

## The Rákóczi Insurrection in English War Policy, 1703-1711

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Hungarian liberties, religious toleration, and Habsburg absolutism were some of the issues which lay at the heart of the Rákóczi-led *Kuruc* revolt in Hungary. In England, most of these matters were little understood and of no apparent concern. Yet, the ministers of Her Majesty's Government in London had the deepest interest in ending the insurrection.<sup>1</sup>

English interest centered on two aspects: supporting the Protestants in Hungary and preventing the revolt from being a diversion to the use of imperial troops. The religious aspect of Rákóczi's cause predisposed the Government in London to seek a solution which favored the Calvinists in Hungary. A few months after the outbreak of the rebellion, Queen Anne stressed the point in a personal letter to the Emperor Leopold in which she asked particularly for freedom of religion for the Hungarian Protestants who supported the insurrection. ". . . We consider it just for us to beg this the more freely from your Imperial Majesty," the Queen wrote,

since we ask nothing from you that we ourselves have not already done. Believing it not possible to compel the conscience in matters pertaining to religion, we have granted to our subjects professing the Roman Catholic faith the same peaceful, quiet and free use as is enjoyed by the rest of our subjects. . . .<sup>2</sup>

Religion was the closest tie which Englishmen shared with the followers of Rákóczi, but they also had a common appreciation for the value of parliamentary power in placing limits on royal authority. Englishmen who were aware of events in Hungary were impressed with the similarity of outlook and values between their own domestic system and Rákóczi's. Focusing on the religious issue and with further appreciation for the parliamentary aspirations of the *Kuruc*, England based her policy toward Hungary on the belief that what was appropriate in English domestic affairs was also a sound basis upon which to construct her

attitude in foreign affairs. Although the Habsburg court in Vienna was a key ally in the War of the Spanish Succession, the English Government could not ignore the persecution of Protestants in Catholic lands merely for the sake of international power politics. Personally, Queen Anne considered herself the leader of Protestant Europe. For that reason, she and many of her ministers felt it necessary to intervene on behalf of Protestants. She explained to the Elector Palatine, earlier in 1703,

We cannot but be moved by their anguish, as is meet, and by compassion, nor are we capable of shunning that which we consider to be our duty (since we profess the same religion as they). . . .<sup>3</sup>

England naturally sympathized with the Hungarian rebel aims since they called for toleration of the Protestant minority, but the relative importance of the issue was determined for England by the relationship of the Hungarian revolt to Austria's efforts in fighting France. As the revolt progressed after 1703, England saw Vienna send more and more troops to Hungary. The English Government believed that these troop movements created a serious obstacle to carrying out the grand strategy of the war against France. Moreover, Englishmen came to think that this action represented bad faith by Austria since they believed that the revolt could easily be quelled by acquiescing to Hungarian demands, particularly their demand for religious freedom.

The English concept of grand strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession was based on the premise that, in order to defeat the most powerful single country in Europe, France's superior military strength had to be engaged on as many fronts as possible so that she would be compelled to divide and, thus, to weaken her forces. For this reason, England believed that it was essential for the allies to attack France from the United Provinces, Germany, Savoy, and from the sea while at the same time engaging French forces in Spain. In this way, the superior strength of France could be reduced to proportions which were manageable by the smaller allied armies. The key element in English thinking was the stress placed on simultaneous attack on several sides. The cabinet in London believed that this required the utmost effort on the part of each ally. In the light of this viewpoint, the revolt in Hungary was a serious distraction to the Austrian military effort in fighting France.<sup>4</sup>

In 1701, the aristocratic Hungarian patriot, Prince Ferenc II Rákóczi, had escaped from prison in Vienna. After nearly two years of refuge in Poland, he returned to Hungary in June 1703 with his associate Count Miklós Bercsényi and put himself at the head of the *Kuruc*, peasant revolt. Shortly after Rákóczi's return, George Stepney, the English

envoy in Vienna surveyed Vienna's position in the war against France. He saw that Austria had various problems: difficulty with the elector of Bavaria, the lethargy of the Imperial army, and the revolt in Hungary. "We want but one disorder more to be in as miserable a state as possible," he wrote.<sup>5</sup> In the back of his mind, he had speculated that this one disorder more might be Turkish support for the Hungarians and a renewal of the war in the east which had ended only five years before with the Peace of Karlowitz. The English envoy to Prussia, Lord Raby, sympathized with the Imperial position, "the misfortune of the poor Emperor is but too plain for the rebels are almost at the gates of Vienna, and the elector of Bavaria with the French are ready to enter his hereditary countries on the other side, so that he can hardly find a place in his dominions where he can be safe."<sup>6</sup>

In the United Provinces, the duke of Marlborough served as commander-in-chief of English forces in the Low Countries and ambassador to the Dutch while also a key political figure and a member of the cabinet at home. In his reports Marlborough assured the cabinet that he understood entirely the serious effect of the Hungarian problem on the prosecution of the war, and that he lost no opportunity in pressing the Imperial envoys to urge their court to bring about peace with the Hungarians. He believed, however, that diplomatic pressure would not be effective while Hungarian demands were so unacceptably high.<sup>7</sup> At an informal discussion in 1704 sponsored by the English and Dutch envoys to Vienna, the *Kuruc* leaders demonstrated that they intended to do more than correct what they believed were immediate political abuses. They sought the restoration of the elective monarchy and the right of the Hungarian nobility to oppose with arms any violation of the kingdom's law and constitution. In addition, they wanted foreign powers to guarantee the settlement with Vienna, while at the same time suggesting that Transylvania be re-established as an independent state with Rákóczi as its prince. The Habsburg court in Vienna found the rebel leaders to be far too obstinate and ambitious to negotiate over these demands or to accept willingly anything else.<sup>8</sup>

In 1704, the English envoy in Vienna was ordered to present Marlborough's campaign against Bavaria as a special favour to the Emperor, which could be appropriately reciprocated by quieting the disturbances in Hungary.<sup>9</sup> This line of approach was repeatedly used by England, but it met with little success. As Marlborough progressed toward the Danube, Stepney continued to hear reports that if the confederate armies should defeat the Bavarian Elector Max II Emmanuel, Austria would probably order her leading general, Prince Eugen, to Hungary with a

large army to suppress the revolt. Stepney diplomatically told an Imperial courtier that he was

fully persuaded such designs were far from the Emperor's inclinations and true interest, which was to come to a speedy conclusion with his own subjects, and if the Elector of Bavaria should chance to be defeated, then to turn all the forces that can be spared out of the Empire toward prosecuting the war in Italy.<sup>10</sup>

The cabinet in London hoped that the further action which it had taken in sending a prestigious general, Lord Galway, with additional forces to Portugal would also be seen as a further assurance of English support for Habsburg interests. They hoped it would deserve the repayment of peace in Hungary. The allied success against Bavaria led London to believe that the Hungarians would be more willing to make peace.<sup>11</sup> It was logical to conclude that the defeat of such a very powerful prince would have an effect on less powerful dissenters within the Empire, but the situation proved to be quite different. On the one hand, this success seemed to lead some in Vienna to "a persecuting spirit" encouraging the use of large detachments of the Imperial army in Hungary.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, the Hungarians now seemed to be even less receptive to the idea of making a peaceful solution. Following the defeat of the Bavarian and French armies by the English, Dutch and Imperial forces at the Battle of Blenheim in August 1704, neither France nor Bavaria was likely to provide any direct military support for the Hungarian revolt. However, Stepney speculated that the Hungarians might now turn to seek support from the Turks.<sup>13</sup> In late August 1704, Stepney and the Dutch envoy at Vienna, Jacob Jan Hamel Bruyninx, jointly approached Count Dominik Andreas Kaunitz, the imperial vice-chancellor, attempting to learn more about Imperial policy toward the Hungarian revolutionaries and "to improve any fair opportunity" that the Hungarians might have in reaching a peaceful solution.<sup>14</sup> But all seemed to be of no avail. In late November, Secretary of State Robert Harley ordered Stepney, at the Queen's express command, that he "in the most warm and engaging terms press" the Emperor to make peace in Hungary. "All the zeal and affection that Her Majesty hath showed to the interest of the House of Austria," Harley lamented,

all the success which heaven hath blessed Her Majesty's arms with will be to no purpose, for not only the Turk will necessarily be brought into the War on one side, but the French will be strengthened on the other side and Her Majesty her allies will be weakened if not disabled from affording assistance to those who will do nothing towards their

own deliverance, but rather embarrass their own affairs and weaken others.<sup>15</sup>

The remote affairs of Hungary could well have been the rock upon which English grand strategy foundered. In English eyes, the spectre of renewed war between the Turks and the Empire was increased by Austrian insistence on putting down the Hungarian revolt by force. The failure of the Imperial court to react to this situation and to put clear priority on the war against France caused an increasingly cynical English attitude toward the Empire's contribution to the war. Richard Hill, the English envoy to Savoy, echoed the common sentiment when he remarked, "we owe little, God knows, to the Emperor, who can neither make peace in Hungary, nor war in Lombardy."<sup>16</sup> For the moment, the war in Italy was to be sustained only by the hope of the 8,000 Prussians for which Marlborough had negotiated.<sup>17</sup>

By the summer of 1705, the insurrection in Hungary had reached such serious proportions for English plans that Lord Sunderland was dispatched on a special mission to establish the basis for peace between Austria and the Hungarians.<sup>18</sup> The Government in London was quite willing to use every available argument in support of its view. Doing just that, Harley wrote to Vienna wishing Sunderland and Stepney success in the negotiations with "those Heathen magicians which oppose you" and suggesting that if peace could not be speedily reached in Hungary, it would neither be easy to give aid to Italy "nor will our Parliament here be ready to continue their supplies for carrying on a war to support those, who will not (though they can) help themselves."<sup>19</sup> As the principal parliamentary manager for the Government as well as a secretary of state, Harley's words should have carried weight when reported in Vienna.

While both the Hungarians and the Emperor had accepted English mediation, there seemed to be a great reluctance on the part of the Austrians to accept an English guarantee of Hungarian rights. Without that, there was little hope that the Hungarians would agree to any terms. Even before leaving for the continent, Lord Sunderland was pessimistic about the success of his mission. "I fear I am going upon a very fruitless errand," he wrote.<sup>20</sup>

After arriving in Austria, Sunderland found that, despite his urgent pleas, there was very little hope of preventing the Imperial army from forcefully putting down the revolt.<sup>21</sup> By December 1705, the situation had not changed. Both sides in the dispute seemed more intransigent than ever, and there were additional fears that disorders in Bavaria would further hinder the war effort against France. Prince Eugene's

army in Italy was in need of every kind of support.<sup>22</sup> Despite these difficulties, there was one ray of hope: the clash of arms in Transylvania during Austria's reoccupation of the area had not brought the Turks into the war. Sir Robert Sutton, English Ambassador at Constantinople, reported to Stepney that the plague, corruption, and confusion in the government of the Ottoman Empire allowed little opportunity for direct entry into the war.<sup>23</sup> Sutton believed that the Turks would go no further than merely encouraging the Hungarians to persevere in their revolt and "favouring them underhand" with arms in Wallachia and Moldavia.<sup>24</sup> By late spring 1706, Stepney had been able to make progress in mediating a two-month truce between the Hungarians and the Habsburgs.<sup>25</sup> The English and the Dutch had great expectations for the success of the conference convened at Tynall on 25 May 1706. This was the first formal peace talk between the Emperor Joseph and his Hungarian subjects after three years of war. Despite English optimism, the conference foundered on Rákóczi's uncompromising demand for the restoration of complete independence for Transylvania. George Stepney and his Dutch colleague worked hard to obtain a compromise, however the Emperor's claim to sovereignty in Transylvania backed by the success of his army in subduing the province gave little reason for the Habsburg court to concede to Rákóczi's demands. At the expiration of the truce in mid-July, the negotiations broke down and the armistice was not renewed. The Dutch and English mediators were optimistic about reaching a settlement in due course, but the prolonged period required would delay and obstruct the Imperial military campaign in Hungary. Viewing the negotiations as only a delay, the Habsburg court broke them off and resumed military operations.<sup>26</sup>

The English and Dutch mediators were outraged at the failure of these negotiations. They interpreted Habsburg intransigence as evidence of insincerity, not only in its dealings with the Hungarians, but with the wider aims of the Grand Alliance against France. The continued presence of thousands of Austrian troops in Hungary weakened the allied effort against France. To Englishmen this appeared to be a weakness caused only by the selfish and unwarranted aims of the Habsburg monarch. Given English perceptions of the situation, the government in London could not support Vienna in suppressing protestantism or the rights of the Hungarians. In one respect, English support for Rákóczi only prolonged the agony of his inevitable defeat, yet the suppression of the Rákóczi insurrection was no more in England's interests than its continuation as a drain on Austrian resources.

Shortly after the collapse of the peace talks at Tynall, Stepney was

transferred to The Hague to replace the incapacitated Alexander Stanhope as envoy. Soon after his arrival there, Stepney learned that the Dutch had ordered their envoy in Constantinople to exhort Turkey to carefully adhere to the treaty of Karlowitz, the treaty which had brought an end to the Turkish war in 1699. Stepney held little hope that such a course of action would be effective. "In my poor opinion the most natural method of preserving the peace would be by persuading the Emperor to be reconciled with the Hungarians," he wrote.<sup>27</sup> The Hungarians were the key to preserving the peace in east central Europe, and Stepney went so far as to suggest that in order to prevent war, the Emperor should relinquish Transylvania entirely to Rákóczi. Unknown to the English, Rákóczi's envoys were already in Constantinople seeking aid from the Turks, but in Stepney's opinion, Turkey was not a natural ally for the Hungarians. Prince Rákóczi, himself, had told Stepney that he would not have recourse to the Turks unless there was no other alternative in attaining his goals.<sup>28</sup> With this advice in mind, the cabinet approved the instructions to the new English Ambassador to Vienna. Sir Philip Meadows was told that his major concern would be to prevent diversion from the war against France, stop the war in Hungary, and avoid Turkish interference. "It can not but give us and our allies much concern," the royal instructions stated, "if we should have any ground to apprehend that there will be less force employed against France the next year than was this. The only way to prevent that is to procure an honourable peace in Hungary."<sup>29</sup> English representations in this matter, however, had little effect. By the autumn of 1707, there were reports that additional Imperial troops were to be withdrawn from Italy and sent directly to Hungary.<sup>30</sup> Some of the forces mentioned included the Hessian and Saxe-Gothans in English pay serving in Italy.<sup>31</sup> In February, reports were received in London that the Emperor intended to send some of the Danish troops in Austrian service to Hungary.<sup>32</sup> Although these troops were paid by Austria, the English diplomats in both Vienna and Copenhagen were instructed to protest against this action and to ensure that the troops were used against France. However, when it was learned in London that Denmark had agreed to the Emperor's proposal to use Danish troops in Hungary, England acquiesced in order to prevent further stress within the alliance.<sup>33</sup>

From 1708, the English Government appeared to take little interest in the Hungarian situation, enduring it as best they could. The envoy in Vienna admitted at one point that he never troubled London with news from Hungary although the court in Vienna seemed "more concerned for the success of that war, than at what may happen on any frontier of

France.”<sup>34</sup> In January 1711, the new Government in London under Robert Harley which replaced the Godolphin ministry renewed appeals for a peaceful accommodation in Hungary. Seeking support from the States-General, Lord Townshend was ordered to ask the Dutch to join in England’s plea for an end to a war which risked Turkish interference and which served French interests.<sup>35</sup> Despite continued assurances from Constantinople that war was unlikely, London suspected that these were only pretenses for the Turks to put themselves in a good military posture before attacking the Habsburg Empire. The safest course to follow, Secretary St. John believed, was to procure peace in Hungary.<sup>36</sup>

In 1710, the chances for English grand strategy to succeed had been reduced following the defeat and capture of General James Stanhope at Brihuega in Spain and the continued lack of a vigorous attack on France from Savoy. In London, however, the cabinet continued to believe that a military solution to the war could only be won by carrying through the original concept of war strategy. The plans for the campaign of 1711 stressed the full use of the Imperial army against France and an active campaign by Victor Amadeus II, the duke of Savoy, complementing the other allied armies in the Low Countries and in Spain.

As war weariness and financial pressures stretched allied military resources to the utmost, English ministers believed that the Hungarian situation must be settled quickly in order to win the war. Hungary, in St. John’s words, had become “the great hinge of the war.”<sup>37</sup> Without the settlement there, he could see “no prospect of reducing France, and of obtaining an honourable Peace.”<sup>38</sup>

The military situation in Spain had fallen to such a level that it appeared far too difficult a situation for the allies to retrieve. Secretary of State St. John outlined the dilemma:

Suppose what number of troops you please sent into Catalonia, they will have hardly ground at first to stand upon or provisions with any tolerable convenience, neither can they hope easily or in any reasonable time to be able to extend themselves blocked up by such an army, and in such a corner of the country.<sup>39</sup>

The situation might be saved, the Government believed, by strong action in the other theatres. As St. John put it, “if we were able to gain a footing in France whilst we lost it in Spain, we might hope to have the opportunity of making a safe and honourable peace.”<sup>40</sup> English troops in Flanders were substantially increased to offset the preparations of the French.<sup>41</sup> The best opportunity appeared to be an attack in Provence or Dauphiné.<sup>42</sup> However, the ability of the allies to gather a strong army in



either of those places clearly depended on peace in Hungary and the subsequent transfer of Imperial forces to the French front. 20–30,000 troops had been deployed in Hungary during the insurrection and by the end of 1711, this figure may have been more than 50,000 or nearly half of the entire Austrian army.

England's expectations were raised by the conclusion of a peace agreement between the Hungarian insurgents and the Habsburg ruler in May 1711. The peace which England had sought for so many years seemed to be at hand. The revolt was over, and English ministers moved quickly to encourage the movement of Imperial troops out of Hungary.<sup>43</sup> They watched the results of their efforts carefully for they were designed to be a test of Vienna's intentions and of the viability of English grand strategy in achieving a military victory in the war. The new government which had come to power under Robert Harley in 1710 was committed to ending the war. The new English government pursued the same basic war strategy which had been followed since the war against France had broken out in 1702.<sup>44</sup> If possible, they wished to achieve a military victory along the lines which the Marlborough-Godolphin government had followed. The new leaders saw the difficulty of achieving success with a purely military strategy and, at the same time, they were exploring other alternatives. They believed that short of a clear cut military defeat on the battlefield, the alliance could still achieve its goals by using allied military preparations as a means of negotiating from a position of strength with France. Failing even allied agreement or cooperation to do that, English leaders believed that they could achieve their own national aims through a separate peace. In any case, the Government in London needed an effective Austrian army attacking France on her borders as part of England's conception of grand strategy for the war. Now that the Rákóczi insurrection had been put down, the English cabinet could see no further excuse for Austrian failure to join fully in the war against France. Secretary of State Henry St. John put the issue clearly when he wrote,

The Malcontents have hitherto been the scapegoats which have borne the blame of all deficiencies we have had to charge the House of Austria with. Hungary has been the gulf wherein the plunder of Bavaria, and of Mantua, the revenues of Milan and Naples, and the contributions of the Italian princes, all gained by the assistance of the Queen and States, have been swallowed up. But these excuses can no longer be pleaded. . . .<sup>45</sup>

The obstacle which the Rákóczi-led insurrection in Hungary had

presented to English grand strategy had been removed, yet the English did not see the desired results after the end of the revolt. The cabinet in London concluded that the Emperor's removal of the troops from Hungary which had formerly been used to suppress the revolt would be "a final test of their good or their bad intentions to that Common Cause where the greatest stake is their own."<sup>46</sup> Consequently, opinion in London became bitter. After peace had been achieved in Hungary, the Imperial army remained there and it seemed England must pay even greater subsidies to Austria at a time when English finances were precarious. If that would be the case, St. John concluded bitterly, "the misfortune will indeed be general, but the fault will only lie at the Imperial Court."<sup>47</sup>

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The Hungarian revolt most certainly weakened the Grand Alliance by increasing tension between Vienna and London. Englishmen showed little appreciation for the realities of the situation in Hungary or for Habsburg objectives in Hungary. There was a lack of understanding and a clash of basic interests. For the English officials, the Rákóczi Insurrection was an obscure problem in a distant land, yet the diversion of troops to Hungary was the principal reason which prevented Austria from participating in the war against France in the manner and to the degree which England wished. The Habsburg court had other competing interests which distracted it in other areas as well, but the lack of cooperation which England felt in regard to Hungary was the situation which London used to test Vienna's sincerity in the Grand Alliance. The Habsburg court's unwillingness to achieve a speedy peace with the Hungarians, in part, spelled the failure of England's strategy for military victory against France.

England was sympathetic toward the rebel cause in Hungary, although she provided little beyond diplomatic support for Rákóczi. The rebels attracted England by a broad similarity in ideology, but English motives in pressing the issues were based in *real politik*. England was probably correct in thinking that the Grand Alliance needed to employ all of its armed force in order to defeat France in battle. However, England calculated allied victory on a number of factors which included the full and undiverted employment of the Austrian army on the French border. English leaders believed that the revolt in Hungary was the major diversion for Austria. They concluded that peace in Hungary would free the Austrian army to operate in the west without hindrance. This conclusion was unrealistic since it would have involved the abandonment of long standing Habsburg ambitions in Hungary. Furthermore, it meant

that Austria would refrain from military involvement in Hungary and would, in fact, yield that country of Rákóczi's forces. English plans also presumed that the victorious Hungarians would not align themselves with France or with Turkey in any way that would create a threat for Vienna. Perhaps the only situation which would have satisfied English aspirations was the creation of a Hungary which would be uninvolved in international politics, and whose laws, constitution—and Protestants—were somehow protected from the power of an absolute monarch. But such a Hungary could only be conjured up by Englishmen who held a curiously incomplete and unrealistic vision of that country as an isolated and distant nation whose external and internal problems had no influence on the general European situation. The greatest weakness in England's war policy was the dichotomy between her keen appreciation for power politics in constructing a war strategy, and her failure to understand Allied domestic affairs which militated against that strategy's implementation.

#### NOTES

1. For a general outline of Austrian and Hungarian reaction to English policy, see Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, "The Rákóczi Insurrection and the Disruption of the Grand Alliance," *Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies*, vol. V, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 17-29, and in particular, Charles W. Ingrao. *In Quest and Crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy* (West Lafayette, Ind., 1979), pp. 123-160; Ladislas Baron Hengelmüller, *Hungary's Fight for National Existence* (London, 1913).
2. Queen Anne to the Emperor, 25 September 1703 in B. C. Brown, *The Letters of Queen Anne* (London, 1935), pp. 126-127.
3. Queen Anne to the Elector Palatine, 20 February 1703. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
4. For a detailed exposition of England's concept of grand strategy, see my "England in the War of Spanish Succession," Oxford D. Phil. Thesis, (1979).
5. P.R.O., S.P. 80/21, fo. 253: Stepney to Hedges, 22 August 1703.
6. P.R.O., S.P. 90/2, fo. 206: Raby to Hedges, 18 December 1703.
7. Blenheim, Marlborough Letter Book, xiv, p. 254: Marlborough to Harley, 29 June 1704.
8. Ingrao, *Quest and Crisis*, pp. 126-28.
9. P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fo. 2: Harley to Stepney, 30 May 1704.
10. P.R.O., S.P. 80/23, fo. 327: Stepney to Harley, 18 June 1704. Report of a conversation with Count Kaunitz.
11. P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fo. 9: Harley to Stepney, 4 July 1704.
12. P.R.O., S.P. 80/23, fo. 423: Stepney to Hill, 22 July 1704.
13. P.R.O., S.P. 80/24, fo. 1: Stepney to Harley, 2 August 1704.
14. P.R.O., S.P. 80/24, fo. 32v: Stepney to Harley, 20 August 1704.
15. P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fo. 26: Harley to Stepney, 21 November 1704.
16. P.R.O., S.P. 92/27, fo. 7: Hill to Hedges, 4 January 1705.
17. The treaty with Prussia, signed 28 November 1704.
18. P.R.O., S.P. 104/203: Instructions to Sunderland, 28 June 1704. Sunderland

was not yet a secretary of state. He received the seals on December 1706, a year after his return.

19. P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fos. 73-33: Harley to Stepney, 14 August 1705.
20. West Sussex R.O., Petworth House Archives MSS. 14: Sunderland to Somerset, 21 July 1705.
21. Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 28,056, fo. 319: Sunderland to Godolphin, 9 September 1705.
22. Blenheim, Marlborough Letter Book, xvi, p. 358: Marlborough to Harley, 22 December 1705; H. Snyder, ed., *Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence*, (Oxford 1975), p. 514.
23. P.R.O., S.P. 80/27, fo. 250: Stepney to Harley, 26 December 1705.
24. P.R.O., S.P. 80/28, fo. 111v: Stepney to Harley, 24 March 1706; S.P. 105/77: Sutton to Stepney, 31 March 1706.
25. P.R.O., S.P. 80/28, fos. 203-6: Stepney to Harley, 12 May 1706.
26. P.R.O., S.P. 80/28, fo. 347: Stepney to Harley, 13 July 1706; fo. 395: [Report of Stepney, Rechteren and Hamel Bruyninx to the Emperor at the Favourite on the miscarriage of negotiations with Hungary], 1 August 1706. Ingrao, *Quest and Crisis*, pp. 134-41.
27. P.R.O., S.P. 84/230, fo. 101: Stepney to Harley, 28 December 1706; see also Király and Pastor, "The Sublime Porte and Ferenc II Rákóczi . . ." in A. Ascher *et al.* *The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds* (New York, 1979) pp. 129-148.
28. *Ibid.*
29. P.R.O., S.P. 104/203, fos. 247-54: Instructions to Meadows, 12 April 1707.
30. Blenheim Palace: Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 102: Sunderland to Meadows, 8 October 1707.
31. Blenheim Palace: Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 105: Sunderland to Meadows, 21 October 1707.
32. P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fo. 56: Boyle to Pultney, 24 February 1708; fo. 57, 27 February 1708.
33. P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fo. 58v: Boyle to Pultney, 30 March 1708.
34. P.R.O., S.P. 80/30: Palmes to Boyle, 18 February 1710.
35. P.R.O., S.P. 104/79, fo. 14: St. John to Townshend, 30 January 1711.
36. P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Palmes, 30 January 1711.
37. P.R.O., S.P. 104/52, fo. 97: St. John to Raby, 6 March 1711.
38. P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Peterborough, 16 February 1711.
39. P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fos. 8-11: St. John to Raby, 6 March 1711.
40. *Ibid.*
41. Marlborough to Heinsius, 10 February 1711. B. van 'T Hoff. *The Correspondence of John Churchill and Anthonie Heinsius* (The Hague, 1951), p. 539.
42. P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Peterborough, 16 February 1711.
43. Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D (W) 1778, V/188, fo. 164: Cabinet Minutes, Kensington, 17 May 1711.
44. See my "England in the War of the Spanish Succession," pp. 290-348.
45. P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Peterborough, 18 May 1711.
46. P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fos. 115v-116: St. John to Raby, 18 May 1711.
47. Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,358, fo. 247: St. John to Peterborough, 22 May 1711.