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Czechs in London

FRANCIS HERCZEG

King Ferdinand of Rumania

ZSOMBOR de SZASZ

Divergence of Mentality between Rumanians of Transylvania
and Rumanians of old Rumania

LADISLAS de FRITZ

An Interesting Rumanian Admission

LADISLAS SZENCZEI

Reciprocal Indictment of Serbian Nationalist and Communist
Insurgents

IMRE PROKOPY

Exposés of Hungarian Premier, Minister of Finance and
Minister of Agriculture

Political Mosaic

Political Economy

BUDAPEST
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CZECHS IN LONDON

BY

FRANCIS HERCZEG

From whatever point of view we regard it — geographical, historical or ethnographical, military or economic — we shall always come to one and the same conclusion, — that *never in history was there so absurd a State-formation as the Czechoslovakia of former days*. The first glance at it revealed that it had not been created by Nature, — that it was, indeed, what it might have been expected to be as the invention of two gentlemen sitting in a hotel-room. It became equally evident that the Czech politicians had at the time been intoxicated to the point of moral insanity by the victory of the Western Great Powers. They were in a state of dreamlike trance such as overcomes us when we think everything is possible and permissible. We know that the first draft scheme of frontiers submitted by them to the Peace Conference demanded the cession of the left bank of the Danube as far as Vác and in addition laid claim to the possession of Miskolc, Sárospatak and the Tokaj hills, while in the West it demanded the demarcation of a corridor linking up with Sopron and the "Fertő" region in the latitude of Kapuvár. In illustration of the moral forces brought into action in the service of Czech imperialism, it will suffice to remind our readers of the Pittsburg Convention and the promises of autonomy to Subcarpathia, — obligations and promises flouted and made light of with a cynism unparalleled in history.

The reason why all these data have occurred to us is that John *Masaryk*, Foreign Minister in the London Czechoslovak Government, recently referred in one of his broadcasts to us Hungarians too. Dealing with the speech made by the Hungarian Premier, Dr. Nicholas Kállay, on May 29th., Masaryk went so far as to declare that "...we refuse to acknowledge the appropriation of Subcarpathia and of a part

of Slovakia and regard the so-called Vienna Award as an act of villainy".

The Czech diplomat trained in the school of Beneš must be in a bad way if he is impelled to speak with the pathos of a censor of morals and to have recourse to the terminology of criminal law. *But is it really conceivable that the "Czechoslovak Foreign Minister" should be ignorant of the fact that the "so-called" Vienna Award was a decision taken at the request of the Parties primarily concerned, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and with the previous and subsequent approval of the Western Great Powers? Does Czech diplomacy regard the latter all as accomplices in an "act of villainy"?*

To the best of our knowledge Thomas Gerrigue Masaryk, the late President of the Czechoslovak Republic, had views on these questions quite different from those of his son John. At least what he said about those questions was quite different. In one of his excellent essays Louis Steier cites *no fewer than eight statements made by President Masaryk with reference to the Hungarian territorial integrity movement.* It will perhaps not do any harm to recall one or two of those statements.

In 1923 President Masaryk made the following statement to Dr. Edward Pályi: — *"I am ready to declare that there is certainly a possibility for a discussion of the question of a return of the areas inhabited predominantly by Magyars, — though of course only on suitable conditions".* And again: — *"There are some 700,000 Magyars living in Slovakia; of these, for the moment we would restore some 3—400,000 living to the east of the Ipoly, the rest being restored by degrees at a later date".*

In President Masaryk's Jubilee Manifesto dated October 28th., 1928, we read the following passages: — *"We cannot expect everybody to accept without protest or resistance the provisions of the treaties of peace. I myself do not hesitate to declare that the treaties of peace need a certain clarification.* Such clarification must, however, be effected loyally, openly and honestly".

In an interview given to the correspondent of the "Sunday Times" on November 19th., 1928, Masaryk made the following statements: — *"I have never regarded the treaties of*

peace as being perfect; but after a war such as the late Great War, after the sacrifices and bloodshed involved, these documents cannot be regarded as mere scraps of paper either, nor can they be simply flung on the dust-heap. *I personally would be quite prepared to enter into discussions relating to the difficulties and the means of averting them, in the event of all Parties concerned giving their consent.* But there must be an end to all disloyalty towards these agreements, — to all one-sided and mischievous propaganda. I have nothing but contempt for the propaganda launched by certain British circles."

On May 17th., 1929, President Masaryk received a Berlin writer, *Julius Wolff*; on this occasion too the conversation turned on the Hungarian question. „*The President himself*” — so Wolff declared — “*would raise no objections whatsoever to the implementation of a Hungarian-Czech frontier re-adjustment to be effected by common agreement.* This attitude, however, has to face *misgivings on the part of the two other States forming the Little Entente*, which are afraid that in the event of such a re-adjustment they too would have to be prepared to meet similar claims on the part of the Hungarians. That is why the hands of Bohemia are tied”.

On July 12th., 1929, the President made the following statement to *Francis Rajniss*, the Hungarian publicist: “I am still prepared to discuss the question of a peaceful re-adjustment. For us the possession of a section of the Danube is a vital necessity; that is why we need Pozsony and the environs of that city inhabited by Magyars. *It is possible, on the other hand, to treat respecting the re-adjustment of all the areas in which the Magyars represent more than 50% of the population*”.

On September 28th., 1930, through the medium of one of the British news agencies, Masaryk made the following statement: — “So far as Hungary is concerned, the danger lies in the aggressive policy (!!) pursued by Hungary. I sympathize with the Hungarians in their difficult situation and under favourable circumstances *would be quite prepared to consider an adjustment in their favour of the present frontiers*; but, before that can be done in one form or

another, the Hungarians will have to change their tactics".

These passages will suffice to make it evident that *there is a vast divergence between the respective views held by the two Masaryks, Thomas and John*. In this case the son can certainly by no means be spoken of as "a chip of the old block". The aged President showed a readiness in principle to agree to what his son calls "the appropriation of Subcarpathia and a part of Slovakia", and to be an accomplice in what John Masaryk is pleased to refer to as "an act of villainy". It should certainly be noted that the Prague Government consistently refuted the statements made by the Head of their State, their refutations at times creating the impression that they attributed the declarations of the old man to the mental aberrations incidental to senile debility. To us, however, it at times appeared as if the Czech leaders were playing with cards dealt in advance.

The President was alarmed by the Hungarian efforts to obtain a re-adjustment; he knew that, while many looked upon the situation created by Trianon as merely provisional in character, the glory of the Czechs was a house built on sand: and for that reason he did everything in his power to disarm and mollify Hungarian public opinion by using words flattering its sensibility. But he never did anything more concrete than indulge in the use of pacifying statements. What Thomas Gerrigue was unable to attain by the insinuating tones of his violin, John is even less likely to effect by use of his martial trumpet. *It would be a good thing if the Czechs and the world at large would realize that every man worthy of the name of Hungarian clings unconditionally, either openly or in secret, to the thousand-year-old frontiers of his country.*

KING FERDINAND OF RUMANIA

BY

ZSOMBOR DE SZASZ

X. The Struggle for Transylvania.¹

Apart from the precarious peace of Soviet Russia, Rumania was the only one of the belligerent States for whom, after the Treaty of Bucharest, the war was over. Although she had been defeated and had suffered territorial losses, she ultimately emerged from the struggle the gainer of territory four times as large as the regions she had lost. Before the peace negotiations had begun, the union of Bessarabia and Bukovina was an accomplished fact. On the other hand, the peace treaty and the foregoing military defeat had frustrated the annexation of Transylvania.

But October 1918 brought a complete change in the situation.

On the last day of September Bulgaria gave up the fight, and on October 7 the Central Powers proposed an armistice. In so far as the future structure of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was concerned, Vienna's peace endeavours culminated in the fateful imperial Manifesto of October 17, which promised the transformation of Austria into a federative State in which the various nationalities would form self-governing units. Hungary was not included in this programme; Austria's new organisation — stated the Manifesto — “should in no wise affect the integrity of the lands belonging to the Hungarian Crown.”

The time had come for the nationalities to throw off the mask of pretended loyalty and to reveal themselves in their true character.

To the Rumanians, the peace offer of the Monarchy

¹ See previous articles under the same title in earlier numbers of his Review.

seemed to furnish the proper moment for an organised revolt.

Eight members of the executive committee of the Rumanian National Party, L. Goldis, Dr. Alexander Vaida-Voivod, St. Pop-Csicsö, A. Vlad, A. Lazăr, Th. Mihali, I. Suciú and Dr. Ciordaş, joined by Sever Dan, Gh. Popovici and Gh. Crişan, assembled in Nagyvárad on October 12, and there passed a resolution to the effect that the Rumanians of Hungary wished to use their right of self-determination and to be represented apart from the Hungarians at the coming peace negotiations. They commissioned Dr. Vaida-Voivod, then a member of the Hungarian Parliament, to lay this resolution before the House, and appointed a permanent sub-committee of six members, with its seat in Arad, to direct further developments.

Dr. Vaida read the resolution in the Hungarian House, prefacing it with a lengthy speech full of accusations against the Hungarian State and against the Prime Minister, Dr. Wekerle, and Count Stephen Tisza, on whom he laid the blame for the present state of affairs. The speech itself was the usual jumble of invectives, but the resolution was of historical importance. It ran as follows:

"In view of the situation created by the Great War, the Executive Committee of the Rumanian National Party states that the results of the war have justified the secular demands of the Rumanian people for complete national freedom. On the strength of the natural right of every nation to determine its own fate — a right recognised by the Hungarian Government in the Monarchy's request for an armistice —, the Rumanians of Hungary and of Transylvania demand for themselves the right to decide, freely and independently of every foreign influence, their situation among and their relations with the free nations of the world. The national organ of the Rumanians of Hungary and Transylvania does not recognise the right of this Parliament and this Government to regard themselves as the representatives of the Rumanian nation, nor does it recognise the right of any other alien factor to represent the interests of the Rumanians of Hungary and Transylvania at the Peace Conference, for they can only entrust the safeguarding of these

interests to factors appointed by their own national assembly. None but this assembly, or organs delegated by it, is entitled to negotiate or to take decisions concerning the political situation of this nation, and we declare all decisions and agreements made without their consent as null and void. After centuries of sufferings and struggles the Rumanians living in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy demand and expect the recognition of their prescriptive and inalienable right to a complete national life."

This was a sufficiently revolutionary document, the repudiation of all constitutional community, parliamentary as well as administrative, with Hungary.

The Hungarian Prime Minister, Dr. Wekerle, answered in dignified terms. "We shall", he said, "follow a policy of understanding, while maintaining intact the integrity of the State." He repudiated the attack against the unity of the State and the idea that the Rumanians of Hungary could be represented at the Peace Conference by a delegation separate from that of Hungary.²

Dr. Vaida was answered, not only by the Hungarian Prime Minister, but a few days later also by a Rumanian, one who was no renegade but an esteemed member, at that time, of the Hungarian Parliament, Peter Mihaly. Subsequently Mihaly was to play a distinguished role in Rumania as the leader of the Liberal Party in Maramaros and was elected a member of the Rumanian Parliament on the same list as Dr. Vaida.

In a speech delivered on October 23, Mihaly energetically protested against the assumption that Dr. Vaida was entitled to speak in the name of the entire Rumanian population of Hungary. The Rumanians, he said, had always maintained as a leading principle of their minorities policy that "the satisfaction of racial interests must never interfere with the interests of the Hungarians or the unity of the Hungarian State, because such tendencies cannot be harmonised with the patriotic sentiments of the Rumanians... We have always recognised, not only in words but also by

² A magyar országgyűlés képviselőházának naplója (the Hungarian Hansard) vol. 41 p. 315 sq.

acts, the principle of the national Hungarian State, and we stand on that basis also to-day... In the new world about to be created we wish to be the members of a rejuvenated, strengthened, independent and happy Hungarian nation... We stand", he concluded, "loyally and faithfully, with not a single hidden thought, side by side with the Hungarians in their terrible struggle."³

On the same October 18 when Dr. Vaida read the National Party's resolution in the Hungarian Parliament, a meeting took place between the Rumanian political leaders and certain Hungarian radicals. Since it seemed a foregone conclusion that as a result of the collapse of the Monarchy the power in Hungary would pass into the hands of the Left Wing parties, Count Michael Károlyi, the leader of the radicals, invited the leading Rumanian Members of Parliament to discuss with him the line they proposed to take. At 9 o'clock in the evening of October 18, eight men, four Rumanians and four Hungarians, gathered together for this discussion. The Rumanians were: Dr. A. Vaida-Voivod, Aurel Vlad, I. Erdélyi and A. Lazăr; the Hungarians were all members of Károlyi's party and included Károlyi himself and O. Jászi, a future Minister in Károlyi's Government, of whom we shall hear later on.

The meeting was opened by Count Károlyi, with the statement that in all probability the king would entrust him, Károlyi, with the formation of a new government. Nothing definite was known as yet, but he was quite aware that if such a contingency were to arise, he would be unable to undertake the mission without the support of the Social Democrats and the nationalities, in the first place of the Rumanians. The latter were the determining factor. The first question, however, concerning which he would like to have the opinion of the Rumanians present was "whether, in the event of a plebiscite, the Rumanian people would vote for remaining with Hungary or for joining the Rumanian kingdom?"

Some minutes of silence followed this question; broken at last by Aurel Vlad.

³ Ibid pp. 425—427.

He began his discourse with the remark that forty years of German domination had been unable to make good German patriots of the people of Alsace; they had remained French to the end. "You Hungarians", he continued, "have governed this country for a thousand years, having in your hands all the means, administrative, financial, cultural and social, with which to make the non-Magyar peoples content with their lot. I will not criticize the past; I only state the fact that they are not content, that they are hostile to the Magyars. We Rumanians have been in permanent touch with Rumania. We have a common language, a common culture, a common national sentiment... I believe that in the case of a plebiscite the Rumanians would vote, if not unanimously then very nearly so, for union with the Kingdom of Rumania."

Another silence followed; then Count Károlyi turned to Dr. Vaida:

"And your opinion, Mr. Deputy?"

"I have nothing to add to the words of my colleague", replied Dr. Vaida curtly, — "I entirely share his opinion."

"And you, Mr. Erdélyi?"

"So do I."

"And you, Mr. Lazăr?"

"I do the same."

I have quoted the above from an article entitled "Difficult Times" by Dr. Vaida,⁴ who concludes his account with the assertion that the conversation ended in a hot discussion in which "nothing more was said as to what the Rumanians would or would not do or how they would vote, but in which we (the Rumanians) explained why we could not remain in Hungary and they (the Hungarians) made every effort to convince us that it would be to the Rumanian interest to vote against the union with Rumania."

In the end it was agreed that a "National Conference" representing all the Rumanian districts should deal with and definitely settle the question.

⁴ "Din vremuri grele", first published in the review Transylvania and reprinted in the March 17, 1934 issue of the Adevărul.

Count Károlyi's Memoirs contain a wholly different account of this meeting in his mansion.

According to him, "the Rumanians demanded a very extensive autonomy for Transylvania, which would have meant a much looser connection with Hungary than we thought desirable. But even the most extreme demands stopped short of the idea of a separation, and their (the Rumanians') policy had a decidedly Hungarian orientation."⁵

It would be hard to decide which of the two versions, Dr. Vaida's or Count Károlyi's, corresponded with the facts. Subsequent developments might be taken to corroborate either of the Rumanian attitudes. In December 1918 the complete separation was declared, but only after many painful heart-searchings, and the Resolution of Union stipulated for autonomy. But in 1934, when Dr. Vaida-Voivod's Memoirs appeared, intransigent irredentism had a better sound in Greater Rumania than nostalgic longings for self-government.

While the Rumanian deputies were lending themselves to these discussions in Budapest, Julius Maniu, the *conducatorul* or Führer of the Transylvanian Rumanians, was starting in Vienna an enterprise destined to lend force to their oratory.

In the autumn of 1918, Maniu was serving as a lieutenant of artillery in Transylvania. After the collapse of Bulgaria he was sent to the Italian front, where, however, he only remained for a short time, being given a few days' leave of absence through the intervention of a Czech superior officer. Fully equipped, he left for Vienna, firmly resolved not to return to the front.

Arrived in Vienna, he immediately set about organising a Rumanian military force.

He convened to a secret conference all the army officers of Rumanian origin then in Vienna — about a hundred altogether — and established a Rumanian Military Council which decided to take over the command of the 64th infantry regiment; this regiment, stationed at that time in

⁵ M. Károlyi: Egy egész világ ellen. p. 388.

Vienna, was recruited from among the Rumanians of Transylvania.

At the same time Maniu arranged with C. Isopescu-Grecul, Bukovinian Rumanian member of the Austrian Reichsrat and President of the Rumanian National Council in Vienna, to enlist all the Rumanian soldiers of the Monarchy under a common command.

On October 13 — narrates Isopescu-Grecul, in describing these events later on — he and Maniu called on the common Minister for War, Baron Stöger-Steiner, and demanded that he should transfer the command of all the Rumanian troops in the Monarchy to the Grand Rumanian National Council. The Minister politely explained to them that, although the Imperial Manifesto had conferred certain rights on the nationalities, the common army was an organic whole which could not be disrupted.

The Lieutenant was not impressed by the Minister's exposition.

The question at present, — he told him — was not one of constitutional rights or such things. He, Maniu, had already assumed command over the Rumanian regiments with the consent of the National Council. It would be much wiser, were the Minister to recognise the actual state of affairs.

The Minister, a most amiable person, begged the two men to wait for a few minutes in the hall while he took his decision. As they went out, Maniu whispered to his companion: "In five minutes it will be decided whether we shall gain the upper hand in the revolution or be court-martialled and possibly shot."

They were not shot. In Vienna the revolutionary excesses were growing more menacing every hour, and the German troops were not to be relied on. In these circumstances Stöger-Steiner was compelled to make a bargain. He consented to have the command of the Rumanian troops transferred to the National Council; the Rumanians promised to maintain order both among the Rumanian troops

* Ion Clopotel: *Revoluția din 1918 și unirea Ardealului cu Romania* pp. 53—58. — Sever Stoica: *Juliu Maniu*, pp. 112—118.

and in the streets of Vienna; in return for which services they were to receive the entire military equipment of the big military barracks in Wiener-Neustadt.

The bargain made, the Rumanian troops were placed under the command of General I. Boeriu, and order was re-established in Vienna. When, at the end of October, a similar situation developed in Prague, things took the same course. In that town there were three regiments recruited from Rumanian territories, which were organised into a "*Legiunea română din Praga*". The Czech National Council appealed to this body for help, and got it without delay.

Having crushed the revolutionary movements both in Vienna and in Prague, the Rumanian troops were ordered to return, *via* Serbia, to Transylvania.

Maniu not only laid the military foundations of the Rumanian revolution; he also took the first steps towards a future foreign policy. He began to establish contacts with all the discontented races of the Monarchy, — Czechs, Slovaks, Croats; and although the Little Entente sprang from other beginnings, its motives and aims were identical with his. He also sent V. V. Tilea and Ionel Mocioni to the Allied Powers with a Memorandum concerning the future demarcation-line.⁷

At this time propaganda had to a certain extent succeeded in improving the prospects of the Rumanian aspirations. Already before the war the irredentist Rumanians, hand-in-hand with their Slovak associates, had launched a noisy propaganda, especially in the direction of the Latin countries; but this propaganda had never been taken seriously in Hungary, and it would have remained without appreciable results, had Hungary not been found among the defeated countries.⁸

During the first two years of the war Rumania, being as yet uncertain on which side she was going to fight, had been unable to put up an effective propaganda. As soon,

⁷ Ion Clopotel: op. cit. p. 57.

⁸ G. Moroianu: Les luttes des Roumains Transylvains pour la liberté et l'opinion Européenne.

however, as she had made her choice and had attacked Austria-Hungary, the road had been clear for a propagandist campaign against Hungary. Its first documentary evidence was the text of the Declaration of War itself.

In April 1917 the Rumanian Government sent three Transylvanian Rumanians to the United States with the mission of organising troops for the French front from among their fellow countrymen there. These three men were L. Stoica, who subsequently became a member of the Rumanian diplomatic corps, and two priests, L. Lucaciu, ex-member of the Hungarian Parliament, and Ion Moța.⁹

They arrived in Washington in June and were amicably received by Mr. R. Lansing, who regaled them with such complimentary phrases on Rumania as are customarily applied to friendly foreign States. But their offer to form a Rumanian Legion was not received with the enthusiasm they expected.

Mr. Baker, the Minister for War, refused to introduce into the American army military units with a distinct national character. The Americans, he said, expected the various races to amalgamate in one great and united nation; this applied particularly to the army, which must be American and imbued with an American spirit. He suggested that the Rumanians should join up with the American army.

Their interview with the French Ambassador was just as unsatisfactory.

The three propagandists had to realise that President Wilson's lofty ideals in regard to irredentism and self-determination were not shared by his people, and that they were unwilling to sacrifice for their sake the unity of their army. The goodwill of the Government was not to be won by the easy offer of a Rumanian legion. "Anyhow", — writes Stoica, — "we had to concentrate our efforts on making our nation known to the American people. This work was as difficult as it was necessary, for the Americans were in a complete state of ignorance concerning us. Men in the forefront of political life hardly knew the whereabouts of

⁹ Vasile Stoica: In America pentru cauza românească.

Rumania, and they knew even less about Transylvania and the ideals for which we were shedding our blood."

Stoica admits that for such a mission the delegation was but ill equipped. He soon discovered that "English was the only language spoken in the States; no member of the President's Cabinet knew any other. In our delegation, on the other hand, neither Moța nor Lucaciu spoke that tongue. Although Lucaciu was looked up to at home, I must confess that at this time his powers were already waning, and in a country so given to precision as the States his romantic enthusiasm, which took no account either of facts or of scientific data, did more harm than good to our cause."

The three men soon parted company, and Stoica alone remained in Washington with his onerous task.

He realised at once that the press was not only indifferent towards Rumania, but downright hostile. The Hearst press depicted her in the most unfavourable colours. The *New York Tribune* criticised her sharply; the *New York Times* took no notice of her; the *Washington Post* and the *Philadelphia Ledger* referred to the Rumanians as "certain uncivilised Balkan tribes". There was no word as to the justice of their war. Specially harmful were the reports of Carl Ackerman, the American war correspondent attached to the German Headquarters, who to illustrate, for example, the inefficiency of the Rumanian army officers, described how at the beginning of the battle of Argeș a Rumanian Staff officer had been taken prisoner with the entire plan of battle on him.

But the greatest difficulty was caused by the favourable opinion which seemed to prevail everywhere concerning the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

"The Americans cannot grasp the problem of the nationalities"; — writes Stoica, — "for them the vitality of and necessity for the Habsburg Empire is an axiom. Austria, the land of the arts, of the Viennese musical comedies and of the violinist Kreisler; Hungary, the land of the *csárdás*, of Louis Kossuth and of picturesquely costumed magnates, the wooers of American girls: these were countries in which liberty, well-being and complete harmony reigned. They were

regarded as the victims of Prussian brutality, which had dragged them into a war against their will."¹⁰

And not only the Great Power Austria-Hungary — even little Bulgaria was accorded greater respect than Rumania. Professor Iorga narrates, without mentioning any names, that a Rumanian living in the States who tried to win a friend of President Wilson's for the Rumanian cause, received the following reply: "If you were a Bulgarian, I should listen to you, because I know that the Bulgarians are a serious people, but you are not."¹¹

Yet it was not so very difficult to convert American ignorance into sympathy. At first both Th. Roosevelt and Hoover talked of "the civilisatory mission of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the necessity of its maintenance"; but thanks to Stoica's powers of persuasion, after some conversations both recognised "the admissibility of Rumania's aspirations." Their only anxiety concerned the fate of the minorities, but Stoica reassured them on this point. The Saxons, he said, are few and docile; the Székelys are poor and will be much better off in Rumania than in Hungary; as for the Magyars, they are a mere fluctuating element which will disappear with the Hungarian domination. And he is not ashamed to set down in black and white, and that in 1926, when his book appeared, — after seven years, that is, of the most ruthless and flagrant oppression of the minorities, — that in September 1918 he told Colonel House that "the Rumanian problem can have only one solution — the union of all Rumanians. He too (Colonel House) was anxious about the Székelys and other minorities, but I re-assured him by saying that we shall not follow the policy of the Hungarians, but shall grant them complete religious, educational and administrative autonomy."¹²

In those days Hungary was cut off from America; and the Rumanian propagandists had it all their own way.

On November 5 the American Government declared that "seeing the struggles, sufferings and sacrifices of the Tran-

¹⁰ V. Stoica: In America pentru cauza românească pp. 10—12.

¹¹ N. Iorga: Propaganda in străinătate p. 262.

¹² V. Stoica: op. cit. pp. 16—41.

sylvanian Rumanians in their fight to liberate themselves from oppression, they are benevolently inclined towards the idea of a union of all Rumanians and shall not neglect to use their influence in the interest of the political and territorial rights of the Rumanian people."

By this time the war was over, and the Rumanian Government as well as the Transylvanian revolutionaries could establish a free and unhindered intercourse with the victorious Powers. Their centre of activity became Paris, the seat of the Peace Conference.

(To be continued.)

OSZK

Nemzeti Széchényi Könyvtár

DIVERGENCE OF MENTALITY BETWEEN RUMANIANS OF TRANSYLVANIA AND RUMANIANS OF OLD RUMANIA

BY

LADISLAS de FRITZ
Justice of the Supreme Court.

For more than twenty years Transylvania was under Rumanian rule, until the Vienna Award of August 30th., 1940, restored North Transylvania to Hungary, — the southern part of that province continuing however to belong to Rumania.

Below we offer data showing how profound is the sentimental gulf separating the Rumanians of Transylvania from the Rumanians of Old Rumania (popularly known as the "Regat"). Before doing so, however, we would stress that this difference is due primarily to the divergence in the respective development of the two kinds of Rumanians. The national consciousness of the Rumanians of Transylvania developed much earlier and much more intensively than did that of the Rumanians of the "Regat". Ever since the establishment of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church at the Synod held at Gyulafehérvár in 1697, when the vast majority of the Rumanians of Transylvania acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope, the Transylvanian Rumanians have been linked up with Western culture. The racial and national character of the Rumanians of the "Regat", on the other hand, has remained typically Balkan. Another factor responsible for this divergence of mentality was that the Rumanians of Transylvania — in the Hungary forming part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — were subject to a settled system of government founded on honest European principles. The Rumanians of the "Regat", on the other hand, lived in a Balkan kingdom which from 1711 until the suspension of Turkish suzerainty in the nineteenth century

was ruled by Phanariot princes, men of Greek origin who enjoyed the special favour of the Sublime Porte.

The divergences between these two kinds were disguised by geographical distance and differences in respect of public law. However, when in terms of the Peace Edict of Trianon Transylvania was subjected to Rumanian rule, this distance and these differences lost their significance, the consequence being that the Rumanians of Transylvania very soon became profoundly disillusioned, that resulting in the opening of an ever-widening spiritual gulf between the Rumanians of Transylvania and those of the "Regat" brought into being by the bitter party conflicts ensuing both in the Press and in the Rumanian Parliament. Very characteristic light is thrown on the divergence between these two kinds of Rumanian mentality by the speeches made in Parliament. In a speech delivered in the Rumanian Chamber of Deputies on September 3rd., 1932, *Alexander Vaida-Voivod*, then Rumanian Premier, dealt with the charge brought by the Rumanians of the "Regat" to the effect that the Rumanians had been treated as slaves in Hungary and had been emancipated in Rumania. The Premier (Vaida-Voivod) then, in a voice trembling with passion, made the following statement: — *"I was not emancipated by any one; I have always been a free man. I was no Transylvanian deserter selling my conscience or betraying and attacking my brethren, as was done by so many of those who shirked their duty"* (Journal of Rumanian House of Deputies, No. 3. — August 5th., 1932 — pp. 15—19).

And this same Alexander Vaida-Voivod, in a speech made by him before the Rumanian Senate on August 3rd., 1932, — while still Prime Minister of Rumania — made the following statements: —

"When I came here with the union proclaimed by us at Gyulafehérvár of our own free will — by the will of our Trans-Carpathian people — and without being compelled thereto by any one, I was received as the herald of our brethren beyond the mountains and feted at banquets and in speeches everywhere, even in the royal palace. Gradually, however, we who were then the leaders of Transylvania came to realize that a fusion with one or other of the

parties — in particular with the Liberal Party — would mean renouncing the idea which had always inspired us, — the idea of popular liberty which is the only guarantee of progress. To our sorrow we were fain to realize that the atmosphere of fraternity in evidence at the outset was changing to an atmosphere of hostility. We were — and still are — accused of regionalism and of undermining the foundations of the existence of the State and of Rumanian unity. These charges have not yet been abandoned. *After having been regarded in Hungary as traitors and irredentists, as we really were*", said Alexander Vaida-Voivod, Prime Minister of Rumania, "*we now find ourselves being treated in Greater Rumania as "bad Rumanians", as emancipated slaves and as men with an Austro-Hungarian mentality*" (Journal of the Rumanian Senate No. 4 — August 24th., 1932 — p. 86).

At the meeting of the Rumanian Chamber of Deputies held on August 19th., 1932, *Demostene Botez*, a Transylvanian Rumanian Deputy, explained that the Rumanians of Transylvania and of the "Regat" respectively — two distinct types — had for generations been brought up under the influence of two different cultures, the Transylvanian Rumanians under that of German, and the "Regat" Rumanians under that of French, culture, and then put the following question: —

"How would you reconcile these two types, the products of two distinct cultures, and at a blow create a spiritual unity between them? A divergence of cultures and systems of education may create differences calculated to lead even to racial differentiation" (Journal of the Rumanian House of Deputies No. 13 — August 25th., 1932 — p. 286).

In its June 8th., 1936, issue the Bucharest daily, "Curentul", published a report of a speech made at Yassy by Marshal Averescu on the differences between Transylvania and the "Regat". In this speech made by a typical "Regat" politician who has always played a leading role and has several times been Prime Minister of Rumanis, we read the following statements: —

"The Great War has brought about the realization of our national ideal. Politically, the whole of Rumaniamdom

has been united; but no spiritual unity has ensued. Today there are more serious antagonisms between Rumanian and Rumanian than there were prior to the Great War. The Rumanians living in Transylvania regard the Rumanians of the "Regat" as a sort of gipsies".

In the March 22nd., 1936, issue of the "Adeverul" *Virgil Muntean*, a Rumanian publicist living in Transylvania, published an article entitled "Colonial System" in which he threw a glaring light on the treatment meted out to Transylvania by Rumania. According to this eminent Rumanian publicist "Transylvania is daily becoming more and more impoverished, and its people have already sunk to the level of biological degeneracy. Apart from the general crisis, Transylvania is suffering also from the effects of a peculiar system employed by the Bucharest Government in its dealings with that province. Here are a few data by way of illustration of that system: — in the years 1934—35 nearly 200 teachers were appointed to posts in the territory of Transylvania; not one of these teachers was however a Transylvanian. Of the 1600 public employees appointed in the same years (1934—35) to posts in Transylvania only 67 were Transylvanians. That means that the ratio of Transylvanians appointed to public posts (expressed in %) cannot possibly be more than, let us say, the proportion of natives employed in the colonial administration in some colony — e. g. in India".

In a question put before the meeting of the Rumanian Chamber of Deputies held on December 19th., 1931, *Ghita Pop*, a former Minister and one of the representatives of the Rumanian National Peasant Party of Transylvania, speaking of the exploitation of Transylvania, complained that *the Rumanians of the "Regat" had initiated a veritable campaign of robbery and pillage in that province, and were ousting the Rumanians of Transylvania from the State and county services.*

AN INTERESTING RUMANIAN ADMISSION

BY

LADISLAS SZENCZEI

Quite recently an interesting booklet was published abroad. We use the term "abroad" in a general sense, because the booklet does not give either the place of publication or the name of the publisher, so that it is impossible to determine the circumstance of its publication. There can be no doubt, however, that this pamphlet — which bears the title "*Justice pour les Roumains*" — must have been issued by persons connected with the "free Rumanians". From the tone of the pamphlet we may surmise that the author and publisher must belong to the group of "*free Rumanians*" sympathizing with ex-King Carol. The author figures indeed as "*Vlad Bucur*"; that is probably a pseudonym. The pamphlet tellingly reflects the state of mind and the mentality of the "*free Rumanian circles*". One of the earliest chapters of the booklet is written in a peculiar, undisguised tone of penitence and self-confession without a parallel in recent Rumanian publicistic literature. We would quote — in translation — certain paragraphs of this instructive chapter and add marginal notes on its most interesting statements.

"Modern Rumanian history" — writes "*Vlad Bucur*" — begins with the Treaty of Versailles, which, raising Rumania to the status of a secondary Power, created for the representatives of that country an atmosphere enabling them to lead the assembly of the States rewarded under the Treaty and at the same time to commit mistakes that subsequently brought about a catastrophe. *It is not our business — and this is not the place — to decide whether Rumania deserved so large-scale an acknowledgment of her demands or indeed whether such acknowledgment was at all desirable; Versailles is already a thing of the past or rather is soon about to be subjected to the verdict of history: and we know what was made of it*".

So far as we know, this is *the first time a Rumanian author has been known to "feel blue" about the magnanimity of the Treaty of Versailles* or to admit a doubt (even though only tacitly) in the childish Paradise of pan-Rumanian dogmatism.

But to continue.

"For Rumania" — writes our author — *"Versailles was undoubtedly a mistaken starting-point giving rise to an initial error of no mean significance which devolved a serious burden on the destinies of Rumania. That peaceful, modest, small country was too suddenly transformed into a big kingdom with imperialistic inclinations. The doubling of the country's territory was accompanied by a re-doubling of the problems awaiting solution; and the difficulties with which the country found itself faced were indubitably too serious to benefit our development"*.

For the first time a Rumanian author ready to admit that the basis created at Versailles was a mistake! Although as from September 6th., 1940, Rumania freed herself from the Versailles constellation and devotailed herself heart and soul in the new European Order of the Axis Powers, so far not a single Rumanian publicist or statesman has been found to voice the break with the system of Versailles so drastically and in a manner affecting the very foundations of recent Rumanian history. Though the Rumanian statesmen of more recent times condemn the twenty-years' Versailles policy, nevertheless, as concerns the Greater Rumania created in 1920, they are unanimously of opinion that what Versailles did was, not to create, but merely to ratify Rumanian unity, which — they say — may, independently of all moments of international politics, be regarded as the logical consequence of Rumanian history. Now for the first time we meet a sober judgment taking realities into account — a discordant note in the dogmatic concert of Rumanian publicistic literature; for so far — and that chiefly among the Rumanians of Transylvania — there have been only tacit suggestions of the opinion that the establishment of Greater Rumania cannot be regarded as a result of spontaneous development, but much rather as the freak of an unprecedentedly auspicious historical opportunity which

presented the Rumanian people with national unity in the form of — a prematurely born child.

But, to continue our quotations.

"There were three concrete facts" — says the author — "that severely tested the power of resistance of the young, overgrown kingdom, — the question of superiority and the conflicts ensuing between Old Rumania and the incorporated provinces, the geographical isolation of the Capital and finally (most important of all and the most difficult to tackle) *the presence of several millions of minority citizens*".

These are three admissions which cannot fail to induce Hungarian readers to indulge in interesting reflections, — particularly in view of the fact that during the past two decades the competent publicists of Hungary have adduced arguments of a similar character to illustrate the real nature of the Rumanian problem. At the very outset Hungarian observers were struck by the serious antagonism in evidence between the Rumanians of the incorporated provinces and the State-building Rumanians of Old Rumania (the so-called "Regat"). The Rumanians of Transylvania and Bukovina had enjoyed a Central European intellectual and political education, and for that reason were entitled to regard themselves as the superiors of their racial kinsmen in Old Rumania, whose mentality betrayed unmistakable and indelible traces of the consequences of more than five hundred years of incorporation in the Turkish Empire. In the eyes of the Rumanians of Old Rumania, on the other hand, the State existence of half a century or more which had been their share since 1859 and the resulting training in the work of State-building, ensured the citizens living in the "Regat" an advantage which rendered the suzerainty of Old Rumania over the Rumanians of the new provinces natural and necessary. The antagonism between the Rumanians of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and of the "Regat" respectively was therefore so insistent and so material in character that a symbiosis of two decades proved incapable of bridging over the chasm or of changing the antagonism into a harmonious co-operation, — even though official Rumania left no stone unturned to suppress the manifesta-

tion of the lack of unity or at least to make it appear insignificant. Equally interesting is the admission respecting the geopolitical structural defects of the Rumanian Kingdom contained in the reference to the limitrophe situation of the Capital. Hungarian science, faced with striking facts, has always stressed — and has been fully justified in doing so — that the Rumanian frontiers ratified by the Treaty of Trianon encircled a State the geopolitical structure of which left much to be desired. The Wallachian Basin surrounded by the Southern Carpathians and the Lower Danube is so compact a geopolitical unit that it cannot possibly form the nucleus of the Greater Rumania created by Trianon, the situation of Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina over against that Basin and its Capital, Bucharest, being decidedly centrifugal in character. As compared with Wallachia and Bucharest, not only the three large provinces incorporated in the new formation, but even the former Principality of Moldavia which forms an integral part of Old Rumania, are limitrophe in character. Strikingly dogmatic in character was the attitude of the Rumanians in the last two decades also in respect of the minority problems. The official standpoint *uni sono* insisted on stressing that Rumania was a national State, and that the problem of the national minorities did not cause the State any particular worry — certainly not being acute enough to deprive the Rumanian State of its national character or to involve any difficulties encumbering its national existence. *Competent Hungarian quarters*, on the other hand, *at all times laid particular emphasis on the insoluble character of the problem of the minorities of Rumania and unceasingly stressed that the insolubility of the minority question was bound sooner or later to lead to grave complications within the framework of the Rumanian State. As "Vlad Bucur" admits without any attempt to mince matters, these prophecies have been fulfilled to the letter.*

"The Rumanians of the new provinces", — says our author — "particularly those of Transylvania, who were born as citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and studied in the free light of Western universities, — the former soldiers, who were treated with ruthless cruelty and

kept in a state of slavery and who even at the cost of incalculable sacrifices rejected every attempt at assimilation —, were conscious of their superiority to their racial kinsmen of Old Rumania, who although educated in the same national spirit, enjoyed better conditions of life in respect of liberty within the frontiers within which they found themselves to their surprise on the achievement of our independence in 1877. And when, after so many struggles and so much oppression, the war brought about the realization of their aspirations and their provinces were incorporated in the mother country, the Rumanians beyond the Carpathians expected to receive the just reward of their exertions, particularly in view of the fact that considerable efforts were needed to ensure the consolidation of the shaky structure of young Greater Rumania. This initial error led necessarily to a second mistake, — the neglect of the limitrophe territories and their exclusion from the national efforts, — a mistake aggravated by the geographical situation of Bucharest, not to speak of the system of forcible centralization, which swept the citizens rapidly in swarms towards the Capital. In the new provinces an appointment as public official was regarded as a mark of disgrace. In very many Transylvanian towns the officials employed were almost exclusively men of Magyar origin; the Hungarian language enjoyed an almost absolute monopoly, and that brought into being a state of affairs which undermined the national unity without hope of redress."

What a strange medley of truth and error! While being *on the one hand a frank admission of the unsurmountable antagonism between the Rumanians of Transylvania and those of the "Regat" and a sincere revelation of the situation brought about by the absurd geopolitical structure of the country and the system of forcible centralization, it is on the other hand a flagrant attempt to put forward statements the baseless character of which is evident to every one who has the very slightest acquaintance with the problems of Transylvania.* Here and there the colour given to the statements leads to logical contradictions, the validity of the first thesis being annulled by that which follows. "Vlad Bucur" admits, for instance, that the Rumanians of Transylvania

were given the opportunity to acquire Western culture within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. But how could they possibly acquire that Western culture, we would ask, if they were kept in slavery or — as “Vlad Bucur” asserts — “treated with ruthless cruelty?” How could these Rumanians have possibly been conscious of their superiority, had they suffered the lot of thralls within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy? We know, on the contrary, that when, in 1918, Transylvania and Eastern Hungary were handed over to Rumania, the Rumanians living in those territories were on a far higher level, both economically and culturally, than their racial brethren in Old Rumania. Had we the time and the space at our disposal, we could adduce a host of Rumanian statements in confirmation of what we have just said. “Vlad Bucur” is aware of the catastrophe resulting from the geopolitical situation and from the forcible centralization engineered by Bucharest; at the same time, however, he ventures to voice the untenable view that in the Transylvanian towns a breach was made in the national unity by the special indulgence shown towards Magyar officials and the Hungarian language. Any feuds that may have arisen as a consequence of official appointments between the Rumanians of Transylvania and those of the “Regat”, were undoubtedly due solely and exclusively to the fact that the Bucharest Government (a fact admitted by many competent Rumanian writers) treated Transylvania as a colony and stocked the public administration with officials imported from the “Regat”, entirely ignoring the claims of the Rumanian elements of Transylvania who were the men for the job. The appointment on a large scale of Magyar officials was out of the question, if only because after 1919 some 200.000 Magyars employed as public servants had to leave their native land and flee to Dismembered Hungary. Nor is it true that to be transferred to the recently incorporated provinces was regarded as a mark of disgrace for the officials from Rumania, — if only because as a matter of fact only third-rate officials functioning in Old Rumania received appointments — and that to high posts far exceeding their most sanguine hopes — in the new provinces.

"The most serious problem testing the sagacity of the leaders in the annexed territories" — says our author — "was that of the minorities mostly of a homogeneous character living in considerable groups. The Rumania of pre-Versailles days was a small country almost exclusively inhabited by Rumanians which was as a consequence strikingly homogeneous in character; from the heart of Moldavia to Oltenia and the Dobrudja there were no minorities in evidence anywhere, — at least not in groups sufficiently strong to make them a serious problem. Our statesmen had therefore no chance of making experiments for is solution of the problem which subsequently made so intensive a claim on the attention of their successors. In our past there was nothing calculated to prepare us for our post-War awakening or for the presence within our frontiers of several millions of new citizens speaking other tongues, following other religions and clinging to other customs and above all cherishing other national feelings. The moment the intoxication of the great victory achieved by us in the past and the moment of excessively easy vows was over, the most suitable means had to be found to dovetail in the structure of our native country and take to our hearts the foreign elements who so completely diverged from us in everything. And that was a task beyond our capacity. Although the League of Nations and the Great Powers proclaimed the advent of friendship, peace and tranquillity, no one offered a satisfactory solution, — particularly seeing that no attempt was made, either by us or by the Hungarians, to sincerely find means to adjust the fateful problem of the minorities by peaceful agreement. We use the term "minorities" deliberately, seeing that the territory is merely a function thereof."

A frank and undisguised admission of the utter and complete failure of Rumania's minority policy! Only it is not true that Hungary never endeavoured sincerely to find a solution. But every attempt of the kind made by Hungary was wrecked on the intransigence of the Rumanian national State dogma and the irreconcilability of Rumanian politicians.

RECIPROCAL INDICTMENT OF SERBIAN COMMUNIST AND NATIONALIST INSURGENTS

BY

IMRE PROKOPY

During the course of the mopping-up operations begun on May 15th. the Chetnik and partisan bands which have for the past two years been committing deprivations in Croatia — particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the province of Lika and Montenegro — suffered such serious losses that, *according to the various official reports, the definitive liquidation and complete annihilation of the scattered remnants still left seems likely to be very shortly accomplished.*

In the struggle to overcome the ruthlessly cruel and destructive insurgents the detachments — German, Italian and Croatian, and indeed in some places Bulgarian — have very frequently found themselves faced with an extremely arduous task in the impassable mountainous districts. The Bulgarians distinguished themselves particularly in the work of occupying the *Durmitor*, the highest peak in Montenegro. In recognition of their effectual co-operation in this exploit, the Bulgarian flag has also been hoisted on the peak thus occupied side by side with the German and Italian national colours, — a circumstance described by the "Bulgarische Rundschau", in its June 29th. issue, as *the symbol of the final and definitive conciliation of the Balkans.*

The mopping-up operations carried out with such persistence and so systematically have to some extent been facilitated in all parts of the threatened territory by the feud — constantly growing in bitterness — between the Serbian nationalist Chetnik formations serving under the command of Drazha Mihaylovitch and the Communist partisans fighting under the leadership of "Comrade" Tito, as also by the circumstance that the ranks of both groups of insurgents

have been decimated by privations and by epidemics due to the weather conditions.

Disunion has arisen among the Chetniks fighting for Pan-Serbianism also as a result of the fact that *after June 20th. their leader, General Drazha Mihaylovitch, abandoned them and retired to London* for the purpose of taking over the portfolio of Minister of War in the new "Yugoslav" Government that had meanwhile been formed. This procedure on his part has resulted in the still remaining remnants of his army, once numerically so strong, surrendering to the Axis troops. *This was the course taken by the whole group of Chetnik insurgents serving under Captain Michael Koprivnik, who, when he was taken prisoner, made the following statement: — "Mihaylovich has betrayed us and has fled, after having plunged the Serbian people into catastrophe. We are laying down our arms, because we are not prepared to continue this senseless struggle for foreign interests"* ("Donauzeitung", June 26th., 1943). We would note by the way that Mihaylovich's flight must have been due to other motives than mere cowardice, — the real motive being probably that the Allies badly need the local experience of the Serbian insurgent leader.

As to the treatment meted out to the territories occupied by them for longer or shorter periods by the insurgents divested of all human inhibitions, may be seen authentically disclosed in the reciprocal indictments hurled at one another's heads during the feud which developed into a veritable "fratricidal war" by the Chetniks and partisans respectively.

In December, 1942, Mihaylovich's followers issued a pamphlet referring to the action of the partisans which contains the following data and allegations: —

1. The bulk of the Yugoslav Communists are recruited from elements without homes, occupations or families, — "shirkers", university and other students who have been ploughed and whose knowledge has been acquired in cafés rather than in schools, depraved women and girls who have lost all sense of morality or decency. *The ranks of the Communists include also a few thousand convicts originally sentenced for serious crimes or murders.*

2. The commander-in-chief of all the Communist forces

is "Comrade" Tito, *one of whose chief adjutants is a former convict of the name of Vlada Segart.*

3. During the short term of their rule in Montenegro and Herzegovina *the Communists burned down 8029 houses and murdered 20,380 persons.*

4. In Montenegro, in East Bosnia and in Herzegovina the Communists *set fire to 381 elementary schools, 115 gendarme barracks, 3 infant schools, 18 churches and 2 monasteries and murdered 182 priests.* They destroyed 30 bridges and caused other serious damage.

Early in July, in a speech made at Ragusa, M. Vjekoslav Vrančić, Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia, referring to these horrible devastations and the terrible havoc wrought, made the following statement: — "Wherever partisans had set foot, I found nothing but villages that had been plundered and reduced to ashes, bridges that had been blown up, and homeless inhabitants." (Croatian papers and "Délvidéki Magyarország", July 9th., 1943).

5. The Communists have ravished more than 400 girls and women, many of their victims having committed suicide rather than survive the shameful humiliation inflicted on them.

6. On one occasion, when well-meaning inhabitants visited the headquarters of the Communists with the complaint that the whole people was doomed to destruction if the partisans continued to act as they had done, "Comrade" Tito smiled sneeringly and replied: — "That is of no importance and is of no concern to us. *If the population of this place (Catholics and Mohammedan Croatians) perished, there are Chinese enough and to spare for us to import and settle here.*"

The above is an abstract in a literal translation of the main counts of the Chetniks' "Bill of Indictment".

Of the crimes committed by the Communist partisans an account was given also by a Croatian war-correspondent in the March 18th. issue of the "Hrvatski Narod". When the partisans had occupied the village of *Maja* and had reduced it to ashes, at the same time demolishing the Catholic church, the drunken "heroes" took their stand in an intoxication of triumph on the ruins of the statue of the Virgin Mary and sang the following song: — "*We are fighting against God,*

against churches and altars, against priests and nuns". — *Verb. sap.!!*

Other documentary evidence was published in the June 1st. issue of the "Hrvatski Narod" revealing the ruthless and unbridled atrocities committed by the Communist partisans. In the paper issued by them ("*Borba*") the latter branded as spies and members of the "Fifth Column" all persons connected in any way with the organs of the Croatian State or the Croatian Army. Such persons — they said — must be brought before the tribunal of the people (sc. partisan bands), which would soon settle accounts with them. And Order of the Day No. 3 of the command of the "Zeta — i. e. Montenegro — partisan formation" instructs all the bataillons under its command that members of the "Fifth Column" (i. e. members of the Ustasha movement and all persons sympathizing with that movement!) need not be handed over to the law, but must be executed on the spot. These instructions were naturally carried out most zealously by the partisans, who *waged a veritable war of extermination against the Catholics and Mohammedans of Croatia*. The measure of the work of assassination may be gathered also from the official Croatian report which tells us that *down to the early days of June the nuns had to find homes for 7000 orphans from Bosnia, Herzegovina and Lika-Krbava; while the Mohammedan head imam has provided for the future subsistence of 300 orphaned children of the kind whose parents were murdered by the blodthirsty partisans.*

The charges and allegations contained in the pamphlet compiled by the Chetniks to which reference is made above were replied to by the Communist partisans in No. 20 of the "*Borba*", their official organ. The article in question brands the persons present at a conference held at Gacak, — a conference at which Mihaylovich himself is said to have presided —, simply as "criminals" and as the authors of the massacre of Mohammedans in Herzegovina, asserting *inter alia* that *Drazha Mihaylovich's Chetniks had murdered 10,000 women, old men and children, and that in the territories subjected to the rule of the Chetniks nearly 70,000 civilians had disappeared.*

In its broadcasts the secret radio station of the partisans

known as "*Slobodna Jugoslavija*" (Free Yugoslavia) repeatedly protested against the charge brought by the Chetniks which accused the partisans of murdering Croats *en masse*. On the contrary — so we are told by the partisans' radio — it was the Chetnik bands of General Mihaylovitch that had razed large numbers of Croatian villages to the ground and had murdered hundreds of Croats — women, children and old men.

"So" — to quote the closing passage of the article in the May 29th. issue of the "Hrvatski Narod" entitled "Between Moscow and London" from which we have cited, for the information of our readers, the above characteristic data throwing a daring light on the "deeds of heroism" of the insurgents — 'these are the henchmen of Moscow and London, of whom the Croatian people can have only *one opinion*'.

As for the opinion of the vast majority of the Serbs of Serbia and of the Belgrade Government circles respecting the activity of the two groups of insurgents so menacing to the future and the very existence of the whole Serbian people, we have already on several occasions informed our readers in these columns. On the present occasion we shall confine ourselves to adding to what has already been said on the subject a few statements made recently by competent quarters.

At a conference of the district sheriffs of Serbia held early in July at *Leskovac* Colonel Gruitch made a long speech dealing with the aspirations of Serbia. The cardinal aim of Serbian policy — he declared — was to provide for the Serbian people to survive in its own country... "The colossus is dying which threatened to completely destroy our national, social and moral values. In this struggle the Serbs too must take part, if they would enjoy the fruit of the future" ("*Délvidéki Magyarság*", July 11th., 1943).

On the second anniversary of the declaration of war against Communism General *Neditch*, Prime Minister of Serbia, addressed to the Serbian people a proclamation, from which we quote the following more important passages: — "A war is raging in Europe and Communism is at our very door, ready to wipe out European culture. *Communism knows no God and desires to plunge everything into ruin.*

But Europe has sensed the mortal danger; her peoples have risen in arms against the danger: and our Continent is now engaged in a life-and-death struggle. This is a Holy War. I call upon you, my brothers, to join in the fight against the Red Terror . . . You have in your ranks, however, some who refuse to understand me. You must exterminate them or hand them over to the authorities. I once more appeal to you all to follow me; for that is the only way to save the people, to safeguard order and ensure the future of the "Serbian people" ("Délvidéki Magyarság", July 2nd., 1943). — This was indeed resolute plain speaking, — just like all Premier Neditch's former declarations!!

Special interest attaches also to the speech made by M. *Nedelkovitch*, Serbian Minister for Economy, in a town in Old Serbia in which he dealt with the ambitions of the two groups of insurgents and most severely condemned the anti-national conduct of the insurgents who had become the mercenaries of foreign Powers. "The Serbian people" — he said — "at the very outset of the war realized that they were being plunged into a terrible catastrophe. After the capitulation they had two roads open to them, — either to follow Premier Neditch or to enter the service of foreign interests . . . *Do not allow yourselves to be cajoled; for Drazha Mihaylovitch cannot be a genuine patriot, seeing that, after first making common cause with the Communists, he then fled the country, leaving the Serbian people in the lurch. We shall destroy everyone — no matter who he may be, whether Communist or a follower of Mihaylovitch — who turns against the Serbian people. You must therefore decide which is the right road. Surely not that which must lead to the complete extermination of the Serbian people. Not that, but the other. You must therefore remove from among you all the tempters; for that is the duty imposed upon you by your own interests and by the interests of your children and of the nation at large. Death to the evil ones who have plunged the Serbian people and the country into the valley of destruction*".

In another speech M. *Nedelkovitch* severely condemned Yugoslavia. "At the time" — he said — "when Yugoslavia was created, the peoples living in its territory were all measured with *one and the same bushel*. Now, however, I

would ask you, — do you really believe that the Croatians are our brothers? In Yugoslavia we had to renounce the Serbian national colours and the cult of St. Save; the names of towns had to be written in the Latin way, so that the Serbian peasants were unable to read the inscriptions on the coins. That was Yugoslavia. Awake, then, my brethren, and *try to realize what fate would be in store for you, if you were to assist in securing the triumph of this idea.*“

Only a few years ago who would ever have imagined or believed that a Serbian statesman would be found prepared to make such statements respecting the Yugoslav idea or the Yugoslavia which was the embodiment of that idea?

OSZK
Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

EXPOSÉS OF HUNGARIAN PREMIER, MINISTER OF FINANCE AND MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE

Dr. Nicholas de Kállay, Hungarian Premier, and Dr. Louis Reményi-Schneller, Minister of Finance, discussed economic and financial questions at Szeged on June 27th., while Baron Daniel Bánffy, Minister for Agriculture, on July 5th., at Marosvásárhely, addressed his audience on Transylvanian matters; each of the speakers availed himself of the opportunity to make statements respecting their respective programmes. Below will be found a short account of the speeches giving the more important details.

"In connection with the adjustment of landed property" — said the Prime Minister — "I have to announce that this year we have utilized for land reform purpose expropriated estates of a total area of 680,000 cadastral yokes. The lots less than 5 cadastral yokes in area (aggregating a total area of some 20,000 yokes) have been *allotted to the National Family Welfare Foundation for the purpose of distribution — on the most favourable terms possible — among agriculturists with many children who have served at the front or of the settlement in suitable places of Magyar families with many children.*

"Lots of 5—100 yokes in area are being given to the Order of Military Knights. *The area allotted in this way aggregates 130,000 yokes; in respect of the distribution of these lots I have given instructions that 80% of the arable land shall be allotted to Members of the Order who belong to the rank and file, 20% being reserved for officers, the respective proportions of the vineyards and orchards available for distribution to be 50—50%. Measures have also been taken to provide that 30% of the area available shall be distributed among Members of the Order decorated for distinguished service in the first Great War, 70% being reserved for distribution among Members decorated for distinguished*

service in the present war. In taking these measures I left out of account no consideration or circumstance, — not only because I do not wish to differentiate between Knight and Knight, between officer and private, but also because there are units of agrarian property which (this being true in particular of small, medium-sized and large vineyards) are to my mind more useful to production generally in the hands of officers, above all in those parts of the country in which smaller agriculturists are not engaged at all in viticulture. *The rest of the agricultural area expropriated has been taken over by the National Land Mortgage Institute, the forest-land being placed in the hands of the Forestry Commission. The State has entrusted the National Land Mortgage Institute with the administration of the land in question and with the exercise of the State's right of ownership, until such time as the estate can be allotted to persons engaged in agriculture. The total area of land administered under its own management by the said Institute is 90,000 cadastral yokes, 133,000 yokes having been allotted in the form of leaseholds."*

According to the Minister of Finance there is No Inflation, and there has been No Increase in the Note Circulation.

The Prime Minister was followed by Louis Reményi-Schneller, Minister of Finance, who *inter alia* made the following statements: —

"I would explain the economic and financial policy — or rather a few important moments in that policy — which I have been pursuing for more than five years and which I propose to continue to pursue without change, though it has nevertheless reached a new stage, — a turning-point. The cardinal principle of this economic policy remains what it has always been, — National Defence first. By that I do not mean that our economic and financial policy has for its sole object to enable us to ensure *the creation of a well-trained, disciplined army with up-to-date equipment, as well as the vigorous development of that army in the future*, but that its object is also to provide that the economic life of the home front shall be organized and disciplined in a manner corresponding completely to the measure of organization and discipline universally demanded of a modern army. The home front has its own soldiers.

"Today the most important question is to ensure the lucrateness of production and to provide that *everyone shall be able to live modestly* — as well as war conditions allow — by his own honest labour. This is the problem to be solved by those responsible for the conduct of public affairs.

"I need not enter into a detailed explanation of the reaction of prices on themselves and on wages, or of the reaction of wages on prices and the cost of production... The important point is that so far all these factors have kept the price-level moving; and this is the process of development which it is now our business to bring to a standstill. That process must stop somewhere; and a stabilized price-level must be developed. The agrarian prices, the industrial prices, wages, emoluments and pensions, and the taxes which influence the price-level, must be determined simultaneously and harmoniously; and that is what is happening now, in the new economic year.

"The industrial prices will be determined in a manner ensuring production a reasonable profit. But — and that point I must emphasise — only a reasonable profit. Today industry is in a position to improve its own position by a better organization of production and by the discovery of simpler and cheaper methods, — in a word, by rationalization; for the profit accruing therefrom will serve the interests of industry. And that is perfectly legitimate and justly deserved; for thereby industry too will be making an additional contribution to the national cause.

"I have had to investigate the question of the position of workers, public employees and pensioners, and indeed of employees earning fixed emoluments generally. Their emoluments had to be adjusted to the recent development of the price-level, — particularly in the case of those in the lower categories, who are most in need of an advance in their earnings to meet the advance in price.

"The object of our economic policy is *to bring the price-level at all costs to a standstill* by stabilizing prices, wages and emoluments. Perhaps some may feel that they have not benefited. They must put up with the disadvantages that

may ensue as a sacrifice made in the cause of their country. There will not be any re-adjustments or "corrections"; for, once we begin to re-adjust here and there, we shall undermine the foundations of the building erected with so much trouble.

"There is no inflation; only an increase of prices resulting from a shortage of supplies. Nor has there been any increase in the note circulation. When we compare the figures of the 1938 note circulation with those showing the present circulation of banknotes, we shall see that as compared with the other countries our position is not an unfavourable, but on the contrary a very favourable one, and that during the past six months there has been practically no advance at all in the note circulation. Undoubtedly our financial situation shows symptoms of the war tension. But after the war it will be an easy matter to neutralize this tension."

The Minister for Agriculture Discusses Transylvanian Matters

In a speech made at Marosvásárhely Baron Daniel Bánffy, Minister for Agriculture, referred to the fact that for a thousand years — with slight interruptions — Transylvania had been at war and had been compelled sword in hand, to defend its frontiers and its culture against the menaces of barbarian hordes. Transylvania had at all times been the watch-tower of the Hungarian nation. *"We have always fought shoulder to shoulder with the Hungarians of Hungary proper; the character of the struggle showed a different development in Transylvania, but the object was always the same. The Transylvanian idea means — a strong Magyardom, national feeling, self-conscious perseverance and at the same time a humanitarian attitude, — an understanding for those of other faiths and tongues."*

The Minister then spoke of the economic recovery which had followed the liberation of the province. "It is to be hoped" — he said — "that *the time is not far distant when we shall be able to make good the omissions committed by foreign rule in the re-incorporated parts of Transylvania.*" He then explained the measures taken by Government to further the recovery of Transylvanian agriculture. A far-reaching action had been initiated for the improvement of the pastures. *Very shortly some 70,000 cadastral yokes of*

agrarian land would be available for the use of Transylvanian Magyar agriculturists.

The Minister announced that the new system of agricultural requisitioning would be put into force in every respect immediately after the harvesting of the crops. *This system was calculated to place the public supply of the country on firm foundations, to ensure special indulgence for those who socially stood in need of such preferential treatment and to provide special advantages for those who by hard work and judicious husbandry furthered the increase of production.* Every sacrifice must be made at home too in the sacred cause.

“Transylvania is no longer defenceless and will never again be so” — said the Minister in conclusion —, “for the whole nation is taking good care to provide that the Széklers shall be in a position to stand sentinel as an impregnable bulwark on the frontiers of Transylvania. Our return unfortunately involved at the same time separation from the Magyars left on the far side of the frontier. We shall never forget them; we are with them in the spirit, and they have behind them under all circumstances and at all times the power and support of independent Magyardom. The whole Hungarian nation has unanimously adopted the slogan “For Transylvania!”; and we Transylvanians reply by the slogan „With Transylvania for the Hungary of St. Stephen!”

POLITICAL MOSAIC

RUMANIAN CULTURAL LIFE IN NORTH TRANSYLVANIA

We are informed of the cultural manifestations of the Rumanians of North Transylvania by a publication issued by the Minority Institute of the Pécs University, which gives an account of the manifestations in evidence among those Rumanians in the period between the Second Vienna Award and May 31st., 1943. The book has been compiled by Joseph *Pusztai-Popovics* and is entitled "*Rumanian Cultural Festivals in North Transylvania*". The book refers to all the Church and secular concerts, Rumanian lectures, debates, meetings of social and cultural unions, entertainments, exhibitions of the works of painters and sculptors, school exhibitions etc. arranged during the said period of well-nigh three years by the Rumanians re-incorporated in the mother-country, — *altogether 158 cultural manifestations*. This is a really great achievement when we take into account the fact that after the announcement of the Second Vienna Award the men who had previously been the intellectual leaders of the Rumanians of Transylvania retired from North Transylvania of their own free will, the Rumanian minority re-incorporated in Hungary being in consequence deprived of the guidance of their intellectual *élite*. A certain time had therefore to elapse before the Rumanians remaining in Hungary could find one another and begin a new cultural organization. *This work of organization was undertaken in North Transylvania primarily by the two Rumanian Churches — the Greek Oriental (Orthodox) and the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Churches.*

The Magyars too co-operated intensively in the cultural activity of the Rumanians; Magyar children, for instance, very frequently played in Rumanian theatrical pieces. Magyar village school-teachers arranged Rumanian cultural festivals; and Magyar conductors led the singing of Rumanian choirs. At the festivals arranged in schools using Rumanian as the medium of instruction which are maintained by the Hungarian Minister of Education, poems by the greatest Rumanian poets, *Michael Eminescu, Peter Carp* and others, were recited. *The Magyars have never shown themselves averse to the cultures of other nations; they have always highly esteemed — and still esteem highly — the values of the Rumanian culture of North Transylvania.* According to the information supplied by *Pusztai-Popovics* the 158 Rumanian cultural manifestations were distributed as follows: — 29 concerts, 39 lectures and addresses in Ru-

manian, 34 amateur theatrical performances, 52 matinées and soirées, and 4 art exhibitions. The scenes of the most recent Rumanian cultural manifestations were *Kolozsvár*, *Nagyvárad*, *Szamosújvár* and *Beszterce*. These lectures, arranged with the co-operation of the spirit of understanding of the Magyars, have contributed to encourage on an extensive scale Rumanian intellectual production and to further a reciprocal appreciation of that production.

PORTUGUESE ARTICLE ON HUNGARIAN REGENT AND CONSORT AND ON EMINENT QUALITIES OF HUNGARIANS

The Portuguese daily, "Solidared", has published a long article dealing with the great services rendered by the Regent of Hungary. We quote the following passages from the article in question: —

"The people of Hungary has just celebrated with cordial enthusiasm the seventy-fifth birthday of Admiral *Horthy*, their Regent, embracing the occasion to give expression to their profound gratitude for *His work in re-organizing the country ruined by the devastations of Béla Kun's Bolshevik hordes*. Nicholas Horthy's Consort has acted as her husband's constant and faithful collaborator in this arduous work. She is a devout Catholic and plays a prominent role in Catholic Hungary as the helpmate of the Regent, the scion of an old Calvinistic family. Nicholas Horthy never for a moment loses sight of the duties devolving upon Him as the Head of a Catholic State, taking part in all church ceremonies at which it is the duty of the Head of State to be present. And Nicholas Horthy's Consort has important tasks to perform socially too. *Twenty years ago she organized the relief action for the betterment of the living conditions of the working classes, centralizing in the Royal Palace the activity of all the women's unions and charitable institutions which during recent years have done important work in the social field*, distributing grants for the benefit of children's refuges, hospitals, homes for the aged and homes for poor widows. The Regent's Consort *devotes her energies in particular to the care of wounded and disabled soldiers*. One of the most interesting of the institutions under her patronage is the schoolchildren's *Red Cross Society*, within the framework of which the pupils of all the schools in Hungary are making dolls and other toys for poor children. *Nicholas Horthy's Consort is a genuine mother and Christian wife who has shown the country what a real Hungarian woman must be, — though without allowing herself to become involved in politics*. She has thereby earned the respect and homage of the whole nation."

The Portuguese papers have recently devoted considerable space also to events in Hungary and to the Hungarian question. They watched with keen interest the doings of *Joao Ameal*, the

Portuguese Deputy and writer, in Hungary, and published exhaustive reports of his visit. In their July 8th. issues the papers gave front-page prominence to reports of Ameal's visits to several large provincial towns, describing how, after his return from Szeged, he was received by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Internal Affairs, reporting also that a dinner was given in his honour by Stephen Antal, Propaganda Minister. Under the title "Political Idealism" the "*Pester Lloyd*" published a statement made by Ameal respecting the political philosophy of Salazar; while in their July 18th. issues the papers published exhaustive abstracts of the statement made by him to a correspondent of "*Magyarország*".

In its July 20th. issue the "*Diario da Manhã*" gave front-page prominence to the first of Ameal's articles dealing with his visit to Budapest. In the introductory part of this article the writer stresses the importance of the visit which took him from the shores of the Atlantic to the vicinity of the Carpathians, where he enjoyed the hospitality of the Hungarian Government and received much valuable and interesting information respecting questions with which he proposed to deal in the columns of the Portuguese papers. "Above all" — he wrote — "I must express my gratitude to the Hungarian Government for the invitation to visit their beautiful country. The Hungarian Government accorded a Portuguese writer a reception, showing him a courtesy and a warmth of affability which is eloquent testimony to the qualities and high standard of culture of the Hungarian people. *Many among us are familiar with the value and power of the Hungary of today, the worthy representative and continuator of the glorious Hungary of St. Stephen, St. Ladislaus, Louis the Great and Matthias Corvinus. We Portuguese should be conscious of the connections binding us despite the distance separating us to this nation, which — for all the world like our own Portuguese nation — came into being under the shadow of the Crusades and the defence of the West, consecrated by sacrifice on the field of battle and by historical events. I shall avail myself of all the means at my disposal to further a knowledge of these facts, being as I am sincerely convinced that thereby I am serving the cause of justice. I shall be inspired by the sympathy due to the home of Rákóczi, Kossuth and Petöfi. After my return that sympathy developed into friendship; of this I shall in the future offer indisputable evidence.*"

THE BUDAPEST RED CROSS

The head office of the Budapest Red Cross undertakes to make inquiries about prisoners of war, obtain money, and send it to foreign countries. It also undertakes to find and examine the documents required by Magyars living abroad. So long as

diplomatic intercourse existed between Soviet Russia and Hungary *the Magyar Red Cross day after day received news from that country about men who had disappeared in the last war.* And day by day people came, mothers who were inquiring about their sons and wives who wished to go to Russia after their husbands.

One of the most interesting cases on record was that of Franciska. She was a little Magyar orphan girl from Czecho-Slovakia, who had lost both father and mother. After the 1918 revolution she had been sent to an orphanage in Budapest by her grandparents. Meanwhile all the girl's papers had gone astray and her native village had become occupied territory. She lost all touch with her grandparents and by degrees forgot everything about her infancy. She had no difficulties, however, until she grew up and married a public official with whom she lived a happy married life until, in terms of the new laws, she had to produce proofs of her Aryan origin. This she could not do, for the only paper in her possession was a certificate from the orphanage stating that she was a legitimate child. This was not enough, for her husband's post depended on the document required. She was desperate, for she could not even remember the name of the place where she was born. As a last straw she appealed to the Red Cross, and strange to say, just at that time the Red Cross received a letter from former Czecho-Slovakia saying that, now that that part of Upper Hungary had been restored an old couple was looking for their granddaughter Franciska, who 24 years before had been sent to the Children's Protection League in Budapest. The grandparents and Franciska were touchingly grateful to the Red Cross through whose instrumentality they had found each other again.

Another function of this office is to help people to go abroad. *Parents who have emigrated to England often ask the Red Cross for help in getting permission for their children to follow them.* Until the war broke out there was no difficulty about this: 10 or 15 children were sent to their destinations with a suitable person accompanying them. Today, despite the fact that the Red Cross here is in touch with the London Red Cross, this is impossible. Day by day beseeching letters keep on arriving in which parents beg to have their children sent out to them. The story of Veronica, a little protégée of the Red Cross, is touching. *One day a letter arrived from the local branch of the Red Cross in Gary, Indiana,* asking the Budapest branch to make inquiries in a village of the Great Plain for a girl called *Veronica Toth* whose sister, dying of an incurable disease, wished to see her. There were no other data about Veronica, and yet in a week's time she had been found in a tiny village of the Great Plain. She was only fifteen years old, and it was very difficult to procure a visa for her. But the Red Cross used all the influence of which it had command *and finally induced the American Consulate to*

allow her to set out on her long journey. (This of course happened before Hungary was at war with the United States.) As the child was so inexperienced, the Red Cross did not like to let her travel alone, and as they could not send anyone to accompany her, they applied to the Red Cross in the countries through which she travelled. It thus happened that little Veronica was given a warm welcome, not only in Budapest, but also in Hamburg, Cleveland and at all the stations on her long journey to Indiana. *She arrived just in time to take leave of her sister and promise to be a mother to her children.*

The pendant of this case happened with *Boriska Varga*, who was born in Detroit, and who after her father's death wished to go to her grandparents living near Budapest, because she felt very lonely in the New World. The American Red Cross sent her to Hungary and asked the organization here to look after her when she arrived and help her to get accustomed to life in her father's native country. Boriska arrived, and her first visit was to the Red Cross to ask advice about how to fit into her new surroundings. The head of the foreign section of the Red Cross gave her motherly advice and sent her to a commercial school, whence, thanks to her knowledge of the English language she got a post with a big firm. *In a short time she left so much at home in Hungary that she never gave America another thought.*

It is well known that The Red Cross sends the dried blood that has saved so many lives to the soldiers behind the front. The blood-donating centre was established there years ago, *during which time fifty thousand persons offered their blood to be used for wounded soldiers.* Of that number twenty thousand, mostly women, because, they are usually at home and available at a moment's notice, are on the list of regular blood-donors. At home in the hospitals direct transfusion takes place, but at the front dried blood is used with excellent results, as reports from the field hospitals show. The following lines were written by a doctor in one of them:— *"For months I have been doing surgical work in a hospital on the Russian front, and I see and know to the fullest extent what blood transfusion with the dried blood collected at home means. It means life."*

Last but not least mention should be made of the Civilian Inquiry and Welfare Section of the Red Cross, which would deserve to be treated in a separate article. Every minute somebody comes asking help or advice, looking for a job, inquiring about relatives at the front, bringing gifts for them or for other soldiers. *Then there are those who wish to have news of relatives in far-off lands, in Japan, China, Egypt, the United States, Brazil, etc.* it is possible to correspond with over thirty countries by way of the Red Cross, of course only on a printed form containing not more than twentyfive words.

POLITICAL ECONOMY

BULGARIA

BULGARIA'S GOLD — TOBACCO

The importance of Bulgaria as a factor in the tobacco supply of Europe in the period prior to the present Great War was due, not so much to the quantity as to the quality of Bulgarian tobacco. Bulgaria ranked sixth or seventh among the tobacco-growing countries of Europe. The area planted with tobacco in Old Bulgaria represented only 1% of the total area under agrarian cultivation. The yield of tobacco ranged from 170.000 to 420.000 metric quintals. After the end of the Balkan campaign Bulgaria immediately advanced to the position of the biggest tobacco-grower in Europe. In 1938 the area of the land planted with tobacco was 36.000 hectares; in 1941, after the annexation of Thrace and Macedonia, the area under cultivation with tobacco within the territories under Bulgarian suzerainty advanced to 81.000 hectares. In the latter year 633.000 metric quintals of tobacco were gathered in in Bulgaria — as against 335.000 metric quintals in 1938. A moment illustrating the importance of Bulgaria's yield of tobacco as compared with her financial resources better than these figures, is that supplied by a comparison between the figures of Bulgaria's tobacco exports and the aggregate figures of that country's exports. The aggregate value of Bulgaria's exports in 1938 was 5578 million leva; the quota of this amount claimed by tobacco exports was 2364 million leva, — 42% of the total value of the exports. *In 1941 the aggregate value of Bulgaria's exports was 9233 million leva; the quota of this amount claimed by tobacco exports being 3477 million* The bulk of Bulgaria's tobacco exports find their way to Germany; in 1937 51%, in the following years 58%, 64%, 65.4% respectively and finally, in 1941, 72.4% of Bulgaria's tobacco exports were delivered to that country.

CROATIA

CROATIAN FRUIT

For the furtherance of the production and exportation of fruit, a Fruit Bureau has been established in Croatia which is charged with the central direction, control and development of fruit-growing. *Last year Croatia exported to foreign countries 275.000 metric quintals of fruit. In connection with the re-*

organization of fruit-growing and fruit-marketing the factories have established several plants for preserving and drying fruit; while the Croatian State Railways are using specially installed fruit-trains for the carriage of fruit.

HUNGARY

HUNGARY'S FOREIGN TRADE WITH HER SOUTHERN AND EASTERN NEIGHBOURS

Hungary's foreign trade shows a noteworthy development during recent years on both the imports and the exports side. *During the last ten years our exports almost quadrupled, their value having risen from 334.5 million pengő in 1932 to 1143 million pengő in 1942.* During the same period our imports practically trebled, — from 329 to 923 million pengő. The increase was a continuous one, appearing uninterruptedly from year to year. The distribution of our export trade by countries has undergone several material changes. Prior to the year of the Anschluss (1938) *our exports to Germany, for instance, represented 27% of our aggregate exports, while Austria took 18.3% of our exports, — that meaning that the two combined claimed altogether 45.7% of the total volume; whereas last year already 55% of our total volume of exports found their way to Germany proper (the German Empire), 4.4% being in addition delivered to the Czecho-Moravian Protectorate.* The figures of our imports tell a similar tale: last year Germany and the Protectorate figured with quotas of 52% and 3% respectively. The second most important of our customers is Italy. It is no mere accident that Italy was originally followed in order by the industrial States of the West, our southern and eastern neighbours figuring at the bottom of the list. But recently a certain development has been in evidence in our trade with the latter countries.

The quota of Hungary's exports delivered to former Yugoslavia was 2% in 1936 and 4.4% in 1940. Our imports from Yugoslavia in 1936 represented 4.4%, in 1939 4.8% and in 1940 5.5% of our total imports. We see, then, that the tendency was manifestly an upward one. The States which have succeeded Yugoslavia, on the other hand, — i. e. Serbia and Croatia —, in 1941 supplied only 0.3% of Hungary's imports; and last year there was only a slight advance in the ratio — to 0.7%. This is quite comprehensible in view of the transitional state of things prevailing in those countries and of the fact that no definitive plan of adjustment has been reached. The export figures show a similar state of things. So does our trade with Rumania. *In 1936 Rumania took 4.8% of our exports, her quota for the years immediately following being 4.3, 4.4, 2.8 and 2%*

respectively, while in the last two years it declined to 0.1%. The quotas of our imports from Rumania as from the year 1936 were as follows: — 13.4, 9.8, 9.8, 5.9, 3.9 and 0.6% respectively, last year (1942) showing a slight recovery — to 1.6%. The setback in our trade with Rumania is to be attributed only in a small measure to the return to the mother-country of North Transylvania; though we have since then purchased less timber from Rumania and have in consequence supplied her with a smaller volume of our manufactured goods: the very noteworthy decline is due mostly to other — non-economic — causes. Bulgaria figures in our foreign trade with quotas even smaller than those claimed by our immediate neighbours. On the imports side the relevant figures (again as from 1936) are as follows: — 0.7, 0.5, 0.8, 0.9, 1.5, 0.9 and 1.4% respectively. It is therefore only since the outbreak of the war that our imports from Bulgaria have shown an increase (and that of a quite insignificant character); and after 1940 the tendency again began to move downwards. The following figures show the development (likewise as from 1936) of our export trade to Bulgaria: — 0.4, 0.4, 1.0, 0.3, 1.1, 1.9 and 2.2% respectively. It would appear, therefore, that the tendency of our export trade to Bulgaria moved rather on the upward grade, though it has been exceptionally fluctuating, particularly since the outbreak of the war. It is worth our while to record the figures relating to the young State of Slovakia, which naturally refer only to the last three years. The year 1940 was the first year of Slovakia's existence as an independent State; at that time Slovakia claimed a quota of 3.3% of Hungary's total imports, — her quota being subsequently 3.1 and 3.2% respectively. Our principal import from Slovakia has been wood and timber. During the three years in question our exports to Slovakia represented 2.6, 2.2 and 3.0% of our total exports respectively. Our chief exports to our northern neighbour have been wine, fruit and industrial manufactures.

RUMANIA

RUMANIA'S COTTON PRODUCTION

During recent years there has been a considerable advance in the production of cotton in South-Eastern Europe. In Bulgaria, between 1935 and 1941, the extent of the area sown with cotton increased from 14.000 to 50.000 hectares. In Greece, during the same period, the area under cultivation increased from 25.000 to 79.000 hectares, in Yugoslavia from 1000 to 6000 hectares, and in Rumania from 1000 to 18.000 hectares. If we include also Spain and Greece, the total area of land in European countries sown with cotton increased during the said period from 223.000 to 573.000 hectares. The production of cotton

fibre is also on the increase. In the economic year 1941—42 Bulgaria produced 80,000, Greece 90,000, Italy 110,000, Yugoslavia 15,000 and Rumania 15,000 metric quintals of cotton.

The average yield in Bulgaria is 1 quintal per hectare, in Greece 2.2 quintals, in Yugoslavia 2.6 quintals, and in Rumania 1 quintal. As an interesting fact it should be noted that the average yield in Italy and Turkey is 1.6 and 1.5 metric quintals per hectare respectively. But everything needed is to hand for the purpose of enhancing the yield. By the help of State grants, the construction of irrigation works, the cultivation of new kinds of cotton plants and the rationalization of operations, it will probably prove possible in South-Eastern Europe too to increase the average yield per hectare and thereby the absolute volume of production.

SLOVAKIA

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SERICULTURE IN SLOVAKIA

Ever since the achievement of her independence Slovakia has been making efforts to further sericulture. However, in view of the fact that the cultivation of mulberry trees is a *sine qua non* of sericulture, no immediate results are to be expected. In 1941 the yield of silk cocoons was 2100 kilogrammes; in 1942 only 2300 kilogrammes. In March 700 mulberry saplings were distributed among the farmers. The authorities are endeavouring to encourage farmers to increase production also by raising the sale prices. The purchase price of cocoons has been increased from 35 to 45 crowns a kilogramme.

Bulgaria is the oldest breeder of silkworms in South-Eastern Europe. This year the production of aggrandized Bulgaria is expected to amount to 4,000,000 kilogrammes; in 1941 the yield was 2,360,000 and in 1936 only 1,370,000 kilogrammes. The Government has placed 50,000 ounces of eggs at the disposal of the producers. In the future the Co-operative and Agrarian Bank is to take over the cocoons produced at fixed prices, — paying 129 leva for yellow cocoons, 126 leva for white cocoons and 135 leva for variegated cocoons. Government is making provision to ensure that all the mulberry trees shall be employed for the purpose of sericulture. The leaves of the mulberry trees in public squares are also placed at the disposal of sericulturists.

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