
ABSTRACTS

ERVIN CSIZMADIA

PARTIES, COMPETITION AND ACCOMMODATION. OUTLINES OF A THEORY OF CHANGE.

The author investigates the variable nature of parties and their adaptability. First he reviews the literature of the parties modification's process. He states that there are many books and articles dealing with the parties' static position and the investigation of their dynamic evolution neglected within political science. Secondly, the author tries to introduce the logic of party transformation. Parties permanently alter their external and internal environment and there is a dynamic interrelationship between them. In the third chapter he considers the different sphere of adaptability of the Hungarian parties, for example the organizations', ideology and communicational adaptability. He concludes that the Hungarian parties play a stabilizing role in the Hungarian political system and at the same time there are many instabilizing elements. Until nowadays Hungary has reached a quasi-two-party-system resulting in the stabilization of the preference of the Hungarian voters. This is a very positive change. Nevertheless, the process of changing of parties have serious effects on the Hungarian democratic model. There is an interaction between the variable characters of parties and the democratic model. In the author's view this process has positive impact on the democracy.

LÁSZLÓ KENYERES

CHOICE OF A PART(NER)Y

The conflicting ideologies, which were intermediated by the two big contrary parties (Fidesz-HCP, HSP), manifested with strong intensity around the 2002 elections. In this period, a new element got a stressed role in common talk: the social segregation. In this topic, the opposition (HSP, AFD) could act

more effectively than the governing parties (Fidesz-HCP, HDF), because the formers could publish the problem for the public more often. It is necessary to define social segregation published in daily papers from strategical point of view. Here we can face a negative element of the Hungarian campaign: to ruin the other political party's reputation.

In my dissertation I examine social segregation in the dimension of partner choosing. It appeared that for the individual it is not important at all that their partners confess the same political view. On the other hand, we can also notice that in case of a smaller group the political view is an important criterion in partner choosing. As a conclusion, we can say that in this dimension public talks did not cover the reality consequently, but in some degree they influenced the mainstream of the public opinion, because significant part of the questioned persons find that similar political view is an important criterion in partner choosing.

Finally, we can also mention our experienced fact that after the campaign period, problem of social segregation became the topic of common talks less frequently. However, it does not lead to the unambiguous consequence that the relationship of partner- and party choosing has been changed. We can answer this question surely after results of further surveys only.

LÁSZLÓ KÉRI

MEDIA, POLITICS, PARTIES

The current study is an attempt to explain the nature of the main controversies of the relationship between the mediaworld and the Hungarian politics. After the beginning-years of the transformation both subsystem had been survived remarkable and deep structural changes, but this development was not too well-balanced.

Partly, because the field of the Hungarian media had made enormously strong attempts to keep its newly regained independency as long as they could. Partly because the new Hungarian political elite was keen to learn the latest media-patterns as the most effective-considered policy-making methods. These both-side misunderstandings could have been caused some surprising conflictuous situations year by year. Finally, the implementation of the commercial televisions after 1997 has made a clear -cut situation, either in media-politics, or in the politization of the media.

These kind of rather uncomparable and quick changes have been shaped the original conflicts and patterns, however the latest tendencies in the Hungarian media-policy show a new

battle-field, which would have drawn towards absolutely another challenges -for both side...

The main question from the point of view of the political elite, whether are they prove to be able to learn the lessons of the last fifteen years as the continuous role-setting, or to adapt the latest to the latest challenges formed of the last some years. One can consider this paper as a first attempt to examine the basic political roles shaped by the last decade changes, how to be able, far more better able to suitable for the requirements of the next elections in 2006. Somewhere, in Campaignland, far from the world of the Common-sense, very far from it...

FERENC KUMIN

ABOUT THE INTERACTION BETWEEN MEDIA AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

As the article's initial thesis Marshall McLuhan's famous statement „media is the message” is quoted and explained. The reason for getting back to this controversial claim is that the true nature of political communication is to be examined. It seems that many of the apologetic symptoms of contemporary democracies is blamed on the recent practices of political communication as operated by both parties of politicians and the media.

The article claims, based on McLuhan's idea, that in order to understand any period of political communication one has to take a look at the dominant means of communication, the so called media regime. Since the concept of political communication is only valid among democratic circumstances only these periods are considered. In the antique era the lack of telecommunication formulated the agora and its key player, the speaker. Taking a huge step in time the reign of newspaper formulated the profile of early modern democracies, leading to the creation of abstract new ideas and players, such as parties and democratic institutions. These concepts could only be communicated in printed forms. For the second half of the 20th century, a TV-based media regime begins, turning the abstract explanations into actual, quick and easy to digest messages. The rise of the new media these days seems to challenge this regime, but the procedure is full of question marks.

In the consequent part the global analysis goes local, and the Hungarian micro history after the change of regime is examined. In many instances, the „media is the message” statement seems valid in this framework as well, e.g. in the effects of the late opening of the commercial TV market, or in the special demand for serious daily newspapers.

Finally the potential future developments are taken into consideration. The core questions of these final thoughts are how the new tendencies is mediated political communication, such as media-deliberation, or participation through media interaction, could change the current profile of media regime, and, therefore, the current state of democracy.

ALADÁR DÉR

THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

The three chapters of the study focus on three basic theoretical questions of this topic:

The notion of European identity – based on the debate about the cultural vs. political interpretation – is defined as a political identity, related to Europe as an institutional community. It does not mean the elimination of cultural- and national dimensions or the acceptance of the deconstructional paradigm of the „national”.

The relation between European and national identity is based on the discussion of Max Heller’s triple classification which includes the model of the conflict-, neutral- and complementary relation. After the critical analysis of the first two theses, we take sides with the complementary relation, which means a functional-genetic exchange relationship between the two theses and it is also in correlation with multi-or polyidentity.

Analysing the temporal dimensions of European identity, its beginning is dated to the period between the two World Wars. Its present is characterized by a certain multilateral limitation. Its future development will be construed as following the characteristics and generating effects of the so-called „Euro-optimist” paradigm. As regards the conditions of this development, the emphasis is on European (political) architecture, identity politics and national development, that provides the basis for „national” transformation.

ANDRÁS NAGY

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON THE AGENDA OF THE 2004 SPANISH ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

This study seeks to prove the devastating impact of the terrorism frame on the political agenda with a new example, the 2004 Spanish electoral campaign. Just like after the tragedy of 9/11 in the United States, the topic of terrorism in Spain also

played much bigger role than its real importance, eclipsing every other issue of the agenda.

The terrorism frame did not change the real risk of terrorism but increased Spanish perception of vulnerability and security. News related to international and domestic terrorism (the war in Iraq, the activity of the Basque terrorist group, ETA and the strengthening of regional nationalist movements) attracted the greatest attention in Spanish press during the 2004 electoral campaign. The public opinion became extremely sensitive to the topic of terrorism and this led to the fact that the terrorist attacks of 3/11 in Madrid could influence the result of the elections causing the unexpected victory of the Socialists.

The effect of framing terrorism in Spain is certified by a new research in which the author goes through the front pages of the two leading Spanish daily newspapers, *El País* and *El Mundo* in the last two months of the campaign, between January and March 2004.

TAMÁS CSAPODY

PASSIVE RESISTANCE OF SECONDARY FORM'S IN HUNGARY BETWEEN 1848 AND 1856

Passive resistance is a kind of non-violent opposition, consisting of various components of non-collaboration, civil disobedience, and satyagraha; a series of non-violent political protest-actions, which is non-violent in each and every case, in spite of the fact that its participants do not stand on the base of principal non-violence. Essentially, passive resistance is open, mass non-collaboration with power, without assuming the full responsibility for the criminal consequences of the participants behaviour.

History and political science consider Ferenc Deák as the originator, and the greatest personality of passive resistance. Ferenc Deák's letter to Anton Schmerling, the then Minister of Justice of the Austrian Empire, dated on 25 April 1850, is considered as the starting-point of passive resistance; and Deák's five letters on the subject are assumed to be the most important political documents of it. Hungarian historiography associates the concept of passive resistance with Deák, because of his mentality, political career, liberal views, way of life, activity, and history-making personality. The years passed from 1849 to 1861 are generally called the period of "the Hungarian passive resistance", and at the same time the period of Ferenc Deák's passive resistance. However, Deák's starting years from 1824-1833, spent in Zala county, which also showed elements of passive resistance, and the former years (from

1820) of local and national passive resistance are not considered as part of the field of passive resistance. We can not detail here the passive resistance of the period before the reform era, and the age of reform (before the revolution), also, we can not touch young Deák's activities of these periods, but we have to mention a few essential points.

1. Passive resistance, as a special form of political protest, did exist and "flourished" in Hungary; 2. Roots of the post-revolution passive resistance period, and Deák's then political activity goes back to the period of passive resistance before the revolution (that is called Deák's primary political socialization); 3. The post-revolution period of passive resistance is a repeated appearance of the same attitude against the same power (the House of Hapsburg), so the post-revolution passive resistance can be considered as a resumption of the former one, a continuity of the same political behaviour; 4. Both periods of passive resistance came from the lack of power, and appeared as the weapon of the weak; 5. An essential difference between the two periods is that the first one is the fighting method of a society that can not take up arms yet, and the latter one is the way of political struggle of a society that can not take arms any more; 6. Afterwards, it is well-known that the pre-revolution passive resistance was the initial phase of a violent uprising, while the post-revolution passive resistance was a rearguard action, fueled by the memory of the revolution.

MÁRIA CSANÁDI

A COMPARATIVE MODEL OF PARTY-STATES:
THE BACKGROUND POWER STRUCTURE OF THE
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF REPRODUCTION,
REFORMS AND TRANSFORMATIONS

What is the political-economic-social logic of the operation and change of party-state systems? How can we explain their similarities and differences? What is the reason of the differences in their transformation? Why some collapse and others don't? Why some transform accompanied by economic crisis while others by economic growth? We introduce here a comparative analytical model that offers theoretical answers to those questions and serves as an empirical tool for further comparative analysis of party-states and their transformation. The Interactive party-state model (IPS) reveals a specific power structure that evolves from the interrelationship between individual party- state- and economic actors. The structure defines the political rationality of their motivations and behavior and thereby the dynamics of self-reproduction.

The model points to the main structural and dynamic traps that determine the factors of self-destruction during self-reproduction. Itl defines three basic patterns of power distribution that provide the structural and dynamic reasons of the different ways and instruments of self-reproduction leading to the different scenarios of disintegration, collapse and transformation. The IPS model points to the consequences of these different dynamics on the location, pace, sequence of reforms and the regime these reforms occur.