

DANUBIAN REVIEW

(DANUBIAN NEWS)

VOL. IV., NO 11.
BUDAPEST
APRIL 1937

PUBLISHED BY THE HUNGARIAN FRONTIER
READJUSTMENT LEAGUE

SINGLE COPY 50 FILL.
SUBSCRIPTION:
ONE YEAR 6 PENGÓ

CONTENTS

- Reply To Echo Aroused in Rumania by my
Article *Count Stephen Bethlen*
- The Right of Self-Determination of the Peoples
of Europe and Centralism *Eugene Horváth*
- Chapters of Hungarian Literature I. Count
Nicholas Zrinyi *Arthur B. Yolland*
- Political Mosaic
- How Minorities Live
- Books
Romulus Seisanu: Rumania in the Course
of Ages *George Lukács*
- Political Economy
- Sport

REPLY TO ECHO AROUSED IN RUMANIA BY MY ARTICLE

by

Count Stephen Bethlen
Former Prime Minister

In the January number of the „Danubian Review” I called the attention of the public opinion of Great Britain to the fact that the relations between Hungary and Rumania could not continue to be wrapped in the obscurity now enveloping them.

The serious persecution to which the Hungarians of Transylvania are being subjected makes it necessary that we should either attempt to relieve the situation of our racial brethren there by an agreement with Rumania or initiate an uncompromisingly determined and energetic international action to save them. I suggested that we should first endeavour to negotiate with the Rumanian Government for the purpose of discovering whether it would not be possible to attain our object that way or rather to bring about better relations between Rumania and Hungary — an issue in other respects too vitally important to both nations?

I then explained that no attempt should be made to initiate the international action proposed by me until we had failed to attain our object by means of such negotiations or had at least during the course of those negotiations been impelled to realise that such procedure was bound to lead no where.

My article found an echo. For weeks the question was discussed in a whole series of Rumanian papers, which dealt exhaustively with the possibilities and conditions of a future re-adjustment of the relations between Hungary and Rumania.

When I look more closely into these statements — which include articles also by politicians of importance — I must admit that, though some of them are very unfriendly in spirit, others again are written in a tone that is not altogether or entirely that of repudiation. It is true, indeed, that most of these statements betray a certain air of superiority and that chauvinistic self-conceit which has so often characterised the victors in the Great War.

However, apart from this offensive tone so jarring to a foreign ear, the impression made upon me is that Rumanian public opinion believes in the possibility of the Hungarian-Rumanian ne-

gotiations suggested by me and would not be averse to the establishment in advance — if possible — of a favourable atmosphere. This „if possible” is however found recurring again and again in these statements, bringing into being a very strange *circulus vitiosus* in that *it would fain make the negotiations depend upon the ensuring in advance of what can only be attained by those negotiations themselves.*

DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS NO PREJUDICE TO SOVEREIGNTY

The statements in question include — it would seem — only one or two which repudiate the very idea of there being any such negotiations respecting the situation of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, — because, *they say, that would involve interference in the internal affairs of Rumania*, so that it would be quite out of the question that the sovereign States should treat with one another in the matter, the only solution acceptable to the writers being that the Rumanian Government should carry on negotiations with the Hungarian minority of that province.

In my opinion this attitude is all wrong. In the first place, *Rumania herself created a precedent for negotiations of the kind when she concluded with Yugoslavia an international agreement adjusting by means of reciprocal concessions the situations of the respective minorities.* If that was possible in the case of Yugoslavia, I cannot understand why it is out of the question in the case of Hungary, there being far more serious reasons in the latter case making it desirable that the moments responsible for continuously disturbing the friendly relations between the two countries should be eliminated by reciprocal goodwill.

Now, should any one object in reply that the situation between Rumania and Yugoslavia was entirely different from that between Rumania and Hungary, seeing that in the former case two States closely connected by alliance concluded an agreement with one another, then *it will suffice to refer to the German-Polish minority treaty, which was concluded between two States the relations between which were at the time perhaps even more strained than those existing today be-*

tween Rumania and Hungary, — the negotiations having indeed, as will be remembered, paved the way towards a relief of the tension and towards the conclusion, at a later period, of that ten years' non-aggression treaty which adjusted the relations between Germany and Poland on a new and satisfactory basis.

To me the reason adduced on the Rumanian side looks rather like an *excuse* to enable Rumania to evade the obligation of entering into friendly negotiations, — particularly when we consider how easy it is to avoid committing any more far-reaching infringement of the sovereignty of either Rumania or Hungary than that committed by the minority treaties which have already been signed and accepted. For what I would suggest would be primarily a treaty between Hungary and Rumania based upon a similar interpretation of any minority treaty concluded already with third States by either of the said countries — in other words, on a treaty already in existence which has been signed by both Parties and has already restricted the sovereignty of both States, — the interpretation of that treaty being however a constant bone of contention between us.

In the event of the conclusion of a treaty of the kind between Rumania and Hungary there would therefore not be any question of any further restriction of the sovereignty of the two States, while politically those two States would be enabled in any given case, without being compelled to apply to Geneva, to settle reciprocally those controversies which otherwise must lead to bitter antagonisms between the two countries, if only because the discussions in Geneva assume the dimensions of important international affairs involving questions of prestige as between the two Governments contending before an international public, and calculated to embitter the relations between the two States.

Most of the statements appearing in the Rumanian press did not however reject *a limine* the suggestion of direct negotiations, only making the acceptance of the suggestion depend upon certain conditions.

Let us see *what these conditions are.*

One of the conditions is that *Hungary shall observe the treaty of peace concluded with her.* Most of the statements however lay the principal stress on the demand that Hungary shall abandon all forms of revisionist propaganda, that propaganda having provoked in Rumania a reaction making it impossible to create the more peaceful atmosphere without which there can be no restoration of the normal friendly relations between the two States.

THE QUESTION OF MILITARY EQUALITY

Unless I am mistaken, this condition can refer only to the military provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, that meaning that Hungary should renounce all claim to military equality in the future too and should acquiesce in her state of defencelessness. The demand in question cannot refer to anything else, seeing that the other provisions of

the Treaty of Trianon — alike its financial and its economic stipulations — have long been regulated by international agreements. And its territorial provisions have all been carried into effect. It is impossible, therefore, to speak of any non-observation of the treaty in connection with these points. But the situation in this field is quite different from what it was two years ago — and from what the public opinion of Rumania would apparently like to have it today too.

Today Hungary is practically the only defeated State still observing the provisions in question; for in the cases of Germany and Austria Rumania herself tacitly agreed — or at most entered a purely formal and unenergetic protest — to the onesided and arbitrary invalidation of those provisions.

Does the public opinion of Rumania then imagine that *Hungary can possibly be in friendly relations with a State which after all these happenings still insists on refusing to grant us that most elementary sovereign right which it has conceded to all other countries as a natural right?* My experience of Rumanian statesmen is that they are far too shrewd politicians to believe that normal neighbourly relations — a moment which after all is vitally important to them too — can be made dependent upon a condition the non-observance of which must be a matter of utter indifference to them, particularly in view of the fact that Hungary could not in any case indulge in armaments seriously endangering the safety of Rumania, and that sooner or later the inner evolution of things must despite their opposition bring that equality into being. And in the event of that equality ensuing despite their opposition any improvement in the relations between the two countries would be bound to meet with increased obstacles; while in the absence of such opposition it would be easy by reciprocal goodwill to bring about such an issue.

THE QUESTION OF REVISION

For that reason, to my mind greater seriousness attaches to the other demand contained in the statements of Rumanian politicians to the effect that the revisionist propaganda being carried on by Hungary should be abandoned, because — they say — it creates an unfriendly atmosphere between the two countries and leads to a reaction in Rumanian public opinion on the one hand causing an antiminority feeling and temper in the country, while on the other hand it is an obstacle to the restoration of normal relations and to negotiations for the purpose of endeavouring to eliminate existing antagonisms.

In my opinion this question must be dealt with seriously and sincerely; for I am quite convinced that the future development of the relations between Rumania and Hungary depends entirely on the adjustment of two pivot questions — viz. on the adjustment of the question of the minorities and upon the action which Hungary intends to take in respect of Rumania in the field of treaty revision,

Before proceeding I must, for the sake of historical accuracy, establish the fact that *Rumania had begun her anti-minority policy and had been continuing that policy crescendo ages before any one in Hungary had begun to talk of revision.* Count Albert Apponyi practically never even mentioned the word „revision” at Geneva: and the *Hungarian Frontier Re-adjustment League* itself was not established until after the appearance of Lord Rothermere's articles and the declarations made by Signor Mussolini, — i. e. when there were already piles of records lying in Geneva telling of the grievances of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and when the inquisitional methods of the minority policy of Rumania — methods with which I do not propose to deal here — were already working at full capacity. It is therefore a *suggestio falsi* to attempt to establish any such causal connection between the excesses of the minority policy of Rumania and the wounds inflicted in Rumanian public opinion by the revisionist propaganda of Hungary. Every politician who is able to think objectively and is familiar with the historical facts is fully aware that *the reference to the revisionist propaganda was only a lame pretext*, — though I must admit that as a pretext it has proved a very suitable weapon in the hand of certain chauvinistic circles, enabling those circles to arouse and lash to fury the wicked spirit of hatred and vindictiveness and persecution. Certain responsible factors needed — and indeed still need — such a pretext for the purpose of making their conduct appear justifiable in the eyes of objective foreign countries.

It is indubitable, however, that there has come into being in consequence in Rumania an atmosphere of hatred which today is unfortunately a living reality and is therefore a factor to be seriously reckoned with.

We must therefore face the question with manly sincerity and frankness; for the situation can never be cleared up except by honest and sincere declarations on both sides.

WHAT CAN BE DONE? AND WHAT IS THERE THAT CANNOT BE DONE?

What is it in the power of the Hungarian Government, of Hungarian public opinion and public life to do in the given case to reassure the public opinion of Rumania? and on the other hand what are the things it is not in their power to do?

For what it is in the power of those factors to do, may be sufficient or may fail to calm the passions that have been aroused: but whichever of the two alternatives ensues, we Hungarians must take the eventual consequences of the given case; for it would be a crime to continue to wait and to allow the situation to become worse and worse.

In order to be able to ascertain what it is in our power to do, we must first find out what it is not our power to do: —

1. *It is inconceivable that there should ever be a Hungarian Government prepared to renounce the right of revision contained in Article 19 of the*

Covenant for the sake of any country whatsoever. To do so would mean the immediate fall of that Government. And indeed it would be quite useless to do so, seeing that the provisions of the Covenant unconditionally ensure every Hungarian Government — irrespective of whether its predecessor in office happens to undertake an obligation to do the other thing or not — the right to avail itself of this provision.

2. For similar reasons it is inconceivable that any Hungarian Government should be in a position to undertake any obligation *respecting the point of time* at which it proposes to avail itself of that right: and finally,

3. *it would be quite out of the question also that any Hungarian Government should make any declaration capable of being interpreted as a renunciation of rights in respect of any of the countries originally belonging to the Holy Crown of St. Stephen.*

No such declaration was made even in the case of „Burgenland”, though this question was at the time settled on a peaceful basis by agreement between Hungary and Austria.

It is another question, however, whether the Hungarian Government — even though not entitled ever to renounce the rights referred to, rights ensured Hungary under the very international treaty the observance of which Rumania so persistently demands — will avail itself of the said right? and if so, when and how and by what means it proposes to enforce that right? *This is a matter to be decided solely and exclusively by the Hungarian Government.* If considerations of political opportunism or other political considerations make it desirable — in order to establish or to maintain good and friendly relations with either of the neighbouring States — that its attitude should be adjusted to harmonise with those considerations, there is nothing to prevent the Hungarian Government accommodating its conduct to the same. For, though it is undoubtedly the right of the Hungarian Government to broach and stress respectively the question of revision, to do so is not a duty to be exercised continuously by that Government. *This given right becomes a duty — and that duty must gain in intensity and become more and more imperative — so long as (and in proportion as) the neighbouring States fail to render tolerable to the very considerable Magyar minorities subjected to their rule the situation foisted on them by the treaty of peace — a situation which psychologically is in any case exceptionally burdensome and painful to them.*

When we look at the question from this angle, we see that there is a certain interdependence between the situation of the minorities and the question of revision; but that interdependence happens to be just the reverse of the syllogism constructed by the public opinion of Rumania — to its own advantage. Both politically — and still more so legally — it is quite wrong to postulate that the right of Rumania to oppress her nationalities increases in proportion to the revisionist character of Hungarian policy. For Rumania has absolutely no right whatsoever to oppress her

minorities, seeing that such procedure has been forbidden absolutely by international treaties. On the contrary, *the true thesis is to the effect that the greater the failure of Rumania to respect these treaties, the greater the reason — both politically and legally — why Hungary should practically too avail herself of the right of revision guaranteed her under the treaty of peace and to urge the effectuation of, and endeavour without delay to ensure the enforcement of, that revision.*

WHAT THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT MAY DO?

It is therefore indubitable that the Hungarian Government is entitled to use its own discretion to determine the trend and to dictate the rapidity of execution of its own policy of revision. This determination is likely to be more or less guided also by the attitude of the neighbouring States towards their Hungarian minorities.

A certain difficulty is undoubtedly caused by the circumstance that *the Hungarian Government has very little to say in the matter of the propaganda.*

Where there is no censorship — as in Hungary —, where there are no restrictions on social organisation and associative activity, — the activity of the daily press and of social organisations cannot be subjected to any serious control or restriction in the field of propaganda either. And although in Hungary both society and the press have always been sufficiently patriotic to endorse the general trend of the international policy of the political head of the country, Government is quite unable to secure absolute control in this field, its influence being practically restricted to that of the soft pedal. But that is of no particular importance, seeing that *the deciding moment in the matter is after all the attitude of the Government, not of irresponsible factors. The Hungarian Government can however offer Rumania a further re-assurance of a very material and far-reaching character — and that in a form adequately binding on that Government —, the assurance, namely, that it will never attempt to secure a revision by other than peaceful means.* I am not thinking here of the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty. Such a treaty would be quite worthless and merely one-sided so long as Rumania is required by the Little Entente treaties to undertake even armed intervention against Hungary in given cases on behalf of her allies. Still less can there be any question of an alliance between our countries; perhaps not even of a treaty of amity such as that concluded recently between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, which after all is essentially the equivalent of a treaty of non-aggression. On the other hand, however, the future relations between Rumania and Hungary do not to my mind seem to postulate that we must be either close friends or enemies. There is not much love lost between us, indeed; but that does not necessarily mean that we must without fail remain for ever in a state of semi-warfare. Of course not: despite the grave and formidable antagonisms — which there is no denying —, *our two nations — particularly in the present-day situation prevailing in Europe — have common interests of a serious and vital character*

making it justifiable for both alike to bury the hatred and try to discover ways and means towards normal and more neighbourly relations based on better understanding. And this is quite possible if the two Governments will only enter into a friendly exchange of views respecting both the minority question and the question of revisionist propaganda, *endeavouring by mutual goodwill to find a modus vivendi calculated to prove of advantage alike to the future development of both nations and to the cause of general European peace.*

LESSONS OF THE PAST

Hungary and Rumania have in the past been on the best neighbourly terms with one another and have indeed actually been in alliance. They were so prior to the Great War, though the antagonism between Hungary and Rumania was the same as today, the only difference being that then Rumania was among the malcontents, Hungary being in favour of the *status quo*.

The public opinion of Rumania should remember that at that time Rumanian society had developed a vigorous nationalist agitation, which subsequently overran foreign countries too in the form of propaganda continually increasing in intensity which spoke of a union of the Rumanians living on either side of the Carpathians and of the Greater Rumania to come. Rumanian public opinion should remember the meetings of the Bucharest *Culture League* organised at that time by Professor *Jorga* which were attended also by the Rumanians of Transylvania, who spoke of the Greater Rumania of the future as the fulfilment of their dreams. Rumanian public opinion should remember the propaganda carried on in foreign countries by the *Culture League* and other social and political factors and organisations — in particular by the Liberal Party now in office — a propaganda resembling that being carried on today — now the tables have turned — by Hungarian society. *And now this latter propaganda is being condemned as an inexcusable crime by all those — including Professor Jorga too — who took part in the original Rumanian propaganda.* And the Rumanian Government and Rumanian society — oblivious of that absolutely elementary self-control without which no one is entitled to claim the right to exercise power — are doing their level best to retaliate and take vengeance for this Hungarian propaganda on persons subjected against their will to their rule; though *there are enormous differences between the original Rumanian propaganda and that being carried on today by Hungarian society — particularly from the point of view of legality under international law.*

The first difference between the two propagandas is that today Hungarian society is entitled by international law as provided in the Article respecting revision of the Treaty of Peace regarded by Rumania as sacred and inviolable — its title being therefore irrefutable — to do what it is doing, such action not being in defiance of international law. And for that reason it cannot be objected to by anyone. In the pre-War period, on the

other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would have been thoroughly justified in taking the most drastic measures of retaliation for the similar action undertaken by Rumania.

The other difference is that whereas the work of propaganda undertaken by Rumania was participated in, not only by the former minorities, but also by the Rumanians of Transylvania, who were enabled with impunity to appear practically every year in Bucharest and to give expression openly to their national zeal, — today the Hungarians of Transylvania, despite the absolute correctness of their conduct, are exposed to the savagest retaliation even when the words spoken in earnest respecting revision are uttered by persons who are not Hungarian citizens, but distinguished statesmen of some foreign country.

As against this — and this is a point I am anxious to stress with particular emphasis — the fact must be established that *the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — despite the Rumanian propaganda — proved able to create and maintain with Rumania friendly relations without demanding from that country a declaration of renunciation which would in any case have been false and therefore quite valueless.* One reason why the Monarchy proved able to create friendly relations of the kind was that it passed over in generous silence and indulgence those sentimental outbursts of feeling on the part of the citizens of the Rumania of those days which in the nature of things were only to a limited extent subject to the control of Government; while on the other hand Rumania can never have had any anxiety as to the Rumanian minority in Transylvania being exposed to a campaign of vengeance owing to the behaviour of certain Rumanian factors.

Today — when the game of chance of history has reversed the relative positions of Hungary and Rumania, and Transylvania has become the property of the latter country — *Rumania has thought fit to pursue a policy towards the Hungarians of Transylvania of a character diametrically opposed to that followed in pre-War days by the Monarchy in its dealings with Rumania* — the latter policy being in my opinion the only one calculated to bring about tolerable relations between the two neighbouring States. This action on the part of Rumania either means that she is deliberately attempting to show that she does not care in the least even for a restoration of merely normal neighbourly relations with Hungary — an attitude which, however strong she may feel today, is bound sooner or later to come home to her, seeing that fortune is fickle and that self-conceit has never done anyone any good; or it may mean that she does not grasp the situation and fails to realise that a continuation of her present policy is an unsurmountable obstacle to the restoration of better neighbourly relations between the two nations — a mistake than which it is impossible to imagine a greater.

FALLACIES OF RUMANIAN POLITICIANS

I do not know which of the two alternatives is the true one. From the statements I have read in the Rumanian papers I should prefer to con-

clude that we have to deal with the latter alternative. For those statements seem to me to show that the writers would fain persuade themselves to believe that the minority policy of Rumania is the exemplar of how a country ought to treat the minorities subjected to its rule.

To show how far this chauvinistic infatuation is going, it is sufficient to refer to the fact, that in the same statements in which the Rumanian minority policy is mentioned as an example, we find recurring time to time the absurd assertion that, as the Széklers are no Magyars, their Rumanisation is a natural process. The writers apparently do not realise that the origin of the Széklers is really a matter of indifference and of no significance in respect of the embargo on that process: *the only moment of importance is that the Széklers desire to remain Széklers and have no wish to be Rumanians.* But there is another solecism to be found in these declarations. They inform us that in the eighteenth century only altogether nineteen Magyar families were living in Transylvania. And in the same breath the writer goes on to assert that the Széklers are Magyarised Rumanians, — an assertion which, if true, would make us really proud to think that nineteen Magyar families, though living in many different parts of Transylvania, proved capable of Magyarising 600.000 Rumanians living in a compact block in the eastern half of the province. By such surprising historical titles the Rumanians try then to justify their forcibly Rumanisation of the Széklers.

But I prefer not to continue; though a mass of similar instances could be cited from the Rumanian statements. *Sapienti sat.* While these hymns of praise were being sung in the Rumanian press in glorification of the minority policy of Rumania — or perhaps after they had already been sung — the Rumanian Public Prosecutor withdrew the charge brought against the journalist who had agitated for the subjection of the Magyars to the horrors of a modern St. Bartholomew's Night; and it was after the appearance of these encomiums that the Prefect of a certain county issued an edict forbidding Hungarian employees to speak in Hungarian to one another or in their intercourse with parties. It is since the appearance of these eulogies that the work has been begun of drafting the Bill demanding the raising of the „*numerus valachicus*” to 75%, — that meaning that even in the industrial or commercial undertakings of Transylvania established and maintained in operation by Hungarian money and operating under the direction of Transylvanian Hungarians (Magyars) 75% of the total number of employees must be Rumanians by nationality and by tongue. It is since the appearance of these encomiums that hundreds of Magyars have once more been dismissed by means of language tests and other similar chicanery. It is since the appearance of these eulogies that the idea has been broached of colonising the frontier Magyar districts with Rumanian settlers. And it is since the appearance of these encomiums that the property of the Pre-

monstratensian Canons of Nagyvárad has been confiscated and the Head of the Order forcibly driven over the frontier; and it is since the declarations hymning the praise of the minority policy of Rumania were published that the idea has been broached of once more reconsidering the political nationality of all the Magyars in Rumania, the object in view being to be able to once more convert thousands and thousands of Magyars into homeless fugitives.

But why continue?

Do people the other side of the frontier really think the whole world is blind and unable to see these monstrosities? and that we are blind too?

In the face of facts of this kind fine words and assertions of the kind fade into insignificance and merely act as provocation.

The sad thing about all this is that such action makes an understanding between the two neighbouring peoples impossible and frustrates the best intentions — thwarting the efforts even to clutch at the straw of any sort of peaceful agreement. The horizon is becoming darker and darker; and grave complications are casting their shadows before: whereas with a little goodwill all this might easily be avoided.

To strain matters further would be a *crime against the peace of Europe*.

THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE AND CENTRALISM

by

Professor Eugene Horváth, Phil. D.

Professor on the University of Budapest

I.

We often hear it said that the presentday political order in Europe was founded on the right of self-determination, and that the Paris Treaties of Peace concluded in 1919—20 raised Europe out of a state of conservative reaction based upon abuses which was already out-of-date and placed that Continent on the broad basis of the right of self-determination of the peoples, heralding thereby the triumph of progress and humanism.

And indeed it would be difficult to deny that there did actually ensue an apparent improvement in the European situation as the result of the dissolution of certain still untried or obsolete political structures: but when making sweeping assertions of the kind we must beware of accepting as final the show of appearances or what one of the interested Parties attempts to make of universal importance. Today no one could deny that the whole world realises that the dissolution and dismemberment of Austria-Hungary have been an egregious mistake.

It was Wilson, President of the United States of North America, that postulated the right of self-determination as one of the cardinal conditions of European peace. However, no one doubts now — though so far no one has made the assertion — that in the form in which Wilson made it the pivot of European peace the right of self-determination is an American doctrine, — or rather that the doctrine in question had a peculiarly American interpretation.

We all know that America once consisted of colonies, and that the people living in the American colonies were under the control of European

Governments. We know also that the American colonies desired to emancipate themselves from the rule of European countries. That is how, at the end of the eighteenth century, the thirteen American colonies became liberated from the rule of England. And that is how, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, the colonies of Central and South America shook off the yoke of Spanish and Portuguese rule. The development of America was therefore a victory of the right of self-determination, which must be regarded as an important pillar of that development, seeing that it formed the basis of the same in the ensuing periods. We cannot for a moment doubt that Wilson — alike as an eminent professor of constitutional law and as President of the United States of North America — in postulating the right of self-determination as a condition of peace desired to offer Europe the best gift his own country and America generally was able to give, — viz. the presentation to the peoples of Europe of the same freedom and unrestricted development as the peoples of America had originally secured for themselves.

However, it is a moot point whether this idea was correctly carried into effect in the manner conceived and demanded by President Wilson?

Let us take a concrete instance. The peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, for example, would have been just as entitled to choose their future destiny themselves as were the Christian nations of Turkey. Charles of Habsburg, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, was evidently not at all averse to the idea of the peoples of Austria and Hungary being allowed to avail themselves of the right of self-determination; for by Letters Patent issued by him on October