

# OBSERVATIONS ON DR. SETON-WATSON'S PAMPHLET

by

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**D**r. Seton-Watson's pamphlet—"*Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers*"—fully deserves the damning criticism to which it has been subjected by Hungarian public opinion and the Hungarian press. It is even a direct provocation of that criticism, because its assumption of the guise of pure science is calculated to impel a section of the foreign reading public not familiar with conditions in the Danube valley to form erroneous conclusions likely to give rise to unjustifiable doubts respecting the possibility of a peaceful revision of the Treaty of Trianon.

After the Great War "*Scotus Viator*" became Masaryk Professor of Central European History in the University of London; and this position of his, combined with his anti-Hungarian policy reaching back almost three decenniums, adequately explains his prepossession in favour of Czecho-Slovakia and the other two States of the Little Entente. He was one of the intellectual pioneers responsible for the creation of the new States and of the Little Entente; and that fact would render his prepossession humanly comprehensible if he did not allow himself to be cajoled into making statements the *bona fides* of which is open to very serious doubts. To give one characteristic example of this fact, I would refer to the passage (pp. 60—61) dealing with the autonomy of Ruthenia, where Dr. Seton-Watson, while admitting that Czecho-Slovakia has not carried out in full the pledges undertaken in respect of this territory under the Treaty of 10 September, 1919, nevertheless speaks of a "partial execution" of these obligations. This example is so characteristic of Dr. Seton-Watson's methods that it is worth our while to dwell on the case in detail.

*In re* Ruthenian autonomy, Dr. Seton-Watson, who in the eyes of British public opinion is regarded as a sound authority on conditions in Czecho-Slovakia, must know better than anyone else that the Prague Government and its Parliament have so far failed to execute a single letter of the pledges undertaken under §§ 10—14 of the Saint Germain Minority Treaty in respect of the autonomy of Ruthenia. This Treaty was concluded on September 10th., 1919, between the Allied and Associated Powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States of North America, the latter having never however ratified the Treaty) of the one part and Czecho-

Slovakia of the other part. In Article 10 of the Treaty Czecho-Slovakia undertook an obligation to ensure this territory "the fullest degree of selfgovernment compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak State". According to Article 11 the territory of the Ruthenians lying south of the Carpathians is to have an autonomous Diet with a sphere of authority extending to questions of language, religion, education and local administration. The Governor of this territory is to be appointed by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and shall be responsible to the Ruthenian Diet. Under Article 12 Czecho-Slovakia undertook that the officials of the Ruthenian territory should as far as possible be chosen from among the inhabitants of that territory. Finally, under Article 13 the Ruthenian territory is to have an equitable number of deputies in the legislature of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, electing those deputies in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic. However, these deputies are not to have votes in the Czecho-Slovak Diet in any matters of legislation belonging to the sphere of the Ruthenian Diet.

Nearly 15 years have passed since the Treaty was signed and put into force; but — a fact practically without a parallel in the history of international treaties — the Czecho-Slovak Government has so far not executed a single letter of the pledges undertaken under the Treaty. So far Ruthenia has not received from the Czecho-Slovak State any form of self-government such as might be spoken of as even a "partial execution" of the treaty obligations. There is no autonomous provincial assembly; nor has any Governor been appointed. In language, religious, educational and local administrative matters the laws in force in Ruthenia too are those passed by the Prague Parliament, these laws being executed by organs delegated for the purpose by the central Government in Prague. Roughly 90% of the officials are Czechs. Ruthenia is not suitably represented in the Prague Parliament, because the so-called "revolutionary national assembly", in which the population of Ruthenia was not represented at all, formed the constituencies in such a manner that in the Ruthenian (Ungvár) constituency the number of inhabitants, electors and votes per deputy is larger than in any other of the constituencies of Czecho-Slovakia. This being so, it is difficult to comprehend how Dr. Seton-

Watson could possibly speak of a "partial" realisation of Ruthenian autonomy.

But the writer goes farther still and speaks of the "scandalous" neglect of this territory under Magyar rule "in contrast to the... reconstruction" which has ensued under the Czech system. We really cannot imagine that Dr. Seton-Watson has never heard of the beneficent activity of Edward Egan and the Ruthenian district commission which did so much for the Ruthenian people during the days of Magyar rule. This commission placed at the disposal of the utterly landless Ruthenian inhabitants 20,657 cadastral yokes of State property, the result being that in 66 villages no fewer than 3063 small-holders were able to take on lease at minimum rents lots of 1,3 and 5 cadastral yokes. In addition some 6,000 cadastral yokes of land were allotted as freeholds to small-holders and parishes respectively. There were then 143 credit co-operative societies and 77 credit co-operative stores in working in this territory. In order to further cattle-breeding the Hungarian State took the lease of 7,282 cadastral yokes of Alpine pasture-land, some 4,600 animals being pastured there. In the Dairy School attached to the Royal Hungarian Alpine Farming Establishment every year 24 Ruthenian boys were given, at the cost of the State, a complete training in general agriculture and in particular in the manufacture of butter and cheese and in the handling of milk. The labour exchange established for the purpose of increasing earning possibilities every year obtained work for 7 or 8 thousand Ruthenian agricultural labourers in farming establishments in the Great Lowland Plain, enabling them to earn roughly 400,000 or 500,000 gold crowns a year in wages. In the various co-operative societies embracing every branch of cottage industry every year some 3400 small holders received employment, the earnings of the same exceeding 200,000 gold crowns.<sup>1</sup>

Our object in mentioning all these facts is to reduce to its proper value the charge accusing the Magyar régime of having "scandalously" neglected the Ruthenian region. Czech papers — e. g. the "Lidové Noviny", an organ very intimately connected with the Czech Foreign Minister Benes — have been repeatedly driven to establish the fact that the network of co-operative societies established by the Magyar régime has been almost completely suspended by the Czech régime. And as concerns the work of "re-construction", it will suffice to note that Ruthenia has for years past been fighting against the most horrible misery and poverty, and to remind our readers of the fact that the British publicist Hamilton, who visited this region in 1932, described the situation by declaring that he had never seen, either in the famine districts of India or in Germany during the blockade that followed the Great War, such distress and misery as that prevailing then in Ruthenia.

### IS THE QUESTION OF REVISION A COMPLICATED ONE?

As may be seen from the particular problem cited above as illustration of the whole question, in his comprehensible prepossession as the advocate of Czecho-Slovakia and the Little Entente, though by

<sup>1</sup> See Dr. Orestes Szabó : "Of the Hungarian Russians" (i. e. Ruthenians), which appeared in "Nemzetiségi ismertető könyvtár" (Library of books dealing with the Nationalities), Vol. I., prior to the Great War, without date.

the use of a pettifoggery entirely lacking in good faith, Dr. Seton-Watson attempts to defend the present régime and to condemn the Magyar régime of older days. In support of this endeavour he would fain represent as extremely complicated the Hungarian demands for a revision of the present situation. He endeavours to suggest that the revision movement is "a predominantly Slavonic question" — a perfectly mistaken view, seeing that the Rumanians are also concerned and that the Slav minorities of the Succession States are equally anxious that the present situation should be changed —, and, stating that in the new period following the Great War the Slav nations — apart from certain Slav minorities — are no longer under non-Slav rule, evidently desires to create the impression that a revision would once more aggravate the relations between the Slav peoples and their non-Slav neighbours. Then he includes among the revision questions the "Anschluss" problem, which has already assumed an entirely different character, as also the question of the Italian Germans, which is quite out of place today, when the relations between Austria and Italy are so friendly, the question of the Slavs of Italy, which as a consequence of the anti-revisionist attitude of Yugoslavia cannot possibly be regarded as revisionist, the Polish-German and even the Polish-Russian frontier problem, the former of which is equally out of place today, and in conclusion a whole series of Balkan frontier disputes. At the same time he does not attribute to the deadly serious Macedonian question a greater importance than that attaching to the frontier disputes existing as between the allied countries of Rumania and Yugoslavia.

### ATTITUDE OF THE NON-MAGYAR NATIONALITIES IN 1918?

After having so completely exaggerated the importance of the Hungarian revision problem, which in our opinion may easily — and must — be taken apart from the questions referred to above, Dr. Seton-Watson finally deals with that revision problem and, after speaking of the present Hungarian system of government as "an oligarchic form of government" etc., endeavours to prove that Austria-Hungary was not broken up by the Allies but fell to pieces "by her own weight". This is quite contrary to fact, at least as far as Hungary is concerned. For Seton-Watson takes the declarations of the National Councils formed after the War — including those of the Slovak Assembly made at Turóc-Szentmárton (Turciánsky Svätý Martin), of the Rumanian Assembly made at Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia) and of the Serb Assembly made at Ujvidék (Novi Sad) — as manifestations of the popular will, whereas it is an easy matter to show that these Assemblies were mere desultory gatherings, the members of which had no mandate whatsoever from the people to decide as to which State they should belong to.

According to Dr. Seton-Watson, for example, the delegates at the Turóc-Szentmárton Assembly represented 110 national councils; though as a matter of fact the persons taking part in the Assembly had no mandate whatsoever, and — as has been so carefully demonstrated by Lajos Steier<sup>2</sup> — among the

<sup>2</sup> Lajos Steier: "Ungarns Vergewaltigung" (Leipzig and Vienna, 1929), pp. 561—62.

103 persons present at Turóc-Szentmárton there was no representative at all of 6 counties with a Slovak majority. At the Ujvidék Assembly — according to the minutes of elections sent in from the "Bácska", Banate and Baranya districts — out of 453 parishes only 211 were represented, that meaning that the majority of the parishes in this area were excluded in advance from participation in the deliberations and in the decisions taken.<sup>3</sup> The Gyulafehérvár National Assembly did not reflect the opinion of the whole body of the Rumanians of Hungary. In a declaration dated December 16th., 1918, one of the leaders of the Rumanian socialists, Trajan Novac, stated that the persons taking part in the Assembly had no authorisation whatsoever to approve separation from Hungary on behalf of the Roumanian working classes.<sup>4</sup>

From what has already been said it will appear pretty evident that the National Assemblies enumerated cannot by any means be regarded as having been manifestations of the general feelings of the Slovak, Rumanian and Serb peoples. So far as the Slovaks are concerned, special stress must be laid on the fact that, on December 12th., 1918, in the town of Kassa (Kosice), the Eastern Slovaks declared an independent Slovak republic, because they were not in the least inclined to join the Czechs in forming a State. The largest of the National Councils of the Ruthenians of Hungary — that of Ungvár — demanded to be allowed to remain in union with Hungary. However, Dr. Seton-Watson ignores these facts, though they are certainly as much in favour of Hungary as those he mentions in favour of Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia respectively.

But it must be remembered that in the territories which the latter States severed from Hungary the inhabitants comprised, not only Slavs and Rumanians respectively, but also very large numbers of Magyars and Germans. According to the data of the Census of 1910, in the territory severed from Hungary and allotted to Czecho-Slovakia, of a total population of 3,535,269 souls 1,070,772 were Magyars and 260,962 Germans (the proportion of the two latter nationalities being therefore 37.08%; and even the Czecho-Slovak Census of 1930 admits that of the 3,963,318 Czecho-Slovak nationals living in this territory 681,460 were Magyars and 160,750 Germans — (that being 21.26% of the total population). In the territories severed from Hungary and allotted to Rumania there were 1,705,000 Magyars and 560,000 Germans; and in those allotted to Yugoslavia (exclusive of Croatia and Slavonia) 458,000 Magyars and 304,000 Germans. The fact that the Magyars protested unanimously against their being separated from their mother country, is not denied even by Dr. Seton-Watson. And so far as the Germans are concerned, the fact must be stressed that the Germans of Upper Hungary (now Slovakia) — at a mass assembly held at Késmárk (Kezmarok) — protested "before the whole world" against any decision being taken in respect of their citizenship against their will, without their being consulted, and without their approval, and emphasised that "Hungary has become our fatherland and provides for our needs, she has always

shared with us weal and suffering, and we have become her citizens, have felt ourselves as such and desire to remain such for ever".<sup>5</sup> Nor was there the slightest doubt then concerning the pro-Magyar feelings of those "Swabians" who were allotted to Rumania and Yugoslavia respectively by the Treaty of Trianon.

Consequently, there is no disputing the fact that a large proportion of the inhabitants of the territories severed from Hungary did not desire to be separated from Hungary. The only point possibly open to dispute is whether those desirous of joining the Succession States or those who desired no such thing were in the majority. The Peace Conference made a fatal mistake is not ascertaining the wishes of the populations concerned, as suggested in the representations of the Hungarian Peace Delegation.<sup>6</sup> In the dispute as to whether she had really — as alleged so often by her enemies — oppressed her non-Magyar nationalities, Hungary appealed to the tribunal of those nationalities and undertook in advance to accept the decision of those nationalities. Had the Peace Conference ordained that plebiscites should be held, today there would be no Danube Valley problem.

#### DR. SETON-WATSON'S FOUR THESES

Dr. Seton-Watson sums up in four points the arguments which in his opinion militate against any revision of the Treaty of Trianon. These four points are as follows:

1. "A "clean cut" on ethnographic lines between Hungary and her neighbours is a physical impossibility"

2. "The economic troubles of which Hungary complains could not be solved by mere rectification. They could only be removed by a reversion to the frontiers of 1914."

3. "None of the Succession States would ever submit to this, and it could only be achieved by war."

4. "Some other solution than revision must be sought through the enforcement and extension of minority treaties, through economic accords, and through a common abandonment of the policy of assimilation for all races alike."

In connection with these four theses it will suffice to adduce the following points.

Ad 1. As is well known, the Hungarian revision movement is not restricted to the demand for the restoration of the territories which are ethnically Magyar, but includes also a demand for the granting of the right of self-determination not yet exercised by them to other peoples too. But, if we confine ourselves to examining only the ethnic principle, we shall find that the carrying into effect of that principle in practice would not be impeded by any obstacles of importance, seeing that the ethnical frontiers of the area of settlement of the Magyars now living in Succession States — in other words, the frontiers of the area possessing a Magyar majority — could be drawn exactly and with the greatest ease through Slovakia and Ruthenia, as also through

<sup>5</sup> Quoted by Dr. Leo Epstein in his „*Studien-Ausgabe der Verfassungsgesetze der Tschechoslowakischen Republik*“ (Reichenberg, 1923), p. 87.

<sup>6</sup> See „*Les Négociations de la Paix Hongroise. Compte Rendu sur les travaux de la Délégation de Paix de Hongrie à Neuilly s/S de janvier à mars 1920*“ Tome I, p. 327.

<sup>3</sup> „*Opomenica Oslobodjenja Vajvodine 1918*“ (published by the Serbian National Committee, Novi Sad 1929. p. 160)

<sup>4</sup> Jancsó Benedek: „*A román irredenta mozgalmak története*“ (History of the Roumanian Irredenta Movements) Budapest 1920. p. 468.

the part of the Magyar territory allotted to Rumania which is this side of the „Királyhágó” Pass and the „Bácska” and Vend districts incorporated in Yugoslavia. Later on, as we shall see, Dr. Seton Watson is himself compelled to admit the ethnically Magyar character of certain territories, and for that reason attempts to fight against the re-annexation to Hungary of these territories on economic grounds and by adducing the question of communications.

Ad 2. Our author declares that "the economic troubles of which Hungary complains could... only be removed by a reversion to the frontiers of 1914": this thesis is probably due to an indubitably thorough appreciation of the sad conditions brought into being by the breaking up by force of the former economic unit which pre-War Hungary represented. By breaking up also the economic unit represented by the customs union of the former Monarchy the Treaty of Trianon inflicted considerable material losses, not only on the Magyars, ethnically taken, but also on the other peoples incorporated in the Succession States. But this circumstance is a source of arguments *in favour* of granting the non-Magyar peoples the right of self-determination, not *against* the restoration of the territories inhabited by Magyars. The restoration of these latter territories would indeed somewhat add to the troubles with which the export trade of Hungarian agriculture has today to contend; though not to an excessive extent, seeing that in consequence there would be a parallel increase in the import requirements of Czecho-Slovakia, the territory inhabited by Magyars being one of the most fertile areas of that State. And in any case we are of the opinion that Dr. Seton-Watson and his friends should be the last to worry on this account. Hungary is only too ready to undertake material burdens too, if by so doing she could redeem our Hungarian (Magyar) brethren from a foreign yoke.

Ad 3. The catchphrase "Revision means war" used with one accord by Messrs. Seton-Watson, Benes, Titulescu and Uzunovitch is not likely to have much effect except upon those who do not know that Hungary desires to obtain a revision solely and exclusively by peaceful means, under Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. There was a time — and we trust such a time will come again — when in the Prague Hradsin, the leading stronghold of the Little Entente, men of the calibre of Masaryk and Benes declared that it was not inconceivable that certain Magyar territories might be restored on the basis of a *peaceful agreement*.

Ad 4. As far as the suggestion respecting the extension of minority protection and the conclusion of economic accords is concerned, we cannot possibly expect such measures to bring about a solution of the intolerable situation prevailing today. The events of recent years have shown that our neighbours — despite their obligations under the minority treaties — are more and more effectually suppressing the rights of the Magyar minorities. Thereby they are making impossible the permanent settlement of economic questions independently of a political *prius*. For so long as Hungary is compelled to see that the Magyar minorities torn from her are being treated as citizens of the very meanest order, there can be no atmosphere of confidence such as is

indispensable to the return of normal trade. Indeed, we must not forget that it was the three neighbours of the Hungarian nation — and in particular Czecho-Slovakia — that paralysed trade by the introduction of various regulations for the purpose of driving Hungary to join the Little Entente, to enter a Danube Confederation under the control of Czecho-Slovakia, and thereby to renounce her revisionist demands.

Under these circumstances the suggestion of a "diminution of the importance of frontiers" — brought to the surface for the first time by the post-War German theory of nationality policy — cannot be regarded either as a suitable means for the solution of the problems of the Danube Valley and the Hungarian nation. For the Succession States have not only economically strengthened the frontiers demarcated by the Treaty of Trianon by building the strongholds of their autarchic endeavours, but in cultural matters have erected Chinese walls on the same. Import prohibitions on books and newspapers published in Hungary, the consistent refusal to „nostrificate" (incorporate) diplomas obtained in Hungary and to accept the terms spent in Hungarian universities, the frequent refusal to allow writers and artistes (actors) to lecture or perform, etc., etc., — all these facts are proofs positive of this state of things. These complaints are all well known to Dr. Seton-Watson too, and we are all the more surprised that under such circumstances he should be able to conceive the possibility of „diminishing the importance of frontiers" towards Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. And in any case, so long as sovereign States exist, no single State will be found willing to renounce having just and equitable frontiers. Hungary too is unable to renounce her right to such frontiers; nor can she look on with folded arms while her nationals — as proved by her Note recently submitted to the League of Nations with her complaints against Yugoslavia — are being shot down by Serbian frontier guards merely for trying to carry home to Hungary the corn grown beyond the Trianon frontier demarcated in defiance of economic reason.

### DR. SETON-WATSON'S STATISTICAL METHODS

A whole monograph would be needed to deal critically with Seton-Watson's census data and the erroneous conclusions drawn therefrom. The methods employed by him in this respect are quite unusual among statisticians and must therefore be condemned outright. We confine ourselves to quoting two characteristic cases by way of illustration.

One of the tables given by Seton-Watson (p. 26) is the following:

<i>Racial Population of pre-War Hungary.</i>	
	1910
<i>Magyar</i> . . . . .	10,050.575
<i>German</i> . . . . .	2,037.435
<i>Slovak</i> . . . . .	1,967.970
<i>Rumanian</i> . . . . .	2,949.032
<i>Ruthene</i> . . . . .	472.587
<i>Croat</i> . . . . .	1,833.162
<i>Serb</i> . . . . .	1,106.471
<i>Jew</i> . . . . .	932.458
<i>Other</i> . . . . .	469.255
	<hr/>
	20,886.487.

Readers will at the first glance be in a position to convince themselves that the total is wrong. Though he copied the data relating to the several nationalities and the figures showing the total population correctly enough from our nationality statistics, Seton-Watson nevertheless includes the Jews — whom the Hungarian Census, in keeping with the practice prevailing in Western Europe, treats not as a nationality but as a denomination — among the "nationalities", thereby entering them *twice* in the same statement — once as a separate nationality and again as members of the respective nationality to which they belong by language. Every statistician will admit that such a method is statistically inadmissible. It is equally characteristic of Seton-Watson's methods that in a footnote on the same page he should — evidently with the object of creating in the mind of his reader an impression of the inner weakness of the Magyar race — estimate at 100,000 the number of baptised Jews. As against this, the official statistical data show that between 1896 and 1914 in Hungary proper altogether 6,583 Jews and in Hungary + Croatia altogether 6,952 Jews were baptised.<sup>7</sup> Now, seeing that the process of assimilation of the Jews began on a more important scale during these very years (as a consequence of the ecclesiastical legislation relating to civil marriages and other similar matters), we must regard Seton-Watson's datum as an entire invention in diametrical opposition to scientific truth.

If that were possible, Seton-Watson's next statement is even more discreditable to the statistical methods he employs. He declares (p. 35) that "*in the old Hungary the Orthodox religious creed was virtually identical with Roumanian, Serb or Ruthene nationality, and the Uniate creed with Roumanian or Ruthene nationality*". Now seeing that the Hungarian Census includes some 400,000 more adherents of the Orthodox and Uniate Churches than the combined Rumanian, Serb and Ruthene racial total in 1910, Seton-Watson concludes that the Hungarian Census was incorrect. In view of the fact that for more than three decenniums Seton-Watson has been one of the leading apostles of the campaign of calumny against Hungary, we consider it by no means superfluous to point out in connection with this datum the unreliability of his statements.

According to the data of the Hungarian Census taken in 1910,<sup>8</sup>

of the 2,025,508 members of the Uniate Church living in Hungary . . . . .	210,653
and of the 2,987,163 members of the Orthodox Church . . . . .	20,910
could speak <i>Magyar only</i> , the total number of members of these two Churches speaking Magyar only being thus . . .	231,563

Of these persons, who spoke no other language but Magyar, it would certainly be difficult to assert that they were of Rumanian, Serb or Ruthenian nationality respectively. And even among the members of these two Churches speaking other languages besides Magyar there were very naturally large numbers of persons whose mother tongue was Magyar,<sup>9</sup> — viz.

of the members of the Uniate Church . .	304,570
and of members of the Orthodox Church	40,851

were persons whose mother tongue was Magyar. And seeing that (*v. supra*) some two-thirds of the latter number could speak Magyar only, there is not the slightest reason to doubt the correctness of the data supplied by Hungarian statistics with reference to the number of members of the Uniate and Orthodox Churches whose mother tongue

was Magyar. Then again there were adherents of these two Churches also among the Slovaks, Croatians and other nationalities. The 1910 Hungarian Census, for example, shows that there were 79,152 Slovaks belonging to the Uniate Church and 680 Slovaks belonging to the Orthodox Church. That these data are not in the least exaggerated, is proved by the Czecho-Slovak Census of 1921, which showed the existence in the territories of Slovakia and Ruthenia of 93,000 members of the Greek and Armenian Uniate Church and 1000 members of the Greek and Armenian Orthodox Church among the Eastern "Czecho-Slovaks", most of the same being Slovaks.<sup>10</sup>

A comparison of all these data must force us to the conclusion that the statement made by Dr. Seton-Watson to the effect that all members of the Uniate and Orthodox Churches in pre-War Hungary were in principle Rumanians, Serbs or Ruthenes, is entirely at variance with the facts. The circumstance that the Hungarian Census shows the existence in pre-War Greater Hungary of exactly 484,581 more members of the Orthodox and Uniate Churches than there were Serbs, Rumanians, and Ruthenians combined, is explained naturally by there having been large numbers of adherents of these two Churches also among the Magyars, Slovaks, Croatians and other nationalities. We do not wish to presume that Dr. Seton-Watson deliberately suppressed the truth. Probably he was ignorant on the point. But in connection with the last case cited we are fully justified in calling in question his authority as an expert.

In consequence Dr. Seton-Watson's other statistical data must also be received with scepticism. By the statistical data he employs, Dr. Seton-Watson endeavours to prove that there was magyarisation by force in pre-War Hungary and that this magyarisation is still going on. However, whereas on the one hand he pretends that this assimilation was — and is — prejudicial to the interested nationalities and a cause for grievance on their part, on the other hand he treats as a natural process the fact that during the Czech régime the "crypto-Slovaks" or "Magyarones", who "at first . . . . . hesitated to declare their true nationality", later on, "when they saw that the old régime was not likely to return, gained courage and confidence, and a process of automatic demagyarisation has set in, here and there of sufficient importance to affect the total figures" (pp. 29—30).

The truth is that the gradual assimilation of the non-Magyar nationalities in Hungary was a natural consequence of the many centuries of symbiosis of these peoples in a State under Magyar direction, of the social superiority of the Magyars resulting from this leadership and the superiority of Magyar culture as compared with those of the Slav and Rumanian peoples, of the absorbing influence of the towns stressed also by Dr. Seton-Watson, etc., etc. It is naturally too early yet for these factors to act in the same way in Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia in favour of the Czech, Slovak and Ruthenian, the Rumanian and the Serbian and Croatian nationalities respectively. The fact that the "crypto-Slovaks" or "Magyarones" after the Magyar régime appeared "not likely to return" declared themselves to be Slovaks, may perhaps explain why certain individuals who had previously stated that they were Magyars at the Census of 1919 declared for Slovak nationality; but it cannot by any means explain why the Czecho-Slovak Censuses of 1921 and 1930 show such a decrease in the number of Magyars as compared with the Census of 1919?

<sup>10</sup> Gustav Peters: "*Der neue Herr Böhmens*" Berlin 1927. p. 65.

<sup>7</sup> "Annuaire Statistiques Hongrois". Vol. 1914, p. 308.

<sup>8</sup> "Az 1914. évi népszámlálás." Magyar statisztikai közlemények. Új sorozat. Vol. 64, pp. 57 and 140.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 454 and 464.

## LET US LOOK INTO THESE DATA MORE CLOSELY

There were, according to the Hungarian census of January 1, 1910:

in Slovakia	896.271 (30.6%)
in Ruthenia	174.501 (29.2%)

Magyars, or a total of 1,070.772 in the entire territory transferred to Czecho-Slovakia.<sup>11</sup>

Another census was held by the Czecho-Slovak Government in August 1919, in Slovakia only, in order to collect data to be submitted to the Peace Conference. The number of the Magyars was put by this census at

692.831 (23.5%).<sup>12</sup>

This census thus returned 203.440 less Magyars than its precursor of 1910, a loss of nearly one fifth, and reduced the percentage of Magyar inhabitants from 30.6% to 23.5%.

Scarcely eighteen months later, on February 15, 1921, a census was held in the entire territory of the State. There were, according to this:

in Slovakia	634.827 (21.48%),
in Ruthenia	103.690 (17.35%),

Magyars, or a total of 738.517 in the entire territory transferred from Hungary.<sup>13</sup>

After a lapse of but eighteen months, in Slovakia alone the Czecho-Slovak authorities returned 58.000 less Magyars than before and reduced the percentage of Magyar inhabitants from 23.5% to 21.48%. In Ruthenia the figures of 1910 suffered a decline of 70.811, the percentage falling from 29.2% to 17.35%. In the whole territory transferred from Hungary, the Magyars of Czecho-Slovakia lost, according to Czecho-Slovak statistics, no fewer than 332.255 souls, well-nigh one third of their total number.

The main results of the Czecho-Slovak census held on December 2nd, 1930, published but a few weeks ago show a still darker picture of the continual decline in the number of the Magyars living in Slovakia and Ruthenia. There were, according to these figures:

in Slovakia	571.988 (17.58%)
in Ruthenia	109.472 (15.44%)

Magyars, or a total of 681.460 Czecho-Slovak subjects of Magyar extraction in both provinces.<sup>14</sup>

The number of Magyar inhabitants of the province of Slovakia thus decreased by 62.839 between 1921 and 1930, according to Czecho-Slovak statistics, entailing a reduction in percentage from 21.48 to 17.58%. In Ruthenia we note an increase of 5.782 in absolute figures, accompanied however by a percentual decrease from 17.35 to 15.44%. The figures from both provinces computed indicate, in comparison with figures of 1921, a loss of 57.057 Magyar souls in the whole territory transferred from Hungary to Czecho-Slovakia. This would mean, in other words, that the Magyar Minority of Czechoslovakia has lost, in less than a decade, one twelfth of its numerical strength.

<sup>11</sup> Manuel statistique de la république tchécoslovaque. II. Prague, 1925.

<sup>12</sup> Soznam miest na Slovensku. Bratislava, 1920.

<sup>13</sup> Zprávy státního úřadu statistického republiky československé. Vol. XVI, No. 195. The number of Magyars possessing no Czechoslovak citizenship was returned as 13,414. (Čechoslovenské Statistik, T. IX.) This would bring up the total figure of Magyar inhabitants to 648,210. No data are available about the number of Ruthenian Magyar inhabitants of foreign citizenship or possessing none whatever, that is, belonging to the category of "homeless" people called into being in consequence of the provisions of the Peace Treaties.

<sup>14</sup> Zprávy státního úřadu statistického republiky československé. Vol. XIV. The number of Magyars possessing no Czechoslovak citizenship was returned as 20,349: This figure added, the grand total of Magyar inhabitants would work out at 592,337.

A cursory comparison of the returns of the Slovakian survey of 1919 and the two general censuses of 1921 and 1930, will inevitably lead to the conclusion that one at least of these operations must have been a fake.

We do not now propose, however, to scrutinize the results of the 1919 survey or those of the census of 1921. The latter was branded as unreliable years ago already by an eminent Czech scholar, Dr. Emmanuel Rádl, Professor in the Karel University of Prague.<sup>15</sup> We only want to examine the data relating to the Magyar population of the census of 1930, on the basis of official Czechoslovak sources, with the sole object of determining whether the returns relating to the natural increase of the Magyar population could be brought into line with the alleged results of the last census. According to official Czecho-Slovak data relating to the years 1921 to 1930

the number of births among the Magyars was	189.640 and
the number of deaths among the Magyars was	115.381 <sup>16</sup>
the natural increase being therefore	74.259
The number of Magyar emigrants was	13.380 <sup>17</sup>
the net increase would work out therefore at	60.879
If this figure is added to the total of Magyar inhabitants, whether Czecho-Slovak subjects, foreigners or "homeless", calculated according to the census figures of 1921, viz.	648.210
the total of Magyars, computed for the end of the year 1930, would appear to be	709.089
The Czecho-Slovak census of 1930, however, puts the total of all Magyar inhabitants of Slovakia, foreigners and homeless included, at but	592.337
leaving	116.752
Magyars unaccounted for.	

In this way the census of 1930 not only spirited away those 60.879 souls who had been added by natural increase to the numbers of the Magyar population between 1921 and 1930, but also another 55.873 souls returned as Magyars in the registers of 1921. The same method applied to Ruthenia produces the following results:<sup>18</sup>

The number of births among the Magyars (1921—30) was	43.229
the number of deaths among the Magyars (1921—30) was	24.043
Natural increase:	19.186
Number of Magyar emigrants:	3.398
Net increase computed:	15.788
Total Magyar population, according to the census figures of 1921:	103.690
Thus the total computed for 1930 would work out at	119.478
The census of 1930, however, puts the Magyars at	109.472
And leaves therefore	10.006
Magyars unaccounted for.	

<sup>15</sup> Dr. Emanuel Rádl, Der Kampf zwischen Tschechen und Deutschen. Reichenberg, 1928, p. 186.

<sup>16</sup> Čechoslovenské Statistik, 59, 63, 77, and Zprávy státního úřadu statistického republiky československé. — Mitteilungen des statistischen Staatsamtes der čechoslovenschen Republik, 45—1921, 82, 83—1930, 151, 152—1931.

<sup>17</sup> Statistická příručka republiky československé. IV. — Data available cover but the years 1922 to 1930, the figure to be derived from them would be 12.164. We have added, therefore, the average for the 10½ months between February 15 and December 31, 1921. The great emigration of Magyar officials expelled by the Czechs was over by that time.

<sup>18</sup> Following data are derived from the sources quoted above, with a similar correction as mentioned in the preceding footnote, regarding emigration in 1921.

Thus, though the loss of Magyar souls is not as significant in Ruthenia as in Slovakia, Czecho-Slovak statistics nevertheless deprived the Magyar Minority of Ruthenia of two thirds of the net increase of their numbers between 1921 and 1930.

In the two provinces, Slovakia and Ruthenia the number of the Magyar population as returned by the census of 1930 falls short by 126.758 of the figure it must have attained by natural increase up to the end of 1930.

What has become of these Magyars? This is a question to which the Czecho-Slovak Statistical Office has failed so far to give a satisfactory answer.

Dr. Antony Boháč, Director of the Czecho-Slovak Statistical Office, attributes the comparatively small shortage in the numbers of the Magyars of Ruthenia (10,006) to the following factors: 1. to the deflection of a number of Jews from the Magyar Minority, 2. to the Germanisation of some Magyar villages, 3. to increases in the number of the Gypsies, 4. to Magyar emigration and 5. to the "return" of "Magyarised Ruthenes" to Ruthene nationality.<sup>19</sup>

Let us examine whether the influence of these factors will suffice to explain the disappearance of 116.752 Magyars in Slovakia?

As regards the Jews, the Czecho-Slovak Statistical Office informs us that in Slovakia the number of people of Jewish nationality was smaller in 1930 than in 1921: it fell from 70.522 to 65.385.<sup>20</sup> It is therefore most unlikely that anything like a substantial number of Israelites who had declared themselves Magyars in 1921 should have joined the ranks of the Jewish nationality in 1930: for in this case the numerical strength of the Jewish nationality ought to have increased rather than declined.

The numbers of the Germans of Slovakia increased from 139.880 to only 147.501 during the period 1921 to 1930,<sup>21</sup> a gain which hardly equals the figure corresponding to the natural increase of the German population. However, a German gain at the expense of the Magyar nationality should have added a surplus to their numbers not to be accounted for by natural increase. This evidently was not the case.

The Ruthenes of Slovakia increased in number from 85.628 in 1921 to 91.079 in 1930,<sup>22</sup> the balance, however, fails to do justice to their natural increase. No Magyars therefore seem likely to have gone over to them.

The numbers of the Magyar emigrants have been duly deducted in the above computation from the figure indicating their natural increase; none of the 115.752 Magyars missing may be explained away on that score. The Magyars of foreign and those of no citizenship have also been taken into consideration.

Therefore, of the non-"Czecho-Slovak" nationalities the Gypsies alone can account for a fraction of the Magyars found missing. Their numbers increased, according to official data, from 7.999 in 1921 to 30.626 in 1930;<sup>23</sup> owing in part at least to the fact that Gypsies of Magyar tongue, especially in the Feled district, were returned by the Czecho-Slovak census recorders, in spite of their protests, as people of Gypsy "nationality". Even this will not account, however, for more than 15—20.000 of the missing Magyars: which is a liberal estimate, as it must be borne in mind that the Gypsies are a prolific race. The mysterious disappearance of some 100.000 Magyars still calls for an explanation.

Thus we come to the inevitable conclusion that nearly one sixth of the Magyars registered as such by the

Czecho-Slovak census authorities in 1921 were kidnapped, as it were, by the census of 1930. No statistical manoeuvres will do the trick of explaining away this huge decline. And nobody conversant with Czecho-Slovakian conditions will believe that these fifteen calamitous years could have sufficed to induce such a large number of Magyars to spontaneously assume "Czecho-Slovak" nationality. This, indeed, would be little short of a miracle.

In the course of two decenniums the Czech Censuses decreased the number of Magyars — as compared with the figures of 1910 — by roughly 390.000, at the same time entirely eliminating the natural increase of the Magyars. On the other hand — as may be seen by reference to Dr. Seton-Watson's pamphlet — the Hungarian Censuses for the period from 1869 to 1910 show an advance in the absolute number of Slovaks. In the decennium 1900—1910 there was indeed a slight set-back (from 2,008.744 to 1,967.970); but this decline of 2% is infinitesimal when compared with the decrease during the decennium 1921—1930 of the Czecho-Slovakian Magyars shown by the Czecho-Slovak Census (a decline of 8%). Consequently a simple arithmetical comparison is also in favour of the Hungarian Census. We would repeat, however, that the assimilation of the Slovaks in the Greater Hungary of pre-War days was the natural result of the working of numerous factors; whereas there can be no question of any such natural assimilation of the Magyars ensuing in Czecho-Slovakia.

## THE PLEBISCITE AREAS

On the map annexed to his pamphlet, Dr. Seton-Watson marks certain small territories as "possible plebiscite areas". In the text, however, the author is bent on proving at all costs that these territories must also not be restored to Hungary.

In respect of Western Hungary the author simply refuses to take cognizance of the Sopron plebiscite, speaking of "a *fait accompli* (effected) there in 1920 in very much the same way as Poland at Wilna" and declaring that "both on a racial and on an economic basis any rectification would have to be in favour of Austria, not of Hungary". (Maybe in order, in the event of an "Anschluss", to give Germany even more territory?) He opposes the restoration of Pozsony (Bratislava) chiefly because in his opinion the Danube is to Slovakia what the Vltava and the Elbe are to Bohemia; To him the restoration to Hungary of Komárom (Komarno) is inadmissible because it "commands the junction of the chief Slovak river, the Váh, with the Danube"; his objection to the restoration of the district lying between the mouth of the Ipoly (Ipel) and Kassa is that such a proceeding would interfere with road and railway communications and would paralyse traffic; Kassa must not be restored because it is "the natural and, indeed, only possible, capital of Eastern Slovakia"; his objection to the restoration to the section of Ruthenia inhabited by Magyars is that such a procedure would deprive the Ruthenian hinterland of all connection between the valleys and would also cut off Bohemia from all direct railway communication with Rumania; he objects to the restoration of the Szatmár district because he finds — speaking in the very spirit of pan-German propaganda — that there are here 30—40.000 Germans (as against 268.000 Magyars and 119.000 Rumanians ! ! ) who — he says — "under

<sup>19</sup> Statistický Obzor — Revue Statistique Tchécoslovaque. 4. 1932.

<sup>20</sup> Zprávy—Mitteilungen, 195, XIV.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

Rumanian rule are slowly recovering their German nationality"; nor would he restore Nagyvárad (Oradea Mare), because it is a railway centre; the restoration of Arad — he says — would lead to its economic ruin; while he objects to the restoration of the Banat because it is a "racial mosaic", and of the Bácska (Bačka) district because he asserts that the population of Szabadka (Subotica) includes nearly 100,000 Yugoslavs (Even according to the official Serb Census of 1921 the town contains only about 62,000 inhabitants of Serb-Croat nationality).

So Dr. Seton-Watson is never at a loss for arguments when calling in question the right of Hungary to any particular territory. He pleads both economic and ethnic grounds — employing whichever of the two seems more favourable to his purpose; but these same arguments are never once adduced in favour of Hungary. This is hardly what one might call "objectivity".

The conclusion drawn by Dr. Seton-Watson from the survey described above is that even if "a policy of minor rectifications, . . . in a more conciliatory atmosphere than the present, might reduce the number of Magyars outside Hungary by something between a half and three-quarters of a million" (!!), "much the greater number of them would . . . still remain on the wrong side of the frontier". This argument is just as little warrantable as the others. From the essay by Sir Robert Gower published in another part of this Review it will be seen that in the territory adjoining the Trianon frontier — without including the Székelys of Transylvania — 1,645,485 Magyars and 259,258 Germans could be re-incorporated in Hungary without placing more than 590,290 Slavs and 61,784 Rumanians under Magyar (Hungarian) rule, while the majority of the Magyars torn from the mother country would be able once more to live in Hungary.

Dr. Seton-Watson declares that the Czechs or the Rumanians of the Regat "would gladly hand over" to Hungary "a few towns and villages", "if that really meant the end of the quarrel." But he believes that the Little Entente statesmen "see no advantage whatsoever in making (such) concessions", for they are of opinion that these concessions "could not satisfy Magyar opinion", which would only treat them as "a first instalment, to be followed by fresh demands and a fresh offensive". And Dr. Seton-Watson, who in this connection would appear to be the spokesman of Beneš's party, believes that the Slovaks and the Rumanians of Transylvania are more intransigent in the question of revision than the Czechs and the Rumanians of the Regat. This statement is perhaps true of the Slovaks in one respect, — viz, in reflecting the constantly increasing tendency in the public opinion of Slovakia expressed in the view that, if the revision regarded as inevitable should restore to Hungary the territories inhabited by Magyars, the whole of Slovakia should be treated as a single unit and the Slovaks should follow the Magyars. We declare that in the event of a plebiscite the majority of the Slovaks would vote today also in favour of Hungary. According to Dr. Seton-Watson the Slovaks are more intransigent even than the Czechs in their opposition to a revision of the Trianon frontiers. *The dispute cannot be decided except by a plebiscite carried out under impartial control. Hungary is today as ready as ever to accept the results of the plebiscite; only the Czechs*

*and their allies repudiate the suggestion of a plebiscite, evidently because they are afraid of it.*

As appears from a recently published work of his<sup>24</sup>, Masaryk in January, 1919, repudiated the suggestion of a plebiscite on the ground that the Slovaks had been so excessively oppressed that they had never had an opportunity to think politically and would not even know how to vote. This statement is typical, not only because in it Masaryk denied the Slovaks — of whom the preface to the Minority Treaty concluded at Saint Germain on September 10th., 1919, asserts that they joined the Czechs of their own accord — the capacity to decide independently concerning their lot as a people, but also because it bases its opposition to the holding of a plebiscite on an alleged oppression. Had this really been the case, the attitude adopted was quite absurd, because oppressed people cannot be regarded as likely to vote for their reputed oppressors. Milan Ivánka, one of the leaders of the czechophile Slovaks (a very small minority), at the trial of Tuka, the Slovak autonomist who was condemned to fifteen years' penal servitude by the Czechs, — the trial was on August 19th., 1929 — spoke far more frankly when he declared that in the event of the convening of a Slovak National Assembly 80% of the delegates would have voted for a return to the Crown of St. Stephen!! This statement requires no comment.

The economic argument adduced by Dr. Seton-Watson against minor rectifications is that such a procedure would not restore to Hungary either forests or ore or salt mines or even health resorts, and would in addition render far more acute Hungary's agrarian problem, for it would re-incorporate in Hungary Magyar farmers who have benefited by the land reforms of the Succession States and obtained possession of lands of their own. On this point we can re-assure Dr. Seton-Watson.

Apart from the fact that the Succession States have allotted precious little land to Magyar claimants (in Czecho-Slovakia, for instance, barely 25,000 hectares), according to a statement made by Count Stephen Bethlen published in another part of this Review, "not a single person is unaware (in Hungary) of the elementary fact that these agrarian reforms could not be undone even in case of Revision". And however touching Dr. Seton Watson's fears respecting forests, mines and watering-places may be, they are not likely to make the public opinion of Hungary falter in its demand for revision.

### MARGINAL NOTE ON A CERTAIN STATEMENT

It would be out of place to deal with the attacks made by Dr. Seton-Watson upon Lord Rothermere, Count Stephen Bethlen, Father Francis Jehlicka and Sir Robert Gower. So we confine ourselves to referring our readers to the two statements of Count Bethlen (*v. infra*) and to the article by Father Jehlicka to be found in another part of this Review. As regards Dr. Seton-Watson's observation to the effect that "personally conducted tours from England were organised at an absurdly unremunerative rate; invitations were scattered broadcast, pheasant shooting and the prime vintages of Tokay and other well-known Hungarian lures were prepared for the frivolous or the unwary", we leave it to the judgment of the reader to decide whether it is conceivable that

<sup>24</sup> "Cesta demokracie" Praha 1933.

English gentlemen can be influenced by invitations, pheasant shooting, Tokay wine or other natural manifestations of Hungarian hospitality to such an extent as to be prepossessed in favour of the Hungarian revisionist demands, not because they are convinced of the objective justice of those demands, but for the sake of such trifles? And if Dr. Seton-Watson takes umbrage at the Chief Editor of the "*Pesti Hirlap*", irrespective of the cost, publishing books written to convince the public opinion of Western Europe of the justice of his country's cause, we would answer simply that the Hungarian nation must be proud that it has sons so convinced of the justice of their cause as to spare no expense in advocating it. For — as against the allegation made by Dr. Seton-Watson — we must state emphatically that there is not a single honest man in Hungary — from the magnate to the simple cottager, from the banker-prince to the poorest labourer — who is not convinced that the revision of the Treaty of Trianon is in the interest of Hungary, of Europe in general and the Danube Valley in particular, and of all those peoples which for centuries — for good and for evil — shared the fate of the Magyars.

At the end of his pamphlet Dr. Seton-Watson publishes the whole text of the declaration in which "the Slovak Deputies and Senators in the Czechoslovak Parliament" and other representatives of the Slovak people protested against the addresses given in England by Count Stephen Bethlen and Father Francis Jehlicka. But Dr. Seton-Watson forgets to inform his British readers that, although the declaration was dated December 20th., 1933, and he asked for its publication in the "*Daily Mail*" as early as December 22nd., the "*Slovák*" both on December 28th. and January 1st., 1934, persisted in stressing the fact that the deputies belonging to the Slovak People's Party and the Slovak National Party had never signed any such declaration. So it is quite evident that Dr. Seton-Watson sent the "*Daily Mail*" a declaration containing signatures of persons who subsequently stated that the said signatures were not theirs. Far be it from us to call in question Dr. Seton-Watson's personal *bona fides*; but we are by no means convinced of the good faith of the person who sent him the declaration from Prague. The fact that, at a meeting held on January 18th., 1934, the parliamentary club of the Slovak People's Party stated that "*those signatures . . . of which it was by a misunderstanding asserted that they were not authentic, are valid*" does not in any way affect what has been said above; indeed, it compels us to conclude that the Slovak autonomists were subsequently either compelled or persuaded to acknowledge the validity, but not the genuineness, of the signatures they had previously repudiated. This state of things in itself throws a remarkable light on the internal political conditions of Czechoslovakia.

### WHAT SETON-WATSON ALSO ADMITS

After having dealt with the shady sides of the pamphlet, we would treat of one or two good points too. It is to the credit of Dr. Seton-Watson that he speaks with regret of the decision of the Czechoslovak authorities depriving the Magyars of the towns of Pozsony (Bratislava) and Kassa of the status of

equal linguistic rights in local government affairs which they had enjoyed until the publication of the results of the 1930 Census. Our appreciation is not in the least prejudiced by the fact that Seton-Watson endeavours to excuse and palliate this measure by referring to an alleged "campaign of aggression and calumny" directed against the Czechoslovak Republic and to "the methods of Magyarisation (*sic*!) still in operation in post-War Hungary against the Slovak minority".

In the introductory section of his pamphlet Dr. Seton-Watson himself admits that "*during the past year the question of Treaty Revision has figured more and more prominently in international politics, forming the real background to the vital problems of Disarmament and Security. In proportion as the economic settlement imposed in Paris has crumbled and proved unworkable — until none save 'the men of the wild jackass' are left to defend it today — there has been a parallel tendency in many quarters to assume that the territorial settlement of 1919—20 is no less imperfect and requires no less drastic revision*". He then adds that, in addition to many Central European, British and American writers, Signor Mussolini also "*raised the question of revision as one of the central aims of the proposed Four Power Pact*", and that Mr. MacDonald — though, he asserts, only "for a brief moment" — "*seemed disposed to endorse his view*", from which moment "*revision can be said to have acquired the rank of an urgent international problem*". In these sentences Dr. Seton-Watson himself has emphasised the central importance of the question of revision in European and indeed in international politics, as also the close connection between the same and the questions of Disarmament and Security. That is our opinion too; and we can only regret that Seton-Watson is, notwithstanding, one of the spokesmen advocating the cause of the most obstinate opponents of a revision of the Treaty of Trianon.

We regret this all the more, seeing that Seton-Watson himself establishes the fact that the treaties of peace must not be regarded as sacrosanct and eternal, urging on the contrary that, where it appears that by their modification or revision it may prove possible to eliminate conflicts and at the same time to reconcile Hungary with her neighbours, "*anyone opposing (such a procedure) would be guilty of a crime against Europe*". That is just what we feel too. *The Hungarian nation would certainly not adopt an attitude of rigid refusal if invited to enter into negotiations promising a serious revision of the Trianon frontiers.*

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*People in Britain should not forget that, though the flag flying over Constantinople and the Dardanelles is that of Turkey, the pole is in the hands of Moscow.*