the commencement of their struggle. The next is that I have received the approbation of their illustrious leader. I, who have held the hand of Kosciusko, now

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[291] Bunsen-Manteuffel, London, Nov. 4, 1851. Immediatbericht no. 97. Berlin-Dahlem.

[292] Cf. Berzeviczy, Adalbert, *Az abszolutizmus kora Magyarországon* (The Epoch of Absolutism in Hungary.) Bpest, 1922. vol. I, p. 382.

[293] Naily News: Oct. 18, 1851.

[294] Daily News: Oct. 17, 1851. — See appendix no. 16.

[295] The Edinburgh News: Aug. 11, 1849.

[296] Ibidem: Oct. 30, 1851.

[297] Cf. a box full of addresses. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

[298] Published on May 19, 1849 in the Examiner. — See Appendix no. 2.

kiss with veneration the signature of Kossuth. No other man alive could confer an honour I would accept . . ."[299]

Again, there were the invitations he received from Birmingham and Manchester, the strongholds of the Radicals, which he could not decline on account of his relations with Cobden and his friends. In Manchester he wanted to pay his respects to the home of the Peace Society and the cradle of freedom. Besides, feelings of emotion induced him to accept the invitation of Birmingham. This important centre of British industry was one of the first towns in Britain where a meeting had been held on behalf of Hungary.[300]

In Manchester an extraordinary meeting was called by sixteen members of the Town Council to make suitable arrangements for Kossuth's reception. But Mayor John Potter opposed any measure proposed by the Council. He was uneasy that the Council might thus exceed its powers as enacted in by-laws of the Town. The Council had to deal with administrative problems, he said, but not with foreign politics, which must necessarily result from the intended Kossuth demonstrations.[301]

Informed of the Mayor's attitude, Bright, Heyworth, Kershaw, Henry Marshall, Milligan and Pilkington, Members of Parliament, formed spontaneously reception committee. Due to their activities, within forty eight hours four hundred citizens presented themselves to undertake the arrangements.[302] There was a general feeling of displeasure at the Mayor's attitude "for he did not manifest the same amount of squeamishness in other questions equally foreign to Manchester". They sent a declaration to *The Examiner* and *The Times* giving utterance to their disapproval.[303] Under these conditions Alexander Henry, M. P. of South Lancaster assumed the rôle of host and invited Kossuth to stay in his country house in Woodlands for the time of the festivals.[304]

Kossuth's lecture was to be delivered in the Free Trade Hall, but it proved to be too small to accommodate the multitude which

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[299] Bath, Oct. 28, 1851. — Wheeler, Stephen, *Letters and other unpublished writings of Walter Savage Landor.* London, 1897, p. 147.

[300] On May 23, 1849 in the Odd Fellows Hall. Cf. Landford, John Alfred, *Modern Birmingham: a Chronicle of local events from 1841—1871.* London, 1873—77, vol. I, pp. 105—107.

[301] The letter of the sixteen councillors and the answer of Mayor Potter, Manchester, Nov. 1, 1851. The Times: Nov. 4, 1851.

[302] Daily News: Nov. 5, 1851.

[303] Daily News: Nov. 6, 1851.

[304] Daily News: Nov. 7, 1851.

asked for admittance. Besides Manchester, Liverpool, Bradford, Asthon, Oldham, Rochdale, Bolton, and Burnley announced that they would send representatives to the festivals.

In Birmingham, where similar enthusiasm prevailed[305] the Town Council seemed to take the same reserved attitude as the municipality of Manchester by expressing its disinclination to take an active part in the arrangements. As a protest against this attitude the citizens themselves collected five thousand signatures, and invited Kossuth on their own behalf.[306] Cheltenham, Kiddermister, Derby, Coventry, Walsall, Wolvenhampton, Athelstone, Grantham and the whole Midland county also resolved to take part in Kossuth's reception.

When Kossuth, en route to Manchester, broke his journey in Birmingham "the capital of the small masters" received him with imposing demonstrations. Only the great workers' procession in 1832 on behalf of the Reform Bill could have equalled them. Geach, Scholefield and Muntz, Radical Members of Parliament, were his hosts and took him round in an open barouche drawn by four greys with postillions in scarlet jackets. On every side the gay banners of the various associated trades fluttered in the air. One could recognize on the banners the sentences taken from Kossuth's speeches. Five bands played Hungarian airs, the bells of the churches rang cheerful peals and the streets were filled with an immense crowd. To describe the programme would be to describe one continual ovation, as the Daily News reported of this great demonstration.[307]

The same scenes were repeated in Manchester. Here Bright and Dudley Stuart introduced Kossuth to the audience which filled the Free Trade Hall completely. He was also addressed by Dr. Vaughan, the President of the Lancashire Independent College, who had written many articles about Hungary since 1849 in the British Quarterly Review.[308]

Kossuth only reiterated the principles he had propounded in his former speeches, but understood well — due to his oratorical sense — how to put what he wanted to say in a new form. His speech delivered in a small circle at Henry's residence found a

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[305] Cf. Kossuth's thanksgiving letter to the five thousand citizens who signed an address of greetings and personal esteem for him. Daily News: Nov. 10, 1851.

[306] Vide ut supra.

[307] Nov. 12, 1851.

[308] Hilson, John, *Kossuth in Exile.* Manchester, 1856.

greater reception. He spoke of France which in sixty years failed three times to obtain results from political revolutions. Now France sought her salvation in a social spirit which must prevail everywhere in order to avoid a general revolution on the Continent. But if this great turmoil ensued, no one could foresee the consequences. In his explanations he assailed Communism and Socialism, which he declared as one and the same movement as far as results are concerned. Both were stigmatized by him as destructive of social order and personal property.

Next evening a public dinner was given him in Birmingham, attended by eight hundred guests. The most impressive scene of the evening was Walter Savage Landor's poem "On Kossuth's voyage to America" which was set to music and sung by the Birmingham choir.[309]

With this Birmingham festival the series of public demonstrations ended. On his return to London he attended only the Polish-Hungarian Ball held in the Guildhall and a meeting of the various charitable societies arranged in the Hanover Square Rooms. The time remaining to him until his embarkation he used in giving instructions to his confidential agents whose task was to organize the insurrection in Hungary.

He could not have forseen the time he was about to spend in America. Anyway he was prepared to return very soon, possibly in January next. Being uncertain about coming events in Europe, he left on November 20th for New York where he was the object of unparalleled demonstrations, fêting in his person the martyr of democracy.

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[309] W. S. Landor wrote many poems dealing with Hungary. „To General Kossuth" appeared in the Examiner on May 19, 1849 p. 307; „Poem on Kossuth" on Dec. 15, 1849, Ibidem p. 789; „Hymn to America" and „Kossuth's voyage to America", Nov. 15, 1851, pp. 723, 730; „To the City of New York on its reception of Kossuth", Dec. 27, 1851, p. 822; „Ingratitude", Nov. 27, 1852. p. 756. — See also his unbounded admiration for Kossuth as manifested in his „Last Fruit of an Old Tree", „Dry Sticks Fagoted", „Hellenics Enlarged". Cf. Foster, John, *W. S. Landor, a biography.* London, 1869; Wheeler, Stephen, *Letters of. W. S. Landor.* London, 1897; also in Stedman, Edmund Clarence, *Victorian Poets.* Boston, 1876, p. 63. — Again, Thomas Carlyle strongly opposed Kossuth's principles. In a letter dated from Chelsea, Oct. 11, 1851 he writes of Kossuth as follows: "To me he is hitherto nothing but a bag of mutinous playacton wind, very doubtful whether he is anything more to anybody; and I mean to keep well clear of him for the present..." Cf. Carlyle Alexander, *New Letters of Th. Carlyle.* London, 1904, no. 226.

XVI.

Summary of Kossuth's trip in Britain. — Impartial attitude of the Press with the exception of the Times, the Morning Chronicle and Cullen's Tablet. — Austria and British Aristocracy behind the Times. — Bureaucracy under the influence of the Aristocracy. — Industrial, commercial circles and the working classes of London in favour of Kossuth. — Middle and working classes of the industrial and rural districts praise him more openly than the Londoners. — Disraeli and Gladstone against Kossuth. — Cobden and Urquhart become reserved. — Official Britain's attitude. — Prince Albert and Baron Stockmar against Palmerston. — Differences between the Queen and Palmerston. — Russell assails Palmerston for his intention of meeting Kossuth. — Palmerston and the deputations of Finsbury and Islington. — Cabinet Council will not condemn Palmerston's attitude. — Kossuth's unsuccessful endeavours in the United States to promote Anglo-American Alliance. — He returns to London.

In any retrospective judgment of Kossuth's visit to Britain one must realize the impartial attitude of the press. It appreciated and understood the principles he was fighting for as well as his extraordinary ability in public speaking, which fascinated all who came in contact with him. Only his speech delivered in Copenhagen House and another made in Woodlands at Henry's, when he identified the consequences of Socialism with that of Communism, created some dissatisfaction and provoked criticism whose seriousness cannot be doubted. There is no other country — writes *The Globe* — where Socialism would represent such a living reality in public's mind as in Britain.

The Tory papers, *The Standard* and *The Morning Herald,* wrote in favour of Hungary though they sometimes criticized Kossuth's activities very keenly. But their criticism was never malicious towards the oppressed Hungarians: it was impartial from a British national point of view. Even *Punch,* under its satiric garb, gave evidence of human feelings and displayed more taste than to sneer at the "Kossuth Humbug".

Amongst the Periodicals *The Illustrated London News* showed much interest in Kossuth and presented him with a copy printed on silk with a welcoming article and pictures of his arrival in Britain.[310] On the contrary, Dicken's *Household Narrative and*

[310] Nov. 1, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

Current Events reported his visit with impartial calmness, without being successful in hiding its inclination to disdainful irony.[311]

The Examiner and *The Leader* were in favour of Kossuth. The great Whig papers, *The Globe* and *The Daily News*, appointed special reporters to accompany him on his trip. They published daily sketches of his activities and editorials which dealt with the political aspects of his principles. *The Times* also provided a special reporter. Russel, who accompanied Kossuth by appointment of his paper, sent very accurate articles in which he never omitted to report *The Times'* being carried round and hanged on gallows by the infuriated multitude.[312] Besides, only *The Times*, *The Morning Chronicle* and Cullen's paper, *The Tablet* permanently opposed to Kossuth and the Hungarian cause.

At the beginning of the war *The Times* and *The Morning Chronicle* reported very impartially but when Russian intervention ensued they took the side of the stronger of the contending parties.[313] *The Times* especially attacked Kossuth with unvarying perseverance. It did not shrink from being inconsequent if it could only discredit him. Kossuth was once declared to be a red republican, another time an ossified aristocrat. Again, he was blamed for his unfriendly attitude towards the Court of the Hapsburghs. Then he was censured as a supporter of the Hapsburghs who placed Hungarian regiments at the disposal of the Vienna Cabinet in order to defeat the Italians fighting for their national independence.

The incessant attacks in *The Times* created a deep impression. And these assaults became more violent as Kossuth's speeches became more passionate as compared with his early moderate speeches delivered in Southampton.[314] It was generally suspected of being on intimate terms with the Austrian Government, which was supposed to have financed the campaign against Kossuth. This supposition seemed to have some foundation when John Thadeus Delane, the editor of *The Times*, happened to be in Vienna, exactly at the time of Kossuth's journeys in Britain, and had a conference with Schwarzenberg.[315] In his absence, the

[311] Cf. „The three kingdoms" in the Household Narrative of Oct. 29—Nov. 29, 1851.

[312] Pulszky, vol. II, p. 70.

[313] Daily News: July 3, 1849, no. 968.

[314] Letter of Count Corti, London, Nov. 14, 1851 ad no. 99. 231/3. A. St. Torino.

[315] Dasent, Arthur, Irwin, *John Thadeus Delane, His Life and Correspondence*. 1908, vol. I, p. 114.

management of *The Times* was left in the hands of Henry Reeve, while Delane endeavoured to collect evidence against Kossuth's private and political life, with the assistance of that paper's Vienna correspondent, Bird. It was proposed to accuse Kossuth of being a common thief, with reference to the execution of Count Eugene Zichy, whose diamonds were stolen by Caesar Bolliak, the head of the intended Wallachian Legion in Hungary.[316] Justifying himself, Kossuth wrote to Canning from Kutahia, and informed him that the jewels he had handed over to Bolliak were supposed to be a token for Omer Pasha, the Turkish commander in chief in Wallachia. It was in conformity with Oriental customs. But the jewels never reached the Pasha. Kossuth admitted having been informed by Bolliak in Shoumla of the loss of the diamonds, but he never believed these assertions.[317]

But all proof was lacking of *The Times'* alleged business with the Vienna Cabinet, excepting the fact it entertained close relations with the Austrian Legation in London. Count Széchen was sent there by Schwarzenberg with express orders to give the information needed by the editor for the anti-Kossuth articles. With the same purpose there were sent to London Felsenthal and Lauterbach, members of the staff of the Austrian Secret Police, to counteract the pro-Magyar propaganda launched by Pulszky and his British friends. Jazziazzi, belonging to the same staff, was also correspondent of *The Times* during his stay in London where he published his work "The Voices from the Danube".

Besides, *The Times* always had in view its political independ-

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[316] Bolliak offered his services to Kossuth together with Bălcescu to form a Wallachian Legion for the support of the Hungarian cause. Cf. Refik, A., *Mültedzsiler,* Stambul, 1926, pp. 17—18. Kossuth was in fact slandered by the Times. Upon the request of Count Edmund Zichy, the brother of the executed Count, Bolliak was examined by the Turkish authorities as to the whereabouts of the jewels. He stated that he had taken them over from Francis Duschek, former Hungarian Minister of Finance, by order of Kossuth, but he lost all of them excepting the golden spurs of the late Count Zichy, which he handed over to Kossuth at the Hungarian frontier when the latter escaped from Hungary. He declared further his readiness to deposit the equivalent value of the lost jewels i. e. two thousand Ducats ,for the brother of the executed Count. Upon this he was set free by the Turkish authorities. But instead of depositing the sum mentioned he left Constantinople in Sept. 1850 for France with a false British passport made out in the name of „Timotheon Paléologue". Cf. die Zirkularnote of Schwarzenberg about the Zichy jewels. Nov. 8, 1851. Haute Police, Interna, H. H. St. A. Wien.

[317] Kossuth-Canning, Kutahia, May 12, 1850. enclosed to Rapp. no. 183. Constantinople, June 5, 1850. F. O. 78/820 P. R. O. London.

ence. It never failed to call the public's attention to its news service as supplied by its own correspondents. Apart from Bird, the permanent Vienna correspondent, Charles Pridham[318] and Patou were also on its staff in Austria. Pridham was soon dissatisfied with the editorial way of changing the essential parts of his articles. And when he realized *The Times'* attitude, opposing the principles so brilliantly represented by Kossuth, he revealed in his work "Kossuth and the Magyar Land" the methods used by that paper. He also published his own experiences and collected data from Hungary.

In spite of these facts *The Times'* point of view requires to be understood correctly. They were indeed some weak points in the theory of non-intervention proclaimed by Kossuth. Through these weaknesses the whole theory might have been attacked with reasonable arguments. If Kossuth's theory had been of standard value — as he tried to convince his audience — then Lafayette and Rochambeau would never have hurried to help the Americans with the express sanction of Lewis XV., the constitutions of Spain and Portugal would never have come into existence and no doubt the Christian subjects of the Porte would never have been granted the rights of existence without Russian intervention.

The Times fought for the existing order and European peace when it assailed Kossuth and the Hungarian cause. This point of view was particularly welcome to those who considered it more reasonable to keep European peace at any price than to repair great injustices committed against small nations by other states, supposing that such injustices could only be redressed by a European war.

This idea prevailed generally among the British Aristocracy, which highly appreciated the principles pursued by that paper, especially when it began to criticise Palmerston's attitude very keenly on account of his sympathies with the Hungarian cause, although it risked its popularity among the political friends of the Secretary of State.[319]

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[318] Cf. his letter to Palmerston, Oxford, June 19, 1849. F. O. 7/375. Domestic-Various. P. R. O. London.

[319] Cf. Dasent, p. 121. — See further Lord Clarendon's letter to Reeve, Nov. 22, 1851. „... I have had a long conversation with Count Nugent who is an intelligent old gentleman. He certainly defends the government. He serves con amore and can find no speck in Austrian policy. He was delighted that no respectable person had figured in the Kossuth ovations and very grateful for the service which the Times has rendered to the cause of order

This feeling of satisfaction expressed by the Aristocracy did not mean of course that the upper classes of British Society would have given their consent to the political methods traditionally practised by Austria and Russia. Even the House of Lords could not have been regarded as reactionary; on the contrary, a great many of its members showed a strong liberal sense, although their liberalism never exceeded the limit of political reasonableness imposed by Britain's continental interests.

This attitude of the upper classes had a strong influence upon bureaucracy; the industrial and commercial circles of the middle classes were more independent in forming their opinion. The latter feted Kossuth in the Guildhall of London, and their enthusiasm was only surpassed by the working classes on the occasion of their great demonstration to Copenhagen Fields.

The middle classes of the country did not refrain from showing their feelings of sympathy. Public opinion in the industrial and rural districts was opposed continental absolutism, and, regardless of Britain's alleged political prestige abroad, demonstrated via Kossuth's person in favour of the Hungarian cause. A similar attitude was shown by the working classes of London as well as of the country, but owing to their individual sense, they manifested the same principles in more pointed manner than the middle classes. Nothing could have proved more clearly the general pro-Hungarian feeling than the forty thousand signatures collected in few days by the committees of reception only in cities which Kossuth actually visited.

Contrary to this respectable public opinion, Official Britain was ostentatiously reserved towards him for various reasons. By chance, Kossuth's visit coincided with the recess of Parliament, whose six hundred and ninety-five members were dispersed in all directions. Yet Kossuth happened to meet about twenty five of them, belonging almost exclusively to the Radicals of the Whig Party.

Thanks to the conservative sense of the aristocracy[320] the House of Lords almost wholly refrained from the Kossuth de-

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abroad and common sense at home. It must have been a difficult task to stem the tide of ignorant enthusiasm; but it was done with tact and the Times will be all the more powerful for risking momentary unpopularity and showing that it knew what public opinion ought and in fact what it has turned out to be..." Knox, John, *Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of Henry Reeve*. London, 1898, p. 240.

[320] D'Azeglio—M. E.—D'Azeglio, London, Nov. 11, 1851. A. St. Torino.

monstrations. Palmerston himself was very pleased to be able to state that not one of the members took part in the meetings, with the exception of John Abel Smith.[321]

Summarizing the attitude of the political parties, it can be said that neither the Tories nor the Whigs or the Peelites sympathized with Kossuth's cause, excepting the left-wing Radicals headed by Cobden. But even the latter withdrew from Kossuth's public receptions on account of the attacks of *The Times*. His party friend Urquhart stood by him all the time and complained incessantly of Kossuth's unwillingness to "expose" Palmerston.

As to the prominent politicians, Disraeli was decidedly against him; Gladstone also shared his opinion. "You need not be afraid, I think, of Mazzinism from me" — he told Lord Aberdeen — "still less Kossuthism which means the other plus imposture Palmerston and his nationalities . . ."[322]

Indeed, Palmerston is considered as an exceptional case among the political leaders of his time in showing sympathy for Kossuth. But his warm interest led him to controversies with the Queen and Premier Russell, which ended finally in his withdrawal from the Cabinet.

The Court has always disliked his attitude towards the refugees. It was regarded as incompatible with the correct relations which the Court wished to maintain with Austria and Russia. Prince Albert definitely condemned Palmerston's policy in Constantinople. It was in 1849 when Palmerston was determined to press the Sultan to refuse extradition. According to this, he prepared instructions for Canning in which he wished to authorize his minister to declare that the Porte's refusal was due to Britain's protest. Being informed of Palmerston's determination, Prince Albert immediately intervened. The Secretary of State had to change his instructions, expressing only the simple advice of the British Cabinet that the Porte might possibly refuse extradition.[323]

The differences of opinion in diplomatic matters between the Court and Palmerston were repeated from day to day and caused much anxiety to Russell. In the affair of Schleswig-Holstein,

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[321] Cf. his letter to his brother, the British Minister at Naples, Brocket, Nov. 6, 1851; Ashley Evelyn, *The Life of Henry Temple, Viscount Palmerston, 1846—1865*. London, 1876, chapt. VI, pp. 263—264.

[322] On Dec. 1, 1851. Cf. Morley, John, *Life of William Ewart Gladstone*. London, vol. I, p. 402.

[323] Walpole Spencer, *The Life of Lord John Russell*, 1891, vol. II, p. 50.

Palmerston took the part of Denmark. Prince Albert was greatly annoyed by this policy and in time became directly inimical to Palmerston. The Prince Consort was backed by Baron Stockmar, his physician and sometime intimate counsellor in foreign affairs. The latter represented the warm sympathies shown by the Belgian Court towards Austria and the condemnatory feelings towards Palmerston for his pro-Hungarian attitude. Stockmar's strong personality had a great influence upon the Prince Consort and through the latter possibly upon the Queen. This circumstance might have also contributed to their decided reserve concerning the Hungarian question and augmented their aversion for Palmerston. "I think, the man has been for sometime insane" wrote Stockmar about the Secretary of State.[324]

Palmerston must have had knowledge of Stockmar's influence, by which he felt drawn into differences of opinion with the Queen[325] and now he was strenghtened in his decision to adhere to his opinion of Kossuth.

As soon as the Queen was informed of Kossuth's arrival in Southampton, she ordered Russell to stop Palmerston receiving the Hungarian leader. She had some anxiety for its objectionable consequences to Britain's relations with the Absolute Powers.

Russell held the opposite view to the Queen. He did not object if Palmerston received Kossuth immediately after his arrival, for he did not want to prevent the Hungarian leader from expressing his deep gratitude to the Queen and Palmerston.

Being convinced of the propriety of such a visit by Palmerston, Russell informed the Queen of his inability to dictate to Palmerston whether he should receive Kossuth or not. Nevertheless, he thought of reminding the Secretary of State that their discussion should be restricted to Kossuth's thanks, and Palmerston should not enter into questions dealing with actual politics.[326] But having read Kossuth's first speeches, delivered in Southampton, in which he definitely attacked the Emperors of Austria and Russia,

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[324] Stockmar, Baron E. von, *Memoirs of Baron Stockmar*. London, 1873, vol. II. p. 459.

[325] Cf. Newman F. W., *Reminiscences of the two Exiles*. London, 1888, pp. 29—31.

[326] Russell—Victoria, Windsor Castle, Oct. 24, 1851, cf. Benson, Arthur Christopher, Lord Esher, *Königin Victorias Briefwechsel und Tagebuchblätter*. 1908, vol. II, p. 91; Pembroke Lodge, Oct. 30, 1851; Walpole, vol. II, pp. 132—133.

Russell changed his opinion and considered it impracticable for Palmerston to receive Kossuth — after these speeches.

But he failed to convince Palmerston. "Even if he is mad, as you say" — wrote Palmerston to Russell — "and which is not unlikely, I am not afraid of his biting me . . ."[327] The Secretary of State persisted in his opinion that he did not want to receive Kossuth in his capacity as British Minister of Foreign Affairs, but as one private individual who wished to meet another in his country home, in Broadlands. In this case, of course, he did not feel any obligation towards the Cabinet. "There are limits to all things" — he wrote firmly to Russell — "I do not choose to be dictated as to whom I may or may not receive in my own home . . . I shall use my own discretion . . . You will, of course, use yours as to the composition of your government . . ."[328]

Russell was indignant at Palmerston's answer. To his mind, the Foreign Secretary could not regard himself at one time as a private individual and at another as a Member of the Cabinet. He was angry at rumours of the Austrian Minister's intention to demand his dismissal if Palmerston actually met Kossuth. But being aware of Palmerston's obstinacy he decided to discuss the controversy with the Members of the Cabinet and requested the Queen to order to Palmerston not to meet Kossuth.[329]

The Queen was somewhat disconcerted by Russell's request. She could hardly be exposed — she wrote to Russell — to the possibility of one of her ministers refusing to obey her orders. But after having sent this letter she changed her mind. She realized that Britain's political interests were at stake if Palmerston's meeting with Kossuth actually ensued. She therefore summoned Palmerston and told him he must comply.[330]

But even Russell changed his mind under the impression he received on learning the Queen's reasons for being unable to meet his request. When Russell received the Queen's first letter he immediately answered that she should not send any order to Palmerston until the Cabinet had considered the affair.[331]

But the Queen had already sent her letter, with orders to

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[327] Oct. 21, 1851. Cf. Gooch, G. P., *The later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, 1840—1878.* 1925. vol. II, p. 8.

[328] Panshanger, Oct. 30, 1851; Walpole, vol. II, p. 133.

[329] Pembroke Lodge, Oct. 31, 1851; Benson, vol. II, pp. 91—92.

[330] The Queen's letter to Russell and Palmerston, Windsor Castle, Oct. 31, 1851. Cf. Benson, vol. II, p. 92.

[331] Pembroke Lodge, Oct. 31, 1851; Ibidem, p. 93.

Palmerston, before she received Russell's second letter. Nevertheless, she did not regret her action. On account of the week-end, the Cabinet could only hold its Council on the Monday, November 3rd; consequently, Palmerston had plenty of time to see Kossuth, unless he had been prevented in time by the Queen's order.[332]

Russell in the Cabinet Council detailed the attitude the government had taken concerning the Hungarian refugees. Then he spoke about the correspondence he had had lately with Palmerston. He wanted to learn the reaction of his colleagues without asking them to pass a resolution, for he wished to avoid differences of opinion which might paralize the Council's activities. Britain in these days needed a strong and united government. The political aspects abroad were particularly critical. No one could have foreseen whether Socialism or Absolutism would prevail in France. Therefore Britain's interests required her to keep order at home and to display a neutral attitude abroad.

Palmerston burst into laughter when he heard of Russell's anxiety. To his mind the Cabinet underestimated the British character in agreeing with the point of view that Austria, Russia or any other state may dictate to the British Secretary of State his attitude in tendering shelter or showing courtesy to anyone if it is his intention.

Russell was glad to have heard Palmerston's explanations within the privacy of the Council instead of in Parliament. It was done with consummate skill. Had he had the chance to make this apology before Parliament, no doubt, his speech would have attracted members, and this might have been followed by impredictable consequences.

But the Council considered it with more calmness than Parliament would have done, though some of the ministers shared Palmerston's opinion. Again Lord Broughton threw light on the question from the opposite standpoint. "Would it not be curious" — he said — "if Kossuth could defeat the British Cabinet when he had not succeeded against the Austrian Cabinet?"

At this remark all members of the Cabinet burst into laughter. In this enlightened atmosphere the majority voted for a note to be sent to Kossuth, that he should not request an audience from Palmerston. The resolution was silently accepted by the Secretary

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[332] Victoria—Russell, Windsor Castle, Oct. 31, 1851; Ibidem, p. 93.

of State. He only desired to keep opposing views within the Cabinet.[333]

The Queen was immediately informed of the details. She became reassured of the dangerousness of the affair, which now seemed to be finally settled. Yet she did not cease to reprove the Cabinet for its reserved attitude which — in her opinion — greatly encouraged the Kossuth ovations.[334]

As to Palmerston personally, her antipathy remained unchanged. "I have the worst opinion of him" — she said to Lady Russell. — "If he took the part of the revolutionists in some countries, he ought in all and that while he pretended great compassion for the oppressed Hungarians and Italians, he would not care if the Schleswig-Holsteiners were all drowned . . .[335]

From this it seemed as if the Prince Consort or Baron Stockmar had expressed the opinion they had of Palmerston, who became irrevocably disgraced at Court.

In few days new controversies arose again between himself and his colleagues. On November 19th the borough of Finsbury and the parish of Islington[336] sent deputations to him to convey their congratulations "for his patriotic and human conduct towards Kossuth", and presented their addresses, condemning the Emperors of Austria and Russia as "odious and detestable assasins".

Giving answer to these fiery addresses, Palmerston failed to correct their strong language and remarked with irony that "during the pending struggle a good deal of judicious bottleholding was obliged to be brought into the play".[337]

No wonder, *The Times* promptly attacked him in scathing editorials.[338] The Queen felt offended again and said to Russell he might well dismiss the Secretary of State. The cup was full.

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[333] Lady Dorchester, Lord Broughtin, *Recollections of a long Life*, London, 1911, vol. VI, pp. 286—288.

[334] Walewski Alexius — to Minister of Foreign Affairs, London, Nov. 1, 1851, Angleterre vol. 684. A. d. M. A. E. Paris.

[335] Cf. Mc. Carthy Desmond and Russell Agatha, *Lady John Russell, a Memoir.* London, 1916, p. 116; *Lady Russell's diary*, Windsor Castle, Nov. 13. 1851.

[336] Cf. the enthusiasm of Th. H. Duncombe, MP. of Finsbury for Kossuth, *The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Hingsbury Duncombe.* London, 1868, vol. I, pp. 128—132.

[337] Times: Nov. 19, 1851.

[338] Nov. 21, 26, 1851.

No one could have convinced the Queen that Palmerston had complied with her orders and did not see Kossuth after all.[339]

Russell again convoked the Council for December 4th and explained that — at present — any change in the position of the Secretary of State was too alarming. If the Cabinet decided to comply with the Queen's desire, the government would be shaken. Russell stated further that he had already informed the Queen of his anxiety. Upon hearing this the Queen gave up her demand for Palmerston's dismissal, but she insisted on the affair being discussed in the Cabinet.

Opening the discussion, Russell asked Palmerston to explain his answers to the delegates. Palmerston indignantly declared the comments of the papers to be most exaggerated. "That sort of literature can only derive from penny-a-liners but not from reliable reporters." Yet he admitted having failed by ignoring the necessity of excluding the reporters before his speech. He also admitted he did not read the addresses before hand. But all that he said he repeatedly expressed in other words before Parliament.

Lord Grey condemned Palmerston unreservedly. He said the Cabinet should express his disapproval to Palmerston and should inform the Queen of this resolution. Nevertheless the majority of the members, headed by Lord Landsdowne, did not want to initiate any steps against Palmerston and authorized Russell to convey their opinion to the Queen in a manner suitable to this particular case.[340]

Informed of these discussions, the Queen thought she was right in her aversion to Palmerston. Also she let her disfavour to Lady Palmerston be known and received her very coldly when she presented in Windsor — among other ladies — the Portugese Minister's wife. The Queen invited them to stay but she let Lady Palmerston return to London alone.[341]

The Cabinet crisis still continued when Kossuth sailed for the United States in order to carry his political plans into effect. He was received in New York with great enthusiasm, unsurpassed in his times. The greatest honour was bestowed upon him by being

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[339] Queen-Russell, Windsor Castle, Nov. 21, 1851; Benson, vol. II, pp. 94—95.

[340] Lord Broughton, vol. VI, pp. 289—290.

[341] Cf. Malmesbury, Earl of, G. C. B., *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister.* London, 1884, vol. I, p. 297.

introduced to both Houses of Congress, which no foreigner with the exception of Lafayette had enjoyed before. He thrilled the masses of the East, Middle-West and the South with his brilliant eloquence on his trip around the States. Yet he did not succeed in realizing the plans suggested by Walker and Crosskey and adopted by him as his programme.

The auguries for a rapprochement between Great Britain and the United States were at that time not very promising. Britain's growing influence in Nicaragua and the Sandwich Isles was anxiously watched by American commerce, which felt its own interests endangered; therefore, no other political watch-word could have been more unpopular than the launching of an understanding with Britain.[342]

In July 1852 he returned again to London, where he took up his permanent residence. After the successful coup d'état of Louis Napoléon, all dreams of the progress of democracy were in vain. The reaction spread over Continental Europe and the last faint sparks of hope for the new struggle in Hungary dwindled.

Kossuth had to experience the transient character of human enthusiasm which Greville had foretold during his visit in Britain. "We are great hero worshippers" — he wrote to Reeve, then editorial-writer of *The Times* — "and there is something romantic and imposing in the Hungarian war . . . However like other things of this kind, the fever soon subsides and Kossuth a week after his departure will be forgotten . . ."[343] Though Greville was inclined to underestimate the term of the Kossuth fever yet he was not very much mistaken.

In the course of years which Kossuth has spent in Britain he excelled himself in lecturing about actual problems as well as with writing editorials, particularly after the War in the Crimea. Otherwise, he had for many years to share the lot of the other emigrants who lived in London remote from publicity under the protective shelter of British liberal sense.

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[342] From the author, *Kossuth politikai tervei az Amerikai Egyesült Államokban* (Kossuth's political plans in the U. S.): Napkelet (Magazine) Bpest, 1928, pp. 450 et sequ.

[343] Livermere, Sunday, Nov. 1851, no. 136. Cf. Johnson A. H., *The letters of Charles Grenville and Henry Reeve.* London, 1924, p. 203.

APPENDIX.

I.

Debrecen (Hungary) May 15, 1849.

Instructions to Francis Pulszky, Hungarian Diplomatic Agent in London.

MSS. F. O. Turkey vol. 375 P. R. O. London.

Monsieur, Il ne peut vous être inconnu, ni à vous ni au gouvernement de l'Angleterre, que depuis quelque temps de nombreuses dislocations et envois de troupes, ainsi que d'autres préparatifs de guerre se font dans l'empire russe. Une armée russe a déjà une fois rompu le principe de non-intervention et blessé le droit des peuples à notre égard en s'ingérant de main armée dans nos affaires intérieures en Transylvanie, et malgré les protestations faites à cet égard tant par les consuls, que les cabinets même des puissances occidentales de l'Europe, malgré la réclamation formelle faite par le cabinet de Londres contre l'occupation même des principautés du bas Danube par lesdites troupes qui demeurent constamment dans ces contrées. Mais ce corps qu'il nous fût facile de vaincre, bien qu'uni avec une armée autrichienne, et des nombreuses hordes de Valaques séditieux, ne fait qu'une petite partie des troupes que le gouvernement russe a dernièrement porté jusqu'aux limites les plus proches des provinces autrichiennes qui nous entourent vers le nord-est.

Des rapports qui ne manquent point de crédibilité portent le chiffre de cette dernière armée au-delà de 100.00 hommes, qui sont effectivement échelonnés sur la frontière de la Galicie et de Cracovie. — Il n'y a de là, que très peu d'étapes pour arriver au seuil même de nos frontières.

Ceci joint aux bruits qui courent dans tous les journaux des avis nombreux que nous recevons sur l'intention prononcée du gouvernement russe de faire entrer ses troupes en quatre colonnes dans la Hongrie, mais plus encore les dispositions assez connues du cabinet de Russe et de l'autocrate lui-même, pas moins le triste exemple que nous avons déjà eu devant nos yeux, jusqu'à quels moyens le cabinet d'Autriche a eu recours pour continuer sa guerre injuste contre la Hongrie, ne peuvent qu'inspirer les plus vives inquiétudes sur les in-

tentions de ces puissances vis à vis de la nation hongroise, au gouvernement de celle-ci chargée de veiller sur la sûreté en dedans et en dehors.

C'est donc au nom de celui-ci que je vous engage Mr. le chargé d'affaires, de ne pas tarder un moment à faire des démarches sérieuses près du gouvernement de l'Angleterre.

Vous lui représenterez d'abord, que ces mouvements des troupes russes, qu'on cherche peut-être de sa part à masquer autant que possible aux yeux de l'Europe, mais dont nous avons connaissance certaine, ne sont justifiés par aucun motif apparent, ni par aucune déclaration de guerre émise par le gouvernement de Russie entre aucune nation de l'Europe, ou lancée contre elle de quelque part que ce soit.

Il ne reste donc d'autre but à deviner, que celui d'une intervention, soit dans les affaires de l'Autriche même, soit dans la guerre, que la Dynastie déchue, bien que vaincue pour le moment, semble vouloir renouveler contre nous. Il est clair qu'une occupation militaire des provinces de l'Autriche même, ne serait autre chose dans les circonstances présentes, qu'une intervention déguisée et indirecte dans la guerre entre la Dynastie de Habsbourg-Lorraine et de la nation Hongroise.

Outre que ce serait un attentat aux droits des nations les plus saints, vous représenterez au cabinet de l'Angleterre que ce ne serait pas une moindre injure et un manque d'égard sans pareil au gouvernement de l'Angleterre même.

La Russie aurait-elle des prérogatifs dont d'autres nations s'abstiennent par respect, non seulement du droit des nations et de l'humanité, mais encore en vertu des déclarations, pactes et traités, concertés et stipulés dans les congrès des différentes nations, tous prononçant également le droit de non intervention dans les affaires intérieures d'un pays à l'autre, comme la base et le principe fondamental du droit international. Tels sont p. e. la déclaration faite par l'Angleterre au congrès de Vérone, où ce principe est ouvertement prononcé.

Plus tard le même principe ne fût pas moins reconnu, non seulement de l'Angleterre, mais aussi de la France, lorsque l'Espagne fût la scène de guerres civiles.

Mais plus récemment encore c'est vis-à-vis de la France même, que le principe de non intervention fut généralement énoncé à deux reprises même par l'Autriche et la Russie même. Les affaires de Sicile fournirent de nouveau l'occasion à la déclaration positive de l'Angleterre, qui ne rencontra point de contradiction d'aucune autre puissance, qu'elle ne regardait point les Siciliens commes rebelles, mais comme une nation qui défendait ses droits naturels.

Sans que j'entre plus amplement en cette matière, vous représenterez au ministre de l'Angleterre que la nation Hongroise n'a pas moins prouvé que celle de la Sicile sous des circonstances bien plus défavo-

rables, qu'elle contient en elle, assez de forces pour maintenir sa liberté, attaquée qu'elle fut de tout côté sur son territoire même, déchirée d'une guerre civile dans son intérieure, guerre suscitée par un tissu de machinations les plus infernales, artificiellement animée dans toutes ses ressources, elle sortit en vainqueur de ce combat inégal. Elle offre donc pour l'avenir bien plus de garantie pour l'équilibre de l'Europe, — dont celui-ci est pris en considération, — que l'état délabré et décrépite de l'Autriche.

Ceci prouvé dans l'affaire de Transylvanie, elle le prouve nouvellement par les préparatifs d'invasion de la Russie, qui se font en tout cas de son accord, qu'elle est trop faible pour se maintenir seule jusque dans son intérieur.

Les obligations qu'elle contracterait envers la Russie, si par son aide elle réussissait même à rétablir son pouvoir en Hongrie, — pouvoir qui ne sera jamais d'aucune durée — tellement notre nation est décidée, unanime, et prête à se consolider dans son intérieur, — ces obligations dis-je, la feraient déjà descendre de son état de puissance de premier rang à celle d'une puissance débonnaire et tributaire de la Russie, — et ainsi le colosse aurait enfin atteint le plus grand de ses dessins si longtemps nourris, objet de tant d'intrigues politiques. Il n'y aurait plus qu'une voix décisive de la mer du Nord jusqu'aux Dardanelles.

La politique timide ou fausse du cabinet autrichien ne lui a cédé déjà que trop de terrain. La Hongrie est capable de mettre sur pied une armée de 200.000 hommes, qui font honneur à son ancienne réputation de bravoure, et un matériel de guerre analogue, sans compter une nombreuse garde nationale, de mieux en mieux aguerrie dans ces derniers troubles sanglants. Puis, l'enthousiasme de la liberté, l'amour de la nationalité et la haine de l'opresseur ne sont point à ne compter pour rien.

S'il y a donc une barrière pour l'Europe centrale contre l'acroissement démesuré du nord, ce n'est qu'une Hongrie autonome, forte, puissante, que tous les intérêts et penchants portent naturellement à la plus étroite alliance aux puissances civilisées de l'Europe.

Du reste, vous représenterez au gouvernement de l'Angleterre et à celui de la Hongrie qu'en recevant avec reconnaissance tout appui de la part de l'Angleterre, ne fût-ce même que l'expression de sa sympathie, la Hongrie ne demande ni secours ni protection; — laissée seule aux prises avec la Dynastie de Habsbourg-Lorraine, la Hongrie ne craint point le résultat.

Elle ne demande que le moyen de pouvoir communiquer librement et sans entraves avec les puissances del'Europe, afin de pouvoir leur exposer ses griefs, qui blessent le droit général des nations, tel que l'irruption projetée de la Russie en Hongrie.

Elle demande que les puissances de l'Europe usent de la même

politique envers la nation Hongroise comme envers d'autres nations qui se trouvent dans une situation pareille.

Elle demande que les gouvernements des premières puissances de l'Europe déclarent formellement à l'Autriche et à la Russie, — comme ils ont fait en d'autres occasions, qu'ils protestent contre toute intervention armée dans les affaires intérieures de l'Autriche et de la Hongrie, de la part de la Russie; — qu'ils somment celle-ci à expliquer les motifs de ses préparatifs de guerre sur les frontières de l'Autriche et de la Hongrie, et qu'ils énoncent décidément, que l'occupation militaire de quelques unes des provinces autrichennes par les Russes sera considérée comme une intervention indirecte entre le suprême pouvoir et les nations qui lui sont soumises, et que le premier pas qu'un soldat russe fera sur le territoire de la Hongrie, ne sera autre chose qu'un casus belli de ces puissances envers la Russie.

En vous priant de soumettre ces vues au gouvernement de l'Angleterre et d'en solliciter la prise en considération, je reste avec estime,

le ministre des affaires étrangères de la Hongrie
Comte Casimir Batthyány m. p.

II.

Undated.

Extract from Walter Savage Landor's open letter to Kossuth.

The Examiner, London, May 19, 1851.

General! There are few who have the privilege to address you, but I am of the number; for before you were born I was an advocate, however feeble, of the sacred cause which you are now the foremost in defending. Imminent was the peril of fine and imprisonment, and certain the loss of friend and fortune: I disregarded and defied the worst. Do not trample on this paper for being written by an Englishman. We are not all of us jugglers and dupes, though we are most of us the legitimate children of those who crowded to see a conjuror leap into a quart-bottle. If we have had our Wilkeses and Burdetts, our Wilsons and Broughams, we have also had our Romilies and our Benthams. In one house we have still a Clarendon, in the other a Molesworth. Be amused but never indignant at the spectacle of our public men; at restlessness without activity, at strides without progress pelted from below by petulance without wit. A wider and fairer scene is lying now before you, a scene of your own creation, under the guidance and influence of Almighty God. Merciful and just by nature, and enlightened, as the powerful of intellect always are, by the continous lamps delivered in succession from past and passing ages you will find them shine clearer by contraction of space and adaptation to circumstances.

You have swept away the rotten house of Hapsburg. It would be an idle trick to pursue the vermin that nestled and prowled among its dark recesses, behind its moth eaten tapestries and throughout its noisome sewers. But there is no idleness in following the guidance of the most strenuous and most provident conquerors. Sulla, Julius, and Augustus Caesar distributed the forfeited estates of their enemies among the defenders of their cause. The justice of their cause was questionable, the justice of yours is not. In our country, William of Normandy broke up the estates of the vanquished and rendered them powerless for revolt. Elisabeth and Cromwell and William of Nassau, our three greatest sovereigns pursued the same policy with the same success. In Hungary there are immense tracts of lands imperfectly cultivated and forfeited by the defection and treason of the rich and indolent proprietors. Surely no time should be lost in the distribution of this national property among the nation's defenders. Larger and smaller allotments should be holden forth as the incentives and the rewards of valour. This was promised in France by the revolutionists of that country; but what promise was ever kept by France, under any of her governments to any nation? Least of all perhaps to her own. The Hungarians are morally the antipodes of the French; the Hungarians are calmly brave, consistently free, strictly veracious, immutably just, unostentatiously honourable.

(Then speaking about French foreign politics he continues:)

Behold the promises of a nation which declared its readiness to aid unreservedly in the deliverance of the oppressed. Behold the first public act, beyond the boundaries, of its President!...

Sir, in your hands are deposited the sword and the scales of justice: hold them firmly and if any price calls to the stranger, bid your lictors bind him, and perform the rest of their duty forth with. In the exercise of this righteous authority may God preserve you for His glory, for the benefit of the present age and for the example of every age to come.

III.

London, October 20, 1849.

Cobden's open letter to Alexander Bach, Austrian Minister of the Interior protesting against the execution of the Hungarian generals.

The Daily News, London, Nov. 20, 1849.

Sir, These lines are not addressed to you in your character as a member of the Austrian government; they are addressed to you personally as a gentleman whose liberal and enlightened views left a lasting impression on my mind when I had the pleasure to make your acquaintance in Vienna. An excuse for this step you will find in the principles of humanity and civilization which at that time were equally

cherished by us both. Mindful then of the opinion which recommended me to your friendly attention in the year 1847. I cannot suppose that you are now less favourable inclined towards them than you were then. Public opinion is in my country horror-struck at the cold-blooded cruelties which have been exercised on the fallen leaders of the Hungarians. The feeling is not confined to one class or to one particular party for there is not a man in England who has defended either in writing or by word the acts of Austria. The opinion of the civilized states of the Continent will have reached you while that of America will very soon be known in Vienna. You are too enlightened not to be aware that the unanimous verdict of contemporaries must also be the judgment of history. But have you considered that history will not deal with brutal soldiery, the creatures of cruelty, but with the ministers who are responsible for their crimes. I should not like to appeal to less important motives than those of an honourable ambition. But have you well considered the dangers which threaten you in your present course? You, who are so well-read in English history that, four years afters Jeffries "bloody assizes" not only he himself but his royal master was a miserable fugitive before the avenging hand of justice. Or, do we live in a time when public conscience can be treated with contempt without fear of the punishment that followed in the seventeenth century. Is it not, on the contrary, the peculiar characteristic of our time, that deeds of violence whether committed by governments or by people are followed by reaction with astonishing celerity? But I am taking too great a liberty in offering to defend your reputation or in permitting myself to be interested for your personal safety. I appeal to you in the name of humanity, to make an end to this renewed terror, which, not content with butchering its victims, must also put to the rack all the better feelings of humanity, for the world has advanced too far in its civilization long to permit upon its stages heroes like Alva or Haynau. I conjure you publicly to protest against the judicial butchering of prisoners of war, against the still more disgraceful whipping of females, and, finally, against the practice of kidnapping, in order that you may be acquitted of all participation in the responsibility for acts which must brand with shame their authors.

I remain etc.

IV.

Memorandum of eighty-tree Members of Parliament to Russell and Palmerston on behalf of Hungary.

The Times, London, December 5, 1849.

We, the undersigned, desire to express to your Lordships, and, through your Lordships, to the rest of her Majesty's confidential servants, the deep interest which we have taken in the contest which has been recently carried on between the Hungarian nation and the

Emperor of Austria. Not less deep is the interest which we now take in the final settlement of the question at issue between them, and in the permanent pacification of that great country. Sincerely attached to the liberties of our own country, the final establishment of which is due to the successful termination of struggles analogous to those which have been made from time to time in Hungary — with equal sincerity desirous of maintaining the peace of Europe, we are fully sensible of the great importance that the settlement of the questions at issue should be effected in a manner, and upon terms, satisfactory to the Hungarian nation, not only for the sake of Hungary herself, but because we apprehend that a settlement unsatisfactory to the country will sow the seed of renewed discontent, may lead to fresh local disturbances, and by the local disturbance of so large an element of the European system, may endanger the tranquillity of the whole.

The objects of the undersigned are internal liberty, national independence, European peace. For the attainment of these objects we trust the Court of Vienna will bear in mind that the satisfaction and contentment of Hungary will afford the greatest security. Considering, however, the means by which the authority of the House of Hapsburg has been re-established, the undersigned are of opinion that the occasion permits, even if it does not call for, the intervention of Great-Britain, in counselling the Austrian government respecting the exercise of its restored executive power. With respect to the mode and opportunity of interfering, the undersigned offer no specific opinion, but we hope that her Majesty's Government will not shrink from suggesting to that of Austria that, since republican France has abolished capital punishments for political offences, it will not be wise to allow a contrast to be drawn unfavourable to the clemency of monarchical governments.

Fitzwilliam
Northampton
Zetland
Beaumont
Hatherton
Conyngham
Gosford
Montford
Ducie
Radnor
R. M. Milnes
T. Townshend
Robert Price
Harry Verney
Thomas S. Duncombe
T. P. Thompson
Thomas Wakley
John Saldeir
Pierce S. Butler
Wm. Scholefield
John Fergus
Robert A. Slaney
Thos. E. Headlam
John Reynolds
E. K. Tenison
Michael Sullivan
T. Chisholm Anstey
James Heywood
F. Mowatt
Geo. Thompson
John O'Brien
James Kershaw
Henry Salwey
Joseph Locke

Wm. Collins
Wm. Fagan
Francis P. Dunne
Nicholas M. Power
Torrens M'Cullagh
J. G. Marshall
D. Jephson Norreys
J. Dawson Rawdon
James Wyld
Savile C. H. Ogle
Charles Pearson
Lawr. Heyworth
James Clay
H. A. Aglionby
The O'Gorman Mahon
B. M. Willcox
William Pinney
A. E. Cockburn
Richard M. Fox
W. S. Crawford
Alex. Hastie
W. T. Fox
J. Twizell Wawn
J. Pilkington
Pryse Loveden
William Hutt
William Evans
Thomas Sidney
B. Hall
P. T. Locke King
T. MacGregor
W. Marshall
T. Twisden Hodges
John Williams
T. A. Mitchell
Charles Cowan
Edw. N. Buxton
Dudley C. Stuart
De Lacy Evans
Maurice Power
William Ewart
R. Perfect
M. Forster
E. H. Bunbury
William Clay
G. W. Fitzwilliam
W. Lockyer Freestun
T. Milner Gibson.

V.

Therapia, December 24, 1849.

Canning to Palmerston respecting the present state of the Refugee Question.

Despatch no. 384. F. O. Turkey vol. 783. P. R. O. London.

My Lord, I know not whether it be owing to the nature of the questions themselves to the overbearing temper of one party, to the vacillating character of another, or what is most probable to a mixture of these causes, but the difficulty, be it how it may, of bringing the Porte's differences with Russia and Austria to a satisfactory settlement appears to be nearly interminable. Their approach towards a conclusion might be imagined to proceed on the principle of those mathematical lines which, though continually approximating, never meet.

It is already well known to your Lordship that the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, after relinquishing the demand of extradition, put forward proposals, not warranted by Treaty, unbecoming and discreditable for the Porte to accept, and, if accepted threatening to produce much future altercation and embarrassment. The firm, but

temperate objections which the Sultan's ministers, with my concurrence and that of General Aupick, opposed to such overweening pretensions, were fairly appreciated by the Russian government and repelled for the most part by that of Austria. Yet Russia was not satisfied without requiring a new and unnecessary concession, in appearance a formality but even in that character showing mistrust of the Porte and lying open to the suspicion of ulterior views.

This state of things is the most perplexing because it inverts the rule of Turkish policy, making Austria an object of estrangement and Russia for a time at least the most complying neighbour of the two.

My advice to the Porte has uniformly been of that tenour which your Lordship's instruction of the 30th ultimo so pointedly incalculates. I have never ceased to recommend a faithful execution of Treaties, a willing fulfilment of the duties of good neighbourhood and a steady, unobtrusive maintenance of the Sultan's honour, dignity and independence. These principles would justify the Porte if it were worth while, in declining, the Russian demand of a Protocol. They engage the Porte to persiste in repelling those Austrian conditions which would interfere with the free exercise of her sovereignty. But although the right and duty are alike aknowledged by the Sultan's principal ministers, various motives of a less rigid character incline them to give way after a decent show of resistance and would in all likelihood hurry them to an inconsiderate and unworthy conclusion, if they had not also to consult the public opinion of Europe, and to preserve the good will of England and France.

Of these important considerations, they seemed however, a few days ago, to have so much lost sight, that I was obliged to enter into a warm expostulation with the Grand Vizier, who finally expressed his readiness to abide by my counsels, directed as they were to the permanent welfare of this Empire and agreeing as they do, in the present instance with those of my French colleague.

The advice which I tendered in consequence to Aali Pasha who does not always perceive where firmness is safer than concession was anything but repulsive or exaggerated. In substance, with respect to Russia, I recommended that the Protocol should be signed with M. de Titov if the measure could not be avoided without a fresh period of delay, but in that simplest possible form which would give it rather the character of a Procès-Verbal than that of a Convention, taking care to have it understood that the renewal of diplomatic relations should follow at once. With respect to Austria I approved the Porte's intention as well to preclude any Austrian inspection over the Refugees, when detained in Asia Minor, as to accept the Internuntio's amended proposal of keeping open the list for two months. As to the main requisition of making the eventual liberation of the refugees dependent on Austria's consent, I suggested terms of agreement which bordered

so closely on Prince Schwarzenberg's demand as barely to reserve the Sultan's right.

To make this more clear I beg to refer to Your Lordship to the accompanying memorandum which exhibits the very term of my suggestion and to the copies, inclosed herewith of two instructions addressed by me to the first interpreter of Her Majesty's Embassy. An extract of Mr. Pisani's intermediate report and a project submitted to Aali Pasha by Count Stürmer are also inclosed for Your Lordship's additional information.

The actual state of the whole affair as resulting from these communications may be thus described. A meeting is to take place to-morrow, at the Grand Vizier's house between that minister, Aali Pasha and M. de Titov. A Protocol will, no doubt, be signed and probably in the form inclosed herewith which is based on my suggestion and contains no addition which I think it worth while to resist; but it is by no means impossible that the Russian Envoy may require and carry amendments less admissible and withhold the renewal of his diplomatic relations with the Porte until Count Stürmer is also satisfied.

As to the Austrian part of the difficulty supposing the statement of M. Mussurus to be correct and the language of Count Stürmer sincere, there is little prospect of an immediate accommodation with the consequent renewal of diplomatic relations, except by means of an unqualified submission to the most objectionable of Prince Schwarzenberg's demands.

However regrettable the continuance of this disagreement may be, I confess that, whether I look to Your Lordship's instructions, or to my own personal conviction, I hold that inconvenience to be a less evil than the surrender of the Porte's independence and dignity to a requisition grounded on no Treaty right and likely to be productive hereafter of much vexations intermeddling and unnecessary suffering.

This manifest at the same time that I should travel out of my province if I ventured on this occasion to control the free judgment of the Porte. The two leading ministers are fully acquainted with my opinions and with those of the French representative. I despair of striking out any fresh expedient for reconciling the pretentions of Austria with the fair and rightful objections of the Porte. The only sort of menace I could by possibility employ would be the immediate withdrawal of Her Majesty's Squadron from the neighbourhood of Turkey and the application of such a lever would be almost equally objectionable, whether it succeeded or whether it failed.

So much during the protracted struggle has been accomplished in favour of Turkish independence and consequently of that pacific system which in the East so intimately connected with its progressive establishment, that it is impossible not to watch with a deep and

anxious interest over the terms of final accomodation. But, deeply as the Porte would compromise its essential interests by any unnecessary weakness or inconsistency in the closing act of these negotiations, and much as the powers friendly to this Empire would have to deplore such ill-timed compliance, the most useful and best intentioned interference has its limits. Ours, I conceive, has reached them under the present circumstances.

I have the honour etc.

VI.

Constantinople, May 6, 1850.

Canning to Kossuth concerning his endeavours on behalf of the Refugees.

Pte. MSS. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

Monsieur, Les deux lettres que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser de Kutahia exigent quelques mots de réponse. Je m'en suis servi pour faire parvenir vos plaintes aux yeux des ministres de la Porte, et en ce qui regarde votre bien-aise personnel et celui de vos compagnons d'infortune, mes représentations ne sont pas restées sans résultat. Le Grand Vizir a consenti à donner de nombreux ordres à Suleiman Bey. Son Altesse m'assure que sa lettre est déjà partie pour Kutahia, et la traduction ci-jointe de cette lettre vous fera savoir mieux que je ne le pourrais dire, sur quoi vous pouvez compter.

Pour ce qui regarde le terme de votre détention dans ce pays et le changement du lieu où elle doit s'écouler, je ne peux pas me flatter d'avoir fait toute l'impression que vous désirez sur l'esprit du ministre ottoman. Il est permis néanmoins d'espérer que le temps amènera une manière de voir plus favorable à vos voeux, et je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire qu'il me sera fort agréable de vous marquer les premiers indices d'un tel changement.

En attendant, Monsieur, je suis persuadé que le courage de soutenir un grand malheur avec fermeté ne vous désespèrera pas, et je profite volontiers de cette occasion pour vous renouveler l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

VII.

Constantinople, April 30, 1851.

Canning to Kossuth concerning the liberation of the Refugees.

Pte. MSS. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

Monsieur, I hope you will forgive my long silence. I wished to send you good news and deferred writing in acknowledgment of your letter until I could have the pleasure of satisfying my wish in that respect. It is at length in my power to announce a decision, — not

indeed such a decision as I desired and at times expected — but one which has at least the merit of certainty. The Sultan has pledged the word of his government of your liberation on the 1st of September next, and His Majesty has had the consideration to adopt new style on this occasion.

The delay of four months will probably occasion disappointment to you and your friends. Fortunately it is confined to the best season of the year, and it may console you to know that every exertion consistent with my position was made to obtain an immediate or at least an earlier termination of your detention. I may add in confidence that a decision worse by two months that the present one was taken at first, and that it cost me no slight effort to gain the amendment.

In order to save the post I must obtain from entering upon any other topic at present. I cannot, however, conclude without thanking you for the kind welcome which you gave to the box of books I sent you in the winter; and begging that you will accept the renewed assurance of my sympathy and consideration,

I have the honour etc.

VIII.

London, June 20, 1851.

Urquhart to Kossuth, asking to be informed of any change in Kossuth's political attitude.

The Free Press, Sheffield, March 8, 1856.

You will recollect that I ventured to ask for a pledge and that you gave it me. I required that you should bind yourself to inform me of any change in your opinions and while you declared they would not change, you gave me your word of honour that, in case they did, I should be informed thereof before you acted in consequence of that change. I recalled this contract because I have had some suspicion awakened in my mind of your being in or tending towards communication with a party, with which, had you been anyway connected in October last, I never could so much as you have seen — and the chief of which you know to be a Russian agent. The requiring such a pledge could only proceed from alarm respecting the fixedness of your purposes, which has never ceased and renders almost painful every thought of which you are the object. If, then, at present my suspicions are happily without foundation, you must attribute them to the morbid irritation thus ungendered. I never write to you without thinking that the letter I write may be the last, nor receive one from you without the same damping reflection. In the case of my worst fears being realized and your having had, or (which is the same thing) thought of having communication with Mazzini, I expect you will let me know the fact yourself. In any case, I am releaved and either deceptive hopes,

or unfounded alarms will be put an end to. In the one case I return to my solitary toil, where I was before we met, in the order I shall be relieved from doubts, which are wholly incompatible with concert, even for objects of low degree.

IX.

London, Foreign Office August 11, 1851.

Palmerston to Canning concerning the demonstration by the Mediterranean Squadron in the Dardanelles.

Draft. No. 210. Turkey, volume 850. P. R. O. London.

Sir,

With reference to my Despatch No. 204 of the 4th instant I have to acquaint Your Excellency that I have stated to the Lord's Commander of the Admiralty that I am of opinion, with a view to the question of the proposed liberation of Mr. Kossuth and the other Hungarian Refugees detained at Kutahia, it would be useful if Sir William Parker's Squadron after reaching Alexandria were to show itself in the Archipelago.

P[almerston].

X.

Turin, Sept. 28, 1851.

Ralph Abercromby to Palmerston respecting Kossuth's behaviour on the „Mississippi".

MSS. No. 123. F. O. Sardinia vol. 179. P. R. O. London.

My Lord, Mr. Kinney, my American colleague, to whom I applied for information with respect to the ultimate destination of the Ex-President Kossuth has given me the following details connected with the conduct and language of the Exile, while on board the United-States Steam Frigate Mississippi which I hasten to transmit to your Lordship as being of sufficient importance to merit the attention of Her Majesty's Government.

From Mr. Kinney's description it appears that Kossuth is a visionary of an impracticable and dangerous character — that he professes to have received a mission from Heaven to deliver Europe from thraldom and in pursuit of the accomplishment of this plan his intention on quitting the Turkish territory was not to proceed direct to America and there accept the hospitable home he had been generously offered.

On being informed that the United States Frigate had been sent for the purpose of conveying him to America, he protested against being taken there and declared his intention of going first to Naples, then embarking for Genova and possibly proceeding to Marseilles,

landing at each Port in order that the people might hail their deliverer; and he proposed to use the United States Frigate as his means of transport on his propagandist errand.

The captain of the Mississippi however, as your Lordship may suppose, peremptorily refused his concurrence in such a plan; and on the Mississippi's arrival at Spezia, Kossuth declared his intention to land here, but, the instructions which there met the captain of the Mississippi from Mr. Kinley forbidding him to allow Kossuth to land, at once put a stop to this project. The language of the Ex-President seems to have been most violent and indecorous and he declared that he had only changed gaolers, the Turk for the American.

Mr. Kinley informs me that he, under the difficulties of the situation, Kossuth having positively declared that nothing but force should take him to America, has directed that the Ex-President should be taken to Gibraltar and there landed, previous warning being given to His Excellency the Governor, Sir Robert Gardiner of the intentions and character of his guest.

I regret that Mr. Kinney did not communicate with me on this subject before the departure of the Mississippi, as I should in that case have taken upon myself to write to Sir Robert Gardiner, requesting him to take particular care that Kossuth did not find the means of returning to this part of the continent of Europe but, I trust that the description he will receive from the captain of the Mississippi of the political fanaticism of Kossuth will be sufficient to impress him with the necessity of taking proper precautions on this point.

The Ex-President intends, it appears, to proceed from Gibraltar to England and I therefore hasten to warn your Lordship of his arrival, in order that you may take such steps as you may consider necessary under the circumstances.

The American Commodore Morgan, commanding the United States Squadron in the Mediterranean who had hastened to La Spezia from Lucca, describes in a letter the captain and the principal officers of the Mississippi as being worn out and harassed by the conduct of Kossuth on board, *as it was found necessary to watch him day and night, to prevent him from tampering with the ship's company.*

It is only charitable to suppose that former excitement and subsequent misfortunes have so disordered the Ex-President's mind as to render him incapable of adopting a reasonable and moderate course of action; for it is hardly to be imagined if the details above given are correct, which I cannot doubt from the source from which I have received them, that he should deliberately avow his determination to commence so wicked and reckless a system of revolutionary propagandism.

I have the honour (etc.)

XI.

Midhurst, Sept. 22, 1851.

Cobden to Pulszky regarding Kossuth's reception in Britain.

N. M. MSS. Dept. Bpest.

My dear Sir, I merely take advantage of the opportunity of my wife writing to Mrs. Pulszky to add a line to you. You are I suppose without any fresh news from Turkey. I observe a report in the Manchester paper that Kossuth is on board the U. S. Steamer Mississippi on his way to America. Is this true? I should not be surprised to find that the yankee commander pleaded the latter of his instructions and refused to take him to any other place than Washington. The Americans are fond of lions and besides they make „political capital" of them. — Apart from any inconvenience it may occasion him in his family arrangements and the disappointment you and his countrymen in England may feel, I do not think it will be to be regretted if he should alight for the first time after his liberation upon American soil. You are all interested in the preservation of his moral power and that will be greatly increased by the glorious reception he will meet with, from men of all ranks and parties, from the president to the daily labourer. If he were to take up his abode here he would be welcomed by the Radical Party. But the Aristocracy both Whig and Tory would generally stand aloof; and the conservative politicians would of course have nothing to say in his favour. The government would, I suppose, plead etiquette and ignore him at least publicly. If he returned hereafter being fêted in America by such statesmen as Webster and Clay, it may shame some of our Whig politicians into some art of recognition. Besides, the American government may give him a township or land which although not convertible into European wealth, is worth having and would be an honourable tribute at least. But should Kossuth after all, land in England, I should advise him to be cautious, how he accepts any offers of a public demonstration. Let him received complimentary address of a public meeting, or of the mayor of the town, or show himself to the masses who may surround his lodging-but let him be cautious of accepting any invitation to a public dinner or a public demonstration of any kind. He might find himself surrounded by persons who would be representatives of their own vanity then of the British public. Verborum satis est. I say this for your own ear only.

XII.

Midhurst, October 4, 1851.

Cobden to Pulszky regarding Kossuth's attitude in Britain.

N. M. MSS. Dept. Bpest.

My dear Sir, I shall be in London on the exhibition business on Wednesday for a week and shall not fail to pay my respect to Kossuth either there or in Southampton. — I presume he will come to town soon after his arrival in England. He will have many occasions for speaking to the people in answer to addresses presented to him from the London Corporation and all kinds of bodies. But I am still of the same opinion as ever that he would do wisely not to attend any banquet *where other peoples will make speeches.* I gave this opinion to Teleki when Kossuth was expected in 1848. — The more public addresses he receives from corporations or bodies of men, the better the more the crowd besiege him with cheers the better: but there is this risk if he enters a room to attend a public dinner or meeting where speeches are made that he has no control over the speakers and still to a great extent he is identified with the orators and their oratory, whatever its character may be. — For instance, supposing that at Southampton one of the speakers were to claim for Lord Palmerston the merit of his release, or suppose he were to attack Lord Palmerston for not having done enough, — in either case it would be embarrassing to Kossuth to be a silent auditor. However, all these I say for your private ear. I wrote before I heard that the people of Southampton intended to offer him a public dinner. That however does not effect the question at all.

I have no objection to his having the offer of a dinner. The more the better. It does not follow that he should of necessity accept them. I have not heard from Beöthy. My wife joins me in kind remembrance to Mrs. Pulszky and yourself and believe me faithfully yours.

XIII.

London, Oct. 14, 1851.

Palmerston to Magenis respecting the refuse of permission by the Vienna Government for British travellers to proceed to Hungary.

MSS. no. 285. F. O. Austria vol. 388. P. R. O. London.

Sir,

I have received your despatch No. 182 of the 30th ultimo reporting that the Austrian government had refused permission to English travellers to proceed to Hungary.

These measures and some other things of alike kind are no doubt the results of irritation at some parts of the policy pursued by Great-

Britain, but however His Majesty's government may lament that the government of a great country should have recourse to such small ways of testifying its displeasure, the measure now in question is not one against which it would be worth while formally to remonstrate.

XIV.

St. Petersburgh, Oct. 15, 1851.

Seymour to Palmerston respecting Nesselrode's opinion of Kossuth's liberation.

MSS. no. 42. F. O. Russia vol. 395. P. R. O. London.

My Lord,

In speaking to me of the liberations of Kossuth and his companions, the Russian chancellor took an opportunity of expressing his regret that they should have been yet free, not only without the consent of the Austrian government but against her wishes.

The chancellor seemed anxious to known what reception the Hungarian exiles would meet with in England.

I stated my conviction that they would be received with the greatest cordiality and at the same time expressed my conviction of the inexpediency of foreign governments making any observations either with regard to the exit of the Hungarians from Turkey, or upon the manner in which they might be welcomed upon English ground.

How far Count Nesselrode coincided in the correctness of this opinion I am unable to state, he only said that up to the present time no representation upon the subject of the liberation of Kossuth and his companions had been addressed to the Russian government by that of Austria.

It is then to be inferred that such a presentation founded upon an alleged violation of the engagements of the Porte towards Austria, is to be expected.

I have the honour (etc.)

XV.

London, Oct. 15, 1851.

Buol to Schwarzenberg respecting his absence from London during Kossuth's trip in Britain.

MSS. Report no. 29 A—C. Angleterre. H. H. St. A. Wien.

Mon Prince!

La faculté que Votre Altesse a bien voulu m'accorder par la lettre qu'Elle m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 9 courant, de ne pas être témoin des scènes nauséabondes et ridicules auxquelles l'arrivée de Kossuth donnera sans doute lieu, m'a paru être un avis que je n'ai pas cru devoir négliger dans l'intérêt du service. Seulement

la considération que Madame de Buol devait précisément quitter Mannheim le même jour où ces directions me sont parvenues et que, ma famille une fois rendue ici, mon départ aurait nécessairement eu plus d'éclat; m'a embarrassé un moment sur la manière la plus convenable de remplir Vos intentions. Je me suis, en conséquence, décidé à adresser sur le champ, une lettre à Madame de Buol pour l'engager à m'attendre à Bruxelles et à dire ici à mes connaissances que j'allais à la rencontre de ma famille. Venant de recevoir une invitation pour me rendre demain à Windsor et y passer la journée d'après-demain, je compte donc immédiatement après mon retour, m'embarquer pour Bruxelles et me rendre de là à Paris pour y attendre le dénouement des folies qui se préparent.

Je n'aurais pour différentes raisons pas jugé à propos de dénoncer ici le véritable motif de mon départ. On n'est pas fort ici sur les questions de délicatesse, et beaucoup de personnes se disant et se croyant bien pensantes, n'auraient pas compris que je dusse attacher tant d'importance à un mauvais jeu dont ils ne veulent pas eux-mêmes comprendre la portée; d'autres m'auraient accusé de l'intention de vouloir ou causer un embarras au Gouvernement, ou forcer la main à Lord Palmerston de se prononcer contre ses convictions, ce dont avec la malignité de son esprit il n'aurait pas manqué de tirer parti dans son intérêt, et certes, je ne me sens pas appelé à lui rendre ce service. Ne voulant aussi exclure de mes prévisions aucune des chances possibles, j'ai dû même admettre la possibilité que Kossuth eût l'intention de se dispenser tout à fait de sa course en Amérique et de rester en permanence en Angleterre. Or, dans ce cas, j'aurais pu, en faisant sonner trop haut le motif de mon départ, me rendre le retour plus difficile que Votre Altesse même ne l'eût désiré. Les bruits qui déjà circulent généralement que cet intrigant s'est brouillé avec le capitaine du Mississippi et que celui-ci après l'avoir déposé à Gibraltar se rendrait directement en Amérique avec les autres réfugiés en abandonnant leur chef à sa destinée, sembleraient même donner quelque poids à cette dernière supposition.

Je serai de cette manière, dans tous les cas, absent lors de la réception de Kossuth à Londres, qu'on tâchera de rendre aussi bruyante que possible; je prolongerai mon absence tant que l'attitude de cet individu me paraîtra peu conciliable avec la présence du représentant de l'Autriche, et si enfin, son séjour devait indéfiniment se prolonger, ou que le Gouvernement dût, ce que je ne crois pas d'ailleurs, se rendre complice de l'accueil que l'on prépare au chef de l'insurrection hongroise, j'attendrai les directions ultérieures que Votre Altesse voudra bien me donner.

Malgré toutes les indignes machinations du parti radical anglais et des coryphés des révolutionnaires réfugiés, pour tenir éveillées les sympathies pour la cause soit-disant hongroise, malgré la peine qu'on

se donne de les faire mousser en faveur du chef de l'insurrection, et de représenter sa mise en liberté comme un triomphe éclatant remporté par la politique de la Grande-Bretagne, il est incontestable cependant qu'il y a quelque chose de très factice dans les préparatifs de sa réception. Toutes ces adresses, ces députations, ces souscriptions ne sont que l'oeuvre d'une classe qui ne jouit pas ici de la considération qu'on lui suppose sur le continent, ces démostrations ne sont soutenues que par le ramas de toutes les populations de l'Europe et stigmatisées par le dégoût de tous les honnêtes gens. Il est constant également que la jactance avec laquelle Kossuth s'est énoncé dans son adresse à Marseille et dans la lettre qu'il a adressée depuis au Maire de Southampton a donné un change très remarquable à l'opinion qu'on s'est formée ici sur le compte de ce dangereux aventurier; les retards qu'éprouve son arrivée ont aussi en quelque sorte déjà ralenti le zèle de ses amis. Toutes ces circonstances me portent à croire que si Kossuth était assez mal avisé pour vouloir à son arrivée se poser comme chef du grand parti du désordre en Europe, il tomberait bientôt dans un ridicule qui le refoulera dans la catégorie des Mazzini et des Louis Blanc, et qu'il serait même honni par un grand nombre de ceux qui, à présent, en font l'idole de leur croyance. Toutefois, son séjour prolongé en Angleterre me semblerait être une infraction flagrante à l'entente au moins tacite, qui semble avoir motivé son élargissement de Kiutahia et si le Gouvernement Britannique pouvait même seulement passivement encourager ce projet, il ajouterait un nouveau tort à tous ceux dont nous avons droit de lui tenir compte dans la part qu'il a prise dans toute cette transaction. Il est certain aussi que malgré le mépris qui l'entourerait, cet homme formerait toujours un point de ralliement fort dangereux pour les intrigues qui s'ourdissent ici contre le repos du Continent. Ce serait donc à la sagesse du Governement Impérial de peser l'importance qu'il croirait devoir attacher à cette nouvelle infraction de bonne foi dont le Ministère de Lord Palmerston nous a déjà fourni tant de preuves, et de juger de la nature des réclamations qui pourraient être présentées au Gouvernement Britannique et sur lesquelles je ne me permettrai pas d'anticiper par un retour trop précipité.

Si, par les raisons que j'ai eu l'honneur de développer plus haut, j'ai cru plus convenable de n'assigner qu'un motif tout à fait personnel à mon départ, je n'userai pas cependant de la même réticence vis à vis de Lord Palmerston, si, comme je le pense, je trouve encore moyen de le voir. Informé de son arrivée en ville, je lui ai adressé avant-hier un billet pour le prévenir que je comptais comme demain, (n'ayant pas alors encore reçu l'invitation pour Windsor) me rendre à la rencontre de Madame de Buol et que je serais charmé s'il pouvait encore avant m'accorder un moment pour pouvoir l'entretenir de différentes communications dont je me trouvais chargé. Je n'ai pas reçu de réponse probablement parce que Monsieur le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat s'est

rendu immédiatement après le Conseil des Ministres d'hier à Windsor, où, au reste, je m'attends à le trouver encore. Je croirais en ce cas ne pas devoir lui dissimuler que j'ai dû avec empressement saisir une occasion pour me soustraire à la réception scandaleuse qu'on prépare à un traître et à un rebelle dans un pays qui cependant affecte de vouloir être en bons rapports avec l'Autriche. Je lui ferai sentir que j'ai cru de la dignité de ma cour de m'absenter et que je craindrais assumer une trop lourde responsabilité en assistant à des orgies politiques que le Gouvernement semblait ne pas pouvoir réprimer, et dont à juger d'un exemple récent de triste notoriété publique, il ne pourrait même pas avoir la puissance de réprimer les excès.

J'ai l'honneur de joindre ici plusieurs coupons de journaux dont l'ensemble donne une idée assez juste des différentes opinions qui tâchent de se faire jour dans l'affaire Kossuth.

Agréez, (etc.)

XVI.

London, October 15, 1851.

Address from the Parliamentary Reform Association to Kossuth.

The Daily News, London, Oct. 17, 1851.

Your Excellency: The Council of the Parliamentary Reform Association offer you their sincere and cordial congratulations on your safe arrival in this country. We esteem our nation honoured by your presence. Britain has often sheltered those whom tyranny has proscribed for their virtues, but in our apprehension, has never received a more illustrious or welcome visitor. Whilst you remain upon our shores you with be the People's Guest. And when you leave them for that land where a great and generous nation wait to echo the shout of welcome that now ascends from the millions of these islands, you will be followed by our heartfelt aspirations for your happiness amongst our honoured brethren of the Western World.

We, and the multitudes of British reformers whom we represent, have watched your carreer with the liveliest interest. We have rejoiced in your success, we have lamented your disasters; but all, we admired the integrity, the wisdom and the fortitude you have undeviatingly displayed through a long and perilous struggle for your country's rights. In unison with every friend of justice and civilisation, we have been indignant at the cruelty and vindictiveness of the influences which enforced the detention of your person, when the conflict was for the time decided. But this detention while it has rendered infamous those at whose instance it was prolonged, has added to the glory of Kossuth, by demonstrating that he knew how to endure as well as to contend for the noblest cause in which man can either combat or suffer.

Enjoying ourselves a large measure of freedom we sympathize with all who labour to achieve their just political rights. What our ancestors did, you have nobly striven to do. We venerate their memory, and regard you and you brave compatriots as their kindred. The inheritance which those ancestors bequeathed to us is precious and we are endeavouring to show ourselves worthy of it by pressing on to the full realization of the liberty, of which they proclaimed and laid deep the foundation.

In thus acting, our only motive is an earnest desire for human well-being; embracing first our fellow-countrymen, but not confined within the narrow boundary of our own land.

Would you learn the object which as an association we have in view, is to give a full scope and authoritative expression of the popular feeling and opinion, that our government may rest upon the intelligence and will of the people.

In this righteous object we have a firm belief that we shall succeed. When this peaceful triumph shall have been gained, the time will have arrived when the sympathy with which the masses of our people already share the hopes, the fears, the gladness, and the sorrow of their brethren throughout the world, will no longer be suppressed in the legislature or misrepresented by official diplomacy, but will make itself heard in tones, that shall neither be misinterpreted nor disregarded.

At whatever time, or by whatever means, it shall please Providence to raise your country from its temporary prostration to the possession of freedom and nationality, we feel confident that a people's gratitude will be yours.

We feel also confident that your future fame is sure and that mankind touching the results of our consels, your exertions, and your sufferings, will consecrate the name of Kossuth, and transmit it to the latest posterity as that of the liberator of Hungary.

On behalf the Council of the Association,

Joshua Walmsley, President.

XVII.

London, Oct. 17, 1851.

Palmerston to Normanby regarding the memorials of the cities in support of Kossuth's liberation.

MSS. no. 485. F. O. France vol. 896. P. R. O. London.

My Lord,

I have received your Excellency's despatch No. 279 of the 6th instant stating the M. Baroche has expressed to you his regret at hearing of the preparations which are being made for receiving Louis Kossuth on his arrival in England.

Your Excellency is aware that a strong interest has been excited in this country in favour of Kossuth. The interest has been expressed not only in the House of Commons but by memorials which I have received from public meetings held in the various cities and towns including the cities of London and Edinburgh and the towns of Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow, Leeds and Newcastle all praying Her Majesty's Government to use their influence at Constantinople to obtain the release of Kossuth and of his companions in confinement.

But this interest was founded upon the belief that Kossuth is a man who placed himself at the head of a nation resisting an unjust and illegal attempt to deprive them of their ancient constitutional rights and that he was kept in confinement in Turkey against the law of nations and to gratify the resentment of the Austrian Government.

It is natural, therefore, that, when Kossuth arrives in England owing his release very much to the efforts made by Her Majesty's Government in accordance with the general wishes of the British nation; it is natural that, when he so arrives, he should be invited to public dinners; and this will probably be the case, not only at Southampton, but at many other places.

If at these dinners the language of Kossuth is moderate and becoming, those dinners will not lead to give encouragement to the Revolutionary Party in Europe; but if at those dinners his language should be violent and revolutionary, public opinion in this country in regard to him will greatly and speedily change and dinners given to him will cause, or will no longer be attended by any persons of consideration and respectability.

XVIII.

Undated.

Considerations of the difficulties to be surmounted before England can render any official assistance to Hungary.

MSS. of Francis W. Newman, Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

The first difficulty is obviously *ignorance of fact.* This will be rapidly dispelled by the public speeches of our noble guest. It is therefore here only needful to remark, that no Englishman feels able to goad an unwilling government into foreign action ,until he believes himself to have mastered the *whole* of the case. Thus, it is not enough to know that the Austrian cabinet is grossly and tyrannically violated law and right and mercy against Hungary. Much as we may grieve over this, we shall be publicly passive, if we imagine that Hungary is likely to oppress the Croats, Slovaks and Wallachians, unless herself oppressed by Austria, so long as we are conscious that we imperfectly understand the relations and conduct of the Magyars towards these subordinate races, detestation of the House of Hapsburg will not urge us into any practical aid to the Magyars.

For these reasons, the outline of the past behaviour of the Hungarian Diet towards Croatia and the intrigues of the Austrian cabinet with Jellašić and the Servians, are the most essential complement for our due sympathy with the Hungarian cause. It may be added, that the wickedness of Austria in the matter of the Servians and of Jellašić seems incredible to a vast number of the English *because of its extravagant atrocity*. It is therefore peculiarly needed to fortify this part of the case with the most cogent and undeniable proof; and its analogue, the Austrian massacres in Gallicia, — equally disbelieved by us, — equally needs to be insisted on.

A second and greater difficulty remains behind, which nevertheless it will perhaps be in the power of Lewis Kossuth, if of any one, to remove, should by distinctly address himself to the task: — it is, the difficulty felt by every Englishman of setting *any limit* to the national effort incurred by quarelling with any first rate European power. Our past history warns us, how subject we are to an unreasoning warlike fanaticism, when once implicated in hostilities. A saying of the Duke of Wellington's has become current, — "A great country cannot have little war"; and the public imagines, that, whatever the cause or circumstances of a quarrel, any or every English ministry is certain to act as in the past century; when we entered war after war as *secondaries*, but conducted ourselves as *principals*, and, for objects of no interest whatever to the nation, incurred flagitious expenses and debts which still threaten the ultimate welfare of England. The public fears, that the very name of War would become an adequate excuse for total neglect of internal reforms, for *unlimited* prodigality and irresponsibility of ministers, with the prostration of all Parliamentary opposition. In consequence, new warlike loans are regarded as inevitable, which, when peace and sobriety return, may endanger Repudiation of an intolerable Debt, with possible convulsion that will end in civil war.

Thousands of us have not exactly shaped to themselves the forms of terror, which nevertheless, flitting across their hearts, impress their judgments: but all thoughtful men among us feel, that our first duty is to uphold the welfare of our own people, and that the justest indignation and compassion for oppressed foreigners ought not to issue in action which will involve our own people in consequences *which cannot be computed*. This desire of "counting the cost" of a generous deed before we undertake it, pervades all English life. The man who will give twenty pounds to aid a refugee into permanent independence (as by establishing him in America) will possibly grudge to give him a single pound for passing necessities, if he foresees that this first act of charity will probably lead to a series of new demands, harder and harder to refuse, yet propagating themselves — he knows not how far. If the English Parliament were quite sure, that to vote a free gift of

one million, of two million, or of three million sterling, would suffice to establish freedom and order in Hungary or Italy, their vote to this effect would (I believe) be joyfully approved in every part of the United Kingdom; but the gift of a single thousand pounds would be contemplated with diffidence and anxiety, if it seemed to be the precursor of indefinite liabilities.

Thus while we look at the Russian intervention with indignation and disgust, few of us know how to answer the questions with which the Times presses us: "Are you prepared to answer for the consequences of a war with Russia? You are generous and chivalrous: no doubt, all wars are popular in the beginning. But if once you plunge into war and several great powers get implicated in it, are you sure that you will not begin to repent of your generosity? What will you, who cry out for Financial Reform, say, when the war-minister whom you have lifted into power, demands new taxes and new loans? will you then cry out for Peace, and ingloriously abandon the object for which you made War? Or, if you are quite resolved not to go to war, are you so silly as to think that Russia or Austria (knowing this too surely) will care for your words?"

Our people will be deluded by this painful struggle of the judgment, until some powerful voice can reach their ears, proclaiming the solution of the riddle which embarrasses them. To do this by *abstract argument*, might seem impossible; but happily *precedent*, to which Englishmen bow, may here be used presuasively. The part which we took in the siege of Antwerp, in 1832, is a practical reply to the sophisms of the Times, and the fears of Financial Reformers. It is not true, that a great nation cannot have a little war. To imagine this, is to throw into confusion all international morality. It is not true, that *all* Hostilities necessarily reach to that *universal* and *unlimited* hostility, which is designated by the illomened and hateful name, War. During the siege of Antwerp, Dutch ships were unmolested by us on the seas and in the very ports of England. Dutch citizens moved as freely as ever on English soil. No attack on the country of the Dutch was dreamed of by us, or feared by them. Our contest was concerning the city of Antwerp *alone;* and while we *there* cooperated with ships against the Dutch forces, everywhere else we preserved unbroken amity.

Now if it be asked what enabled us so to limit our hostility, the reply is obvious: — "If *we* were willing so to limit it, the Dutch were certain to be glad. With their inferior navy, they could not wish to force England into a naval war: therefore, so long as we proclaimed peace and safety to their ships and people, they gladly imitated us". Nothing but the violence and iniquity of powerful states has hindered the general establishment of similar principles. The powerful have been accustomed to take to themselves unlimited license of retaliation for injuries confessedly limited; so that every petty quarrel is liable to

explode into widespread war: but, as this is a vice which has risen out of the abuse of power, so it is one from which a powerful state, if well principled, can break away, — as we and the French practically showed in the siege of Antwerp.

In the Hungarian struggle, more than in any other great cause, England had remarkable facility for giving efficient aid to the right, while strictly declining to take part as a *principal*, and *limiting at her own will* the amount of effort which she thought it prudent to use. The obvious explanation of this remark lies in the fact, that Russia and Austria are helpless against England in a maritime war; and whatever might be their rage against her, it is certain that they would not have been so mad as to attack her merchantships and her subjects, while she proclaimed peace to theirs. Strictly therefore, we had in our hands full power to keep peace with both states, every where that we chose, with whatever exceptions we might choose. Thus, we might have announced, "We are at war with you in Hungary, but no where else: we shall supply arms, money, troops, generals, to the Hungarians, at our own pleasure; your ships are safe; and our commerce, as for as we are concerned, shall be conducted as though no Hungary existed". Or again: we might have announced both *Hungary* and *Lombardy* as our sphere of war, and have thus distracted the Austrian armies. And what could the despots have done? Suppose them so mad as to attack us on the seas. Our existing fleet far more than suffices to close the Baltic and Black Seas, and to sweep away the little navy of Austria. No addition whatever would be needed to our public forces, in the worst case; and it would be in our own power to limit the succour given to Hungary. We might have either presented it with half a million muskets, or we might have sold them for Kossuth-notes, if too poor to be generous.

These topics are probably familiar to the thoughts of the eminent person for whose eye they are intended. The writer's object in penning them is, *to suggest to him the side on which the* English mind is weak. We not only distrust the discreation of war-ministers (an inevitable thing, after our past history), but we are ignorant of the vast results which a prudent English minister could effect without endangering any new burdens on the nation. It is of great importance to point out to our people the critical opportunities which might have been used for Hungarian freedom in the few last years, *without incurring unlimited liabilities*, and also, what lies in our power for the future.

In the past, I presume, we may enumerate:

1st when the collusion of Latour with Jellašić became a public fact, we might have angrily remonstated, pointing to the peace of Szatmár at which our ambassador assisted, and to the debt incurred by as for Maria Theresa, on which we are still paying enormous interest: and if remonstrance availed nothing, our minister might have published a

manifesto to Europe, complaining that Constitutional Royalty was being brought into odium, by the malversation of an Austrian Cabinet. The mere publication of such a manifesto might have driven out Schwarzenberg and Bach from the ministry.

2nd when Ferdinand had abdicated, and (since he is still capable of becoming father to a lineal heir of the Hungarian throne) the throne was left necessarily vacant, — Hungary became *ipso facto* for the time independent of Austria. We might then at once have sent an ambassador to the Diet, and angrily protested against the Russian troops in the Danubian principalities, which were preparing to enter Transylvania. Had we done so, the Sultan would probably have commanded them to withdraw, and Windischgrätz might never have received orders to invade Hungary.

3rd when the Austrians invited Russian aid, we might have commanded them to reject it, by the threat of raising Lombardy against them, or of seeking to effect an alliance of Hungary and Turkey.

4th by acknowledging the Roman Republic, we might have effected an important diversion.

Statesman probably know many other possibilities; but the English nation desponds of its own power to do anything at all, except by a prodigious war; and it has seen, with so much disgust, the result of English interference in Spain, Portugal, Naples, Sicily, Greece, Syria, — that we dread *all* foreign intermeddling. If therefore any one desires our nation to aid an oppressed foreign nationality, be ought to be prepared to point out how we can do it, *without losing the government of our own fortune course.*

I must not venture to suggest in this matter what is the right reply: I desire rather to be one of those who hear it. For myself, I distinctly believe that an English minister, backed by the zeal of the nation, and resolving to be unfettered by the Treaty of Vienna which Austria and Russia have repeatedly broken, would be able, without any addition to our existing burdens, to reestablish Hungary and to free Italy; although the latter question is (perhaps only for a little while) greatly embarrassed by the French forces in Rome. But when one considers how the despots are hated in Poland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, — that in all these great countries they have no internal support, but stand by the brute force of armies, — and that half the soldiers would desert if they dared, — one must believe that there are many ways, if our ministry had but an earnest will, to aid Europe into freedom with extremely little active effort on the part of an insular free state which is mistress of the seas. If our people can be made to understand that the procedure used by us in the siege of Antwerp against the Dutch may with equal ease and propriety be used against Russia and Austria, public aid from this country to Hungary will no longer be a thing to be despaired of.