

Volume 2, Issue 1
February 2007

CEU Political Science Journal
The Graduate Student Review

Central European University
Department of Political Science

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ISSN 1818-7668

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FOREWORD

Discourse Analysis and Critical Political Science

“The categories of perception, the schemata of classification, that is, essentially, the words, the names which construct social reality as much as they express it, are the stake *par excellence* of political struggle, which is a struggle to impose the legitimate principle of vision and division”.¹

Politics necessarily involves struggle over the meaning of events, over how we categorise people, and over how we name and draw borders around places. Political leaders need to mobilise people behind their vision of how to divide people and space by providing answers to questions of who are “we”, where do we belong, and who are our friends and enemies. Discourse analysts seek to uncover the assumptions and processes underlying such visions of political reality. The discourse analyst asks questions about the authoritative knowledge that supports existing political relations, about how governing authorities categorise populations, and about the political consequences of particular forms of discourse. Thus, discourse analysis is part of the tradition of critical social science.

Many discourse analysts want to expose the irrationality of political conflicts as based on lies and distortions. For

example, Mitja Durnik and Marjeta Zupan’s article in this volume shows how political leaders on both sides mobilise their supporters through a discourse of conflict over the border between Croatia and Slovenia. Durnik and Zupan argue that this conflict could easily be resolved but politicians discursively perpetuate it to serve their short term electoral interests. Thus, their article puts forward a reasoned alternative to the border conflict discourse which they see as destructive and misleading.

While some analysts, such as Durnik and Zupan, oppose an irrational discourse with strong claims about the truth of the situation others avoid such claims. Stefan Ihrig analyses the stories told in Romania and Moldova about democracy and their democratic history. However, he does not present these stories as distorting a more accurate version of history. Rather, he is interested in comparing state text book narratives of past experience of democracy and considering the possible effects of these narratives on present democracy building efforts. He points out that while the text books discuss historical experiences of democracy as periods of normality they are short on specifics as to what exactly democracy or normality might be and argues that this lack of specifics provides students with few resources for critical thinking about problems of democracy.

¹ Pierre Bourdieu. *In other worlds: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, 134.

Gavin Slade also analyses the narrative of a state and its relation to society through close analysis of Putin's *Millennium Manifesto*. Slade argues that Putin established a new unifying discourse on state society relations for Russia at the turn of the century. Through a close analysis of this significant text he shows how Putin has blended historic notions of 'the Russian idea' with liberal constructions of individual responsibility. He argues that the discursive efforts of Putin's regime contributed significantly to the strengthening of the Russian state. This article provides an excellent example of textual methods of discourse analysis in concert Migdal's theory of state and society as mutually constitutive.²

Moving beyond the level of individual state politics, Margus Valdre considers how a famous computer game naturalizes a particular vision of global security. Winning the game requires operating according to particular historical, economic and political 'laws'. Thus, the game subtly presents a particular view of how the world works and engages players in an enjoyable experience of operating according to these rules. Drawing upon the Althusser's concept of the 'interpellation' of subjects, which stresses the importance of bodily practices, Valdre suggests that computer games may be powerful mediums for political ideologies

because of their interactive nature. He questions the vision of security offered by this game given that winning requires global military and cultural domination.

Finally, Silva Kantareva's article does not use techniques of discourse analysis but certainly shares the critical agenda of the other articles in this issue. Kantareva critiques contemporary political analyses that discuss Belarus and Ukraine as part of the post-communist 'transition' or the 'fourth wave of democratisation'. She argues that since these countries lacked the structural pre-conditions necessary for democracy such labeling of developments has, at worst, obscured an authoritarian reality. Her article compares developments in Belarus and Ukraine offering an explanation of Ukraine's recent pro-democracy movements while remaining pessimistic about democratic prospects for Belarus.

Thus, all the articles in this edition reveal the importance of critical political analysis even if this may not lead us to optimistic conclusions. Discourse analysis in particular provides an important tool that enables analysts to expose and question our naturalized assumptions about political relations and realities. Such a critical stance toward political discourse forms an essential component of rigorous political science.

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² Joel Migdal. *State in Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

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In our attempt to promote original works, we do not accept articles that are under review at other publications or articles that have parts that were published or are forthcoming under the same form in other places. Contributions using statistical analysis have to make the proof of the data available in order to allow replicability. Formal requirements are found in “the paper requirements” section of our webpage: www.ceu.hu/polccijournal Any paper that does not meet these requirements may be rejected.

Manuscripts should be no longer than 6,000 words (for exceptional cases please address the Editorial Board), and footnotes should provide references and should not including supplementary text. The appendix must be a maximum of 5 pages.

The Journal proposes, besides articles, a “work in progress” section, designed mostly for Ph.D. researchers that have not yet finished their work but are interested in making it public. The section from this issue includes a research with potential, which takes a lot of time to be finalized and whose authors are more than pleased to receive any comments at the provided e-mail addresses.

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UKRAINE AND BELARUS - (UN)LIKELY TRANSITIONS?

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Abstract

This paper will explore the post-communist paths and political developments of both Ukraine and Belarus after their official break from the Soviet Union in 1991. Since both have often been labeled as transitional countries, my objective will be to assess if their socio-economic situation was indeed transient or, rather, one of stable decay. I will look at the political choices that Ukraine and Belarus made in the aftermath of independence and argue that as a result of their political and socio-economic structural conditions, they could not have mimicked the democratization of “exemplary” Central European states such as Poland, Slovakia, Hungary or the Czech Republic. I will also examine Ukraine’s democratic path and explain the emergence of Ukraine’s democratic impetus in 2004 instead of 1991. I will seek to explore why Ukraine undertook the path of revolution and, hopefully, democracy, whereas Belarus is still struggling after disputed and chaotic elections. Useful as empirical data and econometric analysis is, there is much that is overlooked, and therefore those case studies are especially useful as far as democratization is concerned. While both cases are peculiar in many ways,

they are quite relevant for the overall experience of the former Soviet bloc. Therefore, examining them closely can teach us a lot about the ingredients necessary for a successful transition in the context of the former communist states.

1. Introduction

The course of development of the countries from the former Soviet bloc is often referred to as transitional, alluding to the countries’ expected transition to democracy. Analysts have often attempted incorporating those transitions into either the third or fourth waves of democratization. However, it is questionable whether these transitions can be incorporated under a single common taxonomy at all. Moreover, despite the temptation to cast them into the category of democracies, the majority of those countries can be characterized at most as quasi-democracies, feckless pluralities, or even electoral authoritarian states. After more than a decade of “reform and reconstruction”, many still suffer from chronic social and economic illnesses that render the very use of the term “transitional” irrelevant. In the words of Strobe Talbott, the former Soviet bloc got “too much shock and too little therapy.”¹ If one were to plot the

¹ Moises Naim. “Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?” *Foreign Policy Magazine*. October 26, 1999.

relative success of the various transitional stories of Eastern Europe, one would see a wide spectrum of results. On one end, a group of successful forerunners includes Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Czech Republic, along with a subgroup of this category, consisting of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—countries that were not as successful, but nevertheless joined the EU with the first group of Central European states. Next, one finds Bulgaria and Romania, whose limited success was marked by recent EU accession. On the less favorable end of the spectrum one finds Georgia and Kyrgyzstan along with the laggards of transition—also referred to as electoral dictatorships—including Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Belarus, where old authoritarian regimes seem to have “resolidified”. This paper will focus primarily on comparisons between Belarus and Ukraine on one hand, and the successful forerunners on the other. While useful insights can be achieved by comparing Ukraine and Belarus with states from any station on the above spectrum, the sharp contrast between transition in some cases and regression in others provides the best means of discussing the viability of Belarus and Ukraine according to more than one criterion.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin wall, the newly-emerged states were confronted with two options: piecemeal reforms or revolutionary changes to bring about democratization. The international community, the World Bank, and the

IMF vehemently advocated the latter, also known as the “big bang” approach. Ukraine and Belarus did not pursue either option whole-heartedly. Yet, it is worth enquiring whether these states had the “option” of genuine democratization at all. In fact, most democratization theorists predicted that Ukraine and Belarus would be doomed to fail in their first attempts to reform. It is therefore surprising that they have been subsequently criticized for their failure, and begs the question of what had changed in Ukraine by 2004 and why Belarus has failed to follow.

In general, theorists have underscored different conditions for the emergence of democracy. For example, class-based models of democracy, such as the one put forward by theorist Barrington Moore emphasize the significance of class struggles and predict political regimes depending on the groups that emerge triumphant. Applying this model to Ukraine and Belarus, it is easy to understand why the *nomenklatura* prevailed in the class struggle and precluded the possibility of an easy transition to democracy in 1991. On the other hand, modernization theorists have identified a critical threshold income level and industrialization as prerequisites for democracy.² When compared the Central European states, both Ukraine and Belarus were lagging under each of these indicators at the

² Adam Przeworski and F. Limongi. “Modernization—Theories and Facts.” *World Politics*, (49(2), 1997): 155–183.

start of the transition period. On yet a different track, scholars such as Dankwart Rustow have emphasized the importance of political pacts as a resolution to significant social conflicts on the basis of which democracies emerge. While Ukraine had many areas of social conflict, no such pact was ever established, even though some attempts have been made to cast the Orange Revolution into that category. Meanwhile, Belarus' direct transition to authoritarianism was not marked by either social conflict or a pact.

This paper will address the viability of each of these theories in turn; yet theoretical discussion may obscure the fact that both Ukraine and Belarus lacked the most basic condition of all for the emergence of democracy—a strong and functioning bureaucratic state. This reason above all others may help us understand why Ukraine and Belarus failed to become full-fledged democracies in the post-Soviet period, and why Belarus has been unable to match recent Ukrainian success.

2. An equal start?

To criticize Ukraine and Belarus for not having democratized in the manner of the Central European states (CEE) such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic or Slovakia relies on the premise that Ukraine, Belarus and the Central European states began from the same starting point in 1989-1991. It is true that any assessment of the post-Soviet transitional experiences usually presents similar results—monolithic

power structures, a general lack of a vigilant civil society or strong democratic traditions—all factors that did not allow for an easy and painless transition. Other common symptoms were the omnipresent corruption and economic malaise. There are a number of parallels that can be drawn to prove that the post-Communist experiences and challenges to Ukraine, Belarus, or any of other former Communist countries for that matter, were not unique. However, such arguments cannot be extended indefinitely and when extrapolated, often prove inaccurate. As experience has proven, states did not enter the transitional period on equal footing. In many ways the CEE was visibly better prepared to embrace democracy and market economy; the subsequent pages will reveal the extent to which Ukraine and Belarus occupied a different “transition tier” than Central Europe.

3. A modernization story?

Scholars of modernization theory, such as Adam Przeworski and Firmo Limongi, have established a positive correlation between economic development, social transformations, and the consolidation of democracy. Albeit tentatively, they have argued that economic constraints “play a role for the survival of democracy.”³ They propose a mean income threshold level of \$4,115 that, in their judgment, is critical for the emergence of

³ *ibid.*, 159.

democracy. Thus, Poland emerged as the dream case of modernization theorists. It “developed under a dictatorship, became wealthy, and threw [the] dictatorship” at the expected income level. According to these criteria, Poland reached the threshold of democracy in 1974 and in 1985.⁴ While data is unavailable for Ukraine prior 1991, its income per capita in 1991 was less than \$2,000, clearly disbaring the possibility for consolidating this new “democracy.”⁵ Interestingly, however, neither Ukraine nor Belarus have since gone beyond the mean threshold level of income. Ukraine’s GDP per capita for 2005 is \$1,768 while for Belarus it is \$3,163.⁶

Another key factor for modernization theory is the level of industrialization. Modernization theorists have argued that industrialization is essential for the emergence of middle class, civil society, and economic growth—factors that are all crucial for democracy. In general, most communist states underwent similar periods of industrialization that had a negative impact on their economies as central planners skewed their economic structures toward the heavy sectors of

industry.⁷ This was true in Ukraine and Belarus, despite their natural endowments. Even today, Ukraine’s economic structure is inherently flawed—about 12% of total output is produced in the traditionally strong agricultural sector while the overwhelming source of production remains in heavy industry such as machine-building and steel.⁸

Prior to independence, Ukraine was of strategic importance for the development of heavy industry in the rest of the Soviet Union. In 1989, it produced 34% of the Soviet Union’s steel and 46% of its iron ore and contributed over 40% of the industrial and 30% of the agricultural “net material product” of the USSR.⁹

⁴ *ibid.*, 161.

⁵ For more information, see the “Environmental Information Portal”, available at <http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/economics-business/country-profile-187.html>, accessed 11/05/05. Also, Table 3.

⁶ See Appendix—Tables 1 and 2.

⁷ Nevertheless, even at the time when they embarked on economic transitions in the 1990’s, the Central and Eastern European states had more balanced economies—a big part of their output was concentrated in the services sector which, on average, covered around 45% of GDP.

⁸ Classification by sector in 2004 showed that only 30-40% of the population is employed in the services sector. By way of comparison, in Bulgaria, one of EU’s lagging membership candidates, services account for about 2/3 of the national GDP. Because of the heavy emphasis on heavy-industry during the period of planned economy, the telecommunications and high-tech industry sectors are significantly underdeveloped in Ukraine.

⁹ Hugh Hinton, “Explaining Policy Choices in Transition Economies: Models of Economic Policy in Ukraine,” *International*

Belarus, too, specialized in heavy industry—primarily machine building and military production. After the total destruction of its industrial base during WWII, Belarus began renovation that allowed it to sustain higher labor productivity than many other former republics of the Soviet Union. However, soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the two states, having inherited a great number of the deficiencies of Soviet economy, faced serious problems. The cycles of production dictated by the USSR imposed an economic interdependency among the republics. In other words, any good produced in a given republic could not be completed without using the products or facilities of other republics. What is more, Russia was no longer an indispensable market for their products. Suffering from the protectionism of the European Union, Ukraine and Belarus could hardly find markets for their production. While the quality of their products was decreasing, costs increased because of the obsolete technology used. Moreover, heavy industry was largely dependent on imports of electricity and energy-carriers such as natural gas and oil from Russia, which made their economies vulnerable to external shocks and fluctuations in the value of the dollar—the major currency in the energy sector.

Journal of Economic Development. (2, 2000): 67–108.

The Central European states were similarly burdened by Communist economic planning, but nevertheless found themselves at an advantage.¹⁰ For example, Polish agriculture was never collectivized and as a result only 6% of Polish farms are larger than 15 hectares—the communist tendency for gigantism was somehow resisted.¹¹ The Czech Republic underwent industrialization prior to the Communist period; thus even the location of Czech industrial enterprises was advantageous compared to other Communist states where factories were built with little regard for the proximity of raw materials or transportation costs.¹² Moreover, after the uprisings of the 1950s and 1960s, Communists in CEE tried shifting the grounds of their

¹⁰ For comparison, see Table 3 of Appendix, which shows division along the lines of industry and the behavior of various economic indicators since 1990.

¹¹ A massive 38% of Polish population remains rural while agriculture accounts for almost 26% of all employment. See Crawford, Beverly. *Markets States and Democracy.* (San Francisco: West view Press 1995).

¹² Overall, Czechoslovakia scored better in such socioeconomic indicators as life expectancy and school enrollment, and had the most liberal foreign trade regime and the best stabilization performance between the world wars. See also Ham, J. Svejnar J. Terrell, K. *Unemployment and the Social Safety Net During Transitions to a Market Economy: Evidence From the Czech and Slovak Republics.* *The American Economic Review*, (Vol. 88, No. 5. Dec., 1998): 1117-1142.

legitimacy from the ideological to the economic. No longer able to justify their rule as the dictatorship of the *proletariat*, the party justified its rule by claiming it was necessary to achieve steady growth of production and welfare. In Hungary, the reform process began as early as the 1970s when the Communist party launched a gradual economic reform to introduce some free market elements to the economy. Both Hungary and Poland experienced tremendous foreign investment drives fueled by the import of technology and capital through foreign loans.¹³ Both Poland and Hungary engaged in significant trade relations with Western Europe. Even though they found themselves in the difficult position between its Com-econ partners and the European Community, this marked a first step of gradualism towards a market economy.

In spite of the fact that Ukraine and Belarus shared many of CEE's inherent economic problems, they had larger foreign debts and did not experience even the early stages of the capitalist transition seen in Poland and Hungary had. However, the fact that Czechoslovakia as well did not have market socialism begs the question of whether this was the key to the easy

¹³ For more information, see the Glenn E. Curtis, ed. *Poland: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1992 at <http://countrystudies.us/poland/50.htm>, accessed on 11/3/05.

transition of the Central European states.¹⁴ Moreover, even though there are grounds to conclude that Central and Eastern Europe had a marked economic advantage when compared to other states from the Communist bloc, there is not a consistent economic criterion or indicator in which the Central European states uniformly had an advantage vis-à-vis the rest. Before the transition, the three states differed in their democratic traditions and levels of economic development.¹⁵ A further problem is presented by the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, where success was achieved, eventually, despite no precedent of liberalization prior to the fall of the Soviet Union.

The key to this dilemma lays in the presence—or absence—of strong state bureaucracies states, required to shift the outcome of the class struggle and

¹⁴ It is still useful to consider that former Czechoslovakia had the second lowest level of foreign debt—a great advantage that allowed it to not assume drastic stabilization plans in the very short run.

¹⁵ Every state followed a path of economic transition that was suited to its needs—Poland resorted to shock therapy, Hungary successfully continued its gradualism and after dissolution, both Czech Republic and Slovakia tailored their economic policy to the relative level of development of their economies. See also, Paul Leo Dana. “The hare and the tortoise of former Czechoslovakia: reform and enterprise in Czech and Slovak Republic.” in *European Business Review*. (Bradford; 2000. Vol 12, Issue 6): 337.

allow for economic development once transition begins. Modernization theory does not do a good job of explaining the democratic impetus in Ukraine in 2004, but it does points to a very interesting trend—namely how the time and fashion of industrialization impact the chances for democracy. I will later return to this point since industrialization in Belarus and Ukraine, seen as a blessing of communism, affected the attitude and outlook of the political class and ordinary people.

4. Class Structure

In terms of class structure and civil society, Ukraine and Belarus were, once again, fairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis Central Europe. In general, democratic reforms are carried out by discontented elites who, from ideological or material motivations, are resolved to change the status quo. Poland's Solidarity, for example, was one such forum of discontented elites, a bulwark against repression to which neither Ukraine nor Belarus had any analogue. In fact, it is often argued that the CEE countries are quite distinct from the rest of the Soviet bloc. Positioned between the East and West, they share the common imprint of the Habsburg Empire and thus have a common cultural background associated with Western Christianity. This shared sense of common identity was further reinforced by Soviet oppression during the Cold War. The red bureaucratic strata were seen as an imposition of communism while communism itself was detested by the average citizen. In

sharp contrast to the Central European states, neither Ukraine nor Belarus formed dissident movements during the Brezhnev era nor were they as responsive to Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* as other members were.¹⁶ In addition, there were other societal factors working to the favor of the Central European states. Thus, Solidarity was aided by the strong presence of the church which, historically, has acted as a vigilant during the dark years of repression.¹⁷ Overall, the strong position of the Catholic Church, the emergence of independent trade unions, and the survival of private agriculture made Poland a special case in the socialist system.¹⁸ While Communism in Poland was brought down by the powerful push of Solidarity, in Hungary reformist Communists played a major role in toppling the regime. The most orthodox regime in the region—Czechoslovakia—simply collapsed

¹⁶ *Contemporary Belarus—Between Democracy and Dictatorship*. Ed. Elena Korosteleva. (Routledge, NY, 2003), 12.

¹⁷ While the influence of the Orthodox Church in general was severely curtailed during Communism, Ukrainian church was further disabled by being under the strict influence of Russia.

¹⁸ It has to be acknowledged that neither Czechoslovakia nor Hungary possessed such a genuine counterforce as the Solidarity movement even though Czechoslovakia had a sizeable and politically conscious working class and bourgeoisie. See Attila Agh., *The Politics of Central Europe*. (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1998).

after giving up its last hope of survival. In Ukraine and Belarus, however, that was not the case. In fact, it has been argued that Ukraine and Belarus did not have a legitimate aristocracy in the early 1990's nor were their political classes reformist. Regardless of whether one counts them as genuine elites or not, in both Ukraine and Belarus it was the *nomenklatura* that "won" the class struggle in the political vacuum of 1991.

In both Ukraine and Belarus, the *nomenklatura*—the outdated and overly convoluted Soviet regulatory system and the bureaucracy—were, and still remain, a major obstacle to establishing a functioning civil society. Ironically, it is the closest that Ukraine and Belarus have ever had to elites. During Soviet times, the *nomenklatura* had undue influence over the life of the average person. Even after they gained independence, the bureaucratic apparatus remained an active player on the political scene. "The fact that the [collapse of Communism] occurred without violence allowed the former Soviet elites to remain in place".¹⁹ The old elites, needless to say, were highly unwilling to relinquish their power. In Ukraine, however, the *nomenklatura* was further accommodated by the burgeoning underground world. Similarly to the way matters evolved in Russia, by extending capital and political protection to "outsiders" (most

of whom did not stand a feasible chance of running for office due to their ethnic or political profile), the old *nomenklaturchiki* ensured the financing of their future political campaigns from this emerging class of new "elites," also known as oligarchs.

Calling themselves new democrats, nationalists, and reformed socialists, the old bureaucrats were the ones expected to lead the country on the road to market economy and progress. However, the old elites had no interest in creating a system of checks and balances or a strong bureaucratic state once the old system collapsed. Stripping state assets and privatizing state enterprises at little or no cost seemed a far more attractive option. Consequently, joined in their efforts by the oligarchs, they led their countries on the road to catastrophe. Unlike the elite factions in Poland, the new Ukrainian "elites"—many of whom came from the underground circles of Ukrainian mafia—did not confront the totalitarian bureaucracies.²⁰ Neither did they reform themselves like Communists in Hungary. Rather, the two factions sought to collaborate more. They entered into comfortable relationships with one another, rearranged themselves under new party lines and platforms, and divided the state assets.

¹⁹ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine—A History*. (University of Toronto Press, 2000), 632.

²⁰ Alexander Motyl, "Structural Constraints and Starting Points: The Logic of Systemic Change in Ukraine and Russia" (Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No 4, Jul. 1997.): 433-447.

Even though the emphasis of reforms fell on state building, soon after its independence, Ukraine undertook a series of economic reforms. Prices were liberalized and privatization legislation was passed.

[P]rivatization, by creating ample scope for those with such ties to mobilize resources to centralize dispersed citizen-shares, makes such activity much more likely. Such quick privatization also creates owners with very little experience, knowledge, or ability to monitor from managers. This makes successful restructuring much less likely, which makes actors more likely to act exclusively in their private interest, and pursue parasitic satellite strategies.²¹

The political and economic vacuum that came as a consequence of large-scale privatization allowed for the emergence of clientelistic networks between the politically and financially empowered groups. In such environment, “shaped by the old bureaucratic elite, the country will very likely not experience a successful transition.”²² Rather, some of the most often recurring practices that emerged involved funneling out state reserves, exploiting political

²¹ Ibid.

²² Lawrence King. *Making Markets: “A Comparative Study of Post communist Managerial Strategies in Central Europe.”* In *Theory and Society: renewal and critique in social theory*, Vol. 30 (New York: Elsevier Scientific Publication, 2001).

connections and other machinations, which ultimately gave rise to the so-called *patrimonial* or *crony capitalism* where actors, “Utilize political power or clientelistic access to finance regularly to secure opportunities for profit or expand their businesses.”²³

The profitable relations between the oligarchs and the executive branch excluded the general population and resulted in the relentless impoverishment and misery of the people.²⁴ What is more, the government adopted inappropriate economic policies—loose monetary initiatives such as covering budget deficits by printing money, increasing money supply, and “emitting currency in the form of budgetary and off-budget credit subsidies to state-owned and other large enterprises”.²⁵ As a result, the country descended into a vortex of hyperinflation in 1993. By 1999, Ukraine had lost 60% of its 1991 output

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Not only did the oligarchs invest in buying off politicians, but they also started running for parliament. Having turned into business moguls, the above mentioned oligarchs became powerful to the extent they came to control good parts of the political, economic and public life.

²⁵ Robert S. Kravchuk, “Budget Deficits, Hyperinflation, and Stabilization in Ukraine: 1991-96” available at http://www.huri.harvard.edu/workpaper/kravchuk/mon_trends.html Also see Figure 1 in Appendix.

and the better part of the population descended into poverty.²⁶

The reason why things devolved in such fashion is that, unlike Central Europe, Ukraine did not have a strong Weberian state on the basis of which to build democracy. It did not have a bureaucratic state to provide regulatory leeway for the benefits of economic opening.²⁷ As Lawrence King has argued, “privatization and markets themselves do not lead to efficiency and development in the post-communist economy. Rather, their effects are dependent on the local social structure of the societies they impact.”²⁸ Because the spoils of Communism were of such nature that they could not be divided through social pacts and because the *nomenklatura* held the balance of power in 1991, Ukraine missed the path to democracy. Another reason why the red bureaucracy managed to “win” the class struggle was the absence of genuine democratic or state traditions.²⁹

²⁶ Country profile—Ukraine. Economist Intelligence Unit. Data accessed from <http://www.eiu.com/> at 3/3/06.

²⁷ The Freedom House index is another good measure of how Ukraine fared among other transitional states for the periods both preceding and following the collapse of Communism. See Appendix.

²⁸ King. *Making Markets*. 2001.

²⁹ Czechoslovakia came closest to making democracy work and the democratic process was interrupted by external, rather than internal, forces. Poland made an attempt at parliamentary democracy, but after 1926 it reverted to an authoritarian regime under the

Not only do Belarus and Ukraine lack any tradition of democracy, but they also had no substantial tradition of statehood. In fact, with the exception of Russia, after the collapse of the USSR, none of the former Soviet republics had civil society, rule of law, or autonomous culture. Each one of them “emerged without bona fide states, genuine elites...genuine cultures and hence without genuine nations.”³⁰ While Russia or any of the CEE states could use as a base and expand upon the state-structure they had inherited, Ukraine and Belarus did not have such an option.³¹ The question remains,

indirect rule of Marshal Pilsudski—the hero of the Polish-Russian war. Hungary went through a chaotic period after WWI when the short lived Soviet Republic was followed by two attempts by the last Austrian-Hungarian Emperor to regain his throne. She eventually managed to establish a democratic system, weighted towards conservatism, but it gradually shifted to authoritarianism under the Regent admiral Horthy, especially after 1932.

³⁰ Alexander Motyl, “Structural Constraints and Starting Points: The Logic of Systemic Change in Ukraine and Russia”, (*Comparative Politics*, Vol. 29, No 4, Jul. 1997.): 433-447.

³¹ Not surprisingly, most of the newly-independent states, including Ukraine under Kravchuk, engaged in intensive state-building. While Western observers have blamed Ukraine’s governing elite for the unusual stress they laid on state-building as opposed to rebuilding the economy, it is worth questioning how feasible it is to try to establish market economy without the foundation of a state.

however, if those issues had been resolved by 2004.

5. Ukraine in Orange

If Ukraine had remained an underdog in post-Soviet Eastern Europe, the saga of the 2004 elections revealed renewed prospects for fruitful transition to democracy. Despite the cataclysmic nature of the Orange Revolution itself, Ukraine's reversal of fortune was more directly related to a series of political developments which had coalesced slowly after 1991: a developed middle class, an empowered civil society, and more diversified industry; all of which acted to tip the political balance when the forces of liberalism were brought into conflict with the old regime—and all of which remained stunted in Belarus. In the following section, each of these dimensions will be explained in turn.

Economy: Despite many precedent shocks, by 2004 the Ukrainian economy had managed to progress and diversify significantly. For example, public services and the non-profit sector underwent significant growth and stood for more than half Ukraine's GDP in 2004.³² There was substantial progress in telecommunications, the production of drugs and pharmaceuticals, food processing and packaging equipment,

medical equipment, and information technologies.³³ A big boost of GDP owed to sectors such as metals and chemicals in response to a growing demand in Russia and Asia. In addition, there was a surge in steel exports to China. The government, with Viktor Yushchenko as Prime Minister, initiated several policies aiming at stimulating those sectors by forgiving tax arrears in the metals sector and by reducing railway transport costs.³⁴ In 2002, trade had almost doubled and GDP growth had reached 5.2%; the next year, it increased 9.6%; and in 2004 it grew by 12.1%.³⁵ Growth was sustained through strong domestic demand and growing consumer and investor confidence. Although the oligarchs took most advantage of the economic growth, it nonetheless also helped build on a new middle class and stronger civil society.

Civil Society and Freedom of Speech:

As arbiters of the strategic interaction between government and opposition, the citizenry had clear-cut and

³² See Appendix—Tables 1 and 4. Despite solid economic growth in 2004, high oil prices and political unrest led to an economic slowdown for 2005.

³³ For more information, see US Government Export Portal. Available at http://www.export.gov/comm_svc/press_room/marketofthefmonth/Ukraine/ukraine.html, accessed 3/3/06.

³⁴ Economist Intelligence Unit. Data accessed from <http://www.eiu.com/> at 3/3/06.

³⁵ See Table 4 in Appendix. Ukraine's annual economic growth increased from 6 % in 2000 to 9 % in 2001 and was steadily above 4 % in 2002. Economist Intelligence Unit. accessible at www.eiu.com, accessed 4/2/06.

pronounced preferences in 2004. The proliferation of foreign-funded NGO's helped tremendously for the emergence of a vigilant civil society. Reportedly, between 13 and 67 million US dollars were pumped in Ukraine through NGOs, the number of which reached 40,000 in 2004.³⁶ In addition, Ukrainian media had become more independent as measured by the Media Sustainability Index (MSI), accounting for independence, plurality of news sources and free speech. Consequently, ordinary people had a greater awareness of the endemic corruption, and realized the importance of 2004 elections. An attestation of this was the emergence of local, youth activist organizations similar to Serbia's "Otpor" and Georgia's "Kmara." Likewise, Ukraine's "Pora" ("It's time") was organized along Leninist *agitacni* principles and sought to uphold the revolution, by acting as a "spearhead of disaffected youth, holding demonstrations, policing rock concerts and, all the time, demanding accountability from the regime."³⁷

Even the Church—formerly suppressed under Communist rule—and the

military became forces in the Orange Revolution. Viktor Yushchenko received public support from several prominent religious figures who spoke out against the "immoral regime."³⁸ Meanwhile, the Ukrainian military and security services decision not to use force against protestors, despite demands from Yanukovych and other hard-liners, proved crucial. According to *New York Times* correspondent C.J.Chivers, "after the Interior Ministry unilaterally marshaled troops to attack the demonstrators, SBU leaders made it clear that they would use force to protect the protesters".³⁹

This made Ukraine's push for democracy in 2004 far more feasible than in 1991. Coupled with the significant international pressure to ensure the legality of the elections, it is a safe assumption that the balance of power in this case was tipped on the side of the democratic forces. Another revealing feature in 2004 was the fact that Ukraine's political institutions—the presidency, the parliament, the Supreme Court, and the political parties—had acquired political legitimacy, which became obvious during the crisis:

Even Yanukovych, after losing the presidential run-off of 27 December, proceeded to challenge Yushchenko's

³⁶ Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution", *Foreign Affairs*, (March/April. 2004).

³⁷"Ukraine's Clockwork Orange Revolution," British Helsinki Human Rights Group, at <http://www.bhhrg.org/CountryReport.asp?CountryID=22&ReportID=241&ChapterID=731&next=next&keyword=>, accessed 12/4/05.

³⁸ Economist Intelligence Unit. accessible at www.eiu.com, accessed 4/2/06.

³⁹ Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution." *Foreign Affairs*, (March/April. 2004).

victory in the central election commission and the supreme court. Ukraine had acquired formally democratic rules of the game under Kuchma, but it became clear during the revolution that these rules had stuck and were beginning to function as real democratic institutions.⁴⁰

Clearly, in 2004, the balance of power in the class struggle had tipped in favor of the emerging middle class, supported by the military and the church.⁴¹ While failing to fully explain the Orange Revolution, these factors provide additional insight as to why this democratic impetus emerged in 2004 instead of 1999 and why Belarus could not repeat this feat. Belarus in 2006 had achieved little progress on its way to democracy. In fact, the country was moving further toward authoritarianism. Despite meager attempts to produce a “color” revolution of their own, Belarussian demonstrations proved insufficient for the Lukashenko regime to be toppled. The following pages will

⁴⁰ Alexander J. Motyl. “Democracy is Alive in Ukraine” available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-ukraine/alive_2822.jsp, accessed 11/24/05.

⁴¹ The growing independence of media in Ukraine has been measured by the Media Sustainability Index (MSI). According to it, Ukraine has moved progressively up on the charts measuring independence, plurality of news sources and free speech. In contrast, Belarus is still in the bottom of the charts. For more information, see the International Research and Exchanges Board database available at <http://www.irex.org/msi/2005/summary.asp>.

relate the extent to which Belarus, adhering more strictly to Russia’s “super-presidentialist” model, escaped the oligarch curse but also precluded the possibility of any cracks for political and economic transformation.

6. Monopoly of power: Is Belarus authoritarian?

A different spin on the traditional class based models of democracy is provided by theorist Michael McFaul who, mimicking Weber, argues that the outcomes of transitions depend primarily on who holds the monopoly of power.⁴² After the 1991 coup in Moscow, the communists in Belarus were in disarray, allowing liberals and nationalists to take advantage.⁴³ A founder of the faction *Communists for Democracy*, Lukashenko came to power after the hasty elections in 1994, following the short rule of Stanislaw Shushkyevich. The factors that impeded democracy in Ukraine were valid in the case of Belarus, too. However, instead of simple *nomenklatura-oligarchy* collaboration, the result of class struggle in Belarus was an entrenchment of authoritarianism and super-presidentialism. This has proven

⁴² Michael McFaul. “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World.” *World Politics*, (54, 2002):212–244.

⁴³ *Contemporary Belarus—Between Democracy and Dictatorship*. Ed. Elena Korosteleva. (Routledge, NY, 2003), 24.

no more successful in political and economic terms, and has stunted the development of any sort of subterranean civil development similar to that which enabled Ukraine to reverse course.

Politically, Belarus has become little more than a quisling to Moscow. Lukashenko has not hid his strong pro-Russian orientation, sealed with a series of pacts giving significant political concessions to Russia in exchange for economic support and preferential prices in the energy market. The political rapprochement of the two countries was marked by a succession of treaties that envisioned harmonization of policies with respect to citizenship, monetary policy, defense and foreign policy.⁴⁴ In economic terms, things did not take a happy turn either. Even though Belarus has reported some economic growth for the last few years, “peculiarities in official Belarussian statistics” have put into question the reliability of this data. Over 40% of enterprises and a majority of collective farms are on the verge of bankruptcy and currently operate at a loss.⁴⁵ Lacking an independent central bank, Belarus became easy prey for

inflation as monetary practices such as the printing of money were regularly used to finance deficits. Inflation is the highest in the region, despite falling to 18% in early 2004.⁴⁶ Belarus has the lowest levels of FDI in the region and has firmly rejected Western economic assistance.⁴⁷ The Swedish furniture firm Ikea and Russian beer producer Baltika have decided to withdraw their business because of “unrealized government commitments or unwelcome interference”.⁴⁸

Ever since coming to power, Alexander Lukashenko has sought to maximize and centralize presidential authority. Through a referendum in 1996, widely denounced as non-democratic, Lukashenko managed to amend the 1994 constitution and extend his term in office. Not facing any censure for his actions, in 2005 Lukashenko attempted, once again, to use referendum in order to amend the constitution and allow himself to run for president unbound by term limits.⁴⁹ The parliamentary and

⁴⁴ Treaty on the formation of a community of Russia and Belarus (1996), the treaty on Russia-Belarus union, the Union Charter (1997), and the treaty of the formation of a Union State (1999). Economist Intelligence Unit, accessible at www.eiu.com

⁴⁵ *Contemporary Belarus—Between Democracy and Dictatorship*. Ed. Elena Korosteleva. (Routledge, NY, 2003), 24.

⁴⁶ Country Profile—Economist Intelligence Unit. accessible at www.eiu.com

⁴⁷ In 2004, Belarus rejected a World Bank loan to assist it fight AIDS and TB.

⁴⁸ Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit, accessible at www.eiu.com

⁴⁹ Throughout his presidency, Kuchma, too, attempted amending the electoral system to his advantage by looking to extend the number of terms the president is allowed to serve. However, more worrisome was his plan to transfer the election process from the general populace to parliament by allowing the *Rada* rather than the people to have the

presidential elections, held in 2000 and 2001 respectively, were marked by opacity and blatant violations of democratic principles. Human rights violations and election fraud in 2006 was documented by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), and even captured on camera.⁵⁰ The European Union and the United States were unwilling to recognize the 2006 election results and threatened to impose sanctions on Belarus.

Human Rights Watch has released several reports condemning the government for its repressive measures aiming to curb civil rights and liberties, including caps on foreign funding, limitations on access to newsprint and printing presses, censorship, suspending independent and opposition periodicals, and even detaining dissenting individuals. The outright imprisonment of MPs has become a disturbing fact of Belarussian political life, while others have been forcefully exiled. Former Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir, opposition leader Zianon Pazniak,

constitutional right to elect the president. Not surprisingly, his approval ratings fell to 7%. Fortunately, international pressure and fierce opposition paid off and these attempts were frustrated.

⁵⁰ The video and the report that ensued can be found at: <http://www.media-ocean.de/2006/03/26/does-youtube-video-proove-election-fraud-in-belarus/>. Accessed 5/1/06.

former Minister of Internal Affairs Iuryi Zakharenka and others are just a few examples. These facts speak not only to the authoritarian nature of the Belarussian regime, but to the obstacles that systematic authoritarianism presents to any endogenous move toward liberal development.

7. The Background Condition

A crucial element that proved an obstacle for both Belarus and Ukraine was the so-called "background condition" postulated by Dankwart Rustow as a vital component of democracy-building. The background condition asserts that for a democracy to emerge the "vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to".⁵¹ It is important to note that the background condition does not relate to ethnic homogeneity but rather, in this case, to the requirement that most Ukrainians or Belarussians associate politically with their respective states instead of having a mixed loyalty to both their governments and Russia. Thus, the ethnic homogeneity of Belarus is not a guarantee that the citizens will direct their loyalty towards the Belarussian state. While it is important to keep in mind that people can often times have multi-layered

⁵¹ Rustow, D. Rustow. "Transitions to democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." *Comparative Politics*, (2, 1970):337-363.

identities, and that does not necessarily preclude the emergence of democracy, the background condition is nevertheless a good measure of a country's social cleavages and a good predictor of class struggle.

While it is questionable to what extent it satisfies this condition presently, there is no doubt that Ukraine has historically been torn by factionalism and regionalism. It has been remarked that geography is destiny, and in no case does this seem more relevant than in the case of Ukraine. For most of its history, the territories of Ukraine had been parts of various multiethnic political empires. Those historical divisions have their contemporary expression in Ukrainian political life today, divided between the Russified East and the distinctly Ukrainian West which was not part of the Soviet Union until 1945. Despite the fact that it has avoided civil war or partition, unlike other formerly communist states such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, small-scale ethnic tension has been a problem in Ukraine since independence. Political divisions coincide with the language split; Russian is primarily spoken in the East, whereas Ukrainian predominates in the West. These regional disparities in Ukraine become obvious when analyzing the 2004 election results, despite their questionable authenticity. Variations were quite revealing: Yushchenko carried 17 regions in the western, central, and northeastern parts of the country, and Yanukovich held

sway in Ukraine's ten southern and eastern regions.⁵² These disparities become even more obvious when comparing media reactions to the elections in the east and the west. Whereas in eastern Ukraine Yushchenko and his team were castigated as "ultranationalists and CIA agents," they enjoyed significant support in western Ukraine. For example, TV stations UT 1, *Inter*, and 1+1 showed extensive pro-Yushchenko campaign ads while having little or no coverage of Yanukovich's campaign.⁵³ In contrast, *ICTV* and other eastern local channels heavily leaned toward Yanukovich.

The absence of crosscutting cleavages in Ukraine was a serious impediment for the country's transition to democracy in 1991. Clearly at no point in its post-Soviet life did Ukraine satisfy the background condition. Even though the 2004 election results were a good measure of how relevant regional disparities still are, it has to be accounted that institution building in the last 14 years has helped substantially to alleviate them. In fact, the argument has been made that the

⁵² Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution", *Foreign Affairs*, (March/April, 2004).

⁵³ "Ukraine's Clockwork Orange Revolution," British Helsinki Human Rights Group. For more information, at <http://www.bhhrg.org/CountryReport.asp?CountryID=22&ReportID=241&ChapterID=731&next=next&keyword>, accessed 12/4/05.

revolution itself emerged as the greatest cross cutting cleavage in Ukraine. If nothing else, this “transformation of Ukrainians from a passive populace into a self-conscious citizenry” may be the single most important legacy of the Orange revolution.

The above-mentioned clash between the pro-Slavic Russian identity and the pro-European sentiments are a characteristic of Belarus as well. After an extensive Russification campaign through the twentieth century, only a small portion of Belarussians speak their native language. Some scholars go as far as describing the above-mentioned phenomenon as a “lack of history.” Even Belarus “pundits” such as Vital Silitski and Jan Zaprudnik argue that without “sufficient nationalist feeling, it is difficult to create a cohesive modern state.”⁵⁴ Perhaps this is related to the fact that Belarus, in addition to being a weak state, never perceived the Soviet leadership as oppressive like Czechs or Hungarians or Poles did. In fact, in 1991, over 82.7% of Belarussians supported the preservation of the Soviet Union.⁵⁵ However, this is not that surprising since for Belarus the Soviet era brought industrialization, albeit inefficient, cultural development, and rule of law, which gave a silver lining to communist rule. In contrast, the Central European states had already

industrialized and developed a middle class and elites. The red bureaucratic strata were seen as an imposition of communism while communism itself was detested by the average citizen. While far from it being the rule, Communism was detested by important layers of society and perceived as a strange imposition. Whether one embraces the “background condition” or not, the above-mentioned comparison has two key implications: first, the majority of Belarus’ population still embraces the Communist idea and favors a rapprochement, if not a union, with Russia; second, the masses in Belarus will be difficult to unite in a struggle against Lukashenko. Thus, it becomes easy to understand why Belarus did not opt for democracy in 1991 and why the so-called “Denim Revolution” was not a genuine revolution.

8. Democracy-Triggers

A common theme among all theories of democratization, despite their differences, is the emphasis on political actors and “causers” of democratization. This “requirement” helps explain why the Orange Revolution occurred in 2004 and not in 1991. In 1991 Ukraine lacked a determined and ambitious leader to voice the discontent of the people and the opposition. That leader emerged in the mid 1990’s as Viktor Yushchenko, then chairman of Ukraine’s Central Bank, rose in rank. The occasion that brought him to prominence was the Russian financial crash in 1998, which

⁵⁴ *Contemporary Belarus—Between Democracy and Dictatorship*. ed. Elena Korosteleva. (Routledge, NY, 2003), 76.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

led to Yushchenko's temporary appointment as a prime minister and Yulia Timoshenko, one of the former gas oligarchs, as energy minister. Yushchenko and Timoshenko helped deregulate the economy, abolished countless decrees that granted tax exemptions to the oligarchs, preferential trade agreements, and subsidies. Drafting a balanced budget and targeting inflation led to a healthy GDP growth of 7-8% per annum and a 12% aggregate growth in industrial output.⁵⁶ Inflation reached weighted average annual rate of 7.52%, down from the 18.88% from 1992 to 2001.⁵⁷ Feeling their interests endangered, the oligarchs united with the communists to oust Yushchenko and to install puppets from the civil service instead. Ironically, removing Yushchenko from power transformed him from a technocrat into an opposition leader. The emergence of Yushchenko as someone who was willing to lead and invigorate the opposition made the push for democracy in 2004 much more viable than 1991. In Belarus, however, no such leader has emerged. Alexander Milinkevich did not prove to have the charisma or the political agility to lead

the failed "Denim Revolution." Milinkevich attempted to portray his campaign in terms similar to Yushchenko's in 2004, relentlessly touring Belarus and Western Europe but failing to spur sufficient momentum in the public.

9. Conclusion

The demise of Communism presented Eastern Europe with a myriad of opportunities, but various pitfalls as well. With it came the hasty expectation that the old Warsaw camp would quickly catch up with the rest of Europe. However, the leaders of these newly-emerged countries faced a daunting and unprecedented task – Introducing a market economy and democracy in countries whose markets were ravaged by decades of planned economics and whose societies were deeply affected by Communist rule. Despite Western commitments to help, no one was willing to underwrite the enormous costs of liberalization, privatization, and stabilization—the neo-liberal mantra. Few people seemed to remember that the few times in recent history when a market economy and democracy were introduced simultaneously when imposed by an external hegemonic power--post-WWII Japan and Germany. This clarifies the general challenge facing the former Communist states; some, such as Ukraine and Belarus, were disadvantaged even further.

It is an interesting fact that following the frameworks of several

⁵⁶ Ukraine's annual economic growth increased from 6% in 2000 to 9% in 2001 and was steadily above 4% in 2002. Economist Intelligence Unit.

⁵⁷ 2004 Index of Economic Freedom. Marc A. Miles, Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., Mary Anastasia O'Grady, and Ana I. Eiras available at <http://cf.heritage.org/index2004test/country2.cfm?ID=Ukraine> retrieved 07/31/04

democratization theories, Ukraine and Belarus were doomed to fail in their first attempt for democracy in 1991. Having emerged as an independent state tremendously burdened with its Soviet past, Ukraine and Belarus had, realistically speaking, little or no chance in making a successful leap to democracy in the first years of the decade. The absence of revolutionary elites, civil society, a functioning bureaucratic state or economy, among other factors, made that impossible. Both states lacked democratic traditions and were most heavily “injured” by Soviet hegemony. It is illogical to have expected them to transform following the pattern of Central Europe.

However, if Ukraine’s post-Soviet descent was inevitable, its future seems less pre-ordained. In fact, a great deal of it lies in the hands of Ukraine’s West-European neighbors and in the hands of Ukrainians themselves. The EU has to assume a proactive position in encouraging political and social reform in the country, while providing substantial financial support for the modernization of its economy. Of course, it is naïve to lay all responsibility to the EU or other International organizations. However, now that Victor Yushchenko has managed to mobilize a strong opposition or something resembling civil society, it falls to the EU and the international community to give Ukraine a helping hand in the form of political and economic support. Otherwise, if left alone to cope with the remnants of a discontented oligarchy,

this fragile civic movement will fail, political reform will be futile, and the economy will remain stagnant. Meanwhile Belarus shares no similar cause for optimism. The antiquated forces of authoritarianism appear sufficiently entrenched to prevent the flourishing of foundations for a liberal political society. Only time will fully reveal the prospects for success of any such transition.

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APPENDIX**Table 1: Ukraine: Economic Indicators 2001–2005**

Ukraine	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
GDP at market prices (HRN bn)	204.2	225.8	267.3	344.8	423.4
GDP (US\$ bn)	38	42.4	50.1	64.8	82.6
Real GDP growth (%)	9.2	5.2	9.6	12.1	2.1
Consumer price inflation (av; %)	12	0.8	5.2	9	13.5
Population (m)	48.2	47.8	47.4	47	46.7
Exports of goods fob (US\$ m)	17,091	18,669	23,739	33,432	35,278
Imports of goods fob (US\$ m)	-16,893	-17,959	-23,221	-29,691	-36,630
Current-account balance (US\$ m)	1,402	3,174	2,891	6,804	1,626
Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (US\$ m)	2,955	4,241	6,731	9,302	19,040
Total external debt (US\$ bn)	12.7	13.5	16.3	20.6	22.5
Debt-service ratio, paid (%)	10.8	13.8	12.6	12.4	12.1
Exchange rate (av) HRN:US\$	5.37	5.33	5.33	5.32	5.12
GDP Per Capita	0.78838	0.88702	1.05696	1.37872	1.76873

(c) Economist Intelligence Unit 2006

Table 2: Belarus: Economic Indicators 2001–2005

Belarus	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
GDP at market prices (BRb bn)	17,173	26,138	36,565	49,445	62,728
GDP at market exchange rate (US\$ bn)	12.4	14.6	17.8	22.9	29.1
Real GDP growth (%)	4.7	5	7	11	9.2
Consumer price inflation (av; %)	61.1	42.5	28.4	18.1	10.3
Population (mid-year; m)	10	9.9	9.8	9.8	9.8
Exports of goods fob (US\$ m)	7,334	7,965	10,073	13,917	16,083
Imports of goods fob (US\$ m)	-8,141	-8,879	-11,329	-15,983	-16,319


m)

Current-account balance (US\$ m)	-394	-311	-424	-1,043	852
Reserves excl gold (US\$ m)	391	619	595	749	1,215
Exchange rate (official; av; BRb:US\$)	1,390.00	1,790.90	2,051.30	2,160.30	2,153.80
GDP Per capita	2.638298	2.92	2.542857	2.081818	3.163043

(c) Economist Intelligence Unit 2006

Figure 1:

Change in Ukrainian Monetary Aggregates (1991 - 1996, By Quarter)



* Courtesy of Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.

Table 3: Ukraine: Composition of Trade**Main composition of trade—Ukraine**

(US\$ m; fob-cif)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Exports fob					
Non-precious metals	6,468	6,720	7,126	8,492	13,051
Machinery & equipment	1,859	2,340	2,631	3,634	5,661
Fuel & energy, incl ores	1,273	1,614	2,086	3,293	4,066
Food, beverages & agricultural products	1,378	1,824	2,389	2,732	3,473
Total exports incl others	14,573	16,265	17,957	23,080	32,675
Imports cif					
Fuel & energy, incl ores	6,419	6,590	6,940	8,341	10,665
Machinery & equipment	2,625	3,379	3,791	5,723	7,794
Chemicals	1,647	1,959	2,218	1,771	2,248
Food, beverages & agricultural products	908	1,126	1,114	2,174	1,908
Total imports incl others	13,956	15,775	16,977	23,021	28,997

Source: Ministry for the Economy and European Integration.

(c) Economist Intelligence Unit 2006

DEMOCRACY (DIS)CONNECTED - DISCOURSES OF DEMOCRACY AND OF THE INTER-WAR PERIOD AS (MIS)GUIDING LIGHTS IN THE HISTORY TEXTBOOKS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND ROMANIA.

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Abstract

Debates about what societies should remember abound; usually these involve somewhat traumatic histories. However, for the relatively young democracies of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the question of how democracy and societal experience with it are remembered might prove important for the future. This article will analyse the history textbooks of Romania and the Republic Moldova according to their representation of the inter-war period, which amounts, arguably, to the only “tradition” for Romanian and Moldovan democracy. This article will thus attempt to uncover the implicit meaning and historicization of democracy in Romania and the Republic of Moldova.

1. Introduction

Remembering and forgetting are both vital activities of the individual and, arguably, the societal psyche (if something of the like exists). Usually, they are discussed in relation to highly

traumatic times where questions of victimhood, guilt and suffering are involved. Much of the literature on remembering is connected to WWII and the holocaust or is referring to the broader logic of history politics (*Geschichtspolitik*), propaganda and the nation-state. Now, historians have begun looking at how Communism is remembered in post-socialist societies, but this period of time perhaps still figures within the negative and traumatic paradigm.¹ Yet, what about times and contexts which are neither of these? Time and aspects, which are neither negative or national? What about the tradition, memories and narrative of democracy? How do democratic societies remember their path towards and their experience with democracy?

As a typical case for memory questions in relation to democracy, the Weimar

¹ Cf. Andreas Helmedach (ed.) *Die Zeit des Sozialismus in deutschen und tschechischen Schulgeschichtsbüchern/ The socialist period in German and Czech history textbooks* (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung: 2004 [Internationale Schulbuchforschung/International Textbook research 4 (2004)]; Catalina Mihalache. “Communism in post-Communist history textbooks. What to be remembered?” *Xenopoliana* 2-4/XI (2003): 123-142.

Republic assumes a special role in German history. As the German historian Hagen Schulze writes in the introduction to his history of Weimar that the history of the Weimar republic will always to some extent be a political history.² The prism is clear: How could German democracy fail? How was National Socialism possible? How was, then, Auschwitz possible? Clearly, Greater Romania is not Weimar Germany. Yet, looking back the history of Romanian democracy might as well offer some insights. But what exactly are we to learn from it? Edward H. Carr writes that: “[t]he function of history is to promote a profounder understanding of both past and present through the interrelation between them.”³ Although, some historians noted, there has been a tendency to learn the “wrong” lessons from history.⁴

That the inter-war period is something of a critical time in the history of the Romanian and the Moldovan state becomes constantly clear again. It does not need such statements as that of Moldovan Premier Voronin (in 2005) that in fact Basarabia was under “Romanian occupation” when it

belonged to Greater Romania.⁵ Regardless how we view this time in history, it is proposed here that it is a crucial time, because it establishes and in fact is *the* “tradition” for present-day Romanian and Moldovan democracy. The inter-war years were, arguably, the first and only experiment in democracy (in the Western style) here before the revolutions of 1989 and 1991. There are some societal actors which suggest a clear continuation of inter-war democracy in the time after 1989/1991; indeed, in the Moldovan context we find actors which set the interwar years in some way parallel to the time after 1991: they use it as a guiding light, describing what is an attainable goal for Moldovan society. While history is much more politicized in the Republic of Moldova than it is in Romania, there are also some aspects connected to inter-war history like the “Antonescu cult” or the discussions surrounding the Romanian holocaust which warrant special attention to the Romanian experiment in democracy just the same.⁶

² Hagen Schulze, *Weimar. Deutschland 1917-1933* (Berlin et al.: Siedler/BTB 2000), xi.

³ Edward H. Carr, *What is History? 2nd ed.* (London et al.: Penguin 1990), 68.

⁴ Cf. the discussion in Evans, Richard J. *In Defence of History* (London: Granta, 2000).

⁵ “Ce final va avea epidemia aceasta de revolutii? (Fragmente dintr-un interviu cu Vladimir Voronin)” *Contrafort* 1-2 (ianuarie-februarie 2005). [<http://www.contrafort.md/2005/123-124/795.html>]; cf. “Nu asteptam un raspuns imediat din partea presedintelui Putin (Interviu cu Traian Basescu)” *Revista 22* 781 (februarie-martie 2005). [<http://www.revista22.ro/html/index.php?nr=2005-02-25&art=1540>].

⁶ Cf. Mariana Hausleitner, „Das Ende des Antonescu-Kultes? Zum Verhältnis von

Romanian and Moldovan history textbooks are analysed in relation to their representation of inter-war history as well as the interpretations and connections they offer. The role of history textbooks and history teaching in general as a transmitter and identifier of tradition, morality and identity is beyond question. A specific focus will be given to the narrative setting as well as the narrative role the inter-war period assumes; it will not focus on factual errors or “misrepresentations”. The article will introduce the textbook situation with some general background remarks on their role in the two societies. The analysis itself will start with the discourse of the Romanian textbooks and then proceed to the periphery: the Republic of Moldova. The Republic of Moldova is a special case in many regards; here two discourses will be discussed: the Romanianist and the Moldovanist one.⁷

Geschichte und Politik in Rumänien nach 1990,“ *Südosteuropa* 7-9/51 (2002), 412-430; Vladimir Solonari, „Review of Achim and Iordache’s *România si Transnistria: Problema Holocaustului*,” *East European Politics and Societies* 2/20 (2006), 373-377.

⁷ On the general developments in the Republic of Moldova and the identity conflict cf. Wim P. van Meurs. “Carving a Moldavian identity out of history”, *Nationalities Papers* 1 (1998): 39-56; Wim P. van Meurs. “Moldova – nationale Identität als politisches Programm”, *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen* 4-5 (2003): 31-43; Stefan Ihrig, Wer sind die Moldawier? Rumänismus und Moldowanismus in Historiographie und

It will be analysed, if the inter-war period is really a guiding light, i.e. if this period of time is contextualised as the only previous time of democracy and thus its shortcoming, faults and successes are appreciated. Accordingly, it will also be analysed, what the guiding qualities are, i.e. what the content of “Romanian democracy” is in this context - what does democracy as a *telos* mean? The deficiencies and shortcomings of Romanian inter-war democracy have been analysed elsewhere and are well documented;⁸ it is not the aim of this analysis to measure discourse against some “historical reality”. Instead, an analytical re-construction of the time and the connected concepts is attempted - in its own right and with its internal implications.

2. History, historiography and the significance of the past in the Republic of Moldova and Romania

If we analytically group Romania and the Republic of Moldova together, the inter-war period enters quite different historiographical and political contexts. In Romania, questions about national

Geschichtsschulbüchern der Republik Moldova, 1991-2006. (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag: in print) [Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society].

⁸ In addition to the literature cited elsewhere in this article cf.: Hans-Christian Maner, *Parlamentarismus in Rumänien (1930 - 1940): Demokratie im autoritären Umfeld*, (München: Oldenbourg, 1997).

dignity, perhaps of resistance to a deconstruction of national historical truths became obvious in the so-called Mitu-controversy evolving around the experimentally textbook authored by Sorin Mitu.⁹ Here the influence of nationalism theory was harshly rejected by the critics, who defended an essentialist reading of the nation's history. While this conflict can be labelled "progressive vs. conservative", the historical background is somewhat different in Moldova. Here, we are faced with at least two opposing identity-political movements - Romanianism vs. Moldovanism - trying to shape the destiny of the state through their reading of history. Moldovanism proclaims the separateness of Moldova's ethnic Romanians as a Moldovan nation; and Romanianism claims that the ethnic Romanians are part of the wider Romanian nation, making national unification the logical consequence of their discourse.¹⁰

Although political Moldovanism has been in power since 1994, historiographical Romanianism was able to leave its imprint in the textbooks, which appeared in the time from 1996 until 2003. Hence these textbooks will be referred to as "Romanianist textbooks". Moldovanism has been remarkably unable to imprint its own historiographical world view on history teaching as well as textbooks and thus to disseminate its views through a school system. According to traditional nationalism theory, however, we would expect the political hegemonist to wield an absolute power over the education system. This cannot be explained here in detail,¹¹ but suffice it to say, that history has become one of the prime goals as well as arenas of conflict in the Republic of Moldova. Only slowly and most poignantly in 2006 has ruling Moldovanism been able

⁹ Cf. Dan Pavel, "The textbooks scandal and rewriting history in Romania - Letter from Bucharest," *East European Politics and Societies* 14/2 (2000), 179-189; Razvan Raraianu, "National prejudices, mass media and history textbooks: The Mitu controversy" in *Nation-Building and Contested Identities - Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies* ed. Balázs Trencsényi, Dragos Petrescu; Cristina Petrescu, Constantin Iordachi and Zoltán Kántor (Budapest: Regio Books; Iasi: Polirom, 2001), 93-117.

¹⁰ Although some historians from Moldova have argued that espousing Romanianist discourse does not necessarily imply the

need for unification, like Igor Casu, the logic of unification is very much inherent in their discourse as my broader analysis has shown. Igor Casu, "Some Considerations on Ethnic Identity and Nationalism in Bessarabia in the 19th – 20th Centuries" in *In memoriam professoris Mihail Muntean - Studii de istorie moderna*, ed. Valentin Tomulets (Chisinau: CE USM 2003), 253-259, here: 257; Ihrig, *Wer sind die Moldawier*.

¹¹ Stefan Ihrig, "Attainment nationalism vs. maintenance nationalism – The case of Moldova and nationalism theory", In *In Search of a Common Regional History - The Balkans and East Asia in History Textbooks* ed. Nobuhiro Shiba (Tokyo: University of Tokyo: 2006): 173-209.

to assert its power and has introduced the so-called integrated history textbooks. Although again not all of the authors or views expressed within these books are necessarily “Moldovanist”, the representation of the inter-war period follows closely the Moldovanist discourse presented in other publications, some of which were also distributed in schools for use.¹²

Whatever the differences might be - history seems to be important in both societies and in fact Peter Niedermüller’s analytical reading of the historians in post-Socialist countries comes to mind. He described the role of a historian in such societies as that of an archaeologist, who has to renovate, reconstruct and (re-) nationalise history from the rubbles of the communist past.¹³ Such are the heightened responsibilities conferred upon the historian by and assumed by him in such societies; Moldova and Romania hardly seem to differ in this respect. All the more the essence of what is “restored” and what it may mean to contemporary Romanian and Moldovan societies is important. In the last resort, the inter-war period is, chronologically,

the first period of time, when pupils studying history will have the chance to see what democracy in their own society has meant in the past; where they study the history of Romanian democracy. In order to illustrate the role the interwar period plays in the various discourses, I will re-construct the presentation of it according to each of the three main discourses:

1. Romanian textbook historiography;
2. Romanianist textbook historiography
3. Moldovanist textbook historiography.¹⁴

While they have to be somewhat typologized for such a representation, attention to the details of discourse will be paid. The Romanian textbooks used are those published after 1991; in all three samples I am offering a sample analysis, paying special attention to the newest available ones.

3.1 Romanian textbook historiography

The Romanian textbooks reconstruct a biography of the nation that stretches back to the ethnogenesis of the Romanians. The modern nation is bound to the nation-state and thus the modern narrative begins with the foundation of the Romanian nation-state in the 19th century.¹⁵ The narrative

¹² So for example Stati’s monograph: Vasile Stati, *Istoria Moldovei* (Chisinau: Vivar - Editor 2002); although government officials claim this never happened. Anton Moraru, *Stiinta istorica în contextul intereselor politice* (Chisinau: Pontos 2003), 52-53.

¹³ Peter Niedermüller, “Zeit, Geschichte, Vergangenheit – Zur kulturellen Logik des Nationalismus im Postsozialismus,” *Historische Anthropologie* 5 (1997): 245-267, here: 253-254.

¹⁴ Only exemplary reference to textbooks will be made. For broader referencing cf. Ihrig, *Wer sind die Moldawier*.

¹⁵ Cf. Mihaela Selevet, Ecaterina Stanescu, Marilena Bercea, *Istorie. Manual pentru clasa a X-a* (Bucuresti: Corint 2005), 36; Giurescu, Dinu C., Anisoara Budici, Mircea Stanescu, Dragos Tigau: *Istorie. Manual*

then rises to the union of 1918, which is the natural conclusion of a process which began with the union of Walachia and (Western) Moldova; while some narratives stress that union was the prime goal of the Romanians since 1848,¹⁶ it is narrated with remarkably little euphoria.¹⁷ Implicitly, it becomes clear that the union of 1918 was a liberation of the other Romanians as the previous times within the Hungarian and Tsarist Empires are described as “foreign occupations”.¹⁸ The usual narrative further pays particular attention to how the union is presented from a legal perspective. First, it is stressed that the provinces declared independence. Only in a second step they decided in favour of union. The plebiscitary character of the decision is stressed in each case.¹⁹ This micro-narrative is repeated for each case: Transylvania, the Banat, the Bukovina and Bessarabia. What goal the narratives have here, however, is

not entirely clear. We can only speculate that this is also levelled against Hungarian claims to Transylvania and possible claim to the invalidity of the declarations of union. The textbooks narrative claims that these followed closely the principle of “self-determination”. This is then, later in the narrative, used to justify why local autonomy was destroyed and a “unitary Romanian state” was created.²⁰

One of the most striking similarities of the Romanian textbooks in relation to the inter-war period is the presentation of the minority-majority relations. Many of the textbooks feature a chapter entitled “Unity and diversity in Greater Romania” (*Unitate si diversitate în România Mare*).²¹ Yet, both aspects - unity as well as diversity - receive almost no further qualification. Diversity is, when at all, clumsily described by such sentences relating, that there were other ethnic groups, “yet the majority of the population were ethnic Romanians.”²² It seems as if “diversity” is seen as a threat and a problem that the political system somehow had to deal with. While it is probably true that ethnic and religious diversity will need different actions by a political system than a relatively homogenous society would call for,

pentru clasa a X-a (Bucuresti: Editura Sigma 2005), 46.

¹⁶ Selevet et al., *Istorie*, 37; Such narratives are backed up and completed with chapters on the Romanians outside the borders. Cf. Nicoleta Dumitrescu, Mihai Manea, Cristian Nita, Adrian Pascu, Aurel Trandafir, Madalina Trandafir, *Istoria Românilor. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a* (Bucuresti: Humanitas 2005), 90-92.

¹⁷ Giurescu et al., *Istorie*, 86; Ovidiu Bozgan, *Istorie. Manual pentru clasa a 12-a* (Bucuresti: 2000).

¹⁸ Dumitrescu, *Istoria. 2005*, 134.

¹⁹ An explicit assumption of this: *ibid.*, 131; Bozgan, *Istorie*, 89.

²⁰ Dumitrescu, *Istoria. 2005*, 134.

²¹ So for example in: Dumitrescu, *Istoria. 2005*; Bozgan, *Istorie*.

²² „Totusi, majoritatea populatiei era reprezentata de români: 71,9%”, Dumitrescu, *Istoria. 2005*, 134.

what “diversity” might imply and what the benefits of it may be, are not explained, not even hinted at. That in fact diversity is a “normal” aspect of every society, and that diversity exists not only in relation to ethnicity and religion but also in relation to political and moral beliefs, values, sexual orientation, economic interests etc. escapes the textbooks totally. It is all narrowed down to a clear assumption: we will need to “solve ethnic diversity” (i.e. the problems arising from it). An exemplary chapter heading for this kind of approach would be that of Bozgan’s textbook “Ethnic diversity, religious diversity and political solutions”.²³

When taking a closer look of how the problems of the inter-war period are described, it becomes clear that the primary lens of the narrative is the nation. Its secondary lens is that of “minority problems”. For example when the urban-rural relationship is discussed, it is mentioned that the ethnic population ratio was “unfavourable to the Romanians”.²⁴ In the context of economic and urban life, it is remarkable, that in the Romanian textbooks we sometimes find the term “Romanianization”.²⁵ The wider implications for democracy and civic rights posed by Romanianization, which have already received the attention of a

series of publications,²⁶ and what it actually meant for the minority populations it was targeted against, are not discussed at all²⁷ - as if “Romanianization” logically derives from the “problems” posed by “diversity”.

The period in which a democracy existed is limited by most Romanian textbooks to the time up to 1938.²⁸ Afterwards a dictatorial monarchy was introduced - one textbook explains: the internal and external circumstances were difficult.²⁹ Other textbooks acknowledge that democracy in Romania was on a downhill slope in the

²³ Bozgan, *Istorie*, 97.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 140.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 140, 164.

²⁶ Mariana Hausleitner, *Die Rumänisierung der Bukowina – Die Durchsetzung des nationalstaatlichen Anspruchs Großrumäniens 1918-1944* (München: R. Oldenbourg, 2001); Mariana Hausleitner, *Deutsche und Juden in Bessarabien 1814-1941. Zur Minderheitenpolitik Russlands und Großrumäniens* (München: IKGS, 2005); Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania - Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle 1918-1930* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2000).

²⁷ One textbook describes at lengths what the „integration“ of the provinces meant in an administrative way; yet remains very technical. Stelian Brezeanu, Adrian Cioroianu, Florin Müller, Mihai Sorin Radulescu, Mihai Retegan: *Istoria Românilor. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a. Editia a II-a* (Bucuresti: Editura Rao, 2000), 162-3; cf. Bozgan, *Istorie*, 93.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 89.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

whole Thirties.³⁰ The time from 1940 to 1944 is described in one textbook as a “war regime” (*regim de razboi*).³¹ While there is room for disagreement when democracy ended, Romanian textbooks most agree that what existed before was a democracy proper.³² Some mention that the relationship between legislative and executive was reversed in the constitutional system following the constitution of 1923, but that still qualifies as a normal “democracy” for them; the problems flowing from such a relationship is not discussed. Some textbooks admit that the functioning of democratic mechanisms was complex and difficult.³³ The only instances, when it is discussed what democracy might have meant to the ordinary citizen, is when the books refer to their newly granted rights. However, here a mere reference to the text of the constitution seems to suffice, the reality of the law and the rights in the time escapes the books.³⁴ It is only stressed that the Romanian state after 1918 set out to achieve the total political equality in all spheres of society.³⁵ In other respects as well, the narrative of Greater Romania is one of success. Especially the progress in the social and economic sphere is mentioned; some textbooks

present how urban life improved in this time.³⁶

The compartmentalisation of narrative and discourse³⁷ in these textbooks achieves the feat that “democratic regimes” and “totalitarian regimes” in the inter-war time are described totally apart; the one has nothing to do with the other.³⁸ The textbooks paint a wholly positive picture of the time between 1918 and 1938. Their main lens is the nation. Yet, they remain somewhat superficial on the meaning of the inter-war years. Unification, they stress, concluded the Romanian struggle for emancipation.³⁹ That emancipation can mean more than just to live together in one state does not become clear. They narrate national emancipation, not political emancipation.

³⁰ Dumitrescu, *Istoria*. 2005, 151.

³¹ Brezeanu, *Istoria*, 21.

³² Dumitrescu, *Istoria*. 2005, 137.

³³ *ibid.*, 156.

³⁴ Bozgan, *Istorie*, 97.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 97.

³⁶ Burlec, Liviu, Liviu Lazar, Bogdan Teodorescu: *Istoria Românilor. Manual pentru clasa a IV-a* (Bucuresti: All, 1997), 94.

³⁷ Compartmentalisation of historical periods rendering them isolated and disconnected times has already been uncovered in relation to Communism, cf. Mihalache, *Communism*, 140.

³⁸ Cf. Valentin Balutoiu, *Istorie. Manual pentru clasa a XI-a* (Bucuresti: : Editura Didactica si Pedagogica 2000). Just some stress that the battle between democracy and authoritarianism was the main theme of the inter-war period; without explaining what this meant. Dumitrescu, *Istoria*. 2005, 135.

³⁹ Bozgan, *Istorie*, 97.

3.2 *Romanianist textbook historiography in Moldova*

The Romanianist narratives of the textbooks of the Republic of Moldova published between 1996 and 2003 offer, broadly speaking, a similar narrative as the textbooks of Romania.⁴⁰ Yet, in comparison to Romanian textbooks, the Romanianist textbooks of Moldova pinpoint the beginning of the modern history of the Romanians almost exclusively to the union of 1918. When the developments in the Romanian principalities up to the union is described, Romanianist texts offer solely a very dry and factually oriented account. More attention is given to the struggle of the Romanians outside both Walachia and Western Moldova; especially those in Transylvania, the Bukovina and Bessarabia. If pre-WWI-Romania is described at all, then the

⁴⁰ Indeed after 1991 for a time textbooks from Romania were also used in the Republic of Moldova. There is also some overlapping in authorship between the two states: Ion Scurtu for example is author of textbooks in both Romania and Moldova. Ioan Scurtu, Gherghe Dondorici, Vasile Ionescu, *Istorie*, (Târgoviste: Editura Gimnasium, 2000); Ioan Scurtu, Marian Curculescu, Constantin Dinca, Aurel Constantin Soare, *Istoria Românilor. Din cele mai vechi timpuri pâna astazi. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a* (Bucuresti: Editura Petron, 1999); Ioan Scurtu, Ion Siscanu, Marian Curculescu, Constantin Dinca, Aurel Constantin Soare, *Istoria Românilor – Epoca contemporana. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a* (Chisinau: Prut International, 2001).

Romanianist textbooks of the Republic of Moldova stress that there was progress and positive development in all parts of Romanian society - which is contrasted against the backwards and retarding Tsarist regime in Bessarabia. Here, and in the following, it becomes clear that the prime lens is the nation as well.

The union of 1918, however, is represented with enormous joy and euphoria. Almost all of the textbooks feature illustrations of “unification *horas*” (meaning “unification dances”). While arguably for all the textbooks of Romania and of Moldova the inter-war years are of a high importance, in the Romanianist case it is the single most important time in the whole narrative of the nation and of the books from its beginnings until today. In other places I have argued that the inter-war years assume the function of *the* “golden age” for the Romanianist textbooks and indeed for the Romanianist discourse in Moldova.⁴¹ While chronologically distant times are important as well, for example the time of Stefan cel Mare or Mihai Viteazu, the inter-war time is the only time which is constantly re-referenced to across time; it is *the* “functional golden age” of the discourse. Stefan cel Mare’s time is described in much glorifying detail as well, but it does not play a referential role again in most discourses; the inter-war period, however, does. When the time after 1989/91 is narrated, we find

⁴¹ Cf. Ihrig, *Wer sind die Moldawier?*

constant back-referencing and even the attempt to set both times parallel (cf. below). This is achieved by the ascription to the Romanians of their main national characteristic: The textbook claim that the main characteristic of the Romanians throughout history has been to strive towards the unity of all Romanians. The union of 1918 is the most natural and successful conclusion of the history of the Romanians - only to be spoiled by the Soviet Union and WWII. Accordingly the story of the inter-war years is presented as a unique story of success; even more than in the textbooks of Romania.⁴² Above all the economic and cultural progress of Bessarabia within Greater Romania is stressed time and again in the narratives.⁴³ Problems are almost completely absent in the narratives; that in fact there was growing resentment among some of the Bessarabian elites with the treatment by Bucharest is not a topic at all.⁴⁴ In fact the narratives

imply that all problems were solved with Union, which was administratively completed by 1922; problems resulting from the union are non-existent here.⁴⁵ The Romanianist textbooks of Moldova convey the impression that progress and liberty can only be found in the union with all co-nationals; further political questions and improvements are not a topic: democracy, liberty and progress are embodied and fulfilled within the united nation in its nation-state.⁴⁶ The inter-war period, it follows logically, is the only period in Moldovan history that is singularly - encompassing all aspects of societal life - portrayed as a positive time.⁴⁷

3.3 *Moldovanist (textbook) historiography in Moldova*

This high value of the time within the Romanianist narrative is mirrored in the historiographic Moldovanist discourse⁴⁸

⁴² Cf. Scurtu, *Istoria Românilor – Epoca contemporana*, especially page 14; Nicolae Enciu, *Istoria Românilor – Epoca contemporana. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a de liceu* (Chisinau: Civitas, 2003), 34.

⁴³ *ibid.*, 62; Boris Vizer, Tatiana Nagnibeda-Twerdohleb, *Istoria Românilor – Epoca contemporana. Manual pentru clasa a IX-a* (Chisinau: Stiinta, 2003), 18, 28; Gheorghe Palade, Igor Sarov, *Istoria Românilor – Epoca contemporana. Manual pentru clasa a IX-a* (Chisinau: Cartdidact-Reclama, 2002), 3, 16, 28.

⁴⁴ Cf. the famous exclamation of Bessarabian deputies in the Bucharest

Parliament, that Bessarabia shall not be treated like an „African colony“. Hausleitner, *Deutsche und Juden*, 103.

⁴⁵ Cf. Enciu, *Istoria*, 6.

⁴⁶ Cf. Ion Varta, Igor Sarov, *Istoria Românilor – Epoca moderna 1850-1918. Manual pentru clasa a VIII-a* (Chisinau: Cartdidact-Reclama, 2003), 61.

⁴⁷ Cf. especially Scurtu, *Istoria Românilor – Epoca contemporana*, 33.

⁴⁸ Historiographic exponents of post-Soviet Moldovanism are: Stati, *Istorie*; Moldovan, Petre P. (=Vasile Stati), *Moldovenii în istorie* (Chisinau: Poligraf-Service, 1993), Andrusceac, V.E. et al., *Istoria Republicii Moldova din cele mai vechi timpuri pîna în zilele noastre* (Chisinau: Elan Poligraf, 2003

and in the so-called integrated history textbooks by a portrayal of a dark time; the inter-war period as the *negative* defining time of the Moldovan nation. The Moldovanist narratives start by highlighting the fact that the union with Romania was an unjust act of aggression and manipulation. The evolution from the initial *Sfatul Tarii* in 1917 to union is re-narrated with a stress that when it had declared independence, this was the re-birth of Moldovan statehood.⁴⁹ It stresses the negative aspects of the time within Greater Romania, frequently calling it occupation.⁵⁰ In general, the social and economic stagnation of the province under Romanian rule is stressed.⁵¹ While the textbooks differ from the general Moldovanist discourse in as far as they stress that the Moldovans were spared the horrors of Stalinism - being under Romanian occupation at the time -, the general outlook of the period is still bleak: the Moldovans were “degraded in the social and economic

sphere”.⁵² The Moldovanist discourses stress the problems of Greater Romania. This culminates in the judgement that the Greater Romanian state was hated by the Moldovans.⁵³

4. *New old-regimes? - The revolutions of 1989/1991 and the connections back in time*

The revolutions⁵⁴ of 1989 and 1991 were changes in political regime and system. Notwithstanding a variety of critical evaluations by political scientists and historians, these events ushered in a new political system in both countries. The history textbooks of both Romania and the Republic of Moldova include these times in their narratives and convey their own sense of the post-1989 period. These evaluations could not be more different: In the Romanian textbooks the time after 1989 is a continuation of pre-war times; it is a return to democracy and to normality. The Romanianist of the textbooks of Moldova present a time which is parallel to that immediately following the founding of the *Sfatul Tarii* - it is now the second historical chance to re-unite with the motherland

[1997]); Victor Stepaniuc, *Statalitatea poporului moldovenesc. Aspecte istorice, politico-juridice* (Chisinau: Tipografia Centrala, 2005).

⁴⁹ Cf. the state-centred Moldovanist histories by Andrusceac et al. (*Istoria*) and Stepaniuc (*Statalitatea*).

⁵⁰ Cf. “Noile manuale moldovenesti de istorie sustin ca romanii ocupau abuziv Basarabia”, *Curentul* (25. Sept. 2005).

⁵¹ Stati, *Istoria*, 309 -311; Andrusceac, *Istoria*, 225-229.

⁵² Nazaria, Sergiu, Alexandru Roman, Mihai Sprinceanu, Sergiu Albu-Machedon, Anton Dumbrava, Ludmila Barbus: *Istorie. Manual pentru clasa a IX-a*, (Chisinau: Cartea Moldovei: 2006), 47.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁵⁴ Both perhaps not revolutions in the fullest sense of the word.

Romania. Finally, the Moldovanist discourse presents the time after 1989/91 as that of freedom and progress; the re-affirmation of ancient Moldovan statehood.

In the Moldovanist discourse, the inter-war period receives its meaning by the times framing it historically: that of the region under Tsarist and Soviet rule. The periods are described more positively: The inherent national characteristic of the Moldovan nation (i.e. the ethnic Romanians of Moldova) is the struggle for independence; the main aggressor is Romania and the only friend is Russia. Accordingly an “Eastern road to development” is proclaimed. In the Moldovanist discourse no re-connecting to inter-war experience is possible in a positive way. The “development towards democratization” the integrated textbooks speak of is, within its narrative logic, the first and the original such development in Moldova.⁵⁵

While each discourse can be explained in its own context, democracy remains an empty capsule in all of them. Romanian textbooks stress that what happened after 1989 is a “re-birth of plural party politics”,⁵⁶ a “return to

political pluralism”⁵⁷ or a “re-activation of old parties”.⁵⁸ Sometimes it is also described as a re-introduction of democracy.⁵⁹ Democracy is thus bound backwards in time to the inter-war times. What is re-turned to and re-introduced is not even stated, other than by the term “democracy” itself.

5. Conclusion:

Democracy (dis)connected

It became clear that the textbooks build up their description of democracy; this is at times explicit, but mostly implicit. The Romanian textbooks do not hesitate to put clear labels on the different periods of Romanian statehood, thus for example describing the early Romanian state in the 19th century as an authoritarian state,⁶⁰ the regime between 1940 and 1944 as a war-regime and that of the inter-war years as well as post-1989 as democracy. While some give extended definitions of democracy and stress that post-1989 is a “return to democracy”, in fact a “return to normality”, what inter-war democracy and “inter-war normality” meant is not elaborated upon except for two aspects: inter-war democracy is primarily defined through its national

⁵⁵ Nazaria et al., *Istorie*, 66-67.

⁵⁶ Maria Petrescu, Nicolae Petrescu, *Istoria Românilor din cele mai timpuri până astăzi. Compendiu pentru clasele a VI-a a VIII-a* (București: Editura Fiat Lux, 1996), 216.

⁵⁷ Iulian Cârțâna, Gheorghe Dondorici, Elena Emilia Lica, Octavian Osanu, Emil Poana, Rela Stoica, *Istorie. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a* (Pitești: Carminis, 2000), 176.

⁵⁸ Ibid.; Scurtu, *Istoria Românilor. Din cele mai vechi timpuri*, 154.

⁵⁹ Petrescu, *Istoria*, 216.

⁶⁰ Selevet, *Istorie*, 36.

characteristic, its problems by reference to the minorities. Why it failed, except for references to external influences and international situations, and what its institutional and societal deficiencies were, remains unclear. Most of the problems of inter-war democracy are not mentioned; if they are indeed mentioned, they remain largely unexplained and un-contextualized. If inter-war democracy was a “democracy” in the fullest sense of word at all and what a definition of democracy could encompass, is not debated here. In this case, the difference between historiographic developments and textbook discourse is immense.⁶¹

Inter-war democracy takes up a different role in each narrative: In the Romanian narrative, it is part of a broader evolutionary continuity; it establishes the background notion of “normality”. In the Romanianist narrative, it is the golden age, which sets the standard and goals of what has to (or shall be) reached again today or in the future. And finally, in the Moldovanist narrative, it is a negative defining time, which yields value to other times and is the negative example of what shall never happen again. Interestingly enough, the term democracy remains remarkably empty in all three discourses. Perhaps, the biggest void is that left by the Moldovanist discourse, because it

cannot even use the inter-war period as reference. Where it is used - in the Romanian and the Romanianist discourses - it is mostly filled with a national(ist) reading; alleviated at best by a legalistic reading of rights and procedures.

The repeated reference to minorities also sheds light on another aspect of the discourse of democracy: neither in Romania nor in Moldova are the minorities perceived as part of a civic nation; they are national minorities, belonging to some other nation beyond the state’s frontiers and accordingly are all their interests vis-a-vis the Romanian state described as arising out of their connection to another nation.

Democracy is described in all discourses as a system which has no historical bearing or tradition. It is indeed a rather monolithic system as well, as there are no specificities highlighted; especially not in reference to Romanian experiences. This Analysis has proceeded in a re-constructive fashion; the implications of its findings may be assessed differently. For example, could we conclude that the variance of interpretation of their common past will have repercussions on the relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova? Let us, however, focus on the internal consequences. One such consequence is the fact that the narratives spoil their audience (the pupils) of the merit of learning from past problems and solutions of their own democratic precursors. The deficiencies of inter-war democracy as well as the large

⁶¹ Cf. for example Lucian Boia, *Romania - Borderland of Europe* (London: Reaktion Books, 2001), 102-107.

constitutional differences between the systems of post-1918 and post-1989/91 are largely ignored in the textbooks. While it may be perhaps debatable whether democracy is bound to be a different “system” in each state it is at work, some authors, like Ivan Katchanovski for example, advance the argument that the main defining aspect of how societies cope with problems, transition and conflict is their political culture.⁶² This political culture, however, is historically grounded; it evolves and is contingent upon the experiences of these societies. There exists a strong internal discrepancy in all three discourses: On the one hand, the inter-war period serves as the background definition of normality and what is to be attained as well as maintained (and inversely so for the Moldovanist discourse); on the other the period as well as the connected concept of democracy remain largely empty capsules. The implications of these discrepancies, again, may be manifold. A cautious interpretation suggests that the founding myth of indigenous Romanian and Moldovan democracy rests upon an insecure footing in the Romanian and Romanianist history textbook narrative. The attempted confidence trick of an obvious self-referentiality regarding

“democracy” and “normality” merely exposes a high level of uncertainty about what democracy and normality in their own country actually meant, means and could mean- for the past, the presence and the future.

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⁶² Ivan Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries. Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. With a Foreword by Francis Fukuyama* (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2006) [Soviet and Post-Soviet Society and Politics; 33].

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THE RUSSIAN IDEA AND THE DISCOURSE OF VLADIMIR PUTIN

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Abstract

Ideology analysis is important for understanding how weak states stay in tact and strengthen themselves. During the chaos of the 1990s Russia had lost a coherent ideology and unifying discourse of state and society. Vladimir Putin sought to begin his reign as president by recreating one. His Millennium Manifesto is deconstructed here to show a process of re-mythologizing the Russian state by overcoming the political divisions within society. The historical conception of the Russian idea, based on the concepts of Russian uniqueness (samobytnost'), statehood (gosudarstvennost'), and community (sobornost') form the basis of Putin's narrative of the Russian state. This is mixed with aspects of Western liberal ideas, borrowed from Gorbachev's "New Thinking" era. The result is to create a rich inter-textual discursive episteme that forms an ideological backdrop to Putin's first term state-building reforms. The Millennium Manifesto was a basic building block in filling out the dimensions of an ideology that Putin has expounded throughout his time in office and which is crucial to understanding the resurgence of the Russian state today.

1. Introduction

How can discourse and ideology analysis be used as an approach for studying post-communist states? During the transitions of the 1990s, in many cases in the former Soviet Union, the state went through processes of plunder and predation having been captured by rent-seekers of varying stripes. This created an archipelago of weak or dysfunctional states. In the event of state weakness and a lack of capacity, state-building projects must utilise a vital remaining, yet very powerful, resource – the symbolic and the psychological. The state can become an internalised part of consciousness as much as it corresponds to some objective structure in reality. "Where states have tapped into the creation of shared meaning in society, they have become naturalised and the thought of their dissolution or disappearance unimaginable".¹ An established order is maintained not by rational calculations of state and subject but through a naturalising process where the recognition and prestige, or symbolic capital, endowed in state institutions and figures makes for an embedded and internalised orthodoxy in the perceiving of the social world; this is essentially

¹ Joel Migdal, *State in Society* (Cambridge: University Press, 2001), 167.

symbolic power. Thus, in post-communist regimes facing a crisis of capacity where the state has started to break down in its major function of distributing public goods, the discursive and ideological aspects of state-building can be crucial factors in whether a state survives or goes into meltdown.

Here, I apply discourse analysis to partially explain the resurrection of the Russian state under Vladimir Putin. Below, I give some background to the publication of a manifesto written by Putin on the eve of his taking the role of acting president of the Russian Federation; I then go on to do a discourse analysis of four extracts of this text before drawing some conclusions.

2. Background to the Millennium Manifesto

On the 12th July 1996, following a closely fought election victory, Boris Yeltsin called his advisors to him. "In Russia's history in the 20th century...each epoch had its own ideology. [But] now we don't have one. And that's bad," he said². The goal was set to have a unifying "Russian idea" developed before the next election in 2000.

"The Russian idea" was first coined by Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyev in 1889. It was a Slavophilic conception emphasising Russian culture as occupying a special place in the history of civilisation and a unique Russian identity that could lead Russia on a separate path to the modern world. It was particularly anti-Western and emphasised ideals and practices that were the antithesis of Europe's individualistic, formal modernising project. It has comparisons in other cultures in the world at this time that also felt threatened by the expanding empires emanating from Europe - in the Arab world it was Islamism, in China Confucianism, and in Japan *kokutai*³. And this was still the backdrop for the discursive field in the 1990s as Russia sought to find its identity and re-establish its place in the world. That this concept was explicitly invoked by Yeltsin in 1996 shows the position Russia was in at that moment. Its economic reforms had failed - it had tried to follow the West in modernising and democratising but the country was now disintegrating along the fractious lines of diametrically opposed political visions, breakaway territorial boundaries, and diverging ideals. Russia's political discourse was framed

² Boris Yeltsin quoted in Urban, M. 1998, "Remythologising the Russian State", in *Euro-Asia Studies* 50/6. (University Of Glasgow: Routledge), 969.

³ See McDaniel, T, 1996, *The Agony of the Russian Idea*, (Princeton University Press, 1998) for a full description of the Russian idea's main features and its modern relevance.

in black and white, good and evil.⁴ Elections were “plebiscites on the nature of the system”.⁵ There was little compromise or synthesis. What Yeltsin realized was that a common political language was urgently needed. He was aware that “the historical changes and crises of legitimacy experienced by communist and post-communist regimes in Russia are linked to a positional conflict within the community of discourse,”⁶ and that “collectively [this conflict] create[s] an intolerable situation...and anticipate[s] some moment at which victors and vanquished in the struggle for state power will be declared along with the acceptance and/or imposition of a single definition of the Russian nation.”⁷ I suggest here that this declaration was made on the 29th of December 1999 in the *Millennium Manifesto*, placed on

⁴ For example, Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, during the 1996 election campaign, told a stadium-full of supporters how the devil was trying to destroy Russia. He had sent two beasts of hell, anti-Christ, who wear the mark of the devil. He suggested that it was prophesied that one would come bearing the mark on his head followed by another, more destructive, wearing the mark on his hand. This was referring of course to Gorbachev’s prominent birthmark and Yeltsin’s mutilated little finger!

⁵ Sakwa, R. 2004, *Putin: Russia’s Choice* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 23.

⁶ Batygin, G.S., ‘The Transfer of Allegiances of the Intellectual Elite.’ in *Studies in East European Thought* 53 (Springer: 2001)

⁷ Urban, M. 1998, 969.

the internet and published in *Izvestia* newspaper a day later. The author was one Vladimir Putin who was just about to assume the role of acting president of the Russian Federation following the sudden resignation of Boris Yeltsin.

Extract 1: The Post-Industrial Society

1 *“Humankind lives under the sign of two signal events: the new millennium and the 2000th anniversary of Christianity. I think the general interest for and attention to these two events means something more than just the tradition to celebrate red-letter dates.*

5

It may be a coincidence – but then it may be not – that the beginning of the new millennium coincided with a dramatic turn in world developments in the past 20-30 years. I mean the deep and quick changes in the life of humankind in connection with the development of what we call the post-industrial society.

10

Here are its main features.

Changes in the economic structure of society, with the diminishing weight of material production and the growing share of secondary and tertiary sectors.

15

The consistent renewal and quick introduction of novel technologies and the growing output of science-intensive commodities.

20 *The landslide development of information science and*

telecommunications.

25 *Priority attention to management and the improvement of the system of organisation and guidance of all spheres of human endeavour. And lastly, human leadership. It is man and the high standards of his education, professional training, business and social activity that are becoming the guiding force of progress today.*”

We observe in the beginning (lines 1-4) a clear narrative framing the discussion to come. Here the starting point is the birth of Christ and the start of the new millennium – both are given equal importance. This narrative leads to the post-industrial society, an important concept for understanding Russia today. This is framed almost metaphysically by the suggestion that the onset of the post-industrial society exactly now may not be a coincidence (6). This invokes Marxist ideas of historical determinism and unavoidability. The narrative building that this engages sets the frame for defining the problem in this introductory part of the text. The description of post-industrial society (12-25) seems to emphasise what “is” but in fact implies what “ought.” Putin is in fact describing an ideal civilisation here that is a Russian goal. Within intellectual circles it is the post-industrial society which is seen as the alternative for Russia today. “The Russian idea today is the idea of construction of a post-industrial society as an alternative to the Western-style

consumption-oriented society.”⁸ Thus this from the outset frames the explicit discussion of the Russian idea later on. Yet in the speech there is a complete blurring of the universal and the particular so that we are unsure if any of these post-industrial features actually pertain to Russia as yet.

Lastly, on line 23, Putin brings in the ultimate factor of human leadership. This in effect brings Putin himself in as the new acting head of state, this last factor being a crucial aspect of post-industrial society; the need for a leader. It is also evident here that Putin, of necessity, employs a liberal discourse in the sense of placing the responsibility for progress with the individual. With statist discourse discredited, new forms of power emerge in discourse of liberalism as the state withdraws. Society should be controlled through the self-regulating rational individual. Foucault defined the art of statehood that creates self-regulating individuals as “governmentality”. This neo-liberal conception seeks to govern not through society (as in the welfare state) but directly through autonomous, free agents. Nikolas Rose warns: “the freedom upon which such modes of government depend....is no “natural” property of political subjects, awaiting only the removal of constraints for it to flower forth in forms that will ensure the maximization of economic and

⁸ Bazhanov, V.A., ‘A note on Panarin’s Revansh Istorii’ in *Europe-Asia Studies* 51/4 (University of Glasgow: Routledge, 1999)

social well-being.⁹ The self-regulation required of the subject in a liberal, capitalist society is a historical one, moulded out of a legacy of various modes of government. When the state semi-abdicated in Russia in 1991 the individual was to bear a responsibility for law, order, stability and progress that she was not ready for. Here (23-25), Putin clearly states that it is the individual in the abstract “man’ that can only bring Russia forward. As we see below, there is constant blurring of statist discourse with a liberal politics of the individual which characterises the tensions at the heart of the Russian idea.

After producing figures and statistics meant to indicate Russia’s weaknesses, Putin goes on to identify “the lessons Russia has to learn’ in order to transform itself into the post-industrial society:

Extract 2: The Discursive Field

1 *“For almost three-fourths of the outgoing century Russia lived under the sign of the implementation of the communist doctrine. It would be a mistake not to see, and even more so, to deny the unquestionable achievements of those times. But it would be an even bigger mistake not to realise the outrageous price our country and its people had to pay for that*

5 *Bolshevist experiment.*

10 *What is more, it would be a mistake not to understand its historic futility. Communism and the power of the Soviets did not make Russia a prosperous country with a dynamically developing society and free people. Communism vividly demonstrated its inaptitude for sound self-development, dooming our country to a steady lag behind economically advanced countries. It was a road to a blind alley, which is far away from the mainstream of civilisation.*

15 *Russia has reached its limit for political and socio-economic upheavals, cataclysms and radical reforms. Only fanatics or political forces which are absolutely apathetic and indifferent to Russia and its people can make calls to a new revolution.*

20 *Be it under communist, national-patriotic or radical-liberal slogans, our country, our people will not withstand a new radical break up. The nation’s tolerance and ability both to survive and to continue creative endeavour has reached the limit: society will simply collapse economically, politically, psychologically, and morally.”*

Putin positions himself within the field of discourse here. Firstly, he frames his narrative with reference to the new millennium and the communist period (1-5). There are three sentences here, the first neutral, second positive, third negative. This is a key feature of Putin’s discourse. He does not frame the opposing ideology of communism

⁹ Rose, N, ‘Government, authority and expertise in advanced liberalism’. in *Economy and Society* 22/3 (Routledge, 1993), 94.

as wholly negative. Putin is careful not to paint the political picture in black and white. Yeltsin used up the discourse of anti-communism, effectively devaluing the Soviet past and making this an ineffective discursive tool to establish hegemony of the field.¹⁰ Instead Putin understates his anti-communism through the metaphor (4-5) of price paying and the labelling of communism as an “experiment.’ Furthermore, Putin again makes use of the idea of historical determinism to frame Russia’s communist past (7), and once more a hidden liberal equation of economic development with the development of free individuals is present (9-11).

The metaphor of the road and the blind alley (11-12) is one that Putin often makes use of. At another point he talks of the “highway that the rest of humanity is travelling on’ and these types of metaphors are becoming equated with him. The United Russia party, that has a majority in the Duma and is supported by Putin, has a youth movement whose members wear t-shirts bearing Putin’s face and the slogan “Everything is on the Way,’ (*Vsyo Putyom*) in the sense of “coming along’ or “developing’ towards some goal. It is a clear play on Putin’s name and the word for “way’ or “path,’ (*put’*).

Putin refers explicitly to the Russian discursive field (19) but this is actually

a reformulation of lines 15-17. There is a clever use of “metadiscourse,’ or semantic engineering here where these “indifferent political forces and fanatics’ (15-17) become indirectly identified (19-20) according to their ideological creed. Putin goes on to negate all these through an apocalyptic prognosis. All three ideological stances are equated with a future annihilation (19-23) which is grammatically stated as a real possibility denoted by the modal auxiliary verb “will’ (*budet’*) instead of a hypothetical conditional construction which takes “would’ (*bi*). Putin is effectively trying to establish a discourse focused on unity and stability knowing that the binary oppositions of Communist rhetoric and of that used by Yeltsin had created a situation where “the state [was un]able to muster a critical mass of leaders who articulate[d] one or another political discourse that resonate[d] in political society...as Yeltsin himself...co-opted progressively more of his opponents’ political rhetoric.’¹¹ Putin is establishing autonomy in this extract, rejecting all worldviews on offer in order to create a new discourse for the state itself intended to suture the rifts of political society, to “assuage the more liberal communists and traditional nationalists and pre-empt the extremist Red-Brown ideologues...to heal or pacify the whole nation.’¹²

¹⁰ Urban, M. 1998, 982.

¹¹ *ibid.*, 981.

¹² Hoffman, E.P. ‘Conceptualising State-Society Relations in Russia in Brown,’ G

Extract 3: Unifying the Field - Russian Uniqueness

- 1 *“The experience of the 90’s shows vividly that our country’s genuine renewal without any excessive costs cannot be assured by a mere experimentation in Russian conditions with abstract models and schemes taken from foreign textbooks. The mechanical copying*
- 5 *of other nations’ experience will not guarantee success, either.*

Every country, Russia included, has to search for its own way of renewal. We have not been very successful in this respect thus far.

- 10 *Only in the past year or the past two years we have started groping for our road and our model of transformation. We can pin hopes on a worthy future only if we prove capable of combining the universal principles of a market economy and democracy with Russian realities.”*

This follows the logic of presenting Russia as a special, unique case to be saved by a coming together of the political community, the state and society. It displays aspects of inter-discursivity as it borrows the philosophy of Eurasianism, a school of thought popular with many political groupings on left and right, that Russia’s special geographic position requires a special policy direction with a view to expansion towards Asia. It also smacks of the similar ideology that

holds Russia “as a civilisation...[representing] a world in itself, a microcosm that follows its own destiny and develops its own rules.’¹³

The “Unique Russia’ idea is one that has been around since the nineteenth century. It is a powerful emotive discourse, as Tim McDaniel puts it, “no matter how complex and plural the cultural and political undercurrents of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, until Gorbachev the victory was always to those who advocated a special Russian path.’¹⁴ Once more the metaphor of the road is invoked (7 & 9) here as if Putin is very aware of McDaniel’s observation. Interestingly neo-liberalism finds itself interlocked in a hybrid with the Russian idea (11-12). But this mixing of Western ideas with Russian ones is also a dominant discourse that Putin is borrowing from. Baranovsky suggests that, “combining in a unique way a traditionalist mentality and an openness to innovative thinking – Russia may represent an ideal laboratory for developing a viable alternative to...values associated respectively with the West and East.’¹⁵

We have a unifying discourse then which avoids using binary oppositions and instead sets up a reference point around which the political community can unite. This reference point is also the end point of

(ed.) *State-Building in Russia. The Yeltsin Legacy*, (Armonk NY: Sharpe, 1999), 134.

¹³ Baranovsky, V. ‘Russia: a part of Europe or apart from Europe?’ in *International Affairs* 76/3 (Chatham House, 2000), 444.

¹⁴ McDaniel, T, 1996, 30.

¹⁵ Baranovsky, V., 2000, 444–445.

Yeltsin's project – a new Russian idea that emphasises Russia's uniqueness whilst accommodating a certain acceptance of Western values in creating a post-industrial society.

Extract 4: The Russian Idea as the Solution to the Problem of Ideology

1 "I am convinced that ensuring the necessary growth dynamics is not only an economic problem. It is also a political and, in a certain sense, I am not afraid to use this word, ideological problem. To be more precise it is an ideological, spiritual and moral problem. It seems to me that the latter is of particular importance at the current stage from the standpoint of ensuring the unity of Russian society.

...

10 Russians want stability, confidence in the future and the possibility to plan it for themselves and for their children not for a month but for years and even decades to come. They want to work in a situation of peace, security and a sound law-based order. They wish to use the opportunities and prospects opened by the diversity of the forms of ownership, free enterprise and market relations.

15 It is on this basis that our people have begun to perceive and accept supra-national values which are above social, group or ethnic interests. Our people have accepted such values as freedom of expression, freedom to travel abroad and other fundamental political rights and human liberties.

20 *People value the fact that they can have property, be engaged in free enterprise, and build up their own wealth and so on and so forth.*

Another foothold for the unity of Russian society is what can be called the traditional values of Russians. These values are clearly seen today.

25 *Patriotism. This term is sometimes used ironically and even derogatively. But for the majority of Russians it has its own and only an original and positive meaning. It is a feeling of pride in one's country, its history and accomplishments. It is the striving to make one's country better, richer, stronger and happier. When these sentiments are free from the tints of nationalist conceit and imperial ambitions, there is nothing reprehensible or bigoted about them. Patriotism is the source of the courage, staunchness and strength of our people. If we lose patriotism and national pride and dignity, which are connected with it, we will lose ourselves as a nation capable of great achievements.*

35 *Belief in the greatness of Russia. Russia was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic and cultural existence. This determined the mentality of Russians and the policy of the government throughout the history of Russia and this cannot but do so at present.*

40 *But Russian mentality should be expanded by new ideas. In the present world the might of a*

45 *country as a great power is manifested more in its ability to be the leader in creating and using advanced technologies, ensuring a high level of people's well-being, reliably protecting its security and upholding its national interests in the international arena than military strength.*

50 *Statism. It will not happen soon, if it ever happens at all that Russia will become the second edition of say, the US or Britain, in which liberal values have deep historic traditions. Our state and its institutions and structures have always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and its people. For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly which should be got rid of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order and initiator and main driving force of any change.*

55 *Modern Russian society does not identify a strong and elective state with a totalitarian one. We have come to value the benefits of democracy, a law-based state, and personal and political freedom. At the same time, people are alarmed by the obvious weakening of state power. The public looks forward to the restoration of the guiding and regulating role of the state to a degree which is necessary, proceeding from the traditions and present state of the country.*

65 *Social solidarity. It is a fact that a striving for cooperative forms of activity has always prevailed over individualism. Paternalistic sentiments have struck deep roots*

in Russian society. The majority of Russians are used to connecting improvements in their own condition more with the aid and support of the state and society than with their own efforts, initiatives and flair for business. And it will take a long time for this habit to die.

70 *Do not let us try to answer the question whether it is good or bad. The important thing is that such sentiments exist. What is more, they still prevail. That is why they cannot be ignored. This should be taken into consideration in social policy first and foremost.*

75 *I suppose that the new Russian idea will come about as an amalgamation or an organic unification of universal general humanitarian values with traditional Russian values which have stood the test of time, including the test of the turbulent twentieth century.*

Here the Russian idea is giving a full and clear exposition. Yet this is set up as a question of ideology (3), there is a clear example of manifest intertextuality (2-3) where through negation (2) Putin anticipates some future criticism of him for employing the concept of ideology. Furthermore, that Putin might be afraid to use this word is a reference to the Russian Constitution which outlaws the implementation of any state ideology. It seems that Putin is directly addressing Russian society in this passage as opposed to any political elite, and he employs the negation

technique later on (70) as if to pre-empt the future discussion arising from the speech.

However, it is evident that despite his audience, Putin's discourse on the micro-level is not a democratic one. The sentence construction shows processes emanating from a distinct group in the position of the subject, Putin constructs this group abstractly and impersonally as "Russians" (10), "people," "modern Russian society," (56) "the public," (59) "the majority of Russians," (65) and "they" (11-12). Sometimes this group appears as the indirect object of a sentence again showing some possession or feature of the group (e.g. 27 & 52). At times the collective pronoun "we" or the possessive "our" is used which appears to close the distance between the speaker and the audience (33-34). However this is not necessarily the case; there is no usage of the word "you" which in Russian has a universal form (*vy* as opposed to *ty*). Also missing from this extract is a "deictic centre," at no point is the self, I (*Ya*) used. "The more a speaker avoids the first-person singular in favour of other pronouns, the more distancing the speaker becomes."¹⁶ Instead of an I-Thou relational meaning between people and elite, a dialogue of sorts is constructed amongst an abstract

collectivity ("we") who at times is presented as absent ("they") and Putin would appear to be addressing a different audience (11-12). Furthermore there are clear examples of indirect representation where what this collectivity wants, says, or thinks is attributed to them by Putin (10, 17-20, 25-26, 57-60, 65-66). Again these are examples of iconic distancing where the consumption of the text and the identity established by the consumers is at issue. What is more, the identity of the group is at times defined negatively (52, 56-57) and on lines 36-40 the invocation of historical inevitability and determinism further creates an essentially negative construction of identity. Through this negation, it is possible that Putin is trying to preserve two distinct identities, that of the ruler and the ruled, as opposed to one shared identity; this is common in despotic discourse.¹⁷ The Russian citizenry take both informational meaning about the social world from this text and also relational meaning; such text cues the understanding of whether they share an identity with the elite or not. By telling the narrative of the great state (*Derzhava*) (48-61) it seems plausible that Putin wants to keep some distance between state and society and future developments since this speech have borne this out. Mass survey data shows that mass behaviour in Russia is very much influenced by elite behaviour, showing that a clear dividing line between rulers and ruled is a social

¹⁶ Anderson Jr., R, 2001, 'The Discursive Origins of Russian Democracy,' in *Post-Communism and the Theory of Democracy* (Princeton University Press), 116.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 101.

feature in Russia.¹⁸ In any case there is a definite reification and essentialization of a group which is then given a role to be played out according to its qualities.

This extract displays overt features of inter-discursivity also. The central concepts of the Russian idea build the narrative for achieving social accord. These concepts are *samobytnost* – the idea of Russia’s originality and independence (e.g. 23-24); and *Gosudarstvennost* which means literally “statehood” but with an emotional sense of Russia’s spiritual collective interests (48-61). *Gosudarstvennost* is a socio-psychological phenomenon – collective and individual characterisations of Russia’s physical and spiritual essence and assessments of its accomplishments and potentials.”¹⁹ And lastly *sobornost* – collectivity, or more expressively, a “symphonic unity among individual, family and society in which all elements [contribute] to the development of each other,”²⁰ (63-68). These pillars of Russian identity are exactly the sort of reference point that Yeltsin needed. These concepts were borrowed by players across the discursive and ideological field, all three are present in Communist

discourse, the nationalist Eurasianists emphasise *samobytnost*, and while the liberal-democratic rhetoric tends to negate such ideas by borrowing from Western discourses, Putin still makes allusions to Westernising concepts (16-21) that had not been part of the Russian idea in the past. In this way, it seems that Putin is establishing hegemony through a certain amount of co-optation of the competing ideological visions, whilst leaving the style and rhetoric of the producers of these discourses well alone.

Overall, this is a centralising and unifying discourse which seeks to deny “the abyss between elite and mass interests and ideologies, the amorality of the new elites and the alienation of urban and rural masses”.²¹ Hoffman suggests that the idea of a “national interest” was “virtually inoperable” in 1998, and it is with this in mind that we can understand Putin’s purpose in bringing in a new Russian idea. And it is new through its cooptation of liberal discursive features. Putin borrows from the 1980’s and the glasnost “New Thinking” era which has been called an “ideology of renewal”²², the latter a word Putin cites throughout his text. Lines 42-46 are revealing in this inter-discursive respect, Putin is manipulating and transforming the concept of statehood and “great power” within the structure and circumstances of the present day, it is a re-working to

¹⁸ Levada, Y. of the Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), ‘Russian Double-Think’ in Brown A. (ed) *Contemporary Russian Politics – A Reader* (Oxford University Press, 2001), 319.

¹⁹ Hoffman, E.P., 1998, 139.

²⁰ McDaniel, T. 1996, 41.

²¹ Hoffman, E.P., 1998, 138.

²² *ibid.*, 129.

fit within the framework of a discourse of human rights and universal values. Compare those lines with these from 26th of April 1990 when Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze made the following speech:

*“The belief that we are a great country and that we should be respected for this is deeply ingrained in me as in everyone. But great in what? Territory? Population? Quality of arms? Or the people’s troubles? The individual’s lack of rights? In what do we, who have virtually the highest infant mortality rate on our planet, take pride? It is not easy to answer the questions: who are you and who do you want wish to be? A country which is feared or a country which is respected? A country of power or a country of kindness?”*²³

Whether Putin is really dedicated to Western values is subject to much debate, but certainly they find inclusion in this new conceptualization of the Russian idea and there is no absolute break with the discursive changes brought on by the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras.

²³ Shevardnadze, E. quoted in Herman, Robert, "Identity, Norms and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," in Peter Katzenstein, Editor, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), chapter 8., 320.

3. Conclusion

In summary, I have shown here that Putin employs a discourse of renewal in moving Russia towards what he calls the post-industrial society, where this is understood as change and development towards a distinctively Russian modernism. His text is rich in inter-discursivity, appropriating elements from competing ideologies in order to win the war of position within the discursive field, in regard to this it is also a discourse of unity and stability, creating “an all-national spiritual reference point that will help to consolidate society, thereby strengthening the state”.²⁴

Deconstructing the text presented above shows the interlinking of discourse with social practice. It is possible to see many aspects of the changes in Russian society in the discourse here. The tightening of state power, the creation of a power vertical, and the removal of some democratic freedoms make sense in the undemocratic constructions of Putin’s text. The unification of elite groups around the President is also understandable from the changing perceptions and relational meanings created by the cues in this text as to the position that the new President would adopt. Lastly, the text is clearly aimed at certain interpellations of subjects who would consume it. It seeks to create answers to deep questions of identity and meaning in a post-

²⁴ Hoffman, E.P. 1998, 135.

communist world in which the economic traumas of liberalisation had left the nation facing the questions put by Alexander Solzhenitsyn: “what exactly is Russia? Today, now? And – more important, tomorrow? Who, today, considers himself part of the future Russia? And where do Russians themselves see the boundaries of their land?”²⁵

Finally, a comment on the legacy of the *Millennium Manifesto*: In the years since it was written Putin has remained rather consistent in expounding the components of what has become a distinct ideology. As Russian power and influence increases on the world stage Putin’s values and vision for Russia have become all the more pressing to understand. The *Millennium Manifesto* is instructive on this point: Putin accepts some of the basic tenets that ground Western values yet these must be understood in terms of Russian realities and in the context of the historical narrative of the Russian nation. With elections in 2008 upcoming we might expect the heir to Putin’s throne to be the one who best personifies Putin’s adapted version of the Russian idea and his vision for a strong Russian state.

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²⁵ Solzhenitsyn, A. ‘Rebuilding Russia’, quoted in Theen, R., ‘Quo Vadis, Russia? The Problem of National Identity and State-Building’ in Brown, G (ed), 1999, 41.

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DOMINANCE AND SECURITY IN THE POWER DISCOURSES: SID MEIER'S CIVILIZATION AS AN EXAMPLE OF DISCOURSES IN POWER-GAMES

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Abstract

This paper brings upon securitization studies, views to domination and discursive practices in theoretical framework and links them into the legendary computer game to show how the concept of the world in the game follows the theories and understanding of the world in social sciences. The claim is that the player playing the civilization will get used to concepts of different theoretical tools and ask questions about computer games and their influence to social practices and learning processes in modern societies.

1. Introduction

No one questions the influence of the mass media on the people and their perception of the world. Media is not just entertaining or informing audiences - it is normalizing people into the

society. We can say that a lot of scholars in contemporary media, cultural, and anthropological studies already consider so called new media the most important influential factor that transforms societies and leads the socialization process in developed countries, western democracies.

cultural, social and economical capital – and the power and rush for hegemony.

The ultimate answer of how to win the “long run” is to spread your cultural, national and military influence all over the world and this is the insurance-security that the player creates a civilization that will stand the test of time. The following work tries to offer approach to analyze social processes with

If we use here the term of Althusser¹, we can call computers and computer games part of the ideological state apparatuses. As these “things” take part in the socialization process, they reproduce the way of thinking and understanding of the word. Even more, some computer enthusiasts – cybertarians already define PC as the essential part of the person. As stated in the Estonian leading computer magazine:

¹ Louis Althusser. [1970] 1993. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards and Investigation). Essays on Ideology. London: Verso, 1-60.

That's why we can without overstating name the computer as the mirror of the person's soul. (...) It is natural that youngsters interested in cars prefer to play the Need for Speed and gentleman interested in politics spend hours in the Civilization World.²

Computer games are no longer a new phenomenon in society, the generation under 30 has been greatly influenced by computers and computer games, because they have grown up in the environment of information technology and the era of development of computers and games. If we look at the generation between 15-20 years the main media used is computer oriented and consists of all features related to information technology.

Here is the answer as to why we should pay attention to the computer games and discourses created and mediated by the games. If people spend more time in gaming than watching TV or other forms of entertainment then this new media has more influence on them than traditional media that has been researched. If we take a certain game and find discourses in that, we can ask questions whether these discourses are really there in the society and if they are reflecting reality and power relations in the game or is the game creating new discourses that can be brought into the

“real” world to use this medium as a tool of spreading ideology.

The question of this paper is not connected to the question whether people are influenced by computer games or not. It is rather interested in the question how the game looks like and how it fits into the real life. As Miller (2006, 8) stated, when one researches computer games he or she could ask several different questions: who makes the games, who profits from them, how they target audience, what games look like, what they are like to play, and how they fit in with social life.

This paper searches for the answer as to how one of the world's most legendary simulation and strategy computer games – Sid Meier's Civilization - creates the perception of the world and state security through discourses in the game. The research is more interested in discursive practice and also in social practice that emerges in the game not in the textual construction in the micro level. We could ask how the game looks like, how it fits into the “real world” and how it maybe reproduces society and understanding about the world processes.

In order to reach previously mentioned goal the paper opens different approaches to the social systems and concepts of domination and power struggles. In the second part different thoughts about security are introduced. Into this somehow triangulated framework (social theory and security issues combined), the case study is

² Laur, Valdek 2005. Hingedee Peeglid (Mirrors of the Souls) *Arvutimaailm (The World of Computers)* 10/05. 51

fitted. The goal is to analyze the game concept, the power of “world creation” and development of the game concept from 1991 to 2005. Sources are game manuals, computer magazines and forums on the Internet and the case study is based greatly on the paper that has been written for the Discourse Analysis class in Central European University in the fall semester 2005/2006. This analysis brings together discourses over power and power relations and elaborates it into the security sphere. Power means hegemony, and a struggle is about changing power relations and securing your own nation. We look at the game as a social construction, which has a close relation to the “real” living world.

Also, the paper addresses to the question of how the game is used in education. We try to show that this computer game has close connections to world history and it is a tool for learning and creating a certain ideology programmed into the game and that is why this game should be researched in order to identify the discursive practices emerging from the game.

2. Theoretical approaches that bring all together

Questions of dominance and ruling the nation or the whole world have been points of interest for many scholars in almost every field of social and humanitarian science. In the field of communication, the concept of dominance is introduced with the help of framing and “master frames” that

create dominant discourses and through it new social practices. In the next few paragraphs we discuss the process how media becomes a helpful tool for creating dominance and repetitive power relations.

The media could be seen in many ways; in this research we take two perceptions of mediation given by McQuail (1994, 65-66): (i) filter or gatekeeper, acting to select parts of experience for special attention and closing other views and voices, whether deliberately or not; (ii) a screen or barrier, indicating the possibility that the media might cut us off from reality, by providing a false view of the world, through either escapist fantasy or propaganda. One could ask why we do not consider media as a place of discussion or “fourth” power-“watchdog”. In this context computer games carry already undisputable discourses and practices, which are already written by producers and there is no place for discussion and questions. This narrowing of the concept clarifies the role of games as media.

We can now move further to the next important concept which is framing. It is a dynamic process by which producers and receivers of messages transform information into a meaningful whole by interpreting them through other available social, psychological, and cultural concepts, axioms and principles (Fischer 2003). Frames are tools to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments and suggest remedies. Speaking about

frames we must remember that frames highlight some bits of information in order to elevate them in salience. An increase of salience enhances the probability that receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory.³ Now we can see that in the media, such as computer games are, the power of framing is even more crystallized than in other media branches, because players are acting in the frames they have already accepted and their social practices in the game are already determined by the “master frame”, the game concept. It will be explained in the next paragraph why this is a very important point in the argumentation.

We can claim that Norman Fairclough’s theory of social practices as discourses⁴ is applicable to the game concepts that can be viewed as texts in the broader sense and these texts are the sources of creating discourses and practices. If it is so, the dominant frame with the dominant discourse reproduces the same power relations and social order. It means, if we study the world of the game we could see how it constructs and reconstructs the “real” world and how the “real” is framed in the simulated environment. Here lays the theoretical argumentation to justifying

the research of discourses and social practices in the game.

In the next chapter we look at the security issue as an indicator to illuminate the game’s role in creating discourses and understanding about domination through the broad concept of security.

3. “New security” and securitization as a social change

After the ending of the Cold War the main and the central problem of security studies has been the inability to agree what is *security*. In his book Buzan brings out twelve different definitions of states’ security (1991, 16) that has been used by different scholars and shows that *security* is a very ambiguous term and there is even no opportunity to agree upon the definition. Buzan⁵ claims that the most important is not the definition itself, but the process where actors try to get rid of threats. For policy making the most important factor is the understanding that security is usually connected and interlocked with the survival of the people, state or organization and this gives the way and legality to the

³ Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor. *Social Cognition*. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1991).

⁴ Norman Fairclough. *Discourse and Social Change*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992)

⁵ Barry Buzan. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era*. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 18..

extraordinary measures to deal with the certain threat.⁶

The previously-named approach is based on the two concepts: (i) *securitization* and (ii) *speech act*. (i) *Securitization* is, according to Buzan, the extreme version of the politicization. In theory every public question or public issue can be on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision), through politicized (the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocation, or more rarely, some other communal governance) to securitized (the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure).⁷ In theory, any question could be on any level on this spectrum depending on environment and timeframe.

This question could be answered and clarified by the concept of (ii) *speech act*. In this framework questions become the security issues through the speech act. In matters that concern state security, the speaker is usually the government or political leaders. State securitizes certain issues and gives to the state's institutions the legitimate use

of extraordinary measures to deal with the threat. In the game, the speaker is the gamer who can make some issue in the game (strategic natural resource, geographic location, neighbor, technology, diplomatic agreement etc.) an issue of security and start war or some other "abnormal" forceful actions. As we can think further, how certain issues or threats become a matter of national security. It is not only the question of the type of the threat but also the question how state, people or even mass media perceives the threat and also how it is framed and brought into the agenda. Taking to account the previous two paragraphs we move closer to the securitization studies. Framework of securitization allows us to move beyond the state and military power that is very important in contemporary security studies. Buzan describes five security sectors where threats influence human collectivities: military, political, environmental, societal and economic.⁸

In this point I would like to refer to Fairclough who states that discourse is a practice, not only the reflection of social practice and representing the world but signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning. For this analysis it means that we do not search for the "real" threats, as understood in traditional security studies. Our aim is to bring

⁶ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. (London: Boulder, 1998), 21.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 24-25.

⁸ Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era*. 1991.

together more constructivist and critical security thinking combined with textual analysis that is used in media studies and political science. As described before one can look to the securitization process as a social change where one issue is moved from publicly debated questions to the field of security and recognized as a threat to the actor.⁹ It means that state or other actors can use methods that are not usually “normal”. If we treat the securitization process as a social change – the change of the meaning of the security through the change of the security discourse in the key texts, then we can use methodology used by Fairclough.

One could ask how it relates to the media and especially to the computer game discussed earlier. In the next paragraphs we give the possible way to link security, securitization to the concept of domination through symbolic power.

Bourdieu’s theory about three capitals and everlasting struggle over symbolic power is the connecting bridge in this discussion. He distinguishes three capitals that are possible ways to getting symbolic power – the world constituting power. These capitals are economic, social and cultural.¹⁰

Through the accumulation of these capitals one reaches to the level where it has the symbolic power to create social order.

In the broad security framework and dynamic approach of securitization we can see the pattern to securitize issues that influence (usually decrease) the amount of certain capitals. It means that the security struggle is actually about the capital to convert to symbolic power. It leads to the domination, because who controls symbolic power has capability to produce “master frames” with discourses that will reproduce power relations needed for the domination. We can add here one remark from Niklas Luhmann’s theory about self reproducing social systems and we have conceptualized the idea for “broad security”. It is about system reproduction, in other word about securitizing factors that are needed for accumulating resources (either economical or cultural or social) for keeping system capable of self reproduction (gaining symbolic power and constituting social practices).

Now we have presented theoretical “tools” and connections between media system performance, games, securitization and domination. At this point the paper will continue with the analysis of the game concept and its usage in the educational system.

⁹ Fairclough. *Discourse and Social Change*. 1992.

¹⁰ Pierre Bourdieu. “The Forms of Capital”. in John Richardson, ed. *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of* 63

Education. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 241-258.

*4. Sid Meier's Civilization – "the game that stands the test of time"*¹¹

The first release of the civilization was in the U.S. in 1991 by MicroProse Software and the main designer of the game was Sid Meier whose name is now a trademark of so called "reality" strategy games. The inspiration of the game was board games and this was one huge step in developing games on computer that converted simulation of the world and mixed board game features. Sequel of the game, Sid Meier's Civilization II was released in 1996. III part and IV part were released by Firaxis Games respectively in 2001 and in 2005. All games have got superb ratings almost in every computer game magazine and the last version, part IV released in October 2005, took almost all the awards.¹² According to the figures provided by 2Kgames, the number of copies sold before releasing the IV part was over 6 million.¹³ If we take into account the high rate of illegal software and the download of illegal copies

¹¹ Firaxis Games, the company that released last part of the Civilization, fourth one, uses slogan "Games that stand the test of time". Lots of users on the web have used different variations of this slogan to describe the Civilization game concept.

¹² Firaxis Official web page. Game reviews: www.firaxis.com/games/awards.php?id=GAMCIVIV (5. January 2006)

¹³ 2Kgames Official web site 2005. www.2kgames.com/civ4/home.htm (4 January 2006)

of computer games we can assume that the number of actual players is much higher.

5. The build-up of the "reality" in the Sid Meier's Civilization

We start looking into the game from the very first idea of the civilization and move through the time to the year 2006 where the Firaxis game Civilization is III is used as a "stealth" education material and discussed at educational conferences.¹⁴

The first passage manual of the Civilization I tells us that:

Civilization casts you as the ruler of an entire civilization through many generations, from the founding of the first cities 6,000 years ago to the imminent colonization of space. It combines the forces that shaped history and the evolution of technology in a competitive environment. You have great flexibility in your plans and strategies, but to survive, you must successfully respond to the forces that historically shaped the past.¹⁵

As we see, the gamer is put into the place of the ruler and his or her mission is to lead their own civilization/nation to the victory using different "tools" as military, science, luxuries, diplomacy

¹⁴ Firaxis Official Webpage, Teacher Features www.firaxis.com/community/teacher.php (5. January 2006).

¹⁵ Civilization I manual 1999: www.civfanatics.com/civ1/txt/civ1_man.txt (5. January 2006)

and economy etc. And what is important for discourse is that the game refers directly to history and historical forces that shaped the past. The game's reality is created with the connection to the past (World history) and we can not separate this game from the so-called "reality". If we continue reading the manual, it can be called the "Holy book" of the "religion" of civilization we find suggestions as:

Successful wars can be very useful. Capturing cities is much easier than building them up from nothing, and may provide loot in stolen technology and cash. Weakening rivals reduces the threat they pose (...) The fundamental concepts for a successful civilization are the expansion and growth of your cities, and acquiring new technology. In a word, you must grow (...) You must press forward on all three fronts: spread your cities out to claim a significant share of the world, increase the size and production of each city, and strive to acquire the latest technology".¹⁶

After reading these paragraphs we could find similarities to a Marxist thinking about the world order consisting capital (resources in the world), knowledge (latest technology) and struggle to convert it into the power with the goal to have hegemony in the world and securing your own nation. It is also important to look at the words threat, growth, dynamic etc. these words are linkage to the theoretical

framework discussed about dynamic securitization processes.

First release of the Civilization I offered quite simple view to the world and player could win the game by crushing all the enemies or launching the space ship first, which means figuratively technological and industrious superiority. But the question remains of how to rule the empire? The player could choose a different government to rule the state and every type had different traits and influence on economy, military and corruption. Civilization I offered six government types: Despotism, Anarchy, Monarchy, Communism, The Republic, and Democracy

As shown, we can use the manual as superficial encyclopedia which is rating different types of governments from most undeveloped and not "for people" to the best (more democratic and developed) and most beneficial (in economic sense). And these governments show the "negative correlation" between the government type and eagerness to wage war because of "people's decisions". But if we look for players' comments on different governments we can find out that small wars could be waged if players have a huge state. It is possible because "game's reality" calculates unhappy citizens per city and in the case of huge empire certain amount of military could be sent out from homeland to fight the "defensive wars".

¹⁶ *Civilization Manual*

All these governments could be chosen as “game reality” developed and the player could make decisions inside the government frame about tax rates, amounts of money he spends to luxuries (to keep people happy) or invest to science. In some sense these government types are just frames in which player can use state ideological and repressive apparatuses. It sounds like perfect world where only question is how to divide revenue from labor and reproduce knowledge and labor force.

Now we have described the basics of Civilization that have been there in the game for almost 15 years. Next Civilizations added more features to the "world" in order to make this game more "real" than ever.

6. Culture, nationality and religion in the Sid Meier's Civilization

As social scientists moved from pure Marxist theory - "economic capital equals power" to more broader concepts of power, also Civilization moved a huge step forward when Firaxis released the Civilization III and introduced lot of new features allowing player to feel more real when deciding over the fate of his or her empire.

As we are interested in the practices concerning discursive and social practices in the game we have to search for the indicators that reflect the understanding about the world and power. One of the most important new features that are relevant to our topic is

culture and the second that closely relates to a culture is a nationality.

Culture is a very important component of Civ III. It is the general social cohesion of your civ, as well as the impact of your nation's philosophy and arts on the world”

Culture's effects are most visible in the expansion of borders, but it also affects how other civs interact with you in diplomatic sessions (...) One of our goals in developing the culture system was to provide a powerful alternative to war and conquest.

As borders expand around your cities, they can eventually join to create a unified national border. Culture also helps decide border disputes.

Finally, a smaller city bordering a larger city with a substantial culture will sometimes be assimilated into the Civilization with the more dominant culture.

In Civilization III, each citizen in a city has nationality (...) the citizens in the conquered city will retain their nationality, even as new citizens are born with the nationality of the conquering civ.

These "foreign nationals" may "resist" for many game turns, depending on the cultures of the conquering civ and the conquered civ.

In extreme cases, a city with substantial culture can actually fight off its conquerors and return to its original nationality, but in most cases, resisters will eventually rejoin the rest of the population.

Finally, over time, foreign nationals can assimilate into the culture of the city in which they live.¹⁷

This introduction of culture and nationality brings to the Civilization a new dimension and understanding about world order. It is not only economic resources and military that are needed for domination and ruling the world, culture as a thing itself in the game is one very important factor to focus on. Cultural hegemony is a victory condition in the game and we can draw parallels to Bourdieu's three capitals (1986, 1994) mentioned before. In the game his theoretical thoughts about the social system is brought to reality - social, economic and cultural capital should be converted into (symbolic) power to achieve victory - dominance in the world. One could ask how social capital is represented in the game. Social capital is the diplomacy concept in the game. If you have network of civilizations that support your initiatives you could achieve a victory just through networks:

The diplomatic victory condition is enabled after the United Nations wonder has been built. Once built, the UN will meet periodically to vote on a leader. Any *civ* that receives a majority of votes from the U.N. council wins the game.¹⁸

But the development of the Civilization has not been stopped. Firaxis released new version of the Civilization and the most crucial add-on was bringing the religion concept to the game. As Barry Caudill, Civilization IV Senior Producer on Religion stated:

Religion has always played a critical part in human history. Through religion, man has sought to make sense of the universe around him.¹⁹

One interesting thing is that religions are important game features to make alliances and peace. Civilizations in the same religion are more likely to cooperate. But no differences are made between religions. We can ask why these seven religions have been chosen. Why not some ancient tribal religion to be added to the game? Interesting explanation to the problem is answered in the Civilization game manual.

We know that people have extremely strong opinions about religions – in fact, many a war has arisen when these beliefs collide. We at Firaxis have no desire to offend anyone (All religions in the game have the same effects, the only difference being their technological requirements). When determining which seven to include, we picked those religions that we thought would be most familiar to our audience. We do not mean to imply that these religions are more important, better or worse than any other religions. We offer no value judgments on religion; we mean no disrespect to

¹⁷ The official Civilization III web site: 2002.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Apolyton Civilization Site 2005. Civ 4.

anyone's beliefs. We're game designers, not theologians.²⁰

Lots of reviews have mentioned also this "problem" with the religion in the game, which tries to reflect the reality and be the most real strategy game in the world. Many comments are derived from the assumptions that religion is a touchy subject. This disclaimer shows again that this game is dependent on the real world and on our perception of the world. Notions as "most familiar", "better or worse than any other religion", "no value judgments on religion" show that in order to be selling the game all over the world issues of religion can not be raised, even if it is "just" a game.

We can say that in Civilization IV the game concept has reached the level where we can analyze the game as social systems with economy, culture, social/diplomatic relations and religion. But still the question could be raised is this the reflection of the reality or is this game is creating new perception of the world among the players and not society around us teaches about the social interaction but the game creates behavior to be transferred into the real world. From here we reach to the question to be raised, of how this game could be used in educational work in the learning process. As we saw the game is not reflecting the history as a continuum, it creates new

understanding by taking pieces of different concepts and mixes all this together in the so called "real" but simulated world.

7. Sid Meier's Civilization as a tool for education

"You have to balance war and diplomacy, and resources," says Kimberly Weir, an assistant professor of political science at Northern Kentucky University who had several students keep logs — including the one quoted above — while playing Civ3".

"Students felt they better understood what it takes to balance a country," Weir adds"

"Squire has studied middle school kids who played Civ3. He found that some students who were able to spend the hours needed to learn the game began to identify "rules" by which history progressed; rules that apply to such issues as resource allocation, the tradeoff between aggressive military expansion and diplomacy, and technological exchange among societies"

"Several professors said that Civilization I and II were too warfare-oriented to be useful in class, but that the diplomacy options have been ramped up in the third edition".²¹

These samples are just some pieces of information from the Internet to show that in the U.S. the practice in the higher education enterprises is to use

²⁰ Civilization IV game manual; Republic of T. 2005

²¹ David Epstein, "Not Just Child's Play", *Inside Higher Ed.* 28.11.2005 www.insidehighered.com/news/2005/11/28/civ (6. January 2006)

simulation computer games to explain the history, geography or other phenomena. Games are treated as schoolbooks that contain information that is needed to deliver to students. Firaxis has even created a special section "Teacher features" on their web page.

Teachers have found that some games in particular have a remarkable ability to keep students engaged and teach them at the same time. The basic requirements for a "stealth" teaching game is that it be fun, that in order to succeed in the game the student needs to learn about "real world" topics, . . . Much to our surprise, teachers around the world have been using Firaxis games for these purposes. Sid Meier's Civilization III, in particular, is now widely being used to teach students about history, geography, politics, and the like — though we in no way intentionally designed it to be used as such.²²

As we see from their page Firaxis Games has understood the huge market for these games in recognizing that these games have influence over the students. If we remember the concept of ideological state apparatuses, computer games get more and more role in the learning process and through those carriers of ideology. And we saw that these "real" worlds are following the logic of theories of social sciences and try to simulate worlds. But questions

could be still raised who controls the resources and "Gods" who create these worlds and discourses over world. We can see that these games are not reflections of the reality - these games live their own life and create new knowledge about life. As Firaxis participates actively in the conferences to promote his games it would be necessary to follow the steps and look deeply - into the games that are produced in order to promote "stealth learning". Questions that should be answered are related to the concept of religion thus Civilization IV includes these features and would be interesting to see how this game is taken as a model of the world order.

One conclusion can be made from this chapter. Civilization games have really stood the test of time and they have got even more attention. These games are not only for "freaks" who spend free time playing the "World creation". The more sophisticated and real these games become, more and more they start to influence teaching and studying. This is one certain thing when we look the discourses that are related to the Civilization as a game concept. We can say that we can analyze this game equal to the schoolbooks, because it is used as the true reflection of the world and international relations. And at this point we have shown that this game has the potential to bring to near reality an ideological state apparatus that reproduces certain values and understandings about the social system in the "real world".

²² Firaxis Official Webpage, Teacher Features.

8. Conclusion

This paper brought upon securitization, domination and discursive practices in a theoretical framework and linked them inside the legendary computer game to show how the concept of the world in the game follows the theories and understanding of the world in social sciences. If we look at the game, it has more and more features in the virtual game world and this brings it closer to our “real world”. This is not any more just an oversimplification of the life, this is the environment to simulate lessons in international relations lessons.

One still can ask how these discursive practices influence our social practices in the real world where we have more different variables than influence our life. But some interesting thoughts have risen from this discussion for further analysis. We can say that the player playing the civilization will get used to concepts of cultural, social and economic capital – power and rush for hegemony in all these areas. It is the dominant ideology in this game. The ultimate answer of how to win is to spread your cultural, national and military influence all over the world and this is the insurance-security that the player creates a civilization that will stand the test of time. How this will influence the next generation that will make decisions in the future in the “real world” is not the question here, but in the sociological viewpoint the influence of this game is very interesting. Maybe some signs come out from the game we

do not want to admit, but we want people to believe and take it normal.

Is it really so that under the democracy war is possible to wage if you have enough luxuries to spend to keep people happy? War is sometimes the best way to rapid development? War is the measure to continue diplomatic actions? Spreading your religion and culture turns people to make revolts in their homeland and more eager to join your empire? Economic, social and cultural growth is the measure of the success? People are just resource as any other? Domination is the only solution?

These are just rhetorical questions and lot of questions can not be answered easily. This paper tried to offer different approach to analyze social processes with different theoretical tools and ask questions about computer games and their influence to social practices.

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WORK IN PROGRESS SECTION

BORDERLINE DISPUTE BETWEEN SLOVENIA AND CROATIA IN THE POST YUGOSLAV ERA: SOLUTIONS, OBSTACLES AND POSSIBLE THERAPY

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Abstract

The Slovenian and Croatian government do not have a strategy for bilateral relations in the near-term. From the moment when the two states became independent, a series of mistakes have been made that made foreign policy inconsistent. Conflicts are resolved, but politicians use political symbols (especially border) for short-term political goals. A solution for the borderline conflict is from the legal core quite simple but it seems that the long-term status quo is useful for both leading political parties (Croatian Democratic Union and Social Democratic Party of Slovenia). Both parties often use political discourse with elements of demagoguery and populism for the “purposes” of the internal political scene. At the international level political discourse

of leading parties and current prime ministers is much more diplomatic with some tremors in relations. The political history of current political elites in Croatia and Slovenia discovers politics which has had an extreme right and populist element. The main goal of the article is to present potential solutions of the borderline delimitation and to answer the question if politicians and their advocacy of the status quo are real obstacles to a better future in bilateral relations.

1. Diagnosis

Main bilateral problems between Slovenia and Croatia arise from the life in former Yugoslavia: the borderline definition problems, especially in the Piran Bay and the possible access of Slovenia to the open sea, the problem of Krško nuclear power plant and the question of residents of Ljubljanska banka.¹ Both states did not resolve these

¹ Piran Bay is a small bay between Slovenia and Croatia, situated in the south west of Slovenia and in the north west of Croatia. Borderline between countries in this part of the sea is not defined yet.

Ljubljanska banka has been the most important and the biggest bank in former Yugoslavia. It was reconstructed shortly after the break of Yugoslavia and a new

problems successfully in the past years and as a result of these unsuccessful negotiations the past good relationship became strained.

The Slovene-Croatian border was formed in 1991 and until that year was an internal border between two federal units, which has not operated as a demarcation line and later has become an external border separating two sovereign states. After 1991 the borderline has meant the formalization of life including the new “regime” as the most manifested thing in this changing process. Many specialists point out that the new boundary brought

bank called Nova Ljubljanska banka was set up. Management of Nova Ljubljanska banka defined that this is a completely new bank and does not have any connection with the previous. Consequently, it decided that money of Croatian and Bosnian citizens, which they had on accounts in the previous Ljubljanska banka, does not belong to the Nova Ljubljanska banka. Management of the new bank any many politicians in Slovenia advocated that money of Croatian and Bosnian citizens is a subject of negotiations between successors (republics) of former Yugoslavia.

Nuclear power plant Krško was built in the former Yugoslavia. Current and previous governments of Slovenia and Croatia cannot make an agreement how large ‘peace of a cake’ every state belong to. The problem is the price of electricity produced in a nuclear plant and Croatia often wanted to step out of the partnership and consequently the ‘exit price’ is still not defined. However, it is still not clear which country should keep a nuclear waste in the future.

a decline of most cross-border contacts in terms of both dynamics and structure.² Institutional contact lost its importance in the last decade, informal contacts – between friends, locals and families – has been frequent even after the construction of a new border:³

It seems that the main obstacle to the final solution of the border is politicians (members of a political elite) in both countries for whom the status quo is still a political strategy which keeps them at the “top of the water”. Even current prime ministers use very democratic and diplomatic political speech (rhetoric) for the international public and politicians; political elite in domestic political scenes perform quite radical positions one to another. Some social movements and extreme political parties are used as a mediator in what a way polite expressions of top politicians present in a more radical way.

To follow the red line of a subject we want to confirm or refuse the next hypothesis:

Current status quo in relations both political parties (Croatian Democratic Union and Democratic Party of Slovenia) uses for internal short political goals. Solution of a problem is from the legal point of view quite

² Simona Zavratnik-Zimic, “Constructing »New« Boundary: Slovenia and Croatia”, *Revija za sociologiju*. 34 3/4 (1986): 1-2.

³ Zavratnik-Zimic, “Constructing New Boundary”, *ibidem*.

simple to define. But an “unsolved problem of the border” is that kind of political symbolism which is strongly used for the internal mobilization of publics in both countries.

2. Radical Right Determinants of New Political Elites in Post-Communist States: Myth or Reality?

Radical groups or parties have numerous common determinants such as nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism and intolerance. Because of fundamental changes in the late 1980s, some scholars fulfilled mentioned terms with terms such as anti-communism, anti-pluralism, anti-Americanism and anti-democracy. Williams pointed out that we have two traditional explanations why radical politics often find a place in a society: psychological or socio-psychological approaches try to explain such a phenomenon in terms of personal characteristics of the individuals involved, on the contrary, sociological or socio-political theories point out that the radical right must be viewed as a special problem or a set of problems which could be managed and led by the political system.⁴

⁴ Christopher Williams, “Problems of Transition and the Rise of the Radical Right”. *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and George Griffin, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999). 30.

Ramet differentiated between the term organized intolerance and radical right which are “open to some dispute”. The term “radical right” is usually connected with the terms “ultraright” or “extreme right” and is often applied with the organized-intolerance which has been invented as a political term in the twentieth century. Relating to Ramet organized intolerance is a

segment of a political landscape, which arose, historically, as a dimension of cultural “irrationalism”, and is inspired by intolerance (of any defined as “outsiders”), and hostility to notions of popular sovereignty or popular rule...It is also characterized by ideological and programmatic emphasis on “restoring” supposedly traditional values of Nation or community and imposing them to the entire Nation or Community.⁵

Markus Birzer⁶ has recognized a connection between the radical right and “irrational nationalism”,

⁵ Ramet, Sabrina P., “Values and Behaviours of Organized Intolerance in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe”. *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and George Griffin, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999). 4.

⁶ In Ramet, »Values and Behaviours«, 5. Markus Birzer, “Rechtsextremismus – Definitionsmerkmale und Erklärungsansätze,” in Jens Mecklenburg, ed. *Handbuch Deutscher Rechtsextremismus* (Berlin: Elefant Press 1996).

consequently James Gregor⁷ pointed out that nationalism was irrelevant to Nazi ideology and inessential to fascist politics. Some scholars also talked about rationalist determinants of the radical right⁸, but Ost denied mentioned expression and said that radical right is irrational in

any meaningful sense, preferring to characterize it as “rational, through that raises the question as to whether the hatred of entire groups could be interpreted as a ‘rational’.”⁹

Linz specified conditions which were needed for the emergence of radical right and fascism: the existence of a sense of national betrayal or humiliation, the breakdown of state authority, a national “cultural crisis” and a complex mixture of random circumstances and deep-seated structural processes.¹⁰ In addition to the

mentioned, Stoss said that the radical behaviour has both individual and society determinants. According to him, individuals who develop a radical right point of view consequently act upon them.¹¹ Zimmerman and Saalfeld pointed out that a single political system has a power to fight against the radical right but several factors are important at the starting point: the nature and composition of a government, debates around the question of “issue space”, relating to immigration, language, law and order, national identity and unemployment and the way they are handled, and nevertheless, the level of economic recession and political chaos or turmoil.¹² What determinants are going with the term fascism? Specific ideology and goal, some anti-communist, anti-liberal and anti-conservative tendencies, fascist groups share some common features of style and organization such as mass mobilization via the political

⁷ In Ramet, »Values and Behaviours«, ibidem. A. James Gregor, »Fascism at the End of the Twentieth Century,« in *Society* 34, no. 5 (July and August 1997).

⁸ In Ramet, »Values and Behaviours«, ibidem.

⁹ In Ramet, »Values and Behaviours«, ibidem. David Ost, »The Radical Right in Poland: Rationality of the Irrational. *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and George Griffin, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).

¹⁰ In Williams, “Problems of Transition”, ibidem. See more in: Juan Linz, “Political Space and Fascism as a Latecomer”, in Stan Ugelvik Larsen, Bern Hagtvat and Jan Petter Mykebust, eds. *Who Were the Fascists?*

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¹¹ In Williams, “Problems of Transition”, ibidem. See more in: Richard Stoss, *Politics Against Democracy: Right Wing Extremism in West Germany* (Oxford, Berg Publishers, 1991).

¹² In Williams, “Problems of Transition”, ibidem, 34-35. See more in: Ekkart Zimmerman and Thomas Saalfeld, “The Three Waves of West German Right-wing Extremism,” in Peter H. Merkel and Leonard Weineberg, eds. *Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).

militarization of political relationship, a stress on symbolism, male dominance and the use of an authoritarian, charismatic type of leadership.¹³

Throughout the post-communist transition, process change in political parties discourse has been in a large manner connected with ideological sources. The question is what has really been a 'change' in political parties of Central and Eastern European Countries? In the case of Slovenia and Croatia we could also make a generalization of the mentioned to the level of EEC countries, renovated political parties have chosen between two possible ways of political discourse: social-democratic or radical rhetoric. Buyukakinci added:

The liberalizing parties are slipping toward the centre during the post-ideological transformation, while the parties representing the orthodox leanings prefer to adopt the extremist perspectives.¹⁴

Newly formed countries were also called post-communist, post-socialist or states in transition. We could understand mentioned terms as a wide range of social changes that transcend

¹³ Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism*. In Christopher Williams, "Problems of Transition". 35-36.

¹⁴ Erhan Buyukakinci, *The Neo-Communist Parties and Power in Central and Eastern Europe: Change in Political Discourses and Foreign Policy Position* (East European Quarterly, Vol. 39, 2005)

the understanding of the traditional political definition of a state in international community that brings together people, territory and power¹⁵. But the transition process brings a lot of unpopular and negative issues. The »new enemy on the edge« became migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and homeless people in urban areas. Zavratnik-Zimic¹⁶ points out that power players from the past have been replaced with mentioned "subjects" of the new political reality. It seems that states in transition cannot understand the loss of "big father" and it is quite clear that the "new substitute" is the focal point inside the Freudian replacement theory.

4. From Communism to Democracy: Neglected the Past?

Croatian Democratic Union (Sanader) and Social Democratic Party (Janša) are political parties which share some common historic components. Former President of Croatia and CDU Franjo Tudman was a member of Yugoslav army while, at the same time, Janša was an important young communist. The origins of both parties and leaders are the same. Also many members of both parties are nowadays completely neglecting their 'communist pedigree'. In Croatia, the CDU is now officially oriented to a kind of conservative

¹⁵ Zavratnik-Zimic, "Constructing New Boundary", *ibidem*.

¹⁶ Zavratnik-Zimic, "Constructing New Boundary", *ibidem*.

politics while Janša's party advocates that it is a modern social democracy, but relating to many authors (Rizman, Schelder, Kuzmanic) shares some common determinants which are similar to those of extreme right-wing parties.

The mentioned story of a big father was realized in the first year of Croatian independency. At the beginning of the collapse of Yugoslavia and when the war in Croatia began, Franjo Tudjman became a leader of the whole of the nation and before that won the elections with quite a big majority of voters. But his later politics flew into the water of populism; he led the party which had in their policy a lot of elements of radical politics. In Tudjman's political career we can observe one thing. He was a member of military elite in ex-Yugoslavia, the youngest army general, but even in that time became a dissident. Radical right determinants existed inside the ruling party Croatian Democratic union:

The block with stronger support among voters, organization and access to the power is the (radical) right wing within the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU). It controls several state ministers (ministry of defence being the most important). There were a substantial number of supporters among elected representatives in the national parliament who promote conservative and right-wing policies. Some of them control important parliamentary committees and have strong influence on the legislative process. The prominent politicians on the right side enjoy easy access to Croatian president Franjo Tudjman. Some of Tudjman's

political speeches and addresses have had a strong radical right accent.¹⁷

By the year 2003, the HDZ leaders understood that the party had to change a political strategy or it would be questionable in its existence as a key political actor in Croatia. The most important actor in this process of change was new party president Ivo Sanader, who at the beginning wanted to reconstruct HDZ into a conservative party in the European political tradition. Vlahutin continued:

Very few people in Croatia believed he would have had enough strength and could get enough support to reinvent the party for the winning on the next elections. Sanader cleansed the party of his notorious shady characters and disciplined others to support his European vision for Croatia.¹⁸

Sanader has been successful in restructuring the internal structure of a party at the beginning. Nowadays CDU is different than this political party was in Tudjman's political era. The party has lost a part of an ideological pedigree although it is still very nationalistic but

¹⁷ Grdešić, Ivan, "The radical right in Croatia in Its Constituency". *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and George Griffin, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999). 171-189.

¹⁸ Romana Vlahutin, "The Croatian Exception", *Western Balkans Moving On*, ed. Judy Blatt, (Paris: Institute for European Security Studies, Challiot Papers: number 70, 2004). 28-36.

at least the political rhetoric of Sanader is more sophisticated. Vlahutin stated that he had some political abilities for political survival:

In foreign affairs he has many qualities that former Croatian president Tudjman lacked: he was a talented communicator, well trained in international relations, capable of quickly responding to the challenges of negotiations and, above all, a realist. He dedicated the first six months of his government to securing EU candidate status for Croatia... it was clear that the EU goal would take precedence over all other matters. Whether this reflected a genuine pro-European vision or was a tactical move to gain enough political credit for the next term does not really matter because it has served the country well. Croatia has been accepted as an EU candidate.¹⁹

Janša is a demagogic populist and a political figure of the radical right-stage. Rizman says that he consists of a number of paradoxes, which do not pertain only to Slovenia but it is a characteristic of post-communist states:

former devoted communist and Marxist turned to extreme anticommunist and pacifist, who in the former regime struggled for legalization of conscientious objection and civilian control of the army, and against the sale of arms by the Yugoslav army around the world, later became defence minister.²⁰

¹⁹ Vlahutin, "The Croatian Exception", 31.

²⁰ Rudolf M. Rizman, "Radical Right Politics in Slovenia". *The Radical Right in*

Rizman said that maybe Spomenka Hribar's definition about Janša went too far with accusation. Hribar said it is very difficult to define a personality of a politician who applies

...a strange mixture of populism, egalitarianism, xenophobia, anti-intellectualism and intolerance toward marginal groups with a political discourse and iconography which reminds one at the same time of Nazism and Stalinism but who still tries to form his authoritarian posture inside the existing democratic order, and demagogically swearing to it.²¹

Craig Nation argues that Janša can be the representative of demagogic populism and compares him with Tudjman in Croatia, Sali Berisha in Albania or Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia²². Miheljak and Kurdija²³ emphasized that he has had the same problem like Bossi in Italy or Haider in

Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and George Griffin, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999). 147-170.

²¹ Rizman, »Radical Right Politics in Slovenia«, 160. More see in Vlado Miheljak and Slavko Kurdija, "Preoblikovanje slovenskega volilnega telesa", *Meje demokracije*, ed. Darko Štrajn (Ljubljana: Liberalna akademija, 1995).

²² Rizman, »Radical Right Politics in Slovenia«, *ibidem*.

²³ Rizman, »Radical Right Politics in Slovenia«, *ibidem*. More see in Miheljak and Kurdija, "Preoblikovanje slovenskega volilnega telesa".

Austria: how to prove that his political party is “social democratic”.

In this context the distinction between populist and charismatic type of a politician can be very interesting. Schelder²⁴ defined that the populists are rather “chameleons” who have the ability to adapt to their environment. The charismatic type aims at transcending every day life and promises changes. Relating to Rizman's opinion Janša comes close to the first description, although he tries to build a kind of a political image on the latter, Schelder²⁵ calls this attitude “charismatic populism”. Janša paints himself as a victim in both – previous (authoritarian) and the present (democratic) system. His political rhetoric was also very interesting at that time. He always presented stereotypical theory of conspiracy that is of the existence of a secret organization “UDBO-MAFIJA”: a “hidden hand” of the communist nature, which is still dominating over the economy and politics.²⁶

5. Prime Ministers' Bilateral Meetings: Janša and Sanader

²⁴ Rizman, »Radical Right Politics in Slovenia”, *ibidem*. More see in Andreas Schedler, “Anti-Political Establishment Parties”, *Party Politics* 2, no. 3 (1996).

²⁵ Rizman, “Radical Right Politics in Slovenia”, *ibidem*. More see in Schelder, “Anti-Political Establishment Parties”.

²⁶ First syllable refers to the top secret police in the old-communist regime.

Understand the Main Principles of Diplomacy? “Selling the Fog” and Continuing Status Quo

It seems that the current Prime Ministers of both countries in political speeches (rhetoric) in bilateral issues do not use classical phrases of radical right wing parties. We could say that mentioned discourse is closer to that of Jurgen Habermas' reasonable democracy. Habermas pointed out that discourse could become radical in a sense that no aspect of our life can have special immunity on potential devaluation. Relating to the latter, a discourse does not have any real potential to become something as a “revolutionary” thing. It is possible to re-evaluate some aspects of collective life. We can say that a social construction of our political and social world has had origins in:

... traditions that are handed down, the patterns of integration we have inherited, and the identities that have been conceptually opened up to us by our surroundings are our only building blocks in constructing our future.²⁷

The discourse of political parties in opposition is often more independent than that of ruling parties and could contain radical elements of criticism. A political discourse of a leading party does not reflect only the interests of the

²⁷ Simone Chambers, *Reasonable Democracy: Jurgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse* (Cornell University Press, 1996): 164-165.

people that it represents electorally, but also the special interests of the public institutions and the bureaucracy.²⁸

In our case it is quite clear that the 'external discourse' of Janša and Sanader is quite different than the rhetoric they often use for internal purposes in the core of making home politics. Janša's discourse in the internal political arena is not that kind of direct attack towards Croatia. He often uses foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel about whom some international media say he is unable to use diplomatic principles in international diplomacy. Janša and Sanader have made many informal 'gentleman's agreement' on the bilateral level but in reality they were not able to execute any of them. Due to the mentioned, speaking solutions of bilateral problems (border, nuclear power plant Krško, Ljubljanska banka) is not an interest for political elites in both countries at the moment. Polite political speeches at bilateral conferences and meetings along with extreme and rude political discourse on the internal political scene seems to be quite a useful combination for the long-term status quo in bilateral relations.

It seems that Janša is learning from past mistakes: while the left (previous) government created the impression in Europe that Slovenia is a part of the

²⁸ James. N. Rosenau, *Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1970).

neighbourly problem, the new cabinet refuses to acknowledge such a thing. Yet the harshness, if it exists, is restricted to the four walls behind closed doors. Janša thinks like a soldier and strategist; he uses "a fresh and interesting logic". In his opinion, conflicts can occur also in the future, but this is why the government is in favor of Croatia having a future in Europe. Relating to him, if Croatia implements more European standards, there will be more chances of holding talks and adhering to agreements. He regrets the postponement of the beginning of Croatia's [EU] negotiations.

The postponement is not tragic because a negotiations framework has been approved for Croatia ... Some states were against the beginning of negotiations with Croatia also due to a disappointment with The Hague's efficiency. The Hague's image is not completely ideal despite some moves. This has resulted in stricter criteria, especially in the case of those states where such criteria can be set. Croatia is partly a victim of this situation.²⁹

The Slovenian Prime Minister had to respond also to criticism from Slovenian opposition parties that the

²⁹ Report of the Slovenian National Television, March 16, 2005, *Pogajanja s Hrvaško preložena*. http://www.rtv slo.si/modload.php?&c_mod=rnews&op=sections&func=read&c_menu=16&c_id=70775, accessed on April 22, 2006.

government was too soft in relations with neighbouring countries.

The Slovene government's position on Croatia's European perspective is the same as the previous government's position, ever since Croatia expressed the wish to join the EU if it meets the conditions. This position changed only for a brief period at the time of [Anton] Rop's government, right before the elections, and that change did Slovenia no favours in the EU. Support for Croatia is not unconditional. Croatia must meet the same criteria as all the other (EU entry) candidates. It would nevertheless be unfair if Croatia was asked to meet conditions that the other candidates did not meet, or if some other concepts were hidden behind these conditions.³⁰

Sanader has used the similar approach of the "soft communication" when expressing his position about the relationship with Slovenia in an unofficial meeting in Portorož.

...Slovenia and Croatia will finalize a statement on avoidance of incidents, which has been largely harmonized, within ten days... Statement on avoiding incidents would not represent a final agreement on the border

³⁰.Report of the Slovenian National Television, May 14, 2005, *Janša in Sanader o incidentih*.

http://www.rtv slo.si/modload.php?&c_mod=rnews&op=sections&func=read&c_menu=1&c_id=69881, accessed on March 21, 2006.

between the two countries. No solution will prejudice the final border line.³¹

At an official meeting in Grad Mokrice, the Prime Ministers have confirmed the known fact that there are open issues between the two countries. Premiers also stressed that these problems could not overshadow their generally good relations. Sanader explained:

We have agreed to initiate work on an agreement on avoiding incidents in the Bay of Piran, i.e. the Cove of Savudrija. The other thing we agreed was to wind up work, as a lot has already been done, on an extremely important agreement which has not yet been finalized - the agreement on avoiding double taxation... It all looked like a new beginning... The two countries had not created these problems, but they have been inherited, i.e. they were rooted in the disintegration of the common state (Yugoslavia). This initiative is the continuation of a forgotten meeting between the two governments in the former Yugoslavia in 1990, when they were expected to draw up a joint strategy which never materialized.³²

³¹ Report of the Slovenian National Television, March 7, 2005, *Janša v Bovcu s Sanaderjem*.

http://www.rtv slo.si/modload.php?&c_mod=rnews&op=sections&func=read&c_menu=1&c_id=69881, accessed on March 22, 2006.

³² Report of the Slovenian National Television, January 21, 2005. *Janša in Sanader tudi o arbitraži*.

http://www.rtv slo.si/modload.php?&c_mod

6. Possible Therapy and Potential Solutions of a Border Dispute: Using the "Ultimate Ratio"

The following question is important in this context: will Croatia and Slovenia have a clear version of the Schengen regime or will governments try to make a kind of »mixed version« between the Schengen principles and local border regime? To support the latter view, Zavrtnik-Zimic pointed out:

The Schengen regime, designed as a method of protection, introduces new dynamics into the social reality of two small European countries, which is a phenomenon that extends beyond the local Slovene-Croatian significance because it introduces the confrontation of the EU integrating models and the EU peripheral border regimes into this region ... Firstly, in the era of globalisation and 'network society' closed-type borders are a farce and can not be a real policy solution, and secondly, Slovenia has know-how and almost a half century of experience with the local border regime and local crossings.³³

The conflict between Zagreb and Ljubljana is to a large extent part of a populist debate which involves academic persons and other people, who are specialists for the "borderline

debate'. Devetak said that the mentioned conflict is from the legal practice point of view not as difficult as politicians try to show

...It is more a kind of reflection of spiritual crisis in collaboration between countries. Both states do not have any real strategy on how to resolve bilateral disputes. From the very beginning both governments have done big mistakes. Croatia was completely shocked when Slovenia began, very soon after the collapse of Yugoslavia, to build new border-crossings between countries. In Europe we do not have many border-crossings where you can find it kilometres separated one from each other. Besides this, Slovenia has occupied the hill Sveta Gera³⁴ which is evidently on Croatian territory.³⁵

Imaginary debate, where is an equitable border, is completely on the contrary with professional behaviour, which is common with modern diplomacy. Both countries operate similarly; this means both structures cannot develop such a cooperation which is common to European principles of collaboration between the two modern states.

=news&op=sections&func=read&c_menu=1&c_id=64450, accessed on January 22, 2006.

³³ Zavrtnik-Zimic, "Constructing New Boundary", *ibidem*.

³⁴ Trdinov vrh in Slovene language.

³⁵ Gorazd Utenkar, *Suho gašenje v vodi (intervju z dr. Silvom Devetekom)*. Delo. http://www.delo.si/index.php?sv_path=43,49&so=Sobotna+priloga&da=20051105&ed=&pa=8&ar=8d116e745cc423c1f84d511612b48a5c04&fromsearch=1, accessed on March 12, 2006.

After the decade of useless negotiations governments reached the agreement about the demarcation of Piran Bay and other controversial part of a border. Croatian government wanted to ... “eschew the equidistance principle of maritime delimitation and to reclassify a corridor of Croatian international waters as an open sea, creating the direct connection between Slovenian territory and the High Seas”.³⁶ The agreement was accepted in Slovenia, but in Croatia the general public, politicians and legal experts strongly criticized the proposed solution. The most important critics were related on the issue that the Croatian government left to Slovenia 20 km² of the territory in exchange to the support of Slovenian government to Croatian's integration to the West.³⁷

The Drnovšek - Racan agreement defined international border between Slovenia and Croatia as it took place in the core of ex-Yugoslavia. The border in the mainland would be separated into 11 sectors and besides this Slovenia would keep 80 percent of the whole Bay. Drnovšek and Racan made an agreement through which a special corridor would be formed. It would be two nautical miles long and would have the status of the High Seas. The idea

was also that the corridor would be “*a certain shape of a chimney*” and “water tower” could not be a subject of sovereign rights of the two states.³⁸

The Slovenian and Croatian government agreed that they would find a solution in a period of five years from the confirmation of the agreement. They also planned a “supervisor” as an intermediate body which would consist of experts from Slovenia and Croatia and its role would be to control the implementation of the agreement. If countries would not resolve a conflict in six months after the suggestion of one side, the case would immediately be put on the agenda of an international arbitration. The Drnovšek - Racan agreement determined in a special manner rights of frontier villages Mlini, Škrile, Buželin and Škudelin. Besides the rights people in mentioned villages had relating to other agreements, occupants could enter such amount of goods to Croatia, that life of one person and his family requires. The agreement foresaw also the possibility that people in these places would gain Slovene citizenship if they would want.

The opponents pointed out that Prime Minister Ivica Racan in this case exceeded his authority because he ceded the territory without the constitutionally required parliamentary super-majority vote. The opponents said that the only possible solution is

³⁶ Srečko Vidmar, “Compulsory inter-state arbitration of territorial disputes. (Slovenia-Croatia)”, *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* (September 2002):123.

³⁷ Vidmar, »Compulsory inter-state arbitration”, *ibidem*.

³⁸ Aleš Gaube and Meta Roglic, »Dogovor o meji pred vrati”, *Dnevnik* (Jun. 6, 2001).

submitting the conflict to international arbitration. The idea was that the Piran Bay would be divided in half and the Slovenian territorial waters would not have a direct connection to the High Seas. Slovenian politicians rejected the arbitration explaining that two involved countries should reach the solution without the intervention of an international body or an important person.³⁹ In this context, Slovenia and Croatia played the “zero sum game”, where one player loses as much as the second gains. Slovenian government “sacrificed” mentioned villages for the corridor to the High Seas, moreover, here it is pointed out that these places have not belonged to Slovenia before.

Slovenia has the status of being a geographically deprived state. It has the right of economic utilization of the zone that Croatia announced and government in Zagreb must arrange with special agreement. Devetak prejudices Croatian government will resolve the problem of utilization of the sea with the agreement with the European Union. Relating to Devetak, the connection between internal waters and High Seas is not relevant for the Adriatic Sea:

The latter is not an important question. After Croatia a kind of a zone will announce also Italy and because of this reason Adriatic Sea would not be the real High Sea. Besides this, it is important to

³⁹ Vidmar, “Compulsory inter-state arbitration”, *ibidem*.

announce, realization will not change rights of third states, which have the right to sail around the Adriatic sea. In this case the maritime convention equalizes the legal regime in the exclusive economic zone with that on the High Seas. Sailing to Slovene ports is arranged per manner that ships navigate into them through the Italian territorial waters and going out through the Slovenian. Italy and Croatia could theoretically block up Slovene ports with a certain common initiative, however, this looks more like an impossible mission in these days.⁴⁰

Slovenia actually made three mistakes with the announcement of the economic belt and epicontinental belt.⁴¹ Firstly, on the basis of the Drnovšek - Racan Agreement, it does not have the right to declare the zone or epicontinental belt, because Croatia changed a part of its territory into the international waters and with this decision allowed Slovenia to have a free access to the High Seas. The decision that Slovenia has got these two exclusive rights is basically a legal instrument with which the Slovene government gives up the agreement and

⁴⁰ Utenkar, “Suho gašenje v vodi”, *ibidem*.

⁴¹ Davor Gjenero, *Epikontinentalni pas in ekološka cona – tri nepopravljive napake v eni odločitvi*. Delo. http://www.delo.si/index.php?sv_path=43,49&so=Delo&da=20050903&ed=0&pa=7&ar=994d301ec28e7d763d0a5726a33958aa04&fromsearch=1, accessed on October 23, 2006.

is not just a political gesture. Secondly, Slovenia with the mentioned act legitimizes an action when Croatian government announced a similar decision in the year 2003, and against it Slovenia was leading an important diplomatic action. Thirdly, the Croatian government could in the future set up an idea of resolving conflict using an international court, rather than a kind of mediation setting up arbitration. That kind of conflict could not be resolved without the re-definition of borders; the next step is always the decision where the Court of Justice could competently set up the judicial procedure.

In the case of the mentioned conflict, experts point out that states can resolve the problem in two ways: firstly, they can decide whether the problem will be in the hands of international arbitration or they can put the conflict on the agenda of *International Court of Justice* in The Hague or the *International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea* in Hamburg. Devetak⁴² said it would be a better decision if the court would take over the case. In both examples the process would last two or more years, but in a case that the court would receive the subject, it is a better solution, because the judicial process will last less than in a case of arbitration. In cooperation with the latter, involved states must accept the decision who could be a member of a commission, but the real problem takes place in a moment when both sides

have to choose an independent member who is also the president of a commission. It is an important question if countries could confirm a candidate. In a case of a court, this is not an obstacle, because it chooses the members who will participate in the judicial process. Besides this, in case that arbitration would take the procedure, it means the problem would be resolved somewhere in the future.

Transfer of conflict to the court would be efficient because of more reasons. Yet the agreement, what is a *subject* of a trial, would affect on bilateral relations positively. Moreover, states in a time of a trial could at any moment resolve the conflict. Slovenia and Croatia would make an agreement and decide to immediately notify to the court, which can always break away the judicial procedure. Besides this, states can make a kind of »gentleman's agreement« where they can admit past mistakes and express a real desire for the reconstruction of bilateral relations.

Relating to Gjenero⁴³ a judicial process in The Hague Court of Justice is not a usual practice when member states and candidate members want to have resolved bilateral disputes. The arbitration also is not a productive activity, because it means just a postponement of the real problems to the future.

⁴² Utenkar, "Suho gašenje v vodi", ibidem.

⁴³ Gjenero, *Epikontinentalni pas in ekološka cona*, ibidem.

Populist pressures are still too large that states could contract some real agreement concerning to the border. We cannot expect they would adopt a real »gentleman's agreement« in the near future, certain »quasi status quo«, with periods of planned and unplanned incidents would be a consequence of undefined relationship.

7. Brussels' Non-Intervention?

European Union emphasizes specially regional and cross-border cooperation and regional development. Because of past disputes between these two states, the Slovenian frontier regions cannot effectively function and they are in the process of depopulation. Slovenia in its mostly two-year term of EU membership did not carry out any serious project relating to cross-border cooperation and besides this it was sceptical about proposal of Ricardo Illy which formed an idea of the European *Super-region* which in Croatia has really been accepted. The only real solution in this aspect is again establishing strong cross-border cooperation.

One of the main goals of the European Union is also to settle down tensions on the peripheral parts of the Union. Maybe an even more important goal is to restore "multi-applicative" determinants of the integration but the latter is possible only in a case that the Union abolishes a dispute between Croatia and Slovenia which are together a bridge between European Union and the West-Balkan Area. The mediation

in this case is maybe the best solution. The final agreement has to be that both countries accept a kind of a resolution about avoiding conflicts on the border – this means a long-term status quo – or final solution of a border between states which seems to be in these days just a long-term wish.

The European Union has a practice to help in bilateral conflicts in a way that gives standards to members and candidate states on how they can act in this kind of dispute and create harmonious economic and political systems. With harmony a number of problems disappear. It is very clear that the European Union cannot resolve all the mentioned problems automatically, but it has an infrastructure to help the states.

8. Prognosis and Possible Future Scenario

A way how to solve the crisis of frontier cooperation is SOPS (agreement about frontier cooperation) which both states do not carry out in the majority of paragraphs. Croatia avoids participating as a country which prefers principles of law and does not want to accept the principle "pacta sunt servanda".⁴⁴ If Zagreb has carried out

⁴⁴ Pacta sunt servanda (Latin for "pacts must be respected") is a basic principle of civil and international law. Pacts and clauses are law between the parties, and presuppose that the non-respecting of obligations is a breach of the pact.

the latter, the “question of war of fishermen’ in Piran Bay would not be a part of the policy agenda these days. Namely, with the SOPS agreement Croatia and Slovenia defined a much bigger fishing corridor than the Piran Bay is. Besides this, Croatia is avoiding to carry out principles of Banditer’s Commission, which has initiated the

principle *uti possidetis*⁴⁵. According to it, it means that until Slovenia and Croatia do not except an agreement, the situation on the border from 25th of June 1991, when Slovenia announced independence, is valid. Zagreb cannot accept that kind of explanation because at that time Slovenia had jurisdiction over the whole Piran Bay. On the other

⁴⁵ *Uti possidetis* (Latin for “as you possess”) is a principle in international law that territory and other property remains with its possessor at the end of a conflict, unless it is not resolved in different manner by treaty. Peter Radan pointed out: “The principle of *uti possidetis* has two variants. *uti possidetis juris* relates to borders based upon the new state's right of territorial possession as determined by the legal documents of the former colonial power. *Uti possidetis de facto* relates to borders based upon territory actually possessed and controlled by the colonial entity at the time of independence, irrespective of legal rights of possession. In the secessionist conflicts of the 1990s the international community asserted that where a federal unit of an internationally recognized state sought to secede, the borders of a future state would, on the principle of *uti possidetis juris*, correspond to the pre-existing borders of the federal unit. In the absence of agreement to the contrary between relevant federal units, these borders would be regarded as sacrosanct. Such an adaptation of the principle of *uti possidetis juris* complements the already noted adaptation of the territorial definition of a 'people' with respect to the right of peoples to self-determination” (Cited from the book of Peter Radan, *The Break-Up of Yugoslavia and International Law*, Routledge, 2001, 5).

side, Croatia Banditer's principle initiated on special places where central government wanted to prejudice the borderline. His commission opinion does not allow Slovenia to have access to the open sea. The compromise between Prime Ministers Drnovšek and Racan about "demarcation" has given Slovenia the majority of the Piran Bay and ensured opening access to the international seas. Croatia could get territorial border with Italy (territorial seas). This would be a kind of "European compromise" which nationalist publics in both countries did not accept.

Even the current government completely neglected and ignored the mentioned agreement; it seems to be mentioned especially because of ideological reasons. The Drnovšek-Racan agreement was really an optimum solution for the borderline conflict. It was a kind of the positive sum-game where one actor loses as much as another gets.

It is quite clear that the "ideological bridge" between both states it is still very long and we could not expect the solution in the near future. Despite the fact that both leading parties are members of the EPP party group, governments are still the main actors who are the responsible for the status quo. This political group in the European Parliament is the strongest in the Parliament and it also has a big influence on the European Commission. In the future we can expect that some influential politicians will use their

political reputation or image to help Slovenia in Croatia in bilateral disputes. In practice nothing can be done without serious involvement of governments. We cannot be very optimistic because ideology and irrational symbolism are unfortunately more important than an optimum consensus.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Marc Morje Howard, *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

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The re-emergence of the civil society idea in the writings of the Communist dissidents in the 70s and 80s placed the civil society at the core of the democratic transition in post-Communist Europe. In turn, civil society has been a dominant concept in all post-1990 academic literature, which considers it an essential element of the process of democratization.¹ Academic debates have widely acknowledged that civil society stands at the core of democratization, since without civic engagement there is no basis for a

¹ Post-Communist literature has placed the development of a functioning civil society at the heart of democratization: See, for example, Vaclav Havel, *The Power of the Powerless* (New York: Palach Press, 1985); Andrew Janos, *East Central Europe in the Modern World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen eds., *Democratization in Eastern Europe-domestic and international perspectives* (London: Routledge Publishers, 1994).

consolidated democratic order.² As a criterion of democratization, the functioning of civil society has become a major issue for assessing the progress of the post-Communist countries. Today, after almost two decades of transitional reforms, practice has shown, that, unlike the other elements of democratization, civil society development is lingering.³

Marc Morje Howard, in *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe*, analyzes the problem of civil society development in the conditions of post-Communism. Focusing on the behavior of ordinary citizens, Howard examines the reasons behind the low levels of membership and participation in voluntary organizations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. Emphasizing that citizens' participation is markedly lower in post-Communist systems in comparison to other post-authoritarian systems, the author argues that the Communist experience is the core reason behind the low participation in voluntary organizations. The analysis locates three main factors behind the low levels of voluntary organizational membership: the legacy of mistrust of all formal organizations caused by forced participation in Communist

² Havel, *The Power of the Powerless*.

³ Ivan Vejvoda and Mary Kaldor. "Democratization in Central and East European Countries," *International Affairs* 73. No.1 (Jan. 1997): 71.

organizations; the persistence of informal private networks, which function as a substitute to formal organizing; and the disappointment with the new and capitalist systems of today. Concentrating on these interrelated factors, Howard presents a persuasive account of the causal link between people's interpretations of their previous experiences and their current social behavior and activities. In contrast to explanations which relate post-Communist behavior to a *tabula rasa* individual, Howard builds upon the popular experiences from the former system in order to explain current behavior and trends. The data in the analysis point to the continuity of attitudes and practices before and after 1989. Howard concludes that the absence of civic skills in post-Communism impedes democratic consolidation. Furthermore, the author expects that generational change will facilitate the abandoning of old habits and proposes a more active role of the state in supporting and working with voluntary organizations.

The merits of Howard's analysis are located in his methodological and theoretical approach. The author uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative data, largely missing in available research on civil society. The analysis is based on cross-national survey data from the World Values Survey coupled with an original representative survey of membership in voluntary organizations conducted in Russia, East and West Germany. For triangulation purposes and increased

validity of the findings, Howard conducted in-depth interviews with citizens in Russia and East Germany. With this multiple method, Howard overcomes some of the most common problems of academic literature on civil society, such as sole dependence on statistical data on organizations, exclusive focus on single case studies and over-reliance on theory. Although difficult to replicate, Howard's methodological approach combines a variety of information concerning the specificities of civil society building in the conditions of post-Communism, thereby increasing the validity of the research.

The findings of the analysis tackle two of the most important questions in the contemporary analysis of post-Communist Europe. First, Howard's conclusions put forward strong arguments in favor of a common approach for the examination of the examined region. The similar findings on the most-different cases of Eastern Germany and Russia indicate that differences between them are "in degree" and not "in kind". These conclusions challenge the supporters of country-based approaches, which have emphasized country-specific differences, advocating use of single case-studies for analysis.⁴ Despite the

⁴ For a discussion, see Jacques Rupnik "On the two models of exit from communism: Central Europe and the Balkans" in *Between past and future-the revolutions of 1989 and their aftermath*, eds. Sorin Antohi and

differences in other arenas of democratization, the conclusions of this book indicate that it is both useful and recommendable to study the problems of civil society development in the conditions of post-Communism with a common analytical approach.

Second, Howard advocates a shift of focus in the examination of the post-Communist countries from elites and organizations to ordinary citizens, embracing a substantive, rather than a procedural understanding of democracy and democratization. Thus, Howard assesses a substantive aspect of civil society building, in contrast with the usual focus of civil society studies on formal elements of democratization.⁵ His methodological approach and findings closely support Kaldor and Vejvoda's idea that substantive democracy in this region does not rest upon written provisions, but the practices and habits of the post-Communist heart.⁶ Concentrating on the behavior of citizens, Howard studies the vibrancy of civil society, commonly neglected in the analysis of post-Communist Europe. Hence, this analysis represents a novel attempt in the civil society research that commonly relied on the number of

registered voluntary organizations. Practice has shown that the number of voluntary organizations all over the region is not representative of the actual development of civil society, confirming the need for a shift of attention to ordinary citizens in the examination of civil society.

As opposed to other segments of the book, its conclusions are comparatively underdeveloped. In addition, each of the proposed future scenarios necessitates further analysis. The possible positive impact of generational change requires an examination of the link between age and organizational membership. Moreover, the empirical findings do not indicate that the younger generation with virtually no experience from Communism is more likely to participate in voluntary organizations. The work of the state with voluntary organizations, as a second alternative, is also potentially problematic. This option stands in sharp contrast with one of the central arguments explaining the low membership in voluntary organizations today, namely the legacy of mistrust of voluntary organizations during Communism due to their connection with the state. As a result, the work of the state with voluntary organizations is unlikely to have a positive impact on the rates of membership in these organizations.

Overall, Howard's analysis with its focus on cross-regional similarities carries significant implications for the study of post-Communist Europe. Focusing on the behavior of citizens, it

Vladimir Tismaneanu (Budapest: CEU Press, 2000).

⁵ For a discussion on formal and substantive democracy, see Kaldor and Vejvoda, "Democratization."

⁶ Kaldor and Vejvoda, "Democratization," 63.

moves beyond formal approaches, which have proven unsuitable for the assessment of civil society building. Hence, in terms of both its methodology and findings the research has significant implications for the future study of civil society.

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James Kyngge. *China Shakes the World: The Rise of a Hungry Nation*, London: Phoenix, 2006. xi + 244 pp. £8.99/€14.07 (paperback).

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There have been many of books published in the past five years describing the fundamental changes to international politics that a rising China has provoked. Some, such as David Lampton's *Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia* or David Shambaugh's *Power Shift*, largely focus on security and foreign policy issues arising from the PRC's post-socialist transformation. Others, including Nicholas Lardy's *Integrating China into the Global Economy*, are concerned with the implications for global markets of China's economic trajectory. James Kyngge's *China Shakes the World: The Rise of a Hungry Nation*, however, does not limit itself to considerations of a sole element of China's tangible impacts on the world. Instead Kyngge attempts to consider China from within and without in economic, social and political terms, succeeding in presenting an informed study of the nation-state that will come to influence international affairs in ways barely imagined during the Cold War.

Broadly, Kyngge's book is divided into two parts which might be thought of as "the impact" and "the cost". Chapters

One to Five present studies of Chinese successes in manufacturing and industry, all to the detriment of communities in Europe and the United States. Drawing of examples ranging from steel and vehicle production to textiles and men's fashion, Kyngge explains how the evolution of China has revolutionized global markets. The final four chapters assess the impact of this revolution within China from a variety of perspectives. The environmental cost on rivers and forest both in mainland China and across the world, the social costs to individuals and families in China as well as the impacts on those in the West who feel they are "losing" to the rising Chinese state. Kyngge concludes that, in spite of the significant changes within and without China, "future scenarios full of doom and gloom" (p.227) fail to consider the integration of the People's Republic into the world economy in recent years that acts as an increasingly strong restraint on the possibility of international aggression.

Kyngge's style is engaging and it easy to imagine him as a very British Thomas Friedman. In contrast to Friedman's broad generalizations and relentless name-dropping, however, Kyngge takes the reader to the very personal experiences of the average citizen in China and beyond. Kyngge's account of the impact of identity fraud in China, for example, draws on an interview with Qi Yuling, a young woman whose life was changed forever when a classmate stole her identity after high school (pp.149-153). Drawing on Qi's

experience, Kyngge builds a case for the endemic black market that infests Chinese cities. In Beijing, he notes, "a whole identity makeover with a PhD in rocket science can be bought for less than \$100" (p.154). Kyngge cites the thriving market within major cities in illegal vehicle license plates which are mounted on cars to avoid speeding fines (p.155). Such examples build to the inevitable conclusion that, despite all the successes of China, there remain some domestic obstacles for the state to overcome in order to continue its meteoric international rise.

Kyngge uses this methodology consistently throughout his text, moving from the specific and personal through to the general conclusions that depict broader trends, both in China and abroad. Such an inductive style is common in texts that attempt to bridge the gap between academic and popular social science. While it makes for easy reading and opens the book to a wider audience, it also results in an absence of the detailed citations that will aid the researcher. As such, while it is deserving of its 2006 *Financial Times* Business Book of the Year award, it remains short on the footnotes and sourced references that aid scholars in building their own arguments. This is not a failing on the part of Kyngge – he made no representation of presenting a standard academic work – but it must be considered by the serious researcher of post-communist economies.

While it is impossible to compare post-socialist China with post-socialist

Central and Eastern Europe in all areas, there are some similarities that remain striking. Besides the impact of the black market, there are clear parallels in two other areas, the first being the market price of labour in post-socialist societies. Though the disparity in labour cost between China and the rest of the world has driven their manufacturing sector for a decade, the same cost disparity exists between the former socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe and the states of Western Europe. While there remains the chance that Western multinationals will bypass Central and Eastern Europe and direct their investment to China, Kynge does not discount the possibility of post-socialist European states using their comparative advantage in labour costs to their advantage (p.94).

Further, China's embrace of regional institutions through ASEAN+3 (p.212), the East Asia Summit and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation mirrors the integration of Central and Eastern Europe in both the European Union and NATO. While China's regional integration is not as far-reaching or as bureaucratic as that experienced under Europe's continent-wide project, it is significant that major regional powers such as Russia and China are working more closely in matters of security and foreign policy. This will surely impact on international affairs just as much as the economic policies that Kynge describes in this book. The reader with research interests in post-Cold War integration in Europe will thus find this an interesting comparative study of

post-communist economic, social and political development.

However, integration is only part of the rising China story. Kynge recounts the tale of the Illinois town of Rockford. Previously the heart of the American machine tooling industry, today it is a town which has felt the rise of China in a way that increasingly more communities in the West have and will. Its manufacturing jobs have departed for the Asian superpower, and have been traded for cheaper imported consumer products which now fill the aisles of the local Wal-Mart. Describing this trend, Kynge writes "Rockford's centre of gravity had shifted" (p.98). *China Shakes the World* is a compelling study of Rockford's story writ globally. Kynge's book is above all else an account and analysis of the shift in the global centre of gravity from the North Atlantic of the United States and Europe to the Asia-Pacific of China and the United States. Of utility to researchers and students of post-socialism, Asia studies and globalization, Kynge's work will enlighten and inform both the scholar and the more general audience with an interest in this rising state.

TJ. Pempel, editor. 2005. *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region*, Cornell: Cornell University Press, 315 pages.

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The idea of an increasingly cohesive, socially constructed East Asia is evident in the literature on regional integration and international relations. As the most dynamic region in the world, East Asian regionalism demands significant academic attention to map the changes in the region. *Remapping East Asia* demonstrates this effort to understand the historical, political, economic and social contexts of these changes and what they imply in the prospect of the integration project. This book offers new perspectives in three ways: it rejects the EU-based, state-centred focus on regional integration, it demands conceptual clarity in using the terms 'regionalism' and 'regionalization', and finally, it takes East Asia's project on its own terms using realist and constructivist lenses. The result is a compelling argument that greater regional cohesiveness is driven by an expanding, complex network of webs by governments, corporations, and ad hoc problem-oriented coalitions

The book is divided into three parts. The first part provides a concise overview of regional institution-building and regionalization in East Asia in a comparative perspective by analyzing state-to-state interactions and demographic changes. The major argument is that domestic politics and societal conditions matter in creating regional cooperation frameworks. The commitment toward regionalism is determined primarily by national interest, whether it is for economic, political or security reasons.

The second part investigates the drivers of regional integration. Changes in the international and regional political economy of East Asia, the strategic interest of the US, and the economic linkages forged by East and Southeast Asian businesses are key variables that shape regional institutions and bottom-up processes of economic integration. The conclusion is that institution-building is in flux as it is less institutionalised, informal, and voluntary; bilateralism is combined with multilateralism and regional cooperation schemes.

The final part of the book is regional linkages of the institutions, interests and identities. It complicates our understanding of regionalism by looking at different actors and the dynamic processes they undergo to construct and reconstruct the region. For instance, the role of 'epistemic communities' or policy networks is revealing of the limitation of the regional institutionalisation. They see East Asian regionalism as a complementary project to the American-led regional security architecture and 'open' orientation towards global economic integration. The book likewise makes a reflective assessment of regionalism by looking at the two challenges ahead: (1) the lack of capacity of Asian countries and the regional institutions to create an effective international regime for sustainable development; and (2) the challenge of terrorism in Asia. In conclusion, the contributors

problematise the goals, interests, and processes of regionalism and regionalization. While East Asia aims to increase its global influence, it is neither ready to make multilateral regional frameworks more powerful nor to limit the role of external actors, particularly the US. The major impediment remains nationalism and national identity, which is reinforced by state actions.

Since the 1990s scholars have turned their attention on the impact of China as a dominant actor in regional and global affairs. Although comprehensive in dealing with regionalism and regionalization, the book lacks an explicit analysis over this aspect: how does the rise of China affect regional security or economic integration? How do international institutions adapt to the rise of a potential economic and political power? Such questions are fundamental in any analysis of regionalism because they raise the issue of leadership, prospects of economic integration and the tension between national versus regional interests. It is only in Paul Evans' chapter that attempts to address these issues were made. In one way or another, he highlights the tension between China and Japan to influence Southeast Asian states, the ineffectiveness of overlapping coalitions based on the 'Asia Pacific Way', and the negative impact of American assertiveness in the region's affairs. This single chapter is an essential contribution because Evans represents the optimistic scholars attempting to rationalise the institutions

of East Asia into more cohesive and politically relevant institutions. Here, we find new trajectories in doing research on Asian regionalism: China seen as a domineering regional player poses a challenge to institution-building and therefore new research agendas must focus on the politics of accommodation and adjustment.

More importantly, the book leaves out transnational and national civil society movements in Asia as a potential actor of regionalization. In the past twenty years, civil society has been active in Asia more than at any point in history. In a region where governments retain political legitimacy through economic performance, the book (and the literature!) misses out some important analytical issues. These include the extent to which civil society has challenged elites and has sought political inclusion in decision-making in Asia. As shown in Latin America and Europe, civil society has been a source of democratic legitimacy and credibility of regional institutions. It is essential to investigate the nature of this political force, their strengths and limitations, and the ways they affect other actors in the dynamics of regionalization. This would make our picture of East Asian regional integration more complex, realistic and theoretically informed.

Finally, assessing the prospects requires asking the difficult questions: how will the region move forward given the uneasy relationship between China and Japan? Will sovereignty-reinforcing regionalism characterised by less

institutionalisation persist in the context of growing questions over the relevance of ASEAN and the other institutions? Is East Asia building common norms, values and identities that will generate regional cohesiveness, and if so, what is the nature of this identity? The book barely addresses these questions since its focus is in mapping out the continuities and discontinuities between Asia's past and present. The choice to synthesize the literature to understand the integration process is a laudable effort, but explanations require prescriptions, which the book does not explicitly state. Such questions raised point towards reforms and changes in institutional structures at the regional level, to which the book severely lacks responses.

Despite these limitations, it offers important contributions in specifying the processes involved in regionalism and regionalization. Historically accurate and theoretically conscious of its position, TJ Pempel has successfully clarified the debate on national versus regional identity, statism versus transnationalism, and economic versus other forms of integration. The book takes regional integration as a combination of these things rather than an either/or. It illuminates scholars which research areas require more effort towards further investigation and how regional governance can enhance its legitimacy. The book remains an essential reading for students, professors and policy makers who want to understand the past and the present of East Asia.

Elizabeth C. Dunn. *Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of Labor.* **Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 2004. viii + 204 pp; Includes bibliographical references and index (paperback)**

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Privatizing Poland is a case study structured in six parts, conducted by observation of the privatization process in one of the biggest baby food producing companies in Poland. Alima is a successful Polish company organized as a typical socialist company of a Fordistic way of production. In order to modernize and transform Alima into a highly competitive and modern production company, in the beginning of the 1990s the Polish Ministry of Privatization decided to sell the company to foreign investors. Alima's new buyer is Gerber, a leading US baby food producer. Since Gerber realized that Polish workers are not the same as those in Fremont-Michigan (where Gerber's main factory is), a new strategy was required in response to Polish socio-economic and religious customs. In the mid-1990s, author Elizabeth Dunn went to work in AG (Alima Gerber) in Rzeszow. In a very insightful and vivid style, Dunn tries to explain the typical Polish worker's attitude and way of thinking. She was

allowed close observation and was able to discover many differences between workers in Rzeszow and Fremont. The author's research was that Polish workers did not oppose capitalism and favor socialism, but their way of thinking had a more socialist heritage, thus creating a changed personhood and legacy within the new system.

Dunn illustrates different observations on Polish inter-hierarchical behavior, contrasts between how Polish people view *kierownik* (nonflexible, old fashioned bureaucracies whose power lies on close social and personal ties with superiors and subordinates) and *menadzer*, "manager" as a (flexible, initiative, eager to change, sophisticated) autonomous individual. The creation of a new managerial structure, emphasizes Dunn, was decisive in order to strengthen Alima's competitiveness. Not having a marketing or sales department, and without identifying a niche market as was the case with Alima, could jeopardize the existence of the company. Seeing that the Polish economy was transforming into an open trade and market-oriented country during the 1990s, following the neoliberal economic model of Western countries, the introduction of those managerial functions was a question of survival for the company. Establishing TQM (Total Quality Management) in Alima, observes the author, was the second biggest and important reorganization in the company (after introducing a marketing and sales department). TQM is not just

monitoring the control process of production but, moreover, controlling worker's attitudes and productivity. Under socialism, shop floor workers were considered as *proste ludzie* (simple people) that could perform only physical labor without using imagination and creativity, hence almost impossible to move into other jobs that require imagination, as in a marketing department. In the fourth part, in a very remarkable and striking way, Dunn explains the meaning of "znajomosci". Living in an economy of shortages, in order to gain something that could not be obtained persistently and on a regular basis, people in socialist countries created networks of "znajomosci": informal personal connections of friends, colleagues and family members that are interconnected in horizontal and hierarchical relationships through gift giving, bonuses, doing favors, etc. Alima-Gerber workers believe that it is not a worker's productivity or potential contribution to the company that tempers the final choice on hiring and firing, but "znajomosci".

Another interesting observation is how Dunn illustrates the logic of the "gendered politics of feeding" (133). Under socialism, women had equal rights to access labor but there was an underlying division between jobs considered physically 'light' and appropriate for women and others which were not appropriate for women. Working in a company such as Alima was considered a "physically light" job and appropriate for women, thus the

“main reason why mostly shop floor workers were women”. At a more general level, however, the idea of an industrial worker working as a mother was part of the ideology of state socialism, regardless of the industry in which they worked. The construction of femininity in Poland led to a belief within Alima that “women workers make food for babies as mothers, not profit for Gerber as laborers” (145). Considering that East European post-communist countries are just backward reflections of what Western economies were, this could be disastrous for the implementation and final accomplishment of projected strategies. Gerber’s CEO, Al Piergallini, recollects that “this country reminds me a lot of the United States in [the] 1920s” (3) was a typical stereotype about post communist countries in the beginning of 1990s.

Although mostly focused on Alima-Gerber relations, *Privatizing Poland* offers a wide range of information regarding changed “personhood” as a result of the new political and economic situation in Poland. This volume makes a good contribution to the literature on the postsocialist transition in Eastern Europe and provides valuable insight of workers’ behavior in post-communist systems.