

ESSAY

ETHNOCENTRISM IN THE VISEGRAD GROUP: ITS CAUSES AND INFLUENCES ON THE BRATISLAVA PROCESS

LIV HEINRICH

ABSTRACT

In the joint statement of the Visegrad group from 16 September 2016, the day of the launch of the Bratislava process, the Visegrad group gave a statement on their ideas on the improvement of the EU and devoted most of it to security and migration. As responses to the decrease of a sense of security among citizens which is in their opinion caused by terrorism and cross-border crime, they see a great necessity in the reduction of the number of immigrants entering the EU and demand better protection of the EU's external borders through further cooperation with Turkey and other transit countries, a further development of FRONTEX, the improvement of the Schengen-Information-System (SIS) and the general data management architecture.

INTRODUCTION

In the joint statement of the Visegrad group from 16 September 2016, the day of the launch of the Bratislava process, the Visegrad group gave a statement on their ideas on the improvement of the EU and devoted most of it (1/3 of the entire statement) to security and migration. As responses to the decrease of a sense of security among citizens which is in their opinion caused by terrorism and cross-border crime, they see a great necessity in the reduction of the number of immigrants entering the EU and demand better protection of the EU's external borders through further cooperation with Turkey and other transit countries, a further development of FRONTEX, the improvement of the Schengen- Information- System (SIS) and the general data management architecture, including the setup of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), a better operation of the operating IT- Systems, check of individual border- crossings and the support of membership aspirations in the Western Balkans

Even among their own population, neither the Visegrad group nor its work are very well-known. Still, the cooperation among Poland, Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia is of importance, especially to its leading politicians. The Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło said about the Visegrad cooperation in connection with EU reformation process:

*“We agree that the Visegrad group needs to be active in the process of changes, which the EU is expecting. We will propose solutions that are meant to pursue especially one goal: to strengthen the EU so it can focus more on the affairs of its citizen and to guarantee security to all Europeans.”*1*

In the joint statement of the Visegrad group from 16 September 2016, the day of the launch of the Bratislava process, the Visegrad group gave a statement on their ideas on the improvement of the EU and devoted most of it (1/3 of the entire statement) to security and migration.² As responses to the decrease of a sense of security among citizens which is in their opinion caused by terrorism and cross-border crime, they see a great necessity in the reduction of the number of immigrants entering the EU and demand better protection of the EU's external borders through further cooperation with Turkey and other transit countries, a further development of FRONTEX, the improvement of the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the general data management architecture, including the setup of the European

Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), a better operation of the operating IT-Systems, check of individual border-crossings and the support of membership aspirations in the Western Balkans. Additionally, the group points out the advantages of the size and diversity of the European Union and their aspiration to strengthen democracy in the EU and economic integration.³

While looking through the past year's news about the V4, one can't help but notice that they could be summarised under the title of: "We (Visegrad) will not submit to Western European strategies, we have our own interests and we stay strong to fulfil them". These "own interests" include more than just the often discussed discrepancies in attitude towards migration and the often discussed quota system. The Visegrad countries, mainly personified by the populist governments of Poland and Hungary, want more than just block Western Europe's propositions about migration, they want to counterbalance the

domination of the leading countries and stop being treated like the periphery of Europe.⁴⁵

Very representative for this is the “Nutella Council”. This year, Slovakia’s ministry of agriculture compared the quality of same products in its capital and in Austria and found that Eastern European products are often inferior, containing more sugar and more fat, to the products available in the richer West. Prime Minister Fico summarised the feelings of his country, not only about the discrepancy in alimentation, but also about the general sense of inferiority that sticks to the eastern member states: “These practices are humiliating and create two categories of citizens in the EU.”*⁶

In this essay, I want to explore a bit further what are the causes of the lasting feeling of the

V4 to be the periphery of Europe, how their problems to establish a stable economy and democracy are connected to it and how it leads to ethnocentrism, which leads to the election of populist governments who later influence the EU reforms.

TRANSITION IN THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

There are many similarities between the Visegrad countries and their recent history, they lead to similar economic and political struggles, but also differences in their economic development and political apparatus, changing their position in the EU and in the group. The V4 states have a very similar history of foreign determination followed by the, comparably short, recent period of sovereignty after 1990, this brings about some difficulties: The value of law in a country that is new to sovereign governance is certainly different than in the

traditionally “ruling” states, peoples that are new to their own rule of law often have problems respecting this rule, finding a dialogue and engaging into the functioning of their state. Very often, they are used to finding loopholes in the system and to live according to the rules of their own “parallel” law rather than the rules that are established by the authorities.⁷⁸


Like every post- socialist state, also the Visegrad group had a problem to establish their own liberal democracies with a multiple- party system, as they were lacking parties and without a broad, differing political opinion. The communist mindsets in the population made it also difficult to establish a functioning political system, at the beginning of transition, the countries were quick to establish democratic institutions, mainly with the help of NATO and EU, but they were simply lacking a democratic culture. It is difficult to create dialogues and cooperation between opponents when sentences like “Who isn’t with us is against us” dominate the political conversation and individuals with opposing opinions aims to crush their opposition, not to work with it. Additionally, the complexity of a liberal democracy “democracy” being about the community and “liberalism” being about the individual- posed some problems for the peoples of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Czechia, what happened in consequence was the establishment of a “simplified” democracy that did not encounter minorities and struggled with the public opinion in many aspects. To the top of it all, one could argue that in the age of globalisation, forming a democracy is even harder as it questions the idea of a nation state and did change means of communication and the relationship between media and politics, which was already complicated due to the missing tradition of political journalism during communist times.⁹

Looking at the present state of each individual Visegrad member state, Hungary is perhaps the most worrying example. Democracy in Hungary has been dissolving since 2010 when Viktor Orban was, for the second time, elected president. Fidesz, Orban's party, received absolute majority with 53% of all votes and unilaterally voted a new Constitution after he took office, which centralised all power to the hands of the Prime Minister, constrains public and commercial media, cuts social benefits and limits characteristic freedoms of a liberal democracy, such as freedom of press, freedom to take popular initiatives and social rights. One of the reasons this happened is the base of Hungarian society on nepotism and informality, like mentioned above, all Visegrad states had or have a different perception on the obedience of the rule of law, but Hungary is even more extreme in that sense: as success in society is widely based on contacts and links between politicians and people, many jobs and positions are dependent on whoever is ruling, this is one of the reasons for the frequent changes of rule. This "democracy of privilege" is the consequence of the state's political institutions being established by intellectuals who did not question their decisions and found superficial solutions for transition. Orban understood exactly these principles and based his policies on the establishment of a central arena of power, with him as the middle. He eliminated the idea of political competition, replaced heads of media and other important positions with his allies and took measures to homogenise culture and national identity. The aspect of identity is very important, as there is a large number of Hungarian minorities in Hungary's neighbouring countries and ancient territories that the Hungarian government tries to include, Orban therefore follows the idea of ethnic nationalism, not civic, and leaves the minorities in his own territories out.¹⁰ When it

came to the vote on a migration- distribution quota in the European Council, Hungary voted against, even though it would have profited from a quota and could have earned €27 Mio. as a country with a lot of immigration from third- country nationals- even though the migration to Hungary is motivated by its geographical position- Hungary, registered approximately 15 tsd. third- national migrants in 2015, even though it must have been crossed by many more people on their way to western Europe the same year.¹¹¹² The case of Czechia and Slovakia is a bit different, the countries, who left the Soviet bloc as one, divided peacefully in 1993 after elections surfaced two incompatible leading parties in the territories (the Civic party in Czechia and Public against violence in Slovakia) and paralysed the political machine, the new leaders worked on the peaceful split into two and neither of the countries had problems of getting recognised. Interestingly, the Czech Communist party, as the only one of the ex- Eastern bloc, was never dissolved or transformed into a far- left party. It remained a political force, even though Communism was officially banned in 1993. Czechia also faced problems during the privatisation of its economy, similar to the rule of law in society, people had problems understanding the rule of law of the market and corruption remains a problem, even until today.¹³

Both Slovakia and Czechia voted against the migration quota, maybe out of Visegrad- Solidarity towards Hungary. Both countries are rather against a further integration of the Union, they prefer being in the EU for economic and security reasons. Slovakia's Prime Minister Robert Fico is very well aware of this fact, he stated: "*For Slovakia I say it in one sentence: 86 percent of all public investments come from EU- sources. We would not survive without the EU.*"¹⁴

The most successful and most praised example of transition is Poland. While looking for information about the transformation, a lot of information surfaces, mostly economic, not political. Poland is the number one example of how economic transition should work, privatisation was quick, today, there are no oligarchs in Poland, the amount of young people frequenting higher education institutions quintupled, Poland is the fastest growing economy in the European Union and was the only member state that managed to avoid contraction after 2008.¹⁵¹⁶



Graph 1. Change in GP per capita between 1989 and 2013. Source: Marcin Piatowski: How Poland Became Europe's Growth Champion: Insights from the Successful Post-Socialist Transition. Brookings. 11/02/2015.

Yet, Poland has problems, especially on the political level, since 2015, the conservative PiS is in charge of power and takes a Christian-conservative political course, tried to sharpen abortion laws, cooperating closer with the church, changing the Constitution and distancing itself from the EU. The Polish government did in fact not vote for the re-election of their own statesman Donald Tusk as the

president of the European Council but proposed their own candidate Jacek Saryusz- Wolski, a man without experience in governance. This way, Poland did not only give the impression of taking the position of the President of the European Council for granted, but also showed the government's immaturity in the way that the personal rivalry between Tusk and Kaczynski, who accuses Tusk of being involved in the death of his brother Lech Kaczynski in 2010, influences Poland's European politics.¹⁷ Being the most ethnically homogenous country in Europe (97% of Poles are Polish, 96% are Catholic) it becomes difficult to imagine why a nation that did not have many experiences with migrants since 1945 has a generally more sceptic view about immigration from outside the Union (61% of Poles prefer immigrants from in the EU, 39% have positive feelings about non EU-immigration). Poland did initially vote in favour of the quota, but joined the other V4 members in their opposition after.^{18,19}

ETHNOCENTRISM: DEFINITION AND CAUSES

The reason for not only Poland's, but the entire Visegrad group's strong opposition towards a quota and the propositions towards a migration policy that would force them to accept refugees can be explained with the phenomenon of ethnocentrism.

The Oxford dictionary defines ethnocentrism as an "evaluation of other cultures according to preconceptions originating in the standards and customs of one's own culture".²⁰ What can this tell us about the struggle to find a common EU migration policy?

Some countries, groups of countries- like Visegrad-, people, groups of people, do not want to welcome immigrants or refugees, others are

very open about it, this places the heads of states of the EU in a dilemma: how to cooperate further and find appropriate solutions when national or regional interests collide?²¹

Political leaders generally “filter their decisions on foreign policy through the motives of their leadership”²², accordingly, to understand the discrepancies between the attitudes towards migration of different governments, one has to understand what they promised their people and why they were voted. Did the citizens of the Visegrad countries vote for populist leaders because of their own ethnocentrism or are the citizens of these countries ethnocentric, maybe even racist, because of the tone used by their leaders while talking about different peoples?

Most probably it is a mutual influence, caused not only by the migrational isolation of the V4 but also by their economic problems and the earlier described sense of inferiority towards the richer West and North. Despite the measures undertaken by the EU to achieve regional equality, the discrepancies have grown since the 2004 eastern enlargement when poorer countries joined, but also since the financial crisis that hit some countries harder than others. Looking at statistics comparing the changes in trust in society and trust in social relations between 2006 and 2012 in North- Western European countries and South- Eastern European countries, it is easily understandable why certain regions have a higher amount of populist votes and Euroscepticism than others.

Figure 6: Trust in Society: 2006 and 2012 (Northern and Western Europe)




Figure 7: Trust in Social Relations: 2006 and 2012 (Northern and Western Europe)




Figure 8: Trust in Society: 2006 and 2012 (Eastern and Southern Europe)





Figure 9: Trust in Social Relations: 2006 and 2012 (Southern and Eastern Europe)



Trust in Society. Source: Wolfgang Aschauer. Societal Malaise and Ethnocentrism in the European Union: Monitoring Societal Change by Focusing on EU Citizens' Perceptions of Crisis. Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung Vol. 41, No. 2 (156). GESIS- Leibniz Institute for social sciences. 2016.


While the North- West started at a higher level, they mostly improved or slightly decreased their trust in society, except for Belgium, and remained a stable level of trust in social relations. In the East- South on the contrary, Trust in society decreased, with the exception of Hungary while social recognition stayed stable too, but at a lower level than in the North- West.

Another measure of comparing European states and what they do for their people is the comparison between the different types of welfare states that exist in Europe.²³ In the European comparison of public expenditure for social protection, the Visegrad countries are at the bottom end, spending less than half of the European average on public protection, Poland being the only country to note a significant growth in expenditure from 21% to 28% percent of it GDP from 2003 to 2013,

Czechia a small growth and both Slovakia and Hungary keeping their spending stable.²⁴ The quality of the welfare state and the amount of trust that citizens can give to their social protection forces is a strong influencer on their fear of social decline. In the Visegrad countries, together with Slovenia, the minimalist welfare state system with the Bismarck model prevails. Especially since the economic crisis, the importance of the efficiency of a welfare state for its people has been shown. If more people are unemployed, more people are at the bottom of society and build a wider ground for radicalisation.

A survey conducted from in 2012 with 21 EU members participating classified the European welfare systems into six categories that reflect how much states spend for their citizen's welfare and where groups of countries come together.

Figure 2: A Typology of Six European Regions Based on the Varieties of Capitalism Approach and Welfare-State Research




Note: Modified and extended according to Schröder (2013, 59).

Typology of Six EU Regions. Source: Wolfgang Aschauer. Societal Malaise and Ethnocentrism in the European Union: Monitoring Societal Change by Focusing on EU Citizens' Perceptions of Crisis.

Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung Vol. 41, No. 2 (156). GESIS- Leibniz Institute for social sciences. 2016.

The Macro-Micro-Macro Explanation Scheme illustrates the influences Macro level decision have on Macro radicalisation, but more strongly on Micro-level living restrictions, leading to social malaise

Figure 1: The Macro-Micro-Macro Explanation Scheme for Ethnocentrism



Macro-Micro Explanation Scheme for Ethnocentrism. Source: Wolfgang Aschauer. Societal Malaise and Ethnocentrism in the European Union: Monitoring Societal Change by Focusing on EU Citizens' Perceptions of Crisis. Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung Vol. 41, No. 2 (156). GESIS- Leibniz Institute for social sciences. 2016.

(unwell being) and ethnocentrism, which again results in radicalisation. The forces that lead to ethnocentrism and radicalisation are the three D's: societal decline, political disenchantment, social distrust, these forces combined with the perception of crises.

Lastly, the Explanation Model and Operationalization Strategy illustrates how changes on the Macro-level, Meso-level and Micro-level in the temporal, structural and cultural dimension influence each other and play together to cause ethnocentrism, in the Model stated as "perception of an ethnic threat".²⁵


On the Macro-level, there are political impositions from the side of the EU, economic inequalities between the eastern and the western States, internal inequalities, poverty and unemployment. On a cultural dimension, the Visegrad states still share a feeling of inferiority to the West.

On the Meso-level, in the temporal dimension, V4 have to obey EU norms and values, the countries change their norms and guidelines, this leads to a change of structure, some people that were at the top are now at the bottom and the other way around. Culturally, the radical transformation done by the state loosens the cohesion of peoples.

On the Micro-level, citizens are individually disappointed after what happened and lose their trust to the system, on a structural level, they start to fear decline. Culturally, they lose their trust in each other and in society. The factor in each dimension on the different levels influence each other. Macro-level events influence Meso-level events and the other way around. The same goes for Meso-level and Micro-level.

The total of these events leads to the perception of an ethnic threat, not only out of racism or fear of being taken away what should be theirs, but also to lift themselves up and make them feel better in comparison to the “others”.

Figure 3: Overview of Explanation Model and Operationalization Strategy



Overview of Explanation Model. Source: Wolfgang Aschauer. Societal Malaise and Ethnocentrism in the European Union: Monitoring Societal Change by Focusing on EU Citizens' Perceptions of Crisis. *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* Vol. 41, No. 2 (156). GESIS- Leibniz Institute for social sciences 2016.

In addition to the Model, the peoples of Eastern Europe face another feeling that greatly impact their relationship to the EU: disappointment. After the fall of the Iron Curtain and the difficult process of transition, people had hoped for so much more than what is their reality of living now, the process of transition has arrived in a vacuum: there is no more institution to join, no more democracy to develop, no more economy to privatise and yet, structural problems remained,²⁶ economic problems too and Brussels is perceived as a far-away parallel universe that treats its Eastern members like lower class citizens and gives them worse quality food as if they were the “rubbish bin of Europe”.²⁷

Lastly, the economic factors are not the only ones contributing to the level of ethnocentrism in a population, other influences can be the religious distinctions, social intelligence and education. The latter two are generally helpful when it comes to the prevention of ethnocentrism.²⁸

ETHNOCENTRISM: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EU

As mentioned in the introduction, the Visegrad group aims to block the European migration quota and is reluctant to the idea of welcoming migrants to the continent, let alone to their countries. To name just one example of politicians openly campaigning against refugees, the Hungarian government put up advertisement before the referendum about the quota on which was written: “Did you know that since the beginning of the refugee crisis, more than 300 people died during terrorist attacks?”²⁹. Márta Padavic from the Budapest Institute commented on the campaign and summarised its purpose in a very well-fitting way: “This, with governmental funding financed campaign could even lead to violence. The goal is to churn the sentiment towards the strangers. With strong, often unreasonable arguments that let the reader only take one idea: rejection.”³⁰

Now we know what the Visegrad group demands and why, but do their campaign really fruit outside of their own territories?

Reading through the declarations’ conclusions made by the European council during the meeting on the Bratislava roadmap towards a reform of the EU, one can conclude that yes. All their demands, for the establishment of ETIAS, the improvement of border protection, the further cooperation with so-called transit countries, the improvement

of return rates and the investment into developmental aid to avoid migration in general are written in the Bratislava

Roadmap,³¹ the European Council Conclusions on migration from october 2016,³² the European Council Conclusions from December 2016,³³ the “Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route” and the Conclusions from March 2017.³⁴

Now why the Visegrad group is so active right now, what are the goals of their activity, besides preventing migration?

In the end of last chapter, the sense of disappointment was mentioned, it can definitely be seen as driving force in the suddenly more intensive cooperation among the Visegrad group. After Brexit, it is clear that Visegrad needs to focus more on regional cooperation to pursue their interests and to compete with the more dominant German and French interests. Especially the polish government has interests in leading the Visegrad group, standing alone against Germany and France is not possible for Poland, but with three other heads of states by its side, who take politically similar directions, it is possible to build a counter-axe on the East of Germany. This regional isolation might be dangerous, questionable is, if Poland can take a leading position in the group itself, if it will be tolerated as the leader, being the biggest country of all or if the isolation from the West might be harming Polish trade, economy and position in the EU rather than helping.

ETHNOCENTRISM: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

After having established all the different causes of ethnocentrism in the Visegrad group, we identified economic, cultural and political causes. One of the main social and political causes was the discrepancy

between the north-western and south-eastern Europe and the sense of inferiority that is imposed on the latter.

To prevent this discrepancy on the social level, a European passport should be introduced. People would not need to write down their specific nationality, even though they would keep their national identity and government, but they would be forced to write and to read “European” ever time they use their passport. Also, while travelling abroad, no could be distinguished or discriminated based on their passport, while crossing borders, while receiving a visa. Same has been done in France with the population of the Bretagne, they still identify as themselves in their region, but while travelling, they are predominantly identified as French and cannot be discriminated based on the fact that they come from a national minority.

Secondly, at least one of the EU institution should move to Central Europe, the feeling of being far away from decision making influences the attitudes of politicians and citizens too negatively to leave everything the way it is. It is often argued that Strasbourg as the seat of the European Parliament is indispensable because of the German-French history in the region, but any of the Visegrad countries undoubtedly has a similar, maybe even more moved history, especially with Germany and/or Austria. The move of a European institution to the region could be a measure to shift the “periphery” of the EU further to the outside and would allow Eastern Europeans who cannot travel as far as to France or Belgium to visit a European institution and to get in touch with the European Union, which can be an important educational measure.

Lastly, the creation of a European conscription based army, which is an ancient but also a never realised idea, will help not only the citizens

who forcefully get in touch with each other, to educate themselves and open up culturally, but it will also, just like the creation of a European passport, create an indistinguishable identity, everyone is in the same army, everyone goes through the same and defends the same continent during a time where NATO demands higher military expansions, the EU could unite its forces and be much more efficient and strong.

CONCLUSION

Even though ethnocentrism might be understandable in the framework of post-communist transition in Eastern Europe, the European Union should stay strong and not obey that easily to mind-sets that contradict the European idea of acceptance, tolerance and openness.

The EU's attitude towards migration as a "not in my backyard" issue and will to conclude agreements with the undemocratic governments of transit countries will not solve much in long-term. The agreements with transit countries like Turkey, concluded in spring 2016, and now, even worse, Libya, is a very unwise move from the Union. These countries could use the leaders' of the EU's fear of another migration crisis to blackmail them for their own interests, as Erdogan does already, asking for visa freedom for Turkish people and threatening to open the borders if he will not receive what he wants. Migrants will be stopped in Turkey, in Libya or in Serbia and for the Visegrad countries, who did not welcome many refugees anyways and were, despite Hungary, not even directly affected by the refugee crisis, nothing will change.

What the EU really needs to establish during the Bratislava process and EU reform is an eye-to-eye, same-level dialogue with its Eastern

members to identify their problems, their struggles and to establish a solution on how to continue a European Union where all member states are included on equal terms and no region is made feel like the “periphery”. The migration crisis of 2014 and 2015 was not the cause of ethnocentrism in the Visegrad group, it was the indicator that surfaced ethnocentrism and showed us that something clearly is not right with the EU’s internal balance of power.

The superficial short-term solution of the migration crisis that will lead to thousands of people living in inhumane conditions either in their own countries, in transit countries that do not respect human rights nor have acceptable accommodation standards or at the borders in the Balkans while waiting for the possibility to attain what should be a human right: the possibility to get a better life.

After the migration crisis, another crisis will come and if the EU won’t sit down and find a solution that allows the fair functioning of the community, ethnocentrism is not going to be defeated, not in the V4, nor in Eastern Europe nor in any other member state that has problems with its populist parties.

¹ Henryk Jarczyk, Stephan Ozsváth, Peter Lange; *Bremsklotz der europäischen Flüchtlingspolitik*, Deutschlandfunk, 25/08/2016

*Quotations marked with * are translated by the author*

² Stepper Péter: The Visegrad Group and the EU Agenda on Migration: A Coalition of the Unwilling? *Corvinus Journal of International Affairs* 1(1) pp. 62-82. (2016)

³ *Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries*, Bratislava, 16 September 2016

⁴ Jean- Pierre Stroobantz. *Le débat sur l'asile divise l'est et l'ouest de l'Europe*, Le Monde.

⁵ /03/2017 ⁴ *Conseil européen : l'irrationnel combat de Varsovie contre la reconduction du Polonais Donald Tusk*.

Le Monde, 09/03/2017

⁶ Cécile Ducourtieux. *Le Nutella s'invite à la table du Conseil européen*. Le Monde, 10/03/2017

⁷ Krasztev, Péter, and Jon Van Til, editors. *The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy*. NED - New edition, 1 ed., Central European University Press, 2015

⁸ Jiří Pehe, *Czechoslovakia after 25 Years: Democracy without Democrats*. Heinrich- Böll- Stiftung,

⁹ Jiří Pehe, *Czechoslovakia after 25 Years: Democracy without Democrats*. Heinrich- Böll- Stiftung,

¹⁰ Krasztev, Péter, and Jon Van Til, editors. *The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy*. NED - New edition, 1 ed., Central European University Press, 2015,

¹¹ Rebekah Dowd, *Balancing foreign policy decisions*. Henry F. Carey, editor. *The Challenges of European Governance in the Age of economic stagnation, Immigration and Refugees*. Lexington books, 2017

¹² <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php> (19/03/29'017)

¹³ Jiří Pehe, *Czechoslovakia after 25 Years: Democracy without Democrats*. Heinrich- Böll- Stiftung, 2015

¹⁴ Henryk Jarczyk, Stephan Ozsváth, Peter Lange; *Bremsklotz der europäischen Flüchtlingspolitik*; Deutschlandfunk, 25/08/2016

¹⁵ Marcin Piatowski: *How Poland Became Europe's Growth Champion: Insights from the Successful Post-Socialist Transition*. Brookings.s. 11/02/2015

¹⁶ Rebekah Dowd, *Balancing foreign policy decisions*. Henry F. Carey, editor. *The Challenges of European Governance in the Age of economic stagnation, Immigration and Refugees*. Lexington books, 2017

¹⁷ *Conseil européen : l'irrationnel combat de Varsovie contre la reconduction du Polonais Donald Tusk*. Le Monde, 09/03/2017

- ¹⁸ Rebekah Dowd, *Balancing foreign policy decisions*. Henry F. Carey, editor. *The Challenges of European Governance in the Age of economic stagnation, Immigration and Refugees*. Lexington books, 2017
- ¹⁹ Henryk Jarczyk, Stephan Ozsváth, Peter Lange; *Bremsslotz der europäischen Flüchtlingspolitik*; Deutschlandfunk, 25/08/2016
- ²⁰ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/ethnocentrism>, 19/03/2017
- ²¹ Wolfgang Aschauer. Societal Malaise and Ethnocentrism in the European Union: Monitoring Societal Change by Focusing on EU Citizens' Perceptions of Crisis. *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* Vol. 41, No. 2 (156). GESIS- Leibniz Institute for social sciences. 2016
- ²² Rebekah Dowd, *Balancing foreign policy decisions*. Henry F. Carey, editor. *The Challenges of European Governance in the Age of economic stagnation, Immigration and Refugees*. Lexington books, 2017
- ²³ Wolfgang Aschauer. Societal Malaise and Ethnocentrism in the European Union: Monitoring Societal Change by Focusing on EU Citizens' Perceptions of Crisis. *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* Vol. 41, No. 2 (156). GESIS- Leibniz Institute for social sciences. 2016.
- ²⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Social_protection_statistics
- ²⁵ Wolfgang Aschauer. Societal Malaise and Ethnocentrism in the European Union: Monitoring Societal Change by Focusing on EU Citizens' Perceptions of Crisis. *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* Vol. 41, No. 2 (156). GESIS- Leibniz Institute for social sciences. 2016
- ²⁶ Jiří Pehe, *Czechoslovakia after 25 Years: Democracy without Democrats*. Heinrich- Böll- Stiftung, 2015
- ²⁷ Cécile Ducourtieux. *Le Nutella s'invite à la table du Conseil européen*. *Le Monde*, 10/03/2017
- ²⁸ Wolfgang Aschauer. Societal Malaise and Ethnocentrism in the European Union: Monitoring Societal Change by Focusing on EU Citizens' Perceptions of Crisis. *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* Vol. 41, No. 2 (156). GESIS- Leibniz Institute for social sciences. 2016
- ²⁹ Henryk Jarczyk, Stephan Ozsváth, Peter Lange; *Bremsslotz der europäischen Flüchtlingspolitik*; Deutschlandfunk, 25/08/2016
- ³⁰ Henryk Jarczyk, Stephan Ozsváth, Peter Lange; *Bremsslotz der europäischen Flüchtlingspolitik*; Deutschlandfunk, 25/08/2016
- ³¹ European Council, *Bratislava Declaration*, 16/09/2016
- ³² European Council, *European Council Conclusions of migration*, 20/10/2017
- ³³ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2016/12/15/>, 14/03/2017

³⁴ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2017/03/09-10/>, 14/03/2017

CORVINUS SOCIETY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CULTURE

corvinusculture.com