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### Excommunication to Cogito: Exploration of Hegelian Dialectic

#### 1. Introduction

Hegel began with a doctrine of Being in his *Science of Logic* [1], because he needed to start from the concept that is immediately given, yet in its determination would provide the necessary conditions for his *aufhebung* (overcoming negation/sublation). However as even Leibniz pointed out, Being is not unique in that regard<sup>1</sup>. We will perhaps visit a separate set akin to Hegel's fourteen stations, if we choose to begin with a different starting point and apply the Hegelian method. In the present work I have tried to begin with another immediately given concept - subjectivation<sup>2</sup>. We experience subjectivation in its immediate in the narrativized world<sup>3</sup>. We become subjects. However the real that resists the symbolic<sup>4</sup>. The real appears in the gaps over which the ideological narrative tries to gloss over - akin to Freudian slips and dreams. The idea of subjectivation in itself has the schizophrenic core, the becoming-split.

However the subjectivation is determined at the level of our commons and communication. To determine subjectivation is to see the gap in commons/ communication - excommunication. In the next two sections I will try to show how power and hegemony are tied to the determination of excommunication. To determine excommunication is to see what lies outside of the phenomenon - thus the noumenon is determined in section four. The separation of phenomenon and noumenon is already at work in the method (section five). If method is the way to the episteme that gives us the archive, the negation should let us see its determination in the unwritten archive (section six). It is through the unwritten of the archive we reach the becoming-split of knowledge (section seven). The acquisition of

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<sup>1</sup> See *The critique of thought: a re-examination of Hegel's Science of logic* [2] by Paul Owen Johnson.

<sup>2</sup> See *Subjectivation: the two-headed symptom* [3] by author.

<sup>3</sup> See *Situated Learning: Legitimate peripheral participation* [4] by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger for a detailed discussion on how narratives structure our learning. It is similar to what Zizek calls the Symbolic order that we grow in to.

<sup>4</sup> In the introduction to his book *The sublime object of ideology* [5] Zizek points out the difference between Althusserian subject as an ideological mis-recognition and the subject of Lacanian psychoanalysis -

In contrast to this Althusserian ethics of alienation in the symbolic 'process without subject', we may denote the ethics implied by Lacanian psychoanalysis as that of separation. The famous Lacanian motto not to give way on one's desire (*ne pas céder sur son désir*) is aimed at the fact that we must not obliterate the distance separating the Real from its symbolization: it is this surplus of the Real over every symbolization that functions as the object-cause of desire. To come to terms with this surplus (or, more, precisely, leftover) means to acknowledge a fundamental deadlock ('antagonism'), a kernel resisting symbolic integration-dissolution.

Here he precisely posits the subject as the site of antagonisms. However, he also points to a fundamental antagonism that determines (in the precise Hegelian sense) all the other antagonisms. The role of the symbolic is a magician's card trick - mediating the fundamental antagonism in the middle of others. For more see author's *Subaltern's image and the real: an inquiry* [6].

knowledge is through the Kantian transcendental subject - that gives us our cogito, the possibility of our revolutionary moment through our sublime (section eight and nine).

## 2. Excommunication and power

My thesis concerns excommunication<sup>5</sup>; or rather, I should say, excommunication is the beginning of my thesis. Excommunication's idea is manifested in the following subcategories –communication, communion and commons<sup>6</sup>. In his famous seminars recounted in *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* [8], Lacan also begins with this idea of excommunication - excommunication which brings with it a break from the communion and communication (two necessities of knowledge and epistemology). In his *History of Madness* [9], Foucault also begins with an excommunication –that of the lepers from the church, who are excommunicated as blessed individuals who are being punished for their sins in their own lives. And it is of little wonder that the leper colonies serve as a blueprint for disciplinary confinement whose history is recounted in Foucault's other books. But it was Lacan who first noted, skillfully, the connection between discipline and the commons (or lack thereof/excommunication).

If one is to understand excommunication as a gap in communication, then perhaps we will make a mistake. What if the kernel of excommunication lies in an excess, a surplus of communication, the excess of commons (the exterior of commons)? Then, one can understand the uniqueness of the discipline itself. The excesses of commons are the ones that are to be left out of the commons. They are the part-of-no-part. And it is for them that discipline is not only necessary but constitutive of the excess of communication. As a whole constitution has to form the backbone of an immigrant Bangladeshi's fake ration card, the discipline of the nation is also exercised through this excess of communication. And like these immigrants coming into the country, after this excess of communication, excommunication takes

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<sup>5</sup> The formula for excommunication as recorded in Willis' *Benedict de Spinoza* [7]

With the judgment of the angels and the sentence of the saints, we anathematize, execrate, curse and cast out Baruch de Espinoza, the whole of the sacred community assenting, in presence of the sacred books with the six-hundred-and-thirteen precepts written therein, pronouncing against him the malediction wherewith Elisha cursed the children, and all the maledictions written in the Book of the Law. Let him be accursed by day, and accursed by night; let him be accursed in his lying down, and accursed in his rising up; accursed in going out and accursed in coming in. May the Lord never more pardon or acknowledge him; may the wrath and displeasure of the Lord burn henceforth against this man, load him with all the curses written in the Book of the Law, and blot out his name from under the sky; may the Lord sever him from evil from all the tribes of Israel, weight him with all the maledictions of the firmament contained in the Book of Law; and may all ye who are obedient to the Lord your God be saved this day.

Hereby then are all admonished that none hold converse with him by word of mouth, none hold communication with him by writing; that no one do him any service, no one abide under the same roof with him, no one approach within four cubits length of him, and no one read any document dictated by him, or written by his hand.

This is the fullest sense of excommunication.

<sup>6</sup> Etymologically: excommunication - mid-15c., from L.L. *excommunicationem* (nom. *excommunicatio*), from pp. stem of *excommunicare* "put out of the community," in Church L. "to expel from communion," from *ex-* "out" (see *ex-*) + *communicare*, from *communis* "common".

place that makes them invisible to the discipline and the order.

In his discussion of the unconscious, Freud said, 'Reason is not a given; it has to be struggled for.' And if one substitutes power for reason, one can precisely notice that power cannot create. Power is not an *a priori*, power is not a given. Power is not even a Kantian transcendental category. Rather, we should understand power within the constitutive matrix of discipline and excommunication. The relations of power, as it will, appear to mitigate this excess/surplus in the episteme. In William E. Connolly's book *Terms of Political Discourse* [10], he describes persuasion, manipulation, coercion, and anticipatory submission in the context of power, but only locates power in the last three. In all of these three cases, power manifests itself again in the precise idea of communication and commons. One manipulates by distorting the commons of knowledge and violating terms of communication, one coerces by putting in danger the commons of our lived environment, we submit to someone even before power strikes as the excess of communication has fully been communicated earlier and so on.

If we agree with the above formulation of power, then our lines of inquiry must not disengage from the objects of inquiry. The epistemic excess of our inquiry is what obfuscates the two-headed symptom of excommunication - at once an excess and a lack. The substitute inquiry is to locate the excommunication where the formal and the real confront each other. In Marx's piece entitled *Results of the immediate process of production* in the Appendix to his *Capital* [11], Marx elaborates on how the formal conditions of subsumption of labour under capital, creates the real condition for the same. And it is in the excess of communication in the form of the foreman's book that the labour's material life is created - the same material life that it confronts, life that it abstracts from, and the life that it denies/excommunicates. Thus, within the abstract labour, the universal of the Enlightenment Man, that our subalterns' formal and real find their commons.

### 3. The squared circle

The rat-man was obsessive<sup>7</sup>. The rat-man was compulsive. His rituals were bizarre. His complicated routine had even Freud making elaborate time-charts. But with his talking cure and free association techniques Freud managed to find the slips and the symptoms of the rat-man's neurosis. Within the rat-man, the impossible fear had taken hold. The fear concerned his dead father punishing him for his desires. To believe in the fear, or rather to express his desire, he renounced his atheism. So, should we look at the ideologies operative at the level of super-ego to be indispensable for expression of our desire? Is it that the God and religion and the invisible hand of the market are indispensable for our own neurotic expression of normalcy? However, in his *Civilization and its discontents* [13], Freud, through his reformulation of the utilitarian maxim, reached a very Marxist answer to this very same problem. For reduction of our suffering, it is we who maintain the division of class. Is it not the precursor of what Gramsci would call Hegemony?

However, let us understand it from the parable given in Amartya Sen's *An Idea of Justice* [14]. Here we are supposed to pass judgment of regarding allocation of a flute to one of the three children- one who has no other toys, one who knows how to play the flute, and the one who made it. Passing judgment in

<sup>7</sup> See Freud's *Notes Upon A Case Of Obsessional Neurosis* [12]

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favour of any of the children forces us to articulate an ideology, or rather the ideology is constitutive of the reason. Thus, if ideology is constitutive of reason irrespective of our class position, then hegemony has no role. However, if we understand the three judgments as necessarily entailing a position- a predicate- only then can we start making sense of hegemony.

Now, if hegemony itself stand for a relation between predicates (class for instance), then, how does it stand in relation to the subject? This is where we must remember the Hegelian idea of the predicate determining the predicated. Where does the relation between the predicate stand vis-a-vis the predicated? The only way to understand the above relation is through the symptomatic of the predicated itself. Remember the symptomatic of commodity-relation that shows up in the predicated labour power that produces the commodities. Because the labour power acts the unique impossible commodity whose increased use increases its use value and the other exchange values that result from it<sup>8</sup>.

Thus, even hegemony like power, is to be understood within the impossibility of the symptomatic excommunication whose use can even build a community. Like Philip Gourevitch has said "Genocide, after all, is an exercise in community building." [16].

#### 4. Noumenon

In an ethnographic conference held in the social science departments of the University of Hyderabad in 2008, my friend, Sasi Kumar V. K., stood up to give his seminar on sustainable livelihood. He was preceded by two members of the ICRISAT organization talking about their efforts to bring sustainability to the villages of Andhra Pradesh and Vietnam. However, my friend began the talk with a sentence I will remember forever: 'Sustainable livelihood is a myth.'

He had worked on the same districts, Adilabad and Mehboobnagar, as the ICRISAT representatives had done. However, he found the myth in the sustainability that the others had boasted of. His idea of livelihood was a complex one. It included food habits, health, and culture in general. His challenge with the paradigm of sustainability depended on non quantifiable, yet observable indices; and it concerned totality. He was an idealist (in a positive sense that is still not obsolete) trying to speak of material life and culture. His lifelong struggle had, somehow, yet to ask him to choose between materialism and idealism, as was true for Sartre's students (see *The Revolutionary Myth* from Sartre's *The Aftermath of War* [17]). What surprised me about his mode of inquiry was this insistence on totality -the totality that makes one sensitive to the idea of excess, hidden kernel, or rather, the myth of it that comes with the standard inquiries of the ICRISAT representatives. -Sustainability is spoken of as something that has already been achieved (like a static category of being) while neglecting the dimensions of its antagonisms (inherent in the category of becoming sustainable).

Isn't it the same idea informing one's choice between a reform and a revolution, this ritualized excess in the presupposition of a materialist epistemic inquiry (the farmers cannot produce enough for their livelihood because they cannot get loans from the bank to buy seeds from the corporations and so on)? It is where we posit an exterior of the phenomenon and pass it off as noumenon that denies the antagonisms of the real.

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<sup>8</sup> See Rosdolski's *Making of Marx's Capital* [15]

In his book, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* [5], Zizek writes,

...in the structure of the commodity-form it is possible to find the transcendental subject: the commodity-form articulates in advance the anatomy, the skeleton of the Kantian transcendental subject—that is, the network of transcendental categories which constitute the a priori frame of ‘objective’ scientific knowledge. Herein lies the paradox of the commodity form: it-this inner-wordly, ‘pathological’, (in the Kantian meaning of the word) phenomenon- offers us a key to solving the fundamental question of the theory of knowledge: objective knowledge with universal validity- how is it possible?

It is here that we encounter the fundamental problem of episteme. The precise possibility of the fundamental a priori categories that are relegated to the domain of Kantian noumenon. It is the noumenon that is forever beyond the horizon of the phenomenon<sup>9</sup>. But isn’t it the fact that the categories are at work even before the senses can take hold of the object in reality? If this is the case then probably Kant was right in saying that we only see the world as represented and not as it is. However we should probably understand the above from a realist position.

In his *Memoirs of Istanbul* [18] other Orhan and the mirrors in the windows of the dark houses at night and the image of a child adorning his grandmother’s house. If the other Orhan is the ideal ego of the phenomenon- one that can be known through an epistemic inquiry (How does the Orhan look like? Does the other Orhan miss this Orhan?), then the Orhan writing the memoir plays the role of the noumenon- one who leaves a residue forming the outer of what he communicates of the phenomenon, in this case little Orhan.

It is here that we finally arrive at the site of a fundamental antagonism, one that forever eludes the commons of the formal and the real, It is our inquiry in the epistemic that constitutes the gap of phenomenon and noumenon, the gap in turn obfuscates the commons of our formal and our real.

When we were waking up from the fall of the Berlin Wall we also lost the legacy of a revolutionary moment. The noumenon or outer of the revolutionary moment are always the unmitigated, unchallenged categories that form the residue of the revolution’s phenomenon- in this case the antagonisms of capital. There are always categories that are unmitigated by a revolutionary moment, the unmitigated categories of the French Revolution lied in the qualifiers of the Enlightenment Man (All men are created equal except for Asia and Africa and so on.) The outer of the revolution, the part of no part have to be now the new transcendental category of the subject, otherwise we will be lost forever in substitute antagonisms (environmental antagonisms, sexual antagonisms, caste antagonisms and so on) and like Freud used transference antagonisms (the rat-man yelling at him for behaving like his father) for the sake of therapy to get to the symptom so can we use the substitute symptoms/substitute antagonisms to get to the real of the symptom.

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<sup>9</sup> But as Zizek already notes in Sohn-rethel’s work[5],

Before thought could arrive at pure abstraction, the abstraction was already at work in the social effectivity of the market.

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### 5. Method and cogito

For logical positivists in the Vienna Circle, the meaning of a sentence was the method of demonstrating the truth value of it. For them, there was no truth in parts (of a sentence); thus, no error as well. In everyday life, however, we deal with the parts. We assume the truth or falsity of a sentence even if a part of it is articulated. It is as if we deal with a very post-Kantian division –the one between truth and the empirical fact. It is as if the truth stands independent of our empirical endeavour, and the empirical in our content stands independent of truth. You may ask, 'Am I not confusing the fact/opinion distinction and super-imposing it onto truth/empirical fact false distinctions?' We are all post-Kantian in the sense that the division of phenomenon (known from senses, the empirical) and noumenon (the residue of in-itself, the region of totality of truth) is presupposed but treated as if it does not matter, as if it is inconsequential. Perhaps the problematic symptom of the meaning (of parts) can also be found in the method. But isn't it a fact that logical positivists' proclamation makes their own definition of meaning meaningless, as there is no method to verify the definition itself? However, their fault probably lied in misunderstanding the idea of method itself. If our inquiry cannot disengage from the object of inquiry, only then can truth arrive with the method in stages of dialectical derivation yielding meaning in its wake.

The acquiring or the acquisition of meaning is also the acquisition of substance for cogito. The cogito arrives at substance only after crossing the fourteen stations of the cross in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* [19]. However, when we deal with cogito's extension (res extensa), it arrives as the Enlightenment man of Marx's *Capital* [11]. However, the arrival of both the cogito and its extension, can only happen through alienation preserving the dialectic of their development. We championed Norman Borlaug as the rescuer of the Third World, the father of the Green Revolution. We denied the substantive death of the farmers in the supposed success of Green Revolution. We also denied their substance as we forget to mention their contribution to world hunger. Did the produce not always feed the hungry? Did we not see unprecedented hunger and famine following the adaptation of Green Revolution? Thus, our highest econometric methods are always at odds to figure out the truth value to Green Revolution's success; as the farmer will forever be proletarianized irrespective of Green Revolution's success or failure.

However, isn't the condition of the farmers the direct opposite of the acquisition of substance, doesn't proletarianization reduce subjects to substanceless subjectivity? Then how can we find the substance of cogito in the proletarianization process- the key to dialectical process in understanding the precise identity of non-identity? In Marx's *Capital*, the movement from quantity to quality is exemplified in the movement from many capitals to capital in general. However the capital in general is also a quantity, the sum of all the surplus values from many capitals appears as capital in general. Thus the proletarianization's stripped substance also undergoes the movement, the same dialectical movement in the creation of the subject. This is why subjectivation must have two faces. This is why our enquiry into the subaltern might produce the conditions for subalternation –the subalternation that supposes generality of particulars without the negativity of dialectic. Thus our enquiries into the Green Revolution have necessitated Indian government's second Green Revolution programme without dealing with the negative of the first Green Revolution (The ignorance of the effects of the GM seeds for the local food and culture not resolving the cash crop versus food problem which is already couple of centuries old and so on). It is precisely subalternation that makes alienation appear as if it is an inalienable human condition, while forever our

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beings suffer the two headed symptom of subjectivation.

#### 6. The unwritten archive

In a book that was not written, Raja Ram Mohun Roy wanted to write regarding 'the intelligence, riches and power, manners, customs, and especially the female virtue and excellence existing in' Britain. He would have done so if it was not for his untimely death. His entry into Britain in 1831 was as an envoy, as a delegation from the Mughal Emperor Mohammad Akbar II. Ram Mohun's idea of representation was broader than the Mughal Emperor's obsolete diplomacy would allow<sup>10</sup>. He was well versed and much more efficient in dealing with the Britain culture than his contemporary Indians. He had not only covered his ground for his own diplomatic credential, but also acquainted himself with British laws, its constitutional practices, and the relation of the British Parliament with the Company. He had studied quite well how the earlier envoys fared. Even while Ram Mohun Roy was deftly negotiating through British administration and its people (Bentham had proposed nominating Roy for the Parliament), Khwajasara ('unach') Mehboob Ali's envoy from the widow royalties of Bundelcund received very little exposure to Britain's public sphere, and very little hearing of their cause. Mehboob Ali came to Britain after making a long and arduous journey with little or no knowledge of British custom and culture. However, at the end of his one year stay, he failed in his mission and was also discredited by one of the widows he was supposed to be representing. The right to represent was something both of these parties had to prove. Ram Mohun Roy claimed to be representing a greater India than the Mughal Emperor who gave him the title of Raja and 'Ilchi'. However, Mehboob Ali was also carrying letters from local landowners and businessmen. He was also carrying the hopes and aspirations of many Indians for justice. In a strange hand of irony, both of their efforts to represent would largely be forgotten. -Ram Mohun Roy would be remembered as the reformer, as the Indian savant sympathetic to the cause of Western modernity; Mehboob Ali would also suffer the oblivion from which he came.

However, it is within them as representatives, where the Indian condition is finally revealed. Irrespective of Ram Mohun's fame and the relative obscurity of Mehboob Ali, both of their diplomatic credentials are rejected. As Indians, they lost their right to represent Indians. Even when they speak for the multitudes, their voice is forever discredited. In the heart of the idea of modern citizen-subjects, we carry this same burden of a discredited representation. The voices of the villagers and tribals in Central and Eastern India are forever discredited by the same representative they have supposedly elected. Within the category of representation, we finally see one of the universals of modernity. We are forever waiting at different doors of the law where our representations are discredited. The unwritten archive of Ram Mohun Roy in itself appears as the symbolic void of his lived experience, of his representation.

What is this symbolic void, if not our hopes and aspirations? Our induction to cogito is complete when all our hopes and aspirations need to be represented. Thus, representative will always remain one of our universals of proleterisation, the sum of our substance of cogito. Even to hope we need the representative. To escape our subjectivation we need to give our proleterisation a point of symbolic reflection. Thus, if

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<sup>10</sup> See *Counterflows to Colonialism: Indian Travellers and Settlers in Britain [20], 1600–1857* by Michael Fisher.

representation also appears an unmitigated category of the failure of commons, we might not be surprised as the reflection appears as the bloody sublime spectacle that accompanied the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and the Nakshalwari[6].

### 7. Knowledge and Cogito

*Raymond Roussel* [21] still remains outside the canon for the scholars of Foucault. It is one work that plays with his fidelity to the margins. Roussel's madness was exemplified when he tried to begin and end his novels with two sentences that contain the same words, but generated completely different meanings. What attracted Foucault was this double play of structure –the duplicity of meaning that can take or transform one into formless marginality. Thus, for Foucault, the resistance was always to be found at the margins, in the obscure; and somehow, inconsequential. This attitude informs his work on prison reform, on sexuality, and so on. What was important to him was to ask, like Nietzsche, the fundamental question concerning a text/discourse. It is important to ask, 'Who speaks in the text?'

The author was dead for Foucault because Mallarme answered Nietzsche by announcing 'The word alone' speaks through the text. It is as if in his imagination, the death of the author would force those on the margins speaking through 'the word itself' to be heard.

In the structuralist card-trick, one can replace the author with any other subject; say, the king or Mr. X or God even. But if meaning is to be held in this syntagm, then perhaps we will make a mistake because even the author is a Hegelian reflex category –one that cannot escape its own predicate. No herald goes down the street to announce the death of the author, no matter how much similarity there is between being-a-king and being-an-author.

However, death of the king does not mean the end of monarchy. Death of the author does not transport the voice from the margins. One cannot bring the margin to the universality. It can just cause us to dwell in the false universalities. However, if a death is also a predicate determining the subject (in the Hegelian sense), then perhaps we should not clamour for the death of the author. Rather, we should look for where the word in itself is symptomatic, where the word hiding behind its metaphors, its metonymies, its grammar and its context, creates the historical necessity of the death. Remember as Nietzsche recounted Silenus' answer to King Midas (a person being-a-king): 'The best thing possible in the world is not to be. To be nothing. The second best thing is to die young.'

Isn't death of the author already achieved in our archives? Isn't death of the author the demand of our episteme? 'Knowledge is power' as long as the author remains unknown in our policies, our referendums, our reports, and research on those who are at the margins. It is the authorless archive that reduces us to substance-less subjectivity; the subject of death – the Cartesian cogito.

### 8. Sublime and Cogito

I believe Kant is the key to our theoretical and practical predicament. In his essay entitled *What is Enlightenment?* [22] he for the first time expressed the key cleft in reason. He talked of public and private uses of reason. Isn't it the expression of the fundamental cleft that Kant's epistemic paradigm espouses -



separation of faith and reason, separation of church and state, the separation of subject and object, the separation of finite and infinite? When you are a clergyman you should abide by the laws of the clergy. However outside the domain of your work you should question the presuppositions. This is what separates the private and public use of reason. In the public use of reason, one is precisely supposed to work through the transcendental logic to question the *a priori*. All the enlightenment philosophers following Kant (in the tradition of German Ideology) like Fichte and Schelling tried to heal this cleft - the epistemic separation.

However, in his maxim, 'argue, but obey' do we not find the healing of the cleft. One must argue using the public reason. One must obey following the private use of reason. However, one must remember, that neither 'argue', nor 'obey', feature in Kantian categorical imperatives. Then 'argue, but obey' is not a healing, but a propagation of the same division of the Kantian realms.

If even at the presence of *a priori* transcendental categories necessary for arguing, one must negate those same categories for obeying - if our finest transcendental judgement depends on it's negation for practical use of reason - then we are at the dawn of the sublime - the sublime that inspires awe because of the negation of the transcendental.

It is this sublime of the unmitigated categories of revolution, that stops its eventual progression - as history bears witness to French revolution, Russian revolution and so on. It is this what Hegel calls the crisis of the Spirit. The sublime of the revolution of the spirit denies its transcendental. We as Kantian transcendental subjects - formed in the middle of proleterization process - like predicated labour power of commodity-relations - forever deny the due of our substanceless subjects - the cogito.

## 9. Archive and Tragedy

What is tragedy? What is the form of art that makes us look for our sincerest laughter in our suffering? Where does tragedy get its aesthetics? Aren't we all beings trying to reduce our misery? What ethics binds our reading relation to a text in its tragic performance as its aesthetics - rather, the question should be - how does our reading of aesthetics in a tragic performance appears as its ethics. The substance of tragedy is the desire, and the desire forms the kernel of our tragic. It is not the loss of an object that gives texture to tragedy, but tragedy is subjectivation in its immediate, not deferred by its narrative.

Sophocles' *Antigone* had made her choice to die even before Creon had passed his law. As Lacan notes in his *Ethics of Psychoanalysis* [23], it is a choice unmitigated by categorical imperatives<sup>11</sup>. She - the desire-incarnate is the 'sublime object' in her negation of the transcendentals. How can this desire-incarnate then require the foil of Niobe - the princess turned to stone? How is it then the sublime object - able to negate the transcendentals - require a subject, a point of identification? Why does one need a point of identification, if it is not the case that libido, the drive, the desire transcends even death? However, it is our sublime object that is forever denied by our transcendental, or rather the transcendental categories themselves are manifestations that give the sublime its phantasmic character. This is the relation between

<sup>11</sup> See *Lacan's Antigone: The Sublime Object and the Ethics of Interpretation* [24] by Paul Allen Miller in *Phoenix* Vol. 61, No. 1/2 (Spring - Summer, 2007), pp. 1-14

ethics and aesthetics that is our inheritance of Enlightenment. In the phantasmic spectacle of the French revolution, Edmund Burke discovered the sublime. The sublime object of our tragedy is also the other of ideology in our subjectivation.

If *Holinshed's Chronicles* was the archive, *Hamlet* is its tragedy. The archive of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* reveals its tragedy in Marx's *Capital* where the abstract labor appears as the sublime object beyond life and death of Capital<sup>12</sup>. Proleterization receives its highest formulation in the dialectical tension between the cogito and the sublime object. In cogito lies the failure of the sublime object and also its becoming-split, its point of departure. The ethics that is the object-cause of cogito, is also the aesthetics of the sublime object - of its proleterization process. For each cogito of Niobe, there is the sublime of Antigone. The archive of cogito is the tragedy of sublime.

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<sup>12</sup> The archive of Enron's bankruptcy revealed its tragedy in the theatrical bailouts following 2008 financial meltdown.

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