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CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Bojan Vranic

Why is Politics not Essentially Contested? 1

Narek Mkrtchyan

The Notion of "Kazakhness" Behind the Symbolic Nation-Building of Kazakhstan 16

Jelena Cupac

Emerging International Norms and State Behavior: Chinese Foreign Policy between "Pluralist Pull" and "Solidarist Push" 39

Oya Dursun-Ozkanca

British Public Opinion and Mass-Elite Relations on EU Enlargement: Implications on the Democratic Deficit Debate 62

Alexander B. Makulilo

Why the CCM is Still in Power in Tanzania? A Reply 88

BOOK REVIEWS

Linda Overland and Mikkel Berg-Nordlie, *Bridging Divides: Ethno-Political Leadership among the Russian Sami* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012)

Reviewed by: Emel Elif Tugdar 107

David Martin Jones, Nicholas Khoo and MLR Smith, *Asian Security and the Rise of China: International Relations in an Age of Volatility* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013)

Reviewed by: Dylan Kissane 110

Leslie McCall, *The Undeserving Rich: American Beliefs about Inequality, Opportunity, and Redistribution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013)

Reviewed by: Gaelike Conring 113

John H. Farrar and David G. Mayes (eds.), <i>Globalisation, the Global Financial Crisis and the State</i> (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013)	
<i>Reviewed by:</i> Christopher Huszar	115
Nicholas Aylott, Magnus Blomgren and Torbjorn Bergman, <i>Political Parties in Multi-Level Polities: The Nordic countries compared</i> (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013)	
<i>Reviewed by:</i> Mariia Shagina	118
Nazrin Mehdiyeva, <i>Power Games in the Caucuses, Azerbaijan's Foreign and Energy Policy towards the West, Russia and the Middle East</i> (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2011)	
<i>Reviewed by:</i> Alvin Almendrala Camba	121
Leonce Bekemans (ed.), <i>A Value-Driven European Future</i> (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012)	
<i>Reviewed by:</i> Ivana Tomovska EfreMOV	123
Hartmut Behr and Felix Roesch (eds.), <i>Hans J. Morgenthau, The concept of the Political</i> (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)	
<i>Reviewed by:</i> Ciprian Negoita	125
Theo van de Klundert <i>Capitalism and Democracy: A Fragile Alliance</i> (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013)	
<i>Reviewed by:</i> Raphael D. Jackson	128
Fabio Zucca, <i>The International Relations of Local Authorities. From Institutional Twinning to the Committee of the Region: Fifty Years of European Integration History</i> (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2012)	
<i>Reviewed by:</i> Francesca Romana Bastianello	130
Rolf Hosfeld, <i>Karl Marx. An Intellectual Biography</i> (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013)	
<i>Reviewed by:</i> David Ragazzoni	133
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS	136

WHY IS POLITICS NOT ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED?

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Abstract

This paper is an attempt to defend the thesis of essential contestedness against the criticism of its logical inconsistency. The author believes that such criticism results from a misconception of whether Gallie's thesis of essential contestedness can be applied to terms such as politics, law, or history. On the example of politics, the author attempts to demonstrate that this term cannot be essentially contested for at least two reasons: firstly, politics is not a concept, but a general term; secondly, it is the appraisals of the concept that are essentially contested, not the concepts themselves. The author of the paper believes that these claims will dispel the doubts about the logical consistency of the idea of essential contestability.

Key words: essentially contested concepts, Gallie, politics

1. Introduction¹

In the second chapter of Tolkien's book *The Hobbit*, three trolls, William, Bert and Bill, capture Bilbo Baggins and his company of dwarves and decide to cook them. As the night goes on, the trolls get involved in a deep dispute on the best way to cook their prey – whether to fry them, roast them, boil them, or add them to a soup. The argument lasts until late into the night, when Bilbo slyly interferes and critically states that dwarves are not a very desirable meal because they never wash themselves, have long beards, and are too fat and greasy. However they are cooked, they never make a delicious meal. Bilbo's hidden intention is to take advantage of the trolls' natural property to turn into stone when exposed to daylight, which in the end is exactly what happens. My question is: what is the actual object of the dispute among the trolls and Bilbo? It seems to be the concept of cooking. Bilbo is not even considered to be a participant in the dispute until he starts talking about cooking. To rephrase the previous question: if all participants in a dispute understand what the object of the argument is, what do they discuss? It appears that the argument is concerned with the best way to cook something. The reason why the dispute cannot be finished is that none of the participants can rely on a universal criterion on the basis of which he could say: "Yes! This is the best way to cook a dwarf!" The only thing that the trolls have at their disposal is their own appraisal of some of the ways which each of them considers the best. Therefore, such a dispute cannot be concluded using argumentation only, and indeed it ends when a natural property of

¹ A draft of this paper was presented at the 5th CEE Forum of Young Legal, Political and Social Theorists in Greifswald (Germany) 2013. I want to thank the participants for their useful and constructive comments.

trolls is activated. This example refers to the taste or aesthetic criteria of a troll. In similar situations concerning politics, religion, or history, when there is no universal criterion on the basis of which we can judge which appraisal is truly the best one, we say that the subject of the dispute is an *essentially contested concept*.

Essential contestability as a technical term was introduced into epistemology and consequently into political philosophy by W. B. Gallie.² The essential contestability of concepts in political philosophy "has not so much been rejected or refuted as subsumed into the subconscious of political studies."³ Gallie's thesis belongs to a larger project of analytic philosophers of the 1950's, who expressed an anti-enlightenment attitude against reason as the absolute judge; "Gallie's basic intention was to confront such a view of reason and legitimize the disagreement in theory and politics."⁴ Instead of universal rationality, philosophers started to show greater appreciation for diversity and pluralism. Such views, especially among British political philosophers, were based on a new reading of Mill's thesis that "Europeans owe much to 'plurality of paths'" and that from "differences and disagreements sprang toleration, variety, humanity."⁵ Gallie's thesis should thus be read bearing in mind the context of its time, while every modification of its assumptions should be evaluated in terms of how much it encourages the affirmation of humanist pluralism.

Nowadays few papers contain more than a couple of passages defining concepts as essentially contested. Essential contestedness is most often taken as a framework used to define basic concepts which will be applied in research, or as an epistemological position which denies the possibility of universal justification. Without a more elaborate understanding of the meaning of such a framework, essential contestability can lead a political philosopher to accept a kind of skepticism or even political nihilism. Therefore, the authors who criticize essential contestability either call for a radical change of Gallie's basic theses, or completely reject the idea, claiming that it is self-defeating.

Such criticism results from a misunderstanding over the range of application of the idea of essentially contested concepts. One of the most frequent misconceptions is that essential contestedness can be applied to terms such as "politics", "law",

² Walter Bryce Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society* Vol 56 (1955/6): 168-169.

³ Andrew Vincent, *The Nature of Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 108.

⁴ Bojan Spaic, "O suštinskoj spornosti pojma prava: Galijev okvir primenjen na pojam prava," ("On the Essential Contestedness of the Concept of Law: Gallie's Framework Applied to the Concept of Law") *Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu* LVIII, no. 2 (2010): 231. Translation mine.

⁵ Isaiah Berlin, *Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 244.

"history", etc. If such a possibility existed, the idea of essential contestedness would really be self-defeating. I will argue that politics (as an example that could be generalized for all aforementioned terms) is not an essentially contested concept, and that the idea of essential contestedness is not self-defeating. This misconception is generated on two levels. Firstly, politics is not a concept, but rather a general term. Secondly, concepts are not essentially contested. What is essentially contested is the appraisal, which relies on the (political, moral, aesthetic) value of a concept. These two claims can dispel the doubt in the logical consistency of the idea of essential contestedness. I show that both misconceptions come from a wrong interpretation of Gallie's idea. If Gallie's thesis is interpreted in the correct way, and connected to his view of history and theory of meaning, it follows that his thesis is not self-defeating.

2. Essential Contestedness and its Critics

Concepts of "organised or semi-organized human activities"⁶ such as political philosophy, aesthetics, studies in religion and history, are essentially contested because there is no way to give a conclusive argument about how they could be used in a general manner. Essential contestedness is therefore not the consequence of "the sociological thesis that there will always be different interpretations in the everyday use of the words."⁷ It is a feature which is sooner or later attributed to concepts, every time there is a discussion on normative issues in the aforementioned disciplines. Gallie does not provide a comprehensive list of all the concepts from political philosophy that can be essentially contested, but gives the examples of democracy and social justice.⁸ Bearing this in mind, it seems that the corpus of what we call essentially contested concepts is made up of more or less all traditional concepts of political philosophy which do not have a technical meaning or are not part of some metatruths. This list includes freedom, power, equality, community, state, nation, etc. At this point it is important to note that politics does not belong to this corpus, although it is not *prima facie* plausible to say that this sphere of human activity has either technical or metalingual meaning. I believe Gallie can be interpreted in a way that enables us to morphologically define politics as a general term, which is the thesis that I will try to defend in the analysis that follows.

It would be wrong to claim that essentially contested concepts are necessarily reducible to psychologisms such as interest or distrust, or to the fact that on the philosophical level there is a plurality of metaphysical interpretations. Therefore,

⁶ Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," 168.

⁷ Đorđe Pavicevic, *Pravda i politika: nasleđe i granice političke filozofije Džona Rolsa (Justice and Politics: Heritage and Limits of John Rawl's political philosophy)* (Beograd: Fabrika knjiga, 2011), 125.

⁸ Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," 180.

essential contestability is not a part of emotivist moral theories which at first glance occupy a similar position. Emotivists also argue that there is no rational way to conclusively end a *dispute*. Such an argument rests on Ayer's assumption that moral and political discussions contain "no objective validity" in the structure of the attitudes in a *dispute*, which would enable participants to rationally draw a conclusion which would end the dispute.⁹ Since Gallie is more interested in concepts (not attitudes), his position is significantly different than the emotivist one: discussions over the concepts of political philosophy "which, although not resolvable by arguments of any kind, are nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence."¹⁰ Breaking away from the metaphysical position results in a narrower meaning of the adjective "essential." This adjective is related to those concepts which, whenever used, retain the feature of "contestedness." Such a position moves Gallie away from metaphysical essentialism:

The term 'essential contestability' is thus set up in direct opposition to essentialism [...]The crucial philosophical question for essentialism is therefore what is the *core* or essential element of justice [...] The same argument would hold for all political concepts. If it makes sense, we should be able to give some definition of its essence. If a word makes sense and can be defined, then it has some kind of reality. However, essential contestability directly adopts the Wittgensteinian mantle in denying that concepts and words have essences.¹¹

One can only indirectly answer the question of whether Gallie adopted Wittgenstein's theory of meaning and it is beyond my ambition in this article. What is certain is that among Gallie's academic writings there are papers on the theory of meaning, some of which are important for an understanding of the thesis of essential contestedness. It is important to note that Gallie departed early from the so called "solipsistic theory of meaning", such as the one arguing that a sign (or a meaningful string of signs) can refer to private objects, such as sense data.¹² Gallie instead draws upon Russell's argument about the ostensivity of private objects, which is that sense data refer to some publicly accessible objects. Instead of opting for a division between theories of correspondence and coherence, it seems that Gallie believes it is more relevant whether we can understand signs in use or not. The process of understanding is relevant if other participants in the discussion can comprehend (and apply) the word in the same way as I can, and if they are willing to support my position. Put in another way, signs are social instruments which we can

⁹ Alfred J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1936), 161-168.

¹⁰ Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," 169.

¹¹ Andrew Vincent, *The Nature of Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 98.

¹² Walter Bryce Gallie, "Solipsistic and Social Theories of Meaning," *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society* Vol. 38 (1937/8): 62.

understand only in their relation to other publicly accessible objects.¹³ Thus Gallie, in his paper on essentially contested concepts, presupposes publicly accessible relations as a matrix for understanding the meaning of signs.

There has been a considerable amount of criticism of Gallie's thesis over past decades. The first significant criticism is found in an article by John Gray, according to whom any idea of non-existence of justification criteria leads to moral relativism and political nihilism. The idea of essential contestedness does not pose a difficulty if it is understood as a claim that there are no empirical means to conclusively end the debate of the correct use of the term. The problem arises if a political philosopher wants to elevate the thesis to a higher level by claiming that certain concepts have intrinsic values which are not reducible to some justification criterion. For Gray, the value-dependent thesis (which he identifies in Lukes's view of power as an irreducible concept in terms of values) belongs to essential contestability proper, which is a view that belongs to metaphysics.¹⁴ If each of the participants in the *dispute* believes that his use of the concept cannot be replaced with any other use, then that concept is not essentially contested, but belongs to "a conflict between adherents of mutually unintelligible world-views."¹⁵ This means that such metaphysical positions have nothing in common that the ones who hold them could argue about, which is indeed a paradox. Gray concludes that the strong thesis of essential contestability "in terms of incommensurability, then, is self-defeating in that it dissolves the generic identifying criteria of the concept and prevents us from characterising the conflict as a definitional dispute."¹⁶

Gray's criticism therefore refers only to the strong version of the essential contestability thesis (which he identifies in Lukes's application). Instead, he suggests that such a view can be reduced to a thesis that within one culture there are different understandings of a concept, over which a kind of consensus can be reached although the dispute itself will probably persist. The idea is that a *dispute* must have a limited scope, unless we want to end up in a state of "radical Pyrrhonian nihilism."¹⁷ A decade later, Christine Swanton worked on a similar idea. While Gray only briefly mentions that the problem of essential contestability can be resolved if there is something uncontested in the dispute, Swanton explores this idea in more detail. Arguing in favour of a kind of theory of coherence, she suggests that on the basis of empirical insights we can find an "Archimedean standpoint" in every *dispute*, which is the starting point for a logically coherent procedure of

¹³ Gallie, "Solipsistic and Social Theories of Meaning," 75.

¹⁴ John Gray, "On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts" *Political Theory* Vol. 5, No. 3 (Aug. 1977): 339.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 342.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 342.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 343.

justification.¹⁸ The procedure does not necessarily have to justify the starting position of the participants in the *dispute*. Rather, its role is to ensure that each participant stays within the delineated frame of the *dispute*.

The criticism of Gray and Swanton should be understood constructively, because they suggest how to resolve a seemingly problematic position that Gallie has left open. However, in a more recent work, Glen Newey tried to make Gray's conclusion that the essential contestability thesis is self-defeating even more convincing. In his book, Newey demonstrates that despite the seemingly serious problems with the strong thesis, such approaches continuously persist in the works of contemporary theorists.

Newey's criticism thus does not target Gallie directly, but other authors do, including Connoly, MacIntyler, and Mason, who made the original thesis radical by claiming that politics and history are essentially contested concepts.¹⁹ The positions of those authors can be summarized in the following way: politics is a kind of human oratorical activity which does not possess a universal criterion which parties could use to evaluate achievements and determine the best way to realize politics, but each party retains the right to believe that their evaluation is the best. The criticism is expressed through the following question: is it not the claim that politics is an essentially contested concept the one that everyone agrees upon? This is how Newey points to the contradiction contained in the essential contestability thesis:

But in that case, the thesis holds that the parties would have to *agree*, on pain of changing the subject, that the other interpretation was possible, and in this case the concept would no longer be contestable; the only way in which they could fail to do this is by making a mistake, or being in ignorance about the nature of the concept.²⁰

It seems that we are dealing with something resembling Russell's paradox – if a concept is the case, then it is not essentially contested, and if it is not, then it is essentially contested. Something similar was noticed by Gray: "Recall Russell's paradox argument against naïve realism: 'Naïve realism leads to physics, and physics if true, is false; therefore it is false'."²¹ However we understand the form of the paradox, the thesis is self-defeating. Even without the logical strength of the paradox, this criticism seems plausible enough. Put more simply, if there is at least one thing that we can agree upon, in this case that the object of the *dispute* is essentially contested, is that not the criterion on the basis of which the thesis can be discarded as false when applied to itself?

¹⁸ Christine Swanton, „On the ‘Essential Contestability’ of Political Concepts,” *Ethics* Vol. 95, No. 4 (Jul. 1985): 826.

¹⁹ Glen Newey, *After Politics* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 39.

²⁰ Newey, *After Politics*, 43.

²¹ Gray, "On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts," 343.

It seems that the problem can be resolved if the position which Newey criticizes is corrected in the direction of the original thesis of essential contestedness. I believe that the very proposition that politics is an essentially contested concept opens up room for criticism; both the supporters and the critics of the thesis didn't interpret it properly. Firstly, politics is not a concept. To state the opposite is a categorical mistake. Secondly, it is not concepts that are essentially contested, but their evaluations and appraisals which signify the (political, moral, aesthetic) value of a concept.

In the sections that follow I will use the terms "concept," "appraisals," "the use of concept," and "general term." The last three require an additional explanation.²² The terms "appraisals" and "the use of concept" are coextensive. Both were used frequently during the mid-20th century. The difference between the two is that appraisal refers to a value judgement in a nonphilosophical or everyday context. The latter term was used in conceptual analysis. Today, both terms are slightly obsolescent, and in political philosophy the term "conception" is used instead, as defined by John Rawls.²³ In the analysis of essential contestedness there are authors, such as Gerald Gaus, who believe that Gallie's thesis can be better understood using Rawls's distinction concept – conception.²⁴ However, there are at least two reasons why this distinction is inadequate for understanding essential contestedness. The first is that Gallie does not use the term "conception." The second is that the distinction "concept – conception" itself, however useful in the analysis of political concepts (social justice, state, power, etc.), turns out to be useless when it comes to explaining where politics is located on the conceptual map of political philosophers. I will try to clarify this issue.

As will be shown in the following section, Gallie uses the term appraisals to mean something that is essentially contested. It is important to stress that appraisals are a type of value judgement. This means that concepts need to possess intrinsic value, for the terms "appraisals" and "the use of concept" to be used meaningfully. In what way is this different from conception and why is it relevant? At this point one cannot analyze the structure of Rawls's theory in more detail, but can believe that he was sufficiently clear when he emphasized that conceptions are "a set of related principles."²⁵ Appraisals, as it will be argued, are neither principles, nor are subjected to any kind of deduction. If they were, then they would not be essentially

²² I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers whose valuable comments resulted in these clarifications.

²³ See: John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), 9-10.

²⁴ Gerard Gaus, *Political Concepts and Political Theories* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 30-32.

²⁵ Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 10.

contested. In other words, appraisals are elements of the value judgements of those who take part in a dispute. This thesis will be further elaborated on in this text.

The relation between social justice and various sets of principles of those who are its subjects seems plausible enough within the distinction "concept – conception." If politics is understood as a concept, what then is its relation to the concept of social justice? Is social justice a conception of politics? In addition, is the conception of social justice the conception of the conception of politics? Such structure is rather confusing, to say the least. One of the solutions to this strange situation is that politics should be declared a subject of a higher order. However, this is not too helpful, because it results in a categorial mistake, because politics and social justice are placed at the same conceptual level. This article therefore suggests that politics should be understood as a general term, in the same way as "man," "tree," or "lion. I will provide an argument for the plausibility of this claim by analyzing Gallie's idea of championship. If my argument is accepted, the consequence of comprehending politics as a general term is that politics can be understood only linguistically. Politics only signifies and selects the concepts which belong to it. Finally, it would imply that there is no special theory of politics. That does not mean that there is no political theory, but rather that this discipline always refers to what politics signifies. Those are political concepts such as social justice, democracy or power, as well as their contested appraisals.

3. What can be Essentially Contested?

Criticism of the idea of essential contestedness can be narrowed down to the question of whether contestability can be defined as an intrinsic or extrinsic feature of a concept. Gallie's argument, *prima facie*, is vague regarding this issue. At one point in his essay, Gallie says that contestedness is a kind of consequence of the concept's characteristic that it "must be *appraisive* in the sense that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievements."²⁶ If the term "sense" is understood as a criterion of use on the basis of which some "valued achievements" can be appraised, then contestedness appears as an extrinsic consequence of perceiving the concepts of political philosophy, aesthetics, or history through their evaluative dimension. Further reading of the text leads one to a different conclusion. In order for the concept to be essentially contested, along with its evaluative dimension it needs to be "of an internally complex character", and "any explanation of its worth must therefore include reference to the respective contributions of its various parts or features."²⁷ This means that the value of the concept is of an intrinsic character; it is not expressed only through its evaluative dimension. Concepts therefore represent ends in themselves. This is a slippery slope, with a great likelihood that

²⁶ Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," 171.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 172.

Gallie's thesis will end up in a metaphysical world or in moral relativism. This would happen if it turned out that evaluative dimension and internal complexity are in a way synonymous. In order for a concept to be internally complex, it needs to be capable of evaluation. Evaluativity is possible only if there are alternatives which can be evaluated within the same concept. The following analysis should show whether such synonymy is really the case.

One of Gallie's formal conditions of essential contestedness is that the used concept must be such that it can be the object of evaluation or appraisal. This means that it must be possible for the term to be valued at an intersubjective (public or social) level and that it needs to possess evaluative capacity. Does the internal complexity of the concept satisfy the first condition of essential contestedness? I believe there is at least one case when those two views are compatible, without the hazard that the thesis would acquire metaphysical and morally relativistic features. That is the case when internal complexity means that the concept has some minimal empirical content. This is not the same as stating that objects designated by the concept are its essence. This weaker thesis states that the use of a concept implies the existence of a rational belief in the possibility of existential import.²⁸ At this point it is useful to recall Gallie's thesis that signs are social instruments used to understand relations at the intersubjective level, which allows referring to a large number of objects simultaneously.

When it comes to concepts in political philosophy, it seems that their internal complexity can be explained in the following way. The evaluative dimension of the concept (appraisal) refers to some descriptive content. Such content constitutes the empirical dimension of the concept, which is the basis of a rational *dispute*. Although this does not lead to a conclusive decision or a general consensus, the descriptive content at least limits the scope of the *dispute*. On the other hand, the evaluative potential of the concept is the decisive criterion upon which relevant empirical content is selected. In other words, a participant in the *dispute* should use the concept in a way that enables other participants to "have at least some appreciation of the different criteria in the light of which the other parties claim to be applying concepts in question."²⁹

The function of empirical content therefore results in the concept not being essentially contested. Each participant in the *dispute* knows that a particular concept is being discussed and not another, as well as they know that parts of that concept have different value for other participants. Put more simply, there is no

²⁸ This view was present in epistemology during the middle of the last century by Lloyd . See: A. C. Lloyd, „How Concepts Contain Beliefs," *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society* Vol 58 (1957/8): 290-291.

²⁹ Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," 172.

dispute over the fact that participants in the discussion have the same sense data, which are signified by the concept in use. The dispute arises over the meaning of that empirical content. If the internal complexity of the object is understood as a cluster of descriptively susceptible objects which the concept designates, then this does not contradict the evaluative dimension. Does this result in synonymy? The answer seems to be negative. Instead, we seem to be dealing with supervenience: the evaluative dimension has the ability to change the descriptive content, and in some cases it can be the other way around. In Gallie's words, "the accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of considerable modification in the light of changing circumstances."³⁰

Two conditions complement each other although each retains its function without reducibility: the empirical one ensures that participants stay within the *dispute*, i.e. that the *dispute* is rationally limited in its scope, and the evaluative one ensures that argumentation is relevant for the given concept in dispute. If we go back to the example from Tolkien's book, it is now clear that Bilbo Baggins would not be able to advocate for his use of the concept of cooking before joining the *dispute* on cooking dwarves. If the *Hobbit* by any chance had suggested that the trolls make porridge instead of cooking a dwarf, however convincing his arguments may have been, the trolls would have very soon realized that his suggestion was intended to deceive them. By talking about the taste of a cooked dwarf, Bilbo was recognized by the trolls as an important participant in the *dispute*. More importantly, the objective state of affairs largely depended on Bilbo's success in discussing the value of a cooked dwarf.

According to Gallie, there are two ways for participants to know that they are discussing the same object. The easier way is to draw upon the belief that one's use of the concept is the best one. This obliges the participant in the *dispute* to acknowledge alternatives to his view, because otherwise the superlative adjective "best" would not make sense. Gallie does not make it clear how one develops such beliefs (and even less so how one justifies them). Still, this seems to be a kind of inductive conclusion that the participant in the *dispute* reaches before hearing all the alternatives.

The claim that induction is an easy answer reflects Gallie's skepticism about such an approach. In a text published shortly before the thesis of essential contestability, Gallie noticed that inductive conclusions in social sciences are often truistic, because they only confirm the initial assumption. The aim of research should be explanation and not confirmation of what we believe to be right. Gallie claims that there can be no explanation if the use of the term is seen as a conjunction of individual cases. The use of the term should instead be seen as a disjunction

³⁰ Ibid.

between continuity and discontinuity; a concept is either improved through continuous use or its meaning is changed.³¹ It is important to note that in both cases one is dealing with the same concept, so it seems that there is no interruption in the communication between those who are in favour of the improvement and those who believe that the meaning of the concept should be understood in a significantly different way. In order to justify the stability of communication among the participants in a *dispute* over essentially contested concepts, Gallie introduces the idea of an exemplar.

The idea of an exemplar has often been criticized because Gallie openly argued that this idea could defend historicism. The exemplar itself should be understood as a technical term which comprises individual patterns of behaviour, formed in whatever way: imitating the behaviour of an exemplar, acquired in socialisation or inherited through tradition.³² As such, the exemplar is also an essentially contested concept, which consists of historical memory of what such a concept should be like. The difference between the exemplar and the concept being discussed is in their fullness: while the first one has only evaluative content, the other one in addition contains empirical information. Namely, Gallie's idea that the motivation to participate in the *dispute* is always connected with the assumption that each participant believes that their use of the exemplar is the best. This does not imply mechanical imitation, but a normative improvement of the idea of the exemplar. I believe that with this manoeuvre Gallie came significantly closer to normative political philosophy: not only did he demonstrate that the object of the *dispute* was the normative use of the term, but also that the possibility of the use itself makes the concept descriptively dense. In other words, the concepts of political philosophy are not empty.

The belief in the best use and the exemplar leads to the conclusion that it is not essentially contested which particular concept is being discussed, but rather how the participants evaluate or recommend the use of that concept:

In general, it would seem to be quite impossible to fix a *general principle* for deciding which of two such teams [participants in a *dispute* – B.V] has really 'done best' - done best in its own peculiar way to advance or sustain the characteristic excellence revealed in the exemplar's play.³³

Therefore, concepts themselves cannot be contested. This ultimately also goes for freedom, power, equality and other concepts of political philosophy: participants in the *dispute* on these concepts rarely or never challenge that they are political; what

³¹ Walter Bryce Gallie, "Explanations in History and the Genetic Sciences," *Mind* Vol 64, No. 254 (Apr. 1955): 162.

³² Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," 176.

³³ *Ibid.*, 177.

is disputable is the use of the concept. If some of the uses happened to lead to contradictory conclusions (i.e. that the object of the *dispute* is not politics), then the concept itself would stop being essentially contested. If my interpretation of Gallie's thesis of essential contestedness is correct, that is if the concept itself is not essentially contested, but its evaluation or appraisal, then this interpretation seriously challenges the views that the whole thesis is self-defeating.

It has already been said that Gallie does not give a comprehensive list of concepts that can be essentially contested. Nevertheless, he gives a list of criteria on the basis of which we can both identify and test essential contestedness. As a frame for his explanations he uses the example of championship, which means that there are different teams, each of whom has their own style of play, and who periodically win the support of the audience.³⁴ The game lasts infinitely long, and there is no referee who would decide who the champion is. That temporary title is deserved through audience's support – whoever has the most supporters is the champion. The ones who do not support the champion “continue with their efforts to convert others to their view, not through any vulgar wish to be the majority party, but because they believe their favored team is *playing the game best*.”³⁵ The competition is not a metaphor for parliamentary elections or beauty pageants, which do possess clear criteria on the basis of which they are initiated and ended. On the contrary, those are continuous debates which cannot be finished due to the essential contestability of champions: “Clearly, we would never expect the dispute to be settled: who was the champion would always be contested.”³⁶

It follows that we have several elements of a championship: teams, the object of the championship, style of play, the audience and the competition itself. Translated into terms from the conceptual map of political philosophy, it looks like this: teams are political philosophers; their argumentation the style of play; what they compete for are the uses of concepts such as justice or democracy; and the audience are their followers. But what is the championship? I believe it is politics. This seems to put me into a strange position, because it appears that I am claiming that the object of the championship is synonymous with the championship itself. Therefore it is necessary to further clarify the premises to make the argument sustainable.

The championship itself is not what the teams compete for, but rather has a broader meaning and involves the concepts as objects of competition, the audience, and the competitors. Championship is the context in which the game is played, which Gallie himself also says as a side remark.³⁷ This may seem confusing, bearing in mind that

³⁴ Ibid., 171-172.

³⁵ Ibid., 171.

³⁶ Gaus, *Political Concepts and Political Theories*, 29.

³⁷ Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” 176.

Gallie at an earlier point in his text stated that we are all “acquainted with the concept of ‘the championship.’”³⁸ One should be cautious there as well. Gallie uses the term “acquainted,” which according to Russell’s well-known theory³⁹ of truth means that we all share the same empirical evidence regarding the fact that there is something we refer to as championship (bearing in mind Gallie’s social theory of meaning from the second part of this paper). It follows that we are familiar with championship by means of its concepts (such as the champion, audience, etc), which carry empirical content. Championship, therefore, has a broader meaning, which according to Gallie lies in the need for continuity, even when the effective champion has been declared: “There is, therefore, continuous competition between the contestant teams, not only for acknowledgement as champions, but for acceptance of (...) the proper criteria of championship.”⁴⁰

The thesis can be tested using the following example. Let us imagine a debate on democracy between two political philosophers, one of whom advocates a greater degree of deliberation in public discourse, while the other calls for scrutiny over the competition of elites. If we wanted to describe the subject of the debate in neutral terms, we could say: ‘Oh, they are discussing politics!’ This statement would not be incorrect, because when we reduce the discussion to an expression meaning that it is all politics, we have not changed anything regarding the truth value of our conclusion. It appears that the term politics serves as some kind of notational abbreviation. I am not in any way suggesting that politics should be spelled with either a small *p* or a capital *P*, but it seems to me that it would be adequate to find a morphological equivalent for this authentic notational abbreviation. In that sense, politics can be classified as a general term.

Why is it better to accept politics as a general term than a concept? First of all, if we keep claiming that politics is a concept, we would then find ourselves in an awkward situation which could be described in the following way: as a concept, politics can be the object of the championship. This is probably how politics is seen in everyday discourse. In political philosophy, however, things are much more complex, because politics is seen as a context of what we actually discuss. If politics is the context of the championship, then it is possible to state something like: “The championship is about politics”. If we now replace “the championship” with “politics” we get a trivial assertion, “Politics is about politics”. This problem comes from Mill’s theory of meaning, according to which personal names do not need to have a connotation in order to possess a meaning, while general names acquire meaning only after being instantiated with a personal name (a lion has a meaning only after being realized

³⁸ Ibid., 170.

³⁹ See: Bertrand Russell, *The problems of philosophy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) [database on-line]; available at <http://www.ditext.com/russell/russell.html>. Especially chapter V.

⁴⁰ Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” 171.

as the individual animal Simba, for instance). Gallie's thesis eliminates such a problem through the requirement that concepts in political philosophy need to have a political context, which means that they need to be related to some political objects which are susceptible for description. Note that political objects need not be actual ones; it is sufficient that the one who uses the political concept can refer to some relevant empirical content which is verifiable by other potential users. Therefore, politics should be left out from a list of things that can be essentially contested. In that way, politics is not a concept, but at the same time represents its formation (morphology) at a metalevel. Finally, a concept is formed when the general term (politics) is extended to comprise political objects.

4. Conclusion

The thesis of essentially contested concepts cannot and should not be applied to itself. I have argued that Gallie's thesis is not meaningless. Each participant in the *dispute*, who admits that there are different appraisals of the same concept, understands the sense according to which it can be claimed that evaluations and arguments related to the used concept are essentially contested. When parties in the dispute acknowledge essential contestability, the *dispute itself* becomes more rational and claims are justifiable:

Put less artificially, what I am claiming is that a certain piece of evidence or argument put forward by one side in an apparently endless dispute can be recognized to have a definite logical force, even by those whom it entirely fails to win over or convert to side in question; and that when this is the case, the conversion of a hitherto wavering opponent of the side in question can be seen to be *justifiable* – not simply expectable in the light of known relevant psychological or sociological laws [...] It is for this reason that we can distinguish more or less intellectually respectable conversations from those of a more purely emotional, or yet those of a wholly sinister kind.⁴¹

What prevents the *dispute* from being conclusive is the absence of an objective criterion that would decide among different appraisals of the concept. This is not the same as saying that there is no normative criterion for making a *dispute* justifiable. Finally, essential contestedness enables the involvement of tolerance and understanding of other people's position, as well as the need of others to acknowledge our effort. In this view, *disputes* are rational because they require the involvement of criticism in the decision-making process. *Disputes* are, however, not conclusive – each decision regarding acceptance of someone's appraisal can be brought into question, which is a position that I believe deserves attention.

⁴¹ Ibid., 190.

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THE NOTION OF “KAZAKHNESS” BEHIND THE SYMBOLIC NATION-BUILDING OF KAZAKHSTAN

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Abstract

The paper deals with the processes of overcoming Russian ‘colonial’ impediments to the creation of symbolic spaces for the emergence of a new national self-consciousness in Kazakhstan. The paper highlights the importance of Nazarbaev’s decision to transfer to and construct a new capital Astana in fostering the ideas of national identity and ethnic belonging. Therefore, an attempt has been made to observe the phenomena of urbanization and reformulation of state symbols in explaining both ethnic and civic mechanisms of influences on people’s consciousness. Additionally, the works of various Kazakh intellectuals and cultural figures have been taken into consideration to examine the notion of Kazakhness and its’ contribution to the development of the Kazakh national identity. Content analysis of architectural design of Astana and state symbols is essential to understand the vision of Kazakhstan’s imagined future.

Keywords: Astana, post-Soviet, post-colonial, national identity, nation building

1. Introduction

After the breakdown of the Soviet Empire all post-communist regimes emphasized the role of ethno nationalism in establishing new nation-building projects. The model of Kazakhstan’s nation building is quite unique in terms of harmonious interethnic coexistence of a multiethnic society. Since independence President Nazarbaev initiated serious programs in an effort to start active nation-building processes. As a matter of fact, Nazarbaev’s nation and state building policies are represented for the Kazakhs as a *civilizational endeavor*. Nazarbaev took Kazakhstan through large scale administrative, legislative, social, economic and political reforms. Consequently, economic development was considered both a crucial aspect of nation-building and a process by which traditional Kazakh society became more modernized and complex. The article investigates one of the most salient manifestations of Kazakh modernization in the context of post-Soviet nation-building: the transfer and construction of contemporary capital of Kazakhstan. The decision to transfer capital from Almaty to Astana was result of long and meaningful discussions of public, presidential and parliamentarian level. According to September 15, 1995 presidential Decree *on the capital of the Republic of Kazakhstan* a State Commission was formed to organize the transfer of

the highest and central authorities to the city Akmola (Astana).¹ By another presidential Decree *on declaring the city Akmola the capital of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, the city of Akmola became the capital of Kazakhstan and renamed Astana in 1998.²

Although Nazarbaev mentioned 32 criteria (climate landscape, seismic conditions, social and economic indicator, infrastructures, communications etc.) for transferring the capital³, the decision had also significant national implications, which were affirmed by the demographic policy of Astana and new architectural and symbolic solutions. Furthermore, the article examines the negative legacy of Russian *colonialism* on Kazakh's national identity and urban consciousness. Soviet modernization (social, political) in line with industrialization and urbanization played significant role for Soviet Russia in establishing its colonial control in Kazakhstan. The urban areas and especially rapidly growing Astana were populated by non-Kazakh (mostly Russophone) ethnic population, and especially by Russians. The organized migration of ethnic Kazakhs from rural to urban areas during the post-Soviet nation-building processes can be seen a policy towards the becoming post-colonial. The mix of national icons and western architectural motifs of various buildings of independent Kazakhstan is a kind of Kazakh post-modernism tending to overcome the Soviet '*colonial*' legacy of Kazakhstan.

The ethno symbolic approach encourages the processes of ethno-genesis, in which myths, memories, symbolism and especially *language* as mechanism of socio-cultural survival play fundamental role in analyzing formations of national identity.⁴ The incorporation of symbols of Kazakh's nomadic culture has become essential in increasing national self-consciousness among ethnic Kazakhs. As case in point, the article also investigates the interplay between Kazakhstan's ethnic politics and state symbols in explaining civic or ethnic approaches of nation-building.

Following this introduction, the paper aims to set up meaningful coherence between various theoretical ideas and nation-building policies of Kazakhstan. The theoretical framework of this paper combines review of a choice of literatures on nationalism, literature, semiotics, ethno symbolism and post-Colonial studies. The ideas derived from the theories inclined to provide support for the interpretation of the nation-building processes of Kazakhstan. The subsequent section is dedicated to the state's decision on movement and construction of capital Astana in analyzing the nation-building implications behind the decision of Kazakhstan's elite.

¹ Norsultan Nazarbaev, *The Kazakhstan Way* (London: Stacey International, 2008), 303.

² *Ibid.*, 310.

³ *Ibid.*, 299.

⁴ Anthony Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 46.

Additionally, both semiotic and semantic analyses of state symbols and Astana's key architectural buildings give considerable understanding of Kazakhstan's ethnic and civic nationalism. This part of the article outlines the phenomenon of the incorporation of symbols of Kazakh's nomadic culture in increasing national self-consciousness among ethnic Kazakhs.

2. Theoretical Framework

Although it is assumed that nationalism is a Western phenomenon, John Plamenatz distinguishes Western nationalism from Oriental nationalism. To Plamenatz the dichotomy between Western and Oriental nationalisms is that the former feels disadvantage but has enough cultural potential to overcome those deficiencies, while the latter, which is typical to African, Asian and even Slavic civilizations, has no strong cultural base to resist the imperial or colonial domination of "Others".⁵In Eastern kind of civilizations nationalism in line with innovative policies are used by certain leaders or regimes in an attempt to respond to the externally given challenges and achieve public legitimacy for their authority. However, even considering that there is no considerable cultural base in a society, nation-building can be supported by national resources and a charismatic political leader who holds the nation together. Since the final years of Soviet Union the personality of Nazarbaev has been associated with the emergence of national self-consciousness. The origins of public perception of Nazarbaev as a leader of nation are derived from the age of Gorbachev's perestroika. The political decision of Gorbachev to replace Kunaev from the post of First Secretary of the Party with an ethnic Russian Gennady Kolbin awakened ethnic mobilization among Kazakhs. Gorbachev's decision was conceived by ethnic Kazakhs as a negative attempt to subordinate the sense of *Kazakhness*.

As a consequence, on June 22, 1989, Moscow decided to remove Kolbin and appoint an ethnic Kazakh speaking politician Nazarbaev who had special attitude towards national and traditional values and was enjoying the people's respect.⁶ After the establishment of an independent Kazakhstan, the shared visionary future of national imagination provides an opportunity for the authority of Nazarbaev to achieve charismatic values. In this context, these characteristics of charismatic authority differ from the classical concept of charisma developed by Max Weber, who describes charismatic leadership as a "certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with

⁵ John P. Plamenatz, "Two Types Of Nationalism", Eugene Kamenka, ed., *Nationalism and Evolution of an Idea*, (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973). 32-34.

⁶ Martha Brill Olcott, *Kazakhstan: Pushing For Eurasia*, in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., *New States, New Politics: Building The Post-Soviet Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997). 553.

supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities".⁷ The leadership of Nazarbaev can be defined as charismatic because he has been successful in trying to change the attitudes of his followers towards the acceptance of advocated vision.⁸ During the whole period of his rule Nazarbaev's 'plan-based political activity' tended to meet his followers' needs in terms of creating spaces for national imagination and opportunities for overcoming threats and challenges of the past. What can be pointed out here is that we should perceive the idea of Nazarbaev's charismatic leadership as a consequence of successful counter-challenge struggle in favor of nationhood and nation building.⁹

The problems concerning identity crisis of the Kazakh nation are highly comprehended by Nazarbaev's regime. It would be wrong to assume that those challenges are only typical to the Kazakh nation. The phenomenon should be examined within its civilizational context: the fall of Soviet Union created different challenges not only for Kazakhstan but also for fifteen other former Soviet republics. The concept of "challenge and response" is introduced by great thinker Arnold Toynbee to describe the rise and fall of Civilizations. According to Toynbee's developed theory the idea of a challenge provides positive opportunity to a particular group of a people to demonstrate visionary driven leadership in overcoming threats created by the history or past.¹⁰

The post-Soviet nation-building policies of Nazarbaev regime including aspects of urbanization, language politics, ethnic management and identity politics, seem to be considered as efforts exerted to provide responses to Soviet and even Tsarist challenges. However, it is important to mention that the creation of the sense of national identity among Kazakhs is not a mere political process baked by the leader of the nation. The creation of national identity is a phenomenon that is supported by multidimensional cultural and social disciplines. In order to permit national identity to be organized and manifested, it is necessary to set up particular environments and socio-cultural texts such as urban, verbal and oral communication spaces.

⁷ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, eds. Talcott Parsons (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), 358.

⁸ Jay A. Conger and Rabindra N. Kanungo, "Towards a Behavioral Theory of Charismatic Leadership In Organizational Settings," *The Academy Of Management Review*, (1987): 640.

⁹ Rico Isaacs, " 'Papa' – Nursultan Nazarbayev And The Discourse Of Charismatic Leadership And Nation-Building In Post-Soviet Kazakhstan," *Ethnicities And Nationalism* 10 , no. 3 (2010): 439.

¹⁰ See, Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History: Volume I: Abridgement of Volumes I-VI*, ed., D. C. Somervell (London: Oxford University Press, 1987). 56-60.

Nevertheless, among various cultural texts the phenomenon of literature should be emphasized. Generally literature is considered the most essential sphere through which one can illustrate not only cultural distinctiveness of a certain nation, but also the dynamic of identical transformation. Literature which is also known as "high culture" is directly connected with identity construction. Similarly, in the 1960s the national and cultural identities of the British were shaped under the influence of "high culture-Shakespeare and the tradition of English literature".¹¹ The literary methodology of identity study is common especially in post-colonial studies in which literary resistance is one of the best ways to identity formation. However, considering the fact of strict Soviet censorship it can be assumed that the writers and other intellectuals of the Kazakh nation could hardly express clear national values in their works. On the other hand, it should be noted that in the case of analysis of the literature of other states of the same Soviet system, such as Armenia, there appears to have been some misunderstanding concerning literary resistance.

As a point of clarification, the works of Soviet Armenian writer Hrant Matevosyan like *Hangover* provide clear illustration of literary resistance against the Soviet ideology.¹² The novel of Matevosyan, written in the last years of Soviet Union, describes modernization policies of Soviet Union as attempts towards sovietization which caused the crisis of Armenian national identity.¹³ Of course, we can't say that cultural actors and intellectuals of Soviet Kazakhstan did not play serious role in transmitting national impulses to identities of the Kazakhs. Additionally, if we take into account that literary works of Kazakh intellectuals were mostly written in Russian, then it would be considered odd for someone to think about literary resistance against national identity crisis. In the case of Kazakhstan the problem also is that Kazakh writers were "unable" to include any concrete undesirable literary topics in Soviet Kazakh literature describing national awakenings like Kenesary's¹⁴ activity against colonial rule or Alsh nationalist movement¹⁵, or national traumas like Virgin Land Campaign or deportation of nations.

¹¹ Jonathan Culler, *Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997), 53.

¹² For More Detail See Hrach Baydyan, "Soviet Armenian Identity and Cultural Representation", in *Representations on the Margins of Europe: Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States*, eds., Tsyplma Darieva and Wolfgang Kaschuba (Campus Verlag GmbH, 2007), 208.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 209.

¹⁴ Kenesary Kasymov or Kenesary khan (1802 - 1847) being the last ruler of the Kazakh Khanate, led national liberation war against the Russian colonial conquest (1837 - 1847). Kasymov's national liberation movement has been known in the Kazakh history as period of 'great' revolt against Russian colonization. See, Steven Sabol, "Kazak Resistance to Russian Colonization: Interpreting The Kenesary Kasymov Revolt, 1837-1847," *Central Asian Survey* 22, no 2-3, (2003): 231.

¹⁵ Alash nationalist movement was formed in resistance to Russian colonization in 1905. The movement was headed by Alikhan Bukeikhan and other Russian educated Kazakhs

However, it would be quite meaningful to draw reader's attention to some literary works of Soviet Kazakh writers who, in any case, tried to express national ideas in their works. The outstanding ones among those writers are Mukhtar Auezov and Ilyas Yessenberlin, who used national narratives and cultural values in their works "in search for Kazakhs' own ethnic identity and heritage".¹⁶ In this regard the nation-building process of Nazarbaev seems also to be a search for Kazakh's ethnic identity for the population. The relocation of capital in line with ethno-linguistic politics of Nazarbaev¹⁷ is among various official policies concerning the publicization of Kazakh's national identity. The relocation of capital has been accompanied by the movement of ethnic Kazakh speaking people from rural areas to newly established capital. Indeed, this policy has its real demographic aspect aiming at encouraging the notion of 'Kazakhness' among urban population.

Urbanization is among key responses to Soviet challenges: due to Soviet politics ethnic Kazakhs especially were concentrated on agricultural works. There are two

intellectuals like A. Baytursynov, Kh. Dosmukhamedov, Zh. Dosmukhamedov, M. Dulatov, Kh. Gabbasov, S. Amanzholov, M. Tynyshbaev, B. Kulmanov, M. Zhumabaev, M. Chokaev, G. Karashev, A. Ermekov whose activity became effective in resisting colonial yoke, resurrecting statehood and incorporating Kazakh society into the ranks of civilized nations. See, Nurpeis, K., "Kazakhstan", in *History Of Civilizations Of Central Asia, Volume VI, Towards the contemporary period: from the mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century*, eds., Chahryar Adle, Madhavan K. Palat, Anara Tabyshalieva, (Paris: UNSECO publishing, 2005) 253-254. Charles F. Carlson, "The Concept of Sovereignty In Kazakhstan From Kultegin To The Present", in *Altaic Berolinensia: The Concept Of Sovereignty In The Altaic World*, ed. Barbara Kellner-Heinkele (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasswitz, 1993). 64.

¹⁶ Diana T. Kudaibergenova, "Imagining Community" in Soviet Kazakhstan. An Historical Analysis Of Narrative on Nationalism in Kazakh-Soviet Literature, *Nationalities Papers: The Journal Of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 41, no. 5 (2013): 841.

¹⁷ The linguistic policy of Nazarbaev is considered as inseparable and decisive aspect of Kazakhstan's Nation Building Processes, Which will be analyzed in my forthcoming article, entitled "*Linguistic Policy Of Independent Kazakhstan: National Imagination?*". However It Would Be Worth Mentioning To Emphasize Some Details Concerning Post-Soviet language policy of Kazakhstan: The publicization of Kazakh language has been one of the key priorities of Nazarbaev since Soviet times, When the 1989 language law granted Kazakh language as a state language by providing it's usage at all educational levels. See Renata Matuszkiewicz, "The Language Issue in Kazakhstan-Institutionalizing New Ethnic Relations after Independence," *Economic and Environmental Studies* 10, no. 2 (2010): 215. In addition, according to the 1992 Degree On Education, Kazakh was confirmed as the state language and in 1993 The First Kazakhstani Constitution defined Kazakh as the *State Language* demoting the status of Russian as the *Language Of Interethnic Communication*. Another essential official policy of Kazakhstan Regarding Dissemination of Titular Language Is The 1996 decision of state committee for nationalities to change alphabet from cyrillic to latin. See, Jacob M. Landau, and Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, *Politics of Language in The Ex-Soviet Muslim States: Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan*, (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2001), 140.

types of ethnic tension between urban and rural Kazakhs: Kazakhs living in urban areas assimilated to Russians and have an ethnic identity and national language crisis, while Kazakhs living in rural areas maintained continuity of their cultural, identity and language.¹⁸ Nevertheless, Kazakhstan's government could not guarantee the creation of a new urban population by encouraging the emigration of illiterate peasants from villages to Astana. The urban population cannot be created demographically in a short period of time as it should go through key cultural disciplines like literature, film, theater and education. The building of Astana produced a gap between the city and countryside. The gap was defined by the cultural and behavioral differences of the city and the countryside: the culture of the city is open, modern and secular but the culture of countryside is closed, religious and traditional.¹⁹

The distinction between the Kazakh rural and urban populations is considered a key indicator of identical alteration. The dichotomy of traditional and modern societies is expressed in a clear language differences. In this regard it is enough to look into a discourse on *mankurtism*.²⁰ Kazakh speaking ethnic Kazakhs living in rural areas of Kazakhstan consider Russian speaking Kazakhs as *mankurts* so as they lose their ethnic and linguistic affiliations. To understand the identical aspect of the phenomenon it would be quite appropriate to discuss the latter within a context of post-Colonial theory, which will allow making comparison between Central Asian *mankurtism* and African *blackness* in terms of deracination of negativity from their identities. Fanon, in his work "*Black Skin and White Masks*"²¹ as a follower of A. Ce'saire and J. P. Sartre, states that colonizers can overcome colonial impediments only by producing counter narratives. On the other hand, under the light of the post-colonial idea²² the negative notion of *mankurtism* can be transformed into a positive source of national identity formation: if an ethnic Kazakh wants to be a pure Kazakh, he or she should cope with the situation by learning the Kazakh language and returning to the national culture and traditions. The period of Russian conquest

¹⁸ Neil J. Melvin, "Russia And The Ethno-Politics Of Kazakhstan", *The World Today* 49, no. 11(1993): 209.

¹⁹ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order In Changing Societies*, (New Haven And London: Yale Univ. Press, 2006), 72.

²⁰ The phrase of '*mankurtism*' firstly used by Kyrgyz writer *Chingiz Aitmatov* in his novel '*The Day Lasts More Than A Hundred Years*' to denote the ignorance of one's history, linguistic and cultural identity. See Chingiz Aitmatov, *The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).

²¹ Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin And White Masks*, trans. Markmann C. L. (London: Pluto Press, 1986).

²² Ce'saire in his book "*Discourse on colonialism*" goes on to say that blacks can create new identity for themselves through the deconstruction of the negative Eurocentric term *ne'gre*. See Aimé Ce'saire, *Discourse On Colonialism*, trans. J. Pinkham. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000).

of Kazakhstan has been accompanied by the incorporation of Russian values in Kazakh society. The imperial civilizing mission of Tsarist and Soviet Russia to bring civilization to the backward hordes questioned Kazakhs' intellectual and 'cultural' development. To understand the reasons of Russia's modernization one should examine it through the prism of Edward Said's *Orientalism*, where he argues that all empires frame their colonial aims as being civilizing missions.²³ Additionally, Ashish Nandy in his book *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* discusses two kinds of colonization: one is a physical conquest, and another is 'soft' colonization, which tends to "colonize minds in addition to bodies and it releases forces within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once for all".²⁴

Kazakhstan has experienced both kinds of colonization practices described by Nandy, but the alteration of cultural and language priorities in favor of colonizers is the best indicator of marginalized Kazakh identity. The idea of civilizing mission of Russia is considered as a part of ethnic Russian's discourse on the role of Soviet policies. Bhavna Dave in his "*Kazakhstan: ethnicity, language and power*" by referring to the marginalized status of Kazakh identity and Russians' reactions to Kazakh's complaints, presents the conversation with an ethnic Russian:

Who built these buildings, streets, schools and hospitals? Who developed this city (Almaty)? Of course we did! It was called Vernyi then – a pure Russian name. There were no Kazakhs here when we came. They only roamed in the steppe and lived in the *yurts*.²⁵

The Russification of Kazakhstan has historically been an essential part of the political agenda of Russia. Taking into consideration the civilizing mission of Russia and high proportion of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, some of Russian academics started to consider the discourse of incorporation of northern Kazakhstan into Russia as a part of Russian ethnic nationalism. Among these academic the distinguishable one was Soviet dissident writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who in his essay "Rebuilding Russia" published in one of Moscow leading newspapers *Komsomolskaya pravda*, offered to create "Greater Russia" by incorporating eastern and northern parts of Kazakhstan into Russia.²⁶ Thus, the construction of Astana with its architectural symbolic power is comprehended as a counter narrative text towards overcoming Russian 'colonial' obstacle to the creation of national self-consciousness and Kazakh speaking urban population in Kazakhstan. Along with the creation of Astana it is necessary to take into account also other spaces of

²³ Edward Said, *Orientalis* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 142.

²⁴ Ashish Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss And Recovery Of Self Under Colonialism* (Deli: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983), 11.

²⁵ Bhavna Dave, *Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2007), 18.

²⁶ Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, "Rebuilding Russia", (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1990).

ideological and symbolic influence through which not only national but also civic ideologies have been disseminated. In the multinational society of Kazakhstan, the titular nation can legitimize its existence by referring to past archetypes. In order to overcome demographic disproportion, Kazakhs as a titular nation have to prove that they are indigenous population deeply-rooted in early local history and prehistory.²⁷ In this context, the ethno- symbolic approach encourages the processes of ethno-genesis, in which myths, memories, symbolism and especially language as mechanism of socio-cultural survival play fundamental role in analyzing formations of national identity.²⁸ With respect to Kazakhstan, it can be argued that content analysis of state symbols provides important information about state's nationality policies.

In order to understand the meaning and functions of symbols it is necessary to investigate the latter through the prism of code-language theory of semiotics. The fathers of modern semiotic theory, Charles Peirce introduced three types of signs: index, icon, symbol for deciphering and analyzing certain texts.²⁹ Using the framework of Piercian icon-index-symbol typology, another leading semiotician Thomas A. Sebeok in his *Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics* developed six categories of signs: signal, symptom, icon, index, symbol and name to analyze non-linguistic communications.³⁰ Steven Knowlton by applying the typology of signs of T. Sebeok tries to conduct discussion on the study of flags as a non-verbal communication, in which he analyzes flags as signals, icons, indexes and symbols.³¹ Furthermore, he describes the flag of Kazakhstan as an indexical sign representing the signified through revelation of some facts of cultural geography such as the incorporation of national ornaments into the content of the flag.³² The principles of Sebeok's semiotic analysis is also applicable to the analysis of other national symbols, like national emblem, anthem etc.

Another important component of semiotics, which is music is examined as a semiotic system or in other word system of signs. Among semiotic theories which examine musical meaning the theory of Wilson Coker should be emphasized. Coker in his *"Music and Meaning"* developed the concept of musical gesture, which tends to do more than signs, in terms of doing something rather than saying something

²⁷ Victor A. Shnirelman, "Politics of Ethnogenesis in the USSR and After", *Bulletin Of The National Museum Of Ethnology* 30, no.1 (2005):114.

²⁸ Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism*, 46.

²⁹ Charles S. Peirce, *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, (New York: Courier Dover Publications, 2012),101-105.

³⁰ Thomas A. Sebeok, *Signs: An Introduction To Semiotics*, 2nd Edition (Toronto: University Of Toronto Press, 2001).

³¹ Steven A. Knowlton, "Applying Sebeok's Typology of Signs to the Study of Flags," *Raven: A Journal of Vexillology* 19, (nov. 2012): 59-67.

³² *Ibid.*, 72.

about something.³³ Coker's theory is based on the notion of action and reaction, in which emotions evoked within hearers, play a role of musical signs. Similarly Osmond-Smith goes on to say that evocation of emotions is an iconic process backed up by the system of musical signs.³⁴ The encouraging example of an emotional musical sign is a national anthem which refers to the distinctiveness of certain nation. Another musicologist-semiologist is Eero Tarasti, who examines music as a semiotic system and argues that national anthem as a marked signs constitute as sign of social continuum.³⁵ As will be seen later, in the semantics of national anthem of Kazakhstan the idea of the rebirth of the native language is perceived as a necessity or "warning sign" for the future Kazakh generations to save their national identity and ethnicity.

3. Astana: A Model of National Innovation

After the demise of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan paid special attention to the emergence of pan-Kazakh identity. For this, the newly established independent Kazakhstan started to use not only political, economic and social innovative tools but also cultural and traditional archetypes of the Kazakh nation. As a case in point, one should focus on the urbanization policies of Kazakhstan. However, the urbanization should not be considered as a mere representation of post-Soviet modernization; rather, it should be seen as a crucial aspect of nation building. Nazarbaev states that the idea of the replacement of the capital is associated with the state ideology and the concepts of patriotism and statehood.³⁶

The relocation of Astana city was a transitional phenomenon in Kazakh reality. The former city Almaty was the capital of Soviet Kazakhstan. Almaty's cultural heritage is a mixture of Soviet historical and cultural landscapes, which could have influence on people's ideological preferences. The project of Astana tended to be transformed into a new post-Soviet center for the emergence of national and civic identities. The latter would provide a wide range of opportunities for citizens of the city to exclude themselves from Soviet or colonial imagination and enter into a post-Soviet era. National urban surfaces, symbols and artifacts being identity-forming factors constitute inseparable parts of Astana's architecture, which will outline the processes of nation building. The ideological coherence of Astana's architecture inclines to keep balance between civic and ethnic identity construction. The project of Astana, being conceptualized as national innovative project, contains legitimization and justification elements for Nazarbaev's ethno politics. Nazarbaev's

³³ Wilson Coker, *Music and Meaning* (New York: Free Press, 1972), 18-19.

³⁴ David Osmond-Smith, "The iconic process in musical communication," *Versus* 3 (1972): 40.

³⁵ Eero Tarasti, *Signs of Music: A Guide to Musical Semiotics; Approaches to Applied Semiotics* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), 6.

³⁶ Nazarbaev, *The Kazakhstan*, 318.

urbanization policies are quite essential for Kazakhs in terms of transition from traditional to modern. On the other hand, it can be argued that Astana's modernistic architecture is mixed with the notions of traditional and modernity, which constitutes a part of urban environment of the city. Urban environment is a space of cultural production, which is intermediated by national ideologies. The urban environment of the newly established capital with architectural design is considered itself as social utopian place for national identity through which people's identity is stamped in time and space.

The idea of social utopia is not a mere contemporary product backed by the policies of Nazarbaev regime; rather it has been stamped on Kazakh culture by XV century Kazakh philosopher and politician Asan Kaygy, who introduced the ideas of social utopia in searching "promised land" for societal coexistence.³⁷ It is interesting to note that such ideas are used for identity construction and delivered by the state through popular culture also. As a case in point, one can focus on one of the state sponsored films of Kazakhstan, called *Жерұйық* (Promised Land). The film starts with the words of the founder of Kazakh literature Abai Kunanbayev (1845-1904); "*Love all people of the world as if they were your brothers*".³⁸ The film emphasizes the humanistic attitude of the Kazakhs towards forcibly deported people. At the end of the film a voice of an older Korean man could be heard, who pronounce the following sentences: "We are thankful to the Kazakh nation, which despite its difficulties carried out the highest mission of the savior. And this ancient Kazakh land for us has become a truly promised land - *Жерұйық*".³⁹ The final fragment of the film is followed by the scenes of modern buildings of Astana, which tends connect the ideas of "promised land" and the newly established capital.

The ideological landscape of the city supports the development of ethnic identity by referring to the past archetypes. In particular, the monuments dedicated to historical figures, a great poet, educator and founder of Kazakh written literature Abai Kunanbaev (1845-1904) and to the khans Kerey and Zhanibek are supposed to be the articulation of national narrative. Kerey and Zhanibek and Abai Kunanbaev are considered key cultural and political actors of Kazakh nation. The emergence of Kazakh nationality was ascribed to the period of Kazakh Khanate in 15th century, when Kerey and Zhanibek engaged in a successful struggle for separating Kazakhs Kypchak tribes from Uzbek Khanate by consolidating them on their ethnic

³⁷ Abdumalik Nysanbayev, *Kazakhstan: Cultural Inheritance and Social Transformation*, (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2004), 30.

³⁸ Slambek Tauekel. (Director). (2010). *Zheruik* (The Promised Land): Drama, History, 00:25. Kazakhstan. Available At: [Http://Kinopod. Ru/Video. Html?id=19871](http://Kinopod. Ru/Video. Html?id=19871) [Accessed: 18 January 2012].

³⁹ Ibid., 01:47.

territory.⁴⁰ The idea of a monument to Kazakh khans as a symbol of national struggle derives from the literary works of Soviet Kazakh writer Ilyas Yessenberlin (1915-1983), who in his historic-literary *Koshpendiler* (Nomad) trilogy, in the first book entitled *Alams Kylysh* (1971) describes the founders of Kazakh Khanate as national positive hero-symbols.⁴¹ Similarly, parallels could be drawn between the symbolic influence of Abai monument and excellent epic novel of Soviet writer Mukhar Auezov (1897-1961) (*Abai's Way*) about the life of Abai, in which he discusses freedom-loving soul of the Kazakh people, his imagined future and national character of nomadic Kazakhs in the second half of the 19th century.

3.1 Key architectural buildings

The idea of the national imagination, development and statehood of Kazakhstan are stamped in the architectural and sculptural design of various monumental buildings. Among these architectural buildings "Kazakh Eli" monumental complex should be emphasized. The monument is represented as a mix of nomadic, inter-ethnic and national ornaments. The Kazakh mythical sacred bird Samruk situated on the peak of the tower, symbolizes the idea of Kazakhstan's further development. The symbolic meaning of Samruk is applied to the architectural context of the Kazakh Eli monumental complex to prioritize national and traditional ideas in strengthening the process of rebirth and development of the Kazakh nation. The central symbol of statehood like the bronze statue of President Nazarbaev is situated in one of the niches of the monument to emphasize the role of the president's leadership in the nation building process.⁴² In addition, it is noticeable that there is also a Museum of the First President of Kazakhstan with the shape of Kazakh nomadic yurt dedicated to Nazarbaev, in Astana.⁴³ Besides buildings, the symbol of Nazarbaev's leadership is

⁴⁰ Karl Baipakov and Bulat E. Kumekov, "The Kazakhs", in *History Of Civilizations Of Central Asia, Vol. V, Development In Contrast: From The Sixteenth To The Mid-Nineteenth Century*, eds., Chahryaradlehabib, I., Baipakov, K. M., (Paris: UNESCO publishing, 2003). 90-91. Andijapar Abdakimov, *Istoria Kazakhstana; S Drevneishikhvremen Do Nashikh Dnei*, (History Of Kazakhstan: From Ancient Times To The Present Days) (Almati: RIK,1994), 51-53. Ingvar Svanberg, "Kazakhstan and The Kazakhs", In *The Nationalities Question In The Post-Soviet States*, ed., Graham Smith (London And New York: Longman, 1996). 318-319.

⁴¹ Diana T. Kudaibergenova, "Imagining Community" in Soviet Kazakhstan, 845.

⁴² Alex Ulko, *Architecture as a Mirror of the Age. Part III: Pasts Condensed, Present Constructed*, (Neweurasia.Net, 2013) [database on-line]; available at <http://www.neweurasia.net/cross-regional-and-blogsphere/architecture-as-a-mirror-of-the-age-part-iii-pasts-condensed-presents-constructed/>.

⁴³ Official site of the Museum of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, [database on-line]; available at www.prezidentsmuseum.kz/index.php?lang=eng&uin=1166779416.

highlighted also through public holidays: the anniversary of the capital Astana or Astana Day, is celebrating on the same date as Nazarbaev's birthday.⁴⁴

However, in order to understand the semiotic mobility of every city, it is necessary to conduct communication among architectural buildings situated in opposite and central sites of a city. In this regard, to read the textuality of Astana one should analyze the symbolic meaning of Baiterek Tower situated in the center of the city. The tower, which is the articulation of the Kazakh's national myth, highlights the pivotal importance of Kazakh national values in the newly established state. The pillar, on the apex of which the golden ball symbolizing the egg of sacred bird Samruk is located, represents the idea of ancient tree of life. Kazakh culture has been highly influenced by national myths and nomadic traditions. Consequently, the myth of the sacred bird called Samruk has quite a special place in the Kazakh culture. The golden egg of Samruk represents one of the cultural symbols of the Kazakh nation which, according to the legend, every year is eaten by a snake but Samruk returns and lays another egg next year.

The innovative representation of Astana is seen as return to national imagination. The symbol of tower sets up relations between the cultural past and the future of Kazakhstan. The idea of mythical egg of Samruk as a symbol of rebirth outlines development tendencies of Kazakhstan. The 'breath' of Nazarbaev is evident in this architectural monument too: inside the golden ball of the tower one can find a 2kg triangular golden handprint of President Nazarbaev⁴⁵ and when people place their own hands in the imprint they can make a wish, while at the same time the national flag of Kazakhstan appear and anthem begins to play. In this case the capital Astana is not the only example in the country. Likewise, one can find such phenomenon in the Republic Square of the former capital Almaty too, in which the handprint of Nazarbaev has been used in the same logic by the Kazakhs, who want to fulfill their dreams.⁴⁶ Thus, mythical archetype was used by Nazarbaev regime as a tool to encourage the legitimacy of its charismatic leadership. Such manifestations seem to be intended to attract people's attention and remind them again and again about the role of the 'first president or leader of nation' in nation and state building processes.

⁴⁴ Laura L. Adams and Assel Rustemova, "Mass Spectacle and Styles of Governmentality In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan," in *Symbolism and Power In Central Asia: Politics of The Spectacular*, ed., Sally N. Cummings (New York: Routledge, 2013), 186

⁴⁵ John Lancaster, "Tomorrow Land; Astana, The New Capital Of Kazakhstan, Is Brash And Grandiose—And Wildly Attractive To Young Strivers Seeking Success", *National Geographic*, 2012.

⁴⁶ Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Rob Kevlihan, "State-Building, Identity and Nationalism in Kazakhstan: Some Preliminary Thoughts," Centre For International Studies, Dublin City University, Working Papers in *International Studies*, no. 1. (2011):13.

A considerable emphasis has been placed on the incorporation of the symbols of nomadic lifestyle into the architectural content of the city, to strengthen the role of ethnicity. In this regard, the huge entertainment center called Khan Shatyr is distinguished by its luxury. However, the latter is not a product of national architectural mind; instead it is designed by British architect Norman Foster.⁴⁷ The design of the Khan Shatyr resembles a traditional Kazakh yurt. The building's purpose is not constrained to its entertainments function, but it also provides ideological space for imagining their communities at least in the Andersonian sense.⁴⁸ The idea of yurt has outstanding meaning in the Kazakh culture as a symbol of unity and family. Khan Shatyr is supposed to be represented as a model of the immobile Kazakh yurt in supporting the notion of sticking to their homeland among ethnic Kazakhs. The fact that Kyan Shatyr is visible from various sites of the city empowers the notion of *Kazakhness*.

Another astonishing symbolic building of Astana is the Palace of Peace and Concord or, as it is more commonly called, the Pyramid. It includes the Opera theatre, the University of Civilizations and the Museum of Culture. This building has been designed by British architect Norman Foster in 2006. The Palace of Peace and Concord has become a symbol of religious dialogue and harmony. Important nation-building implications of this building are to emphasize Kazakhstan's path to modernity and to draw the world's attention to the fact that Kazakhstan differs from other "intolerant Muslim" states.⁴⁹ The Congress of leaders of international and traditional religions was held in the Palace of Peace and Concord in 2006.⁵⁰ President Nazarbaev argues that the Palace of Peace and Concord expresses the spirit of Kazakhstan, where the bearers of various cultures, religions and nationalities coexist in harmony and accord.⁵¹ According to Plato's concept, the geometrical structure of pyramid as a symbol of proportional equality characterizes the harmonic unity of unequals.⁵² The apex of the pyramid is designed with yellow (sun) and blue stained glasses, resembling the colors of the Kazakhs flag. Kazakhstan is itself represented as a guarantor of inter-societal harmony and peace. Thus, the

⁴⁷ Foster + Partners, Projects/Khan Shatyr Entertainment Centre Astana, Kazakhstan 2006-2010, [database on-line], available at www.fosterandpartners.com/projects/khan-shatyr-entertainment-centre/.

⁴⁸ Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections On The Origin And Spread Of Nationalism*, (London: Verso Press, 2006).

⁴⁹ Leon Yacher, "Astana, Kazakhstan: Megadream, Megacity, Megadestiny," in *Engineering Earth: The Impacts Of Megaengineering Projects, Vol 1, ed.*, Stanley D. Brunn (London, New York: Springer, 2011), 1011.

⁵⁰ Nazarbaev, *The Kazakhstan*, 315.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 315.

⁵² Dominic J. O'Meara, *Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy In Late Antiquity*, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005), 103.

concept of 'Kazaks first among equals' is reflected in the architectural design of Palace of Peace and Harmony.

4. The Power of State Symbols

State symbols like the national flag, anthem and emblem have great influence on nation building processes and potential to provide solidarity among people. However, in multiethnic societies state symbols can cause tensions among various ethnicities, because they are important in characterizing certain national group.

4.1. National Flag

In Kazakhstan, the content of national flag, deprived from Kazakh cultural and historical past, attempts to feed not only nation-building but also consolidation processes. The state Flag of Kazakhstan was designed by S. Niyazbekov and officially adopted in 1992.⁵³ As for Smith, state symbols are rooted in the cultural past and are especially essential in establishing communal bonds and a sense of national identity.⁵⁴ The state flag of Kazakhstan has a sky blue background, in the center of which there is a sun with thirty two rays, with a soaring steppe eagle underneath and with a golden national ornament on the left. According to official version, a blue-sky color with its ancient Turkic symbolic meaning symbolizes fidelity, honesty and integrity. In addition, the blue color of the flag symbolizes pure sky and represents the idea of peace, prosperity and unity of Kazakhstan.⁵⁵ A flag is considered as an inseparable component of public culture (state and national ceremonies etc.) and of the ideological apparatus of the state. Furthermore, the role of the flag in the promotion of national identity can be understood through the prism of Althusserian process of identification, through which individuals become "concrete subjects".⁵⁶ To Althusser, 'Ideological State Apparatus' produces ideologies, which are supposed to transform individuals into the consumers of ruling ideologies. The ideological content of Kazakhstan's national flag is a consequence of elite-led nation-building processes. Obviously, the flag's national symbols and ornaments provide a non-verbal dialogue between the citizens and state-led ideologies.

4.2. National Anthem

⁵³ *The Flag of the Republic of Kazakhstan* [database on-line]; available at http://www.akorda.kz/en/category/kazakhstan_flag, in Official site of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Accessed: 18 October 2013).

⁵⁴ Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism*, 25.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*,

⁵⁶ Louis Althusser, *Ideology And Ideological State Apparatuses, Lenin And Philosophy, And Other Essays*, trans., Ben Brewster. (London: New Left Books, 1971).

The state anthem is another key state symbol of the Republic of Kazakhstan. National anthems provide valuable information about the state's nation-building processes. The state anthem as an official song functions as a driving force for the creation of national identity, national consciousness and sense of belonging with a state. State symbols and especially national anthems set up identity boundaries in establishing distinction in a society; the representatives of a titular nation are distinguished from non-titular nations. On the other hand, it has to be kept in mind that any anthem has a purpose to unite individuals by creating general feeling of belonging to a certain state. In addition Tarasti states that national anthem as a musical sign can serve as a symbol of an ethnic and social group.⁵⁷ Likewise, one of the most important tenants of Kazakh nation-building is the anthem, which reflects the ethnic structure of the state. It emphasizes the ethnic and civic belonging of ethnic Kazakh people, but at the same time it maintains the bonds of non-ethnic groups, who are entitled to Kazakh citizenship, to the Kazakh state.⁵⁸

The Anthem of independent Kazakhstan was adopted twice; first in 1992, then in 2006. The state anthem of Kazakhstan was adopted in 1992; however the melody remained the same, as that which was performed during the Kazakh SSR.⁵⁹ The lyrics of the anthem of independent Kazakhstan were created by Kazakhstan's famous poets M. Alimbaev, K., Myrzaliyev, T., Moldagaliyev and Z. Daribayeva⁶⁰ that seems to be a post-colonial text and special attention should be paid to the third verse of the lyrics:

We have overcome the hardships
Let the past serve bitter lesson
But ahead we face a radiant future.
We bequeath our sacred legacy implying our mother tongue.⁶¹

In this sense, the anthem as a national symbol bases the project of collective identity by resisting the historical and cultural difficulties experienced by Kazakhstan's past. In this context Kazakhs' resistance identity is constructed through the negative experiences of Kazakh identity (marginalized language, lower economic status), and

⁵⁷ Tarasti, *Signs*, 6.

⁵⁸ Özgecan Kesici, "The Dilemma In The Nation-Building Process: The Kazakh Or Kazakhstanian Nation?", *Journal On Ethnopolitics And Minority Issues In Europe* 10, no.1 (2011): 48-49.

⁵⁹ Mukan Tulebayev, Yevgeny Brusilovsky And Latif Khamidi Have Become The Authors Of The First Anthem.

⁶⁰ *The State Anthem of the Republic of Kazakhstan*. [database on-line]; available at http://www.akorda.kz/en/category/kazakhstan_gimn, Official site of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Accessed: 18 October 2013).

⁶¹ Kazakhstan Discovery, *Kazakhstan National Anthem – 1992-2006*, [database on-line]; available at http://www.kazakhstan-discovery.com/kazakhstan-national-anthem.html#Uxkiyai_S9a (Accessed: 17 October 2013).

the reference to the mother tongue of Kazakhs is to incite a reassessment of Kazakh language, from a prior mark of national inferiority to cultural superiority. The idea of mother tongue has unique place in Kazakhstan's culture, which is comprehended by the Kazakhs as a medium of patriotism.⁶²

So, one should state that the native language of the Kazakhs is represented as a defensive tool for the future generations to think in a national language. Thus, the vision of radiant future, being shaped by the legacy of positive experience of Kazakhs' identity like mother tongue, will provide opportunities for the proliferation of Kazakhs language and culture throughout the society. Nevertheless, the expression "Kazakh mother tongue" was excluded from the new version of State Anthem, adopted in 2006, which is based on the song of Zhumeken Nazhimedenov (My Kazakhstan) 1956, the lyrics of which were modified by President Nazarbaev.⁶³ This revision of the lyrics of the anthem represents the policy direction of Nazarbaev's regime regarding interethnic harmony. Kazakhstan has a multi-ethnic society which requires a national anthem through which citizens can relate to and identify themselves with the state and nation. In this context, the phrases "My native land – My Kazakhstan!⁶⁴" in the chorus part of the national Anthem are supposed to bring together all ethnic groups who were born in Kazakhstan and consider Kazakhstan to be homeland.⁶⁵

4.3. National Emblem

According to Eric Hobsbawm the national emblem is a key symbol through which an independent country proclaims its identity and sovereignty.⁶⁶ The national emblem of sovereign Kazakhstan has a shape of circle with a picture of *sharinak* which is the cupola of Kazakh traditional yurt. In this sense, the symbols of traditional nomad culture have been used here to define Kazakhs' cultural identities. The national emblem of the Republic of Kazakhstan was created by famous Kazakh architects Zhandarbek Malibekov and Shot-AmanUalikhanov and was officially adopted in

⁶² Aisha Baigerim, *Funkcionirovaniya Nacionalnikh Yazikov V Respublike Kazakhstan, Pod Red. Auezkhan Kodar, Zamza Kodar, Kulturnie Konteksti Kazakhstana: Istoriya I Sovremennost*, (Aisha Baigern, "The Functioning Of National Languages In The Republic Of Kazakhstan," In *The Cultural Contexts Of Kazakhstan: History And Modernity*, eds., Auezkhan Kodar, Zamza Kodar) (Almati: Nisa, 1998), 267.

⁶³ *The State Anthem of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, [database on-line]; available at http://www.akorda.kz/en/category/kazakhstan_gimn, Official site of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Accessed: 18 October 2013).

⁶⁴ Ibid.,

⁶⁵ Kesici, *The Dilemma In*, 48.

⁶⁶ Eric Hobsbawm, *The Invention Of Tradition*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 11.

1992.⁶⁷ It speaks of the Kazakha identity, traditions, history, culture and more significantly the ideologies they give importance to. The shape of 'shanyrak' symbolizes life and eternity, welfare of family, peace and calmness.⁶⁸ The mythical winged horses, tulpars, are pictured on the left and right sides of *shanyrak* and are considered to be key heraldic elements of the state emblem.⁶⁹

The 'horse culture' is central to Kazakh national culture and symbolizes power, grace, freedom and nobility. In addition, horse-breeding has been highly important aspect of social, economic and cultural life of the peoples of Central Asia and became luxury and a status symbol.⁷⁰ Kazakh nomadic tribes used not only hides and meat of horses, but also they milked them and the product *kumyss*, the fermented mare's milk,⁷¹ was used for medical purposes. The sky-blue background of the emblem and golden sun rays symbolize peace, consent, harmony and prosperity, which are essential factors for multiethnic communities. Nevertheless, as Dave argues, the apparent reflection of Kazakhs' cultural symbols on state emblem provides emotional satisfaction and psychological appeasement to the titular nation, which, on the other hand questions the sense of equality among non-titular nations.⁷² The state symbols were formed in accordance with national archetypes but were also affected by Russian legacy. The latter is evident on the lower portion of the state emblem of Kazakhstan, in which there is an imprint Kazakhstan, *Қазақстан*, in the form of Cyrillic alphabet.⁷³

5. Conclusion

The dissemination of the concept of Kazakhness throughout the urban and symbolic power is a national but adequate response to the multidimensional challenges given by the post-Soviet transition. In this regard the article outlined the phenomenon of identity crisis as a result of marginalization of national cultural values by Russian colonization. Despite ethno-symbolic analysis of nation-building is quite descriptive, it helped to understand the ways through which Nazarbaev regime

⁶⁷ *The Emblem of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, [database on-line]; available at http://www.akorda.kz/en/category/kazakhstan_gerb, in Official site of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Accessed: 18 October 2013).

⁶⁸ Armedia, *Heru ev Mot Kazakhstan* (Far And Near Kazakhstan), (Yerevan: Nshanak Hratarakchutyun, 2010), 22.

⁶⁹ The Emblem of the Republic of Kazakhstan, *Ibid.*,

⁷⁰ Alibiy Mukhamejanov, "Natural Life and the Manmade Habitat in Central Asia", in *History of Civilizations of Central Asia 4*, no. 2, eds., Bosworth, C. E., Asimov, M. S. (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2003). 286-287.

⁷¹ Katherine Bliss Eaton, *Daily Life in the Soviet Union* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 50.

⁷² Bhavna Dave, *Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power*, 166.

⁷³ The Emblem of The Republic of Kazakhstan, *ibid.*

empowered the creation of national identity even without strong intellectual and cultural base. Nevertheless, the symbolism of Kazakhstan showed that Nazarbaev's nation-building policies have referred also to the cultural values of the nation. The findings of the article showed that political elite or charismatic president became essential agents in establishing national identity. The paradigm of Kazakhstan's nation-building stands out as a unique model of innovative tendencies that inclined to emphasize not only the power of ethnicity but also of civic values. As mentioned in the article, innovative urbanization policies of post-Soviet Kazakhstan are based on both ethnic and civic nation-building approaches. The incorporation of the symbol of Kazakh's nomadic culture in the architectural design of the newly constructed capital Astana has become essential in increasing national self-consciousness among the ethnic Kazakhs.

The establishment of monuments dedicated to national heroes and traditional symbols has also been an essential way of converting people's soviet consciousness. The construction of Astana was accompanied not only by incorporation of national symbols and archetypes but also new social and demographic policies in favor of ethnic Kazakhs. The civic nation building implications of Astana's architectural design and state symbols are considered one of the inseparable policies towards the creation rules of harmonious coexistence in multicultural, multi-religious and multiethnic Kazakh society. Nevertheless, national symbols incorporated into the content of the national symbols could create some sort of burden for members of other ethnic nationalities of Kazakhstan to setup rational form of identification with the Kazakh nation. Additionally, one can strongly believe that the Turkic ideologies of Kazakhstan's symbolism do not fully reflect Kazakhstan's domestic and foreign politics; instead they have strong ethno-national tendencies to stress their ethnic belonging and legitimize regime's authority.

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EMERGING INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STATE BEHAVIOR: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN “PLURALIST PULL” AND “SOLIDARIST PUSH”

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Abstract

The article examines the impact of emerging international norms on the behavior of states, thus endeavoring to fill a gap within the constructivist IR scholarship which has mostly focused on the relationship between fully-fledged, inter-subjective and internalized norms and the behavior these norms encourage. The main argument it advances is that emerging norms should not be considered as legitimate. Instead, they should be understood in terms of the (morally charged) legitimacy claims that sustain them and have the ability to prompt states to consider compliance due to a fear of international shaming, exclusion or some other losses. Empirically, the article makes an inquiry into China's approach to the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) principle by examining its recent voting strategies in the UN Security Council, namely its abstention on the Resolution tackling Libyan crisis and three subsequent vetoes in relation to Syrian uprising.

Key words: emerging norms, legitimacy claims, “responsibility to protect”, China

1. Introduction

The constructivist scholarship in the study of international relations should be praised for contributing significantly to our understanding of the influences that international norms have on the behavior of various international actors, as well as for unpacking the intricate processes lying behind the emergence of these norms.¹ Yet there are many questions in this strand of IR scholarship that require further attention. In general, constructivists tend to focus on the fully-fledged, intersubjective norms and the relatively undisturbed effects that these norms have on the behavior of actors who, in turn, take part in their reproduction. However, many norms which feature prominently in the international arena have not yet, and perhaps never will, reach the point at which the majority of international actors will

¹ For more detail on the constructivist approach to international norms see: Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52 (1998): 887-917.; Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Michael N. Barnett, "The Un Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda," *Cultural Anthropology* 12 (1997): 551-578; Michael N. Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

accept them as legitimate and will choose to act accordingly. Nevertheless, these kinds of “norms” often cause a considerable international stir and, to an extent, are one of the most important ingredients of everyday international politics. Despite these effects, international relations scholarship has largely failed to examine the influence they exert on the behavior of states. Through an examination of the Chinese approach to the “responsibility to protect” principle (R2P), this article endeavors to offer some insights with regard to this issue.

Historically, China’s preferred strategy in the UN Security Council has been one of abstention. However, this “passive” approach has recently caused a significant amount of controversy. In March 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 with regard to the humanitarian situation in Libya which authorized the UN member states to “take all necessary measures to protect civilians” by acting through “regional organizations”.² As it had already done many times before, China decided to abstain. However, its abstention in this case had an entirely different meaning since the Resolution was the first Security Council decision that actively endorsed the R2P principle. In this way, China implicitly allowed for a breach of the non-intervention principle. Many observers were fast to interpret this move as a possible indication that the country had renounced its usual attachment to the principle of sovereignty and was instead ready to act as a more responsible international actor. A few months later, however, China contradicted these expectations by casting a veto against the three Security Council Resolutions tackling the situation in Syria.³ This was unusual since, in its entire history, China had used its veto power only six times. Thenceforth, scholars started offering an entirely different analysis of the country’s behavior whereby it was depicted as an active and assertive power prepared to stand by the non-interference principle even if this meant annoying Western powers eager to see the R2P develop into a new international norm.

The R2P principle has featured prominently in the international discussions and discourse for almost fifteen years now; however, in spite of some initially optimistic promises, it has failed to acquire a legislative status equivalent to that of an amendment to the UN Charter, Chapter VII or international treaty.⁴ Yet, as we can

² The UN Security Council (S/RES/1973 Meeting) Resolution 1973, (March 17, 2011).

³ See: The UN Security Council 6627th Meeting, "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resoluton Condemning Syria's Crack on Anti-Government Protestors, Owing to Veto by Russian Federation and China "(October 4, 2011); The UN Security Council 6711th Meeting, "Securtiy Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation and China Veto Text Supporting Arab League's Proposed Peace Plan," (February 4, 2012).

⁴ See: Alex J. Bellamy, *Global Politics and the Resonsibility to Protect: From Words to Deeds* (London: Routledge, 2010); Ramesh Thakur, *The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use of Fore in Intenational Politics*(London: Routledge, 2011); James Pattison,

see from the example of China, the country which showed a substantial reservation towards this new principle, the R2P has become an important component of its foreign policy calculations, thereby indicating that even if a certain international norm has not yet acquired a fully-fledged international status, it still has the ability to exert influence on the behavior of states. What is more, the R2P has the ability to influence the behavior of powerful states which do not yet accept it as a prevailing standard of international conduct. By using the concept of legitimacy to make a distinction between emerging and fully-fledged international norms, this article endeavors to advance a particular understanding of the mechanism by which emerging norms affect state behavior. The main argument is that emerging norms are not sustained by international legitimacy but by various legitimacy claims premised on strong moral arguments. The persistent presence of these moral arguments in international discourse creates an "atmosphere" whereby states face shaming, exclusion or some other kind of ramification if they choose not to comply with the provisions of an emerging norm. In this way, emerging norms become an element in a strategic calculation of state's "national interest".

In light of these theoretical and empirical considerations, the article proceeds as follows. In the first section the theoretical argument is embedded within the existing literature on international legitimacy and is developed in greater detail. The second section briefly revisits the emergence, evolution and constraining/enabling effects of the R2P principle, while the third and final section employs the theoretical argument to account for the apparent inconsistencies in Chinese voting strategies displayed with regard to the recent UN Security Council Resolutions on Libya and Syria.

2. Theoretical Argument: An Emerging Norm and the Role of Legitimacy Claims

The use of force for humanitarian purposes has become a familiar practice in post-Cold War international politics. The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, has characterized this process as indicating possible development of an "international norm in favor of intervention to protect civilians".⁵ However, one characteristic cannot be stressed enough: for a new norm of international relations to develop, legitimacy is a *condicio sin qua non*. And indeed, the concept of legitimacy has entered the field of IR⁶ through the debate on the controversial 1999 NATO

Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁵ Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," *The Economist*, 16 September 1999, 82.

⁶ For examples on recent IR scholarship on legitimacy see: Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," *International Organization* 53 (1992), 379-408.; Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy & Power in the United Nations Security Council* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007); Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*

intervention in Kosovo and the 2003 US-led war against Iraq.⁷ However, due to its elusive nature, the concept itself that has become the subject of a debate.⁸ On the one hand, there are those who approach the issue of legitimacy in largely prescriptive and normative terms and who are thus predominantly concerned with outlining the conditions under which certain social actions, institutions and norms can/should be considered as legitimate.⁹ On the other, there are a growing number of scholars who engage with legitimacy empirically. Rather than proposing why something *should be* considered as legitimate, they focus on social phenomena that *are* already accepted as legitimate and explore the reasons why this is the case.¹⁰

This article joins the “empirical camp” since, rather than advancing a particular normative stance, it aims to examine how emerging norms influence state behavior. Nonetheless, normative considerations play an important role in the overall argument. They are studied in relation to the reasons social agents (be they state officials or academics) advance in support of emerging norms. With this in mind, this article makes a distinction between fully-fledged and emerging international norms by arguing that a strong international legitimacy sustains fully-fledged norms, while emerging norms lack such legitimacy and, instead, are grounded in the legitimacy claims that various social agents pronounce in their support. This distinction is important because, as will be shown below, legitimacy and legitimacy claims impact, enable, and constrain social behavior differently.

As defined by Mark Suchman, legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the action of any entity are desirable, proper, appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”.¹¹ Suchman’s definition implies that legitimacy has two constitutive elements: quantitative and

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 20 (2006), 405-437.; Allen Buchanan, “The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention,” *Journal of Political Philosophy* 7 (1999), 71-87.

⁷ See: Corneliu Bjola, “Legitimizing the Use of Force in International Politics: A Communicative Action Perspective,” *European Journal of International relations* 11 (2005): 266-303.

⁸ See: Jens Steffek, “The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Discourse Approach,” *European Journal of International Relations* 9 (2003): 253; Bjola, “Legitimizing the Use of Force in International Politics,” 268.

⁹ Steffek, “The Legitimacy of International Governance,” 253.

¹⁰ These line of reasoning is mainly inspired by Max Weber’s idea that a legitimate social order enjoys “the prestige of being considered binding”. See: Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978)

¹¹ Mark C. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,” *Academy of Management Review* 20 (1996): 574.

qualitative. Quantitatively, legitimacy depends on the social action, or the corresponding social norm, being generally perceived as desirable. In their study of the international norms dynamic, Martha Finnemore and Kathrin Sikkink demonstrate this in a compelling way. With the concept of "norm cascade" they enable us to observe that if a large enough group of social actors is prepared to adopt a new norm as a standard of appropriate behavior, this norm is likely to replace the one that previously structured certain kinds of social interaction.¹² Qualitatively, Suchman relates legitimacy with "socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions", and thus with an elaborate social scheme which is perceived as logical and meaningful for social actors who sustain and reproduce it through social action. International norms, which are in this sense legitimate, are often described by constructivists in terms of their intersubjective character and are thought to be internalized by the social actors in such a way that they rarely reflect upon them while engaging in corresponding behavior.¹³

Emerging norms, on the other hand, lack both the quantitative and qualitative element typical of fully-fledged norms. They do not yet command broad social recognition, nor are they internalized and intersubjectively shared so as to influence an unquestionable social behavior. Nonetheless, the advocates of emerging norms advance numerous arguments why these norms, and the behavior they inspire, should be considered as legitimate. In the absence of quantitative and qualitative components that render fully-fledged norms legitimate, these arguments become one of the most important instruments in upholding emerging norms and making them effective. However, rather than being seen as constitutive of the emerging norms' legitimacy, these arguments should be conceived of as "legitimacy claims" – a normative assertions telling us why a new norm *should be* considered as legitimate, rather than why it *is* legitimate.

The equating of legitimacy and legitimacy claims is a surprisingly common feature in the literature that deals with the use of force for humanitarian purposes. Nicholas Wheeler, who is considered as one of the most authoritative scholars dealing with this issue, is no exception in this regard. In his seminal book *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, Wheeler builds a case in favor of intervention around what is indeed a question that confronts us with an noteworthy moral dilemma:

¹² Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 895.

¹³ For more information see: Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20 (1995): 71-81; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46 (1992): 391-425.

If we do not allow for the unilateral response, what should happen if the UN Security Council is unable or unwilling to authorize the use of force to prevent or end humanitarian tragedy?"¹⁴

In this way, he identifies with the English school's "solidarists" who maintain that individuals hold rights in world politics, and that states have not only a moral responsibility to protect the security of their own citizens, but also the wider duty of "guardianship of human rights everywhere".¹⁵ This is clearly a normative assertion, yet Wheeler chooses to present it as proof of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, although his own definition of legitimacy does not differ significantly from the definition presented earlier in this section. In his view, legitimacy consists in "standards of acceptable conduct set by the prevailing morality of society be it domestic or international society".¹⁶ However, he fails to acknowledge that humanitarian intervention is not yet a part of any such "prevailing morality".

Although Wheeler confuses legitimacy with legitimacy claims, his work reveals one important feature of the legitimacy claims uttered in support of international humanitarian interventions: they are "just cause" assertions imbued with significant moral weight. The recent scholarship on legitimacy, which draws heavily on Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action, has recognized that "validity claims" uttered in the process of legitimization must possess certain characteristics that make them convincing. In an attempt to understand how international organizations legitimate their own activities, Jens Steffek has combined Habermas's notions with Max Weber's theory of rational legal domination in order to arrive at the idea of "legitimization through rational discourse".¹⁷ In just the same way, this article argues that "legitimacy claims", which are uttered as a part of the communicative action surrounding the new international norm in favor of intervention to protect civilians, are aimed at achieving "legitimization through moral discourse". In Habermas's terms, we are in the realm of validity claims which can be challenged only on the basis of the moral rightness of underlying argument.¹⁸ However, it is important to distinguish between the process of the

¹⁴ Nicholas J. Wheeler, "A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect after the 2005 World Summit," in *The UN at Sixty: Celebration or Wake?* (Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Canada 2005): 2.

¹⁵ This claim is not specific only to Nicholas Wheeler. Alex Bellamy observes that in the past few years many liberal states have begun to accept the proposition that intervention not authorized by the UN Security Council can be considered as legitimate. See: Alex Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).

¹⁶ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, 10.

¹⁷ Steffek, "The Legitimization of International Governance," 262-264.

¹⁸ Habermas distinguishes between three types of validity claims that can be challenged through communicative action: (1) those that concern the truth of assertion; (2) those that concern its moral argument; (3) those that center on truthfulness and authenticity

legitimization of emerging norms, which is aimed at providing these norms with fully-fledged status, and the process of the legitimization of fully-fledged norms, which is aimed at their social reproduction.

That being said, what is the difference between fully fledged and emerging norms in the influence that they exert on the behavior of states? Friedrich Kratochwil, Alexander Wendt and Ian Hurd, constructivists all, argue that we can differentiate between three types of reasons that motivate states to follow international norms: (1) coercion or fear of punishment; (2) cost-benefit calculation; and (3) acceptance of the norm as binding.¹⁹ There has been a lot of debate among the IR scholars as to which of these motivations should be given priority. For the purposes of this article, however, it is sufficient to observe that Max Weber associated legitimacy only with the “acceptance of norm as binding”, since following norms due to a fear of punishment is a matter of common sense, while following norms in order to gain benefits is a matter of rational calculation.²⁰ What this implies for emerging norms is that, due to their lack of legitimacy, they cannot be expected to be accepted as binding. However, their persistent presence in the international discourse, as well as the strong moral argument with which legitimacy claims behind emerging norms are imbued, means that these norms have become the standards by which the conduct of individual states is measured, and often, the means by which certain states are internationally shamed or even isolated. The moral arguments of legitimacy claims thus prompts states to include emerging norms in their “national interest” calculation, either to avoid punishment (e.g. shaming, isolation), to increase/maintain certain gains or to avoid losses (e.g. to sustain good relations with the state that supports the emerging norm).

In this way, the national interest becomes an “independent variable”, to use the language of positive science, helping us to understand how emerging norms can exert influence on state behavior. However, national interest should not be understood in purely realist terms as a state’s inherent and constant pursuit aimed at maximizing material utility. Rather, as Martha Finnemore argues, external influences, such as social interaction and international norms, should equally be taken as factors influencing the formation of state preferences (interests).²¹ These external influences, she asserts, generate “shared expectations about appropriate

of speaker. For more details see: Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987).

¹⁹ See: Kratochwil, “The Force of Prescriptions,” 685–708.; Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” 378; Wendt, “Social Theory of International Politics,” Chapter 6.

²⁰ Steffek, “The Legitimacy of International Governance,” 254.

²¹ Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996).

behavior"²² which have a strong impact on a state's understanding of the objects that should be commonly desired in international politics. When it comes to an emerging international norm on the use of force for humanitarian purposes, a strong moral argument behind its legitimacy claims creates an "atmosphere" of high expectations about appropriate state behavior which, in turn, pressures states to recalibrate their preferences accordingly. In this regard, Quentin Skinner is right to assert that "even if an agent is not in fact motivated by any of the principles he professes, he will nevertheless be obliged to behave in such a way that his actions remain compatible with the claim that these principles genuinely motivated him".²³

Bearing these theoretical assertions in mind, the remainder of the article will endeavor to account for the apparent inconsistencies in recent Chinese foreign policy. Namely, it will explore China's decision to abstain on the Security Council Resolution on Libya, which implied its tacit endorsement of the "responsibility to protect" principle, and its three subsequent vetoes, premised on its strong support for the "non-interference" principle, against the Security Council Resolutions with regard to the situation in Syria. First, however, the article will briefly recall the process of the emergence of the "responsibility to protect" principle since it is an important factor for the understanding of the Chinese decisions.

3. R2P: The Constraining and Enabling Effect of the Legitimacy Claims

The R2P principle emerged on the basis of the belief that an urgent reconceptualization of the traditional notion of sovereignty was needed. The gross violations of human rights worldwide have prompted scholars, as well as practitioners, to propose a conceptual shift from "sovereignty as right" to "sovereignty as responsibility".²⁴ By rejecting the sacrosanct status of the sovereignty principle, the main idea behind this new concept has been that states unable to protect their own citizens should welcome an international support.²⁵ Following the 1999 NATO intervention in the humanitarian crises in Kosovo, which was not sanctioned by the UN Security Council Resolution, this question became one of the most fiercely debated questions of the world politics in the first decade

²² Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, 22.

²³ Quentin Skinner, "Analysis of Political Thought and Action," in *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics*, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 116.

²⁴ James Pattison, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 2.

²⁵ The "responsibility to protect" concept was first advanced by Francis Dang and Robert Cohen with respect to problem of internally displaced persons. Later it was adopted by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Comity, the OSCE and African Union. See: Alex Bellamy, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention," *International Affairs* 84 (2008): 615-639.

of the twenty-first century. The controversies surrounding this intervention led to the formation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which, in 2001, issued a report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*.²⁶

The central idea of the report was clear: the unwillingness or inability of any state to protect its citizens from "supreme humanitarian emergence" suspends non-interference principle, simultaneously invoking the "international responsibility to protect".²⁷ In this way, the focus of the debate has been shifted from the concept of sovereignty to the concept of human rights making it possible to use an empathetic notion of a "responsibility to protect" in place of a controversial "right to intervene". By embedding the legitimacy claim behind the newly advanced international norm into a strong moral language, the authors of the report succeeded in creating a new international atmosphere within which the "burden of proof" was no longer on those advocating the new norm, but on those opposing it. The terms of the debate were thus set in such a way that any actor who dared to protest against helping the civilians whose rights were grossly violated was faced with the likelihood of being shamed and labeled as an irresponsible international actor.

However, the importance of this discursive shift should not be overstated since the subsequent document on the R2P did not, in terms of substance, diverge significantly from the principles already set out in the UN Charter. The ICISS's general focus on intervention²⁸ and its openness towards intervention that would not be authorized by the Security Council meant that the R2P was unlikely to command a consensus among world leaders without some important revision.²⁹ It thus did not come as much of a surprise that the version of the R2P endorsed by the *Outcome Document* of the 2005 World Summit was markedly different from the initial ICISS version. The *Outcome Document* referred to the R2P in two

²⁶ Kofi Annan, "Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly," (September 20, 1999).

²⁷ Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The Responsibility to Protect" (December 2001), xi.

²⁸ As Alex Bellamy notices the report dedicated only 9 out of 85 pages to prevention, whereas 32 pages were devoted to intervention. What is more, the Report left significant space for the unilateral intervention by urging the permanent five members of the Security Council to refrain from using the power of veto in the cases where "threshold conditions" are fulfilled and no vital national interests are at stake. Furthermore, the UN General Assembly, as well as other regional organizations, were given the power to authorize possible intervention. See: Bellamy, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention," 621.

²⁹ Bellamy, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention," 622.

paragraphs- Paragraph 138 and Paragraph 139.³⁰ These paragraphs ruled out the possibility of granting the right to authorize intervention to any international body other than the Security Council. Nonetheless, the continued presence of the R2P in the international and states' discourse was confirmed through the unanimous endorsement of the *Outcome Document*. Even the Chinese officials openly asserted that "when a massive humanitarian crisis occurs, it is the legitimate concern of international community to ease and defuse the crisis".³¹

In 2006, an attempt to translate the provisions of the *Outcome Document* into a binding UN Security Council Resolution brought about further difficulties. As Gareth Evans observes, once the draft of the Resolution reached the Security Council, states started expressing a "buyer's remorse".³² Algeria, Brazil and the Philippines, which were non-permanent members of the Security Council at the time, voiced their hostility and skepticism towards the R2P and its predominant focus on the issue of military humanitarian intervention. The adoption of the Resolution was made possible only after the change in the nonpermanent membership of the Security Council, which tipped the balance of the debate. All of the new five non-permanent members - Slovakia, Qatar, Peru, Ghana and Congo - were strong supporters of the principle.³³ As for China, it entered a process of serious negotiations with the United Kingdom, demanding that the Resolution fully reflects what had already been agreed on in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the *Outcome Document*, in exchange for its support.³⁴

It is, however, one thing to rhetorically support the principle and quite another to allow for its implementation and further development. By not objecting too loudly to the R2P and at times even voicing support for its ethical background, it can be assumed that China primarily sought to convey the image of a responsible power willing to socialize in the emerging normative context and that it is deserving of international prestige. In any respect, the effects of this "solidarist push" on China goes only so far. As many official documents and its behavior reveal, China is still more than happy to play by the rules of the "pluralist camp". As an illustration, China's Permanent Representative to the UN asserted at the Security Council's

³⁰ See: The UN General Assembly, Resolution 60/1 World Summit Outcome (24 October, 2005): 30.

³¹ Sarah Teitt, "China and the Responsibility to Protect " *Asian-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect* (December 2008), 8.

³² Gerath Evans, "Responsibility to Protect in 2007: Five Thoughts for Policy Makers," Presentation Given to the Panel Discussion "The Responsibility to Protect: Ensuring Protection of Population under Threat of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity," *United Nations, New York* (April 12, 2007).

³³ Alex Bellamy, "Realizing the Responsibility to Protect," *International Studies Perspectives* 10 (2009): 115.

³⁴ Bellamy, "Realizing the Responsibility to Protect," 115.

Open Debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict that the responsibility for the protection of civilians lies, first and foremost, with their respective governments; it also asserted that any international action aimed at the protection of civilians must be in accordance with the UN Charter, thus first paying due respect to the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the non-interference principle.³⁵ During the *Open Debate*, China's Representative also suggested that since there "are still differing understandings and interpretations of this concept among Member States", the Security Council should refrain from adopting it fully.³⁶ In 2009 this approach was reiterated when Ambassador Liu Zhenmin emphasized that "thus far" the "responsibility to protect" remained just a concept, and as such did not yet constitute a rule of the international law.³⁷

4. The Case of China: Between "Pluralist Push" and "Solidarist Pull"

This section examines China's approach to the R2P through the scrutiny of its voting decisions in the UN Security Council with respect to the recent crisis in Libya and Syria. The reason why China has been chosen as a case study is threefold. First, China is still suspicious to the R2P, which makes it a particularly interesting case for the study of the influence emerging norms have on the behavior of states, given that the transition of these norms from an emerging to a fully-fledged status depends on the support from those states that oppose it. Second, at first glance, China's votes on the Libyan and Syrian Resolutions seem to contradict each other which, in itself, makes it a compelling research puzzle. Lastly, an understanding of the approaches that the world's greatest powers have adopted towards the recent uprisings in the Arab world ranks as one of the most important issues of current world politics.

In this section both primary and secondary sources are used. Secondary sources and the official United Nations' data assisted in the historical reflection on the Chinese approach to the non-interference principle and on its behavior within the UN. The text of the SC Resolutions on Libya and Syria, the explanations of the Chinese Permanent Representatives to the UN that followed these Resolutions, along with newspapers' clippings were used for the analyses of the Chinese vote in these two instances. Both their content and discourse were analyzed. One thing, however, should be noted. These sources were used only as circumstantial "evidence" assisting this article to make a claim about the motives lying behind China's behavior and, as such, should be understood as providing a first step in a larger

³⁵ Li Baodong, "Statement at Security Council Open Debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict," (November, 2011).

³⁶ The United Nation Security Council S/PV.5703 Meeting, (New York, June 22, 2007).

³⁷ Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, "Statement at the Plenary Session of the General Assembly on the Question of Responsibility to Protect," (July 2009).

study inspired by the theoretical argument made above, rather than as a comprehensive body of data supporting it.

4.1 Revisiting History: China and the Principle of Non-Interference

Ever since it was formally established in 1949, the People's Republic of China has been an avid advocate of the international normative order premised on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference.³⁸ The reasons for this are complex and manifold; nonetheless, a brief examination of Chinese history might offer us some valuable insights. First, on numerous occasions the country suffered forceful intrusion from external powers: the Opium Wars when it fought against the British Empire (1839-1842 and 1856-1860), the Japanese dominance of Manchuria in the 1930s and many border disputes with Russia and India during the Cold War, to name just a few.³⁹ Second, China's wary approach to foreign intervention can also be related to territorial claims it has with regard to several disputed regions - Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan.⁴⁰ In order to get a sense of the strength of Chinese rhetorical commitment to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference one should also look at the Preamble to the Chinese Constitution where these issues dominate in the overall discourse.⁴¹

During the Cold War, China's approach to the principle of sovereignty was so rigid that, until the 1980s, it refused to participate in any of the UN Security Council meetings requiring voting on the issues of peacekeeping, or to contribute any resources to UN missions.⁴² In China's interpretation, peacekeeping was one of the many tools of American, and even Soviet, imperialist expansion. However, during the 1980s it started to develop a more flexible approach. As Ken Sofer observed, by noting that the support for peacekeeping does not necessarily interfere with the sovereignty principle and can even be beneficial in conveying a message of the country's peaceful intentions and its willingness to socialize in world politics, China decided to engage.⁴³ In 1981, when the Security Council was considering the

³⁸ Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano, "Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect," *Singapore: RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies* NTS Working Paper 5 (2011).

³⁹ Prantl and Nakano, "Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia," 10.

⁴⁰ Prantl and Nakano, "Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia," 10.

⁴¹ Christopher Holland, "Chinese Attitudes to International Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty, and Intervention" *Journal of International Law and Politics Online Forum* (July 2012): 3-43.

⁴² Ken Sofer, "China and the Collapse of Its Non Interventionist Foreign Policy: Past Diplomatic Practices Colliding with Rising Economic and Political Realities," *Center for American Progress* (March, 2012).

⁴³ Sofer, "China and the Collapse of Its Non Interventionist Foreign Policy," 1-12.

Resolution on Cyprus, China decided to cast a positive vote in relation to a peacekeeping operation for the first time in its history.⁴⁴ From then onwards, China's role in peacekeeping has steadily increased, so much so that today it sends more peacekeepers than any other permanent member of the Security Council.⁴⁵

All things considered, China's approach to peacekeeping does not diverge from any of the principles and provisions set down in the UN Charter. Internationally, its rhetorical action still consists very much in a constant reiteration of the principle of sovereignty, although its practical actions, as will be shown below, sometimes go against these professed principles.⁴⁶ The explanations that China's ambassador to the UN gives as the follow up to the country's votes in the Security Council serve as a good illustration of this point, since they do not fail to emphasize the need for the consent of the target state, the limited use of force, the necessary authorization by the UN Security Council and the need for regional support in order for any intervention to be considered as legitimate.⁴⁷

4.2 China's Voting Record in the UN Security Council

The People's Republic of China joined the UN in 1971 when it replaced the Republic of China. Initially, as already pointed out, China approached the UN with suspicion and did not engage in its activities in any great extent. In the 1980s, besides participating in the UN peacekeeping missions, the country decided to join most of the UN intergovernmental organizations, advocating altogether a multilateral and engaging approach to major world issues.⁴⁸ However, within the Security Council, China preferred to abstain rather than to take strong "pro" or "against" positions, and this earned it its famous nickname - "Mr. Abstention".⁴⁹ From 1971, China used

⁴⁴ Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, "China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping" *SIPRI Policy Paper* (November, 2009).

⁴⁵ In 1982, for the first time China contributed financially to the UN led peacekeeping. In 1989 it became a member of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. In 1989 it set up its first civilian observer's mission in Namibia. For more information see: United Nations Documents, "Montley Summary of Military and Civilian Personnel Deployed in Current United Nations Operations," (January 31, 2012). ; Gill and Huang, "China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping."

⁴⁶ The United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Courte of Justice," (San Francisco 1945), Article 2 (1), 2 (4) and 2(7).

⁴⁷ Holland, "Chinese Attitudes to International Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty, and Intervention," 24-29.

⁴⁸ Jianwei Wang, "China's Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium" in *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*, ed. Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: 2005).

⁴⁹ Cary Huang, "For Beijing, It's No More Mr Abstention," *Chinese News Watch*, February 2012, 63-85.

its veto power only eight times, which is in stark difference to the United States, which, in the same period, used it seventy-nine times (for a detailed comparison see Table 1.0).⁵⁰

Table 1: The Number of Vetoes used by the UN Security Council P5 countries⁵¹

Period	China	US	USSR/Russia	France	UK
Total	8	79	100	16	29
2006-14	5	3	7		
1996-2005	2	10	1	-	-
1986-95	-	24	2	3	8
1976-85	-	30	6	9	10
1966-75	1	12	6	2	8
1956-65	-	-	21	2	3
1946-55	1 ⁵²	-	57	0	-

This statistical data is even more surprising if we bear in mind that China used its veto power when no other country did so in only three situations. The first time this was in 1972, when it voted against the admission of Bangladesh into the UN in order to show its support for Pakistan. As Della Fok points out, Chinese interests were not directly at stake in this situation which is why it voted in favor of Bangladeshi membership two years later demonstrating, at the same time, a certain level of discomfort for exposing itself internationally in such a way.⁵³ The remaining two times that China opted to use its veto power against the SC Resolutions were inspired by its interest with regard to Taiwan. Accordingly, given the Guatemalan support for the Taiwan and the Macedonian decision to establish diplomatic relations with this disputed region, China voted against the 1997 Resolution to send peacekeeping mission to assist Guatemala's peace process and the 1999 Resolution which sought to extend the UN observers' mandate in Macedonia.⁵⁴ Although Taiwan features prominently in Chinese foreign policy some inconsistencies should not be overlooked: in the case of the UN operations in Haiti, China did not choose to use its veto power, although Haiti established diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

⁵⁰ Michael Fullilove, "China and the United Nations: The Stakeholder Spectrum," *Washington Quarterly* 34 (2011): 63-85.

⁵¹ The table was constructed on the basis of the official United Nations data available at: http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml

⁵² Between 1946 and 1971, the Chinese seat on the Security Council was occupied by the Republic of China (Taiwan), which used the veto only once in order to block Mongolia's application for UN membership in 1955.

⁵³ Della Fok, "The Emergence of a Superpower: China's Un Policies from 1971 to Present," *DEAN Jurnal* (May, 2011).

⁵⁴ See: The UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/1997/18 (January 9, 1997) and Draft Resolution S/1999/201 (February 25, 1999).

The remaining five times that China used its veto power were in tandem with Russia. In 2007, the two states objected to the Resolution condemning human rights violations in Myanmar. The general belief is that in this way China wanted to protect itself from the possibility of any similar criticism. In 2008, a Resolution aimed at imposing sanctions against Zimbabwe was on the Security Council's agenda but China decided to block it, largely due to the energy deal worth \$1.3 billion that it had signed with this African country.⁵⁵ The Syrian uprising, which started in 2011, was the cause of the three subsequent Chinese vetoes on Security Council Resolutions. In October 2011, it refused to agree to sanctions against the Assad regime, in February 2012 it rejected the possibility of military intervention, while in July 2012 it objected to a set of the UN non-military measures proposed as a way of sanctioning Syria for not complying with the "six-point plan".⁵⁶ These three vetoes will be discussed in more detail below.

4.3 Between "Pluralist Push" and "Solidarist Pull"

On March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 in relation to the Libyan civil war establishing a legal basis for foreign military intervention.⁵⁷ The Resolution demanded an urgent ceasefire between warring parties and it authorized the international community, acting through regional organizations, to establish a "no-fly zone", as well as to use all the means necessary, with the exception of foreign occupation, to protect civilians. China decided to abstain from the vote on this Resolution. Given its vast economic interest in Libya and the fact that Resolution 1973 openly endorsed the R2P principle, this Chinese move caused a great deal of dismay. Many IR scholars were prompted to understand this event as a clear sign of a new era in Chinese foreign policy, consisting in abandoning of its rigid support for the sovereignty principle and its willingness to assume a more responsible international role.

According to the data available from 2011, Chinese trade with Libya amounted to \$6.6 billion.⁵⁸ This trade mainly took the form of the Chinese purchase of Libyan oil, although, due to the fact that China never adhered to the sanctions against the Gaddafi regime, other businesses also flourished. According to China's Ministry of Commerce, when the Libyan conflict broke out, Chinese companies were involved in

⁵⁵ Fok, "The Emergence of a Superpower: China's Un Policies from 1971 to Present."

⁵⁶ See: The UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/2011/621 (4 October, 2011), Draft Resolution S/2012/77 (4 February, 2012) and Draft Resolution S/2012/538 (19 July, 2012).

⁵⁷ See: The UN Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1973 (17 March, 2011).

⁵⁸ Leslie Hook and Geoff Dyer, "Chinese Oil Interests Attacked in Libya," *Financial Times*, 24 February 2011.

projects in Libya worth more than \$18 billion.⁵⁹ Moreover, some 30,000-36,000 Chinese workers were actively engaged in these projects.⁶⁰ For example, in 2008, Chinese rail companies signed a railway contract with Libya worth \$1.7 billion.⁶¹ At this point, a question can be legitimately raised: how was it possible that these high economic stakes in Libya did not prompt China to cast a veto against the Security Council Resolution on the no-fly zone? Why did it indirectly allow for NATO's actions in support of the R2P principle?

China's abstention in the case of Libya was surprising because of the content of the Security Council Resolution. However, the abstention itself, as shown earlier, was typical of China's voting strategy in general. For this reason, China surprised everybody when, contrary to its tradition, it decided to use a veto power three times in a short span of time on the Security Council Resolutions which proposed mechanisms to stop the Syrian civil war. Although China is Syria's largest export partner, when compared to Libya, its economic interests in Syria are almost negligible.⁶² The data from 2009 shows that the trade between the two countries was worth nearly \$2.2 billion, although this was almost entirely uni-directional. China was also actively engaged in Syria's oil industry through joint ventures with the country's national oil company.⁶³ These facts prompt the following question: if China's stakes in Syria were significantly lower than those it had in many other countries, especially when compared to Libya, how was it possible that China decided to use veto power three times in a short period of time against the Security Council Resolutions aimed at bringing the Syrian conflict to a halt? Should these Chinese decisions be taken as a sign of a more assertive foreign policy?

The arguments supporting the official explanations that China offered for its abstention in the case of Libya and its vetoes in the case of Syria are remarkably similar.⁶⁴ In all the four documents explaining its decisions, a strict compliance with the UN Charter was demanded, indicating that China still held that the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference were extremely important.

⁵⁹ "The Libyan Dilemma: A Rising Power Starts to Knock against the Limits of Its Hallowed "Non-Interference"," *The Economist*, 10 September 2011.

⁶⁰ "China and Libya: Update on Workers," *China in Africa: The Real Story*, 15 March 2011.

⁶¹ Leslie Hook and Geoff Dyer, "Chinese Oil Interests Attacked in Libya," *Financial Times*, 24 February 2011.

⁶² Nicolas Wong, "China's Veto on Syria: What Interests Are at Play?," *Open Democracy*, 25 July 2012.

⁶³ "Factbox - Syria's Energy Sector," Reuters, 5 September 2011.

⁶⁴ See: Li Baodong, "Explanation of Vote after Vote on Security Council Draft Resolution on Syria," (4 February 2012); Li Baodong, "Explanation of Vote after Security Council Resolution on Libya," (17 March 2011); The UN Security Council 6627th Meeting, "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resoluton Condemning Syria's Crack on Anti-Government Protestors, Owing to Veto by Russian Federation and China "(October 4, 2011).

Nonetheless, the fact that China abstained on the Libyan Resolution meant that it was ready to compromise on these principles in order to obtain gains elsewhere. In line with the theoretical considerations advanced in this article, it can be argued that in spite of the robust economic interests it had in Libya, China allowed for the intervention because it was under strong "solidarist" pressure in the Security Council.⁶⁵ The fact that the Security Council had already endorsed a particular version of the "responsibility to protect" principle through its 2006 Resolution and had unanimously adopted the Resolution 1970 recognizing and condemning the seriousness of the situation in Libya, precluded China from compromising its international prestige by legitimizing inaction in the face of mass atrocities.⁶⁶ With regards to this point, it is interesting to observe that in the Security Council's Open Debates on Libya, China dropped the "consent of the host state" from the conditions under which intervention can be legitimate.⁶⁷ The strong moral character of the legitimacy claim behind the R2P principle thus provoked China to go against its traditional foreign policy approach as it feared international shaming and isolation, as this would compromise its overall standing within the international community. In other words, China approached the emerging R2P norm in a calculated and strategic way.

However, as NATO's intervention in Libya was interpreted as an action aimed at regime change under the guise of protecting civilians rather than as a fully-fledged humanitarian intervention, China realized that by abstaining it gained little and, potentially, lost a lot. The discourse that prevailed in the aftermath of the intervention in Libya was that its abstention contributed to the further development of the R2P, and that it thus opened the door to the misuse of the principle by Western powers. By compromising on the non-interference principle, China also lost valuable "points" with the developing countries without compensating for this elsewhere. Its approach to Syrian civil unrest was the direct result of the "bad" calculation it made in the case of Libya, as well as its attempt to control the damage as much as possible.

As already shown, the explanation that China put forward in order to justify its vetoes on the Syrian Resolutions can be interpreted as part of its longstanding tradition to strictly adhere to the concept of non-interference. However, a further and important part of Chinese international behavior is to lie low with regard to issues that do not concern its national interest directly. In the case of the UN Security Council Resolutions on Syria, China had clear indications that Russia was ready to use its veto power, so there was no need for it to attract attention in this way. For this reason it can be argued that China chose to veto the three Resolutions

⁶⁵ Holland, "Chinese Attitudes to International Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty, and Intervention," 35-37.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 36.

on Syria not only to reassert its support for the non-interference principle, but also to prove a different point. Namely, that Libya was an exception that should not be taken as a ground upon which the new norm of international politics was to be constituted, and that there was a long way for the “responsibility to protect” principle to go before it was to become a fully-fledged international norm.

Knowing that China has plenty of potential to play a more assertive international role, scholars observe its behavior closely. Each “inconsistent” move that China makes tends to be labeled as the turning point after which the country will start behaving either as a more “responsible” or as a more “assertive” international power. The analyses of Chinese behavior with respect to the situation in Libya and Syria, on the other hand, demonstrate that these inconsistencies and contradictions are the result of the country’s attempt to play simultaneously on a wide number of fields. Both material and non-material interests come into play in this regard. China is cautious not to make too many enemies, both on the part of Western powers and on the part of developing states. The case of Syria is, however, an odd case for making a statement in international arena since, due to its severity, it has inevitably exposed Beijing to the criticism that it sides with dictators and encourages violent crackdowns. Nevertheless, this is perhaps the cost that China is now willing to pay in order to contain any further development of the “responsibility to protect” principle. These are also the tradeoffs of a particular kind of strategic approach to foreign policy which combines material interests with the pressures of international norms, both of those which are already established and of those which are gradually emerging.

5. Conclusion

The IR constructivist scholarship has contributed significantly to our understanding of the relationship between international norms and the behavior of international actors. However, a large amount of this scholarship has focused on the established and fully-fledged norms which have already been internalized and inter-subjectively shared among actors. This article, in contrast, has attempted to examine the influence that emerging norms bring to bear on the behavior of states. Its main assertion is that emerging norms should not be considered as legitimate in any way. Instead, they should be understood in terms of the legitimacy claims that sustain them and should prompt states to consider compliance due to a fear of international shaming, exclusion or some other loss. The focus of this article has been on the R2P principle, which is why the moral argument upon which this principle’s legitimacy claim is constituted has been taken as a main reason behind its ability to influence state behavior. However, it is clear that not all emerging norms are based on morally charged legitimacy claims. Some, such as economic norms, might draw on rationality claims, while some, such as environmental norms, might even combine ethics and rationality. For this reason, approaching emerging norms

through the concept of legitimacy claims opens up a noteworthy space for further research and promises to yield many interesting results.

The article focused empirically on China's approach to the R2P by examining its recent voting strategies in the UN Security Council, namely its abstention on the Resolution tackling the Libyan crisis and three subsequent vetoes in relation to the Syrian uprising. By examining a number of official documents, it found a strong indication of the fact that China's abstention in the case of Libya, which meant going against its strong economic interest in this country, was the result of the pressure exerted by the compelling moral argument behind the R2P. However, this implicit recognition of the R2P did not result in any tangible gains for China. On the contrary, from China's point of view, it might have set a dangerous precedent for recomposing the international normative landscape. For this reason, by casting three vetoes in a row on the Syrian Resolutions it entered a process of "damage control" aimed at conveying the message that R2P is not yet a fully-fledged, legitimate international norm. Although this issue requires further investigation in order for the claim about China's motives and behavior to be planted on stronger empirical ground, scholarly perspectives should also closely monitor the development of China's position on the recent Crimea crisis, taking into account the non-interference/intervention principles.

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BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION AND MASS-ELITE RELATIONS ON EU ENLARGEMENT: IMPLICATIONS ON THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT DEBATE

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Abstract

Despite the fact that the public in Britain had predominantly negative attitudes towards the Eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2004, the British government endorsed this policy. Since the legitimacy of elite actions on EU affairs depends on the level of public support, it is important to study the formation of public opinion and the political communication processes in the European context. Using Flash Eurobarometer survey data, this article first tests the determinants of public support for EU enlargement in Britain. It then examines the nature of the relationship between elites and public opinion on the 2004 enlargement. It concludes that the public discussion about enlargement in Britain was fuelled by hysteria rather than facts, and that the British policymakers failed to both provide the worried public with clear facts on the possible effects of enlargement and take substantive policy decisions to alleviate popular concerns.

Keywords : EU enlargement, attitudes, mass-elite relationship, democratic deficit

1. Introduction

There is very little consensus among scholars concerning what democratic deficit is and even whether or not it exists in European Union (EU) policymaking.¹ Dahl maintains that international organizations are inherently unable to support democratic decision-making.² The EU, according to many, is no exception. It is not uncommon to see European elites initiating projects even when most of the public is against such ventures.

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¹ Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, "Why there is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44(3) (2006): 533-562; Simon Hix, *What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It?* (Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Press, 2008).

² Robert Dahl, "Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic's View," in *Democracy's Edges*, ed. Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 19-36.

The EU is on the verge of major sea changes as a result of the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, the crisis in the Eurozone, and the planned future rounds of EU enlargement. Even though 2013 was declared to be the European Year of Citizens by the EU, democratic deficit criticisms have still been prevalent in EU affairs. Since the legitimacy of elite actions depends upon the level of public support for European political processes³, it is important to study mass-elite relations and political communication processes on European affairs.⁴

While 2014 marks the 10th anniversary of the 2004 enlargement, the literature has so far provided either only aggregate-level studies of public opinion data on EU enlargement or analyses of the influence of media coverage on public opinion about EU enlargement, generally ignoring the determinants of public support for widening or EU enlargement.⁵ Since the Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 was a vital development shaping the nature and the composition of the EU, the public opinion on this issue commands special attention. Through the accession of 10 new member states and 74.1 million people, it was the fifth and the largest round of enlargement in EU history.

Popular attitudes in EU member states are significant for the success of enlargement.⁶ Even though no EU member state has ever conducted a referendum

³ Christoph O. Meyer, "Political Legitimacy and The Invisibility of Politics: Exploring The European Union's Communication Deficit," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37(4) (1999): 617-639; Robert Rohrschneider, "The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support for An EU-wide Government," *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(2) (2000): 463-475.

⁴ Oya Dursun-Ozkanca, "French Public Opinion on the European Union's Eastern Enlargement and Public-Elite Relations," *French Politics*, 11(3) (2013): 241-258; Ian Down and Carole J. Wilson, "Opinion Polarization and Inter-Party Competition in Europe," *European Union Politics*, 10(1) (2010): 61-87; John Garry and James Tilley, "The Macroeconomic Factors Conditioning the Impact of Identity on Attitudes Towards the EU," *European Union Politics*, 10(3) (2009): 361-379; Catherine E. De Vries and Erica E. Edwards, "Taking Europe to Its Extremes: Extremist Parties and Public Euroskepticism," *Party Politics*, 15(1) (2009): 5-28.

⁵ For exceptions, see Oya Dursun-Ozkanca, "European Union Enlargement and British Public Opinion: The Agenda-Setting Power of The Press," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 12(2) (2011): 139-160; Dursun-Ozkanca, "French Public Opinion on the European Union's Eastern Enlargement and Public-Elite Relations"; Natalia Timuş, "The Role of Public Opinion in European Union Policy Making: The Case of European Union Enlargement," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 7(3) (Sept 2006): 336-347; and Claes H. De Vreese, and Hajo Boomgaarden, "Media Effects on Public Opinion about the Enlargement of the European Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44(2) (2006): 419-436.

⁶ Dursun-Ozkanca, "European Union Enlargement and British Public Opinion"; Erik Jones and Niels Van der Bijl, "Public Opinion and Enlargement: A Gravity Approach," *European Union Politics*, 5(3) (2004): 331-351.

on enlargement, Austria has already pledged to hold a popular referendum on the Turkish membership into the EU. Analyzing the public opinion on the biggest round of EU enlargement has significant repercussions for understanding the public opinion in future rounds of enlargement. Furthermore, scholars are in disagreement about the nature of the public-elite relationship on EU affairs. This article examines the nature of the relationship between elites and public opinion on the 2004 enlargement by focusing on Britain, a key player in EU decision-making. Throughout the debates on the 2004 enlargement, the cleavage between the British elites and the people was strikingly manifest. Only 31 percent of the people in Britain supported the enlargement just before May 2004.⁷ Despite the fact that the majority of people in Britain had negative attitudes toward enlargement, the British government endorsed this initiative.

Following a survey of the relevant literature, this article first conducts an individual-level multivariate logistic regression analysis in Britain using *Flash Eurobarometer Survey on EU Enlargement 132.2*⁸ (November 2002) to determine the demographic, political, economic, and cultural factors influencing people's attitudes towards enlargement. Building on findings from this quantitative analysis, it then provides an in-depth qualitative study of the public-elite nexus on the issue of EU enlargement through an analysis of primary and secondary sources from 2002 to 2004 to determine if and to what extent the elites responded to the people's enlargement-related concerns in Britain. It aims at shedding light on the nature of the relationship between the British elites and masses on an important EU topic, and concludes with a discussion of the empirical and theoretical implications of its findings. The results of this study become even more important in the context of the speech that UK Prime Minister David Cameron delivered in January 2013 promising to hold a referendum on Britain's membership in the EU. Furthermore, in the upcoming European Parliament elections in May 2014, the UK Independence Party, a major Euro-skeptic party in Britain, is expected to acquire a significant increase in its voting share.⁹

2. Literature Review

This section identifies the findings of the existing literature on both the nature of European public opinion and the relationship between policymakers and European citizens. Demographic characteristics, such as gender and age, are used as

⁷ European Opinion Research Group, *Standard Eurobarometer 61*, Public Opinion in the European Union (Brussels: European Opinion Research Group, 2004).

⁸ European Opinion Research Group, *Flash Eurobarometer on Enlargement 132.2*, Public Opinion in the European Union (Brussels: European Opinion Research Group, 2002).

⁹ Patrick Wintour, "UKIP is the Party with Most Reasons to be Cheerful ahead of European Elections," *The Guardian*, 10 April 2014.

independent variables in many studies projecting the support for EU membership.¹⁰ Based on the literature on public attitudes towards European integration, one might expect a gender gap in the attitudes toward the EU enlargement.¹¹ Accordingly, women are expected to be more skeptical towards the EU enlargement.

Besides the demographic factors, this analysis largely draws on a previously developed framework¹² for the construction of the "political," "economic," and "socio-cultural" consequences of enlargement independent variables.¹³ Many scholars note that economic factors are important in influencing people's attitudes towards EU integration.¹⁴ Other studies note that cultural variables are more important than economic ones when determining people's attitudes towards European integration.¹⁵ Finally, there are studies that argue that political variables are more important in determining public opinion.¹⁶

¹⁰ Anderson, Christopher J. and M. Shawn Reichert, "Economic Benefits and Support for Membership in the EU: A Cross-National Analysis." *Journal of Public Policy* 15 (1996): 231-249; Gabel, Matthew and Harvey Palmer, "Understanding Variation in Public Support for European Integration." *European Journal of Political Research* 27 (1995): 3-19; McLaren, Lauren M., "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?" *Journal of Politics* 64(2) (2002): 551-566; De Vreese, Claes H. and Hajo G. Boomgaarden, "Projecting EU Referendums: Fear of Immigration and Support for European Integration." *European Union Politics* 6(1) (2005): 59-82.

¹¹ Givens, Terri E., "The Radical Right Gender Gap." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(1) (2004): 30-54; Inglehart, Ronald, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Liebert, Ulrike, "Gender Politics in the European Union: The Return of the Public." *European Studies* 1(2) (1999): 197-239.

¹² Semetko, Holli A. and Patti M. Valkenburg, "Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News." *Journal of Communication* 50(2) (2000): 93-109.

¹³ Semetko and Valkenburg, "Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News".

¹⁴ Gabel and Palmer, "Understanding Variation in Public Support for European Integration"; Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Calculation, Community, and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration," *European Union Politics* 6(4) (2005): 419-443; Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton, "Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration," *International Organization* 47(4) (1993): 507-534; Gerhards, Jurgen and Silke Hans, "Why not Turkey?: Attitudes towards Turkish Membership in the EU among Citizens in 27 European Countries," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49(4) 2011: 741-766.

¹⁵ Carey, Sean, "Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?" *European Union Politics* 3(4) (2002): 387-413; McLaren, "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?"; Hooghe and Marks, "Calculation, Community, and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration".

¹⁶ Garry, John, Michael Marsh, and Richard Sinnott, "'Second Order' versus 'Issue Voting' Effects in EU Referendums: Evidence from the Irish Nice Treaty Referendums," *European Union Politics* 6(2): 201-221.

Regarding the elites-people nexus, the democratic deficit argument holds that the EU and its institutions suffer from lack of democracy or legitimacy. Many suggest that the democratic deficit is inherent in the EU's policymaking processes and institutions, and has existed since its inception.¹⁷ They posit that the European elites are not sufficiently responsive to public preferences and scrutiny and make decisions on the EU independent of the popular input.¹⁸ Even in the European Parliament elections the turnout levels have continuously decreased since direct elections began in 1979 (63 percent), reaching the lowest point in the latest elections in 2009 (43 percent).¹⁹ Additionally, there are those who argue that the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit or a communication deficit; that is, that the EU lacks the ability to generate public support due to the lack of media attention.²⁰ Studies on Euro-skepticism are a significant part of the debates on the future of the EU.²¹

There are multiple competing arguments in the literature regarding the relationship between European elites and publics. Some note that European citizens' knowledge

¹⁷ David Marquand, *Parliament for Europe* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1979).

¹⁸ David Beetham and Christopher Lord, *Legitimacy and the European Union* (London: Longman, 1998); Meyer, "Political Legitimacy and The Invisibility of Politics"; Fritz W. Scharpf, *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Liesbet Hooghe, "Europe Divided? Elite vs. Public Opinion on European Integration," *European Union Politics* 4(3) (2003): 281-304; Follesdal and Hix, "Why there is a Democratic Deficit in the EU."

¹⁹ European Parliament, *Turnout at the European Elections* (Brussels: European Parliament, 2014); available at [www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-\(1979-2009\).html](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-(1979-2009).html), on 7 January 2014.

²⁰ Hans-Jorg Trezz, "Media Coverage on European Governance: Exploring the European Public Sphere in National Quality Newspapers," *European Journal of Communication* 19(3) (2004): 291-319; Meyer, "Political Legitimacy and The Invisibility of Politics"; Christoph O. Meyer, "The Europeanization of Media Discourse: A Study of Quality Press Coverage of Policy Coordination since Amsterdam," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43(1) (2005): 121-148; Martin Gleissner and Claes H. De Vreese, "News About the EU Constitution: Journalistic Challenges and Media Portrayal of the European Union Constitution", *Journalism* 6(2) (2005): 221-242; Claes H. De Vreese, *Framing Europe: Television News and European Integration* (Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers, 2003); Neil T. Gavin, "Imagining Europe: Political Identity and British Television Coverage of the European Economy," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 2(3) (2000): 352-373; Pippa Norris, *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communication in Post-Industrial Democracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

²¹ John Garry and James Tilley. "The Macroeconomic Factors Conditioning the Impact of Identity on Attitudes Towards the EU," *European Union Politics*, 10(3) (2009): 361-379; Catherine E. De Vries and Erica E. Edwards. "Taking Europe to Its Extremes: Extremist Parties and Public Euroskepticism," *Party Politics*, 15(1) (2009): 5-28; Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart. *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

of European-level politics is limited when compared with their knowledge of national political affairs.²² They argue that “many people are ill-informed” and “slow to see the relevance” of European affairs in their own lives.²³ Earlier works on European public opinion note the emergence of a permissive consensus on European affairs.²⁴ The permissive consensus theory holds that an ill-informed and disinterested European public has generally been positively predisposed toward European integration, giving political elites a blank check in EU decision-making. Permissive consensus is expected to survive so long as EU affairs remain distant from the daily lives of the European citizens. Nevertheless, as noted by one scholar, the permissive consensus among the European citizens can no longer be taken for granted.²⁵ As the EU starts to influence the daily lives of the European citizens, the expansion of EU membership becomes increasingly conducive to opposition from the public.²⁶ This leads to the emergence of the constraining dissensus argument, implying the constraining role of public opinion on EU affairs.²⁷

The policy mood argument suggests the primacy of public opinion for policymakers.²⁸ It holds that the elites “are keen to pick up the faintest signals in their political environment,” and respond to electoral pressure.²⁹ The cue-taking

²² Klaus Schoenbach, “What and How Voters Learned,” in *Communicating to Voters: Television in the First European Parliamentary Elections*, ed. Jay G. Blumler (London: Sage, 1983). 299-318; Jay G. Blumler, ed. *Communicating to Voters: Television in the First European Parliamentary Elections* (London: Sage, 1983).

²³ Blumler, *Communicating to Voters*, 4.

²⁴ Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold. *Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970); Ronald Inglehart, “Public Opinion and Regional Integration,” *International Organization* 24(2) (1970): 764-795; Martin Slater, “Political Elites, Popular Indifference and Community Building,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 21(1) (1982): 69-87.

²⁵ Sarah B. Hobolt, *Europe in Question: Referendums on European Integration* (Oxford University Press, 2009).

²⁶ Eichenberg and Dalton, “Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration.”

²⁷ Cees Van der Eijk and Mark Franklin, *Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of the Union* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996); Simon Hix, *The Political System of the European Union* (London: Macmillan, 1999); Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (2008): 1-23.

²⁸ Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Public Policy,” *American Political Science Review* 7(1) (1983): 175-190; Lawrence R. Jacobs, *The Health of Nations: Public Opinion and the Making of American and British Health Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); John G. Geer, *From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls: A Theory of Democratic Leadership* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

²⁹ James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen and Robert S. Erikson, “Dynamic Representation,” *American Political Science Review* 89(3) (1995): 543-564.

argument, on the other hand, changes the causal direction in the previous argument, and claims that cues presented by political elites provide citizens with cognitive shortcuts that help them decide what is in their interest.³⁰

Some works in the literature on EU mass-elite relations conclude that higher polarization between elites on EU issues leads to more negative public opinion among citizens, as they are exposed to more intensive debate upon EU policies.³¹ As one scholar puts, "elite attitudes to membership decisively infiltrate national economic evaluations and the subsequent utilitarian judgments citizens pass on the Union."³² On the other hand, as another study concludes, European politicians are sensitive to their electorate and their interests when they take decisions on EU enlargement.³³ As illustrated by this review, scholars are in disagreement about the nature of the public-elite relationship, in general, and the existence of democratic deficit in EU policymaking, in particular.

3. Methodology

The analysis in this article aims to shed light on the determinants of public support for enlargement as well as the relationship between the elites and public opinion. It does so by combining quantitative and qualitative methods. It employs quantitative methodology to examine the public opinion on enlargement. *Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement* is the only available survey series measuring public attitudes on different aspects of the 2004 enlargement. Using *Flash Eurobarometer Survey on EU Enlargement 132.2*³⁴ (November 2002) raw data made available through the University of Cologne's Central Archive for Empirical Social Research Data Service (ZA), and drawing on the existing literature on the determinants of public opinion on EU affairs, a logistic regression is conducted to analyze the relationship between the support for EU enlargement and various demographic factors and expectations on various consequences of the enlargement at the

³⁰ Clifford J. Carrubba, "The Electoral Connection in European Union Politics," *Journal of Politics* 63(1) (2001): 141-158; Hooghe and Marks, "Calculation, Community, and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration."

³¹ Hooghe and Marks, "Calculation, Community, and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration"; Ray, Leonard, "When Parties Matter: The Conditional Influence of Party Positions on Voter Opinions about European Integration," *Journal of Politics* 65(4) (2003): 978-94; Steenbergen, Marco, Erica Edwards, and Catherine De Vries, "Who's Cueing Whom? Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration," *European Union Politics* 8(1) (2007): 13-35.

³² Tamvaki, Dionysia, *Legitimacy and EU Enlargement Policies: Differentiation in Elite Attitudes and Public Support for Integration* (VDM Verlag, 2008).

³³ Serrano, Omar, *The Domestic Sources of European Foreign Policy: Defence and Enlargement* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013).

³⁴ European Opinion Research Group, *Flash Eurobarometer on Enlargement 132.2, Public Opinion in the European Union* (Brussels: European Opinion Research Group, 2002).

individual level.³⁵ This analysis helps determine which consequences of EU enlargement received the highest attention during the public opinion formation process. Then, a qualitative analysis through examination of the British elite discourse as well as newspaper coverage of EU enlargement in *The Times*, *The Guardian*, *The Daily Mail*, and *The Daily Express* from 2002 to 2004 is conducted to determine whether the British elites paid attention to the consequences of enlargement the British people anticipated.

4. Public Opinion Analysis

The dependent variable, the reference category in the binary logistic regression, is the public support for EU enlargement. It is drawn from Question 2 of *Flash EB132.2* which asks: 'Are you, personally, totally in favour, rather in favour, rather opposed or totally opposed to the enlargement of the European Union?' The dependent variable is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 denoting support for enlargement (combining 'totally in favour' and 'rather in favour' answers) and 0 denoting no support (combining 'rather opposed' and 'totally opposed' answers).³⁶


The independent variables used in this analysis are derived from the *Flash Eurobarometer Survey 132.2* to test which factors affected the public support for EU enlargement. These included demographic variables such as gender (with female coded as 1 and male coded as 0) and age (with 15-24 coded as 1, 25-39 coded as 2, 40-54 coded as 3, and 55+ coded as 4), as well as political, economic, and cultural variables for determining the public support for enlargement. The political variables included awareness of EU enlargement (Question 1, coded as 1 'yes' and 0 'no'), perceptions of national importance of enlargement (Question 6, coded as 1 combining 'very important' and 'rather important' answers, and 0 'rather unimportant' and 'not important at all'), perceptions of personal importance of enlargement (Question 7, coded as 1 combining 'very important' and 'rather important' answers, and 0 'rather unimportant' and 'not important at all'), perceived impact of enlargement on peace (Question 8-1, coded as 1 'rather agree' and 0 'rather disagree'), perceptions of enlargement as moral duty (Question 8-2, coded as 1 'rather agree' and 0 'rather disagree'), perceptions of enlargement increasing the EU's power in the world (Question 8-3, coded as 1 'rather agree' and 0 'rather disagree'), perceptions that enlargement will decrease the significance of [our

³⁵ Additionally, a goodness-of-fit test using chi-square is conducted to test whether the model was a good fit for the data or not. All variables included in the analysis, with the exception of gender, are statistically significant. Hence the null hypotheses assuming a normal distribution are rejected for all variables but gender.

³⁶ The dependent variable is recoded as a dichotomous variable, as the results of the ordered and binary logistic regression analyses were similar. The analysis in this manuscript reports the binary logistic regression results for the sake of simplicity of interpretation. All "don't know" answers are coded as missing variables in the analysis.

country] in Europe (Question 8-5, coded as 0 "rather agree" and 1 "rather disagree"), perceptions that enlargement will make it difficult to take decisions in the EU (Question 8-6, coded as 0 "rather agree" and 1 "rather disagree"). The economic variables included perceptions that enlargement will be very costly for [our country] (Question 8-4, coded as 0 "rather agree" and 1 "rather disagree"), perceptions that enlargement will expand markets (Question 9-1, coded as 1 "rather agree" and 0 "rather disagree"), perceptions that enlargement will increase unemployment (Question 9-6, coded as 0 "rather agree" and 1 "rather disagree"), perceptions that enlargement will decrease the standard for social welfare in [our country] (Question 9-7, coded as 0 "rather agree" and 1 "rather disagree"). The cultural variables included perceptions that enlargement will make the EU more remote from citizens (Question 8-7, coded as 0 "rather agree" and 1 "rather disagree"), perceptions that enlargement will increase immigration to [our country] (Question 9-2, coded as 0 "rather agree" and 1 "rather disagree"), perceptions that with enlargement it will be easier to control illegal immigration (Question 9-3, coded as 1 "rather agree" and 0 "rather disagree"), perceptions that enlargement will make it harder to tackle crime and drug trafficking (Question 9-4, coded as 0 "rather agree" and 1 "rather disagree"), and finally, perceptions that enlargement will make the EU culturally richer (Question 9-8, coded as 1 "rather agree" and 0 "rather disagree").³⁷

³⁷ As Flash Eurobarometer 132.2 survey questionnaire does not have a direct measure on the education levels of respondents, this analysis does not include education among independent variables.



As illustrated in Figure 1 and Table 1, for every one-unit increase in people's perceptions of the positive impact of enlargement on the expansion of markets, their odds of supporting enlargement increase by a factor of 4.480 ($p < 0.01$). This is by far the strongest statistically significant and positive relationship in this multivariate analysis. This finding implies that the anticipated economic consequences of EU enlargement were vital when the British people developed their opinions on enlargement.

Table 1: A Model of Public Support for EU Enlargement in Britain

	British Support for EU Enlargement
Awareness of EU Enlargement	2.521***; 0.72 (0.263)
Personal Importance of EU Enlargement	1.372**; 0.58 (0.154)
Enlargement's Impact on EU's Role in the World	2.101**; 0.68 (0.328)
The Cost of EU Enlargement	0.400**; 0.29 (0.343)
Enlargement's Impact on UK's Role within the EU	0.577*; 0.37 (0.285)
Historically Natural to Expand the EU	2.979***; 0.75 (0.276)
Enlargement's Impact on the Expansion of Markets	4.480***; 0.82 (0.391)
Enlargement's Impact on Culture	0.363***; 0.27 (0.304)
Constant	0.288*; 0.22 (0.698)
Observations	568

Source: Flash Eurobarometer Survey on Enlargement 132.2 (November 2002).

Entries are odds ratio coefficients and probability statistics with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$ (two-tailed tests)

The attitudes as to whether or not it is “historically natural to expand the EU” are the second strongest statistically significant variable in this analysis. For every one-unit increase in people’s perception that the enlargement of the EU is historically natural, their likelihood of supporting enlargement increases by a factor of 2.979 ($p < 0.01$). This is not an unpredicted finding, as many people in Britain saw the Eastern

enlargement process as a turning point signifying the reunification of the European continent.

Furthermore, as more people became aware of enlargement, their likelihood of supporting enlargement increased. For every one-unit increase in the awareness of enlargement, the odds of supporting this development increase by a factor of 2.521 ($p < 0.01$). This finding highlights the significance of communication. If political elites communicate EU affairs more effectively, and inform the people about the EU developments, popular support for such initiatives may be expected to increase.

For every one-unit increase in British people's expectations of a positive impact of enlargement on the EU's power, the odds of supporting enlargement increase by a factor of 2.101 ($p < 0.05$). In other words, if people believed that enlargement would contribute to the power of the EU in the world, they became more likely to support enlargement. When people thought that enlargement would be costly for their country, their likelihood of supporting enlargement decreased by a factor of 0.400 ($p < 0.01$). Additionally, when the British people thought that enlargement would make the UK less important in the EU, their likelihood of supporting this issue decreased by a factor of 0.577 ($p < 0.1$).

Another notable finding is that while people's perception of the importance of EU enlargement for Britain did not play a statistically significant role in affecting their likelihood of supporting the issue, people's perception of the personal importance of EU enlargement played an important role. For every one-unit increase in the perception of enlargement as personally significant, the odds of supporting this development increased by a factor of 1.372 ($p < 0.05$). In line with the findings of a major work in the literature³⁸, people in Britain demonstrated a tendency to engage in personal cost-benefit analyses when forming their attitudes on this particular policy issue.

Additionally, there is a strong but negative relationship between the support for enlargement and the perceived impact of enlargement on culture. For every one-unit increase in the perceived impact of enlargement on culture, the odds of supporting enlargement decreased by a factor of 0.363 ($p < 0.01$). This is arguably due to the British people's concerns regarding the possible effects of post-enlargement immigration in their society and culture. As noted by one scholar, the British press coverage created a sense of panic regarding increased prospects of immigration into Britain, emphasizing the adverse effects of enlargement on the British culture and society.³⁹

³⁸ Hix, *What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It?*

³⁹ Dursun-Ozkanca, "European Union Enlargement and British Public Opinion."

There are two additional variables that had a statistically significant but negative relationship with the support for EU enlargement. The first one is the cost of EU enlargement: for every one-unit increase in the perceived cost of enlargement, the odds of supporting enlargement decreased by a factor of 0.4 ($p < 0.05$). The second one is the enlargement's impact on the role of the UK within the EU. This is perhaps due to the Euro-skeptic nature of the British public opinion, documented well by previous studies.⁴⁰

All in all, as illustrated by Table 1, most of the statistically significant variables are related to the economic consequences of enlargement, such as the cost of EU expansion of membership, personal significance of enlargement, and the impact on the expansion of markets. For instance, people's perceptions of the impact of enlargement on the expansion of markets contributed to their support for enlargement. In other words, a cost-benefit analysis framework has been predominant in the way the British people formed their opinion on enlargement.

In conclusion, people's expectations about the effects of enlargement on their daily lives played a major role in determining their attitudes toward enlargement. The anticipated economic consequences of EU enlargement weighed heavily in determining people's likelihood of supporting EU enlargement.⁴¹ Without contextualization, the results presented here do not add much clarity to the elites-masses relationship. The following section adds some flesh to the empirical findings in this study by providing a qualitative analysis that places the EU enlargement debate in a larger political context and looking into the declarations made by British political elites and articles the British newspapers published on the topic from 2002 to 2004.

5. Analysis of the Elite-Mass Nexus on EU Enlargement

In democracies, public opinion sets parameters on policymaking. As one study notes, there is "little doubt that people have a strong sense of what issues the government ought to be addressing."⁴² While the 2004 enlargement was preordained, the European citizens in general and the British people in particular

⁴⁰ See, for example, Andrew Geddes, *European Union and British Politics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) and Dursun-Ozkanca, "European Union Enlargement and British Public Opinion."

⁴¹ However, as these results are derived from public opinion data from November 2002, they should be treated cautiously. For instance, while at the time of *Flash EB 132.2* the popular support levels for EU enlargement were much higher in Britain (54 percent), they have considerably decreased as the enlargement date approached.

⁴² Frank R Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). 2.

still had to be convinced that their general interests were being guarded and concerns being addressed.

As the British people became more aware of the impact of European integration on their lives, they became more concerned about the potential disadvantages of enlargement and demanded recognition of their concerns. Immigration became a very controversial topic in Britain during the enlargement debates, more so as the enlargement day approached. To illustrate, in the final *Standard EB* survey conducted just before the Eastern enlargement in 2004, immigration was listed by 41 percent of the British respondents as the most important topic the EU is facing at the moment.⁴³

The negative implications of increased immigration on the welfare state, healthcare system, and culture were discussed with increased frequency in the public discourse on enlargement. As noted by one study, "people feared the arrival of cheap labour from the new Member States, or that enlargement would increase drug trafficking and organized crime in Britain."⁴⁴ References to the effects of enlargement on markets were also fairly frequent in Britain. The favorability balance generally tilted in the negative direction when these economic and social consequences of EU enlargement were discussed. The high salience of immigration-related and economic concerns during the enlargement debates in Britain justifies a detailed look at these issues to determine whether the British elites did an effective job responding to such concerns.

Britain has always been regarded as unique in having a continuing aversion or skepticism towards European integration.⁴⁵ It is often characterized as a reluctant or awkward member of the EU.⁴⁶ Europe is frequently viewed as a threat to British national sovereignty.⁴⁷ An exception to the traditional Euro-skepticism of British policy is vivid on the issue of enlargement.

⁴³ European Opinion Research Group, *Standard Eurobarometer 61*, Public Opinion in the European Union (Brussels: European Opinion Research Group, 2004).

⁴⁴ Dursun-Ozkanca, "European Union Enlargement and British Public Opinion": 154.

⁴⁵ Simon Bulmer, "Britain and European Integration: Of Sovereignty, Slow Adaptation, and Semi-Detachment," in *Britain and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment*, ed. Stephen George (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 1-29; Helen Wallace, "Britain Out on a Limb?," *Political Quarterly* 66(1) (1995): 47-58.

⁴⁶ Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); David Gowland and Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European Integration 1945-1998* (New York: Longman, 2000); Geddes, *European Union and British Politics*.

⁴⁷ David Baker, "Britain and Europe: The Argument Continues," *Parliamentary Affairs* 54(2) (2001): 276-288.

Each EU Member State uses the European framework in a way to maximize their national interests.⁴⁸ The British political elites clearly supported enlargement due to Britain's "obligation as an advanced democracy," provision of "a bigger market for Britain", and for contributing to the "stability and security of the region."⁴⁹ As noted by one analyst, there has been consensus among the British elites toward enlargement, as it served to divert attention away from deepening in the EU.⁵⁰

Moreover, before coming to power in 1997, the Labour Party had already emphasized its strong support for EU enlargement while in opposition. Furthermore, the 2004 enlargement was expected to shift the internal balance of power in favor of the UK, as the new members primarily pursue pro-American and pro-British foreign policies. Britain also did not share the concerns of those EU member states that are in closer geographical proximity to the acceding countries.⁵¹

Despite the government support only 31 percent of the British people supported enlargement.⁵² There are two main reasons for the lack of British public support for enlargement. First of all, not many people were informed about the EU enlargement. According to *Standard EB 61*, 30 percent of the British people were uninformed about enlargement, which is, however, substantially higher than the EU15 average of 20 percent.⁵³ This illustrates the deficiency in the flow of information from the elites to the British people. The second reason is the fact that the immigration issue was central during the EU enlargement debate. The British press was instrumental in escalating the sensitivity of the public on the issue of immigration. As the British tabloid press and opposition increasingly framed the enlargement issue from the immigration angle, immigration-related concerns increased.

As suggested by one scholar, "the most direct barrier to information about immigration is the scarcity and ambiguity of official data."⁵⁴ Even the report that the Home Office commissioned complains about "the lack of good data" on

⁴⁸ Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal-Intergovernmentalist Approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31(4) (1993): 473-525.

⁴⁹ Atsuko Ichijo, "Nation and Europe in the British Public Discourse: The Cases of Media and Political Elite Debates," EURO NAT Project, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, November 2002: 46.

⁵⁰ Charles Grant, *Europe's Blurred Boundaries* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2006).

⁵¹ Kirsty Hughes and Edward Smith, "New Labour-New Europe?," *International Affairs* 74(1) (1998): 93-104.

⁵² European Opinion Research Group, *Standard Eurobarometer 61*.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Gary P. Freeman, "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States," *International Migration Review* 29(4) (1995): 883.

immigration and forecasted that migration to Britain as a result of the EU enlargement would be “relatively small,” at between 5,000 and 13,000 immigrants per year up to 2010.⁵⁵ The right-wing group, Migration Watch UK, on the other hand, claimed 40,000 people a year would enter the UK from Eastern Europe. As Pat Cox, President of the European Parliament at the time, noted,

it is greatly to be regretted that – at a moment of such historic significance for Europe – so much of the debate has been reduced to accountancy and mere hype, speculation and unsubstantiated claims about migration.⁵⁶

Against the background of confusion and uncertainty on immigration, the media increasingly referred to the negative implications of enlargement on immigration and the welfare system.⁵⁷ Yet, the British political elites failed to effectively address these inefficiencies in the information flow to the public.

In 2004, while many other EU members, such as France, Germany, Austria, and Italy, banned migrants from accession countries for transitional periods, Britain and Ireland were the only EU countries willing to open their borders to workers from accession countries. British tabloids heavily criticized this open door policy. Many articles criticized government’s soft approach on asylum and immigration. To illustrate, referring to a British government advertising campaign in Slovakia asking people not to come to the UK, *The Daily Mail* asked: “Are ministers living in the real world?”⁵⁸

The Conservative Party frequently criticized the Labour Party for having an ultra-liberal asylum seeker-immigration policy. Conservative Party leader Michael Howard continuously called on the government to follow the example of its EU counterparts and impose restrictions on immigration from accession countries. For the Conservative Party, immigration was an important policy area in which the British people give the Conservatives higher marks than the Labour Party government. In other words, the opposition party leaders were successfully engaging in cue-taking, and influencing public opinion in Britain.

⁵⁵ Christian Dustmann, Maria Casanova, Michael Fertig, Ian Preston and Christoph M. Schmidt, “The Impact of EU Enlargement on Migration Flows,” *Home Office Online Report* 25(03) (2004): 58.

⁵⁶ *The Guardian*, “Blunkett Urged to Resist Immigrant Crackdown,” 24 February 2004.

⁵⁷ Ekaterina Balabanova and Alex Balch, “Sending and Receiving: The Ethical Framing of Intra-EU Migration in the European Press,” *European Journal of Communication* 25(4) (2010): 382-397.

⁵⁸ *The Daily Mail*, “A Pounds 50 Fare to Britain and No Return,” 25 February 2004.

Furthermore, increased political salience may change public indifference to issues,⁵⁹ as it may make the public, political parties, the organizers of societal cleavages “more involved in an issue.”⁶⁰ As a result of the heightened alarm from the media and the opposition on immigration-related consequences of enlargement, people became concerned about this issue. As May 2004 approached, the British public started prioritizing the issue of immigration in the context of the EU enlargement debate. According to a public opinion survey conducted by *YouGov* on 3 April 2004, 46 percent of the respondents identified “immigration and asylum-seekers” as “the most important political issue” in the country, while only 29 percent identified “the war on terrorism” as such.⁶¹ In the same survey, 80 percent of the respondents maintained that the “present Government’s policies on immigration and people who seek asylum in Britain” was not tough enough.⁶² Another public opinion survey carried out by *Ipsos MORI* in 2003 suggested that 85 percent of the people in Britain disagree that the Government has immigration under control.⁶³ While two thirds of the UK respondents saw immigration policy as being a domestic affair, the majority of the EU (52 percent) saw it as an issue that should be handled jointly within the EU.⁶⁴

Opponents of enlargement feared increased unemployment with the arrival of cheap labor from the new member states or increased drug trafficking and organized crime in their country – issues that were frequently emphasized by newspapers such as *The Daily Mail*. Many British citizens feared that migrants from the new member states would exploit their welfare systems.

The subsequent response of the UK government to the popular concerns regarding the migration-related consequences of enlargement is an effective illustration of the policy mood argument. Confirming the expectations of the policy mood argument, due to their re-election considerations, the governing elites responded to public pressure in the final months prior to enlargement, and proposed several (albeit limited) changes in the immigration policy to signal their commitment to addressing people’s enlargement-related concerns.

In February 2004, only three months before enlargement day, British Prime Minister Tony Blair accused Conservatives of trying to exploit public concerns about

⁵⁹ Baumgartner and Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*.

⁶⁰ Terri E. Givens and Adam Luedtke, “The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization,” *Policy Studies Journal* 32(1) (2004): 150.

⁶¹ YouGov. “Mail on Sunday Survey,” 3 April 2004.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ipsos MORI. *British Views on Immigration*. 10 February 2003.

⁶⁴ European Opinion Research Group, *Standard Eurobarometer* 59. Public Opinion in the European Union (Brussels: European Opinion Research Group, 2003).

immigration and discredited the tabloid scare stories.⁶⁵ The government made changes to its liberal policy towards asylum and immigration, and adopted a number of limitations to the free movement of labor. It imposed welfare access restrictions on those coming from Eastern Europe. British Home Secretary David Blunkett announced the new policy:

migrants to Britain who are resident for less than a year will need to prove they have a job or can support themselves without access to state benefits before they register for work.⁶⁶

Immigration Minister Beverley Hughes maintained that the new measures would enable "managed migration" and protect the British benefits system.⁶⁷ These new measures point out the relevance of the policy mood argument in the British elite-mass relationship.

Nevertheless, the press was quick to criticize these policies. Many media reports emphasized that the fact that such measures were taken at the last minute demonstrates that the government was panicking about the imminent immigration from Eastern European countries. Negative framings of the tabloids are hardly surprising: the British press generally is notorious for its anti-EU and right-wing populist coverage.⁶⁸ For instance, regarding the newly announced policy changes, *The Daily Mail* noted that "[Blunkett's] plans that [immigrants] must register for work and pay taxes will be unenforceable and impossible to police."⁶⁹

To make things worse, Hughes resigned due to a scandal over the handling of visa applications from Eastern Europe in the beginning of April 2004. This scandal further fuelled the bitter criticism by tabloids and the Conservative Party. As the immigration concerns escalated, the government announced that it was suspending all visa applications from Bulgaria and Romania, candidate countries that were planning on joining the EU in 2007. This, once again, demonstrates the validity of the policy mood argument in the British context.

On 27 April 2004, with only a few days left before EU enlargement, Blair announced that "now is the time for controlled migration" and maintained that the British government's strategy against illegal immigration aims to secure the British borders and "prevent abuse by those who entered the UK legitimately but then attempt to

⁶⁵ *The Guardian Unlimited*, "EU Enlargement: Facts and Fears," 23 February 2004.

⁶⁶ *The Guardian*, "Blunkett Urged to Resist Immigrant Crackdown," 24 February 2004.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Peter J. Anderson. and Tony Weymouth, *Insulting the Public? The British Press and the European Union* (New York: Longman, 1999); Tony Harcup and Deidre O'Neill, "What is News? Galtung and Ruge Revisited," *Journalism Studies* 2(2) (2001): 261-280.

⁶⁹ *The Daily Mail*, "A Pounds 50 Fare to Britain and No Return."

stay on illegally.”⁷⁰ Blair stated that the government is “putting tighter rules to restrict migrants’ access to benefits and housing.”⁷¹ While Howard accused Blair of “blind panic,” the then Shadow Home Secretary David Davis criticized the government by arguing that the new announcement is “a panicky response.”⁷² On 29 April 2004, only two days before the enlargement date, the government put in place a package, to become effective on the day of enlargement, consisting of measures to enable people to work legally in the UK labor market. The Home Office announced the details of the Worker Registration Scheme applicable to citizens from the Central and Eastern European accession countries (excluding those from Cyprus and Malta) that wanted to come to the UK to work. Individuals from these countries were required to register under this scheme within one month of starting a new job in Britain.

In other words, the British government attempted to respond to the concerns of the people, and introduced several regulations for its open doors policy at the last minute. However, these limited attempts on the part of British elites to shape the public opinion were not effectively communicated to the public and failed to address the main enlargement-related concerns of the people.

6. Conclusion and Discussion

As shown in the analysis above, British people engaged in a cost-benefit analysis when forming their attitudes on EU enlargement. They were interested in practical issues that would affect their everyday lives, such as jobs and social welfare. The anticipated economic consequences of EU enlargement weighed heavily in determining people’s likelihood of supporting EU enlargement.

Against this background, populist right-wing party leaders and sensationalist journalists scared the people about an “avalanche” of immigrants that are desperate to come to Western Europe. Accordingly, public discussion about the Eastern enlargement in Britain was fuelled by hysteria rather than facts. It was almost impossible for the public to receive a balanced view on the immigration and unemployment-related implications of the Eastern enlargement. Consequently, the British public gradually became skeptical of enlargement. While support for enlargement hit its highest point in autumn 2002, it decreased significantly afterwards. There was a 23 percent decrease in the British public support for enlargement from November 2002 to March 2004.⁷³

⁷⁰ *The Guardian Unlimited*, “Blair’s Migration Speech,” 27 April 2004.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ European Opinion Research Group, *Standard Eurobarometer* 61.

Nevertheless, policymakers neither took substantive policy decisions to alleviate popular concerns, nor provided the worried public with clear facts on the possible effects of enlargement on immigration, employment, and social welfare. They have only introduced minor cosmetic changes to their policies. The fact that the British government reacted to the question of immigration provides limited evidence that public preferences influenced policymaking. Thus, the policy mood argument seems to be relatively more effective, when compared to the cue-taking argument. But the British elites failed to shape the public opinion on enlargement, as the support levels were quite low immediately before the enlargement day. As the analysis above also illustrates, if elites communicate EU affairs more effectively with the public, popular support for such initiatives may be expected to increase.

When considered generally, the British elites went ahead with the approval of enlargement, despite the low popular support for the policy. This conclusion is also reinforced by a recent study on immigration, which argues that immigration policies in Britain are "determined in a relatively autonomous way by political elites."⁷⁴ The disregard of the public opinion by elites on such an important policy issue critically demonstrates the existence of democratic deficit. As concluded by many studies before, this analysis demonstrates that there was limited public communication in Europe.⁷⁵

In conclusion, since the incorporation of public feedback was limited, there was a breakdown of political communication between the political leaders and people. While people were eager to hear what their leaders offered to address several possible enlargement-caused problems, the leaders used abstract language attracting attention instead to the positive impact of enlargement on EU's power in world politics or peace and prosperity in the European continent. In order to build support for the EU project, the elites need to focus on delivering visible solutions to the problems European citizens care most about. This analysis is an initial foray into the relationship between the public opinion and policymaking in the context of the British take on EU issues. Its results become more important in the wake of debates in Britain regarding a possible "Brexit" from the EU. Nevertheless, it does not take into account the variation in public opinion across time. Future studies should analyze changes in public opinion on EU enlargement. Regarding the democratic

⁷⁴ Statham, Paul and Andrew Geddes, "Elites and the 'Organized Public': Who Drives British Immigration Politics and In Which Direction?" *West European Politics* 29(2) (2006): 248.

⁷⁵ Joseph H. Weiler, *The Constitution of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Meyer, "Political Legitimacy and The Invisibility of Politics"; Meyer, "The Europeanization of Media Discourse"; David Ward, "The Democratic Deficit and European Union Communication Policy: An Evaluation to Commission's Broadcasting Policy," *The Public* 8(1) (2001): 75-94; David Ward, *The European Union Democratic Deficit and the Public Sphere: An Evaluation of the EU Media Policy* (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2004).

deficit debates, subsequent research in this field should build controlled analytical models using time-order analysis to see how the elites and public opinion interact with each other over time. All in all, it is yet to be seen whether the British elites will eventually become more responsive to the opinions of the masses when it comes to taking decisions regarding EU affairs.

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WHY THE CCM IS STILL IN POWER IN TANZANIA? A REPLY

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Abstract

In her article "Why the CCM won't lose", Melanie O'Gorman claims to have found a puzzling dominance of the CCM in Tanzania. Using a survey conducted in 2008 amongst subsistence farmers, she notes that respondents tend to support the ruling party despite the rural neglect. This article questions the methodology and contests the key findings. It argues that the CCM's dominance is a function of the incomplete de-linking of the party from the state of the old authoritarian regime thereby suffocating political space not only for the opposition parties but also for the members of civil society in rural and urban areas. The electoral data from the 2005 and 2010 general elections indicate that the margin of votes across constituencies for the CCM is in steady decline, thus challenging its dominance.

Key words: Tanzania, CCM, dominant party, elections

1. Introduction

In April 2012, Melanie O'Gorman published an article set to address the question of "what appears to be leading to single-party dominance in Tanzania".¹ Unlike other studies about democracy in Tanzania,² this research used data from the rural sector where approximately 80% of the Tanzanian population can be found. The findings indicate that farmers tend to support CCM³ despite the rural neglect. O'Gorman undertakes a qualitative and quantitative analysis of voting behaviour in order to explain this puzzling situation and concludes that:

¹ Melanie O'Gorman, "Why the CCM Won't Lose: The Roots of Single Party Dominance in Tanzania", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Volume 30, Issue 2, p. 313-333.

² Such as Alexander B. Makulilo, *Tanzania: A De Facto One Party State?*, (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Muller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. Kg, Germany: 2008); Consolata Raphael, "Party Institutionalisation in Tanzania: A State Project?" (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Muller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. Kg: 2011); and Helen B. Kiunsi, "Money and politics in Tanzania: An Evaluation of the Election Expenses Act in the 2010 general elections" *Elixir Criminal Law* 51 (2012): 10841-10849.

³ Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) is the ruling party in Tanzania. It has been in power since 1977. Prior to that there were two separate political parties known as the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) for Tanganyika and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) for Zanzibar. The two parties merged in 1977 to form CCM. It is for that reason other scholars simply tend to say that CCM has been in power since independence of 1961.

The qualitative analysis reveals a sense of nostalgia for the CCM, gratitude for the CCM's maintenance of peace, satisfaction with the CCM's performance during one-party rule and a sense that the CCM is the party that identifies the most with farmers' concerns. The empirical analysis then asks: what farmer characteristics tend to lead to support for the CCM? The analysis suggests that access to newspapers or radio make a farmer more likely to support an opposition party. Involvement with a farmers' organisation also increases the likelihood of opposition support. Finally, farmers are more likely to oppose the CCM the lower their subsistence consumption or the higher the value of their capital equipment.⁴

The purpose of the current article is twofold. First, it criticizes the methodology and findings of the survey conducted by O'Gorman in the seven regions of Tanzania. I argue that the article was not exhaustive with regards to the Tanzanian political context and literature and thus treated the survey as purely a mathematical phenomenon. Second, it seeks to offer an alternative explanation regarding the dominance of the CCM. I maintain the failure to de-link the party from the state of the old authoritarian regime as a strong explanation. I note that although CCM still holds the majority of seats in the Parliament, its votes in both the rural and urban areas are declining.

2. Questioning the Methodology and Findings

O'Gorman's article is solely based on a survey which was conducted in 2008 amongst subsistence farmers. It primarily concerns the rural sector as its unit of analysis. She notes that the empirical results of the survey indicate that the majority of rural citizens in Tanzania are loyal to the dominant ruling party in the absence of any material benefits stemming from that loyalty.⁵ This suggests that the CCM does nothing to influence or solicit votes from the rural population, something which is not true. This is so due to the fact that CCM employs a number of strategies ranging from legal to illegal ones, as will be explained later, to mobilise citizens to support the party during elections.

It is somewhat surprising that the author aims to study the "roots of the single-party dominance in Tanzania"⁶ without examining the nature of the electoral system itself leave alone the broader political context within which such dominance originated. One way to do this – and deliberately excluded by the author – is to interview the CCM leaders to obtain their version of the state of affairs. O'Gorman might have obtained what CCM does to mobilise support. She could then use other sources such as election observation reports and the literature on Tanzania's politics to

⁴ Melanie O'Gorman, "Why the CCM Won't Lose: The Roots of Single Party Dominance in Tanzania", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 30, no. 2 (2012): 314.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

argue her case. More detailed evidence would have also helped avoiding misjudgements such as the one that Tanzania adopted a multiparty system due to Nyerere: "In 1992, under the advice of ex-President Julius Nyerere, Tanzania amended its constitution to allow the formation of a multiparty democracy."⁷ According to this perspective, the whole transition politics from single party to multiparty system was a one man show. In my view, the process was much more complex in nature and causes with several concurring domestic and foreign factors. For example the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO and the Western donor countries which put many conditions not only to Tanzania but also to all Third World Countries to democratise are side-skipped. Similarly, internal factors such as the economic and legitimacy crises contributed to the process.

To my understanding, the CCM dominance in Tanzanian political life is objective rather than subjective (perceived) and hence cannot be adequately captured by survey data. In Africa, many dominant political parties are essentially those that struggled for independence. Consequently, it is important to examine what they do in practice to maintain their dominance and more particularly the support of the rural sectors. What are the strategies used by dominant parties to remain in power? How has that dominance been maintained over time? There is no any analysis of how the authoritarian past permeates the current multiparty system. In Tanzania, there is abundant literature on the dominant party and voting behaviour. It is not known why the author chose not to review them. Instead O'Gorman concentrated on reviewing works on the agricultural sector. It is even difficult to provide a strong link between the rural sector and electoral politics from such literature. If she had looked at the actions of the CCM, then the findings are not puzzling.

Similarly, the survey was supplemented by the national electoral data for both parliamentary and presidential results. By relying on national data for the past four multiparty elections (1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010) the author fails to capture the actual trend of the CCM's dominance in the rural sector. Notwithstanding the fact that about 80% of Tanzanians live in rural areas, technically such data presents combined votes for both rural and urban dwellers. Yet a comparison of the CCM's parliamentary data between the 2005 and 2010 general elections in the seven regions where the 2008 survey was taken by O'Gorman indicates that although CCM won the majority of seats, the CCM vote in almost all constituencies (Appendix 1) is declining, thereby challenging the explanation as to "Why CCM won't lose". This is also the trend for the popular votes which declined from 80.2% to 62.8% in the same period. Moreover, the survey was limited to seven regions of the Tanzanian mainland. This is problematic since the national electoral data is for the entire United Republic of Tanzania of which Zanzibar is a part. In Zanzibar, the CCM and the main opposition party, the Civic United Front have almost equal strength.

⁷ Ibid., 317.

A further weakness is that the author seems to be selective with data. Though she mentions that the voter turnout for the 2000 and 2005 elections was higher than 70% in most rural areas, nothing is mentioned about voter turnout in the 2010 elections. In this case, it dropped from 72% (in 2005) to 42% (in 2010).⁸ This was also the case in many rural areas such as Kilindi constituency, Korogwe rural constituency, and Mbeya rural constituency.⁹ It implies that many citizens did not vote thus casting doubt on the loyalty of the citizens to CCM and its respective government.

Moreover, the absence of other sources of data such as election observer reports, CCM's documents, review of electoral laws, and published materials on democracy and elections on Tanzania make findings disputable. For example, O'Gorman noted that a substantial number of respondents (about 18.2%) support the CCM because the party has "maintained peace".¹⁰ While this might be true, further exploration could have easily shown that this is not surprising in the context of multiparty politics. One might wonder, if opposition parties have not been able to rule Tanzania, how can one think that the party in power has maintained peace unlike the ones which have not yet been in power? What is peace in this context? In reality, the CCM identifies itself as the guardian of peace in Tanzania and has always propagated this message to voters particularly in rural areas.¹¹ In contrast, the party has massively campaigned that opposition parties stand for chaos. In connection to this, in the 1995 elections, CCM was singled out as the master of disinformation and intimidation. This took a variety of forms such as direct intimidation of voters, intimidatory information, distortion of information, and refusal to act on information by feigning ignorance. TEMCO observed:

Intimidatory information by CCM sought to make voters believe that a vote for the opposition parties was a vote for chaos. This was reported in several regional monitoring reports. To take an example from Mwanza, CCM took advantage of the ignorance of the people on the origins of the Rwanda/Burundi conflicts to scare the people with propaganda that if the opposition took over the country, similar conflicts would occur. Such propaganda was in many cases supported by a show of a video film on the ghastly massacre in these countries.¹²

⁸ TEMCO 2011, *The Report of the 2010 General Elections in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam, 2011).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 196.

¹⁰ O'Gorman, "Why the CCM Won't Lose," 321.

¹¹ TEMCO 2001, *The Report of the 2000 General Elections in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam, 2001).

¹² TEMCO 1997, *The Report of the 1995 General Elections in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam, 1997).

This problem has remained systemic. The CCM top leadership has played a major role of threatening Tanzanians that opposition parties are the source of political instability in Africa. For example, in the case of *the Attorney-General and Two Others v. Aman Walid Kabourou*,¹³ CCM leaders uttered defamatory statements regarding the opposition party Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) during the Kigoma by-election of 1994. Citizens were warned that they should not dare to vote for opposition parties as that would mean bringing chaos like the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi. To be sure, one witness said:

Mr. Mrema started to warn us against opposition parties. He said who knows not how to die should look at the grave. He asked us to go to Lake Tanganyika and see Burundi Refugees and said they were a product of opposition parties. At Lake Tanganyika Stadium there were thousands of Burundi Refugees who were living in real hardships. They slept outside and had no shelter from rain or sun. He repeated saying that if other parties were elected this will be a cause for war like in Angola, Burundi, and Liberia.¹⁴

The court ruled that the public statements made by various officials of the CCM with respect to opposition parties generally, and the respondent's party specifically, were clearly defamatory, and such statements could not be justified during electioneering since elections are required to be conducted not only with due observance of the constitution and the Elections Act, but also of the general law of the land which forbids defamation. The court further held that because of large number of people who attended these campaign rallies and the respect of people of this country usually give to their president and his ministers, the defamatory and intimidating statements in question must have affected the election results in favour of CCM. This was one among the grounds that the court relied upon in nullifying the results of that election. Certainly, the CCM's claim that the party stands for peace, unity and tranquillity needs to be re-examined. The same phenomenon repeated in the 2005 and 2010 elections.¹⁵

2.1 Access to Media

Similarly, the author observed that the access to newspapers or radio make a farmer more likely to support an opposition party. While newspapers and radios are important, the message conveyed by them is crucial. During the single party period (1965-1992) media was owned by the state and the clear message was to promote the ruling party's objectives. They socialised Tanzanians to be loyal and obedient to

¹³ [1996] T.L.R, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Civil Appeals No. 32 and 42 of 1994. This case was filed by Kabourou, then the MP candidate for CHADEMA during the 1994 Kigoma by-elections. In that election, CCM won the seat but the court nullified the results.

¹⁴ [1996] T.L.R, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Civil Appeals No. 32 and 42 of 1994.

¹⁵ TEMCO 2006; TEMCO 2011, The Report of the 2010 General Elections in Tanzania.

the authority. Even in the present day the radio with coverage in all rural areas is Radio Tanzania, owned by the state. It is therefore difficult to have coverage which seems to be anti-governing party and government. For example, in the 2010 elections, the *Daily News* of 24 September, 2010 which is owned by the state published a defamatory editorial on its front page "Dr. Slaa will not be the fifth president of Tanzania. The CHADEMA candidate has a lot of issues to settle, beginning at family level, from which he will need to practice leadership upwards."¹⁶ Yet, the same paper on 31 October, 2010 published on its front page "Vote for CCM, vote for Unity".¹⁷ TEMCO notes that "at the very top is the fact that the ruling CCM enjoyed total monopoly coverage in both print and electronic media throughout the campaign period compared to other political parties that fielded presidential candidates."¹⁸

It is important to understand that in the two decades of multiparty system since 1992 the media has so far failed to insulate itself from state power. The reason for this state of affairs is the legacy of single party journalism carried forward from the single party political hegemony. This was meant to guarantee total loyalty and subservience. This observation is consistent with the findings by the Afro-Barometer survey and conclusions of 2002 that Tanzanians are "uncritical citizens" partly oriented towards the socialist ideology and one-party structures inherited from the old regime.¹⁹ The ordinary people have not yet developed the healthy scepticism about authority, the independence of preferences, and the courage to take action that are the life blood of functioning democratic and market systems.²⁰ Thus, O'Gorman's work is unable to tell the audience the extent to which newspapers or radio spread in the rural areas; the frequencies people read newspapers or listen to the radio; and the kind of messages covered in these media and how these would shape the rural community to develop citizenry competence. It should be noted that although the Presidential Commission on whether to introduce multiparty system or remain single party system recommended for the massive civic education countrywide in order to de-indoctrinate the values of the single party system, the ruling party and its government rejected proposals to provide such education.²¹

2.2 *The role of Civicness*

¹⁶ TEMCO 2011, "The Report of the 2010 General Elections in Tanzania".

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 151.

¹⁹ Amon Chaligha *et al.*, "Uncritical Citizens or Patient Trustees? Tanzanians' views of Political and Economic Reform" Afrobarometer Paper No. 18, 2002.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ United Republic of Tanzania, "The Presidential Commission on Single Party or Multiparty System" in Tanzania: *Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the Democratic System in Tanzania*, (Volume I) (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 1991).

One further argument in O’Gorman’s work is that the involvement with a farmers’ organisation increases the likelihood of opposition support. The underlying mechanism is missing. Empirical evidence shows that the CCM does not tolerate any organisation that seems to challenge its power and such organisations are either weakened or de-registered. The case of the *Baraza la Wanawake Tanzania*²² (BAWATA) is telling. In July 1995, BAWATA prepared a manual to educate women voters for the October 1995 general elections in line with its objectives. The manual aimed at supporting candidates who would further the interests of women such as land ownership, health care, water, education, and inheritance. The organisation therefore presented its views on the qualities needed by any presidential candidate. Tenga and Peter²³ contend that the fact that the ruling party had been used for a long time to having all women in Tanzania under its control, the emergence of a strong and independent organization was not universally welcomed. Indeed, its leaders felt obliged to reduce their level of political engagement in the run-up to the elections, following threats from the CCM, and several ‘warnings’ by the President of the United Republic. On 30 June 1997 BAWATA was de-registered owing to accusation from the government that the organisation, among other things, operated more or less like a political party. BAWATA filed a case against government’s action for deregistering it on the ground that it was unconstitutional and violated Articles 13(6)(a), 18, and 20 of the URT Constitution 1977 which provide for the right of fair hearing, expression, and association and assembly, respectively. In that case, *Baraza la Wanawake Tanzania and Five others v. Registrar of Societies and others*,²⁴ the High Court of Tanzania ruled in favour of BAWATA on the ground that the Societies Act gives too wide discretionary powers to the President to abolish any civil society organisation.

It has to be noted that the Non-Governmental Organisations Act No. 24 of 2002 as well as the Societies Act, Cap. 337 R.E 2002 suffocate political space for NGOs and Societies to play their effective role in the democratic process. These organisations are required to be apolitical. This has been a source of problem since they engage the policy making process, an exercise which is purely political, but when it comes to criticize the performance of the government or during elections, they are threatened to be de-registered as was the case with the HAKI ELIMU.

3. An Alternative Analysis: Explaining the CCM’s dominance

²² Women’s Council of Tanzania.

²³ Nazakael Tenga and Chris M. Peter, “The Right to Organise as Mother of All Rights: The Experience of Women in Tanzania”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34(1): 143-162.

²⁴ Misc. Civil Cause No. 27 of 1997, High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam (unreported).

After clarifying some of the critical omissions in O’Gorman’s article, I provide an alternative explanation as to the persistence of the CCM in power. I hold the state-party fusion to be a strong factor for this state of affairs. In the following sections I revisit the nature of the political system and how it operates during elections. The idea is to capture what the CCM exactly does to maintain its power.

3.1 The Evolution of the Political System

In order to understand elections in Tanzania and how the ruling party has dominated the political landscape, we must revisit the nature of the political system in a historical perspective. My argument is that the domination of the ruling party in Tanzania is a by-product of the failure to de-couple the party from the state. It is along this line of reasoning that other observers hold that one of the major problems of the transition from one party system to a multi-party system is to untangle, both practically and in people’s minds, the links which was so carefully forged between the party and the state property, functions and personnel.²⁵ This simply means that the value, pace, and prospects of democratization as well as its sustainability in the hitherto authoritarian regimes largely hinge upon the de-coupling project between the state and the party at both institutional and behavioural levels. It is emphasised that:

Uneven playing fields tend to emerge under conditions that facilitate incumbent control over key and societal resources. Such conditions often exist in cases of incomplete transition from single-party rule. Single party regimes tend to fuse the state and ruling party, creating a highly politicized state in which bureaucrats are also party cadres, state properties (businesses, media outlets) are also party properties, and resources from various state agencies are systematically deployed for partisan use. Transitions to multiparty rule-often accomplished via a simple constitutional change or the calling of elections-do not necessarily alter these patterns.²⁶

The above paragraph simply provides that a mere substitution of a clause in the national constitutions which supported the one party system by a multi-party system did not bring an effective de-coupling of the party from the state; therefore the multiparty system arising from this situation is identified from the following features: state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends; the incumbent party is systematically favoured at the expense of opposition parties; and that the opposition’s ability to organise and compete in elections is seriously handicapped. It is not uncommon to find out that the multiparty system of the day presents resource disparities, unequal access to the media, and unequal access to the law mainly in

²⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave : Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

²⁶ Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “Why Democracy Needs a Level Playing Field”, *Journal of Democracy*, 21 (1): 57-68.

favour of the ruling party. While this kind of regime conducts regular multiparty elections at all levels of government, violation of basic democratic standards are done in serious and systematic ways.²⁷

That situation develops a subjective political culture toward its population to the degree that it becomes difficult for them to think of an alternative party and if they do, their ability to effect it is largely constrained by that party. In its operation, as a general rule, a state-party exerts centrifugal force to maintain elite cohesion which if left uncontained would have otherwise undermined its foundation.²⁸

Moreover in a state-party system, a tilted playing field in favour of the ruling party is a common phenomenon; therefore, a state-party unlike a dominant party is not ad-hoc but rather it is a continuous situation during its lifetime. In this way, it may be able to suffocate the political space for other actors to play their roles effectively. State parties can be visible in either a *de jure* or *de facto* form and in some instances in both forms together. In sum total, a state-party can thus be identified from the fusion between the state and the party in power. It depends on state-instruments and resources for its operation and survival, partisan attitude of state officials in favour of the ruling party, overlapping roles and jurisdictions between the state and ruling party posts, coerced membership and support to the ruling party, subordination of the civil society and private sectors to the claws of the party as well as elite cohesion. Indeed the party becomes a supreme organ over the state and non-state actors. It assigns itself an exclusive right to rule the society singly.²⁹

3.2 Institutional and Legal Framework for Elections

The main institutional and legal framework that guides elections in Tanzania is contained within the Constitution of 1977, the Elections Act of 1985, and the Political Parties Act of 1992. However, the constitution is the fundamental norm of the land. Historically, it has evolved through four phases: The independent constitution of 1961, the Republican constitution of 1962, the interim constitution of 1965 and the permanent constitution of 1977 (the current constitution). There are six distinctive features about these constitutions: Firstly, they all did not involve

²⁷ Andreas Schedler, "Authoritarianism's Last line of Defense", *Journal of Democracy*, 21 (1): 69-80.

²⁸ Jason Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

²⁹ Goran Hyden and Max Mmuya, 2008. *Power and Policy Slippage in Tanzania-Discussing National Ownership of Development*, Sweden: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) Studies, No. 21 (2008). USAID/Tanzania, Democracy and Governance Assessment of Tanzania (Final Report), (Dar es Salaam: USAID, 2010); and Richard L. Whitehead, *Single-party rule in a Multiparty Age: Tanzania in Comparative Perspective* (PhD Dissertation: Temple University, 2009).

public debate and discussion in their making; secondly, with the exception of the independence constitution, the rest tend to concentrate and centralize power to the executive arm of the government and particularly the chief executive i.e. the president (head of state, head of government, head of public service, commander-in-chief of all armed forces); thirdly, they raise the ruling party to the pinnacle of power by making it the supreme organ in the United Republic; fourthly, they suffocate the associative life of autonomous organizations such as trade unions, cooperative unions and other civil societies; fifthly, they did not incorporate the Bill of Rights (note that the Bill of Rights firstly appeared in the constitution of the United Republic in 1984); and sixthly, the ruling party is the sole maker or un-maker of the constitution through amendments. The sum total effect of all these constitutional tendencies is the politics of hegemony by the ruling party and the resultant repressive political culture over the last four decades since independence.

There are several critical areas about the constitution and state-party fusion. For the want of space, I will discuss just one of them: the powers of the president. In Tanzania, the evolution of the constitution since independence indicates that the president is a very powerful figure indeed, with almost absolute power under the constitution. Most of such power is discretionary. It should be pointed out that there are no effective safeguards to control the exercise of that power. The best and the only remedy against the possible abuse of power in fact remains with the president. This is true as the then President of the United Republic of Tanzania Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere once remarked, "I have sufficient powers under the constitution to be a dictator." Similar statement was made by President Jakaya Kikwete on 21 August 2008 when addressing the members of Parliament. In Tanzania, the president is the head of state, head of government, commander-in-chief of armed forces, and above all he or she is always in practice the chairperson of the ruling party [Note that under the party constitution the chairperson need not necessarily be the head of state as per Article 105(1) of the Constitution of CCM 1977].

To demonstrate the powers of the president, for example, Article 74 of the Constitution of the URT 1977 empowers him or her to nominate commissioners of the National Electoral Commission (NEC). The NEC is the only institution with constitutional mandate to manage the Union elections. Article 74(1) of the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 and Section 4(1) of the Elections Act. No.1 of 1985 establish the NEC. The independence of NEC is questionable since its formation in 1993. Four areas are subject to contestation: The appointment procedures of the commissioners, mode of finance, tenure of commissioners, and the role of the judiciary in handling electoral disputes. Article 74(7 and 11) of the Union Constitution provides that NEC is an independent department and that it has no any obligation to follow any order or directives from any person or government department or opinion from any political party. Moreover Article 41(7) states "No court is allowed to inquire into the election of a presidential

candidate who is declared by the electoral commission (NEC) to have been duly elected” and Article 74(12) puts that no any court is allowed to inquire into any matter done by the NEC in discharging its duties. Yet, at the local level, NEC does not have a permanent staff. It therefore relies on the local government system. The personnel who manage elections from the local government are in most cases cadres of the ruling party.³⁰ Despite these provisions of law, a critical analysis reveals that the independence of NEC is highly compromised. Certainly, since its formation, NEC has not enjoyed confidence and trust of some of the key stakeholders in elections, that is, political parties (particularly the opposition parties) and the general public.³¹

3.3 Security Forces

Although on the eve of multiparty system the Nyalali Commission³² recommended the separation of the party from security forces to ensure the forces are apolitical, it is evident that the security forces have remained politicized in the current multiparty system to favour the ruling party. This is in sharp contrast with Article 147(3) of the URT constitution 1977 which provides that “It is hereby prohibited for any member of the defence and security forces to join any political party save only that he shall have the right to vote.”

The presidency is the highest institution that forges the relationship between the ruling party and security forces. As the commander-in-chief, the president appoints all the top commanding officers of the armed forces, recruits people into and organises their removal from the armed forces; appoints commanders of various units of the armed forces and supervises any power vested in any member of the armed forces. The president may command the armed forces to engage in any operations within and outside Tanzania. The order of the commander-in-chief is constitutional and binding to all the armed forces and therefore it should be respected [Article 148 (1), (2) and (3) of the URT Constitution, 1977]. Being CCM’s chairperson and the president (with wide discretion), the commander-in-chief, may misuse such powers in favour of his or her party. During the 2000 elections, for example, the former president of the United Republic, Mr. Benjamin William Mkapa (then an incumbent president and a presidential candidate in that election) used a police helicopter to campaign in the remote regions. The same practice was repeated by the retired president, Mr. Ali Hassan Mwinyi, in campaigning for CCM in the Coast region and Kigoma.³³ It is evident that the conflict of interests between

³⁰ TEMCO 1997, The Report of the 1995 General Elections in Tanzania; TEMCO 2006.

³¹ TEMCO 1997, The Report of the 1995 General Elections in Tanzania; TEMCO 2001, The Report of the 2000 General Elections in Tanzania; TEMCO 2006 and TEMCO 2011, The Report of the 2010 General Elections in Tanzania.

³² United Republic Tanzania, “The Presidential Commission on Single Party or Multiparty System,” 177-8.

³³ TEMCO 2001, The Report of the 2000 General Elections in Tanzania, 86-7.

the president and the party is paramount. Elsewhere, as I noted, president Mkapa pledged to deploy state apparatuses to ensure CCM win the 2005 elections with a 'tsunami effect' (*ushindi wa Tsunam*) and it was so.³⁴ There is no doubt that this statement influenced the behaviour and conduct of the armed forces in that election. The President of the United of Republic of Tanzania affirmed in his official address to the Members of Parliament on 21 August 2008 that the President has imperial powers over the Inspector General of Police (IGP). He said that if the president orders the IGP, Said Mwema to arrest any person, it would be so. The IGP would implement president's orders without any question. Arguably, the above incidences reveal the fusion between the presidency and CCM. The use of security forces repeated during the 2010 general elections. CCM started campaigning that opposition should not be elected since they would shed blood. The climax of this campaign was for the security forces to intervene the matter. The Tanzania People's Defence Forces, Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Abdurrahman Shimbo, the Deputy Director of Criminal Investigations, Mr. Peter Kivuyo and the Head of the Police Special Operations Unit, Mr. Venance Tossi called a press conference to threaten people on security. They said that no blood would be shed by any political party since they were full prepared to handle the situation. Gen. Shimbo said:

There have been signs of disrupting peace and tranquillity in the ongoing campaigns...some politicians have even dared threatening to shed blood. Let them be warned that we are firmly prepared to make sure that no single drop of blood will be shed during the ongoing campaigns, the Election Day and after that.³⁵

Although there were many parties contesting the election, this statement aimed at frustrating CHADEMA which seemed to offer stiff competition to CCM. In response to the threat, on 4 October 2010 CHADEMA wrote a letter with reference No. C/HQ/ADM/SG/02/79 to the Dean of Diplomatic Corps, international organizations, and all political parties to condemn this tactics.³⁶ The head of the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) to Tanzania, Mr. David Martin, described the security threat as disappointment and frustration to democracy.³⁷ After the public outcry from politicians, activists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that the security forces were used to further the interests of CCM, proper authorities particularly the National Electoral Commission (NEC) maintained that there was no any threat with regard to peace.³⁸

3.4 Media

³⁴ Makulilo, *Tanzania: A De Facto One Party State?*

³⁵ *Daily News*, 1 October 2010.

³⁶ *The Citizen*, 7 October 2010.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *The Guardian*, 7 October 2010.

Media in this context is treated concomitant with information. The access to information is essential to the health of democracy. This is because it ensures that citizens make responsible and informed choices rather than acting out of ignorance or misinformation. Moreover, information serves a “checking function” by ensuring that elected representatives uphold their oaths of office and carry out the wishes of those who elected them.³⁹ In a democratic polity, this role is carried out by media. The media is an important element for free and fair elections since it facilitates freedom of expression. Indeed, contemporary election campaigns are increasingly dominated by national television, radio and press coverage.⁴⁰

Until 1992, the media in Tanzania were the organ and agent of the sole ruling party, CCM. The available media of the time (Radio Tanzania, Dar es Salaam Radio Tanzania, Zanzibar, Zanzibar Television, Daily News and the Sunday News) served the interests of the state-party. The media became instruments of propaganda. On the eve of multiparty system, the country saw the proliferation of “independent” press. There are dozens of weeklies, fortnightlies, or monthlies in Kiswahili or English with a reasonable circulation. However, the electronic media remain under monopoly control of political parties in power. This is not surprising as the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) maintains that the freedom of the press as a fundamental right is guaranteed in most Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) constitutions. Yet, in many countries the ruling party dominates the public media.

Public media being financed with tax-payer money are obliged to be impartial in conducting their businesses during elections. Section 53(1) of the Elections Act. No. 1 of 1985 provides candidates for the office of the president and vice-president of the United Republic and political parties participating in an election with the right to use the state radio and television broadcasting service during the official period of election campaign. Subsection 3 furthers that:

[e]very print media owned by the government which publishes any information relating to the electoral process shall be guided by the principle of total impartiality and shall refrain from any discrimination in relation to any candidate journalistically and in the amount of space dedicated to them.

For the purpose of giving binding effect to this law, Section 53(4) of the Act gives the National Election Commission mandate to issue directives to any government owned media.

³⁹ See the role of Media in Democracy: A strategic approach, Technical Publication Series, June 1999, Center for Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C., 3.

⁴⁰ James Forrest, and Gary N. Marks, “Research Note; The Mass Media, Election Campaigning and Voter Response: The Australian Experience”, *Party Politics*, 5(1):99-114.

On face value, the intention of this law is to ensure fairness among contestants during elections. However, evidence abounds to show that since the introduction of the multiparty system, CCM has enjoyed a favourable air-time and space coverage in the public media like the National Television (TVT), Television Zanzibar (TVZ), Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD), Radio Zanzibar (STZ), the Daily News, Sunday News and Zanzibar Leo. In the case of *The Attorney-General v. Aman Walid Kabourou*⁴¹ following the Kigoma by-election, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania held that:

CCM was given more air-time on Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam than were given other political parties, and its broadcasts generally were biased in favour of the CCM candidate, such that it must have influenced the by-election results in favour of the CCM candidate.

This tendency repeated in the first general elections of 1995. It was noted that CCM enjoyed a lion's share of air time and space coverage in the public media. The Association of Journalists and Media Workers (AJM) observed that from 4 to 21 September 1995, the third week of electoral campaigns, CCM and its presidential candidate enjoyed absolute monopoly of campaign broadcast coverage over the RTD news bulletin by 63% and *Majira* programmes by 52%. It is along this premise that TEMCO argues that despite the efforts put by the court and National Election Commission the media continued to work in favour of the ruling party.⁴² This pattern remained almost the same during the 2010 general elections.⁴³

4. Conclusion

In this paper I have discussed the limitations of relying only on a survey method in studying the dominance of a political party. While this method is able to capture the perception of respondents towards such dominance, it fails to provide an in-depth understanding of a political phenomenon and its context. In the absence of an appropriate analysis of the political context, the strategies employed by the CCM to mobilise support and votes it is difficult to appreciate "why the CCM won't lose." Since party dominance is primarily objective, it is necessary to investigate what exactly the ruling party does in order to remain in power. Unlike O'Gorman, who entirely based her observation of the ruling party in Tanzania on a survey method, this article provides an alternative analysis to understand the dominance of CCM. I have argued that the failure to de-link the state from the party is robust in explaining CCM's dominance. As can be noted, the incomplete transition from

⁴¹ [1996] T.L.R 156.

⁴² TEMCO 1997, p. 181.

⁴³ SYNOVATE, 'Tanzania media election coverage 2010 monthly monitoring report', June 2010, no. 5, available at : <http://www.empt.co.tz/>, accessed 10 March 2014.

single party-rule has resulted into an uneven playing field in favour of the ruling party. Likewise, the resulting political culture has remained to be subject. CCM and its government have all along been reluctant to endorse the proposal for providing civic education thus benefiting from the ignorance of the people particularly in the rural areas. This paper therefore informs researchers who study dominant party systems to go beyond numbers generated by a survey method so as to capture the actual practice by ruling political regimes.

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Appendix 1: Comparison of CCM Parliamentary Vote Margins between 2005 and 2010 general elections

Region	Constituency	Status	Votes 2005 %	Votes 2010 %	Vote Change %	Remarks 2010
Mtwara	Mtwara Mjini	Urban	61.30	58.52	-2.78	Won
	Lulindi	Rural	84.10	74.30	-9.80	Won
	Masasi	Rural	79.30	65.98	-13.32	Won
	Nanyumbu	Rural	77.40	61.79	-9.32	Won
	Mtwara Vijijini	Rural	74.40	68.08	-6.32	Won
	Newela	Rural	79.90	66.10	-13.80	Won
	Tandahimba	Rural	70.20	49.26	-20.94	Won
	Kilimanjaro	Moshi Mjini	Urban	41.90	36.70	-5.20
Hai		Rural	58.80	44.62	-14.18	Lost
Siha		Rural	83.20	65.96	-17.24	Won
Moshi Vijijini		Rural	71.20	60.63	-10.57	Won
Vunjo		Rural	43.80	32.46	-11.34	Lost
Mwanga		Rural	78.10	79.85	1.75	Won
Rombo		Rural	78.50	47.95	-30.55	Lost
Same West		Rural	90.20	84.51	-5.69	Won
Same East		Rural	60.40	62.19	1.79	Won
Shinyanga	Shinyanga Mjini	Urban	60.8	49.92	-10.88	Won
	Bariadi West	Rural	52.6	56.41	3.81	Won
	Bariadi East	Rural	43.0	46.17	3.17	Lost
	Bukombe	Rural	64.7	37.48	-27.22	Lost
	Kahama	Rural	75.9	56.68	-19.22	Won
	Msalala	Rural	80.8	69.04	-11.76	Won
	Kishapu	Rural	81.9	74.76	-7.14	Won
	Maswa ⁴⁴	Rural	55.4	38.47/48.59	Negative	Lost
	Kisesa	Rural	47.5	61.84	14.34	Won

⁴⁴ In 2010 Maswa was divided into Maswa East and Maswa West. The ruling party lost these constituencies.

	Meatu	Rural	60.7	48.18	-12.52	Lost
	Solwa	Rural	68.2	72.83	4.63	Won
Mwanza	Ilemela	Urban	75.1	44.33	-30.77	Lost
	Nyamagana	Urban	73.9	42.21	-31.69	Lost
	Busanda	Rural	79.2	56.36	-22.84	Won
	Geita	Urban	57.5	55.93	-1.57	Won
	Nyang'wale	Rural	60.6	85.82	25.22	Won
	Kwimba	Rural	76.5	70.89	-5.61	Won
	Sumve	Rural	60.8	52.79	-8.01	Won
	Busega	Rural	72.7	82.85	10.15	Won
	Magu Mjini	Urban	68.7	47.83	-20.87	Won
	Misungwi	Rural	81.3	86.40	5.1	Won
	Buchosa	Rural	55.0	52.53	-2.57	Won
	Sengerema	Rural	69.3	XX ⁴⁵	Unknown	Won
	Ukerewe	Rural	53.6	39.98	-13.62	Lost
Morogoro	Morogoro Mjini	Urban	64.6	59.23	-5.37	Won
	Kilombero	Rural	75.5	50.08	-25.42	Won
	Gairo	Rural	94.6	94.76	0.16	Won
	Kilosa	Rural	82.1	82.73	0.63	Won
	Mikumi	Rural	68.2	64.82	-3.38	Won
	Morogoro South	Rural	86.2	76.90	-9.3	Won
	Moro South East	Rural	79.1	77.84	-1.26	Won
	Mvomero	Rural	84.2	68.30	-15.9	Won
	Ulanga West	Rural	53.3	53.46	-0.16	Won
	Ulanga East	Rural	83.3	XX	Unknown	Won
Tanga	Tanga Mjini	Urban	63.1	56.92	-6.18	Won
	Korogwe Mjini	Urban	63.5	83.74	20.24	Won
	Handeni	Rural	85.1	73.06	-12.04	Won

⁴⁵ XX in this Table means that there was a single candidate who was declared the winner right away (i.e, no voting). In most cases, manipulation is used to reach the single candidature status.

Alexander B. Makulilo: Why the CCM is Still in Power in Tanzania? A Reply

	Kilindi	Rural	87.2	94.51	7.31	Won
	Korogwe	Rural	84.5	87.70	3.2	Won
	Vijijini Bumbuli	Rural	83.1	XX	Unknown	Won
	Lushoto	Rural	89.7	81.59	-8.11	Won
	Mlalo	Rural	90.9	75.35	-15.55	Won
	Mkinga	Rural	70	63.61	-6.39	Won
	Muheza	Rural	85.4	77.94	-7.46	Won
	Pangani	Rural	58.9	61.93	3.03	Won
Iringa	Iringa Mjini	Urban	70.4	45.05	-25.35	Won
	Ismani	Rural	88.7	XX	Unknown	Won
	Kalenga	Rural	68.4	87.18	18.78	Won
	Kilolo	Rural	90.8	93.01	2.23	Won
	Ludewa	Rural	95.7	XX	Unknown	Won
	Makete	Rural	95.8	XX	Unknown	Won
	Mufindi North	Rural	94.4	XX	Unknown	Won
	Mufindi South	Rural	81.6	XX	Unknown	Won
	Njombe North	Rural	65.7	74.62	8.92	Won
	Njombe South	Rural	83.3	XX	Unknown	Won
	Njombe West	Rural	96.5	68.45	-28.05	Won

BOOK REVIEWS

Linda Overland and Mikkel Berg-Nordlie, *Bridging Divides: Ethno-Political Leadership among the Russian Sami* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012)

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The term “indigenous” refers to the ethnic minorities within a state but without a state. Generally, the indigenous groups are located across neighboring states. The Roma people in Europe are one of the significant examples of indigenous people that are located across Central and Eastern European states without a state of their own. As the indigenous groups have unique social, cultural, economic and political characteristics, they are distinct from those of the society in which they live. Their language, knowledge systems and beliefs differ from the society as well. Due to their cultural differences, the diverse indigenous peoples share common problems also related to the protection of their rights. They strive for recognition of their identities, their ways of life and their right to political representation and participation. As a result, a special set of political rights have been set to protect them by international organizations such as the United Nations. The United Nations have issued a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to guide state policies in order to protect the collective rights of indigenous peoples, such as their culture, identity, language, and access to employment, health, education and natural resources.¹

Bridging Divides written by Linda Overland and Mikkel Berg-Nordlie is a significant contribution to the literature on indigenous people. It examines the topic of indigenous people from a political perspective as opposed to the majority of related works on Sami people, which have treated the issue as part of history, anthropology and ethnography. Thus, the authors of the book fill a gap in literature with their research by exploring not only the issue of indigenouness, but also the importance of political leadership. They question whether the collapse of the Soviet Russia and opening of the borders makes a difference in the political participation and mobilization of the Russian Sami people living in the Kola Peninsula.

¹ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Economic and Social Council, *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*. (New York: United Nations, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.p4.

It is possible to divide the book into four sections based on the themes, with Chapter One is as an introduction to the book and the general topic. Chapter Two and Three can be identified as the book's first section based on the historical and cultural background of the Sami People and their presence in Russia. The second thematic section is Chapter 4 that focuses on the language revival of the Sami group in Russia. Chapter Five illustrates the educational reorientation of the Sami people whereas the Sixth Chapter primarily focuses on their political representation in Russia. The conclusion chapter offers a summary, comparison and evaluation of the research conducted.

The Sami people are the indigenous people analyzed in the *Bridging Divides*. The Sami people that are referred as also Sámi in the book, are the minority group that are located at some parts of Northern Sweden, Norway, Finland and the Kola Peninsula of Russia (p.11). The authors of the book concentrate only on with the revival of the Russian Sami in the book. Initially, they focus on the post-Soviet attempts at linguistic revival and the close connection between this process and the emergence of Russian Sami ethno-political elite. In addition, the authors examine the educational reorientation of the Russian Sami and education institutions of the Sami people in Nordic states. Finally, Overland and Berg-Nordlie specifically focus on the first political organizations of Sami population in Russia.

Overland and Berg-Nordlie are concerned with the Russian Sami living in the Kola Peninsula, and they present a "fieldwork" in the region. Throughout the book, the focus is on the popularity of the leaders and organizations and the relation between the educated members of the Sami community with the others related to the problems of the community. The methodological framework of the book deserves attention in particular. The preparation phase which took sixteen years includes fieldworks to Kola Peninsula. The data gathered for the research primarily based on the interviews with the public figures and leaders of political organizations among Sami community living in the Kola Peninsula of Russia. Thus, the interviews were conducted in Russian by both of the authors without any interpreter used which is strength of the methodology of the research.

Much of the book is devoted to making readers understand a small group of people (the Russian Sami) and their attempts to build an ethno-political organizational framework for their indigenous community and their attempt to integrate this into the existing Sami political structures abroad, and revitalize the culture of their community (p103). However, the concept of ethnicity is not defined properly. How the authors define the term "indigenous" remains as a question that requires a clear answer for the reader to better understand the issue. Relatedly, improper identification of the Sami people interviewed creates a methodological obstacle for the research. Who are identified as Sami in Kola Peninsula? Russian Sami is presented as a subset of the Sami community located across four countries;

however, the authors do not clarify how the so called public figures and organizational leaders in the book were identified as Sami. Is this a self-identification of these people or based on other sources such as the Constitution or Census data?

Another methodological shortcoming is the lack of discussion about the reason of focusing solely on the Sami community living in the Kola Peninsula. As mentioned before, the Sami population presented as a community located in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Russia in the book. Although the authors succeeded in illustrating the importance of their research, the justification of the case selection is not properly discussed in the book. Why only Koma Sami? In addition to the case selection, another methodological concern is the generalizability of the findings in the book which is directly related to the case. The strategic selection of the case is necessary for an in-depth and enriched analysis of the issue. Thus, as the justification of the case selection is not properly presented, the reader may be skeptical of the applicability of the results. Furthermore, the authors ignore the fact that the findings should also be applicable to the other Sami groups in Sweden, Norway and Finland. However, it should be noted that the conclusion section of the book have a brief discussion about relationship between Russian Sami and its Nordic counterparts although it remains as a relatively small part of the book.

Despite all these shortcomings, the *Bridging Divides: Ethno-Political Leadership among the Russian Sami* is a significant contribution to the literature on indigenous people, in particular on Sami people. As the similar pieces on Sami people in literature looks from either anthropological or ethnographical perspective, the book of Overland and Berg-Nordlie fills a gap by presenting the issue from a political perspective. Thus, the analysis illustrates how the Russian Sami developed a civil society of their own and gained confidence in their own ethnic identity. Despite the problems they have been facing similar to many indigenous people in the world, the book shows that the Russian Sami managed to set up their own ethno-political infrastructure and actively engaged in shaping their own future by this way which constitutes as a good example for the other indigenous groups.

David Martin Jones, Nicholas Khoo and MLR Smith, *Asian Security and the Rise of China: International Relations in an Age of Volatility* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013)

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If there is one issue in contemporary international relations that continues to provoke interest in academic and policy making circles alike it is how states, regions and the world should react to a rising China. While the influence of the People's Republic is being felt from Africa and the Global South through to the developed economies of North America and Europe, it is in East Asia where a re-emerging China has most focused the minds of diplomats and strategists, leaders and scholars and, indeed, the military men and women who must navigate this increasingly precarious great power polity. Within this East Asian context this new volume by David Martin Jones, Nicholas Khoo and MLR Smith delivers thoughtful and attentive analysis to the problem of responding to China's rise. The book is neither a historical account of the rise of China, though it does offer sufficient historical contextualisation for the reader, or another collection of prescriptive policy suggestions, though there are clear conclusions made about which regional and state strategies have best dealt with the rise of the Sinic superpower. Instead, this book is a theoretically informed, consistently argued and well written account of how states in a broadly defined East Asia have and continue to react to the changing security environment that confronts them in the first decades of the twenty-first century.

The volume is divided into seven chapters bookended by an introduction and conclusion, though it can be better thought of as being presented in four main parts. The first consists of an opening chapter that defines the terrain of the US-China relationship, the great power dyadic interaction that has thus far dominated debate and discourse about the region as the latter gains power at the expense of the former. The second part of the book, in the words of the authors, assesses the "response of the region to China's rise among its neighbours in the Pacific arena" (p.6). This part consists of four chapters that consider the reactions of northeast Asia, including Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the ASEAN states, along with ASEAN the institution, to the emerging reality of East Asian security. A third section consists of a lone chapter titled 'Between Two Worlds', analyses the recent history of Australian foreign policy in East Asia, a contemporary account that is detailed in its analysis of the Howard, Rudd and Gillard administrations and demonstrates exactly why the Australian example is a single state worthy of analysis in the broader regional context. Finally, in Chapter 7, the authors consider the impacts of the 2008 financial crisis on the region before concluding, with allusions to Carr, that there is little special about this crisis or the post-crisis world it will engender.

The authors make clear from the outset that they are not seeking to present an analysis of Asian security that is balanced somewhere between the realist, liberal and constructivist poles of the discipline. Instead, they succinctly explain the assumptions about the international system and the behaviour of states upon which they ground their work. These assumptions (p.3) can be characterised as broadly realist: anarchy is a foundational organising principle of the international system, that states are the principal actors in this system, that survival of the state is a fundamental concern and that security is thus a primary concern of states and their leaders. Yet the authors tweak this classical stance somewhat so as to fall more properly into the neoclassical realist realm. For example, while acknowledging that, in the style of Waltz and Mearsheimer, the states in the international system can be considered unitary actors in a self-help world, they also allow for the impact of domestic politics and regime type on international actions and reactions of states. Where classical realists might imagine states as seeking to maximise their power or structural realists imagine states seeking blunt survival, the authors adopt a position where they expect states to be "security maximisers rather than power maximisers" (*ibid*), staking out a theoretical position that encourages criticism, such as in Chapter 2, of both theoretical liberals and the more aggressive offensive realist theorists alike. Clearly outlined from the outset, this theoretical grounding is a major strength of the book and allows the authors to offer a sustained argument on East Asian security that would be impossible to find in, for example, one of the competing edited collections which seek, rightly or wrongly, to balance different views in the cause of fairness but which do not deliver the same consistent, rigorous and satisfying inquiry that Martin Jones, Khoo and Smith manage herein.

The book draws on a wealth of sources, both academic and journalistic. The former include all of the names one might expect in a book on the region (Acharya, Beeson, Johnston, Shambaugh and White) and the theoretical approach selected (Cha and Christensen). The latter are a result of the authors' efforts to ground their analysis firmly in the real world of diplomacy and inter-state strategic relations; with internal government documents not yet available for secrecy and security reasons, the use of journalistic accounts of meetings, motivations and decision making is a fair proxy for what, for the moment, cannot be known in its entirety. All of these sources are meticulously footnoted throughout the volume making it easy for the curious reader or the reader challenged by the conclusions of the book to acquaint themselves with the source material relied upon by the authors. However, it is not the footnoting or the broad literature underwriting the book that is underlined as its great strength. Instead, there are two significant contributions that *Asian Security and the Rise of China* make to the discipline of international relations generally, and the sub-disciplines of security studies and East Asian regional relations specifically, that can and should be highlighted.

The first is the book's efforts to problematize the stunning disconnect between the theoretical and the empirical in analysing East Asian security. A striking example here is the demolishing, in Chapter 2, of the extent to which theoretical perspectives predict populations and leaders in northeast Asia to be fearful of a rising China. This chapter, based largely on Nicholas Khoo's previously published article 'Fear Factor: Northeast Asian Responses to China's Rise' (Khoo 2011), positions the offensive realists and their 'much fear' ilk, represented here by Mearsheimer, at one end of a continuum of fear, with Johnston and Shambaugh as prototypical 'little fear' alternatives at the other end. With reference to popular surveys and empirical data the authors are able to demonstrate that neither the very pessimistic nor the very optimistic theorists are describing the reality on the ground in East Asia. Instead, studies point to a fear that is real and rising (p.52) and reflect neither the regional 'fear inflation' of Mearsheimer nor the 'fear deflation' of Johnston and Shambaugh.

The second is the authors' position with regards to the financial crisis that has enveloped the world since 2008. The book makes the argument that this is less a 'Global Financial Crisis', as it is often termed in the West, but rather a Northern Financial Crisis born of the US housing market and today continuing thanks to the "financial contagion sparked by the public debt accumulated by states in Southern Europe, and...the unsustainable character of the European monetary project more generally" (p.213). This positioning of the global crisis as a distinctly north-formed event (as opposed to the Asian Financial Crisis ten years before) is novel in and of itself, yet to then continue and argue in what remains of Chapter 7 and also in the Conclusion that this crisis is not particularly special in contemporary or broader history, at least in security terms, is reassuring and sound, particularly in light of the disparate voices within and without of the region who imagine this crisis is some sort of Great Depression II (for example, DeLong 2013). For realists, even those who shirk the limitations of both Morgenthauian and Waltzian approaches, this certain scepticism emerges naturally yet, in an era of moral panics, it is all the same intellectually refreshing.

David Martin Jones, Nicholas Khoo and MLR Smith have delivered a wonderful neoclassical take on East Asian security and added energy to the debate surrounding China's rising influence in that region. *Asian Security and the Rise of China* will find an audience in universities as well as in the conference rooms where foreign and security policies are made in the Asia-Pacific.

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Leslie McCall, *The Undeserving Rich: American Beliefs about Inequality, Opportunity, and Redistribution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013)

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The ideal of equality of opportunity looms large in American history. It is the core tenet of the American dream, promising advancement for everybody willing to work hard and abide by the rules. More generally, it is the benchmark against which the success or failure of the economy's role in promoting the public good is evaluated. As long as *a priori* equality of opportunity for those participating or looking to participate in economic life is a given, unequal outcomes are justified and even necessary in keeping this virtuous cycle alive. Thus explains Americans' skepticism towards overtly redistributive policies to rectify unequal economic outcomes. A fitting example is the Joe Wurzelbacher *aka* 'Joe the Plumber', incident involving then presidential hopeful Barack Obama. When prompted about his tax policy proposals, Barack Obama's stated intention of 'spreading the wealth around' did not sit well with most Americans; not even with members of his own party. If public opinion indicates a rejection of government redistributive policies, does that amount to a public unfazed by rising levels of income inequality?

Building on American dream ideals, one view postulates that Americans are exceedingly tolerant towards the very wealthy. Another traces ambivalent views towards income inequality to the inherent tension arising from Americans' conservatism on economic matters and liberalism (in the American sense) with respect to social programs. Yet others see tolerance and ambivalence towards the very wealthy as the result of ignorance and/ or lack of information. McCall approaches the ignorance, ambivalence and tolerance theories as distinct though interconnected parts of the puzzle that is public opinion on income inequality. In studying public opinion on income inequality between 1980 and 2010, she illustrates that contrary to previous findings, the larger trends in income inequality have been incorporated into public opinion. Moving beyond the theoretical case for separation, equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes become interrelated, though distinct benchmarks against which economic performance is judged, with the latter serving as an indicator for the former. The circumstances that activate this feedback loop are subject of McCall's investigation.

The book is presented in five chapters. Chapter one lays out the historical origins of Americans' primary concern with equality of opportunity and tolerance towards inequality of outcomes. Throughout American history, equality of opportunity ensured upward mobility to millions of workers and enticed entrepreneurs to take on risk and become wealthy, creating millions of jobs in the process. If jobs are accessible to all willing to work, such a system in the words of John F. Kennedy 'lifts

all boats', while simultaneously perpetuating a virtuous circle of wealth creation. With redistribution taken care of by the labor market, ex-post redistribution becomes unnecessary, since poverty, in the presence of abundant opportunities for employment is a self-inflicted problem rather than a matter of social policy. Underpinning this system were two tacit agreements: a government only minimally regulating economic activity, receiving in return a broad tax base resulting from entrepreneurs' job creation and workers tolerant of inequalities in economic outcomes in return for abundant employment opportunities coupled with the promise of upward social mobility. The following four chapters explore how public opinion responds to a new era in American economic history, namely that of rising income inequality dating back to at least 1980.

To pinpoint the role of the media and by extension elite opinion in conveying income inequality trends to the public, chapter three explores, how and if at all, media coverage of income inequality coincides with actual trends in income inequality. Content analyses of the three biggest newsweeklies in the United States reveal media coverage as largely unrelated to actual income inequality trends. Media reporting is weakly related to the ebbs and flows of academic research into income inequality highlighting the role of academic research in focusing journalists' attention on this issue and in providing factual information. The shrinking fortune of the middle class is the most frequently used frame in approaching the topic of income inequality, clearly delineating the line in the sand when public opinion turns against growing levels of income inequality. It is therefore not the mere existence of income inequality that is considered problematic, but rather whether or not the spoils of economic growth are perceived to be shared justly, as postulated by the just deserts tenet.

Using regression analysis, chapter four picks up on this notion and uncovers the ebbs and flows of public opinion on income inequality in relation to the equitability of economic growth, while chapter five builds on the empirical findings from the previous chapter to illustrate how and when inequality in economic outcomes gives rise to the perception of inequality of opportunity. Optimism about economic prospects is most closely related to perceptions about income inequality. When concerns about income inequality come to the fore, it is perceived as an economic, rather than a societal problem. An economy that fails to lift all boats, as is the case in a jobless recovery, is symptomatic of the previously alluded to bargain broken, moving public opinion from the frame of the deserving rich to one of the undeserving rich. The feedback loop between inequality of economic outcomes and public perception of inequality of opportunity in economic affairs is activated when the economy fails to live up to its redistribution promises.

As demonstrated by the Joe the Plumber incident, even in the midst of the greatest recession since the Great Depression, overt attempts at government mandated

redistribution policies did not meet widespread public approval. When it comes to dealing with inequality in economic outcomes, Americans apparently do not want government to get involved in readjusting the outcomes, but rather wants it to renew its efforts in ensuring equality of opportunity. Which policies, in the perception of the public actually work to this end is the subject of the empirical investigations in chapter five. Even though the public knows what kind of political initiatives it rejects, with the exception of strengthening the role of education, there is little agreement with respect to policy initiatives perceived as enhancing equality of opportunity. On the one hand, this explains successive administrations attempts at reforming and improving the educational system. On the other, high levels of uncertainty in policy preferences coupled with concerns about inequality of opportunity also demonstrate scope for politicians and policy makers to more explicitly link policy initiatives to equality of opportunity, thus generating a broader support base.

Overall, then, this book is a call for renewed scholarly attention to the over time within country dynamics in public opinion on income inequality. It is also a cautionary tale about adopting overly simplistic approaches to the study of public opinion. Catch-all indices for positions on income inequality have missed finer nuances of public opinion thus producing inconsistent results that were mistakenly attributed to ignorance. Lastly, McCall's book demonstrates scope for politicians and policy makers to frame policy preferences such that they relate to the uncertainty in public policy preferences pertaining to combating the, as of late, imperiled ideal of equality of opportunity.

John H. Farrar and David G. Mayes (eds.), *Globalisation, the Global Financial Crisis and the State* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013)

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The recent financial crisis devastated financial markets the world over. The events of the crisis caused many to question the policies of the pre-crisis era, which tended towards minimizing regulation as well as many others amorphously placed under the term Washington Consensus. The text *Globalisation, the Global Financial Crisis and the State*, edited by John H. Farrar and David G. Mayes, professors of law and finance, respectively, focuses on the interactions between states, economic policies and laws against the backdrop of the global financial crisis. Utilizing perspectives in the fields of law, political science and economics, the twelve chapters delve into interdisciplinary arguments over the changing regulatory structure of the world and the global forces that shape the state. The authors' overarching argument is that the financial crisis marked a discursive departure from the models supported by pre-

financial crisis policies typified by the Washington Consensus towards a more multilateral approach symbolized by the emergence of the G-20 and more state-oriented control over commercial activities.

The text focuses primarily on the legal and regulatory changes taking place in Australia and New Zealand, but also devotes chapters to transformations in China, the European Union, and South Africa. Section I, International Perspectives, provides an analysis of how the state and political institutions have evolved against the backdrop of globalisation and the recent effects of the crisis in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, China, and the European Union. Section II, Commercial Perspectives, provides insights into how the commercial and regulatory environment has also changed. Each chapter tends to follow a rather similar structure: an introduction to the problem or regulatory issue under consideration, how it has evolved over the course of interaction with globalisation forces, how the global financial crisis created an impact, and finally steps the state has pursued in light of those events.

The first chapter by the editors, John Farrar and David Mayes, provides a broad overview of and introduction to the general trends produced by global forces on political institutions and regulation: the Washington Consensus, traditional roles of the state, the main lessons learned from the financial crisis, and the main themes and approaches some regulators have initiated in the post-crisis environment. This is also where the editors present the argument developed in subsequent chapters; that the global financial crisis has challenged conventional wisdom of deregulation and a shrinking state and instead created a broad and discursive global trend of the state as a powerful, hands-on economic and regulatory actor. The remainder of the text is a collection of chapters written by various authors intended to highlight this theme.

While each chapter is well written and concise, the selection of case studies for the text provides the greatest area for methodological concern for the editors' main arguments in the text. The book is limited to a small collection of case studies, with a heavy focus on Australia and New Zealand, which attempt to depict the changing role of states policy framework as a global trend. The editors fail to show why these case studies were used to indicate a broader shift in global mentality towards globalisation and the Washington Consensus, in fact other than the priority of deviating from the Washington Consensus in the introductory chapter it is not often used as a point of departure throughout the following chapters. The case studies fail to paint a broader macro trend in regulatory sentiment or a real departure from the pre-crisis policies and ignore a large part of the world by leaving out South and Central America, Africa (minus South Africa) and Asia (minus China). Instead, the chapters each show a specific change in regulation in one country but fail to show a broader connection or common trend between them. Of course China, with their

strong Chinese Communist Party, is going to likely hold different regulatory and governance paths than South Africa, with its apartheid past, or from the issues of integration and democratic legitimacy facing the Euro-area states. Whether these regulatory changes should be seen as similar events due to the financial crisis remained to be wholly seen. Additionally these states had such a different interaction with the ill-defined concept of the Washington Consensus that readers will remain unsure if the financial crisis changed their regulatory path or if they were ever puppets of the consensus doctrine to begin with. Sometimes this policy framework change represents a topic of domestic policy but other times mean their electoral systems, court systems, regulatory structure, monetary or fiscal policies, or central bank independence. Unfortunately the state in question as well as the policy focus seems quite unrelated in terms of their states' economic, cultural and political contexts.

The book tries to assert that the time prior to the financial crisis was a US dominant/Washington Consensus world and that the post-crisis era is a multipolar system that focuses more on increased localism, multilateralism and state regulatory control. While it is quite easy to argue that as a result of the crisis, or any systemic crisis, many countries are more concerned with managing macro economic risks and holding greater control over key commercial affairs, the authors do not demonstrate a global change in mentality towards states interactions with global affairs and do not show that the types of regulation explained in the chapters marks a clear and discursive event which created this deviation in regulatory mentality on a macro level. While many countries have initiated regulatory changes in response to the recent crisis, the authors do not show this as a clear and discursive regulatory shift different from previous crises. A crisis, intuitively, would likely cause states and its citizens distress and the desire to prevent its reoccurrence, however this does not imply a permanent or guaranteed change in regulatory trends globally.

This book may find appropriate audiences with academics and students in the fields of law, politics, and economics. However, given the interdisciplinary approach the authors have utilized as well as the cases selected, some researchers may find portions of the book or chapters to be somewhat superfluous as they may find sections devoted to other disciplines unnecessary for their purposes. Additionally, while there is some attention given to South Africa, China, and the European Union, the main focal point is on changes in Australia and New Zealand. As such, academics interested in these transformations elsewhere may not find this book of particular importance. Readers investigating these specific countries may find a particular chapter to be useful, but this is not a book to be read from front to back cover as the case studies seem quite disconnected and there is little overarching continuous theme between the chapters and their contents.

Nicholas Aylott, Magnus Blomgren and Torbjorn Bergman, *Political Parties in Multi-Level Politics: The Nordic countries compared* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013)

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As the result of changes in European governance, the environment in which national parties operate has been unambiguously modified. The complexity of European structures has put additional pressure on national parties and forced them to adapt to new challenges. The emergence of sub-national level has created new arena for national parties to perform their customary functions such as candidate selection, formulation of party manifestos, government formation etc. Yet, the sub-national level stipulated by other institutional structure differs significantly from the national one. The democratic deficit intrinsic to the EU institutions affects and changes the internal organization of national parties. Aylott, Blomgren, and Bergman aim to fill this research gap by investigating the impact of European integration on democratic accountability within Nordic political parties. The authors seek to uncover “the black box of party organization” (p. 2) through the lens of modified delegation and accountability procedures on both national and European levels.

As an explanatory model, the authors embark upon the principal-agent approach by explaining delegation relationships. Transferring this template to party organization, Aylott, Blomgren, and Bergman define three different levels of control mechanisms within party structure: party membership to party leadership, party organization to parliamentarians, from the parliamentary group to individual parliamentarians. Within each level, the authors operationalize various forms of intra-party delegation on national and European arenas, differentiating between *ex ante* and *ex post* control mechanisms. Thus the first channel of delegation include the selection of party leadership by the party organization through the screening procedure, the formulation of party programme as part of contract design, and the policy committees as institutional check. From the second channel onward, the authors begin to juxtapose the forms of delegation and accountability on national and European levels. They examine candidate selection, manifesto formulation, pre-electoral candidate contracts as *ex ante* mechanisms, and voting instructions and reporting requirements as *ex post* mechanisms. The forms of delegation from the parliamentary group to individual parliamentarians comprise role allocation, maintenance of party cohesion and coordination between MPs and MEPs.

The main findings conclude a difference in power distribution between national and European levels. Whereas the control mechanisms within domestic arena are tight, the delegation relationships on sub-national level give more room for deviation and self-determination for the parliamentarians. The juxtaposition of the two levels

established that MEP's freedom of maneuver is larger than of the national parliamentarians (p. 77). In countries where only the small number of MEP's is delegated to the European Parliament (EP), it is difficult to treat them as a delegation but rather as individual candidates. The authors observed that the candidate selection to the EP is more centralized and personalized. As country being treated as one constituency, the selection proceeds through the top-down recruitment. The control mechanisms on the European level are rather weak. The national parties lack both ability and desire to exercise such controlling functions as they accept different nature of institutional context and therefore the possibility of MEP's deviated behavior. The coordination between two levels is impeded by conflicting schedules, so that MEPs rarely attend the meetings of the national parliamentary parties. Additionally, MEPs possess considerably more freedom in using their subsidies. As the final conclusion, Aylott, Blomgren, and Bergman claim that national institutional settings are of importance by shaping party organizations.

Generally, the book is structurally well elaborated, representing the findings on country case study approach. Analyzing Danish, Finish, Norwegian, and Swedish mainstream parties, each chapter precedes with the introduction to the electoral and party systems, EU-country relationships, and party stances on the European integration. The core of analysis is focused on abovementioned forms of delegation and accountability. The embeddedness of research into the national context is much of help by analyzing the differences in party organizations. The book is written in an invigorating manner providing succinct titles by the description of country's findings. Focusing on internal party mechanisms, Aylott, Blomgren, and Bergman successfully covered so far under investigated domain of the impact of European integration. Whereas the previous studies have predominantly concentrated on programmatic and/or organizational facets of parties, the authors of the book have shifted the focus to intra-party mechanisms in terms of delegation and accountability. Methodologically, the book represents an innovative approach to examination of power distribution within party structures. The application of the principal-agent theory gives a novel viewpoint on the functioning of political parties and their toolkit of control instruments.

Despite numerous positive sides, there are a couple of flaws the the research design and argumentation suffer. First, the country case selection is disputable as to whether it corresponds with the research goal to gauge the impact of European integration. Reasonably, the authors craft the case selection in line with the "most-similar-system" design's logic to control country specific variables. However, it raises lots of question, how the case of Norway can contribute to answering the research question. Aiming to distil the "net impact" by inclusion of non-EU member states, the authors have actually missed the core part of causal mechanism. If a country does not belong to the EU, there is no boundary expansion and no challenges for political parties to adapt to. In line with this logic, the juxtaposition

of national and European levels is merely impossible, so that the analysis of Norwegian case simply boils down to the analytical narrative of national party politics. From this point of view, the Norwegian case is much of domestic politics analysis with no additional value in terms of comparison.

Secondly, conceptualizing their toolkit of control mechanisms, Aylott, Blomgren, and Bergman have defined three channels, where the first one – party membership to party leadership – has been again exclusively rooted into domestic party politics. As we are interested into the detection of the impact of European integration, the only way to gauge it is the juxtaposition of the same control mechanisms within the same channels. In this case, the first channel merely describes the peculiarities of intra-party affairs within country context. As the truly analysis starts with the second channel, the first channel seems to be abundant. Thirdly, the normative statement is prone to certain analytical flaws as well. The authors' starting point begins with the statement that political parties in Nordic countries are perceived to be mass-party model with internal party democracy. Based on this assumption, they build their principal-agent model with controlling mechanisms. However, during the course of the book, there are several references to the "stratarchical" structure of Nordic parties (p. 165). Stating this, the authors weaken their starting assumption. The stratarchy as internal party structure indicates the independence between party levels and points to the lack of linkage with grassroots thus undermining the mass-party model. The last critical point regards the poorly formulated concluding chapter. There is certainly some room for enhancing the final remarks. It seems lacking of the overarching comparison – both cross-channel and cross-country. Instead, the chapter immerses into the discussion of party decline debate, thus recurring to the point of normative statement and omitting the discussion of the findings.

Overall, the book is an essential analytical contribution to the domain of Europeanization of party politics and will certainly find broad interest among party researchers and academics with focus on the European integration. The book touches upon vital current developments in party organizations and offers a promising template for the tracing of implications in the future.

Nazrin Mehdiyeva, *Power Games in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan's Foreign and Energy Policy towards the West, Russia and the Middle East* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2011)

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Nazrin Mehdiyeva's work is elegantly argued and timely volume on small states and energy politics; however, in looking to contribute to both of these literatures, she opens up questionable points in her book. Her main aim was to understand the conditions that allowed Azerbaijan to pursue an autonomous foreign policy after the Cold War while focusing on energy's role in the context of global energy insecurity. Mehdiyeva's structure relies on a simple and clear deductive narrative. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on small state literature and its application in Azerbaijan's institutional context; 4 focuses on Russia, the main 'antagonist' in the narrative, and 5 on the Caspian sea issue; while 6 and 7 deal with alternative allies in the form of Turkey and the United States. The last chapter concludes with the author's projection of future foreign policy.

Theoretically, the book contributes to, and focuses on, small states in international relations literature. The book begins with interrogating the popular notion of bandwagoning, also known as small states pooling their resources together with, or succumbing to the bigger power, in the presence of a clear and impeding threat. To follow the strategy, Mehdiyeva argues that Azerbaijan's success underlies two assumptions. First, in contrast to the commonly held notions of small state proclivities, Azerbaijan's foreign policy was one of strategic maneuvering. Conventionally, small states could either join bigger states for protection or band together themselves to balance the 'power deficit.' Strategic maneuvering however rejects this. In the book this means not aligning with Russia, or the West but instead choosing allies depending on the specificities of the issue—a framework of strategic resistance and pragmatism—allowing policy-level flexibility and practicality in the face of 'power deficits'. Second, she argues that, in contrast to the structural conceptions of power in neorealist, this 'strategic maneuvering' with the West underlies the non-determinism of four ideational factors: (1) Russia's historical image in Azerbaijan; (2) Turkey's Westernising tendencies; (3) the benevolent image of Western nations; and (4) Azerbaijan's misreading of its strength relative to the willingness of the West to help.

While these points were well argued, two points of criticism can be found. First, in as much as her explanation of ideational factors conjures a sophisticated narrative of Azerbaijan's politics, contrasting the pro-Turkish position of Abulfaz Elchibey and the pragmatism of Heydar Aliyev, the narrative appears to focus on the personalities and strategies of these leaders, which undermines the ideational factors she

identified. The ideational factors point to a general framework pursued by Azerbaijani actors. With a narrative that focuses on the leaders at the top rather than other actors in other policy and decision institutions, her narrative somewhat undermined the understanding that this was a state-level conception of a strategy. At this point, more focus on the rules of the game, commonly understood in Azerbaijan, rather than Elchibey or Aliyev, would have been better to balance her story. Even if posited that she was not going to discuss these issues, an institutional focus could have more concretely placed her story within the debates of state autonomy in foreign policy. In a way, she was already alluding to such ideas, seen in her telling of Aliyev's pragmatic approach, playing Turkey and Russia against each other in the pipelines of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipelines, Tengiz-Novorossiysk, and others policy areas.

Second, her focus on situating energy in Azerbaijan's successful maneuvering also has problems. There seems to be a focus on state leaders and state actors in explaining the outcome, but little has been done to explain the role of non-state actors such as British Petroleum, Dutch Shell, and Chevron, not just in negotiating the pipelines and in forming the Oil Consortiums, but also in maneuvering to acquire their interest in many other situations. These non-state actors may have had influence over the domestic policy structures of the United States, Turkey, and the EU, which could say that the success of Azerbaijan could have been because of a confluence of interest from all of these actors as a way to limit Russia's petronational expansion. A focus, then, on the relative power and actions of these companies could have strengthened her arguments. In the end, I wondered about energy's role in her narrative. Although she was keen on energy role a 'resource' that states go after, it has been rendered as a resource for consumption rather than its object-specific complexity. This points to the role of energy in the capital accumulation process and further consumption of the West within the evolving global political economy. The insecurity associated with peak oil, the contentious climate change negotiations, and the recent climate related changes, and the 'great power' 'competition' between the US and China, have highlighted that energy is not just a resource for the economy, but it is the potential prime mover in global economic machine. Put simply, energy is a much more complex object than a resource that states need to go after. The book could have benefited much if she was able to draw the relations of all the other energy-related political and economic activities taking in the United States, the EU, Turkey, or Russia, during those times, which prompted these states to act in certain ways. This could have situated Azerbaijan's autonomy within, say, the drive of the US economy for oil, or the EU's transition. This would have been a much stronger narrative situated within a global-local nexus.

Overall, this is a compellingly argued book that I recommend to anyone interested at moderate reading of international relations literature within the complexity of her personal understanding of Azerbaijan.

Leonce Bekemans (ed.), *A Value-Driven European Future* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012)

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As an editor Bekemans presents to academic readers a rich collection of essays initially presented at the international workshop 'Cultural and Value Roots for Intercultural Dialogue in a European Context' held in October 2011 at the University of Padua under the auspices of the Jean Monet Centre. The essays presented at the conference and published a year latter provide to the reader an excellent overview of the topic and capture the engaging academic discourse that took place at the conference. The book aims to define the set of values that in turn define European identity. It also poses very important questions, such as what is the common set of 'core values', how to maintain and enrich those values in the face of globalization, multiculturalism and economic crises and how to work across institutions to promote and preserve those values.

Three years after the conference and two years after the publication of the book these same questions remain an ongoing source of discussion and debate in the European countries. Those questions are of great importance for the European countries, however even more so for the countries on their way to join the European family. The views and recommendations presented in the scholarly essays are equally useful for scholars and policy-makers. Some of the essays literally provide a road-map to policies, actions, documents and trainings within the area of intercultural dialogue and education as well as the institutional framework to enable the human-rights approach.

Structurally the essays are grouped in three camps with Part One referring to the conceptual framework of intercultural dialogue and the human-rights based approach. The second part begins with providing a historical overview of the creation of the 'core' European values including some of the challenges and the way these values have been created and are evolving. For example, in his essay Thomas Jansen brings attention to the 'need to recover the common historical and cultural origins of Europe' (p. 57). Furthermore in this part and throughout some of the essays, including Bekeman's essay there is a reference to the Christian foundations of the European values and the Christian ethics principles, such as solidarity, justice and freedom. Part three 'Perspectives of a Value Oriented Europe in the World' gives an overview of the role of the institutions of promoting the preserving the core values. The European Parliament for example can be seen as an institutional keeper of the European values. Luc Van den Brande discusses and presents the system of multi-level governance in enabling openness, participation and commitment at all levels. For the author's argument is it very important for leaders to make sure the system of values is transferred and in sync with the policies and

values promoted on institutional level. Basically, to have coordination between, what can be perceived as, top-down policies with the bottom-up values at all levels. This is important in order for the values not to be lost or altered along the way. This part also refers to the role of education in the promotion and preservation of values. One can argue that the most important point is to incorporate the European core values of mutual respects, tolerance and solidarity in the formal as well as non-formal education especially for the young generations. Overall part three touches upon three of the biggest challenges when it comes to defining the European values and those are: Migration, Enlargement and Economy.

As much as the collection of essays encompasses many important issues, there are few questions that remain unanswered. When the scholars are referring to the European core values it may remind the reader of the post-1989 appeals to the countries of Central Europe and their 'Return to Europe'. This idea was part of the political discourse in the emerging democracies of Central Europe and it referred to the natural path of development for those countries that was inhibited for nearly fifty years by Communism. By returning to Europe, the CEE countries were returning to their core, original values and political culture with it. The book provides the view of renowned scholars that are obviously supporters and advocates to the European project. It would be interesting to see an opposing view or view that challenges some of the arguments presented in the book. The reader would also like to see the opinions from scholars from other European Countries about this topic such as French, Spanish, Greek, German, Dutch scholars in order to present different academic voices in Europe.

Another question that the reader cannot help but ask is, in a time of multicultural and multi-religious communities is it possible to refer to a more universal approach, such as the Human Rights Based Approach rather than refer to religious-based values? Religion is, indeed a large part of one's culture and therefore when we talk about 'intercultural dialogue' we are addressing a set of religious values as well. What is the role of religion in determining the core values? Different standpoints are presented, however without a conclusion. Finally, to connect some of the arguments with the current reality, a question that has not even been mentioned and it is a pressing issue in reality is: What about the values created and promoted by political parties? Many of the values that are currently promoted by political parties in the countries across Europe seem to stray away in a large degree from the core European values that European identity as such has been built upon. Example of this political rhetoric is the Danish People's Party, Belgium's Flemish Interest Party, National Front in France, Freedom Party of Austria and the populist parties from the Scandinavian countries that have a solid support of 11 to up to 22% of the population. With this contrasting reality between the fundamental core European values and the ones currently internalized by EU citizens that originate from

political parties it would be really challenging to reach the value-driven future of Europe.

The discussion presented in this rich collection of essays provides many open ended questions that can and will be a good basis to continue this never-ending and very important question for European countries. The contributors to this book and the editor are committed and deeply believe in the human values of Europe. This notion gives confidence to the reader that there is a substantial and solid group of supporters across European universities and institutions dedicated to make this idea reality.

Hartmut Behr and Felix Roesch (eds.), *Hans J. Morgenthau, The concept of the Political* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)

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The Concept of the Political, translated from the 1933 study – *La Notion du "politique" et la théorie des différends internationaux*, represents a significant contribution for the European public specialized in the field of international relations. While this text may at the first sight seem different from other versions of realism and more related to international relations theory today, in fact, the core assumptions addressed in this study are connected to political realism. The translation of this book represents the first initiative to make Morgenthau's European writings more accessible to students of international relations, particularly to English-speaking researchers. This endeavor both in French and English is relatively little known compared to his major and successful textbook *Politics Among Nations*, published in 1948 and considered one of the leading writings of the realist school. As the title indicates, this book is constructed around the complex and controversial "concept of the political", a concept whose correct understanding Morgenthau, and many others before him, considered essential for any theory of political life. Thus, the purpose of this book is to provide an understanding of Morgenthau's *oeuvre* and worldview and to emphasize the ontological and epistemological commitments of the author, which influenced his later works.

Hans J. Morgenthau, *doyen* of international relations and the most important figure for the development of this discipline, engaged in an intellectual journey by comparing and criticizing different schools of thoughts (Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen) concerned also with this concept, later to provide a general theory about the political, seen as a core requirement for society. The book is organized in two important parts. The first one represents a comprehensive introduction into Morgenthau's study written by the two editors of the book, Hartmut Behr and Felix

Rösch, professors of international relations, specialized in the sociology of knowledge, theories of international relations and international political theory. This general overview of Morgenthau's worldview provides the contextualization of the author's work in the legal and political debates in the moment he wrote the book and presents as well as present debates of international relations and introduces the most important epistemological and ontological aspects of Morgenthau's political theory. In the second part, we can observe the objective analysis of the author, separating the legal from the political sphere which would conduct to a certain isolation of the political deliberations from the legal regulations and the normative conceptualization of the political. More precisely, in order to highlight his own theory the author builds its exposure on the dynamics of these three distinctive concepts: legal disputes, political, and political disputes.

When defining legal disputes, Morgenthau leaves aside the common practice of opposing the concept of disputes of interest to that of legal disputes and argues, from a terminological point of view, that such an opposition is incorrect since the legal disputes are also disputes of interest. In other words, he questions the two schools of thought that manifested themselves as advocates of this theory, and later he creates his own interpretation. He concludes that these disputes are legal because they have characteristics of the concept of legal dispute while the so-called disputes of interest do not. Thus, for Morgenthau the correct interpretation to name the latter is "pure disputes of interests".(p. 95)

The second concept, the political, analyzed through the author's filter of thought is argued in the same manner like the first one. Morgenthau leaves out of consideration the original and etymological sense of the concept applied in relation to non-state actors and individuals and applies it in the sphere of interstate relations where his considerations are solely concerned with the realm of foreign policy. What is worth mentioning here are the two different meanings of the concept; on the one hand, it designates the activity of the state aiming to maintain, increase or assert its power in specific sphere and on the other hand, it distinguishes within the whole group of possible foreign activity spheres of the state certain particular modes of activity which we could be designated as political matters and political activities in the particular sense of the word (p. 119). Thus, taken in general, the concept of the political designates the will of the state to maintain, increase or assert its power, in particular political can define an object that is in the mind of the state deploying a political activity and in a specific sense, and this is Morgenthau's theory: political could be characterized by a particular degree of intensity, which depends on the connection generated by the state's will to detain the power between its objects and the state itself (p. 120).

The concept of political disputes reflects the comprehensive relationship between the sphere of the political and the sphere of the international legal system.

Morgenthau argues that the link between these two spheres is notably observed by analyzing the general position of the state within the international community, which is often considered to be a problematic matter generating particular political disputes. (p.133).

The book, both with the translation and re-publication, along with the historical and intellectual contextualization produced by the editors, represents a significant resource not only for the categories of people mentioned above, but also for anyone interested in the nature of political realism. Furthermore, the study contributes to the understanding of Morgenthau's concept of power – a concept that has always been an important aspect not only for domestic politics, but also for the international arena. Morgenthau gives a special attention to this concept and he meticulously suggests the important distinction between the empirical and normative concept of power. The majority of critics addressed the subject of this particular distinction and a great number of scholars from the field of IR argued Morgenthau's unclear boundaries between empirical and normative concepts of power. Nevertheless, the author succeeded without any doubt in explaining and elaborating his theory about the concept of the political.

Small, but concise, this cornerstone of Morgenthau's intellectual experience presents a innovative theory of the notion of the political, criticizing in the first instance the old theories of Carl Schmitt's conception of "friend" and "foe" and Hans Kelsen's legal positivism and later developing a new theory where the concept of the political is the central factor of any human association and the study of politics. For these reasons, this book provides coherent and excellent arguments sustaining the main theory and represents a benchmark for the general study of the international relations theory.

The elements that make this book an interesting and worth reading study are related to the fact the book combines different methods of research: the scientific research and the personal experience – a mixture that gives originality to Morgenthau's work. The book is the outcome Morgenthau's intellectual journey during and after his doctoral thesis. All the intellectual reflections, knowledge and life experience of one remarkable person has been combined in an unique manner so that the next generations could understand the origins and the dynamics of the Concept of the Political. Even though this book provides original theoretical formulas, the expository writing style reveals an overuse of the specialized vocabulary, which indicates that this study is addressed to a limited range of readers, especially scholars who are studying Morgenthau's thought sociology of knowledge of the discipline of International Relations and international political theory.

Taking everything into consideration, this book represents a significant contribution in the field of international politics. It provides the readers both significant theoretical contributions and critical understanding of different schools of thought in order to create a personal theory about the concept of political.

Theo van de Klundert *Capitalism and Democracy: A Fragile Alliance* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013)

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Theo van de Klundert is a Dutch economist and Professor Emeritus at Tilburg University in The Netherlands. *Capitalism and Democracy: A Fragile Alliance*, was originally written in Dutch and translated into English in order to reach the larger Anglophone audience. This book is the result of Klundert's sixty years of study in the field of economics. The focus of the book revolves around the central question of whether it is possible to combine capitalism and democracy. The book is divided into two parts. The first part emphasizes the importance of technological progress as a main engine for economic growth. The second part highlights what has been described as "the diffusion of capitalism across countries". In this work, the author also sets out to ascertain whether or not such diffusion gives rise to regional varieties of capitalism.

In the first chapter Klundert discusses the genesis of capitalism. In the book, *The Great Transformation*, Polanyi (1944) makes reference to the social and political upheavals that took place in England during the rise of the market economy. According to Polanyi, setting political rulers at a distance is a pre-requisite to establishing a self-regulating economic environment. Polanyi's theory states that it is precisely this distance that ensures the property rights of merchants and entrepreneurs. Chapter two is devoted to an overview of the field of international political economy. Klundert analyzes formal models of political economies. This analysis stems from a theory which states that technological change is the driving force of accumulation and growth in the capitalist system. The third chapter explains precisely how the neoclassical theory was conceived as an exogenous factor in the technological growth theory. Klundert also acknowledges the new literature which offers alternate explanations to technological change, such as learning-by-doing and investment in research and development. Chapter four explores the plausibility of third world nations catching up to the GDP of their first world counterparts. In this chapter Klundert reviews the research of Syrquin (1988) who categorizes the "catching-up" phenomena in three stages. The first stage emphasizes primary production while the second and third phase emphasize both industrialization and de-industrialization respectively. Chapter four segues into the

second part of the book, beginning with chapter five, which explores the historical developments of capitalization in Europe and the United States. Chapter six chronicles the history of capitalism and distinguishes the history of the development of capitalism in the United States from the history and development of capitalism in the United Kingdom. Chapter seven, aptly entitled *The World Community at Large*, challenges the hypothesis which presumes that globalization is necessarily complemented by a “convergence of welfare” in poor countries, as has typically been the relationship with rich countries. The author contests this theory by exhibiting twentieth century evidence which points to the contrary. Such evidence is exemplified by the cases of the EU and contemporary China. In this chapter Klundert also distinguishes the major differences between African, Asian, and Latin American economies. The final chapter entitled, *Democracy at Bay* discusses the importance of international economic relations as expressed by institutions such as the WTO, IMF, World Bank and EU. This chapter explores whether such “supranational institutions can be controlled in a satisfactorily democratic way” (p. 179).

The major strengths of this work can be found within its chapter by chapter organization as well as the contents of the final chapter. At the conclusion of each chapter the reader is offered a review section entitled *Evaluation*. The final chapter functions as the evaluation section for the entire book. Only in Chapter eight does the author’s stance emerge as distinguished from the scholarly opinion of the academics he copiously refers to throughout the book. Chapter eight not only seeks to settle the underlying questions the book initially set out to explore but it also examines these questions in the light of contemporary events such as China’s export surplus and the 2008 global financial crisis. Within chapter eight the flexibility of the authors position is made apparent when he lays out his predications for China “we have seen that China will equal the US in 2012, as far as the size of GDP is concerned...and [it] may be expected to exhibit fast growth in the years to come” (p. 180). Overall, Klundert’s work is a researched book with an organized layout. These two qualities make it an exceptional reference work for senior scholars who are studying and conducting research in the field of international political economy.

Like many scholarly works, the book mainly speaks to the most senior members or the author’s peer group. As a result, its more complex themes will likely pose a challenge for the interdisciplinary researcher. It seems that the author’s intent was to provide a vast set of reference points in the first seven chapters before concluding by addressing the author’s main thesis. As mentioned earlier, this poses a problem for either the novice or the interdisciplinary scholar, both of who would be in great need for a primer before approaching this work.

A simple way to overcome the above mentioned challenges is to read the book out of sequence. An interdisciplinary researcher or novice in the field of economics may

seek to gain a better theoretical grasp of the content matter before moving forward. This can be accomplished by beginning with chapter eight. Just as chapter eight provides an excellent theoretical context, chapter seven provides an excellent historical context and should be subsequently read. The remaining chapters can then be read in sequence from chapter one to chapter six. Ultimately, senior scholars and researchers in the field of economics would likely find this work most useful as an essential part of their reference collection.

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Fabio Zucca, *The International Relations of Local Authorities. From Institutional Twinning to the Committee of the Region: Fifty Years of European Integration History* (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2012)

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At a moment when the European Union is having an identity crisis, it is pertinent to remember the motivations, the ideas and efforts of the men who dedicated their lives to its creation and who established the means and organizations necessary to involve the citizens in the bottom-up part of this process. This book focuses on the role played by local authorities, who were the first to use the establishment of twinning – the development of cultural, political and economical bonds between two cities or villages belonging to different nations – as a parameter of real international policy and to view it as an essential phase of the establishment of a united Europe.

The deep archival research the author has conducted shows how the legitimisation of local authorities within the European institutions has been a “long march” and his book clearly considers all the different historical steps in this process, from the creation of the *Union internationale des villes* (UIV) in 1913 to the new phase of EU cohesion policies started in 2013. He also shows a special regard for the men who made this integration possible: Gasser, Milhaud, Schiavi, De Jager, Bareth, Chaban-Delmas and other. In the context of the activities implemented by local authorities, the establishment and development of twinning between important European cities appears as a prime case of their effectiveness and importance. At the beginning, these relations started as means for the reconstruction of Europe, but they soon

became an instrument for sensitising citizens to and involving citizens in the ongoing European integration process, as well as giving them the opportunity to enter in contact and to compare personal experiences. Zucca highlights the activities of three Italian cities: Florence, Turin and Milan. In each of them, the role played by municipal councillors and mayors was the engine of the mechanism of European integration. In Florence, the federalist and Europeanist councillors Riccioli and Zoli put great efforts into overcoming political and administrative problems as well as fighting the underestimation of the importance of twinning; in Turin, after the initial hesitation, Mayor Peyron totally devoted himself to the work of the *Associazione Italiana per il Consiglio dei Comuni d'Europa*, concluding six of the seven European twinning contracts of its city and even winning the *Prix de l'Europe* in 1957. Milan, despite being extremely active in ideological and political debate, concluded its first twinning agreement only in 1961 and the reference framework was more focused on the economic and international political relations that Milan could develop rather than on European integration. Only with the advent of Aniasi as mayor did Milan assume its role as a European and federalist city.

The representatives of local authorities put every effort into obtaining the recognition of their institutions by the Union, but their first official appearance took place only in 1988 and the Committee of the Regions was only established in 1994. The positive outcomes of these now European institutions have reinforced the perception of the effectiveness of their initiatives, giving one more tool for the integration of new member cities and countries.

European integration is a multifaceted process, comprehending different aspects and paths, and it is difficult to provide a comprehensive overview. Besides being difficult, it should be noted that scholars often concentrate on the same issues, neglecting smaller, but fundamental successes, such as the establishment of inter-municipalities contacts and exchanges, and this book is one of the few covering the fifty years of the effect regional institutions have had on the European Integration process. Zucca completed a long and complex process of archival research to reconstruct all the phases in this path to bring the role European citizens had in creating the Union to the eyes of their descendents, their commitment and belief in integrating with their neighbours overcoming national belonging. To make his message more effective, the author supports his thesis with a detailed historical reconstruction of local efforts, from the theoretical development, stressing in particular the fundamental role of Adolf Gasser, to the creation of newspapers – from *La Gauche européenne* to *Der Europaer* – and associations – from *La Fédération* and the European Movement to the Council of European municipalities – providing us with the example of three important Italian cities. This choice may seem curious since Italians municipalities were much less active than French ones, both in terms of official and civic engagement and belief in the possibility of achieving concrete results. Zucca faced a challenging and difficult task in collecting

the necessary material for his analysis, since archives did not always meet his expectations and information might have been lacking, not considering the geographical distance between them. If the cases of Florence and Turin are interesting for the important results achieved, deeply analysed by the author, Milan was more source of theoretical and international debate on the direct elections of the European Parliament rather than concrete local commitment. Consequently, more attention is given to that than to concrete results at the people-to-people level such as twinning. It is definitely proof of Italian politicians' activities and involvement in the unification process, but it can give the impression that the Milanese have been detached, leaving behind only their political and intellectual guides.

Although complex, the reading is quite fluid: sentences are well structured and the vocabulary not too formal, not an easy accomplishment considering the subject of the book. Arguments are well grounded, with the necessary references to discussions, events and speeches. However, regarding the latter, Zucca is maybe too confident in his readers' understanding of French since he provides translation only for quotations in Italian. Even if there are few of them in the text, they can still create the feeling among the readers that they are missing something in the description of the events. Another point creating some difficulties in reading is the stress on the biographies of the men and women who devoted their lives to the recognition of local authorities' importance. It is undeniable that personal education and affiliation are essential to the choices people made; but sometimes it seems that biographical elements prevail in the historical reconstruction and this excessive stress risks detaching the readers' attention from the main focus. The author wisely confines the majority of these to the footnotes; nevertheless the latter may be longer than the text on a single page.

People who are interested in popular European history as well as those who look for an example of how will and commitment can bring societies together and overcome both physical and political boundaries will find in this book an excellent guide. Zucca reminds us how difficult the creation of a united Europe and the establishment of an adequate civic participation were, which nowadays European citizens seem to underestimate and forget, but which is the core of European belonging and is one of the best ways to welcome our new members in a ever-larger Union.

Rolf Hosfeld, *Karl Marx. An Intellectual Biography* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013)

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The book of Rolf Hosfeld is a sophisticated exploration into the intellectual and historical context in which Karl Marx developed his thought and work. A scholar with a broad and highly interdisciplinary cultural background, the author effectively combines the history of political and philosophical ideas, political and intellectual history and the attention to the world of literary works to cast light upon the multiple sources and internal developments of Marx’s ideas. Unlike most of the literature that developed around the Marxian world, he provides both a thorough analysis of philosophical issues and an enjoyable portrait of events and intellectuals; at the same time, he focuses on Marx ‘the philosopher’ as well as on Marx ‘the man’, underlying the intimate connection between the public and the private sphere in the way he shaped his own thought throughout his life.

From such a perspective, this book is an excellent tool for those who want to familiarize themselves with the main concepts in the writings of Marx (and Engels) as well as a useful reminder of the complexity of their thought to those who are already well acquainted with their ideas. In fact, the clash of ideological interpretations that developed around their work has predominantly conveyed a narrow perspective of their theoretical and practical visions; yet, as Hosfeld shows, the philosophical and political grammar they developed throughout their writings was not new. Rather, it originated from a very personal and critical engagement with a variety of authors – Hegel most importantly – and their conceptual framework. The book consists of four main parts – “Ideas”, “Deeds”, “Discoveries” and “Consequences” – which offer a chronological account of Marx’s life and thought throughout the century and follow his movements across Europe – from his childhood in Trier and his Hegelian education in Bonn (1818-’42) to his early career as a journalist in Cologne (1842-’43), from his years in Paris (1843-’45) and Brussels (1845-’47) to the choice to move to London, where he spent the rest of his life until 1883. Therefore, Hosfeld offers an accurate overview of the successes and failures of Marx’s life-long project to interpret and change the reality of his time. His intellectual biography becomes the story of both his own ideas in motion and their intrinsic tension between theory and practice.

Over four chapters Hosfeld successfully sheds light upon the philosophical background that progressively shaped the work and thought by Marx (and later also by Engels); he also provides a refined, yet accessible, synopsis of the historical events that urged the authors of the *Communist Manifesto* to constantly question their own beliefs. At this level, Graeme Duncan’s contention that Marx, as well as

John Stuart Mill, failed to emancipate himself from his European and Eurocentric perspective should be rephrased. Marx was a European intellectual who progressively developed a systematic attention to the revolutionary phenomena of his era: his life as well as his genius turned him, from a Prussian student fascinated by philosophy and law, into a truly cosmopolitan thinker. He understood the similarity of events occurring in different geo-political contexts – from France and England to Russia and the United States – and encouraged his contemporaries to appreciate their interconnection as well as their national and global implications. As a political journalist, philosopher, historian and economist, he always tried to employ the “weapons of criticism”, that is, to view the present critically in order to understand, and solve, the intimate contradictions of his time.

One of the most illuminating parts of the book is the first chapter, in which Hosfeld provides his readers with the five basic ideas of Marx’s thought. This overview of his theoretical vocabulary pursues a threefold goal: it sketches the intellectual and philosophical context in which the young Marx critically engaged with the work of Hegel; it offers the background for understanding the persistence of a number of recurring themes in his later thought and writings; it makes Marx’s work accessible to a non-specialized, yet intellectually curious, public. According to Hosfeld’s hermeneutics, ‘criticism’, ‘historical materialism’, ‘modernity’, ‘simplicity’ and ‘necessity’ emerge as the five cornerstones of Marx’s interpretation of history and politics. All these five concepts are closely intertwined insofar as they originate from a passionate and critical reading of Hegelianism through the influence of the Left Hegelians. However, the education of the German philosopher was shaped by a variety of intellectual sources, political ideologies and personal experiences. As a student of the theologian Bruno Bauer – the most dominant figure of the Berlin Doctor Club, namely a circle of heterodox students of Hegel – throughout the 1830s he developed a strong interest in ancient philosophy and devoted his PhD dissertation to examining similarities and differences between the natural philosophy of Democritus and Epicurus.

At the same time, also under the influence of Bauer himself, he was fascinated by the critique of the French Enlightenment’s atheism and the Hegelian reading of Christology proposed by David Friedrich Strauß in his widely debated *The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined*. As Hosfeld recalls, these theological debates constitute one of the most important matrixes of Marx’s later conceptualization of politics and economics. Yet, after his experience as a political journalist for the *Rheinische Zeitung* in the early 1840s, he felt the need to critically engage with Hegel’s legal philosophy and test it vis-à-vis the real world, its contradictions and tensions. Such a dissatisfaction with Hegel’s constitutional law led Marx to call into question the whole realm of representative politics, which he dismissed as obsolete and incapable to produce an effective mediation between the interests of the ‘State’ and those of ‘civil society’.

Contrary to what Hegel had taught, Marx suggested that man, rather than the State, should become the starting point of a renewed science of politics. As he argued in the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, "just as it is not religion that creates man but man who creates religion, so it is not the constitution that creates the people but the people which creates the constitution". Accordingly, the contestation of Hegel's legal and political theory resulted in the refusal of any mediation, either political or institutional, and the idea that true democracy could reconcile State and society only through a direct kind of politics. This Copernican revolution, which was grounded in Feuerbach's dialectical critique of religion and ideology as well as his break with Hegel's speculative philosophy, led Marx to focus his attention on real humanity, rather than personified abstractions, as the main actor of history, politics and economics. The historical materialism he progressively developed was the direct outgrowth of this critical engagement with the thought of Hegel.

As Hosfeld accurately explains, Marx's critique of the constitutional State as a repressive institution of the ruling class and his conceptualization of the proletariat's dictatorship as necessary stage in the dialectical development of history were both grounded in a secularized reading of modernity and the dismissal of any "spiritualistic-democratic" illusion. The whole intellectual trajectory of Marx – from his early philosophical writings to his later work with Engels and their reading of the social and economic struggles both in Europe and outside Europe – should thus be read through the lenses of the critical re-reading of his own cultural background and the capacity to always combine a variety of sources and influences. This is definitely one of the main reasons why Hosfeld's book is worth reading.

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