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REPLY TO ECHO AROUSED IN RUMANIA BY MY ARTICLE

by

Count Stephen Bethlen
Former Prime Minister

In the January number of the „Danubian Review” I called the attention of the public opinion of Great Britain to the fact that the relations between Hungary and Rumania could not continue to be wrapped in the obscurity now enveloping them.

The serious persecution to which the Hungarians of Transylvania are being subjected makes it necessary that we should either attempt to relieve the situation of our racial brethren there by an agreement with Rumania or initiate an uncompromisingly determined and energetic international action to save them. I suggested that we should first endeavour to negotiate with the Rumanian Government for the purpose of discovering whether it would not be possible to attain our object that way or rather to bring about better relations between Rumania and Hungary — an issue in other respects too vitally important to both nations?

I then explained that no attempt should be made to initiate the international action proposed by me until we had failed to attain our object by means of such negotiations or had at least during the course of those negotiations been impelled to realise that such procedure was bound to lead no where.

My article found an echo. For weeks the question was discussed in a whole series of Rumanian papers, which dealt exhaustively with the possibilities and conditions of a future re-adjustment of the relations between Hungary and Rumania.

When I look more closely into these statements — which include articles also by politicians of importance — I must admit that, though some of them are very unfriendly in spirit, others again are written in a tone that is not altogether or entirely that of repudiation. It is true, indeed, that most of these statements betray a certain air of superiority and that chauvinistic self-conceit which has so often characterised the victors in the Great War.

However, apart from this offensive tone so jarring to a foreign ear, the impression made upon me is that Rumanian public opinion believes in the possibility of the Hungarian-Rumanian ne-

gotiations suggested by me and would not be averse to the establishment in advance — if possible — of a favourable atmosphere. This „if possible” is however found recurring again and again in these statements, bringing into being a very strange *circulus vitiosus* in that *it would fain make the negotiations depend upon the ensuring in advance of what can only be attained by those negotiations themselves.*

DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS NO PREJUDICE TO SOVEREIGNTY

The statements in question include — it would seem — only one or two which repudiate the very idea of there being any such negotiations respecting the situation of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, — because, *they say, that would involve interference in the internal affairs of Rumania*, so that it would be quite out of the question that the sovereign States should treat with one another in the matter, the only solution acceptable to the writers being that the Rumanian Government should carry on negotiations with the Hungarian minority of that province.

In my opinion this attitude is all wrong. In the first place, *Rumania herself created a precedent for negotiations of the kind when she concluded with Yugoslavia an international agreement adjusting by means of reciprocal concessions the situations of the respective minorities.* If that was possible in the case of Yugoslavia, I cannot understand why it is out of the question in the case of Hungary, there being far more serious reasons in the latter case making it desirable that the moments responsible for continuously disturbing the friendly relations between the two countries should be eliminated by reciprocal goodwill.

Now, should any one object in reply that the situation between Rumania and Yugoslavia was entirely different from that between Rumania and Hungary, seeing that in the former case two States closely connected by alliance concluded an agreement with one another, then *it will suffice to refer to the German-Polish minority treaty, which was concluded between two States the relations between which were at the time perhaps even more strained than those existing today be-*

tween Rumania and Hungary, — the negotiations having indeed, as will be remembered, paved the way towards a relief of the tension and towards the conclusion, at a later period, of that ten years' non-aggression treaty which adjusted the relations between Germany and Poland on a new and satisfactory basis.

To me the reason adduced on the Rumanian side looks rather like an *excuse* to enable Rumania to evade the obligation of entering into friendly negotiations, — particularly when we consider how easy it is to avoid committing any more far-reaching infringement of the sovereignty of either Rumania or Hungary than that committed by the minority treaties which have already been signed and accepted. For what I would suggest would be primarily a treaty between Hungary and Rumania based upon a similar interpretation of any minority treaty concluded already with third States by either of the said countries — in other words, on a treaty already in existence which has been signed by both Parties and has already restricted the sovereignty of both States, — the interpretation of that treaty being however a constant bone of contention between us.

In the event of the conclusion of a treaty of the kind between Rumania and Hungary there would therefore not be any question of any further restriction of the sovereignty of the two States, while politically those two States would be enabled in any given case, without being compelled to apply to Geneva, to settle reciprocally those controversies which otherwise must lead to bitter antagonisms between the two countries, if only because the discussions in Geneva assume the dimensions of important international affairs involving questions of prestige as between the two Governments contending before an international public, and calculated to embitter the relations between the two States.

Most of the statements appearing in the Rumanian press did not however reject *a limine* the suggestion of direct negotiations, only making the acceptance of the suggestion depend upon certain conditions.

Let us see *what these conditions are.*

One of the conditions is that *Hungary shall observe the treaty of peace concluded with her.* Most of the statements however lay the principal stress on the demand that Hungary shall abandon all forms of revisionist propaganda, that propaganda having provoked in Rumania a reaction making it impossible to create the more peaceful atmosphere without which there can be no restoration of the normal friendly relations between the two States.

THE QUESTION OF MILITARY EQUALITY

Unless I am mistaken, this condition can refer only to the military provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, that meaning that Hungary should renounce all claim to military equality in the future too and should acquiesce in her state of defencelessness. The demand in question cannot refer to anything else, seeing that the other provisions of

the Treaty of Trianon — alike its financial and its economic stipulations — have long been regulated by international agreements. And its territorial provisions have all been carried into effect. It is impossible, therefore, to speak of any non-observation of the treaty in connection with these points. But the situation in this field is quite different from what it was two years ago — and from what the public opinion of Rumania would apparently like to have it today too.

Today Hungary is practically the only defeated State still observing the provisions in question; for in the cases of Germany and Austria Rumania herself tacitly agreed — or at most entered a purely formal and unenergetic protest — to the onesided and arbitrary invalidation of those provisions.

Does the public opinion of Rumania then imagine that *Hungary can possibly be in friendly relations with a State which after all these happenings still insists on refusing to grant us that most elementary sovereign right which it has conceded to all other countries as a natural right?* My experience of Rumanian statesmen is that they are far too shrewd politicians to believe that normal neighbourly relations — a moment which after all is vitally important to them too — can be made dependent upon a condition the non-observance of which must be a matter of utter indifference to them, particularly in view of the fact that Hungary could not in any case indulge in armaments seriously endangering the safety of Rumania, and that sooner or later the inner evolution of things must despite their opposition bring that equality into being. And in the event of that equality ensuing despite their opposition any improvement in the relations between the two countries would be bound to meet with increased obstacles; while in the absence of such opposition it would be easy by reciprocal goodwill to bring about such an issue.

THE QUESTION OF REVISION

For that reason, to my mind greater seriousness attaches to the other demand contained in the statements of Rumanian politicians to the effect that the revisionist propaganda being carried on by Hungary should be abandoned, because — they say — it creates an unfriendly atmosphere between the two countries and leads to a reaction in Rumanian public opinion on the one hand causing an antiminority feeling and temper in the country, while on the other hand it is an obstacle to the restoration of normal relations and to negotiations for the purpose of endeavouring to eliminate existing antagonisms.

In my opinion this question must be dealt with seriously and sincerely; for I am quite convinced that the future development of the relations between Rumania and Hungary depends entirely on the adjustment of two pivot questions — viz. on the adjustment of the question of the minorities and upon the action which Hungary intends to take in respect of Rumania in the field of treaty revision,

Before proceeding I must, for the sake of historical accuracy, establish the fact that *Rumania had begun her anti-minority policy and had been continuing that policy crescendo ages before any one in Hungary had begun to talk of revision.* Count Albert Apponyi practically never even mentioned the word „revision” at Geneva: and the *Hungarian Frontier Re-adjustment League* itself was not established until after the appearance of Lord Rothermere's articles and the declarations made by Signor Mussolini, — i. e. when there were already piles of records lying in Geneva telling of the grievances of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and when the inquisitional methods of the minority policy of Rumania — methods with which I do not propose to deal here — were already working at full capacity. It is therefore a *suggestio falsi* to attempt to establish any such causal connection between the excesses of the minority policy of Rumania and the wounds inflicted in Rumanian public opinion by the revisionist propaganda of Hungary. Every politician who is able to think objectively and is familiar with the historical facts is fully aware that *the reference to the revisionist propaganda was only a lame pretext*, — though I must admit that as a pretext it has proved a very suitable weapon in the hand of certain chauvinistic circles, enabling those circles to arouse and lash to fury the wicked spirit of hatred and vindictiveness and persecution. Certain responsible factors needed — and indeed still need — such a pretext for the purpose of making their conduct appear justifiable in the eyes of objective foreign countries.

It is indubitable, however, that there has come into being in consequence in Rumania an atmosphere of hatred which today is unfortunately a living reality and is therefore a factor to be seriously reckoned with.

We must therefore face the question with manly sincerity and frankness; for the situation can never be cleared up except by honest and sincere declarations on both sides.

WHAT CAN BE DONE? AND WHAT IS THERE THAT CANNOT BE DONE?

What is it in the power of the Hungarian Government, of Hungarian public opinion and public life to do in the given case to reassure the public opinion of Rumania? and on the other hand what are the things it is not in their power to do?

For what it is in the power of those factors to do, may be sufficient or may fail to calm the passions that have been aroused: but whichever of the two alternatives ensues, we Hungarians must take the eventual consequences of the given case; for it would be a crime to continue to wait and to allow the situation to become worse and worse.

In order to be able to ascertain what it is in our power to do, we must first find out what it is not our power to do: —

1. *It is inconceivable that there should ever be a Hungarian Government prepared to renounce the right of revision contained in Article 19 of the*

Covenant for the sake of any country whatsoever. To do so would mean the immediate fall of that Government. And indeed it would be quite useless to do so, seeing that the provisions of the Covenant unconditionally ensure every Hungarian Government — irrespective of whether its predecessor in office happens to undertake an obligation to do the other thing or not — the right to avail itself of this provision.

2. For similar reasons it is inconceivable that any Hungarian Government should be in a position to undertake any obligation *respecting the point of time* at which it proposes to avail itself of that right: and finally,

3. *it would be quite out of the question also that any Hungarian Government should make any declaration capable of being interpreted as a renunciation of rights in respect of any of the countries originally belonging to the Holy Crown of St. Stephen.*

No such declaration was made even in the case of „Burgenland”, though this question was at the time settled on a peaceful basis by agreement between Hungary and Austria.

It is another question, however, whether the Hungarian Government — even though not entitled ever to renounce the rights referred to, rights ensured Hungary under the very international treaty the observance of which Rumania so persistently demands — will avail itself of the said right? and if so, when and how and by what means it proposes to enforce that right? *This is a matter to be decided solely and exclusively by the Hungarian Government.* If considerations of political opportunism or other political considerations make it desirable — in order to establish or to maintain good and friendly relations with either of the neighbouring States — that its attitude should be adjusted to harmonise with those considerations, there is nothing to prevent the Hungarian Government accommodating its conduct to the same. For, though it is undoubtedly the right of the Hungarian Government to broach and stress respectively the question of revision, to do so is not a duty to be exercised continuously by that Government. *This given right becomes a duty — and that duty must gain in intensity and become more and more imperative — so long as (and in proportion as) the neighbouring States fail to render tolerable to the very considerable Magyar minorities subjected to their rule the situation foisted on them by the treaty of peace — a situation which psychologically is in any case exceptionally burdensome and painful to them.*

When we look at the question from this angle, we see that there is a certain interdependence between the situation of the minorities and the question of revision; but that interdependence happens to be just the reverse of the syllogism constructed by the public opinion of Rumania — to its own advantage. Both politically — and still more so legally — it is quite wrong to postulate that the right of Rumania to oppress her nationalities increases in proportion to the revisionist character of Hungarian policy. For Rumania has absolutely no right whatsoever to oppress her

minorities, seeing that such procedure has been forbidden absolutely by international treaties. On the contrary, *the true thesis is to the effect that the greater the failure of Rumania to respect these treaties, the greater the reason — both politically and legally — why Hungary should practically too avail herself of the right of revision guaranteed her under the treaty of peace and to urge the effectuation of, and endeavour without delay to ensure the enforcement of, that revision.*

WHAT THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT MAY DO?

It is therefore indubitable that the Hungarian Government is entitled to use its own discretion to determine the trend and to dictate the rapidity of execution of its own policy of revision. This determination is likely to be more or less guided also by the attitude of the neighbouring States towards their Hungarian minorities.

A certain difficulty is undoubtedly caused by the circumstance that *the Hungarian Government has very little to say in the matter of the propaganda.*

Where there is no censorship — as in Hungary —, where there are no restrictions on social organisation and associative activity, — the activity of the daily press and of social organisations cannot be subjected to any serious control or restriction in the field of propaganda either. And although in Hungary both society and the press have always been sufficiently patriotic to endorse the general trend of the international policy of the political head of the country, Government is quite unable to secure absolute control in this field, its influence being practically restricted to that of the soft pedal. But that is of no particular importance, seeing that *the deciding moment in the matter is after all the attitude of the Government, not of irresponsible factors. The Hungarian Government can however offer Rumania a further re-assurance of a very material and far-reaching character — and that in a form adequately binding on that Government —, the assurance, namely, that it will never attempt to secure a revision by other than peaceful means.* I am not thinking here of the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty. Such a treaty would be quite worthless and merely one-sided so long as Rumania is required by the Little Entente treaties to undertake even armed intervention against Hungary in given cases on behalf of her allies. Still less can there be any question of an alliance between our countries; perhaps not even of a treaty of amity such as that concluded recently between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, which after all is essentially the equivalent of a treaty of non-aggression. On the other hand, however, the future relations between Rumania and Hungary do not to my mind seem to postulate that we must be either close friends or enemies. There is not much love lost between us, indeed; but that does not necessarily mean that we must without fail remain for ever in a state of semi-warfare. Of course not: despite the grave and formidable antagonisms — which there is no denying —, *our two nations — particularly in the present-day situation prevailing in Europe — have common interests of a serious and vital character*

making it justifiable for both alike to bury the hatred and try to discover ways and means towards normal and more neighbourly relations based on better understanding. And this is quite possible if the two Governments will only enter into a friendly exchange of views respecting both the minority question and the question of revisionist propaganda, *endeavouring by mutual goodwill to find a modus vivendi calculated to prove of advantage alike to the future development of both nations and to the cause of general European peace.*

LESSONS OF THE PAST

Hungary and Rumania have in the past been on the best neighbourly terms with one another and have indeed actually been in alliance. They were so prior to the Great War, though the antagonism between Hungary and Rumania was the same as today, the only difference being that then Rumania was among the malcontents, Hungary being in favour of the *status quo*.

The public opinion of Rumania should remember that at that time Rumanian society had developed a vigorous nationalist agitation, which subsequently overran foreign countries too in the form of propaganda continually increasing in intensity which spoke of a union of the Rumanians living on either side of the Carpathians and of the Greater Rumania to come. Rumanian public opinion should remember the meetings of the Bucharest *Culture League* organised at that time by Professor *Jorga* which were attended also by the Rumanians of Transylvania, who spoke of the Greater Rumania of the future as the fulfilment of their dreams. Rumanian public opinion should remember the propaganda carried on in foreign countries by the *Culture League* and other social and political factors and organisations — in particular by the Liberal Party now in office — a propaganda resembling that being carried on today — now the tables have turned — by Hungarian society. *And now this latter propaganda is being condemned as an inexcusable crime by all those — including Professor Jorga too — who took part in the original Rumanian propaganda.* And the Rumanian Government and Rumanian society — oblivious of that absolutely elementary self-control without which no one is entitled to claim the right to exercise power — are doing their level best to retaliate and take vengeance for this Hungarian propaganda on persons subjected against their will to their rule; though *there are enormous differences between the original Rumanian propaganda and that being carried on today by Hungarian society — particularly from the point of view of legality under international law.*

The first difference between the two propagandas is that today Hungarian society is entitled by international law as provided in the Article respecting revision of the Treaty of Peace regarded by Rumania as sacred and inviolable — its title being therefore irrefutable — to do what it is doing, such action not being in defiance of international law. And for that reason it cannot be objected to by anyone. In the pre-War period, on the

other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would have been thoroughly justified in taking the most drastic measures of retaliation for the similar action undertaken by Rumania.

The other difference is that whereas the work of propaganda undertaken by Rumania was participated in, not only by the former minorities, but also by the Rumanians of Transylvania, who were enabled with impunity to appear practically every year in Bucharest and to give expression openly to their national zeal, — today the Hungarians of Transylvania, despite the absolute correctness of their conduct, are exposed to the savagest retaliation even when the words spoken in earnest respecting revision are uttered by persons who are not Hungarian citizens, but distinguished statesmen of some foreign country.

As against this — and this is a point I am anxious to stress with particular emphasis — the fact must be established that *the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — despite the Rumanian propaganda — proved able to create and maintain with Rumania friendly relations without demanding from that country a declaration of renunciation which would in any case have been false and therefore quite valueless.* One reason why the Monarchy proved able to create friendly relations of the kind was that it passed over in generous silence and indulgence those sentimental outbursts of feeling on the part of the citizens of the Rumania of those days which in the nature of things were only to a limited extent subject to the control of Government; while on the other hand Rumania can never have had any anxiety as to the Rumanian minority in Transylvania being exposed to a campaign of vengeance owing to the behaviour of certain Rumanian factors.

Today — when the game of chance of history has reversed the relative positions of Hungary and Rumania, and Transylvania has become the property of the latter country — *Rumania has thought fit to pursue a policy towards the Hungarians of Transylvania of a character diametrically opposed to that followed in pre-War days by the Monarchy in its dealings with Rumania* — the latter policy being in my opinion the only one calculated to bring about tolerable relations between the two neighbouring States. This action on the part of Rumania either means that she is deliberately attempting to show that she does not care in the least even for a restoration of merely normal neighbourly relations with Hungary — an attitude which, however strong she may feel today, is bound sooner or later to come home to her, seeing that fortune is fickle and that self-conceit has never done anyone any good; or it may mean that she does not grasp the situation and fails to realise that a continuation of her present policy is an unsurmountable obstacle to the restoration of better neighbourly relations between the two nations — a mistake than which it is impossible to imagine a greater.

FALLACIES OF RUMANIAN POLITICIANS

I do not know which of the two alternatives is the true one. From the statements I have read in the Rumanian papers I should prefer to con-

clude that we have to deal with the latter alternative. For those statements seem to me to show that the writers would fain persuade themselves to believe that the minority policy of Rumania is the exemplar of how a country ought to treat the minorities subjected to its rule.

To show how far this chauvinistic infatuation is going, it is sufficient to refer to the fact, that in the same statements in which the Rumanian minority policy is mentioned as an example, we find recurring time to time the absurd assertion that, as the Széklers are no Magyars, their Rumanisation is a natural process. The writers apparently do not realise that the origin of the Széklers is really a matter of indifference and of no significance in respect of the embargo on that process: *the only moment of importance is that the Széklers desire to remain Széklers and have no wish to be Rumanians.* But there is another solecism to be found in these declarations. They inform us that in the eighteenth century only altogether nineteen Magyar families were living in Transylvania. And in the same breath the writer goes on to assert that the Széklers are Magyarised Rumanians, — an assertion which, if true, would make us really proud to think that nineteen Magyar families, though living in many different parts of Transylvania, proved capable of Magyarising 600.000 Rumanians living in a compact block in the eastern half of the province. By such surprising historical titles the Rumanians try then to justify their forcibly Rumanisation of the Széklers.

But I prefer not to continue; though a mass of similar instances could be cited from the Rumanian statements. *Sapienti sat.* While these hymns of praise were being sung in the Rumanian press in glorification of the minority policy of Rumania — or perhaps after they had already been sung — the Rumanian Public Prosecutor withdrew the charge brought against the journalist who had agitated for the subjection of the Magyars to the horrors of a modern St. Bartholomew's Night; and it was after the appearance of these encomiums that the Prefect of a certain county issued an edict forbidding Hungarian employees to speak in Hungarian to one another or in their intercourse with parties. It is since the appearance of these eulogies that the work has been begun of drafting the Bill demanding the raising of the „*numerus valachicus*” to 75%, — that meaning that even in the industrial or commercial undertakings of Transylvania established and maintained in operation by Hungarian money and operating under the direction of Transylvanian Hungarians (Magyars) 75% of the total number of employees must be Rumanians by nationality and by tongue. It is since the appearance of these encomiums that hundreds of Magyars have once more been dismissed by means of language tests and other similar chicanery. It is since the appearance of these eulogies that the idea has been broached of colonising the frontier Magyar districts with Rumanian settlers. And it is since the appearance of these encomiums that the property of the Pre-

monstratensian Canons of Nagyvárad has been confiscated and the Head of the Order forcibly driven over the frontier; and it is since the declarations hymning the praise of the minority policy of Rumania were published that the idea has been broached of once more reconsidering the political nationality of all the Magyars in Rumania, the object in view being to be able to once more convert thousands and thousands of Magyars into homeless fugitives.

But why continue?

Do people the other side of the frontier really think the whole world is blind and unable to see these monstrosities? and that we are blind too?

In the face of facts of this kind fine words and assertions of the kind fade into insignificance and merely act as provocation.

The sad thing about all this is that such action makes an understanding between the two neighbouring peoples impossible and frustrates the best intentions — thwarting the efforts even to clutch at the straw of any sort of peaceful agreement. The horizon is becoming darker and darker; and grave complications are casting their shadows before: whereas with a little goodwill all this might easily be avoided.

To strain matters further would be a *crime against the peace of Europe*.

THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE AND CENTRALISM

by

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I.

We often hear it said that the presentday political order in Europe was founded on the right of self-determination, and that the Paris Treaties of Peace concluded in 1919—20 raised Europe out of a state of conservative reaction based upon abuses which was already out-of-date and placed that Continent on the broad basis of the right of self-determination of the peoples, heralding thereby the triumph of progress and humanism.

And indeed it would be difficult to deny that there did actually ensue an apparent improvement in the European situation as the result of the dissolution of certain still untried or obsolete political structures: but when making sweeping assertions of the kind we must beware of accepting as final the show of appearances or what one of the interested Parties attempts to make of universal importance. Today no one could deny that the whole world realises that the dissolution and dismemberment of Austria-Hungary have been an egregious mistake.

It was Wilson, President of the United States of North America, that postulated the right of self-determination as one of the cardinal conditions of European peace. However, no one doubts now — though so far no one has made the assertion — that in the form in which Wilson made it the pivot of European peace the right of self-determination is an American doctrine, — or rather that the doctrine in question had a peculiarly American interpretation.

We all know that America once consisted of colonies, and that the people living in the American colonies were under the control of European

Governments. We know also that the American colonies desired to emancipate themselves from the rule of European countries. That is how, at the end of the eighteenth century, the thirteen American colonies became liberated from the rule of England. And that is how, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, the colonies of Central and South America shook off the yoke of Spanish and Portuguese rule. The development of America was therefore a victory of the right of self-determination, which must be regarded as an important pillar of that development, seeing that it formed the basis of the same in the ensuing periods. We cannot for a moment doubt that Wilson — alike as an eminent professor of constitutional law and as President of the United States of North America — in postulating the right of self-determination as a condition of peace desired to offer Europe the best gift his own country and America generally was able to give, — viz. the presentation to the peoples of Europe of the same freedom and unrestricted development as the peoples of America had originally secured for themselves.

However, it is a moot point whether this idea was correctly carried into effect in the manner conceived and demanded by President Wilson?

Let us take a concrete instance. The peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, for example, would have been just as entitled to choose their future destiny themselves as were the Christian nations of Turkey. Charles of Habsburg, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, was evidently not at all averse to the idea of the peoples of Austria and Hungary being allowed to avail themselves of the right of self-determination; for by Letters Patent issued by him on October

16th., 1918, in his capacity as Austrian Emperor he gave his peoples a free hand in respect of the form of government. It would be a great mistake to assume that he would not have wished to do the same in the case of Hungary too, or to presume that the Hungarians were averse to the idea, — the latter presumption not in the least warranted merely because Charles of Habsburg did not take such measures in respect of Hungary. First of all, we should remember that the Letters Patent of the Austrian Emperor were not valid in respect of the Hungarian State; while the fact that the Sovereign took no similar measures in respect of his Kingdom of Hungary in itself shows that in the latter country the question required preliminaries of an entirely different character. For, whereas the Constitution of Austria was merely on paper, in Hungary the Government was required to consult Parliament and through that body the nation itself in respect of the application of the right of self-determination in the American sense of the term or rather in re the necessity of passing a Bill to amend the Hungarian Constitution accordingly.

There can be no doubt that what Wilson had in mind was a peace by agreement; and that what happened was just the reverse, — the Paris treaties of peace consisting of conditions forced on one of the Parties without that Party having taken any part in drafting those conditions or having been consulted as to their acceptance in a manner proving that that acceptance was the result of a voluntary decision. Whereas Wilson's terms of peace and the Letters Patent issued on October 16th., 1918, agreed in essentials and almost coincided in substance, on the other hand there is a decided contradiction between those terms and the Memorandum drafted by Lord Northcliffe which — according to reports appearing in 'The Times' and in the 'Matin' — demanded the dismemberment of Austria and Hungary. The French Government endorsed the Memorandum, noting thereby that the terms proposed by Wilson could not be taken as basis of the peace treaties to be concluded, seeing that those treaties had to be based upon the annexations demanded in Lord Northcliffe's Memorandum. After Austria-Hungary had fallen a victim to this demand, it became glaringly evident that there were two camps — that of annexation by armed force, and that which abode by the right of self-determination whether interpreted in the American spirit or conceived in any other sense whatsoever. This was so much the case that Wilson himself solemnly protested at the Peace Conference against the armed occupations, — though he must have known that his protest would be futile, seeing that the application in practice of the right of self-determination would have prevented the acquisition of all the territories which the Governments interested in the dismemberment of Hungary had been so quick to occupy and to take actual possession of so as to be able to claim them on the basis of the principle of *uti possidetis*. Such a course would surely have been superfluous if they had really hoped to obtain

those territories on the basis of the right of self-determination.

However, another thing that follows of necessity from this fact is that, if Wilson's condition — the exercise of the right of self-determination — would have produced in the severed territories results other than separation and incorporation in foreign States, — the solemn declaration of the annexation preceded the completion of the work of occupation —, there might perhaps have been some prospect of the peoples of Central Europe uniting for mutual support. But that hope dissolved already during the Peace Conference; there was therefore no agreement as to the solution; instead of understanding there ensued a process of decay. It would be a far cry — and it is not our object on the present occasion — to relate all the relevant details. We would prefer to ascertain how far back we must retrace our steps if we would reach the point at which the ways of understanding, and of the lack of understanding respectively parted.

According to international law that point cannot be remoter from us than the treaty of armistice concluded on November 3rd., 1918, by Austria-Hungary with the Allied and Associated Powers — the latter not formulating any more far-reaching demands than that their territories should be cleared of hostile troops.

For the Padua Armistice Treaty may be regarded as the outer expression — and also the ultimate and definitive result — of the agreement which evidently existed between the time when the Monarchy declared its readiness to make peace and its acceptance of Wilson's terms and through those terms the conclusion of the armistice treaty.

It should be added that under the treaty the Hungarian troops were to be withdrawn from all foreign States occupied by them; we may therefore presume that this was also a *sine qua non* of the opening of peace negotiations. However, seeing that at the time there were no other hostile soldiers in the territory of Hungary than prisoners of war, it may be presumed that the retiring Hungarian troops had to withdraw within the frontiers of historical Hungary in order to make the conclusion of peace possible.

From what has been said above we may draw the interesting and instructive conclusion that, if Hungary and the victorious Powers really came to an agreement in the armistice treaty, those Governments which claimed certain territories of Hungary for themselves must have found themselves in conflict, not with Hungary only, but with both contracting Parties; for they had assailed the agreement concluded between those Parties. Consequently, the Czech, Serbian and Rumanian Governments must have had their claims to those territories ratified by those Powers which had availed themselves of their assistance during the Great War and claimed to exercise the direction of the Peace Conference.

The victorious Powers paid their war debts by promising certain territories of Hungary to their Czech, Serbian and Rumanian allies. By doing so, however, they themselves infringed the

armistice treaty and paved the way towards that chaos which is more and more absolutely holding sway in Central Europe.

The evident anxiety and reluctance which the Powers betrayed on all occasions when they yielded to those demands, proves better than any thing else that they were fully conscious of the inevitable consequences. That was the real reason why they drafted the Minority Treaties; and it was even more the motive force behind the Treaty of Sèvres concluded on August 10th., 1920, in which the Allied and Associated Powers transferred to the Czech, Serbian and Rumanian States the sovereignty over the territories claimed from Hungary.

If this is really the case, what happened was that the territory of Hungary guaranteed by the armistice treaty was one-sidedly dismembered. The territories occupied arbitrarily and also those within the frontiers demanded by the victors which had not been occupied, were annexed *prior to* the conclusion of the treaty of peace. The Powers endeavoured to ensure the political and human rights of the inhabitants subjected against their will to foreign rule by drafting Minority Treaties. The Treaty of Trianon concluded with Hungary in the Trianon Palace on June 4th., 1920, was not regarded by the Powers as sufficing to transfer the sovereignty over the disputed territories to the Czech, Serbian and Rumanian States.

It is a moment of extreme interest that the Powers did not accept as sufficient in respect of the ensuring of the minority rights the mere promises of the annexing Governments. That is at least what we cannot but conclude from the deed of obligation dated May 20th., 1919, and signed by M. Edward Beneš, then Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, undertaking to organise the Czech State on a federative basis similar to that of Switzerland.

Beneš himself thus showed the way towards building up the peace of Central Europe; and it must be from him that the Powers — after twenty years of a barren reign of force and labour spent in vain — learned to what point they must return if they would give Europe peace and tranquillity.

II.

The idea of establishing federative formations in the Danube Basin, is not a new one.

The chief impediment to a realisation of this idea in the past was that the former Austrian Empire, in the territories of diverse types of which it was composed, resorted to a policy of an excessively centralistic character. The Empire organised after 1526 with Vienna as its pivot followed the absolutistic systems of the day and endeavoured to secure absolute power over the whole territory of Central Europe and — by forcibly breaking up existing systems — to build an entirely new and novel political structure independently of the peoples and their historical development.

This structure had first made its appearance when, in 1437, Albert of Habsburg, Duke of Austria, came into possession of the thrones of Hungary and Bohemia. In the two decenniums

(1437—1457) during which the three countries had a common sovereign, the power of the Estates was still stronger than that of the monarch. When in the battle of Mohács, in 1526, the King of Hungary and Bohemia fell, Archduke Ferdinand of Habsburg, Duke of Austria, the brother of the widow of the fallen King Louis II., came into possession of all three countries. But for a whole century the Habsburgs proved unable to overcome the resistance of the Estates, — so much so indeed that in 1620 the Estates of Austria, Bohemia and Hungary took the control of affairs and declared war on that central power which was in Vienna endeavouring to establish a government independent of the Estates of the three countries. At this critical moment the struggle was decided in favour of Vienna. The battle fought at Prague in 1620 was won by the Archduke of Austria, who then by armed force dissolved the co-operation between the Estates of Austria, Bohemia and Hungary which had so often been in evidence since 1437. To examine the question as to whether this co-operation was — or might have been — of a federative character, is beyond the scope of the present essay.

The fact may however be established that there came into being a new form of connection between the three countries utilised by the Vienna Government after the victory of 1620 as a means to secure absolute power over the Estates of the three countries. The circumstance that the Estates proved incapable of availing themselves permanently of the turns of fortune in the European war, removed all obstacles in the way of that scheme. So, when in 1648, by the Peace of Westphalia, the Habsburgs were deprived of their ancestral possessions, the centre of gravity of their power was transferred from the Rhine to the Danube, where they began to lay the foundations of a new Great Power. The repulse of the Turks and the liberation of Hungary expanded the dominions of the Habsburgs by the acquisition of new territories of enormous area. After the loss of Spain they concentrated their attention on the work of building up this Danube Power. However, though they utilised every opportunity that offered, they were driven to differentiate between those countries which belonged to the German Empire and those which had never been in political alliance with Germany. They were thus compelled to uphold the distinction between Austria and Bohemia on the one hand, as countries belonging to the German State, and Hungary on the other hand, — a differentiation of which we find documentary evidence galore. Consequently, if the Habsburgs desired to keep the Empire of which the Danube was the pivot, they could not pursue an exclusively German policy; and — as we know — the reason why Bismark in 1866 excluded them from the German Empire was that in his opinion the Habsburg Empire could not be regarded as a German State. That is why, in 1867, the Habsburgs established a Power independent of the German Empire consisting of Austria, Bohemia and Hungary.

Nothing could have been more natural than that, after 1866, Francis Joseph should establish

a Power in keeping with the character of these three countries. However, people in Vienna persisted in believing — erroneously — that the power and strength of the Empire depended, not on the steadiness and security of the inner structure, but on the size of its territory. That is why Austria-Hungary was a conglomeration of heterogeneous territories.

Although the Compromise (Ausgleich) of 1867 brought into being an acceptable agreement between Austria and Hungary, we must add that, whereas the Hungarian State consisted of territories and population united by a historical development and uniform in character, the term Austria included territories acquired at various periods which had been wrested from various political formations and were heterogeneous in character. It is true, indeed, that all these various territories were parts of the Austrian Empire which concluded the Compromise with the historical State of Hungary.

It is indubitable — as they themselves are so fond of telling us — that the Czechs did not profit much by the Compromise of 1867. However, if that complaint is justified, — as it certainly seems to be —, the Czechs should not blame Hungary, but should turn against the House of Habsburg, which in 1620 annexed Bohemia, not to Hungary, but to Austria. Bohemia and Austria both alike having been principalities of the German Empire, we are perfectly entitled to say that this was a case of antagonism between two provinces of Germany — a quarrel in which the Hungary that never belonged to the German Empire could not interfere, that country actually never having interfered or officially taken up any attitude whatsoever in the Austro-Czech question. The presumption that the Austro-Czech Compromise hinted at in 1871 was frustrated by the Hungarian Government, is a piece of mere guesswork refuted by all the relevant State documents. In 1866 Austria and Bohemia together withdrew from the German Empire, to which they had previously belonged for centuries; so that the Compromise of 1867 was in reality an agreement concluded between States and territories which had originally belonged to Germany on the one hand and a State and territory which had never belonged to that Empire on the other hand. The former States and territories were known by the designation of the Austrian Empire and were under the absolute control of the Vienna Government; consequently, Hungary was not guilty of committing any fault when she concluded the Compromise of 1867 with the Austrian Empire and not with the several provinces incorporated in that empire.

What has been said above will suffice to show that the only possible reason the Czechs can have had prior to 1918 to be angry with the Hungarians was that Hungary never belonged to the German Empire and was never incorporated in Austria either, but had for centuries been able to secure her independence against the Vienna Government, which ruled over Bohemia too. Bohemia was originally a German principality; and the reason why the Duke of Austria strove to secure

that country for himself was that he might have at his disposal as considerable a might as possible in his endeavour to obtain the German imperial throne. It is therefore indubitable that if there were questions still awaiting solution after 1867, the matters at dispute must have been between Bohemia and Austria or Austria and Hungary, — *not between Bohemia and Hungary.*

When the Czechs realised that they could not get Hungary — or hope for Austria — to adjust the question still at dispute between their country and Austria — in particular the revision of the political relations between the two countries which had remained unaltered since 1620 —, they did not think of inciting the public opinion of Austria, Bohemia and Hungary against the Vienna Government — a result which appeared, despite the extinction of parliamentary government, to be quite on the cards under certain given circumstances and given forms —, but in 1868 appealed over the head of the Austrian Government to France (through the good offices of the Emperor Napoleon III.) and after 1878 to Russia (through the good offices of the Tsar), — in both cases appealing therefore to a foreign Power. According to the evidence of the relevant State documents this appeal had for its object to persuade the foreign Powers in question to endeavour to change the policy of the Government ruling in Bohemia under the Austrian Constitution and to achieve that object by bringing those foreign Powers into active opposition to the Vienna Government. The same conception is traceable also in subsequent events; for when, in 1915, the Monarchy looked like losing the War against France and Russia which had previously been appealed to for assistance by the Czechs, the latter came forward with a programme ready to hand and undertook to build up a Central European structure of a more suitable character than that with Vienna as its pivot.

Perhaps the most mistake made by Vienna was not its refusal even after 1867 to adjust the political relations between Austria and Bohemia, but the fact that the maps of certain imperial authorities still exclusively under the control of the sovereign failed to demarcate the frontier line between Austria and Hungary prescribed by the Compromise of 1867 and indeed refused to accept any other frontiers than those separating the Habsburg Empire from outside Powers. In the office of Baron Conrad, Chief of the General Staff, the only frontiers known and taken into account were those of the Austrian (Habsburg) Empire separating that Empire from foreign States. Indeed, among the possible changes of those frontiers were those taken into account as likely to ensue as a result of the eventual annexation to the Habsburg Empire of Serbia and Rumania. What interested the Vienna statesmen for the moment was the possible effect upon these frontiers exercised by neighbouring Powers. Those adjoining Germany were certainly made safer and securer by the lasting alliance between the two countries; but those adjoining Italy were endangered — despite the alliance with that country — by certain Italian irredentist movements in evidence; and General

Conrad left no stone unturned to provide for the Italian-Austrian frontier being strengthened as effectively as possible. That is why he had the Tyrol forts built, counting as he did on the probability of a war with Italy. He ignored the aversion to the idea of a war with Italy in evidence everywhere in Hungary; for, relying upon Germany to protect his rear, he had ready a plan of campaign for action against Hungary too. He wished to open up new avenues of approach towards the Balkans; and though his intentions in this respect must certainly have found an impediment in the attitude of Russia, he believed that with Germany protecting his rear and a possibility of the alliance with Italy being strengthened by an alliance with Rumania too, he would find adequate protection against Russia. It was in this situation of reassurance respecting the future that General Conrad entered the Great War, which then annihilated the whole Monarchy.

As far back as the sixties of last century the centralistic policy of the Vienna Government was assailed by those who believed that that policy was a mistake and that it would be better to replace centralism by federalism. So there began a dispute — and a struggle — which went on behind the scenes, not only between Austria and Bohemia, but also between Austria and Hungary; indeed, there was a third front as between Austrian centralism and its opponents which has so far escaped attention. Yet from 1867 onwards the Hungarian Opposition struggled continuously and with unflagging energy; and later on the Hungarian Government itself joined that front, — indeed, Count Stephen Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister, actually became the standard-bearer of the movement. So far no one has considered — though the fact is evident and obvious enough — that this involved also a change of attitude on the part of the Hungarian Government; for by opposing the centralism of Austria that Government documented its readiness to accept eventual changes calculated to strengthen the inner structure of the Monarchy as established by the Compromise of 1867 by a more effectual satisfaction of the legitimate demands of the various peoples living in that Monarchy.

Today it would appear to be indubitable that the fate of the Monarchy too depended upon whether it persisted in maintaining the centralistic tendencies and in opposing all those who had turned against the Vienna Government, or whether, abandoning the imperialistic policy of the centralists, it showed a readiness to consult the interests of the various peoples and to place the security of the Monarchy upon a wider basis? And the reason why in 1906 the Rumanian Aurelius Popovici and in 1908 the Czech Edward Beneš demanded provincial autonomy, was that they might weaken the inner foundations of the Monarchy;

while the reason why Charles of Habsburg abandoned Austrian centralism was that he might avert the danger and secure the safety of his Empire. From Mr. Lloyd George's *Memoirs* it appears that the same change was demanded of the Monarchy in 1917 by President Wilson and the British Government too, who were therefore anxious to retain the Monarchy and at the same time to reform it in keeping with the requirements of the age. The same was the object also of the Government of the Monarchy in 1918, when the Letters Patent of the Austrian Emperor were issued (October 16th.); and this is weighty enough evidence to show that the Emperor was fully prepared to adjust the relations between Austria and Bohemia and between Austria and other parts of the Monarchy too. And yet, in face of these facts, what we find today is in open defiance of the historical development and legitimate demands of the Danubian peoples and of natural evolution — the Great War having been succeeded by a policy which created on the ruins of the Monarchy centralistic States whose Governments keep offering occasions galore for complaints on the part of the millions incorporated in the new States. These complaints are however of importance in another respect too: they point to an open defiance of the agreements upon which the peace and the treaties of peace of Europe are based. It is extremely difficult to defend the League of Nations in view of the fact that the Nations to their great regret cannot follow that institution on the path chosen by it which leads to an unproductive defence of continuous branches of international law.

The Hungarian nation fought against the centralism of the Austrians, not theoretically, but in practice, and at immense cost. In its unyielding struggle it succeeded in persuading the Powers to admit that centralism must be replaced by the right of self-determination of the peoples; and it was on this basis that certain territories were wrested from the Monarchy and from Hungary. Few know, however, that this was the starting-point of a new legal transaction. For the Powers transferred to the Czech, Rumanian and Serbian Governments the territories wrested from Hungary only against guarantees of the rights due to the inhabitants of those territories; that means that these territories were transferred to the possession of those countries, not from Hungary direct, but through the Powers. Indeed, in the Treaty dated August 10th., 1910, those same Powers transferred the sovereignty over those territories expressly and exclusively on condition of the observance of all the treaties and agreements of which we have spoken.

Thereby those Powers themselves admitted that there could be no redress of the situation in Europe except by a return to the starting-point determined in 1918.

CHAPTERS OF HUNGARIAN LITERATURE

I.

COUNT NICHOLAS ZRINYI

by

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Hungary has had a stormy past. Not the least stirring of the periods in that stormy past was the age in which she stood as the bulwark of Christianity and Western civilisation athwart the path of conquest of the Crescent and suffered a patient martyrdom in the cause of an apathetic Christendom.

One of the most glorious pages in the story of this martyrdom was the struggle of the hero of Szigetvár to stem the tide of Turkish conquest. Count *Nicholas Zrinyi* the Elder was a typical representative of that stalwart and uncompromising patriotism which has so often made non-Magyars the foremost champions of their Hungarian fatherland, — which has given Hungary her Zrinyis and her Petöfis.

The story of the dauntless heroism of the master of Szigetvár is indeed a fit subject for a national epic. Just as "Beowulf" sums up in the character of its hero those qualities which the ancient English regarded as the acme of manly prowess, — qualities which find a striking analogy in those of the hero of Arany János's great epic "*Toldi*" —, so in the Epic of Nicholas Zrinyi the Younger we find exemplified those characteristics of the Hungarian which have rendered his struggle in the cause of an ungrateful Europe so typical of the race, — characteristics which again find their analogy in those qualities of the British race that have given Great Britain her place in the van of the nations of the world, — that grit and dogged perseverance which know not how to yield even before overwhelming odds, that sense of honour which Wiglaf expressed when he said that "death is preferable for all earls to a life of dishonour", that firm belief in the power of right to conquer might which has saved Britain's cause in many a perilous enterprise undertaken without regard for the risks involved.

In the sixteenth century the main obstacle to the assertion of Hungarian nationalism and national independence was the expansion of the German and Ottoman Empires. The nation was unfortunately divided against itself; the country acknowledged three masters, — the Sultan of Turkey, the

Habsburg King of Western and the national King of Eastern Hungary and Transylvania. The want of unity was a terrible handicap to those true patriots who, like Nicholas Zrinyi the Elder, fought for the ideal of an independent fatherland and for the triumph of their Christian faith. The marchmen of the district between the Danube and the Drave were a living breakwater to stem the tide of Osmanli invasion that threatened with destruction, not only the nationalism of the Magyar race, but the very existence of Christian civilisation. The one care that possessed their nights and converted their days into an incessant round of exertion, was the expulsion of the Turk and the recovery of their native land. These heroes were too few in number to meet the Osmanli hosts in open battle; but their guerilla warfare and their daring surprise attacks made them a terror to the infidel invaders, from their home in the South-West as far north as Buda itself.

The Zrinyis, like all other national heroes of their time, had to fight, not only against the inexhaustible resources of the pagan foe of their country and of Christianity, but against the equally inexhaustible intrigues and selfish indifference of the Court of Vienna, which subordinated the interests of Christendom and of mankind in general — as always — to the particular interests of an infatuated opportunism. It was jealousy of the fame and glory of Nicholas Zrinyi the Elder that made the Court and the Imperialist generals turn a deaf ear to the appeals for aid which went forth from the heroic defenders of Szigetvár. It was in vain that Zrinyi protested, with perfect sincerity, that he was fighting, not for personal exaltation, but for his God, his King (to whom he was ever loyal), his faith, and his down-trodden country; both King Maximilian and Archduke Ferdinand refused their assistance, though they had an army of 120,000 men — lying idle in the neighbouring county. This army was moved *north*, to Győr; Szigetvár was razed to the ground, and its heroic commander fell. The same fate was in store for his son George, who was — intentionally — misunderstood and underrated by Hardegg, and for

his grandson George, who was employed by Wallenstein for work quite unsuited to his genius and his temperament, so that the people attributed his death to an epidemic which they called „Wallenstein”.

The poet, Nicholas Zrinyi the Younger, inherited the great traditions of his family, and at the same time was himself the incarnation of the soul of his nation and of the grand ideas for which his generation lived and died. He had a national mission to perform; and he undertook the work sword and pen in hand. On the battlefield and in his cloistered study alike, he was the patriot embodying that unselfish love of country which had inspired his great ancestor as he rushed out to his death over the drawbridge of his fortress (then a mass of smoking ruins), with the sacred symbol of his faith on his breast and the fire of Hungarian courage in his heart, selling his life dearly and striking terror into the hosts of infidels, who scarce knew whether he were man or fiend. The poet personified further, in particular in his literary products, those ideas which permeated the national life of the Hungary of the seventeenth century; religious tolerance, political liberty for all alike, the consciousness of the common danger threatening the nation and Christianity from the expansion of the Turks, distrust in the sincerity of the goodwill of the Emperor and of the Vienna Court.

Nicholas Zrinyi the Younger, son of George Zrinyi and Elizabeth Széchy (thus, great-grandson of the hero of Szigetvár), was born on May 1, 1620. His education was practical and in accordance with the customs and manners of the time. He was brought up in the family castle at Csáktornya to a knowledge of books and of the art of war. His training in the latter began early with the sight of his father's warriors entering the castle gates after successful „Turk-baiting”, bearing the horse-tails captured from the pagan foe, leading their crest-fallen captives and carrying the heads of the fallen enemies on the points of their lances. Thus in his tenderest childhood the future poet grew accustomed to the glory of victory and the sight of blood, and imbibed the conviction that the greatest service to his country and his faith was that rendered on the field of battle. In this conviction he was strengthened by the traditions and the memorials of the past, which formed no unimportant part of the child's education. From Komárom in the North to the coast of Dalmatia in the South, there was hardly any region that did not echo the memory of some engagement in which a Zrinyi had played a leading part or done deeds of heroism; the name of Zrinyi was on the lips of every minstrel and bard, Magyar and Croatian alike; and there must have been many an old servant in the castle who remembered the glorious days of Nicholas Zrinyi the Elder and fed the imagination of the poet — as Walter Scott's veterans of the Forty-Five did nearly two centuries later — with stirring stories of the grand struggle of the great champion of his country and his faith to hold the formidable foe of Christianity in check. The castle of Csáktornya

itself was a veritable museum of trophies; the walls of the corridors were covered with Turkish flags and banners of all the colours of the rainbow, with valuable Spahi sabres, curious muskets and flints captured from Janissaries, and wondrous Tartar bows: while the rooms were adorned with portraits of renowned ancestors or pictures of battle-scenes in which they had distinguished themselves, and on the ramparts Turkish cannon told the child of his forefathers' glorious victories and spoke to him in silent eloquence of the mission and career awaiting the scion of a fighting house of invincible warriors.

But the death of his father, carried off by an insidious epidemic, as he wasted his youthful energy in his capacity as Wallenstein's sentinel on the banks of the river Vág, compelled the orphan, at the age of seven, to leave his ancestral home, taking with him only the inspiring memories of a stirring infancy. He was entrusted to the care of the Bishop of Zagreb, who himself provided for the education of the young Zrinyi, being encouraged to do so, not only by the interest taken in the boy by the King, but by the sincere esteem and affection he felt for the family that had enhanced the glory of his own — the Croatian — nation and had symbolised the natural unity of interests and sentiments between that nation and the Magyars, — a unity which no forced disunion has ever been able to annul. Nor was the Cardinal-Bishop averse to the thought of binding closer to the Catholic Church which he served the son of that Zrinyi whom he had converted to the Roman faith: thus young Zrinyi was ensured an education far superior to that usually afforded the nobility of the day. Zrinyi himself tells us that he „*jeunesse dorée*” of his time learned but little, being taught how to dress, drink, display their pomp and the splendour of their costumes, ride well — as befitted the members of a nation of horsemen —, and spend their days in idleness.

Zrinyi dabbled in the sciences; from 1630 to 1634 he and his younger brother Peter studied under the Jesuits, being initiated into the secrets of grammar, while from 1634 to 1636 they were at Nagyszombat, where they were trained in rhetoric, under the supervision of the Bishop himself. Zrinyi could not have been a student at Cardinal Pázmány's University, which did not open its courses of lectures till January, 1636, while in May of the same year he went on a pilgrimage to Italy. The finishing touches of his education were received under the immediate influence of the great Cardinal Pázmány, the patriotic prelate who founded the mother university from which that of Budapest takes its origin. Pázmány trained Nicholas Zrinyi to a knowledge of the Magyar tongue, to admiration for the Magyar traditions; the Magyar Cicero took the place of the Latin Cicero of the Jesuits. Pázmány's court was far more fertile in kindling the imagination of the young noble than the classical atmosphere of the grammar-school at Nagyszombat; the practical instruction of the great master of Magyar proved more efficacious than the formal rhetoric of the Jesuits in inspiring the mind of

Zrinyi, who was then at the most susceptible age. The Cardinal's uncompromising patriotism proved an invaluable aid in deepening the impressions of the poet's childhood; his „*Spiritual Guide*” — the Magyar „*Cura Pastoralis*” of this Hungarian Gregory — acted as the lodestar of the poet's religious devotion.

It was a stirring age. Zrinyi found himself face to face with the motives underlying the movements of the time, — the religious reaction, the desire of the Vienna Court to enthral the nationalism of a struggling people, the motive forces behind the Thirty Years' War, the endeavours of the princes of Transylvania — in particular of Gabriel Bethlen — to counteract the Germanising and Catholicising tendencies of the House of Habsburg, the diplomatic game of chess being played by the Emperor, the Sultan and the national sovereigns of Transylvania, with Hungary as pawn, the need for the consolidation of Hungarian national literature, sciences and education. And the ambitious soul of Nicholas Zrinyi drank deeply of the sublime problems that awaited solution. Pázmány's home was the meeting-place of the leading statesmen of the day, of the bannerets and magnates, of the most eminent prelates of the Church; Zrinyi listened eagerly to their discussions, which were of far-reaching effect on the destinies of the country and must have exercised a profound influence on the moulding of his intellect. He witnessed the frequent passages of arms between the Palatine, Nicholas Eszterházy, and the Cardinal, who, though Primate of the country and a devout Catholic, advocated the cause of the Protestant principality of Transylvania, for, as the first diplomat of his time, he regarded as essential — from the point of view alike of the State and of his nation — the maintenance of the full independence of this last refuge of Magyardom; and what he heard set the poet thinking and made him reflect the more deeply on the problem of the national existence of the people with whose fate that of his own particular race was inseparably united. He too was destined to play a leading rôle in deciding the fate of that people; that was part of the inheritance bequeathed him by his ancestors, the Bans of Croatia.

As quite a young boy, Zrinyi had become hereditary high sheriff of the county of Zala and a banneret of the kingdom; as such, his name and presence were essential to the ratification of the resolutions of Parliament: and in 1630, as Master of the Horse, he signed his name to all Acts passed by the Estates.

As the pupil of Pázmány, he betrayed a special sympathy for Transylvania, and later became the intimate friend of George Rákóczy II. and an ardent partisan of the Hungarians of the principality which was then, as always, the principal bulwark of Magyar national individuality.

Another peculiarity of Zrinyi's political conviction must be traced to the influence of the Hungarian Primate: he believed implicitly that the salvation of his country depended upon its return to the bosom of the Catholic Church. Catholicism triumphed, as a result of the efforts of Pázmány;

but Hungary failed to rise to her former greatness, for the Habsburgs, who — according to Pázmány — should have given the Catholic nation full liberty and restored its privileges, were but little concerned in the welfare of what they regarded as a province of minor significance compared with the imperial interests of their house. Zrinyi did not cease to believe in the dynasty as the natural stay of the self-defence of his country; and his visit to Italy in 1636 confirmed his belief in the efficacy of the Catholic reaction.

But that was not all — or even the most valuable part — of the education he received from the great Cardinal. „The latter taught him the importance of learning, — taught him that writing was not merely a delightful pastime, but an invincible weapon to ensure the triumph of the ideas which he had imbibed. For each work of Pázmány's had been a decisive engagement in the conflict between Catholicism and Protestantism; and he taught Zrinyi to understand that all State and constitutional questions must be judged and solved with due consideration for national interests and for the conditions prevailing generally in Europe...”

„Italy was still the Holy Land of Religion, Art and Poetry; the Renaissance was still shedding its brilliance and pouring forth the wealth of its intellectual treasures. Under the ever-changing and captivating influences of his surroundings, Nicholas Zrinyi dived deep into Italian literature, and became an ardent and devoted student of *Tasso* and *Macchiavelli*. When he returned home, he was saturated with new ideas and inspired with fresh sentiments.”

“By birth a warrior, by education a politician, by calling a poet, Nicholas Zrinyi was, in all he did and wrote, the living expression, the true personification, of his nation.”

On his return home, the first thing he did was to fortify his ancestral seat at Csáktornya and to make due provision for the defence of the district under his special charge as Lord Lieutenant of the counties of Zala and Somogy and Captain of Légrad and the Muraköz region. He became a terror to the Turks, whom he punished severely on several occasions; he obtained distinction in the Thirty Years' War, in 1644 as commander of a Croatian brigade, in 1646 as commander-in-chief of the Croatian army. But in his absence the Turks had harried and wasted the Muraköz; and it required all his skill as a general and all the steady discipline and intrepid bravery of the Hungarian army to cope with the superior odds fighting against him under the leadership of the Pasha of Nagy-Kanizsa. However, Zrinyi succeeded in driving the intruder back to his own territory; and he was rewarded by the King appointing him Ban of Croatia (December 27, 1647). Thus the young poet became the third dignitary of the realm.

His work as a poet began in the forties, when he played with the passion of love in the „*Viola Idylls*”, probably the record of a personal experience. These verses betray beyond a doubt the influence of the Italian poets, particularly of Tasso, whose „*Aminta*” served as the model for his matter and manner, but not for his form. The object of the poet's love, Countess Eusebia Dras-

kovics, became his wife — after a long and persistent wooing — in 1646. But the happiness was a short-lived one; for the lovely rose of Zrinyi's idylls faded and died in 1651. The poet was crushed by his loss; and he lamented his bereavement in „*The Sorrows of Orpheus*”. He apostrophises the Drave, which he had so often fed with his tears, to weep with him for the faithlessness of his Eurydice, who has left him to pine in despair alone in the world. He descends to the dark depths of the Acheron and implores Pluto in tones of meekest supplication to be merciful to her. The classicism saturating the poem reminds us forcibly of „*Lycidas*”; while the „*Elegy*” written by the sorrowing father of a young boy, — the „tiny nightingale” torn prematurely from his breast — recalls the spirit and manner of the Middle English „*Pearl*”.

The „*Idylls*” and other minor poems, despite their occasional scrappiness and even heaviness, are worthy of the author of „*The Fate of Sziget*”. They are full of bold and telling conceits, pictures, similes, both borrowed and original; and we feel everywhere the sincerity of the poet's passion, even where the object of his song is fictitious. The

descriptions of Nature serve merely to decorate and illustrate the lyrical feelings, to which they are at all times subordinate. The poet makes no secret of the genuineness of his love and the suffering which that love involves; but that passion is not inconsistent with the calling of a warrior. Yet the poet would seem to prefer the character of warrior to that of lover; he makes far more use of historical detail than is usual in love-poetry. He takes his similes and pictures most frequently from the figures of ancient religion and past history; and of his minor poems the one that captivates the imagination most and penetrates to the soul is his „*Hymn to the Crucifix*”, a powerful expression of Christian devotion, resignation and penitence, to exercise which he exhorts all his readers, „for our merits are like the track of ants on the rock, while our sins are like leaves on the trees, like whirlpools in the ocean, like the sand on the sea-shore and like birds in the air. But the Lord's mercy is greater still, His grace infinite; thus we may have trust in Him, not for ourselves, but for His Holy Son, Christ who died on the Cross, who is worthy to have the Muse shed torrents of tears for Him!!!”

(To be continued.)

P O L I T I C A L M O S A I C

THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN SITUATION AFTER THE ITALO-YUGOSLAV AGREEMENT

We believe that when the Little Entente has long been no more than a historical memory, certain circles in Prague and Bucharest will still continue to assert that it is the most perfect of political and military constructions, with a serious mission in the Danube Valley, where mighty tasks lie before it.

It is no longer doubtful that the Italo-Yugoslav treaty of friendship ratified in Belgrade on 27th March is a deviation from the line of traditional Little Entente policy and that it was concluded without the assent or support of the other two States of the Little Entente. And yet, after Count Ciano's departure from Belgrade, we witnessed demonstrations on the part of Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia, in which, however, there was much more of stage-managing than of real sincerity. It would seem that those countries felt impelled to save appearances before the rest of Europe. But the bitter, disappointed tone of the French press, the press of their own ally, shows clearly that that effort was a failure.

The official Italian commentary on the exchange of the ratifying documents in Belgrade is completely reassuring from a Hungarian point of view. One circumstance of special importance for us is that the first stage in Yugoslavia's new foreign policy — for it cannot be questioned that it has struck out in an entirely new direction — was not an agreement with Italy but with Bulgaria. The possibility that Italian influence contributed to this step merely supports our opinion. Rome was bound to follow after Sofia, and it is very probable that, conditions being favourable, this network of friendly treaties will sooner or later

extend to the other two signatory States of the Rome Pact. These treaties were conceived in a spirit of constructive reorganization and signify advantages to all Parties concerned. Italy is desirous to ensure order and co-operation in all the sectors where Central European, Mediterranean, Levantine, and more particularly Danubian and Balkan interests intersect.

This is what the other two States of the Little Entente refuse to understand, and this was the reason why in order to counteract the effects of Count Ciano's visit, they, in hot haste, convened the official Conference of the Little Entente, also in Belgrade. On April 1st and 2nd the three Foreign Ministers, MM. Stoyadinovitch, Krofta and Antonescu, conferred, and the results of their conversations were published in lengthy communiqués containing mention of everything but the most important point of all, namely that Yugoslavia had rejected the plan of mutual assistance offered by France. The situation is that the official communiqué contains a wealth of outer amenities: it is friendly and understanding in tone, formal etiquette has been rigidly observed; but somehow or other the substance has been omitted. For an insistence on the fact that the treaties concluded by Italy, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria do not prejudice the commitments previously given by their signatories does not, we think, affect the main issues. More important by far than the letter of a treaty is its spirit, and in our opinion neither Prague nor Bucharest has any reason to flatter itself with the illusion that the spirit of those treaties is favourable to the Little Entente.

The other day the „*Echo de Paris*” declared that

the Little Entente was going through hours of severe crisis. Should M. Stojadinovitch continue to tread the path he had chosen, the Little Entente would soon be a chimera. Yugoslavia had deserted Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia and showed a readiness to join the system of bilateral treaties that prevent their signatories from coming to the assistance of a third party innocently attacked.

In truth, the Belgrade Little Entente Conference was a struggle between two systems, that of collective security and that of bilateral treaties, and in the light of what happened at that Conference we have no difficulty in deciding which system was victorious. Not without interest either is M. Tardieu's opinion of the question as stated in the "Gringoire".

Tardieu does not say that by the Belgrade agreement Yugoslavia has betrayed the Little Entente, or that she has accepted the "German yoke"; but he believes that the agreement will weaken the Little Entente and modify its policy. The Italo-Yugoslav *rapprochement* — which France has so often endeavoured to bring about and which has now been effected without her — does not, in M. Tardieu's opinion, follow the main line of French politics.

The opinions expressed in the English press are just as pessimistic. The fact that M. Stojadinovitch's colleagues found it necessary to induce him to make a separate statement to the Bucharest "Adeverul", in which *inter alia* he said that a bilateral treaty between Yugoslavia and Hungary was out of the question and that, should it come to negotiations with Hungary, those negotiations would have to be conducted jointly by the three States of the Little Entente, is not regarded very tragically in Budapest. Nor did the sentimental statement issued in Belgrade after Dr. Benes's visit make any deeper impression here. Both are panaceas calculated to relieve symptoms, but utterly powerless to hinder organic changes.

And these changes are inevitably under way. Our conviction is that they will very soon make their effect felt and their presence noticed in European politics. The visit of the Turkish Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs to Belgrade does not lie in the line of Little Entente policy either; nor has that line been reinforced by the article published in the semi-official "Vreme" after the conferences, — an article which firmly and unequivocally stated that "every State has the right to defend its own well-understood interests". This is a distinct and determined enough message to the capitals of the two "sister" States.

The whole situation has been defined best of all by Count Stephen Bethlen's statement to the "Corriere della Sera". Writing of the significance of the Rome Three Power Pact, Hungary's ex-Premier said:

"The Rome Pact paved the way for the Austro-German and Italo-German agreements; secondly the stable situation created in Central Europe by that Pact has made Italy's recent noble gesture of reconciliation towards Yugoslavia possible and given rise to all the events that culminated in the visit to Belgrade of Count Ciano, Italy's Foreign Minister. Through this visit relations between the two countries have been placed on new, friendly foundations, whereby a new situation has been created in Central Europe. — one that will be a sure help towards better relations between the nations and towards the growth of peace.

— "As I see things, certain phenomena accompanying the Little Entente's last appearance on the stage indicate that when after Count Ciano had left Yugoslavia they immediately gathered in Bel-

grade, nothing was accomplished beyond searching for means to retard the natural development of the friendly relations created between Italy and Yugoslavia. One of the reasons why the Little Entente immediately took the stage was obviously a desire to frustrate the intentions of the Yugoslav Government, or may be a determination to prevent the materialization of the logical consequences of the newborn Italo-Yugoslav agreement, namely the development of more normal relations with Hungary by means of an elimination of the existing difficulties which have hitherto stood in the way of a *rapprochement* between the two countries.

— "I attach no special importance to these efforts of the Little Entente. I do not believe, provided the Yugoslav Government sincerely desires to improve relations with Hungary, that the recent activity of the Little Entente in Belgrade will act as a check. Even the Balkan Pact was powerless to do so at the time when the Yugoslav Government entered into better relations with Bulgaria.

— "Certainly, as regards Hungary, nothing has happened to spoil an atmosphere favourable for the creation of better relations with our southern neighbour. I am firmly convinced that this is attainable without prejudice to the commitments to which Yugoslavia through her signature of the treaty with the other two States of the Little Entente is bound.

— "In my opinion therefore" — said Count Bethlen, — "in the interests of universal peace nothing must hinder the further development of the auspicious situation so happily created in Central Europe by the Italo-Yugoslav agreement signed in Belgrade by Count Ciano and M. Stojadinovitch."

Hungarian public opinion — we may safely say — to a man shares Count Bethlen's opinion. The path towards the desired end is clearly marked out. The conditions are to hand, well-defined, unmistakable conditions. The official point of view was expressed a few days ago not only by M. Kánya, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, but also by the Premier, M. Darányi: Hungary will never stand in the way of co-operation — first economic, then political co-operation — among the Danubian States. But the indispensable conditions of co-operation are full equality of rights, a tolerant attitude towards the movement to obtain peaceful revision, and legal protection, on the basis of the rights guaranteed in the international treaties, of the Hungarian minorities. In the future, too, Hungary will refuse to undertake any obligations exceeding the commitments of the peace treaties; nor will she sign any agreement detrimental to her own interests. These are unalterable conditions. Unchanging too may be considered the other cardinal principles of Hungary's foreign policy — the Rome Pact, friendly relations with Germany, and a correct attitude towards the other European States.

In point of fact — as Count Bethlen says — thanks to the Italo-Yugoslav friendly agreement, relations between Budapest and Belgrade, which a considerable time ago took a turn for the better, may be expected to develop along favourable lines; and it is to be hoped that the resolutions of the Little Entente Conference in Belgrade will not be able to exert an adverse influence on them.

YUGOSLAV POLITICIAN'S HOMAGE TO MEMORY OF STEPHEN TISZA

Baron Joseph Rajašić, who in pre-war times, as member of the Serbo-Croatian coalition, represented Croatian interests, in the debates on Hungarian and Croatian joint matters in the Hungarian Parliament, was in Hungary in the March of this year and took this opportunity to visit Geszt, where he laid a wreath on the tomb of Count Stephen Tisza. In spite of the fact that his visit was purely unofficial, his laying of a wreath on the tomb of a former Hungarian Prime Minister must, to a certain measure, be considered a political event, for the object of his act was obviously to further a *rapprochement* between Hungary and Yugoslavia by reviving old political ties. "To lay a wreath on Count Tisza's tomb" — said Baron Rajašić to the representatives of the Hungarian press — "was an old idea of mine. For years I have been looking forward to this opportunity. Hitherto this act of

homage would have been misunderstood in Yugoslavia: so I was obliged to postpone it until there was no more danger of misapprehension. That time has now arrived... I became acquainted with the splendid character of Stephen Tisza during the war. I must say openly that *during the war Tisza delivered many thousands of Serbs of the Szerémség and the Bácska from the hands of bigoted Austrian military authorities, and that it was solely to his efforts that those Serbs owed their lives.* Even where our people were concerned, I found Tisza a man of his word, an honest, energetic and just politician, and therefore I honoured and esteemed him."

This statement is commended to the notice of those who in their unbridled hatred of Hungary bring false charges against her and her nationality policy.

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DEGRADATION OF PRINCE NICHOLAS AND INTERNAL POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN RUMANIA

At the beginning of April the National Peasant Party of Rumania held a congress in Bucharest. The speech delivered by M. Michalache, Chairman of the Party, was actually a Cabinet programme. In it he sketched Rumania's political situation at home and abroad, criticizing it very severely. He declared that *Rumania's foreign policy was equivocal, aimless and muddled and the internal situation a dance on a volcano.* ("Dimineata", April 6.)

M. Michalache's statements are closely connected with the situation created by the degradation of Prince Nicholas. Thanks to the censor and to the state of siege obtaining, all that has leaked out concerning the reasons for this step and the facts behind it is — as the official report of the Crown Council meeting states — that Prince Nicholas was deprived of his royal rank because in 1931 he contracted marriage with a commoner without the King's consent. But reports in foreign newspapers (e. g. the "Matin" of 11th April) suggest that Prince Nicholas's connection with the Iron Guard is the explanation. This would seem to be confirmed by a report in the "Times" stating that General Cantacuzene, the leader of the Iron Guard, that organization of the extreme Right whose motto is "Totul Pentru Tara" (Everything For the Country), protested in the name of the Party against not having been invited to the Crown Council meeting of 9th April and against the resolution taken there to force Prince Nicholas to renounce his rank. It is undoubtedly true that Prince Nicholas, who had quarrelled with his brother over his marriage, did

approach the Iron Guard, an organization bitterly opposed to the present Liberal Government, and relying on its support, openly defied the King and the resolution of the Crown Council.

Whatever else may be true, one thing is certain, namely that the most powerful of the Opposition Parties, the National Peasant Party, as well as the Iron Guard, look upon the bitterly offended Prince Nicholas as a trump card that may help them to gain the upper hand. According to reports in circulation, the Iron Guard has already offered to co-operate with M. Maniu — the head of the fraction of the National Peasant Party dissatisfied with its present leaders. The Liberal Party now in power does not seem to consider it time to retire, and will use its power to the utmost in defence of its position and its lucrative transactions. Rumanian public life is a dance on a barrel of gunpowder and nobody can presage what the next twenty-four hours may bring forth.

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When the above article was written Prince Nicholas was still in Rumania. He has now left the country under the name of Nicholas Brana as a simple commoner. This circumstance does not however in any way change the situation; for the recent history of Rumania offers a striking example of the fact that the voluntary ostracism of persons of high rank does not in the least mean that their personal influence has ceased to affect internal political conditions or that they have definitively retired from the political stage.

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RUMANIAN OFFICIALS CHARACTERIZED BY "CURENTUL"

In an article published on April 7th, the "Curentul", a Bucharest daily, gives the following description of Rumanian customs officials: "A little more civilized manners would be desirable at the customs offices of Rumania, a country sadly ill-famed all over the world. The officials of the Ministries, the

Police, the Post Office, etc, are only too well known for their indolence, rudeness, and lack of good manners. It is easy to imagine, then, how unfavourably foreign visitors must be impressed by experiencing such treatment at the very frontiers of the State! No person will ever forget these impressions. The bad

manners of the Rumanian customs officials are unparalleled even in Bulgaria, Serbia, or Poland, though *these nations are of a highly conceited character*. If you arrive at a frontier station in Rumania you have the feeling that you have somehow or other landed in an inferior suburban district, and you will find that the police authorities adjust their manners and morals to suit the tastes of their environs. Just take the customs officers with their caps cocked over the eye, as if they were sitting in an ale-house! And the way they perform their duties is not only undignified but definitely demoralizing. They treat both foreign and native travellers most rudely and even

impudently." — No doubt the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Poles will energetically protest against having their officials compared with those of Rumania in respect of manners.

"BEWARE OF RUMANIANS!"

In an article published under this title in the "Universul", a Rumanian daily, on March 15th, a correspondent complains that many banks and shops in England have notices put up warning people to "Beware of Rumanians!".

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WHAT LEADING BRITISH PERSONALITIES THINK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND OF THE UNSOUND FRONTIERS OF TODAY

Fifteen prominent personalities figuring in British public life (*Lord Arnold, Lord Astor, Henry Carter, John Fisher Williams, Edward Grigg, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, George Pansbury, F. O. Lindley, Lord Lothian, Edith Lyttleton, Charles E. Raven, Lord Rennell, Lord Sanderson, Donald Soper, Lord Trenchard*) were the signatories of a Letter to the Editor of "The Times" which appeared in that journal on April 14th, and contained the following very instructive statements:

"If all nations were members of the League, if the League possessed power to revise treaties, remove barriers against the movement of goods and of people,

and to remedy other conditions calculated to lead to war, economic sanctions might prevent aggression without serious risk of war. But it is quite clear that the present international tension and crisis is fundamentally due to the fact that the League has not been able to deal with any of the major problems of the contemporary world. It has been unable to modify frontiers admittedly unsound, to abate economic nationalism — though this is by far the biggest single cause of social unrest, dictatorship, and international tension — or to limit armaments, just as it was unable to give to Germany, even when it was a republic, the "equality" which was its natural right."

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HOW MINORITIES LIVE

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

THE VOZÁRY CASE

The „Prághi Magyar Hirlap" (the organ of the United Hungarian Party of Czecho-Slovakia) of 2nd April 1937 reported that at a meeting of the Ruthenian Provincial Assembly on 1st April, the Vice-President of the Province, M. Jaroslav Meznik, stated that in accordance with the intentions of the President of the Republic and the Premier he wished to deal with minority affairs in a spirit of understanding. He had already issued instructions to the effect that in terms of Ordinance N° 229 ex 1928 the minorities were to be treated with the greatest consideration and the utmost concessions granted so far as the use of the Hungarian language was concerned.

In contradiction of this statement M. Meznik that same afternoon interrupted M. Aladár R. Vozáry (Hungarian Party Member of the Provincial Assembly) and told him he had no right to speak in Hungarian, since in his constituency (Munkács) the Hungarian minority was less than 20% of the population. Vozáry, however, continued his speech in Hungarian. In it he referred to the opening speech of the Vice-President of the Province in which the latter had said that the Hungarian minority was to receive more considerate and more liberal treatment. M. Vozáry was not able to reconcile the Vice-President's interruption with his opening speech, for the river Latorca

ran through other districts besides the Munkács district, and in those others the Hungarians had been classified as a minority of more than 20%. (The question under debate was the regulation of the river Latorca.) Thereupon Meznik again warned Vozáry not to speak Hungarian, and when the latter took no notice of this warning he first called him to order and then suspended the debate. When the sitting was re-opened, Vozáry expressed his astonishment that the Chairman had refused to allow him to make his speech in Hungarian, since hitherto there had been no difficulty about it, although the Chairman was not obliged to reply in that language, unless the subject under discussion referred to districts with a 20% Hungarian population. After warning him again the Chairman once more suspended the debate and called in two detectives. When one of them laid his hand on Vozáry's shoulder with the intention of leading him out of the room, Vozáry made an attempt to resist. He was led out of the room and was not allowed even to go up to the gallery.

This incident has aroused a storm of indignation among the Hungarians in both Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary; all the more so as it happened at a time when the Vice-President of Ruthenia — not without a certain cynicism — had just announced a more tolerant policy.

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To enable a foreigner unacquainted with conditions in Czecho-Slovakia to understand the signifi-

cance of what has happened it is necessary to remind him that: —

1. In the treaty concluded between Czecho-Slovakia on the one hand and the Allied and Associated Powers (Great Britain, the U. S. A, France, Italy and Japan) on the other on 10th September 1919 at St. Germain-en-Laye, Czecho-Slovakia undertook the following obligations:

„Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to constitute the Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians within frontiers delimited by the principal Allied and Associated Powers as an autonomous unit within the Czecho-Slovak State, and to accord to it the fullest degree of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak State.” (Article 10.)

„The Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians shall possess a special Diet. This Diet shall have powers of legislation in all linguistic, scholastic and religious questions, in matters of local administration, and in other questions which the laws of the Czecho-Slovak State may assign to it. The Governor of the Ruthene territory shall be appointed by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and shall be responsible to the Ruthene Diet.” (Article 11.)

„Czecho-Slovakia agrees that officials in the Ruthene territory shall be chosen as far as possible from the inhabitants of this territory.” (Article 12.)

„Czecho-Slovakia guarantees to the Ruthene territory equitable representation in the legislative assembly of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, to which Assembly it will send deputies elected according to the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. These deputies will not, however, have the right of voting in the Czecho-Slovak Diet upon legislative questions of the same kind as those assigned to the Ruthene Diet.” (Article 13.)

2. Not one letter of that treaty has been observed by the Czecho-Slovak Republic, except that Constantin Hrabár was appointed Governor. But his sphere of authority is so limited that he cannot even appoint an office messenger. After 18 years of unkept promises negotiations were begun recently between the Government and the leaders of the Czech parties in Ruthenia. The results are so far unknown. The Government does not allow the newspapers to write about them, and the Easter number of the „*Öslakó*”, a Hungarian weekly paper appearing in Munkács, was confiscated by the Public Prosecutor for containing mention of the draft of the autonomy prepared by the Coalition Parties (*Prágai Magyar Hírlap*, March 31.) According to what has hitherto leaked out, there is no word of anything more than a certain extension of the Governor's sphere of authority and the organization of an advisory committee. The „*Lidové Noviny*”, a newspaper closely connected with the Hradčín, says that this committee is to consist of 12 elected and 6 nominated members of the Provincial Assembly and 6 persons appointed by Government. Since the 6 nominated members are also appointed by Government, 12 of the 24 members of the committee would be appointed by Prague; and at the Provincial Assembly elections Government would have to win over only one man more to secure a majority. Needless to say this advisory committee is no legal substitute for the autonomous parliament guaranteed in the minority treaty and recognized therein as a factor

enjoying the same rights in autonomous matters as the Prague Parliament. Similarly an extension of the Governor's sphere of authority does not mean fulfilment of treaty obligations, for under the treaty the Governor is a functionary responsible to the autonomous Assembly and not an official appointed by Prague. (See pages 14—16 of enclosed Danubian Review for Andrew Korlát's speech on this subject in the Prague Parliament.)

3. Accordingly, should negotiations prove successful, Ruthenia's present Provincial Assembly and President would remain. All this has nothing to do with the *political autonomy* guaranteed in the treaty; these are merely questions of an *administrative self-government* the like of which is enjoyed by Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia. What is most characteristic of the extent of that administrative autonomy is that in terms of the Law of 14th July 1927 (No. 125) which established that autonomy, questions of a political nature may not be discussed at Provincial Assembly meetings. In any case under this law one-third of the members of the Provincial Assemblies are appointed by Prague.

4. In distinct contradiction of Article 11 of the minority treaty, in the absence of a Diet, the Prague Parliament executes legislature in matters classified as autonomous by that treaty — religion, language, education and internal administration —, and the laws passed by the Prague Parliament are put into force by the Prague Government and its officials. In contradiction of Article 13 of the minority treaty, 85—90 per cent, of the public servants in Ruthenia are of Czech nationality. The head of the administration is a Czech, Provincial President Roszypal, as is also the Provincial Vice-President (Mezník). These are the men who rule Ruthenia, the Governor having no authority at all.

5. According to Article 11 of the minority treaty the language question also comes within the sphere of authority of the self-governing Diet. No such Diet existing, the language question is regulated by the Prague Parliament and Government. Thus the Czecho-Slovak Language Act (No. 122, 29th February, 1920) in terms of which minorities have no linguistic rights except in districts where they represent at least 20% of the population, and the Language Ordinances (Nos. 17, ex 1926 and 229, ex 1928), are in force also in Ruthenia. For the present we are only concerned with the last mentioned. In terms thereof the only members of the Provincial Assembly entitled to use their mother-tongue in the Assembly are those who belong to a minority which forms at least 20% of the population of the Province, and those who speak on behalf of a district in which the minority in question forms at least 20% of the resident population. This provision runs contrary not only to Article 11 of the minority treaty, but also to the Language Act (No. 122) of 1920, § 3 of which says that the self-government corporations themselves shall regulate the question of the use of minority languages.

6. The 1910 Census showed a 29.2% minority of Hungarians in Ruthenia. The Czecho-Slovak Census of 1920, by means of various devices, especially by the creation of a Jewish nationality and by forcing numerous Jews who called themselves Hungarians to register under the heading Jews, managed to reduce that percentage to 17.35. (For details see pages 62—78 of enclosed Memorandum.) As a result Hungarian members of the Provincial Assembly are not entitled to speak in Hungarian on every question, although they are the representatives of 109,472 inhabitants (1930 Czecho-Slovak census). At the same time Czech members are always entitled to speak in Czech, al-

though the number of *Czechs* and *Slovaks* in Ruthenia is only 33,961, or 4.79% of the total population.

7. But even under Ordinance No. 229/1928 M. Aladár Vozáry was fully entitled in the present instance to speak in Hungarian. The river Latorca on its course through Ruthenia flows through the Ungvár (Užhorod) administrative district, where even according to the 1930 Czecho-Slovak Census the population was 32.31% Hungarian. In refusing to allow Vozáry to speak in Hungarian Vice-President Meznik was guilty of a breach, not only of the minority treaty, the Czecho-Slovak Constitution and Language Act, but also of Ordinance No. 229 ex 1928.

8. The Czechs themselves, realising the injustice of forbidding the representatives of the Hungarians in Ruthenia to use their mother-tongue in the Provincial Assembly, seeing that the Hungarians had settled in Ruthenia earlier than the Ruthenians themselves and were high above them from a cultural point of view, have permitted speeches in Hungarian on all subjects in the Provincial Assembly since 1928. This usage was abolished by Vice-President Meznik, just when he had announced his intention of treating the minorities with consideration and understanding, and when he was reported to have issued instructions that the widest concessions were to be made in the matter of the Hungarian language. The Vozáry incident, however, would seem to indicate that instead of understanding and consideration the Hungarians may be prepared for worse things in the future.

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ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP MADE MORE DIFFICULT

An old and standing complaint of the Hungarians in Czecho-Slovakia is the chaos surrounding the question of citizenship. The Bill now being drafted by Government is calculated to aggravate the question still further. From a minority point of view special danger lies in the provision which stipulates that no one may acquire citizenship who cannot speak the official language of the country. The problem of the "homeless" in Slovakia and Ruthenia is very vaguely regulated in the new Bill. According to the "Lidové Noviny" consideration will have to be paid to those Hungarian subjects who have been resident in Slovak or Ruthenian villages without interruption since 1st January 1910, but it will be for the *administrative authorities* to say whether they are ill-disposed towards the Republic or not. The most important innovation is that the Bill introduces de-nationalisation, i. e. the State may deprive its own subjects of their rights of citizenship. In terms of the draft the Prefect of any Province may deprive of their rights of citizenship all who offend against the interests of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

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SUGGESTIVE FIGURES

The Hungarian population of the city of Pozsony, according to the figures of the last Census, represents 16.16% of the total number of inhabitants. Official statements recently made by various authorities point out that the Hungarians have a right everywhere to claim admission, according to their percentage, to public offices as well as to posts in private companies. Nevertheless, the national percentage is being totally

ignored at the Post Office of Pozsony. The total number of Post Office employees in that city is 896, and only 15, i. e. 1.67%, are Hungarians. In the parish of Szenc the percentage of the Hungarian population is officially given as 57.6% (out of a total number of 5609); nevertheless, the only school the parish has at present is Slovak, though the number of Slovak inhabitants is not more than 1934 in the whole parish. — Similarly, the parish of Sirák, where 84.87% of the inhabitants are Hungarians, has only one school, and that one is a Slovak school. — The percentage of the Hungarian population in the County Court district of Galánta is officially given as 62%; yet warrants are written in Czech only, even if the clients ask for the replies to be sent in Hungarian. — The Hungarian population represents 78.9% in the County Court district of Királyhelmec; yet, several official writings are written in Czech only, in defiance of the provisions of Law No. 122, 1920; no exception is made in favour of Hungarian clients, even if they lodge their information in Hungarian. (Prágai Magyar Hírlap, April 11.). — In the district of Somorja, where the Hungarians represent 76.63% of the population, as against 11.37% Slovaks and 9.05% Germans, the public institute for juvenile welfare has no Hungarian branch, nor has any such institution been established for the Hungarians.

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RUMANIA

AFTER EXISTING FOR CENTURIES THE SAXON "COMMUNITY" ("UNIVERSITAS") HAS BEEN DISSOLVED BY THE RUMANIANS

The Rumanian Senate has discussed and passed the Bill providing for the *dissolution of the "community" of the Saxons of Transylvania which had existed for centuries and possessed enormous wealth.* "By this sad act" — writes the "Kronstädter Zeitung" (26th. March 1937) — "an end has been put to something which was more than mere material wealth, — being a symbol of a great past and the emblem of the days when the Saxons possessed the right of self-determination." The new Act has transferred 75% of the assets of the now extinct Saxon "universitas" to the "Mihai Viteazul" Rumanian Cultural Fund established simultaneously with the dissolution of that "universitas", leaving 25% to be placed at the disposal of the Evangelical Church.

The distribution of the assets of the Saxon "universitas" was effected by agreement between the Saxon deputies and the Rumanian Government. The legality of this procedure has however been called in question by a daily — the "Deutsche Tageszeitung" — representing the section of the Saxons who have amalgamated in an opposition party, which in an article published in its April 4th. (1937) issue writes as follows: "Now that the Government is depriving the Saxons successively of their goods and possessions, a few Germans have entered into negotiations with the Government and have definitively renounced the ancient right of utilising their property exclusively exercised of old by the Saxons." In another article the same paper writes as follows: — "Only the General Meeting was entitled to decide in the matter of liquidation; and that right by no means belonged to a few members of the "Volksgemeinschaft": for the

ranks of the Germans include Saxons who do not belong to the "Volksgemeinschaft", while in the Királyföld region there are living claimants to the property who are of other race and other faiths, not only Saxons and Rumanians."

It this connection it will be interesting to glance back briefly at the history of the Saxon "universitas".

The foundations of this institution were laid by the *Diploma Andreanum* issued by Andrew II., King of Hungary, in 1224. This Diploma for centuries provided for the protection of the Saxon "nation", acted as guide of the Saxon people, administered justice and watched over the spirit of the German schools and over public morals etc. In 1876 — as a consequence of the administrative re-distribution of the territory of the country and of the abolition of "privileged" regions in keeping with the general European development of law — the Királyföld region (*Fundus Regius*) previously under Saxon administration was also divided into counties, being thus adjusted to the general administrative system of the country; but Act XII. of 1876 provided that the authority of the Saxon "universitas" in respect of the management of the property of the "universitas" should be left intact and that the revenues of that property which were freely available should be devoted to cultural purposes, for the benefit of all inhabitants alike without respect of religion or language. The right of disposal of the property of the "universitas" remained however in the hands of the General Meeting, the 20 Members of which were to be elected by the inhabitants of the said region who possessed suffrage rights. The Chairman of the General Meeting was the High Sheriff of the County of Szeben, — the legal successor of the Saxon "comes" of older days; consequently — seeing that out of particular consideration for the Saxons the Hungarian Government (apart from one single exception) always appointed the High Sheriff of Szeben from among the Saxons — the Chairman of the General Meeting was a Saxon, a circumstance which in itself sufficiently strikingly symbolises the Saxon character of the "universitas".

At the outset the Rumanian Government raised no objections against the exercise by the "universitas" of its rights. In 1934, however, the present Liberal Government appointed a provisional committee — consisting of 3 Saxon and 3 Rumanian Members functioning under the presidency of the Prefect of Nagyszeben, then of course no longer a Saxon, but a Rumanian by nationality — to administer the property of the Saxon "universitas". The Agrarian reform inflicted a grave blow on the "universitas", expropriating altogether 35,000 yokes out of the landed estate belonging to that institution and leaving only 1200 yokes of forest-land in its possession. The assets of the "universitas" — the value of which in pre-War days was estimated at 19.2 million gold crowns, their yield being 970,000 gold crowns a year — shrank to an amount of altogether 45 million lei, 33 millions of that amount consisting of State bonds yielding in the most favourable case a revenue of 3 million lei a year. Other assets belonging to the Saxon "universitas" were the agricultural school at Meggyes, with an estate of 75 yokes attached, and 10 valuable houses in Nagyszeben. And now the said Act is depriving the Saxon "universitas" of even this exceptionally diminished wealth. It should be pointed out, further, that the expropriated land (35,000 yokes, representing a value of 1,000 million lei) has come into the possession exclusively of Rumanians — against expropriation bonds of the nominal value of 33 million representing an actual value of only 12 million lei. And now, out of the fraction of its original wealth still left in the

hands of the Saxon "universitas" the new Rumanian Act has allotted 75% to a cultural endowment with exclusively Rumanian objects, the remaining 25% being allotted, not to the Saxons, but to the Evangelical Church. That means that when distributing the assets still remaining the authorities have cut off without a single penny, not only the Magyars (representing about 5% of the population of the Királyföld region), but also the Catholic Germans living within the territory.

In the days of Hungarian rule the Saxons were enabled to keep in their possession the whole property of their "universitas"; under the present régime, however, they have been simply deprived of their goods. That is the difference between the nationality policy of "feudal" Hungary and that of "democratic" Rumania.

STATE OF SIEGE AND CENSORSHIP TO CONTINUE

According to the law published in the official gazette (*Monitorul Oficial*) on March 15th the state of siege and the censorship in Rumania are to be prolonged until September 16th, 1937; the terms of the state of siege are to be much more rigorous than they have been so far. It will be remembered, namely, that ever since Rumania annexed her new territories (formerly parts of Hungary) — that is to say, for the last twenty years, with the exception of a period between 1929 and 1932 — a state of siege and a censorship have permanently prevailed in these areas. This fact has been severely criticized even by the Rumanian papers. Thus, for instance, the "Adeverul", a radical paper appearing in Bucharest writes as follows (on March 11): "Now, twenty years after the Great War, the Rumanian people still live under extraordinary conditions. After the introduction of Land Reform and Universal Suffrage the ruling class now wishes to perpetuate its rule with the help of the state of siege. Since the distribution of land may now be considered a failure, owing to the lack of credit and sufficient financial support, this state of siege is intended to deal a fatal blow to the system of universal suffrage too. As if Rumania were still living in 1918."

Needless to say, this suspension of liberties weighs most heavily upon the minorities. We have referred already to many cases in the columns of this paper to show that in those areas which are in a state of siege the Hungarian Party meetings and even the meetings of religious bodies have been prohibited.

While the state of siege refers only to certain parts of Rumania, a censorship has been introduced in the whole country extending to the preliminary control of all kinds of printed matter and the press in general. The authorities have a right to prohibit the publication of any daily paper, any news or articles, etc. When the prolongation of the state of siege was brought before Parliament, the Hungarian members protested that the censorship was active even in those areas where the safety of the State was exposed to no danger whatsoever, and that it did not allow the use of geographical names in the languages of the minorities, with the result that the minority papers have been more than once obliged to change their titles (*Brassói Lapok*, March 14). — M. Gafencu, Senator of the National Peasant Party, has pointed out that the censor has cancelled whole passages of the speech made by Prof. Jorga, former Prime Minister, in the Senate.

RUMANIZATION OF HUNGARIAN AND GERMAN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE BEGUN WITH RENEWED ENERGY

A National Labour Bill has been introduced in the Rumanian Parliament which, if it becomes law, will mean that 75% of the employees of commercial and industrial undertakings must be of Rumanian origin (*origina etica romaneasca*). The two biggest minorities, the Hungarians and the Germans, energetically oppose the new Bill.

The protest submitted in a memorandum to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Hungarian Party lays stress on the fact that the Bill is diametrically opposed to the international treaties for the protection of the minorities. Moreover, it is a violation of very important principles of the Rumanian Constitution. The Hungarian breadwinners who have been thrown out of the public services and have only with the greatest difficulty found posts in private undertakings, are in danger of losing the latter and being cast out into the streets. According to the Hungarian press, the Bill would reduce hundreds of thousands to beggary and shake the foundations of those big enterprises in the development of which the men who are to lose their jobs have played an important rôle.

Particularly energetic are the protests in the press of the Germans of Rumania. The "Kronstädter Zeitung" of 12th March, for instance, calls the Bill the most unfortunate step ever taken by the Rumanian Government. It declares the Bill an infraction of the Constitution; depriving, as it does, citizens of their fundamental rights and flouting the principle of equality, it strikes at the very foundations of the State itself. The "Kronstädter Zeitung" is convinced that the well-known results of "nationalization", as witnessed in Soviet Russia, will not fail to follow. The "Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tageblatt" points out that the flourishing industries and commercial concerns which the Rumanians found in Transylvania at the time of the union were mostly in the hands of the present minorities. In principle and in practice the new Bill will create intolerable conditions, for it will drive tens of thousands of German workmen into the arms of Bolshevism. Should the Bill become law — says this German paper — it would cause a serious breach between the Rumanians and the minorities and force the latter in self-defence to form a united *bloc*. This breach of the Constitution violates the Gyulafehérvár resolutions as well as the minority treaties; and it is the duty of the leaders of the German minority — continues the paper — to fight against it in the constitutional departments and also in Geneva, before the eyes of the whole world (March 18). In the name of the German People's Council of Rumania, its chairman, M. Fabritius, has made a statement to the effect that the German *Volksgruppe* has waged and will continue to wage unceasing war against all endeavours to degrade the Germans to the rank of second-rate citizens in the spheres of culture and economy. The new Bill signifies the most serious interference with the most elementary rights of the Germans and will deprive many thousands of them of work and wages. In the event of its becoming law serious Communist danger lies ahead ("Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tageblatt", March 23).

According to the latest information received, the Government intends to put the National Labour Defence Bill in force by Edict (*decret-lege*).

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THE "ECONOMIST" ON THE "NUMERUS VALACHICUS"

In one of its April issues the "Economist" expresses its disapproval of those laws which are now about to be passed by the Rumanian Parliament against the minority population, which forms 30% of the total population of post-war Rumania. Rumania is not in a position to encounter the hostile attitude which these laws for the prosecution of the minorities are bound to create — on the score of racial affinity — both in Budapest and in Berlin. The Rumanian Government apparently proposes to appease the Rumanian intellectual proletariat by securing for it all public and private employments; such an enormous abuse of political power must, however, lead to very grave consequences.

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HUNGARIANS COMPELLED TO ABANDON THEIR RELIGION

The inhabitants of the county of Maros-Torda, particularly those of the parish of Szentháromság (Troita) are being compelled to go over to the Greek Catholic Church. The sergeant of gendarmes, the parish clerk, and the Greek Catholic priest have already succeeded in frightening 200 Unitarian and Roman Catholic inhabitants of that parish into conversion. When a delegation appeared before the Government Commissioner to protest against these atrocities, two members of the delegation, the Rev. János Antal a Roman Catholic priest, and the Rev. Gyula Pap, a Unitarian minister, were arrested by the gendarmes and were only released by command of the State Attorney. (Reggeli Újság, April 1., and Brassói Lapok, April 15.) — In Nagybánya, where the State has very rich ore mines, the engineers are persuading the Roman Catholic and Reformed miners to become Greek Orientals, in return for which they will be allowed to pass the language tests in summer without any difficulty. (Brassói Lapok, April 2.) — The sergeant of gendarmes in the parish of Görgény has arrested and insulted the Rev. Imre Szász, a Reformed minister, for reading from the Bible to a family from his congregation. (Népujság, March 23.)

— y —

PRIOR OF PREMONSTRATENSIAN ORDER IN NAGYVÁRAD DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP AND EXPELLED TO ENABLE STATE TO CONFISCATE POSSESSIONS OF ORDER

Camillo Kovács, Prior of the Premonstratensian Order of Canons, who is a Magyar by race, has been deprived of his rights of citizenship and expelled from Rumania by order of the Cabinet Council. The moment the writ of expulsion had been served on him, the gendarmes conducted him to the Hungarian frontier. Since years Prior Kovács has been fighting a losing battle to save the Order's possessions in Nagyvárad, as has more than once been reported in these columns. Scarcely had Prior Kovács been driven from his post when Onisifor Ghibu, university professor, as head of the Land Registry Department, filed a petition with the Court of Justice asking that, as

the Order lacked a Superior (!), the real estate belonging thereto — the very valuable Felix Thermal Baths, and the buildings of the Academy of Law which are part of the Catholic Educational Foundation — should be conveyed to the State (Keleti Ujság, March 22). Professor Ghibu has also had conveyed to the State the monastery of the Piarists in Mármarosziget, as well as the Piarist secondary school there (Magyar Lapok, March 11).

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STATE GRANTS TO HUNGARIAN INSTITUTIONS AND MINORITY CHURCHES AGAIN NOT INCLUDED IN THE BUDGET

The State grants to minority Church schools have been left out of the new Rumanian Budget, as in all previous years, notwithstanding the fact that these grants were provided for in Art. 10. of the Minority Agreement of Paris; Rumania, too, seems to have forgotten about the generosity of the Hungarian State towards the schools of the Rumanian minority prior to the Great War. The inequality of this treatment is only increased by the fact that the schools of the German minority receive a grant of 2 million lei under the Budget and another two millions of extra-budgetary credit (Keleti Ujság, March 12., and Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tageblatt, March 21.). — The State contributions to the salaries of the minority clergy will be considerably lower than at present; they will receive a much smaller subsidy than the clergy of the State (Greek Orthodox) Church; an Orthodox clergyman will receive a monthly grant of 4.060 lei, a Greek Catholic priest: 3.950 lei, Roman Catholics: 3.000 lei, Lutherans: 2.950 lei, Calvinists: 1.800 lei, Unitarians: 1.200 lei (Keleti Ujság, March 21.). — The towns and counties with a considerable Magyar minority too, have left the institutions of the minorities altogether out of their Budget calculations. Thus, for instance, the city of Marosvásárhely, which has a purely Magyar population, gives no subsidy whatsoever to the cultural institutions of its Hungarian citizens, while its infinitely smaller Rumanian schools, Church institutions, and other cultural institutions receive very respectable grants from the city (Brassói Lapok, March 13.). — The situation is the same in the 97% Hungarian city of Nagyszalonta, where the Rumanian Churches receive a grant of 470.000 lei, while the applications of the minority Churches for a similar grant have simply been refused (Keleti Ujság, March 8.).

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CULTURAL COMPLAINTS OF HUNGARIAN MINORITY

For a whole year the Hungarians of the parish of Szamosujvár have been unable to obtain permission from the authorities for their amateur theatrical performances. (Népujság, March 21.) — The Rumanian authorities have refused to permit the performance of a Hungarian play entitled "The Great Jeweller", written by the famous Hungarian humorist Frigyes Karinthy. (Keleti Ujság, March 29.) — A publishing company in Kolozsvár received a considerable order for prize books to be distributed among the Hungarian children of the Church and State schools in Arad by the local branch of the Hungarian Party there. When the consignment of books had been duly dispatched by the company, a warrant for the confiscation of the

books was issued by the Prefect of the local police, in spite of the fact that these books had been ordered with the permission of the Ministry and of the Censor. (Népujság, April 6.)

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HUNGARIAN GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES TO DISAPPEAR EVEN FROM THE LAND REGISTER

The Ministry of Justice has instructed all law courts in Transylvania to strike off all the old Hungarian names of towns, parishes, rivers, mountains, lanes, etc. from the Land Register. (Ellenzék, March 6.) — The police authorities of the city of Arad have ordered all merchants and private companies to put up new sign boards within two weeks, with purely Rumanian inscriptions. (Hirlap, March 19.) — The Censor of the city of Temesvár has decreed that all posters have now to be printed in Rumanian only. (Brassói Lapok, March 22.)

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LANGUAGE TESTS

The system of language tests is now being extended to economic life as well. The Chambers of Labour have already received the latest decree of the Government ordering private employees to take the language tests. ("Keleti Ujság", March 13.). — This order applies even to the two thousand employees of the metal mines of the State, including miners, servants, and officials; these people have to take the language tests in June. ("Aradi Közlöny", March 23.). — Even sports are not free from this chicanery. In the cities of Nagyvárad and Arad respectively six (out of altogether 12) minority football referees have been disqualified owing to an insufficient knowledge of Rumanian. ("Friss Ujság", March 27.).

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MORE PAPERS CONFISCATED

The Hungarian daily papers, "Magyar Lapok" and "Népujság", appearing in Nagyvárad were confiscated on March 13th, and are not allowed to appear for one month each. ("Brassói Lapok", March 25.). — The German daily papers "Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tageblatt", published at Nagyszeben, and "Kronstädter Zeitung" appearing in Brassó, have also been confiscated because they continued to use the old German geographical names. The only Ruthenian paper in Rumania, the "Čas" has met with the same fate.

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HUNGARIAN MINORITY EXCLUDED FROM SELFGOVERNMENT

The selfgovernment recently instituted by a series of Rumanian laws is merely a formality not to be compared to the home rule Transylvania enjoyed for many centuries in the past. How is it possible to give the name of "autonomy" to a system which authorizes the Government to appoint temporary committees for the performance of the duties of certain autonomous bodies? There are hardly any autonomous bodies functioning at present in Transylvania, especially in the Hungarian areas. Although it was decreed under the latest administrative law that the new councils of towns and parishes — which are now replaced by

temporary committees — have to be elected not later than March 1937, the Government is continually postponing the date of the elections. The city of Nagyvárad has had an elected council for not more than four years out of eighteen. The Minister of the Interior has ordered the dissolution of the newly elected parish council of Nyáradszereda (95% Hungarian!) because the president by seniority — not speaking any other language — addressed the constituent assembly in Hungarian. (From "Brassói Lapok", March 7.)

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ANOTHER OFFENSIVE LAND BILL

An amendment to Art. 47 of the Land Reform Bill declares that the State is to be considered to have the right of preemption in the case of the buildings, investments and even the nonagrarian areas of properties that have been wholly or partly expropriated. The minority deputies and senators of the Rumanian Parliament have protested against the amendment as being in defiance of the terms of the Constitution. Another objection against the Bill is that it refers to Transylvania only and that it proposes to enforce these measures with a retroactive force. Herr Binder, a German senator, has pointed out that the Legislative Council has considered the Bill to be anti-constitutional.

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YUGOSLAVIA

WHY ARE THE CROATIANS DISSATISFIED ?

The answer to this question, which has been much discussed in the European press, will be found in the following extracts from speeches made in the Skupstina and the Senate and from articles published recently in various newspapers.

Dr. Kosić, university professor and Serb member of the Skupstina, delivered two great speeches in which he treated of the main reasons of Croatian dissatisfaction. In his opinion the chief causes thereof are to be found in the Vidovdan Constitution, which, contrary to the Corfu Agreement and the spirit and letter of the Geneva Declaration of 1918, was voted by an unqualified and bribed majority in the absence of the representatives of the Croats and Slovenes; in the lack of a real equality of rights, and in the slights heaped on the Croats. Of the 25 successive Premiers 23 have been Serbs of Serbia, 1 Serb of Bosnia and 1 a Slovene. None of them was a Croat. Of the officials in the ministries 74.5% are Serbs and only 16.5% Croats. There is not one single Croat at the head of the big banking establishments and economic organizations. Since ten years the Croats — like the Hungarian and German citizens of the Voivodina — have been paying income taxes from which the Serbs are exempt. In addition, the regions inhabited by Croats are practically neglected when it comes to the distribution of State investments.

As against these opinions of Dr. Kosić three former ministers and supporters of the Dictatorship, Koić, Popović and Rafailović, deny the existence of a Croatian question. They urge the maintenance of centralism in an unaltered form, arguing that Yugoslavia is merely the Kingdom of Serbia on an enlarged scale. The answer to Rafailović's assertion that the Croats have no cause for complaint, since during

the Hungarian era they never had a minister of their own, was given in the "Pravda" by Adam Pribičević, brother of the Swetozar Pribičević who died last year in exile and chairman of the Independent Democratic Party. "In terms of the Hungaro-Croatian compromise of 1868" — he writes — "Croatia-Slavonia enjoyed complete independence in the spheres of administration, justice and education. The Ban of Croatia was a minister with the rights and authority of three portfolios; and at the head of every department there was a chief whose rank was that of a State Secretary. Besides this, in the sphere of joint legislation the executive power was entirely in the hands of the Ban. Thus Croatia had not *one* but three ministers in the person of the Ban, who exercised the executive power of the joint ministers throughout the Croatian territories. The Ban had also headquarters in Budapest as attached to the common Government and was a sort of link between the autonomous Zagreb and the common Budapest Government. Croatia had also its own militia, gendarmerie and police, the official language of which was Croatian, and it had its own colours and coat-of-arms." (February 21).

The Croatian "Hrvatski Dnevnik" of 25th February writes: "The Croats have not relinquished their right to the things of which Adam Pribičević writes. They have not sacrificed anything voluntarily, *but have been robbed by force of what was theirs*. But robbery is always robbery, and the right to regain stolen goods never falls into abeyance. This is particularly true when the sufferer is a nation that harms no one, but merely defends its own and struggles to obtain its rights."

Of the speeches delivered in the Senate those of two Croatian senators, Andjelinović and Superina, deserve special attention. On 18th March Senator Andjelinović, former minister, amongst other things said: — "We Croats who were in office in different Cabinets never had any of the important portfolios and therefore had nothing to say in questions of State policy and the administration of State affairs." And on 19th March Senator Superina said: — "In terms of the Hungaro-Croatian compromise of 1868, Croatia was recognized as a separate political nation with its own legislation and government in certain matters. So far as Dalmatia was concerned Hungary gave promises that she would do everything possible to have the territories of the Littoral attached to Croatia. (Dalmatia *de facto* belonged to Austria, Ed.) The legislative and executive power was in Croatia's own hands in the spheres of justice, internal affairs, education, architecture, agriculture, social policy and hygiene as well as physical culture, and part of the portfolio of the present Ministry of Forests and Mines. In commerce and industry Croatia was its own executive power. This means that portfolios corresponding to eight of Yugoslavia's present ministries were in the hands of the Croats as regards legislation and the executive power, while in one of the ministries they exercised executive power only. All these matters were administered by the Government of the country, at the head of which stood the Ban with four departmental chiefs each of whom had the authority of a minister. The Ban himself was the Premier of the Croatian Government.

"The Ban of Croatia was a link between the Government of Croatia and the Crown. In common Croatian and Hungarian affairs the Croats exercised an influence through the members sent to Parliament in Budapest by the Croatian *Sabor*, and the common affairs of the whole Monarchy were controlled by a delegation a certain number of whose members were Croats. And we were not content with this state of affairs. In the field of administration the local

governments in Dalmatia, Carniola, Istria, Görz and Trieste had a much greater sphere of authority than in the present Banates, not to speak of the fact that those provinces had their own provincial assemblies with legislative rights in matters concerning the provinces.

"These historical facts show that the statesmen and politicians of the Serb Kingdom have not fulfilled the obligations undertaken by them towards the Croats and that they have framed a constitution which destroys the political and national individuality of the Croatian nation; also that the Croats have lost everything they possessed in the Habsburg Monarchy before its collapse. When people say that in Yugoslavia we have a Greater Croatia, I can only take it as an ironical statement... When the union with Serbia was completed the Croats behaved like idealists, even like altruists. They did so convinced that the Serb statesmen and politicians would not abuse the ideal of national unity to further their own imperial interests and deprive the Croatian nation of all the political rights it enjoyed within the Monarchy, rights it had preserved through centuries of struggle."

Illustrative of the slights put on the Croats is also the complaint concerning the wretched financial condition of the Zagreb University submitted to the Government lately in person by the Vice-Chancellor of the University. Whereas the Belgrade University continually receives large sums from the Budget, the Zagreb University, the equipments of which are out-of-date, received from the Government for the purposes of modern improvements 50,000 instead of 45,000,000 dinars. The 50,000 dinars are insufficient to pay for even the most urgent repairs.

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SERB POLITICIAN ON SITUATION OF SERBS IN HUNGARY

In an article in the February issue of a Serb magazine, the "Glas Srpske", Dr. Kosta Hadji, a leader of the Serbs in the Voivodina, bears witness to the understanding and consideration displayed by the Hungarian Governments of the Monarchy in their dealings with the Serbs in Hungary. During the war the Serbs in Bosnia and Hercegovina were in a very trying position. Already at the beginning of hostilities it proved extremely difficult to provide the inhabitants of those areas with the necessary articles of food, and in the latter years of the war, but particularly in 1917, destitution among them assumed alarming proportions. Food, it is true, was sent from Croatia and Hungary, but not in sufficient quantities to satisfy the needs of the population, especially of the children. Thereupon the Serbs of the Voivodina and Croatia-Slavonia decided to find temporary homes for the Serb children of Bosnia and Hercegovina in the Bácska and the Banate, and for this purpose committees were formed in Újvidék and Zagreb. No obstacle whatever was placed in the way of these committees by the Hungarian authorities, and the result of their activities was that in two years no fewer than 10,400 Serb children from the stricken areas found homes for several months with Serb families in the Bácska and the Banate. On 20th January, 1918, however, it happened that the Commissioner of Police in Újvidék held up a train that had arrived with 600 Serb children and would not allow them to leave it, since there was a possibility of their spreading contagious diseases in Southern Hungary. To overcome the difficulty Dr. Hadji telephoned to M. Alexander Wekerle, then Hun-

garian Prime Minister, who immediately instructed the police in Újvidék not to prevent the Serb children proceeding to their destinations. Dr. Hadji does not stint his appreciation of the Hungarian Government's behaviour. It is, however, extremely characteristic of the attitude displayed by the Serbs of Újvidék that the relief committee very soon secretly resolved itself into the Újvidék Serb National Council which on 25th November 1918 proclaimed, without the consent of a 61% majority of the population of the Voivodina, the separation of Southern Hungary from the mother-country.

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300—350 HUNGARIAN STATE OFFICIALS INSTEAD OF 9000.

The Budget Estimates for the year 1937/38 put the personal expenditure of the country at 5000 million dinars, which represents 47% of the total expenditure. Since 1927 the number of State officials and employees has risen from 175,000 to 220,000 that being an increase of 45,000 within ten years. On account of their percentage, — even according to the official records, — the Hungarians of Yugoslavia would be entitled to hold 8000 positions in the service of the State. Adding to this the number of the Banate, district, municipal and parish officials — which is at least 30,600 — the Hungarians should hold at least 9000 public posts. In reality, however, the number of those Hungarian officials and employees who have not yet been turned out of their jobs cannot be more than 300—350, and even most of these individuals are serving in inferior positions. On the other hand, the Serbs of Hungary — before the war — were represented by very large numbers of parish clerks as well as in the different grades of municipal, county, and State officials and employees, and even in the Army, up to the highest ranks.

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100—131 HUNGARIAN TEACHERS INSTEAD OF 1084

In his speech on the Budget M. Stosovitch, Minister of Education, put the number of elementary schools in Yugoslavia at 8590 and that of school teachers at 30,360. According to their percentage the Hungarians of Yugoslavia would be entitled to not less than 307 elementary school sections which, counting four classes for each section, would amount to 1228 elementary classes. In reality, however, the Hungarians of Yugoslavia have not more than 528 elementary classes — i. e. 132 elementary sections in all; even in these classes most of the subjects are taught in the language of the State, in defiance of Art. 9. of the Minority Treaty and of § 45 of the Yugoslav Elementary Education Act. Out of the 30,360 elementary school teachers at least 1084 should be Hungarians (according to the percentage of the Hungarian population), while actually there are not more than 100—130 Hungarian teachers employed at present, the other teachers of the Hungarian sections being persons of Serbian or Yugoslav origin who — in all probability — know very little or no Hungarian.

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17 PARISHES AND FARMSTEADS WITHOUT A SCHOOL — IN ONE DISTRICT

At a meeting of the officially appointed Banate Council in March last year M. Ferenc Keceli-Mészáros, Hungarian Banate Councillor, complained that teaching had been suspended many years previously in 17 schools in the parishes and farmsteads of the purely Hungarian District of Zenta, since — regardless of repeated applications and interventions — the Ministry of Education has refused to appoint to these schools teachers qualified to teach in Hungarian. In consequence of this many hundreds of Hungarian school children in the district have received no schooling for the last ten years or so. The authorities gave a firm promise to redress these grievances before the beginning of the current school year. At a meeting of the Banate Council in February this year M. Keceli-Mészáros was obliged to hand a memorandum to M. Rajić, the Vice-Ban, asking for the fulfilment of last year's promise.

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MISAPPROPRIATION OF MINORITY FOUNDATIONS

The town of Zombor had three big foundations, the incomes of two of which (the Falcione and the

Gyalokay foundations) in terms of the deeds of endowment were to be used to aid poor Hungarian, German and Bounievatz Roman Catholic or Protestant students, while that of the third, the Kotzik foundation, was to be made use of to maintain an orphanage. After the change of rule the Serb Municipal administration made use of the incomes accruing from the foundations for Serb nationalist and other unknown purposes. Now the new administration appointed a few months ago has decreed that the incomes are to be handed over to their original purposes as stipulated by the founders. Within the past 18 years no less than 1,944,000 dinars of the income accruing from the two first-mentioned foundations have been misappropriated.

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ATROCITIES OF GENDARMES

A Hungarian and a German inhabitant of the parish of *Bocsár* (in the Banate) were severely chastised by the gendarmes because they had informed their friends in the parish that a party of Serbian guests at a restaurant in the village were singing songs offensive to the minority inhabitants. As a sign of protest against the brutality of the gendarmes the minority members of the parish council have resigned their offices.

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B O O K S

Romulus Seisanu: "Rumania in the Course of Ages. A Historical, Geopolitical, Ethnographical and Economic Atlas." ("Universul" Bucarest 1936.)

With the above title Romulus Seisanu has published an atlas containing a large number of maps and diagrams. The text is in English French and Rumanian and the preface was written by M. Stelian Popescu, former minister, present editor of the "Universul" and chairman of the Anti-revisionist League. The object of this publication is to refute the arguments put forward in support of the Hungarian revision movement, convince the reader that the *status quo* is the best, and prove that the frontiers drawn in Central Europe by the Paris peace treaties — thus also the frontiers of dismembered Hungary — were demarcated on the principle of self-determination; that therefore the incorporation of the territories wrested from Hungary in the States of the Little Entente was a just act, consequently Hungary has no legitimate historical or ethnical title to demand a restoration of those regions from Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia or Yugoslavia.

The limited space at our disposal precludes the possibility of refuting in this article all the statements contained in this bulky volume. For the present, therefore, we shall confine our attention to certain of them, but with the intimation that a book is being written which, throwing the true light of geography, history, ethnography and economics on the daring assertions of Rumanian propaganda, will refute them point by point. This work will show that they are a faithful continuation of the propaganda of misrepresentation wherewith at the time of the Peace Conference the statesmen conducting it were induced to draw such

unjust frontiers in Central Europe, frontiers that mock the principle of self-determination and stand in the way of peace in the Danube Valley.

Two-thirds of Seisanu's atlas, about a hundred and thirty-two pages, are devoted to the task of convincing the reader that the invasion of the Hungarians — the word "invasion" is always used when mention is made of the settlement of the Hungarians between the Carpathians and the Adriatic in the X century — found Rumanians in Transylvania. These Rumanians are declared to be lineal descendants of Dacians who under a Roman rule extending from 101 B. C. to 274 A. D. became Latinized.

History, however, has long since proved that the thesis of Rumanian descent from the Romans is a myth pure and simple. Roman rule in Dacia lasted 173 years at the close of which, the last Roman soldier left Dacia. The Romans maintained their 173 years' rule over Dacia by military force, and besides their armies there was only a very small number of colonists in the country, sent there to exploit it. And even these colonists did not come from Italy. (The assertion that they did was disproved with all the weight of historical science by Louis Tamás in the November issue of this paper.) They came from the eastern provinces of the mighty Roman Empire where, as we know, the inhabitants were not Latins. For this reason alone it is impossible that the Dacians became Latinized during the brief duration of Roman rule, since no Latins settled in Dacia. Opposed to this legend is the certainly, proved by history, that the *Vlachs*, a nomadic

Slav tribe, were of Balkan origin and began to filter into Transylvania about the close of the XII century.

As regards the rest of Seisanu's work, a few brief remarks will suffice.

Treating of the attitude displayed by Rumania during the war, Seisanu devotes several pages to lauding the policy pursued by that country and the deeds of the Rumanian army. Far be it from us to offend Rumanian national pride, but the truth must be told: Rumania attacked her former ally, the Austria-Hungarian Monarchy, without any ultimatum at a time when the armies of the Monarchy had been transferred from Transylvania to other fronts and Transylvania stood practically defenceless. The ultimatum was not despatched until the Rumanian army had entered Transylvania.

Seisanu becomes very garrulous on the details of why the Paris Peace Conference entrusted Rumania with the task of putting an end to Béla Kun's Bolshevism in Hungary. International gratitude is claimed for the Rumanian army's feat of delivering not only Hungary and Rumania but also Western Europe from the danger of Bolshevism. It was a waste of printer's ink to put forward this claim. First of all it is an open secret that the Hungarian national army which had meanwhile been organized in Szeged was by that time ready to stamp out Bolshevism, had action not been forbidden by Paris in order that Rumania should play the role of deliverer. It was owing to Clémenceau's good offices that Rumania was given this historical mission, in the execution of which — alas! — the Rumanian troops, instead of striving to win their laurels by heroic and humane action, in the guise of saviours conducted a punitive expedition against Hungary and — in spite of the armistice — on the pretext of establishing order plundered that defenceless country.

Seisanu spends pages trying to prove that when the Peace Conference drew the frontiers of the new States and broke up the Monarchy, it did so solely on the principles of nationality and self-determination, and that the same measure was applied to victors and vanquished alike. In proof of this assertion Seisanu brings up the question of the *Burgenland*, which formerly belonged to Hungary, but on the principle of nationality was adjudged to vanquished Austria. What he forgets to mention, however, is that originally the *Burgenland* was intended to be a corridor to connect Czecho-Slovakia with Yugoslavia and thus completely isolate Hungary on all sides. But even Beneš was not able to make the Peace Conference accept this proposition and therefore he devised the new solution whereby the *Burgenland* was handed over to weak Austria. Beneš and his companions reckoned that it would be easy later on to take the corridor away from Austria or compel that country to let the *Burgenland* serve the purposes of the Little Entente. The detachment of the *Burgenland* from Hungary proves exactly the opposite of what Seisanu would have it prove.

Entirely lacking in sincerity is also another argument urged to prove that the frontiers were justly and objectively drawn. Namely Seisanu says that the application with hair-breadth exactitude of the nationality principle in territories inhabited by mixed races is impossible; therefore though it is true that there are some Hungarian enclaves in the regions adjudged to Rumania, it is no less true that Rumanian minority territories were left in Hungary. This argument might be allowed if the number of Rumanians left in Hungary were anything like the number of Hungarians attached to Rumania. In point of fact about 16,000 Rumanians were left in Hungary, while almost two million Hungarians were driven under

Rumanian rule. Is there any sign here of equal treatment or reciprocity? And was not this division a flouting of the nationality principle?

The resolution passed by the mass meeting of the Saxons is of no special significance, for the Saxons took the oath of allegiance to Rumania on the strength of the Declaration of Gyulafehérvár in which Rumania promised that all the peoples in the country would be entitled to the use of their own mother tongues in the spheres of education, administration and jurisdiction; that every race would enjoy administrative, religious, cultural, educational and economic self-government, and that the minorities would share proportionally in the legislation and administration of the country. Well we know that the Rumanian State has not fulfilled any of these promises. And, to continue our questions, is it possible, is it permissible, to defend Transylvania's attachment to Rumania by referring to the principle of self-determination in view of the historical fact that the two million Hungarians there not only never opted in favour of Rumania, but even protested with might and main against Rumanian rule, and were not to be silenced until their protests were rammed down their throats with violence and oppression.

A few sentences will suffice to show that Seisanu's work is full of a whole series of false data. As one instance we point out the fact that in it the number of Rumanians living in present-day Hungary is estimated at 70,000, whereas the 1930 census shows no more than 16,225. On the other hand the number of Hungarians in Transylvania is made to appear considerably less than that admitted by the artificially reduced Rumanian statistics. Seisanu's mistaken or purposely false data would fill columns.

The unreliability of his statistical data is shown even more strikingly by the following table illustrating the distribution of nationalities in pre-War Hungary to be found on p. 120: —

	1880	1890	1900	1910
Magyars	6,445,487	7,426,730	8,679,014	10,050,575
Germans	1,953,911	2,107,577	2,114,423	2,037,435
Slovaks	1,864,529	1,910,279	2,008,744	1,967,970
Rumanians	2,405,085	2,591,905	2,785,265	2,949,032
Ruthenians	356,062	383,392	427,825	472,587
Croatians		1,554,000	1,670,905	1,833,162
Serbs	2,352,339	1,057,264	1,042,022	1,106,471
Jews	624,826	707,961	826,222	932,458
Others	264,689	318,251	394,142	469,255

A mere glance shows that there is something wrong with the addition. Although he copied the nationality statistics quite correctly from the Hungarian sources, *Seisanu* — in order to be able to make the distribution of nationalities in pre-War Hungary appear to have been less favourable than it was in reality — has taken the number of Jews from the statistics relating to religion and added them as being a separate nationality to the original number of inhabitants. As a consequence, persons professing the Jewish faith figure twice in the table, — the first time as members of the several other nationalities and then for the second time as a separate nationality (though Hungarian Censuses have never treated the Jews as a separate nationality, but — in conformity with the practice in force in Western Europe — have recognised the Jewish faith as a separate religion, including the Jews among the members of the nationality whose mother tongue is their language too). *Seisanu* then correctly copied the aggregate number of inhabitants as given in the Hungarian statistics, not being in the least worried by the fact that as a consequence of the Jews being described as a separate nationality and given a column of their own there was bound to be something wrong with the total shown. It should be noted that

— as stated already in the first number of our Review — Professor Seton Watson, whom certain circles in Great Britain regard as the leading authority on Central European questions, employed the same unscientific method so misleading in its effects in his brochure entitled "Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers".

The work bristles with mistaken conclusions drawn from the maps it contains. To take one instance at random. The map in Paul Balogh's "Races in Hungary" (*Népfajok Magyarországon*) has been made use of by Seisanu as proof that Nagyvárad, Arad and Temesvár lie in Rumanian language territory, and this, although the map in question clearly shows that those towns belong to the Hungarian linguistic territories.

The work is also full of historical misinterpretations. For example, the Constitution of medieval Transylvania based on the union of the three nations living there (*Unio trium nationum*) is presented as an alliance formed in order to oppress the Rumanian people. Now, it has been proved by historical research that the Union was not national in type, the word *natio* signifying "Estate", so that the Hungarian serfs who did not belong to the Estates were no better off than the Rumanians. Furthermore, the fact that the free practice of the Greek Oriental religion was not re-

cognized in Hungary and Transylvania for centuries has been presented as evidence that the Rumanians were oppressed. The historical truth, however, is that in the Middle Ages the Kingdom of Hungary was Roman Catholic, while the Principality of Transylvania, was Protestant. Hungary was bitterly opposed to Protestantism, while Transylvania strove to ensure Protestant supremacy. When this antagonism ceased the Greek Catholic and Greek Oriental Churches became recognized religions, the former in 1701, the latter in 1848, and in 1868 the equality of right of both Rumanian Churches was again recognized by law. From that time on, in the eyes of the law, there was no difference between them and the other denominations.

In conclusion: the statement that the Rumanian State's treatment of the minorities, namely of the Hungarians, is exemplary, is so audacious in view of the facts published month by month in this paper that we shall not attempt to refute it in this brief review. We refrain from doing so also because the book which we promised at the beginning of this article will tear to pieces all the arguments put forward by Rumanian propaganda as proof of the "exemplary" nature of Rumania's minority policy.

George Lukács.

P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA NOW OCCUPIES ONLY FOURTH PLACE IN THE FOREIGN TRADE OF YUGOSLAVIA

The data relating to Yugoslavia's foreign trade during the first two months of the year show very noteworthy shiftings. Both as exporter and importer Czecho-Slovakia has now been relegated to fourth place. The list still continues to be headed by Germany, the second place being claimed by Austria and the third by France, — the latter country now occupying the place formerly occupied by Czecho-Slovakia. There has been an increase in the foreign trade between Germany and Yugoslavia, which shows an excess of exports of 48.2 million dinars in favour of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's trade with Austria shows a balance of 62.2 million dinars in favour of the former country. As concerns the trade between Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia, the same shows an excess of imports of 2.6 million dinars in favour of Czecho-Slovakia.

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124.65 MILLION CROWNS LESS STATE REVENUE IN JANUARY

The reports of the Ministry of Finance show that the revenues of the State in the month of January amounted to 749 million crowns after deduction of the revenues of the local government authorities. The result shows an improvement of 73.44 million crowns as against that of January 1936, but is still 124.65 millions below Budget Estimates.

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CRITICAL DAY ON PRAGUE EXCHANGE

As well know already, on April 20th. all quotations recorded on the Prague Exchange declined — the average set-back being one of 10%. For years there has not been any similar decline of quotations on the Prague Exchange. The *baisse* affected the so-called "gilt-edged" securities in particular; these securities showed a decline of 4—500 crowns. The bear movement must be attributed primarily to the decline in prices in the international raw materials market, though it was due partly also to speculators having shown an excessively eager anxiety to purchase securities — particularly those of war industries —, the result being that when the banks demanded adequate security from the parties giving orders for the purchases, large numbers of people were driven to effect forced sales. A very striking instance of this was the noteworthy decline in the quotations of Skoda shares. Another cause of the bear movement was undoubtedly the better prospects of peace, a factor which also contributed to bring about the set-back in the quotations of the shares of war-industry undertakings.

HUNGARY

THE STATE BUDGET FOR 1937/38.

The final figures of the State Budget for 1937/38, which is now under debate in Parliament, are as follows:

I State Administration.

Total expenditure	821.800.000 pengő
Total revenue	805.300.000 „

Deficit 16.500.000 „

II State Undertakings.

Total expenditure	445.300.000 pengő
Total receipts	393.800.000 "
Deficit	51.500.000 "

III Together.

Total expenditure	1.267.100.000 pengő
Total revenue	1.199.100.000 "
Deficit	68.000.000 "

The deficit estimated in last year's Budget was 75.700.000 pengő, so that this year's deficit will be 7.700.000 pengő less.

A comparison of the expenditure and revenue figures of the Budget for 1937/38 with those of the last Budget gives us the following table:

Increase in Administration expenditure	36.600.000 pengő
Increase in Administration revenue	33.700.000 "
Increase in State Undertakings expenditure	21.700.000 "
Increase in State Undertakings receipts	29.300.000 "
Total increase in Budgetary expenditure	55.300.000 "
Total increase in Budgetary revenue	63.000.000 "

In his exposé on the introduction of the Budget M. Tihamér Fabinyi, Minister of Finance, summed up the economic situation in the following words:

"On the whole *economic conditions have considerably improved in our country too*. Last year's good crops in conjunction with improved prices have certainly done much to make agriculture more profitable. This finds expression in the higher price of land, as well as in the fact that our live stock, which in consequence of 1935's poor yield of fodder had deteriorated, has increased again. This improvement is largely due to the efforts of the Government. Everything was done in the way of financial support and no efforts were spared to raise the level of agricultural production and agricultural profit by decreasing the farmers' burdens — farmers' debts —, ensuring better markets for agricultural produce and promoting exportation by means of favourable foreign trade treaties. That these efforts proved so successful this year was, however, mainly due to a fortunate combination of circumstances. Prudent economic policy must not forget that in 1936 a very unusual state of matters occurred, that to our favourable crops was added the factor of bad crops elsewhere. Demand was therefore brisk and this exerted a favourable influence on the conditions under which we were able to sell.

"*Industrial production has made great strides*. In quantity it was 10% more in the last quarter of 1936 than in the previous year, and 65% more than in the worst year of the economic crisis. The number of workmen employed in factories and workshops was 580.000 in the December of 1936, while at the end of 1935 it was only 535.000, and 409.000 at the beginning of that year. At present, therefore, about 50.000 more workmen are employed than a year ago and 170.000 more than in the worst years of the crisis.

"In 1936 *foreign trade* also improved. The balance with exports to the value of 433.000.000 pengő and imports totalling 507.000.000, was 74.000.000 pengő to the good, while in 1935 the profit was only 49.000.000.

Imports rose by 31.000.000 pengő (8%) and exports by 55.000.000 (12%).

"Compared with last year the money and capital market, with the exception of a boom on the Stock Exchange, did not vary much. The rate of interest remained unchanged. Deposits, I am sorry to say, are increasing very slowly. There are new savings, but they are being put to uses other than banking, and are invested chiefly in industrial concerns or in building.

"Improved economic conditions, chiefly the improvement in agricultural and industrial production, has had a beneficial effect on other branches of occupation."

Speaking of the Budgetary deficit M. Fabinyi said that "it corresponds roughly with the burden of pensions caused by the Treaty of Trianon, and one of the main contributing factors is the deficit of the State Railways, which is observable in other countries too. A gradual improvement may be expected from a further betterment of economic conditions."

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NEW INVESTMENTS

One of these Bills authorises Government to spend 40.000.000 pengő from the Treasury funds on investments. In this case the financing of public works would not be effected with the aid of the money market. Of these 40.000.000 pengő part would be spent on planting trees on the Great Plain, on water-works, road-building, parcelling, buildings, wine-marketing and railway and defence investments.

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FRESH UPSWING OF FOREIGN TRADE

According to the data supplied by the Central Statistical Bureau, the value of our imports in the month of March amounted to 37.9 million pengő, as against 35 millions in the corresponding month of the previous year; while the value of our exports during the same period advanced to 53.5 million pengő, as against 38 millions in March, 1936. Consequently, the excess of exports for the month of March amounted to 15.6 million pengő, as against 3 millions for the corresponding period of 1936.

The results shown by our foreign trade in the first quarter of the year 1937 are as follows: — value of imports, 98.1 million pengő (as against 105.8 millions in the previous year); value of exports, 150 million pengő (114.1 millions in 1936). Consequently the excess of exports for the said quarter aggregates 51.9 million pengő, as against 8.3 millions in the corresponding period of 1936.

The value of the wheat exported by Hungary was 24.8 million pengő (as against 9.5 millions in the previous year). Our principal customer for wheat in the first quarter of 1937 was *Italy* (roughly 660,000 metric quintals), the next in order being *Austria* (roughly 440,000 metric quintals), the third being *Switzerland*, (308,000 metric quintals). There was an important increase also in the volume of our cattle exports, the value of the same amounting to 8.78 million pengő, as against 5.68 millions in the corresponding period of the previous year. The market of decisive importance for our cattle exports was *Italy*, that country having purchased 19,400 head, the next in order being *Germany* (4000 head). There was a gratifying development as compared with the figures for the previous year (which were certainly abnormally low) in our export

trade in poultry products. The value of our exports of eggs increased from 2.7 to 4.1 million pengő, and that of the feathers exported by us from 2.75 to 4.65 million pengő. Of the total volume of our exports of eggs (roughly 48,500 metric quintals) two-thirds were purchased by *Germany*, *Austria* having taken over not quite one-third. Trifling quantities were despatched to Italy too. There is a noteworthy set-back in the export trade in pigs and pig products, — that being a result of there being less opportunity of export and partly also of the increased consumption of the inland market.

A characteristic feature of our import trade during the period under review is the increase of our imports of important raw materials, in particular of raw hides and metals. It is a noteworthy circumstance that raw hides (representing a total value of 8.82 million pengő) now figure as the largest item on the imports side of our trade balance, the item normally heading the list — wood — being thus relegated to second place (with a value of 7.38 million pengő). The next items in order are raw cotton (7.08 million pengő) and crude metals (5.32 million pengő). The fact that — despite the increased importation of raw materials — the total value of imports shows a decline, is clear evidence that there has been a decrease in our imports of manufactures.

RUMANIA

“RUMANIAN AGRICULTURE IS THE WORST IN EUROPE“

A certain exceptional character was lent to the National Rumanian Agrarian Congress recently held in Bucharest by the presence of the King of Rumania, who in his speech made at the Congress — as already reported in these columns — declared with perfect frankness that “it is a shame that we Rumanians should allow our country to rank lowest in Europe in respect of the quantity and of the quality of our agrarian production”.

The Congress decided to provide for a suitable professional training and for the improvement of seeds. In order to be able to solve the question of agrarian credit — so we are informed — a banking institute is to be established with the financial co-operation of the National Bank of Rumania and of the Treasury. Another matter brought to light by the discussions of the Congress is that *the excessively liberal manner in which the land reform was carried into effect has resulted in intolerable conditions in many parts of the country*. For dwarf holdings possessing less than 5 hectares of land were made the basic types of agrarian units. The co-operative societies should have made it their business to neutralise the difficulties arising in consequence of the dismemberment of the landed estates: but instead of doing so, those societies have made themselves *the instruments of political parties*, the Governments in succession having availed themselves of the assistance of the same for purely propaganda purposes and for the purpose of bolstering their own power. As a consequence the co-operative societies have become quite incapable of coping with the tasks for which they were established. The Congress therefore declared that one of the most urgent tasks facing the country was to rid the co-operative societies of their political character and then gradually to train those societies to work systematically.

Extremely instructive are the statistical data submitted by the several Members of the Congress in illustration of the condition of Rumanian agriculture. Last summer, for instance, — as a means of encour-

aging the action for the bolstering of wheat prices — the standard quality of wheat was fixed at 77 kilogrammes per hectolitre and the proportion of outside matter at not more than 3%: whereas in Canada the standard wheat is 83 kilogrammes per hectolitre, and the proportion of outside matter fixed at not more than 1%. When last year Germany wished to buy eggs in Rumania and stipulated for a minimum weight of 55 grammes, it transpired that the best eggs Rumania had to offer did not weigh more than 53 grammes each. Or, to give another instance: in the so-called “Regat” (Old Rumania) cattle breeding has deteriorated so enormously that the cows give on the average not more than 4 litres a day. The quantity of artificial fertilisers used in Rumania amounted to only 0.4 kilogrammes per hectare of land under cultivation; while the quantity employed in Hungary — a country with similar climatic conditions — amounted to 5 kilogrammes per hectare, and *that employed in Austria to actually 20.5 kilogrammes*.

YUGOSLAVIA

YUGOSLAV OPINION OF ITALO-YUGOSLAV TRADE AGREEMENT

The economic part of the Italo-Yugoslav agreement was commented upon by the Yugoslavenski Lloyd on April 2nd as follows:

Yugoslav economists are not too optimistic respecting the prospects of trade relations with Germany and Italy. Any amount of goods may be sold to Germany, it is true, but the Germans do not pay. Italy has fixed an export quota of a value of 800 million lira for Yugoslavia, while the value of Yugoslavia's quota for Italy is not more than 450 million dinars. Clearing transactions between Italy and Yugoslavia already show a balance of 50 million dinars in favour of Yugoslavia. If the Yugoslav exporters are able to exhaust the full quota by the end of this year, the balance will amount to 400 million dinars in favour of Yugoslavia. It must be remembered, moreover, that the value of the goods which Italy has hitherto paid for in foreign currencies will now be balanced by clearing transactions, which again will make this nominal balance still more. The active balance of the clearing transactions will, however, inflict heavy losses on the exporters, because they must either wait for the payment longer than is possible for them, or they must sell their goods at a lower rate than they had calculated before. For this reason, for instance, the timber trade must under any conditions endeavour to keep the British market, which it acquired at the time of the “sanctions”, and leave the chances of the Italian market untried. At present Italy's importance as a market for Yugoslavia's trade, especially her timber trade, is very far from what it was before the “sanctions”.

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THE BULK OF THE AMOUNT REPRESENTED BY THE BILLS REDISCOUNTED BY THE NATIONAL BANK GOES TO SERBIA

The Narodna Banka recently made public its Report for the year 1936, which contains the following interesting data relating to the distribution by sections of the country of the re-discount credits granted by it. These data show that the amount granted by the Bank on 21,652 bills of exchange presented to the head office in Belgrade and to the branches enumerated

below was 1,458,603,283 dinars, that amount being distributed as follows:

Belgrade	8559	630,140.529
Nish	871	39,470.285
Sabac	627	7,343.596
Skoplje	1223	33,468.795
Bitolj	119	4,508.500
Cetinje	850	19,326.298
Ujvidék (Novisad)	700	75,047.481
Pancsova (Pančevo)	210	16,681.645
Nagybecskerek (Petrovgrad)	308	7,636.377
Versec (Vršac)	493	7,406.247

Szabadka (Subotica)	433	13,367.536
Szarajevo	1623	58,182.156
Mostar	279	4,382.669
Banja-Luka	275	8,787.223
Laibach (Ljubljana)	561	96,554.364
Marburg (Maribor)	193	22,158.490
Zagreb	1613	326,309.041
Varasd	549	10,490.505
Eszék (Osijek)	971	57,213.133
Susak	131	7,054.057
Spalato (Split)	146	8,168.352
Raguza (Dubrovnik)	18	4,906.000

S P O R T S

HUNGARIAN VICTORY IN SWITZERLAND

Ever since its 4:3 victory (at Berne) in 1929 the representative Hungarian team has been unable to win against the Swiss; moreover, it suffered a disastrous defeat (6:2) at Zürich not very long ago. Switzerland has achieved very remarkable results of recent years; and, although the Swiss team was beaten three times in the international meetings (Milan, 4:2; Zürich, against Austria, 3:1; and Prague, 5:3), yet in all these matches it proved to be a very strong and respectable opponent; in fact, it was stated at Prague that the Swiss team was much better.

In these circumstances the sportsmen of Hungary did not expect very great things of the match at Bale, before which the Swiss team had had a hard trial at Amsterdam ending in the victory of the Dutch team (2:1). The encounter of the Hungarian and Swiss teams took place on April 11th and resulted in a serious defeat for the Swiss (5:1). Thus the positions of the competitors in the international Cup Finals are as follow:

1. Czecho-Slovakia	3	2	1	0	11:6	5
2. Hungary	3	2	0	1	12:9	4
3. Austria	3	1	1	1	7:7	3
4. Italy	1	1	0	0	4:2	2
5. Switzerland	4	0	0	4	7:17	0

The unfinished match between Austria and Italy played in Vienna (2:0 for Austria) is not included in this list. The next cup match will be played in Turin on April 25th, between Italy and Hungary.

CHAUVINISM IN RUMANIAN SPORTS

Another striking example of unsportsmanlike chauvinistic prejudice has been offered by the Rumanian Press, which is always ready to make its hatred felt even in the field of sports. In connection with the Czecho-Rumanian match the Rumanian Press attacked the Captain of the Association for letting too many Hungarians play in the Rumanian team; this criticism is not only highly unjust, but it is also in defiance of a resolution recently passed by the Association. It must be remembered that the representative Rumanian team contained not less than seven Hungarian players from Transylvania. The Bucharest papers incited the public not to visit these matches under such conditions, as a mark of protest against

the policy of the Association. This unprecedented encouragement of a boycott has caused great embarrassment in the whole sporting world.

AVIATION

Ladislaus Almássy, the wellknown Hungarian traveller and aviator, chairman of the Egyptian Gliders' Association, is reported to have performed a successful gliding flight over the Pyramids in Egypt. He set off from the aerodrome of Almaza, near Cairo, his glider being driven by a British aeroplane piloted by Lieut. Mole of the R. A. F. Having reached the Nile the glider was detached from the aeroplane and, flying over the Pyramids, reached the ground again not far from them. This achievement is particularly remarkable seeing that no glider has ever yet succeeded in flying over the Pyramids after having flown across the Nile in an easterly direction. With this extraordinary performance M. Ladislaus Almássy won a cup offered by the "Al Ahram", a Cairo daily.

BOXING

On April 3rd the boxing champions of Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia met for a great fight in the presence of a large crowd of spectators. The Czecho-Slovak team was severely beaten, by 5:2; of the two victories only one was an actual victory, the other being the result of a series of mistakes made by the referee.

FENCING

On April 9th the Hungarian Fencing Association arranged a grand tournament between the best fencers of Italy and Hungary respectively in memory of the great Hungarian Olympic champion, the late Col. Terstyánszky. — The tournament ended with the victory of the Hungarian team, 19:17. The number of cuts was: Hungary: Italy, 130:143. — The result obtained by the Hungarian fencers were as follows: Rajczy, Kabos, and Gerei 4 wins each, Berczelly 3, Rajcsányi and Kovács 2 wins each. Of the Italian fencers Signor Marzi won 6 matches, Signor Gaudini, Masciotta, and Montano 3 each, Signor Pinton 2 matches. Signor Tanzini lost all his matches.

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