

P O L I T I C A L M O S A I C

HUNGARY AND THE ITALIAN-FRENCH AGREEMENT

In its progress along the thorny path bristling with obstacles which it has had to follow since 1920 Hungarian foreign policy has never deviated a hairbreadth from its original course — never for a moment lost sight of its original object of inducing the public opinion of the world, by means of convincing information and peaceful enlightenment, to understand that when the treaties of peace were drafted a grave injustice was done to Hungary and that the maintenance in force of this injustice is not in the interests either of the States immediately concerned or of Europe generally.

It is not in the interests of the States immediately concerned, which under the name of Little Entente have concluded a defensive and offensive alliance against Hungary, that the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Trianon should be maintained in force unchanged, because during the past fifteen years it has been repeatedly proved that *political frontiers demarcated artificially on the basis of exaggerated nationalism and historical bias can never serve as lasting foundations of peace or of an economic and cultural revival*. The decennium and a half which has passed since the conclusion of the Treaty of Trianon has proved the justice of the Hungarian cause and documented times without number that no distinction can possibly be made between conqueror and conquered where it is a question on the one hand of an artificial restriction of the free assertion of natural, economic and historical forces or on the other hand of a logical and rational removal of the restrictions. The genius of history knows nothing of parties or of conquerors and conquered; it distributes justice to all alike and makes no distinction in respect of consequences when preparing the way for the ultimate manifestation of the spirit of an age.

Now it is evident that the spirit and fundamental idea of the present age is solidarity — a fruitful co-operation of the peoples and the collaboration of the big economic territories. How can this all be realised by a policy of a particularistic, exclusive, malicious and excessively selfish character — in a word, just the opposite of all that is needed to ensure the materialisation of the great idea of the age?

It is impossible that the States immediately concerned should themselves not have realised this fact; for the endeavour — repeated continually for years past — to bring about an economic union of the Little Entente States has so far proved an abortive experiment; nor will that endeavour lead to any results until the fundamental conditions essential to such an issue — of which the most essential is *the liberation of Hungary from the economic and political fetters impeding her freedom of action* — are complied with.

How essential to the interests of Europe it is that the peoples of the Danube basin — recognising the importance of the interests latent in a political and economic solidarity — should at last meet and exchange ideas, is shown most strikingly by the agreement between Italy and France just concluded in Rome and by the coercive force — the practically irresistible pressure of French public opinion — which impelled the French Foreign Minister Laval to go to Rome to sign the agreement. The waves of the general crisis have swept over France just as they have over all the other States of Europe except Great Britain; and the lessons taught by that crisis, though for the moment not inducing a full acknowledgment of the justice of the Hungarian cause, have at any rate led the public opinion of France to realise that *it is imperatively urgent that a new political and economic order should be created in the valley of the Danube*. That an agreement of that tenor should have been concluded in

respect of the leading principles — despite the enormous difficulties which the parties to the negotiations had reciprocally to overcome — is certainly a most gratifying result. And for us Hungarians it is of peculiar interest that *in his speech of welcome addressed to Laval Mussolini emphasised pointedly that neither party had abandoned — or would in the future abandon — its friends*. Mussolini however pointed out also that the nations living in the Danube basin must reconcile their own interests and vital necessities to the considerations of universal significance essential to the establishment of European peace; and that means only that he regards as necessary a restoration within the shortest time possible of the political and economic balance between the peoples living in the valley of the Danube which has been disturbed. For that is a *sine qua non* of Austria being induced to prefer adherence to the historical community of the Danube basin to inclusion in the German Empire, continuing to look for and to find her prosperity and future best ensured by the historical connections of former days.

The Rome agreement is certainly one of the most important events in the political life of post-War Europe; but for the moment it is not the end, only *the starting-point — a possibility holding out the prospect of a noteworthy political change*. We may perhaps also express the hope that this agreement will to a certain extent bring about a change in the relations hitherto existing between France and her Danubian allies, — a change leading to *the French nation in the future not blindly following the advice given it primarily by Prague, though also by Belgrade and Bucharest*, but to adopt the ideas prevailing everywhere in Europe (ideas fully in evidence during the Rome pour-parlers) and to serve the universal interests of Europe far more decidedly and freely.

In a *communiqué* drafted in a hurry at the station of Laibach the Little Entente States have stated their attitude towards the agreement between Laval and Mussolini. The official text itself speaks in terms of the greatest courtesy — and indeed in flattering words — of the Rome covenant, which they regard as one of the most serious guarantees of the peaceful development of Europe; but if on the other hand we compare this manifesto with the statements made by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Yefitch to representatives of the Belgrade press, we must conclude that *there is by no means absolute agreement between the foreign ministers of the Little Entente in their respective views of the political value of the covenant, and that Yugoslavia must have an opinion of her own and ideas differing from those of the other two States*. But in any case the immediate future will show where these separate ideas are likely to lead?

In their statements to the press the foreign ministers of the Little Entente spoke of the possibility of direct negotiations with Hungary; and we have no reason at all to adopt an attitude of excessive pessimism in advance in respect of these statements. It is true that the lessons of the past *warn us to be cautious*, for during previous negotiations it has happened more than once that the States of the Little Entente have found some pretext for withdrawal at the very last moment — when the agreement was practically ready —, naturally throwing the responsibility for the illsuccess on Hungary; but on the present occasion it would nevertheless seem as if there were more prospect of the intentions being serious and of the foreign ministers really believing the time ripe for the conclusion of at least a *modus vivendi* between Hungary and her neighbours. However, we must at once establish the fact that *this is subject to three conditions. The first*

is the possibility of a peaceful revision; the second is the ensurance of the rights of the minorities in the territories of the Succession States; and the third the recognition of the absolute equality of Hungary. Should we succeed in coming to an agreement in respect of these conditions, Hungary

will prove the most loyal of parties; and we may assure the Little Entente States that in that case Hungary will be the first to sincerely welcome any agreements calculated to open a new gateway for the materialisation of the brotherly solidarity and prosperity of the peoples.

HUNGARY COMPLIES LOYALLY WITH RESOLUTION OF COUNCIL OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS TAKEN ON DECEMBER 10TH

In compliance with the terms of the Resolution passed by the Council of the League of Nations on December 10th. last in re the Yugoslav-Hungarian conflict, the Hungarian Government continued or rather resumed the work of investigation initiated by the Hungarian authorities immediately after the attempt at Marseilles for the purpose of clearing up as fully as possible the background of the attempt. The results of the investigation are summarised as follows in the Note handed to the Secretariat of the League of Nations on January 12th.:

1. As a result of the exhaustive examination carried out by the Hungarian Government the fact must be established that neither the Hungarian Government nor any of the Hungarian authorities subordinate to that Government can be connected either directly or indirectly with the Marseilles regicide; nor are they in any way even in the slightest degree responsible for the attempt.

2. Certain organs of subordinate Hungarian authorities — chiefly as a consequence of the defective character of the existing measures, which take no account of abnormal cases — did not watch the Croatian emigrés so intensively as was desirable or as in such abnormal cases is also necessary; and for that reason, where certain omissions have been ascertained, the Hungarian Government has taken adequately severe punitive measures.

3. The Hungarian Government has deemed it necessary to increase the severity of the measures relating to the control of foreigners and to the system by which passports are issued, this being done as a consequence of the events at Marseilles and in deference to the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations.

The punitive measures referred to sub 2. above are as follows: — *Imre Gajdan*, deputy inspector of police attached to the Nagykanizsa detachment of the Royal Hungarian Police, and *Dr. Louis Bokor*, deputy inspector of police attached to the Central Office for the Control

of Foreigners, have been declared guilty of committing the disciplinary offence of infringing their official duties as prescribed and have therefor been dismissed the service. The Superintendent of the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie as competent authority has punished *Alexander Deseb*, Major of Gendarmes, by confinement in barracks and at the same time has proposed that he should be transferred to the district of some other gendarmerie command; in addition he has sentenced to 30 days' confinement each *John Ferencz* and *John Czinka*, gendarmerie cadets, and has transferred them to another station at a greater distance from the frontier. Further, *Dezso Vilmányi*, deputy chief of the passport section of the Budapest Police Headquarters, has been transferred to the country (that being disciplinary punishment of the second grade) for having failed to call the attention of his superiors to the technical difficulties not ensuring adequately the prevention of abuses.

The measure referred to sub 3. above is contained in the Ordinance of the Hungarian Minister of the Interior dated January 2nd., 1935, in re the increased control of political exiles (emigrés).

The Hungarian Government is therefore of the opinion that by the measures described above it has fully complied with the demand of the Council.

At the meeting held on January 16th., Mr. Eden, Lord Privy Seal, in his capacity as rapporteur — in view of the fact that some Members of the Council who might have observations to make in connection with the report were not yet in a position to present those observations — stated that he would be grateful if the observations were handed to him in writing as soon as possible, so as to enable him to present his proposals.

During the course of the action undeservedly taken against her in connection with the Marseilles attempt Hungary has done all in her power to further the full clearing up of the matter; and it was no fault of hers that the Council of the League of Nations was unable to take a definitive and final decision.

THE SAAR PLEBISCITE. ITS IMPORTANCE IN POINT OF PRINCIPLE IN THE DANUBE VALLEY

The result of the plebiscite taken in the Saar District on January 13th. surprised no one in Hungary, for to the Hungarian nation, a considerable proportion of which was incorporated in other countries by the Treaty of Trianon, it was from the very outset quite clear that the almost purely German population of the district would desire to be re-annexed to the country in which the bulk of their racial brethren live. And yet after the announcement of the result the hearts of many millions of Hungarians too beat faster; for both the Hungarians living in Dismembered Hungary and those compelled to submit to a foreign rule asked themselves why they had been denied the privilege just accorded to the German inhabitants of the Saar District — the privilege of deciding by virtue of the right of self-determination their own destiny and the glorious feeling of being able to return to their own country? At the same time the public opinion of Hungary once more bows in homage before the League of Nations too, the prestige of which has been enormously enhanced by the exemplary object-

ivity and the discipline with which the plebiscite was carried out.

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This result of the plebiscite is of interest to us Hungarians, not so much for its bearing upon the political situation as for its significance in the matter of principle. We regard it as the realisation in fact of that right of self-determination of the peoples for which the Hungarian Peace Delegation fought under the leadership of Count Albert Apponyi as far back as the days of the Peace Conference, — though unfortunately the sons of the Hungarian nation allotted to other States were denied the exercise of that right under the treaties of peace.

As is well known, the Treaty of Versailles accorded Germany in several places the privilege of a plebiscite, — e. g., apart from the Saar District, in Schleswig, in Upper Silesia, and in the united districts of East and West Prussia. And the idea of a plebiscite was carried into effect — even though in an imperfect form — in Eupen

and Malmédy too. The Treaty of Saint Germain accorded Austria the privilege of a plebiscite in Carinthia. On the other hand, however, nowhere in the territories severed from Hungary representing two-thirds of the total area of that country in pre-War days was it considered necessary to consult the wishes of the inhabitants. It was only later, at the end of 1921, that a plebiscite ordained to be held — in terms of the Venice Protocol due to the intervention of Italy — in the town and immediate environs of Sopron afforded a tiny fraction of the population which it was proposed to sever from Hungary an opportunity to freely express their wishes and declare whether they desired to remain incorporated in their ancient country Hungary or to be allotted to Austria.

The inhabitants of Sopron and its environs remained true to Hungary, a large majority voting in favour of that country. This plebiscite was peculiarly instructive in view of the fact that, though Germans by tongue, the majority of the population thus consulted proved to be Hungarian in feeling. From this we may safely conclude that the Conference was too hasty in presuming that the other nationalities — in particular the Slovaks, Ruthenians, Saxons of Upper Hungary (Zipser), Swabians of the "Bácska" district, Vends of the "Muraköz" district and "Bunyevác" people in the South of Hungary — were desirous of being incorporated in Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia or Rumania respectively.

That a person uses a particular language as his native idiom does not necessarily mean that he regards himself as belonging to the nation speaking that idiom. In Carinthia very many persons who are Slovenes by tongue voted not for Yugoslavia but for Austria; in the Saar District many persons who are German by tongue have voted for France; in Sopron and environs the majority of the Germans voted, not for Austria, but for Hungary; and it is equally certain that a considerable proportion of the persons belonging to the races enumerated above would have voted, not for the States using languages similar to their own, but for Hungary. The only moot point is whether the majority of those persons would have decided in favour of Hungary or not. The treaty-makers were guilty of a very serious omission when they refused to put the inhabitants of the territories severed from Hungary to the vote: for Hungary declared already in advance that she would bow before the decision taken by the plebiscite, so that, whatever the result of that plebiscite, all frontier disputes would have ceased in the Danube valley fifteen years ago.

Omissions may however always be made good. If it has proved possible to consult the wishes of the inhabitants of the Saar District sixteen years after the signing of the Treaty of Peace, it is surely equally possible still to accord the peoples separated from Hungary in the valley of the Danube an opportunity to decide freely and unimpeded whether they desire a maintenance of the present régime or re-incorporation in Hungary, — or to be granted self-government? This expression of their will is accepted in advance by the Hungarian nation as definitive and decisive. This would be the best way to secure lasting peace in the Danube valley and thereby to safeguard also the peace of Europe. The States of the Little Entente are always proclaiming that it was on the basis of the right of self-determination and of the principle of "nationality" that they acquired the territories severed from Hungary, declaring that the non-Magyar inhabitants of those territories voluntarily adhered to them. If this were really the case, these States would have no cause whatever for rejecting the idea of a plebiscite; on the contrary, they should be the first to demand most decidedly that a plebiscite should be held as a means of ridding them of the incubus which gives them no peace.

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We were delighted to learn from reports received just as we were going to press that the above idea has found favour and approval also in British political circles. At a debate before the City of London College Colonel Moore, M. P., pointed out that the best way to solve the Hungarian question had been shown by the Saar plebiscite. In his opinion the inhabitants of the territories severed from Hungary should be asked to answer the following questions:

1. Do you wish to remain under the present régime? or
2. Do you wish to return to Hungary? or
3. Do you wish to live in a new and independent State?

In Colonel Moore's opinion, if the conscience of the Governments of the Succession States is clear, they cannot oppose a plebiscite, seeing that during the fifteen years of their rule they have had opportunity enough by wise and just government to win over their new subjects. The resolution referred to above was passed by 63 votes to 3.

We shall return to this action in a later issue.

HUNGARIAN PREMIER DISCUSSES QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY

The Assembly of the County of Szolnok and the Corporation of the Town of Szolnok having conferred the freedom of the County and Town respectively upon Premier Gömbös, at a meeting of the Szolnok County Assembly held on January 24th. the Hungarian Prime Minister delivered a speech in which he expressed his thanks for this expression of confidence, taking advantage of the occasion to make political declarations in the course of which he referred also to certain questions of foreign policy.

After ascertaining that the Italian-Hungarian-Austrian protocols signed last spring had exercised a beneficial effect upon the economic life of Hungary, the Premier proceeded to deal with the Marseilles affair, in this connection making the following statements:

"I have not much to say of the Marseilles affair. The rules of international chivalry are identical with our own. Let us refrain from talking about the affair until it has been finally and definitively adjusted. There is only one thing I should like to say, — *an attempt has been made to make our country — which has never admitted the methods of political assassination — the victim of political back-biting.* Whatever page of our history we may turn up,

we find that this nation never — even in days of utter humiliation and oppression — resorted to weapons of the kind; for *its religious feeling and its moral sense have always stood in the way of such action, and it has always believed in the triumph of justice.* Its oriental character makes this nation peculiarly capable of embitterment, though it can bear its embitterment in patience. This fact must be realised by everyone desirous of judging Hungarian life either from an international or from a Hungarian national point of view. *We have the gift of waiting and of trusting in God.* We know that this nation's mission is one that will live for ever. As history shows, a few decenniums of bitterness in the life of our nation are of no account. When the Mongols drove us to take refuge in marshes and bogs, — when our great king was driven to flee for his life —, then too we knew that *the star of Hungary would rise again;* and today too we know that no machinations whatsoever will ever be able to prevail on our nation to abandon its real historical mission. Neither Vienna nor the Turk nor the Mongol ever succeeded in doing that. *We live our daily life with the names of God and Jesus on our lips;* and we continue on the path of history always ready for sacrifices —

unselfishly, for other nations and for our view of life too. And we deserve to have this unselfishness at last rewarded with justice."

The Premier then proceeded to deal with the Italian-French agreement and explained its importance from the Hungarian point of view as follows:

"We were gratified to see our great friend *Italy* and *France*, the great friend of the Little Entente, meet to discuss important questions — questions still pending a settlement —, raising the question also of the possibility of attempting some new solution here, in the valley of the Danube and the basin of the Carpathians.

"We shall not obstruct such a scheme. *What we want is peace, — though peace based upon justice and equality. We have always employed peaceful means; and we shall continue to do so in the future too.* But no one can expect us to accept the role of a nonaged nation — whereas we are really entitled more than any other nation to consider ourselves of age here, in the basin of the Carpathians —, and to sit down to discussion at the round table in our present character of a nation torn asunder and afflicted by an unjust peace. If peace is really wanted — and there certainly is need of peace —, *then it is the duty of those who are responsible for the treaties of peace to create an atmosphere, as well as the physical possibilities, enabling us to sit down with a quiet conscience to discuss all the evils to which our peoples are subject.*

"The "screech-owls" — or other croakers — who have told us that we have renounced our revisionist endeavours are very much in the wrong. I would tell them that *our revision policy may be defined as follows: — we maintain our claim to a territorial revision by peaceful*

STATEMENTS BY BUDAPEST CZECHO-SLOVAK MINISTER

In the two statements recently made by him M. Nicholas Kobr, Minister of Czecho-Slovakia in Budapest, referred in an extremely interesting manner also to the revision endeavours of Hungary.

In its Christmas number the "Prager Tagblatt" published a statement by the Budapest Czecho-Slovak Minister which contains the following passage:

"We do not wish to force Hungary to abandon her political aims; nor is the adjustment of the economic questions in any way dependent upon such an abandonment".

In reply to a question on this point addressed to him by a representative of "Az Est", M. Kobr said:

"I would repeat: no one demands that Hungary should renounce her national aims. The Covenant of the League of Nations also contains that certain Article — 19 — which we do not propose to take away from the Hungarians".

When the representative of the Hungarian journal asked for a more concrete explanation, the Czech diplomat replied as follows:

"I interpret Article 19 as it is written. Should Hungary regard the existing treaty of peace as inapplicable or as endangering the peace of Europe, this Article enables her to apply to the League of Nations. I repeat, therefore: we do not demand that Hungary should renounce the rights assured her under Article 19. For what Article 19 says is undoubtedly in force".

This statement made by Beneš's representative in Budapest — a statement correct alike from the international and from the political point of view — resumes the revision question at the point where it was dropped by Beneš (after 1928) and by Masaryk (after 1930). No better justification for the revision endeavours of Hungary could possibly be found than that contained in the remarks of the Czecho-Slovak Minister quoted above. M. Nicholas Kobr has always shown great diplomatic ability; and it was probably for that reason that he was placed at the

means, and we trust that a period of tranquillity will bring about such a result. We desire that Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia should recognise the *Hungarian minorities* as parties of equal standing alike in cultural and in economic and in political respects, affording them every possibility of continuing to live the life of their ancient culture for the benefit of mankind.

"In the third place, we ask for equality of rights *in respect of disarmament or rather armaments.* We regard it as impossible that we should not be entitled to freely control one of the branches of our national sovereignty. We regard it as impossible that *a defenceless Hungary should be surrounded by a Little Entente army 500.000 strong,* while all it is proposed to grant to us is *the Trianon army.* We are entitled to equality of rights in respect of self-defence — a right to which every civilised people has a claim, and which is a *sine qua non* of our sitting down at the round table. *It is the business of the diplomats to formulate the conditions roughly drafted — though frankly expressed and sincerely felt-by me in a manner enabling us to find an agreement. For fifteen years we have borne patiently with this state of inequality in international life.* If peace is desired, an effort must be made to eliminate one-sidedness; for we have shown — despite the agony of the struggle involved by our dismemberment — *an ability to remain true Europeans.* We have shown *virility,* — for neither social troubles nor subversive ideas have proved able to strike root in our country. The ordeal is a serious one; but we are standing the test, and are facing the difficulties like men. We do not lament, but go our way along the thorny path of every day life without complaining, for we know that *this way must end in the resurrection of Hungary."*

head of the Budapest Czecho-Slovak Legation — a post which from the Czecho-Slovak point of view is one of considerable importance —, so that we may take it for granted that his views are not in any way opposed to those of Czech official and non-official quarters. If there is any country in the Danube valley whose economic interests imperatively require it to try to come to an agreement with Hungary, surely there is none so badly in need of such an agreement as Czecho-Slovakia, whose grave domestic problems (in particular the question of the nationalities which are numerically superior to the ruling Czech nation) and geographical isolation too are a continuous warning of the necessity of endeavouring to become reconciled with her Hungarian neighbours. People in Prague are well aware that the psychical *sine qua non* of such a reconciliation is that the Hungary so horribly dismembered by the Treaty of Trianon should be enabled to breathe freely by an amendment by agreement of the frontiers demarcated by the treaties of peace. The statements made by the Minister would seem to prove that — though for the moment only in a guarded form — the appreciation of this truth is once more gaining ground in Prague. Fine words in themselves of course are of but little value; for the siren songs heard so often just after the bitterest attacks against Hungary which have never been followed by corresponding action, have made Hungarian public opinion sceptical.

LORD ROTHERMERE ENERGETICALLY DEMANDS REVISION

To a representative of the Berlin "*Morgen*" Lord Rothermere's son, Edmond Harmsworth, has made the following statement: — "Both my Father and I are still as determined as ever in favour of a revision of the treaties of peace. The struggle is more strenuous than ever; and we shall avail ourselves of all the means at our disposal to continue the fight. Neither my Father nor I will yield a jot on this point. We consider the treaties of peace unjust; that is why we are fighting for a revision".

FALL OF UZUNOVITCH AND PREMIERSHIP OF YEFTITCH

The appointment of the Yeftitch Government was received with confidence by the international press, which considered that appointment to mean the beginning of a new internal political development and to indicate the liquidation of the dictatorship and of the pseudo-constitutionalism and mock parliamentarism previously prevailing, as also a serious endeavour to bring about conciliation at home. The negotiations respecting the formation of the Cabinet, the pourparlers between Yeftitch and the leaders of the older parties which since 1929 had been ostracised from the political life of the country, the dismissal of Lazarevitch, the dreaded Belgrade commissioner of police, — who is said to have been ultimately responsible for the expulsions *en masse* effected in December —, as also the pardon granted to Maček, the Croatian leader, and the removal of Peritch, director of the semi-official news agency "Avala", are undoubtedly all moments and facts which as promising tokens of new methods would seem to justify the confidence reposed in advance in the Yeftitch Government. This favourable view of the situation is for the moment not in the least prejudiced

even by the official declaration read by Yeftitch in the Skupstina and in the Senate which, taking into account the present composition of the Parliament and the relative strength of parties, accepted as the basis of government the Constitution introduced by edict in the year 1931. This attitude adopted by compulsion and evidently out of purely tactical motives does not justify our drawing too far-reaching conclusions. No steps can be taken to draft a sweeping programme of reform possibly including the re-adjustment of the State on a federal basis — still less to carry that programme into effect — until the expiration of the term of office of the present Parliament, which will ensue during the current year, opens the way for such a procedure and until, with the co-operation of real representatives of the Croatian, Slovene and Bosnian peoples elected by the free will of their constituents, it proves possible to attempt a satisfactory solution of the most difficult internal problem of Yugoslavia. Whether Yeftitch will prove capable of successfully solving this exceptionally difficult and delicate problem is a question to which the immediate future will supply the answer.

HOW MINORITIES LIVE

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

THE CENSORSHIP

The Public Prosecutor ordained the confiscation of the "*Národní Listy*", the organ of M. Kramarž, former Prime Minister, because in its December 13th. issue it published a cartoon entitled "*Long Live The Conqueror!*" depicting Foreign Minister Benes after his return from the League of Nations session which discussed the Yugoslav-Hungarian conflict. This incident too shows that Beneš's statement to the effect that the Geneva decision meant the victory of the Little Entente and the defeat of Hungarian revisionism, was not generally believed even by the public opinion of Czecho-Slovakia. The December 17th. issue of the "*Kárpáti Magyar Hírlap*" — the organ of the Magyars of Ruthenia — was confiscated for having reproduced a report published in "The Times" protesting against the expulsion of the Hungarians living in Yugoslavia. And the "*Magyar Néplap*", the organ of the Christian Socialist Party, was confiscated at Christmas owing to the publication in its columns of statements by Géza Szüllő, President of the Joint Parliamentary Club of Hungarian Deputies and Senators, and by Count John Esterházy, President of the National Christian Socialist Party, and of an article by Deputy Nicholas Fedor (the two latter being representatives of the Christian Socialist Party in Parliament). All these cases of confiscation show clearly that the vaunted democracy of Czecho-Slovakia exists only on paper, not in reality.

EIGHTEEN CHARGES AGAINST THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE „SLOVÁK“

As a consequence of the anti-Czech demonstration on the occasion of the "Pribina" festival at Nyitra in August, 1932, a whole avalanche of suits have been brought against the Slovaks, — as we have repeatedly explained in the columns of our review. Against *Charles Sidor*, Editor-in-Chief of the "Slovák", organ of the Slovak People's Party, the Public Prosecutor has filed a bill of indictment containing no fewer than eighteen charges based upon articles which have appeared in the said paper in connection with the events at Nyitra. At the proceedings held on January 9th. the commission of the Pozsony District Court sitting to investigate the indictment rejected the objections put forward by the defendant and ordered him to be sent to trial on eighteen counts being breaches of the Act relating to the Defence of the Republic. Sidor is therefore in danger of being sentenced to several years' imprisonment.

RUMANIAN MINORITY EMIGRATION FROM CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

A process of re-emigration to Rumania — in which very many are taking part — has begun among the 12.000 Rumanians living in Ruthenia. In the villages of Alsó-apsa, Középpapsa, Tiszafehéregyháza, Faluszlatina and Aknaszlatina situated in that part of the county of Marmaros which was assigned to Czechoslovakia by the peace treaties, the Rumanian population, for the most part lumbermen, have lost their means of livelihood owing to the crisis in the timber trade. The barren soil and the climate are responsible for the population being in dire distress and on the verge of starvation. Their lot has