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PARTY OF THE SUBJECTIVE WINNERS? FIDESZ' SUCCESS AMONG EMPLOYEES AFTER THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 2008–2012

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Introduction

The economic crisis of 2008-2012 has severely affected citizens all over Europe, leading to high levels of insecurity. Along with socio-economic, political and moral crises, voters have seen their faith in democratic values and human rights falter. As a result, many people are becoming distrustful of democratic institutions, parties and politicians and are supporting increasingly populist, authoritarian, radical or extremist parties. Others are turning away from politics, not participating in elections and other political activities. In many cases, however, it is no longer just the rise of populist radical parties that we should fear, as has often been the case in recent decades. Rather, the rise of these parties to governmental power has led to concerns that these countries are going off the path of liberal democracy, causing hardly reparable damages to democratic institutions. Alarming examples include Brexit, the attack on the Capitol, or the abortion ban in the US, the hybridisation of the political system in Hungary and Turkey, where democratic institutions formally exist but their contents are significantly damaged. But from Brazil to India, we could list examples that demonstrate the breakdown of democracies.

In this paper we analyse the success of Fidesz responsible for establishing a hybrid regime in Hungary after the economic crisis of 2008-2012 and the so called refugee movement of 2015 with the help of the SOCRIS project database, which – inter alia – investigated the link between the perceptions of socio-economic changes and political orientations of employees in 2017 (founded by FWF and NKFIH ANN 120360). Only employees who have been active for at least 5 years on the labour market (N=700) belonged to the investigated population, and so, they could have enough experiences concerning socio-economic changes in the world of work, more precisely, in their workplaces after the second wave of the economic crisis in 2012.

So, this analysis will map the perceptions of, and reactions to, the socio-economic changes and will link these to political orientations of employees in Hungary. In doing so, it will explore the

67 A szerző a Milton Friedman Egyetem tanszékvezető tanára

impact of the crisis on social cohesion and anti-democratic developments. The paper will show to what extent these developments have fuelled exclusivist, nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes and increased the attraction to the populist radical right.

Research questions are as follows:

- What different attitudes did people develop in dealing with the consequences of the crises?
- How do people's perceptions and reactions impact on far right political orientations?
- To what extent, where and relating to which groups of employees can the changes make people receptive to right-wing populism and radicalism and, in particular, to Fidesz affinity?

The Impact of Crises on the Hungarian Labour Market

The crisis of 2008-2012 and its effects on wages and consumptions of the households in Hungary

Hungary was affected by both waves of the global economic and financial crisis breaking out in 2008 more deeply than the majority of the EU member states. Economic downturn started in Hungary already before the crisis, and it was on a larger scale than in the neighbouring countries. In the second quarter of 2009, domestic real (i.e. adjusted for inflation) volume of GDP fell by 6.7% compared to the same period of the previous year in Hungary, which exceeds the average 4.4% decrease of the EU28 countries. According to the Hungarian Labour Market Review of 2016, the crisis of 2008/2012 afflicted the domestic import, export, and industrial production more heavily than the GDP decrease. The crisis broke the cyclic change of these macro-economic indicators that reached its deepest point at the time of the crisis. The first wave of the crisis meant the absolute deepest point, but its second wave in 2012 resulted in a significant decay as well (Blaskó et al. 2016). In the second wave of the crisis, productivity figures fell again to a larger extent as compared to the EU28 average, but then this tendency turned back, and since 2013 the growth of the real volume of GDP in Hungary is over the average real GDP growth of the EU28 countries (Eurostat 2016).

The change of GDP calculated on Purchasing Power Parity in USD per capita can provide an image of how economic productivity affects the consumption of the members of the society. At the beginning of the 2000s, household consumption data in Hungary were 58% of the EU15 countries, and 57% twelve years later (Simonovits–Szivós 2016). The crisis especially affected the households of larger number with an inactive head. The coping strategy of the Hungarian population was ranging from using up the savings through selling assets to taking loans. Research data showed that every third household was obliged to hold back their expenses on fashion and electronic goods. Another 25% was forced to save on basic foods, 20% on consumer goods (Simonovits and Szivós 2016). During the recession, borrowing took the form of informal loans in increasing numbers (Medgyesi 2016).

Labour Market and Employment Security

Since the millennium Hungarian economy and labour market have been characterized by instability which made the economic boom and catching up with the developed European economies difficult. According to the Hungarian Labour Market Review of 2015, the employment rate of people of active age fell in the period of the crisis, then started to grow dynamically after the lowest point in 2013, reaching an average of 4 million 210 thousand employees in the Hungarian labour market by 2015. This is the highest rate ever measured, and its reason is the growing number of people working in the primary labour market and in the public employment programme and, the increasing number of Hungarian workers abroad. In public employment, 212 thousand people were permanently employed according to the data of the Central Statistical Office and 348 thousand people were employed at least for one day. Statistics show that public employment – as active labour market tool – reduced unemployment and increased employment; however, it did not help the reintegration into the primary labour market. This can especially be harmful for people living in poverty whose chances of breaking out are potentially reduced by public employment (Blaskó et al. 2016).

The common feature of the period before and after the crisis is the growth of aggregated employment without a significant improvement of the employment opportunities of people in their best age for employment. It is premonitory since the reserves lying in the practice of retirement and disablement are about to be exhausted, and the present government's vocational training and higher education policy threatens with reducing the rate of marketable workforce (Eppich and Köllő 2014).

Social inequalities and poverty during and following the crisis

To judge the role of the welfare state and the changes of the social services, the development of the income distribution and social inequalities needs to be reviewed first, and then will be examined the extent of poverty and the change of the welfare redistribution in Hungary.

The number of households with no active earners was growing even before the crisis (Szivós and Tóth 2008). Regarding the effects of the crisis on employment, it reduced the number of people living in households with economically active members in a way that households with two wage-earners were affected badly (Tóth 2010). Therefore, it is important concerning the distribution of income that although the situation of both the rich and the poor got worse during the crisis, but that of the poor became worse (Tóth 2010).

As a result of the crisis, a significant reorganisation seems to have taken place concerning the relative income situation:

- among the aged, and people with children: the elderly increasingly got into the middle income categories, and people having children were forced into the bottom of the income distribution;
- among people with different numbers of children: people without children got more into the upper income groups, while people with (and especially ones with many) children got into the lower ones;
- among people of different level of education: the university degree became associated with higher income categories, while lower education level with impoverishment more and more;
- inactive people outside of the labour market and the unemployed are concentrated more in the growing number of the group of poor; and, finally,
- the proportion of the Roma has also grown significantly among the poorest group (Tóth 2010).

Income distribution is only one indicator of material deprivation, however. Townsend (1979) defined deprivation as “the disability to live at a normal standard”, and envisaged a poverty line that is independent of the distribution of income. The proportion of people living in material deprivation in Hungary is the third highest in the European Union after Romania and Bulgaria, and in 2015 it reached the 44% of the population. Similar data are found in TÁRKI’s Social Report 2016: in 2009 about half of the population of Hungary (53%) lived deprived of basic material goods, and a third lived in severe material deprivation. These ratios were reduced to 37% and 23% by 2015, however (Gábos et al. 2016).

Concerning the probability of material deprivation, within households of very low work intensity a significant and strong relationship is detected between the occurrence of material deprivation and the education level of the head of the household. In 2015, the rate of deprivation is especially high in the case of households with a head of Roma origin (its probability is 64% as opposed to 21% in the case of the non-Roma population). Differences are significant by place of residence: the frequency of deprivation is a lot lower among people living in the more developed Western regions, in large cities, and Budapest than among the population of disadvantaged regions and small municipalities. The proportion of deprived people is also higher in households with more than four members (40%), among those living in one-person households (29–31%), and single parents (34%). The lack of holidays, the inability to cover unexpected expenses (practically 100%), and inadequate meat consumption is typical of the majority of both deprived and gravely deprived people, and most of the heavily deprived cannot even heat their houses properly (Gábos et al 2016).

Social policy in Hungary

One way of employment and income distribution is the regulation of the minimum wage by the government. Hungary has always had a high proportion of people employed for the minimum wage, and even this was gradually and significantly growing following the crisis. However, raising the minimum wage has its risks. Firstly, it may increase unemployment, as employers are forced to dismiss employees in order to reduce their loss; secondly, it may increase illegal employment; thirdly, it may increase the number of people that employers will only employ at the minimum wage; and fourthly, it may worsen the differentiation of the wages by distorting the income rates upwards, and squeezing the wage structure of the businesses more and more (Szivós 2012).

The other important labour market related development was the introduction of the already mentioned public employment. Government communication argued that creating full employment is essential for both macroeconomic and social political reasons, and it can only be reached by directing the population living on social aids and benefits into the world of work. Not only reaching full employment was a doubtful and disputable goal of this argument, but how public employment can guide back and integrate public workers into the market-based labour market on the long run is highly questionable. Public employment is a special form of employment status; unemployed people leave the registry for the period of public employment. Following the termination of the public employment, slightly more than 10% of the participants enter the primary labour market, and this rate has gradually been shrinking since 2011 (Cseres-Gergely and Molnár 2014). Public work is “compulsory”; rejecting it may result in losing social aids at once and for up to a three-year period, at the same time, the monthly salary to earn by public employment does not reach 200 Euros, therefore the gap between public work wages and minimum market wages threatens with job losses on the market. Last but not least, public employment combined with social aids does not provide breaking out of poverty for the great majority of people affected (Eppich and Köllő 2014).

In the area of taxation the most important change after the crisis was the introduction of the flat rate income tax by the Fidesz government. And, although government communication keeps emphasizing its positive effects (and the constant decrease in the rate of the single tax), in reality it significantly increased the inequalities, for many reasons, such as:

- the Flat Tax and its constantly reducing rate primarily favours people with high income belonging to the upper middle and upper classes;
- the Flat Tax is definitely disadvantageous for families with a low income, not to speak about those living exclusively from welfare redistribution (e.g. unemployed, and public workers);

- as state revenues cannot decrease, consumer taxes are the highest in Europe (VAT), and its burdens are particularly suffered by poor families, since these expenditures represent an extremely high part of their total household expenditures (Markó 2012).

Further tax reductions and various state support significantly contribute to the increase of inequalities; including the income tax reduction for families with two or three children, which is not advantageous at all for families of low or no income. State funding to support building or buying apartments (like the CSOK introduced in 2016) also mainly favours well-to-do families since they require a substantial amount of own funding that poorer families lack.⁶⁸

All these state tax policy measures are basically in favour of richer and more successful households with a higher income, strengthen families of upper and upper middle status, enhancing this way social polarisation already mentioned earlier.

The state spends slightly more than one fifth of the GDP on social expenditures. This more or less equals the OECD average but lower than the expenditures of western welfare states. Between 2009 and 2012, Hungary did a radical, 3 percent reduction in the area, unprecedented in the West. In Austria for example, the reduction of social expenditures was only one percent in the same period (Felméry 2015).

The largest and fastest growing part, three-fourths of social expenditures is retirement benefits. Its growing rate is due to demographic reasons, as the ageing society requires the service of an ever growing population. At the same time, the Fidesz government has made several decisions since 2010 (abolishing the mandatory private pension insurance system and confiscating the money gathered there, providing the opportunity for women to retire after 40 years of employment status, and the changes in calculating the amount of pension) that endanger the sustainability of the system.

The second important and expensive area is the healthcare system whose expenditure is more or less invariable. As the healthcare system in Hungary has long been underfinanced, the underpayment of employees, attrition, and emigration cause severe service malfunction of the system.

Family and disability benefits are of medium level. Narrowing the opportunity to obtain disability status, practically abolishing disability pension, and curtailing services in this social group as well resulted in the constriction and tightening of the system of state benefits.

The next category is the circle of various social services constituting the smallest part of all state social benefits. In this area, the government policy is also featured by more rigour and the restriction of the neediness principle in the past period. This includes unemployment benefits, the housing aid, and other social aids. Although the number of people needy of the services grew as a result of the inequalities, impoverishment, and the temporarily increasing unemployment due to the crisis; the extent of redistribution was shrinking. During the crisis, socially based redistribution has narrowed,

⁶⁸ Lakhatási támogatások, Infojegyzet [Housing Subsidies, Infonote] 2016/34, 2016 június 8. http://www.parlament.hu/documents/10181/595001/Infojegyzet_2016_34_lakhatasi_tamogatasok.pdf/dd941c05-3ee5-4fe7-93bd-3f07de619922

and the total amount of funding is only constant because the expenditures of public employment growing in the period. Along with increasing the number of people in public employment, the government practically terminated unemployment benefits (Szivós 2012).

Radical right: Definitions, explanatory models/theories

The concept of populist extreme and radical right

Right-wing populism has skyrocketed to the political forefront in Europe and the United States, and there are no signs of slowing down. Mudde described the current era as the “populist Zeitgeist,” a title that seems ever-increasingly relevant (Mudde 2004, p. 542). This success has encouraged a number of scholars to question why populism, especially radical right-wing populism, became and remains so popular.

Mudde points to structural shifts in European politics and identity beginning in 1960s. In the first decades following WWII, Western European politics was dominated by three major points of consensus: alignment with the US in the Cold War, the need for deeper political integration in Europe, and support for a strong welfare state. Although the political front appeared united, significant shifts in society and politics were simultaneously taking place. Deindustrialization and a sharp decline in religious observance weakened support for centre-right and centre-left parties, which traditionally garnered support from workers and religious voters. Furthermore, the advent of the internet revolutionized media coverage of politics. Average people had the ability to access more information (whether correct or not) and became more attentive to politics. During this time, the political elite tended to adopt TINA (“there is no alternative”) policies, in which they would prioritize their commitments to supranational organizations, such as the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, over those to their states. As the consensus on the continent began to fade, ideological alternatives, like populism, began to emerge. Populists capitalized on the growing discontent of the people, gaining the traction we see today (Mudde 2016).

In his already classic work Mudde points out that there are “at least 26 definitions of right wing extremism, which mention no less than 58 features, of which only five, namely nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strive for a strong and encompassing state, are mentioned by more than half of the authors.” (Mudde 1995, p. 206).

According to Holzer (1993), right wing extremism can be described as follows: 1. the idea of national community – the living, eternal organism built on a hierarchic, patriarchal order that ensures the social-economic status of the individual; 2. ethno-centrism and xenophobia, a strong division of ‘us and them’ accompanied by the exclusion of strangers and looking down on them; 3. authoritarianism and anti-pluralism, the idea of a strong state and a strong leader; 4. creating enemies, finding scapegoats; 5. the nationalistic approach to history that serves to support personal

identity (Holzer 1993, p. 35). During the study of right-wing radical phenomena, Gentile separates five determinant ideological elements: 1. identity elements (cultural, national); 2. refusal of cosmopolitanism and internationalism; 3. making the migration policy stricter; 4. emphasizing law and order; 5. upgrading work and criticizing capital (Gentile 1995).

Mudde (2000) warns that it has to be distinguished ‘traditional neo-fascist’ from new, ‘post-industrial’ type of radical right-wing populist parties. The new type radical right-wing populist parties distinguish themselves from old-fashioned, neo-fascist extremism, its anti-democracy and inclination to violence. These new type parties rather give a nationalistic response to the challenge of globalisation. (Mudde 2000). Butterwegge (1996) thinks that right-wing extremism and radical right-wing populism are not different phenomena just different levels of the same phenomenon, therefore radical right-wing populism does not need to be considered as a new phenomenon ‘competing’ with right-wing extremism (Butterwegge 1996).

Minkenberg (2013) contextualizes the radical right in terms of modernization theory. He defines modernization as a “process of social change characterized by increasing functional differentiation and personal autonomy” (2013, p. 11). Right-wing radicalism attempts to counter and/or even dismantle modernization by radically redefining the “exclusionary and inclusionary criteria of belonging” (2013, p. 11). In other words, the radical right overemphasizes images of social and national homogeneity and clearly delineates between the “in-group,” usually the nation, and the “out-groups,” typically some sort(s) of minorities. The specific criteria for exclusion varies based on the party and/or movement; examples include race, gender, religion, culture, and a combination of one or more of these.

It is important to note that Minkenberg characterizes right-wing radicalism or extremism⁶⁹ as an ideology: “right-wing extremism is a political ideology revolving around the myth of a homogenous nation – a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism hostile to liberal, pluralistic democracy, with its underlying principles of individualism and universalism” (Minkenberg 2013, p. 11). The key characteristics we can take away from this definition are ultra-nationalism, anti-liberalism, anti-pluralism, and anti-individualism.

The link between perceptions of socio-economic changes and crises and the rise of far right

The literature takes the existing link between socio-economic changes and the success of the far right as an axiom. At the same time, socio-economic changes come up in the studies dealing with the relationship between socio-economic changes and the affinity to far-right buzzwords as a combination of the political system, the influence of the media, and various factors of socialisation and attitudes, or psychological explanations, and not in themselves (Koopmans and Kriesi 1997).


⁶⁹ He uses *radicalism/radicalist* and *extremism/extremist* interchangeably.

The SOCRIS project analysed in this paper was a follow up investigation of the SIREN project with similar sampling and questionnaire structure. The results of the SIREN project conducted in eight European countries between 2001 and 2004 demonstrated that not only losers but also winners of the changes can be attracted to the far right, i.e., not only the economic, material disadvantages lead to the growing popularity of the extreme right (Flecker 2007). The SIREN project identified five large groups of attitudes which are equally related to the rapid socio-economic changes and the affinity to far-right or radical right-wing populist views. The five large groups of attitudes are the following:

1. nationalism and chauvinism, which can take the form of ethnocentrism, in-group defence, or imaginary integration,
2. prejudice towards the out-group, typically finding a scapegoat, counter-immigration, or xenophobia,
3. the attitude of political powerlessness and disappointment accompanied by anti-elitism and protest voting,
4. authoritarian, strict order and law-centred approach, accompanied by the need to restrict democracy to a certain degree, and the wish for a charismatic leader,
5. social dominance orientation appearing as racism, new racism, and social Darwinism.

The SIREN quantitative results suggested two routes linking perceived change in job conditions to distrust and intolerance (Flecker 2007). The 'winners' route related to workers, who felt employable and, as a consequence, emphasised attitudes of competition and exclusion. They opted for reducing competitors on the labour market (e.g., migrants). The winners stressed attitudes such as social dominance orientation (e.g. to legitimate inequality and dominance of some groups over others), expressed chauvinism, prejudice against immigrants and authoritarian attitudes to, ultimately, favouring right-wing parties. The 'losers' route experienced negative changes at work, which made them feel powerless and isolated, leading to distrust and intolerance. They felt deprived, which fostered a negative attitude towards immigrants, political powerlessness and authoritarian attitudes, and ultimately led to a preference for extreme right-wing parties (Figure 2).

Figure 1: Routes linking perceived change in job conditions to distrust and intolerance (Flecker 2007)



This model-building logic is to be used in the recent paper for better understanding the success of Fidesz in 2017.

Rise of fidesz during the economic crisis

The autumn of 2006 opened a new chapter in Hungary's history. In the so-called speech of Ószöd left-liberal Prime Minister Gyurcsány admitted that they lied about the economic situation of Hungary before the elections of 2006 and the probability of a new era of recession to come, which resulted in riots linked to the right-wing opposition and emerging right-wing movements in the autumn of 2006 in Budapest. The Prime Minister refused to resign, which was worsened by police brutality against demonstrators on 23 October, 2006.

General disillusionment, recession, impoverishment on the one hand, and the inexorable, often brutal rhetoric manifestations of the right-wing opposition trying to find a scapegoat, the regular paralysing of parliamentary work, and permanent demonstrations were in favour of the strengthening of right-wing nationalistic, anti-globalist, and anti-EU movements and parties on the one hand, and the marked right shift of the society on the other hand (Tóth and Grajczjár 2015).

The economic crisis of 2008, the political corruption scandals, and the critical state of the economic and political management finally forced Prime Minister Gyurcsány to resign but the new Prime Minister Bajnai did not manage to create a convincing economic and social policy for the broad spectrum of the society until the new elections. In a radicalized atmosphere, the European Parliament elections in 2009 resulted in the success of Fidesz and Jobbik, and the elections of 2010 were won by Fidesz practically without an actual programme (Szűts et al. 2015), also winning a

two-thirds majority in parliament. Taking advantage of the two-thirds majority, and the vengeful public sentiment, Fidesz set to the nationalistic, witch-hunting, markedly exclusivist attitudes of Hungarian society: the slogan was the restoration of economic autonomy (“A Nemzeti Együttműködés Programja” 2010). The relativisation of the Horthy regime, and partly realising the political programme of Jobbik⁷⁰ played an active part with a double purpose: on the one hand, to take the wind from Jobbik’s sails, and, on the other hand, to start a radical right-wing resocialisation process that makes the return of parties considered earlier as left-liberal impossible.

In order for this, the new government has extremely centralised the political system, introduced a new constitution based on a nationalistic credo, conquered the majority of printed and online media, transformed the public media to make it the propaganda channel of the government, started to create a new upper class called “national capitalists”, to position the groups loyal to the prime minister, to nationalise the education system and to fill it with national authors, to reduce the number of graduates at universities and colleges, to establish some “own” national universities, and to create an illiberal society based on work (for a more detailed analysis see: Bajomi-Lázár 2013; Sipos 2014; Csillag and Szelényi 2015; Ágh 2016; Enyedi 2016; Kornai 2016). As mentioned earlier, the main feature of the latter is the anti-poor policy based on public work which does not lead back to the world of work, and which excludes people with low salaries from family benefits in most cases, and, at the same time, encourages well-to-do families to have more children (Szeredi 2013). The low flat income tax also only favours people with high income, while the highest VAT in Europe mainly afflicts the poorest groups.

An important feature of the new order is the freedom fight against the EU and global capital, the populist scapegoating attitude, keeping the society constantly ready by rumours, anti-migration and anti-refugee rhetoric (Krekó and Mayer 2015). Fidesz has curtailed the authority of the constitutional court, made the legal system operated by checks and balances meaningless, transformed the election system and shapes legislation according to the momentary interests of Fidesz, and the parliament’s role is practically confined to voting the ideas of the government. Orbán only tolerates leaders loyal to him in the cultural, academic, and political spheres as well.

The Fidesz-led right-wing government initiated a number of high profile conflicts with NGOs with international backgrounds, especially targeting those receiving and redistributing the Norwegian Grants and those being supported by Hungarian-American businessman, philanthropist George Soros.

70 For example: diminishing Hungary’s role in World War II., freedom fight against the EU, strong anti-migration campaign, discrimination against multinational corporations, nationalizations in the financial sector, the public utility sector and the private pension system, public work for the unemployed, eastern opening and stronger ties with illiberal and authoritarian regimes first of all with Russia, eliminating the separation of church and state, while upholding segregation in the education system (for a more detailed analysis see: Political Capital 2015)

Methodology and the Operationalization of aggregated variables for employed sampling

This paper presents the most important results of the SOCRIS survey in Hungary which was conducted between July and September in 2017. The survey was based on a representative sampling of employed people. The database was weighted with the help of the European Labour Force Survey 2016 data, so, our data are representative of gender, age categories, level of education, and degree of urbanization among employed people between 18 and 65 years.

The SOCRIS questionnaire – as a quantitative tool of the follow-up research of the SIREN project – was based more or less on the structure of the SIREN questionnaire. It began with a socio-demographic block (using variables like gender, age, settlement type, education), followed by a labour market block (using variables like employment and occupational position, sector, or work-contract). The next block measured the perceptions of socio-economic changes by using variables like perceptions of changes in the amount of work, work autonomy, or job security. Then, we measured socio-psychological drivers like subjective wellbeing, social attachment and collective relative deprivation. This was followed by an attitudinal block measuring social dominance orientation (SDO), ethnocentrism, xenophobia, authoritarianism, and political powerlessness. Then, we asked respondents about their political orientations and voting behaviours. Finally, we measured the subjective incomes of the respondents.

In this paper, all analyses were based on simple, multiple and step by step multiple linear regression models. Moreover, we built a path model for analysing latent processes on routes from perceptions of socio-economic changes to far right party affinity.

In the followings we present the most important variables – besides socio-demographic (like gender, age, education) and labour market ones, (occupational position, work-system), types of work contracts (open ended, fixed term) or sector (public, private).

Socio-economic changes (SEC index) – the role of job insecurity, changes in the amount of work and in autonomy, subjective wellbeing

Previous research in Europe suggests that job insecurity has an impact on distrust in institutions. Job insecurity was associated with feelings of dissatisfaction, social deprivation, economic strain and fear of losing one's current social position, which in turn translated into intolerant attitudes, such as distrustful attitudes towards migrants, which have been found to impact extreme-right wing voting intentions and behaviours (Baughn and Yaprak 1996; De Weerd et al. 2007; De Witte and Meulemann 2007).

The next important variable here is autonomy. Melvin Kohn showed that less autonomy pushes values and perceptions of workers into an exclusive direction (Kohn, M. L., & Schooler, C. 1982). Subsequent research has shown that job autonomy even has an immediate effect on the economic attitudes of workers (De Weerd & De Witte, 2001).

Next we considered the amount of work people had to do, and more precisely if there have been changes in this. The assumption was that a strong increase in workload, not accompanied by any kind of compensation (e.g. increase in income or autonomy) could instigate feelings of deprivation and cause frustration (De Weerdts & De Witte, 2001).

Income deprivation, which was found to affect distrust towards immigrants, i.e., perceived ethnic threat in various European countries (Billiet et al. 2014), was measured by creating a subjective wellbeing variable (measured as principal component by combining changes in the financial situation of the family, optimism concerning the financial possibilities of the family in the near future, and subjective income; total variance explained: 61%).

Appreciation/collective relative deprivation

(principal component, total variance explained: 55%)

Some people find it hard to face the challenges generated by the accelerating world, multiculturalism, and rapid social changes. Feelings of competition, for example with minorities, might therefore be expected to be stronger if one thinks his or her job is threatened, or has suffered income or status loss. Deprivation of the attainment of norms, which is considered important to assess personal success (getting ahead or further in life), could then lead to frustration. Deprived persons are in this sense more likely to hold unfavourable attitudes towards out-groups. The demand for the exclusivist politics of national closing in can be seen as an 'identity stabilising tool' to counterbalance such insecurity and losing the ground, promising the national in-group security, well-deserved, calculable economic position and order in society (Kriesi et al. 1998, Vester 2001: 299).

Collective relative deprivation was operationalized as follows:

- q19_1 - the appreciation that people like me get is not proportionate to the appreciation we deserve
- q19_2 - people like me get rewarded for their effort
- q19_3 - people like me have the power needed to defend our interests

Social attachment

(workplace integration; principal component, total variance explained: 60%):

The literature on right-wing populism and extremism often addresses more general and more long term socio-economic change such as "individualisation" in which traditional societal institutions – such as the occupational group –, lose their former security and protective function. This may lead to social isolation, insecurity of action and to feelings of powerlessness that can be targeted by right-wing extremist ideology (Heitmeyer 1992). The complexity and the contradictions of contemporary society may lead to problems of orientation. In such a situation, extreme-right ideological elements

such as nationalism may help individuals to create a subjective sense of consistency (Zoll 1984).

In investigating the presence of such a link, we speculated that this would be more likely to happen when people, in addition to experiencing changes at work, also experience a crisis in their identification with meaningful social categories at work were incorporated into the questionnaire, including both an identification with a limited and very concrete social category such as the work group, and an identification with wider and more abstract social categories such as the organisation, and an imaginary one like the nation.

Thus, social attachment (workplace integration) was operationalized as follows:

- q20_1 - I feel strong ties with my workgroup/colleagues
- q20_3 - I feel strong ties with my company/organization
- q20_5 - I feel strong ties with Hungary

Authoritarianism

(principal component, total variance explained: 60%)

Authoritarianism was first investigated as a possible explanation for the surprising overrepresentation of blue-collar workers in the NSDAP electorate but has come a long way since then. In the present research authoritarian personality is referred to as a combination of a need of submission and a need of domination. According to Ignazi (2000), the social groups going through a crisis of identity appreciate clear hierarchy, well-defined social borders, order, and a homogeneous society.

Basically, recent theory and measurement instruments hereby draw upon three dimensions (Altemeyer, 1988): conventionalism, authoritarian submission and authoritarian aggression. It is this approach we adopted from the theory of psychological interests in this research.

- q22_12 - obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn
- q22_13 - most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of immoral and anti-social people
- q22_14 - we need strong leaders who tell us what to do

Social dominance orientation

(SDO index)

The theory of social dominance orientation examines relationships between groups, distinguishing between the egalitarian and hierarchical concepts. The key element of the theory of SDO is the desire for domination over others based on a meritocratic approach. The attitude of ruling over others is closely related to nationalism, chauvinism and authoritarianism. Increasing competition on the labour market and individual responsibility, self-care, especially among the winners of the

changes, can lead to the idea 'the winner takes it all'. Accordingly, the unmerited, 'lazy stragglers' fall away from the market in fierce competition, and this creates the dominance of the hard working worthy people in the society.

We chose two important variables from the original operationalization of Sidanius and Pratto's (2001) work:

- q22_1 - some people are just inferior to others
- q22_2 - to get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others

Political powerlessness

(principal component, total variance explained: 60%)

People affected negatively by the socio-economic changes may become dissatisfied and feel they have no influence on political processes. By protest voting we mean that voters disappointed by moderate parties vote for marginal and extreme parties displaced from the "traditional" political space. Of course, exclusive attention to protest voting as an explanation has proven to be problematic, because large parts of the electorate have shown affinity with the extreme right-wing ideology itself as well (see Falter and Klein 1994). This is of course one of the reasons this theoretical approach is just one among others that we chose to include in our theoretical set-up.

The operationalization of political powerlessness is as follows:

- q23_1 - it seems that whatever party people vote for, things go on pretty much the same
- q23_3 - people like me have no influence on what the government does
- q23_4 - the people we elect as members of parliament very quickly lose touch with their voters

Xenophobia

(index)

Prejudice against immigrants or "everyday racism" refers to negative attitudes towards foreigners because they are perceived as an economic or cultural threat (De Witte 1999). These negative attitudes play a crucial role in ethnic competition theory (Coenders 2001). This theory combines conflict theory (Campbell 1967) and social identification theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Conflict theory states that social groups have conflicting interests because relevant material goods (employment, housing, social security) are scarce. This scarcity promotes competition. As a consequence, autochthonous respondents lacking essential resources develop negative attitudes towards immigrants, which make them susceptible to the appeal of extreme right-wing parties.

From the original SIREN conceptualization we preserved two variables for measuring xenophobia:

- q22_9 - immigrants increase crime rates in Hungary
- q22_10 - immigrants contribute to the welfare of this country

Ethnocentrism

(index)

The overwhelming majority of the mentioned sociological and social psychological theories emphasize the importance of workplace experiences, uncertainty and deprivation, the disturbance of collective and individual identity, and the need to rebuild this through imaginary national integration and identification. Modernity, atomization and individualization lead to the protection of natural communities in today's Western societies. But the theory of *déclassement*, the losers of modernity theory, the theory of social disintegration or the theory of symbolic world all emphasize the threat of the erosion of social identity and, the demand of symbolic integration into a broader and secure community, as well, which demand can easily lead to ethnocentrism and nationalism (Flecker 2007).

From the original SIREN conceptualization we preserved two variables for measuring ethnocentrism/nationalism:

- q22_5 - the world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Hungarians
- q22_6 - people should support their country even if the country is wrong

Research findings

In this chapter we will show which socio-demographic variables correlate with the perception of socio-economic changes, drivers like deprivation and wellbeing and receptiveness attitudes, moreover, what sociological, socio-psychological phenomena and value profiles influence the satisfaction with the Orbán-government.

Concerning **perception of socio-economic changes** age and occupational position play a part, where older people, less educated and those with lower occupational positions have more negative views on the perceived socio-economic changes.

Perceptions of socio-economic changes appear to have the strongest relationship with **subjective wellbeing** where positive perceptions of changes go together with positive accounts of subjective wellbeing. Occupational position and education is also relevant here – people with higher occupational positions and educational levels report more positive subjective wellbeing. Age has a role to play as well: older people report worse levels of subjective wellbeing than younger people.

The most important bivariate relationships with feelings of **social attachment** are the variables of age and perceptions of socio-economic changes. In general, older people report higher levels of social identification than younger people. People who have more positive perceptions of socio-economic changes also report higher levels of social attachment. The same is true of subjective wellbeing. Educational level is also significant: people with higher educational levels appear to be

more attached. Workers of the public sector in general report higher levels of social attachment than workers of the private sector. Occupational position is significant too: the higher one's occupational position, the more attached s/he feels.

Among the background variables subjective wellbeing has the strongest relationship with **appreciation/deprivation**. Those who report higher levels of subjective wellbeing also report higher levels of appreciation (and so, lower collective relative deprivation). The case is similar to the perception of socio-economic changes: those who report positive socio-economic changes tend to report higher levels of appreciation. People with higher levels of education and higher occupational positions report higher levels of appreciation. Age is relevant as well: older people report lower levels of appreciation than younger respondents.

Turning to the receptiveness attitudes, people with higher educational levels are less inclined to hold the attitude of **social dominance orientation (SDO)**. Age is relevant too, where older people are less likely to hold SDO than younger people. Besides, contract-type seems to be important, where permanent workers are more declined to have SDO than fixed-term labourers. The perception of socio-economic changes is significant, where winners of changes are more prone to SDO than losers. Deprivation also plays an important role: the more feeling of deprivation the more affinity to SDO. Occupational position is relevant as well: the higher one's position on the occupational ladder the less inclined they hold SDO.

Educational level is negatively correlated to **authoritarianism**, more highly educated people hold less authoritarian views. The same applies to occupational position. Sector is also relevant here: people working in the private sector are less authoritarian than public sector employees. Curiously, social attachment is positively related to authoritarianism.

People with higher educational levels are less **xenophobic** than people with lower educational levels. The higher one's position on the occupational ladder, the less xenophobic they are. Sector is important too: people in the private sector are less xenophobic than those employed in the public sector.

Similarly to xenophobia, educational level and occupational position are strongly related to **ethnocentrism**. The higher one's occupational position or educational level, the least prone to ethnocentrism they are. Feelings of social attachment and appreciation, however, are positively related to ethnocentrism. People employed in the public sector are more ethnocentric than those working in the private sector. Finally, subjective wellbeing is positively related to ethnocentrism too: those who report better subjective wellbeing are more ethnocentric.

The most important relationship with **political powerlessness** comes from feelings of appreciation and subjective wellbeing. The more appreciated or more wellbeing one feels the less powerlessness they perceive. The higher one's occupational position and educational level, the least they experience

political powerlessness. Contract is relevant too: people employed with open ended contracts feel less politically powerless here. Social attachment is inversely related to political powerlessness: the more attached, the less politically powerless they feel.

Analysing the **satisfaction with the Orbán-government** as affinity to the new populist far right in governing position we find the following results. Employees of the public sector, those with higher occupational positions and more integrated jobholders are more satisfied with the government. What is more, higher subjective status (subjective winner positions, wellbeing, feelings of appreciation) is strongly connected to the satisfaction. Nevertheless, strong political trust and all of the right wing extremist attitudes (SDO, ethnocentrism, xenophobia and authoritarianism) correlate the satisfaction with the Orbán-government, positively. Practically, all these factors imply the radicalization of subjective winners of the changes.

Step by step analyses

In this subchapter we analyse the effects of the most important influencing factors towards satisfaction with the Orbán-government. It means that we build different, ever expanding models, where the included independent variables hold each other's effects to the given dependent variable under control. The first model includes socio-demographic variables, the second one variables relating labour market positions, the third one the perceptions of socio-economic changes as well, the fourth one is complemented with socio-psychological drivers and the subjective wellbeing, and finally, the fifth one with receptiveness attitudes.

Table 1: Stepwise overall regression on satisfaction with the Orbán-government in Hungary


Orbán-government satisfaction	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Gender (Male, Female)	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Age	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Education	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Sector (Private/Public)		0,16**	0,15**	0,13**	NS
Contract* (Permanent/Fixed term)		NS	NS	NS	NS
Work system* (Part-time/Full time)		NS	NS	NS	NS
Occupational position		NS	NS	NS	NS
SEC Index			NS	NS	NS
Subjective wellbeing				0,2***	0,15**
Social attachment				0,14**	NS
Appreciation				0,15**	NS
Authoritarianism					0,13*
Political powerlessness					-0,34***
Xenophobia					0,22***
Ethnocentrism					NS
SDO					NS
Adjusted R2	NS	0,02	0,03	0,12	0,34

Socio-demographic variables do not influence the satisfaction with the Orbán-government, practically sympathizers can be found in all strata of the Hungarian society. Higher occupational positions and workers of the public sector appear in some models, but fall out in the last one. Seemingly, more positive socio-psychological drivers like appreciation, social attachment and feelings of wellbeing influence affinity to the government, in the last model, however, only the effect of the subjective wellbeing remains. Besides wellbeing, strong political trust, xenophobia and authoritarianism are the most important factors that explain satisfaction with the Orbán-government.

Path-model

A path model is a linear regression chain, where the correlation between two variables is broken up to different routes. Based on the idea and methodology used in the international SIREN project (2003), we have worked out a path model for satisfaction with the Orbán-government. We built this path model, since we wanted to investigate the latent effects of socio-economic changes across socio-psychological drivers and receptiveness attitudes to satisfaction with the Orbán-government.

Figure 2: Satisfaction with the Orbán-government in 2017



As we can see, ethnocentrism and xenophobia besides strong political trust are the most important factors, which explain the satisfaction with the Orbán-government in 2017 in Hungary, directly. But the most interesting phenomenon here is that there are no loser routes leading to the satisfaction with the government. What's more, not only social attachment and authoritarianism play an important driver-role here, but also appreciation (lack of deprivation) via SDO lead to ethnocentrism and through this attitude, to satisfaction with the government. Interestingly, there is a direct winner route observed from SEC (perceptions of socio-economic changes) to satisfaction with the Orbán-government as well which indicates that it is enough to be a subjective winner of the changes to support a far right populist government without any ideological munition.

Summary and conclusions

The second wave of the financial crisis of 2012 had a significant effect on xenophobia as we know from the results of ESS data from 2012 and 2014 (own calculation). This growing tendency was seriously strengthened due to the exclusivist political reactions of the right wing parties to the so called refugee crisis of 2015, which caused a moral panic in the society and benefited first of all Fidesz, as we saw from the comparison of the 2014 and 2016 ESS data (own calculation). However, labour market variables have not shown any correlation with growing xenophobia between 2014 and 2016 in Hungary (own calculation).

Nevertheless, analysing SOCRIS data we found that belonging to disadvantaged social groups can clearly be a seed-bad of receptiveness attitudes. Employees with lower social status (lower education and occupational position) are more inclined to show more SDO, authoritarianism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism or political powerlessness, while lower subjective status (deprivation and less subjective wellbeing) correlates “only” with political powerlessness in Hungary. Employees having fixed term contracts are more social dominance oriented and feel politically powerless. According to the literature, this is a normal pathological reaction of the loser of the changes (Mudde 2010). Deprived persons working among precarious conditions or living among disadvantageous circumstances can feel discriminated and be easily disappointed with the ruling regime and lose trust in the mainstream political forces. Ethnocentrism plays a status-compensative role as imaginary integration into the nation, whose “natural” superiority as “community of the majority” is unquestionable (Anderson 2006). SDO appears as a moral superiority feeling along a double demarcation logic against the unmerited corrupt elite “up there” on the one hand and, against the “lazy scroungers” downwards on the other hand. Authoritarianism is a tool to punish people violating conventions, and restoring order by creating dominance of the “merited” in the society, while xenophobia is partly a consequence of the fear of insecurity, (ethnic) competition for jobs and for social benefits (Lipset 1966) and it partly embodies the general out-group rejection resulting from the above mentioned receptiveness attitudes.

Younger employees and those with a higher status are clearly the subjective winners of changes. Only younger employees and those with a higher status (and subjective winners of changes) reported higher level of appreciation and wellbeing.

But also groups being in a more advantaged situation are threatened by radicalization in Hungary: younger employees, subjective winner groups, appreciated employees or those who reported more subjective wellbeing are more social dominance oriented and show a higher degree of ethnocentrism: positive subjective status can lead to a higher level of SDO and ethnocentrism by emphasizing meritocratic views and defending the status quo and the ethnic community: the ruling power and the integrity of the virtuous and superior national majority (Flecker 2007).

Besides, employees of the public sector are clearly radicalized in Hungary as well: they seem to be more 'integrated' on the labour market, but also are more ethnocentric and authoritarian and xenophobic than employees of the private sector. The question is whether this radicalization process could be explained by a kind of feudal constraints enforced by the government and fear of job loss, high level of conformism (self-surrender or loyalty without criticism), justification of the new order or even the classic authoritarian subjection in the public sector? We still don't know it surely; this is a question of further research.

As we know, right wing radicalization in the sense of supporting far right parties is rather a complicated phenomenon in Hungary, since Fidesz and the Orbán-government partly occupied the far right position in the political field. Orbán has supporters rather from the xenophobic high-subjective-status-holder block having strong trust in him and his charisma. But, socio-demographic variables do not influence the affinity to the Orbán-government: far right sympathizers can be found practically in all strata of the Hungarian society. Nevertheless, based on our step by step models, perceptions of changes do not seem to influence these affinities, directly.

Therefore, by using path models for analysing latent effects of perceptions of SEC it is to be stated that Fidesz addressed first of all the subjective winners of his regime successfully: there are exclusively winner routes that lead to the satisfaction with the Orbán-government among employees. In this model subjective (probably felt as merited) winner positions combined with strong workplace integration and with an authoritarian organization of work and authoritarian demand keeping up winner workplace positions are to be explored as socio-psychological drivers that lead to overheated ethnocentrism/nationalism and out-group rejection (xenophobia), which meet the most important populist buzzwords of the Orbán-government on the one hand. On the other hand, the appreciation in the workplace via the meritocratic and superior character of SDO gives the feeling to the subjective winners of the regime that Hungary is one of the best countries of the world that should be defended at any costs (ethno-nationalism). Besides, appreciation via superiority feeling as support of the just hierarchy leads to the unquestionable trust in the Orbánian world as well. What's more, there is a direct winner route leading from perceptions of socio-economic changes to satisfaction with the Orbán-government without any right-wing ideological influence, which clearly shows that a winner perception is well enough to support a far right political force in a governing position.

This shows fatal divisions of employee groups in Hungary: there can be observed a radicalized subjective winner group supporting the governing coalition and a disappointed and (partly) radicalized group supporting the opposition, first of all Jobbik (Tóth-Grajczjár 2015). The picture is even clearer if we take into consideration that the far right (Fidesz and Jobbik together) includes more than two thirds of the active voters in Hungary. Practically, the extreme right political ideology is common ground also in the world of work today in Hungary

All in all, there is a wide permeation of right-wing radicalism among different social strata in Hungary received enough far right attitudinal and ideological scapegoating munition from Fidesz (and Jobbik) to create a radicalized majority against the left-liberal political forces. Nevertheless, the majority of subjective winners are clearly convinced that the recovery from the crises is only due to the Orbánian governance.

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