

POLITICS

BHAT, Tarooq Ahmad & LONE, Sheeraz Ahmad**Soviet Healthcare System in Kazakhstan**

Health is the general condition of a person in all aspects. It is a level of functional and/or metabolic efficiency of an organism, implicitly humans which is achieved through a combination of physical, mental, and social well-being. It is maintained and improved not only through the advancement and application of health science, but also through social and economic environment, the physical environment and the person's individual characteristics and behaviours. The World Health Organization (WHO), in April 7, 1948, defined 'health' as "a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. So generally, the context in which an individual lives is of great importance on his/her life quality and health status. The social and economic environments are key factors such as clean water and air, safe houses, communities, roads, education etc. that all contribute to good health status of an individual. It is what Soviets tried their best to determine in their health planning in the Soviet Union through sheer determination, explicit execution and dedication of the field staff by making available the prevention, treatment, and management of illness and the preservation of mental and physical well-being through the services offered by the health workers. This maintenance was approached through an indelible component of human social structures. The societal institution of healthcare was the necessary phenomenon of Soviet civilization whereby an individual continually sought to improve, mend, and alter the overall nature and quality of his or her life.

To achieve such assets Soviets also believed that religions, in whatever form were present in the region, have created rituals, dogmas, taboos, etc. that hardly allowed any forward movement for material gains and therefore attacked all religions to be practiced in real letter and spirit. To change the mental horizons of traditional societies was not easy, it was rather a difficult one and creation of medical facilities for introduction of a health care system was launched in big way. This was not only to make people healthy but also to create hygienic way of life where after traditionalism was pushed away to live happily and also to give shape to the capacities and talent in human nature for the enrichment and progress of society.

By all these ways the lifespan of an individual in Kazakhstan increased from mere 32 to 68 years and crude mortality rate decreased just up to 6 per thousand infants. The purpose of this work is to unveil those efforts of the Soviet health care which brought the Kazakh nomads a healthy and well-balanced light of modern health care facilities.

Keywords:

Health; Hospital; Doctor; Life span; Mortality; Ayurveda; Shamana

Before the advent of Socialization, Central Asia including Kazakhstan had traditional health system like *ayurveda*, *unani* and *sidha*.¹ Besides these, many other primitive methods of doctoring were common in the region that was used for curing disease.² Three types of traditional healers served the medical needs of the Kazakh population; ‘Mullahs used prayer, chants, and “holy” water, among other approaches, to treat the ill. Shamans, whose incantations often contained both pre-Islamic and Islamic elements, relied on a variety of practices, including exorcisms and herbal remedies. Folk doctors depended primarily on medicines derived from plant and animal products; for example, fermented mare’s milk was widely used to treat illnesses, including tuberculosis.’³ During the late 19th century the colonial administration created a modern public health system mainly for the use of their military and administrative personnel. Towards the beginning of the 20th century they also organized health care for Russian settlers in west Kazakhstan. For this purpose hospitals and medical posts were set up where feldshers (medically trained staff in the health posts) and midwives were pressed in service to cater the needs of the Russian immigrant settlers.⁴ On the other hand the Kazakhs used the services of traditional healers. After the emergence of the Soviet Union, not only in Kazakhstan, but everywhere in the USSR programmes were launched to promote modernization. The Communist government considered the Central Asian region one of the most backwards in the Soviet Union and therefore made sustained effort to alter both its economy and its cultural practices.⁵

The Soviet Union, soon after the Revolution, took some major steps to solve the problems of the people and so of the state.⁶ Lenin thus embarked on such programmes that would uplift the conditions of the people, remove poverty and disease, and provide education, make the state to organize the economic sector for the sustenance of the country. Accordingly he issued many decrees that were to address the problems and solve them. One such was regarding the health policy. In June 1918 the People’s Commissariat of Health was established and for the first time in the history of medicine a central body was directing the entire health work of a nation under the supervision of Dr. Samashko.⁷ It

¹ A. K. Patnaik, “Education the Press & Public health”, Eds. Madhavan K. Palat & Anara Tabyshalieva, *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Vol. VI, UNESCO, 2005, pp. 577-578.

² Kazakhs had developed a rich traditional culture, including folk medicine, which was practiced by Shamans and mullahs; Paula A. Michaels, “Curative Powers: Medicine and Empire in Stalin’s Central Asia”, *Journal of the History of Medicine*, Vol. 59, Oxford, 2004, p. 318.

³ Paula A. Michaels, “Medical Propaganda and Cultural Revolution in Soviet Kazakhstan, 1928–41”, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, Moscow, 2000, p. 160.

⁴ WHO, *Health care in transition: Kazakhstan*, London, 1999, p. 9.

⁵ The Soviet Government from the very beginning made it a fundamental purpose of its policy not merely to benefit the people whom it served but actually to transform them. Lenin and his colleagues thought that the principle object and duty of a government is to change drastically the human nature with which it dealt; Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*, London, 1947, pp. 675-78.

⁶ The transformation of Central Asian society was accelerated by waves of immigrants from the Slav republics. Some Slavs (mostly Russians) had already settled in the region in the pre-Revolutionary period, but many more came during the years of Soviet rule. The first and largest period of immigration was 1926–39 when, along with Party officials and bureaucrats, there came doctors, teachers, engineers and other professionals, who contributed to the development of Central Asia. Many skilled workers also arrived to work in the newly established industries; Shirin Akiner, “History and Politics in Central Asia: Change and Continuity”, Eds. Martin McKee, Judith Healy & Jane Falkingham, *Health Care in Central Asia*, Buckingham, 2002, p.16.

⁷ *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*, p. 655.

was to bring a change in the set-up and make health sector modern to combat diseases. On the other hand public health was of strategic importance for winning the population to the Soviet cause.

Health Policy and Soviet Efforts

Health status indices were not in great shape at the time the Soviets took control of Kazakhstan. Soon after the Revolution Russia was plunged into civil war, large scale epidemics and pandemics including typhus were spreading and the death rate was very high. The condition was so difficult that Lenin recognized the gravity of the situation in his address at the 7th Congress of Soviets, held in December 1919, where he said 'Typhus among a population [already] weakened by hunger without bread, soap, fuel, may become such a scourge as not to give us an opportunity to undertake Socialist construction. This [must] be our first step in our struggle for culture and for (our) existence'.⁸ The first task was to tackle the epidemics which were rapidly spreading across the country and which were gravely affecting the troops fighting for the young socialist state.

Beginning with the early 1920's the Kazakh Ministry of Public Health conducted a large scale medical propaganda campaign, radio programmes, posters, films, lectures, and staged public spectacles on health and hygiene,⁹ that reached the most remote parts of the country.¹⁰ It was on account of the policy made in Moscow administered through a centrally organized hierarchical structure, i.e. the republic level to the oblast or city administrations, then to the subordinate rayon level. Since the policy adopted, involved feldsher (paramedic) stations at the village level, district (rayon) and regional (oblast) levels, topped by an assortment of advanced institutions at the national level, where services were in principle, accessible and mostly free to everyone.¹¹ To offer efficient medical help, they also introduced biomedicine a step towards modernization and accordingly opposed ethno-medicine. Soviet medical administrators strongly opposed the traditional practices; fearing both the spread of disease and the traditional healers influence at the local level.¹²

The Soviets were fortunate to succeed rather quickly as in the late 19th century, large number of Russians and Ukrainians had settled in northern Kazakhstan, where they established large farms. Though Kazakhs and Europeans lived in separate settlements, they did not exist in total isolation from

⁸ Mark G. Field, "The Soviet legacy: the Past as prologue", Eds. Martin McKee, Judith Healy & Jane Falkingham, *Health Care in Central Asia*, Buckingham, 2002, pp. 68-69.

⁹ When in 1928 a Russian doctor entered a remote village in southern Kazakhstan to improve the Kazakhs' health and well-being he found a world very different from his own. The Turkic-speaking nomads neither physically nor culturally reminded him of the Russian villagers. The doctor summoned the villagers to hear a series of lectures on topics ranging from syphilis to prenatal care to sanitation, the physician noted the filth and squalor in which his would-be patients lived, their resistance to the notions he brought with him, and the distrust that forged a gulf between him and those he served; M. A. Bykov, *Sanitarnogigienicheskie ocherki i zdravookhranenie v raionakh Syr-Dar'inskogo okruga*, Chimkent, 1931; c.f. Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p. 167.

¹⁰ Paula A. Michaels, *Journal of the History of Medicine*, Vol.59, p.318.

¹¹ Mark G. Field, *Health Care in Central Asia*, pp. 68-70.

¹² Donald A. Bar & Mark G. Field, "The Current State of Health Care in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Health Care Policy and Reform", *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol.86, No.3, 1996, pp. 307-308.

one another and accordingly whatever the Czars had established, in respect of health care system for the European settlers had become known to them.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s Soviet efforts were made to reshape Kazakhs on their own image, they were rather systematic to spread the facilities far and wide.¹³ In this atmosphere Soviet medical activists brought European biomedical practices to all levels to spread a system that was in essence free for all the nationals of the republic. Added to it the Soviet propaganda denounced traditional healers, and praised the Socialist system with its miracles of modern medicine accessible to the population.

The construction of Kazakh life as bright, clean and healthy was entrusted to medical cadres. Government and party officials believed that if medical workers succeeded in imparting this view to the Kazakhs, they would open the door to modernization and Europeanization of the region. It was because Central Asia including Kazakhstan was 'plagued with malaria, leprosy, polio, diphtheria, and tuberculosis before the Soviets took charge. The general mortality rate was 30.2 per 1000 inhabitants; infant mortality rate 272.0 per 1000 births. In 1913, average life expectancy was under 32.0 years, and 0.4 doctors were available per 10,000 inhabitants in Kazakhstan.'¹⁴



Picture 1. A Kazakh Shaman

Since the Soviets believed that religious practices, poverty, and illiteracy played as great a role as microbes in illness¹⁵ the State charged medical professionals with fighting disease not only through the application of scientific knowledge about microbes and vectors but also through a struggle against the social conditions viewed as fundamental to creating an environment in which diseases thrived. Although Soviet officials knew that germs caused diseases, they also stressed that environmental factors, such as nutrition and sanitation, played an equally important role in a disease's course and spread. Soviet medical theorists saw these environmental forces as products of the economic structure. Soviet medical etiology placed as much importance on the economic substructure as on microbial causes. While

¹³ Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p. 160.

¹⁴ A. K. Patnaik, *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Vol. IV, p. 580; Howard M. Lecher, *Health Care Policy in Four Nations, USA*, 1978, p. 203.

¹⁵ The Marxist framework that formed the policies of Soviet political and medical authorities fit well with notions that linked disease to economic conditions. An economic substructure served as the foundation for the social, political, and cultural superstructures that sprang from it, fundamentally changed everyday life; *Soviet Communism: a New Civilization*, pp. 653-655.

it is scientifically valid to assert that environmental factors play a role in disease, the strong emphasis on environmental causes was a unique characteristic of Soviet medicine.¹⁶

Beginning in 1928, the Soviets intended to facilitate the transformation of the cultural superstructure at a time when industrialization and collectivization provided for fundamental changes in the economic substructure.¹⁷ There was no place in this new order for vestiges of a superstitious, irrational and unscientific past. Traditional healers, who included Shamans (Picture 1), mullahs, and folk doctors, found themselves the targets of a vigorous propaganda campaign meant to drive the indigenous population into the hands of the newly trained biomedical doctors, nurses, and midwives. For the most part, the effort was to persuade the population to distrust traditional healers, even though occasionally the state resorted to coercive methods, such as arrest and imprisonment.¹⁸ Accordingly at local level official's exerted pressure to people as they knew the role played by Shamans, mullahs, and folk doctors was exclusive among the natives who thus had tied a tight knot on them.¹⁹ The development of biomedical institutions in Kazakhstan, even if it was a clear expression of power and control, was but meant for the health and well-being of potential contributors to the Socialist economy.

Even if many things that the Soviets introduced under the health programmes were new yet there were certain areas like sanitation, basic health and hygiene education that had their origin in the pre-Revolutionary Russia, when doctors employed by 'zemstvos'²⁰ attempted to persuade Russian peasants to abandon their folk medical practices and to embrace biomedicine.²¹ At the time of the October Revolution, the 'zemstvos' work was still unfinished, much of rural Russia remained wedded to old practices and superstitions, and thereafter it was left to the Bolsheviks to finish this campaign while they pursued similar policies in the non-Russian territories of the Soviet Union including Kazakhstan.²²

After the formation of Soviet Union, to bring biomedicine to Kazakhstan in the interethnic context, this modernization project became linked to the state's political and economic exploitation of the region.²³ Therefore the Central government poured considerable resources into the development of biomedical cadres to meet the population's needs. Special attention was paid to the so-called backward regions, such as Central Asia including Kazakhstan which was particularly in acute need of medical

¹⁶ Leonard J. Bruce-Chawtt, *Malaria Research and Eradication in the USSR*, WHO, 1959, pp. 739-740.

¹⁷ Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p. 163.

¹⁸ Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p. 160.

¹⁹ Traditional healers served as cornerstones of Kazakh culture. Undermining these healers was essential to both the expansion of biomedicine and the securing of the state's exclusive authority at the local level; Paula A. Michaels, *Journal of the History of Medicine*, Vol. 59, p.70.

²⁰ 'Zemstvos' were the establishments of rural district councils who emerged during Tsar Period; *Soviet Communism: A new Civilization*, pp. 653-654.

²¹ Biomedical workers fought to rid the Russian peasantry from superstitious beliefs that they thought kept Russia poor and backward. These medical workers had a modest impact on the health of Russian peasants through the dissemination of information about sanitation, personal hygiene, and neonatal care. This propaganda attempted to coax peasants into abandoning their customs by teaching them to view their way of life as dirty and a relic of the pre-modern past; *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*, p. 650.

²² *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*, pp. 653-654.

²³ Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p. 163.

facilities. In Kazakhstan, for example, the number of doctors grew from 452 in 1927 to 1,571 in 1937.²⁴ Until the founding in 1931 of the V. M. Molotov Kazakh Medical Institute (KazMI), all Kazakh doctors received training outside the republic. Even after the institute was opened, the majority of doctors continued to come from outside the republic, transferred there by the USSR Commissariat for Public Health. One of KazMI's primary missions was the creation of a cadre of indigenous medical workers. As of 1931, only 30 to 35% Kazakh physicians served the indigenous population.²⁵ Even after KazMI began graduating students in 1935, the number of Kazakh graduates remained quite small in the pre-war years. Kazakhs were more numerous at lower levels of the medical profession, working as nurses, midwives, and physician's assistants; still they could not serve the population wholly. In 1935 there were 14,604 health workers in Kazakhstan, but among them just 2015 were Kazakhs that is 13.8 % of the total number of health workers.²⁶

In 1928 the Kazakh Regional Committee of the Communist Party, was charged with developing 'massive agitation and propaganda and generally strengthening the struggle against the influence of mullahs, tabibs, and Shamans using the existing system of clinics and (Defense of Motherhood and Infancy) institutions.' Through special 'women's evenings' lectures women were made aware that old customs carried negative health consequences.²⁷ Gynecological problems that sprang up were attributed to child marriage. Accordingly child marriages were discouraged as the law fixed marriageable age for women at 18 years.²⁸ The Soviet officials and Communist Party members also worked against the *Kalyan*²⁹ which they regarded as bride price, prompting fathers to 'sell' their daughters into marriage at a very young age.

Besides the propaganda the State focused health and hygiene efforts on Kazakh women, in particular during the weeks between International Women's day (8 March) and ban on bride price and polygamy day (22 March). The regime focused concern for the health of women, particularly of pregnant ones and worked hard for their liberation from traditional medical practices. Both medical administrators and antireligious propagandists bemoaned the detrimental effects of lay midwives on the health and well-

²⁴ Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p.165.

²⁵ "Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstana", Ed. Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo v Kazakhstane; c.f. Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p.165.

²⁶ David Lane, *Ethnic and Class Stratification in Soviet Kazakhstan (1917-1949)*, Cambridge, 1975, p. 181.

²⁷ In 1938, Kazakh Commissar for Public Health I. Karakulov stated that the "total absence of medical help facilitates the development of all types of sorcery by Shamans, illiterate, ignorant witch doctors cling to Islamic law and Islam, perpetuating savage customs—spitting in [their patients'] mouths, beating the severely ill with the goal of "expelling" the illness from the person, etc. With the help of these witch doctors the population has been infected with all sorts of social illnesses." few months later, Deputy Commissar for Public Health I. Tazhiev in December 1938 reiterated these sentiments and stressed the negative effect of mullahs and Shamans on health conditions in Kazakhstan. "Spitting in mouths" he refers to occasions when the Shaman first chews a medication or some component of the healing ceremony, and then passes it to the patient's mouth. *Kazakhstan Press*, August 3rd and December 25th, 1938.; c.f. Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, pp. 171-173.

²⁸ Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p.170.

²⁹ Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p. 169.

being of newborns, while trumpeting the state's strides in expanding (Defense of Motherhood and Infancy) facilities ³⁰ (Picture 2).



Picture 2. Group of nurses working with children to stimulate their development

In a 1928 memo to the Kazakh Council of People's Commissars regarding the opening of midwifery schools in Semipalatinsk and Kzyl Orda, the Kazakh Commissar for Public Health asserted that from the moment of birth, Kazakh infants were in jeopardy at the hands of Shamans and lay midwives who did more harm than good, because of the danger they posed during childbirth by failing to provide a clean environment as above 272/1000 infant deaths occurred before the Soviet rule in Kazakhstan.³¹ Hygiene propaganda and antireligious³² leaflets published at the Center echoed these accusations against lay midwives, emphasizing the danger to both mother and child of infection contracted in an unsanitary home environment.

Medicalization of childbirth had the potential to lower the risks associated with childbirth, even though birthing facilities in rural Kazakhstan, even during the 1930s, offered less sanitary environment. However, the state launched an effort to use medical discourse not only to undermine the influence of local lay midwives but also draw Kazakh women's bodies into the hands of state-authorized biomedical workers.³³ In urban areas, "Houses of Health Education" advanced the cause of hygiene propaganda through exhibits, lectures, and outreach programmes to local schools and factories ³⁴ (Picture 3).

³⁰ According to Lopatina, a Russian, female writer who fought the influence of traditional healers in the countryside, lay midwives also jeopardized the lives of women experiencing difficult labour because they lacked formal biomedical training. The failure of lay midwives to call for a biomedical physician in a timely manner led to patient's illness, infertility, and even death; *Nuzhno Borot'sia*, Lopatina, pp. 17, 18, 27; C.f. Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p. 170.

³¹ Midwives came under severe attack as the cause of high infant mortality rates and the state encouraged women to abandon home birthing in favour of maternity wards; Arnold, *Colonizing the Body*, London, 1950, pp. 254-68.

³² Soviets paid particular attention to spreading antireligious biomedical propaganda among Muslim women, whom they believed to be disaffected with their position in Central Asian society and receptive to the state's message.; Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, p.70.

³³ Soviet Communism: A New Civilization, pp. 653-657.

³⁴ The awareness programmes were on physiology, infectious diseases, or social diseases, including alcoholism, prostitution, syphilis, and TB; Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p.176.

As the ranks of medical cadres gradually grew, efforts were made to disseminate health and hygiene propaganda to the whole spectrum of population.³⁵ Sanitation education found expression in written, visual, and oral media. Activists appear to have relied most heavily on written means to convey their



Picture 3. Babies in Children Hospital in Astana, Kazakhstan

vision of cleanliness and culture in the late 1920s and early 1930s, when cadres and resources were particularly scarce, and newspapers and pamphlets provided an inexpensive way to reach the broadest audience. By the mid-1930s, when more medical workers were available to conduct lectures,³⁶ discussions, and one-on-one agitation, oral propaganda methods and posters³⁷ were also employed to a greater extent.³⁸ Week-long public health drives in schools and workplaces, where teachers and health care workers were carried rallied to raise public consciousness about health questions.

By engaging the vast spectrum of people in medical activities, the Soviets started to succeed in gaining some control of the medical problems in Kazakhstan during the pre- World War II years. The medical education that was available in the republic or elsewhere in the Union was widely attracting Kazakhs. The result was that towards the beginning of the 1940s women came to predominate among

³⁵ In Central Asia, where the cultural gap between mostly European medical workers and Kazakh patients was wide, such propaganda efforts may have played a particularly important role in eroding local reluctance to accept biomedical approaches; Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p.173.

³⁶ Among the semi nomadic population of Southern Kazakhstan, the doctors implored the nomads “not to listen to your Kazakh healers who fail to heal the sick with their medicines; for all illnesses always go to the doctor, and there you will receive free, effective medicine.” Alonzo S. Yerby, *Medical Care in the Soviet Union*, Lippincott Williams press, 1968, p. 284.

³⁷ One health education poster from 1930 contrasts the unscientific methods of traditional healers with the accurate, enlightened methods of diagnosis used by biomedical workers. It depicts a Russian man shining a flashlight down on a crowd of Central Asians in traditional dress. On his desk sits a microscope, laboratory instruments, and test tubes, markers of scientific authority. He lights their path toward a hospital and the banner across the top reads “Religious leaders, healers, (tabibs), and mullahs destroy the health of workers. Don’t fall for their tricks! Get treatment at Soviet hospitals!”; *Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka*, 1935, p 4; c.f. Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p.169.

³⁸ As radios became more widely available in the 1930s, even the most distant corners of Kazakhstan were within earshot of sanitation education lectures and in the largely illiterate society of the Kazakh nomads and seminomads, posters, slides, and educational films may have been especially effective. “Kratkii ocherk”, p.28; c.f. Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, pp. 173-176.

practicing physicians,³⁹ while males retained most administrative positions in clinical facilities and medical educational institutions⁴⁰ (Picture 4).



Picture 4. Local pediatric clinic, Almaty, Kazakhstan

Needless to say, activists in the Kazakh Commissariat for Public Health incorporated all health education methods in their work throughout 1928–41, usually in conjunction with one another. On the one hand the medical propaganda offered an opportunity to convince Kazakhs of the dangers of their traditional healers, while the regional and republic-level newspapers described Shamans, mullahs, and other folk healers as greedy charlatans who willfully deceived the ignorant masses.⁴¹ Lectures, posters, and pamphlets all encouraged Kazakhs to become dependent on medical practitioners which for some meant that by inference it was to depend on the Soviet State. Along with cultural and religious factors, Soviet authorities stressed the link between economics and health. Writing in a 1927 manual for Central Asia's hygiene propagandists, I.I. Akodus stated that "the fundamental principle that lies at the base of Soviet medicine is that illness is not only biological, i.e., dependent upon the forces of nature, but is subject to social influence, i.e., dependent on the conditions of labour and everyday life in a particular society, economic conditions, the distribution of poverty and wealth, etc."⁴² He underscored that while exposure to the tuberculosis virus caused TB; infection occurs more frequently and has a greater impact among the poor, "who live in crowded conditions, eat poorly, work a lot and rest little - this is the social essence of the disease." Writing in an official Kaznarkomzdrav organ, a public health official named N. N. Matveev attributed the spread of infectious diseases among the Kazakhs to impoverishment and to "capitalism, which penetrated all aspects of the nomads' patriarchal life."⁴³

³⁹ Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, pp. 173-176.

⁴⁰ Faye Abdellah, *Nursing and Health Care in the USSR, USA, 1973*, p. 2097.

⁴¹ *Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, 1938, p. 3; c.f. Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p.176.

⁴² Akodus, "Kratkii ocherk", 1927, p.5; c.f. Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, pp. 169-70.

⁴³ N. N. Matveev, "Ocherednye zadachi na fronte zdravookhraneniia po KazASSR"; c.f. Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p.171.

There is a certain amount of medical truth to above mentioned assertions, but the emphasis on the overriding significance of economic conditions reflects a peculiarity of Soviet medicine that served the political purpose of buttressing the regime's economic agenda in Kazakhstan and across the USSR, and of asserting the superiority of Socialism over Capitalism.⁴⁴

The Soviet government stood as the saviour of the non-Russian peoples from Czarist capitalist exploitation. Both at the center and in the periphery, numerous authors blamed the Czarist system and wealthy native clan leaders for carrying out a policy of neglect designed to keep the Kazakhs and other minorities ignorant, uncultured, and physically weak for the sake of colonial domination.⁴⁵ Because of these limitations, Kazakhs were "ignorant of doctors prior to the Revolution", while the nomadic encampments and villages on the eve of World War II, had developed an enormous network of public health institutions.⁴⁶ Not only the facilities were created in a big way but the medical care that was available after the Revolution was free."⁴⁷

Probably more so than health propaganda, positive experiences with biomedicine played an important role in cultivating reliance on Soviet medical workers. When officials opened a clinic or hospital, the local population did not immediately flock to medical professionals for assistance. Rather, medical workers had to build trust gradually within the community by demonstrating the effectiveness of biomedicine and of their own skills. A 1936 newspaper article states that a hospital maternity ward in Aktyubinsk helped only six Kazakh women deliver their babies in 1933, while most Kazakhs 'ran to Shamans for help.' Within two years hospital workers had eroded much of the community's distrust and assisted two hundred women per annum.⁴⁸ Even though the number of hospital beds expanded from 3,767 in 1928 to 16,290 in 1941 yet most were concentrated in Slavic urban and industrial areas, and thus were beyond the reach of the region's indigenous population, which was often served by itinerant medical teams that passed through nomadic and semi-nomadic encampments for a few days or weeks at a time. Nevertheless in agricultural areas, the state established temporary clinical facilities to serve collective farmers during harvesting and sowing seasons. Among other duties, these young, temporary medical cadres bore responsibility for transmitting health awareness to Kazakhstan's villages.⁴⁹

The effective biomedical work and propaganda won the support of the Kazakhs for growing familiarity of biomedical practices to take advantage of clinical facilities. Periodic visits from medical personnel traveling through rural Kazakh areas had awakened the local population's interest in scientific medicine, which won the faith of this population for the doctor (Picture 5). Furthermore the dramatic economic and socio-political changes, right from the First Five-Year Plan in 1928 to the Union's entry into World War II in 1941, forged a 'New Soviet Man', through interventionist cultural policies,

⁴⁴ Soviet Communism: A new Civilization, pp. 696-697.

⁴⁵ Paula A. Michaels, *Journal of the History of Medicine*, p. 318.

⁴⁶ Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p. 171.

⁴⁷ Centrally published pamphlets aimed at the general public emphasized how many hospital beds, doctors, hospitals, and midwives served Kazakhstan, testifying the party's devotion to ordinary, working class men and women; Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p.175.

⁴⁸ Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p. 175.

⁴⁹ Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, pp. 318-322.

collectivization campaign, industrial and educational developments and the States efforts⁵⁰ to undermine traditional healers and supplant them with biomedical workers was that allowed Kazakhs to take increasing advantage of clinical facilities where in sanitation education work also played an important role in this shift.



Picture 5. Local pediatric clinic, Almaty, Kazakhstan

Improvements in Health

After the Revolution, and until World War II, health and hygiene conditions of Kazakh people indicate that the State had accomplished its objective of lowering rates of infectious diseases. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1942, numerous public health officials asserted that the Revolution had washed away all the evils of the Tsarist past.⁵¹ In subsequent decades, dramatic improvements in the field of health were undoubted. By 1960-61, there were 1620 general hospitals in Kazakhstan with 77,000 hospital beds, 560 polyclinics, 704 health posts, 34 medical and

⁵⁰ After 1930, the Soviet government began forcing the nomadic Kazakhs to settle on collective and state farms, and the Soviets encouraged large numbers of Russians and other Slavs to settle in the region. During this period Kazakhstan endured repeated famines. At least 1.5 million Kazakhs and 80 percent of the republic's livestock died. Thousands more Kazakhs tried to escape to China, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey; however, most of them starved in the attempt; Toregelyd Sharmanov, "History of Kazakhstan"; c.f. *Kazakhstan Demographic and Health Survey 1999*, Kazakhstan, 2000, p.2.

⁵¹ S. A. Chesnokov, Kazakh Commissar for Public Health claimed that the "The Great October Socialist Revolution transformed the face of old Russia. Colonial exploitation of Kazakhstan, with its darkness, ignorance, and cultural backwardness has disappeared forever." His deputy, Tleugabylov, enthused that, "casting off the chains of their damnable past, a friendly family of Kazakhs including many others marched hand in hand with the great Russian people along a vast, bright path [to the future]." c.f. Paula A. Michaels, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59, p.173.

sanitation units, and 3940 feldsher-midwife posts.⁵² With the great emphasis on preventive medicine some common diseases like malaria, leprosy, polio, tuberculosis and diphtheria including cholera, plague, smallpox, typhus, relapsing fever etc. were brought under certain degree of control by the 1960s through widespread preventive measures like mass vaccination and immunization⁵³ as the incidence of typhoid was reduced by 80%, diphtheria by 75% and scarlet fever by 55%.⁵⁴

One of the dreaded diseases of Kazakhstan has remained, over the years, TB for the scarcity of safe drinking water and climatic environment has allowed it to sustain among the natives. Nevertheless, the state made efforts, between 1940 and 1960, to an extent that the number of people dying annually from tuberculosis fell by 75%.⁵⁵ From 1950-1965 the TB sick-rate was reduced threefold while bone and joint tuberculosis was reduced fourfold. It was achieved because the majority of the newborn babies were

vaccinated since 1934, and from 1948 onwards anti-tuberculosis vaccination was made compulsory for all children, (Picture 6) and from 1961, all employees of medical establishments and some other professions up to the age of 30 were also vaccinated against TB.⁵⁶



Picture 6. Kazakh/Russian medicos in TB testing laboratories in Kazakhstan

Such concentrated and die-hard efforts were taken in many other cases soon after the state was able to convince the people of their efforts. Many of the medical gains were achieved in the post-war years not only because of the cooperation of the natives but also because of the availability of the wide variety of

⁵² Medical Services in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 1963, p.109.

⁵³ A. K. Patnaik, History of Civilizations of Central Asia, p. 580.

⁵⁴ "The Russian Health care System: Sick in so many ways", 2007, www.La Russophobe.com

⁵⁵ "Medical Services in Central Asia and Kazakhstan"; c.f. A. K. Patnaik, History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Vol. VI, p.580.

⁵⁶ Agranovsky & Antonov, *USSR: Questions and Answers, 1917-1967*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 327-328.

medical facilities. Leprosy completely vanished out of Kazakhstan by the 1960s, and not a single child of leper parents had caught the disease in the years from 1955-1961.⁵⁷ There was also an organized assault on cancer, comparable to the drives taken against common diseases. Hospital beds reserved for cancer cases were doubled, enabling almost every sufferer to be hospitalized. In general the incidence of specific diseases showed a dramatic decline between 1913 and the 1970.⁵⁸

The measures that were taken not only in other Central Asian republics but also in Kazakhstan too were so concrete that the health status of the people showed a lot of improvements. Mortality rates, both infant and general dropped sharply, the expectation of life correspondingly rose and the general health of the population improved largely. All the Central Asian republics succeeded in reducing the rate of infant mortality, by opening new children's hospitals and clinics and by increasing the number of pediatrician's. Women and infant mortality rate declined substantially. For example, between 1940 and 1960, there was a fivefold drop in infant deaths in Kazakhstan. The general life expectancy reached 43 years in 1942, and nearly 70 years at the dissolution of Soviet Union as compared to 32 in 1913.⁵⁹ The



birth rate was comparably high, 36/1000 population, in 1960, 40% above the all Union average. It was the aim of authorities that all confinements should take place in hospital conditions and new maternity homes were constantly being opened to make this possible. There were 11,000 maternity beds and 410 kolkhoz maternity homes, more than 500 women's and children's clinics including 196 in rural areas and 11,500 beds in children's hospitals and more than 1,700 children's doctors in Kazakhstan in 1961. In addition all the kolkhozes were being encouraged to build their own maternity homes⁶⁰ (Picture 7).

Picture 7. Physician checks the overall health development of children in a hospital in Almaty

⁵⁷ Medical Services in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, p.115.

⁵⁸ Comparative Approach to Policy Analysis: Health Care Policy in Four Nations, pp. 226-227.

⁵⁹ Medical Services in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, p.123; A. K. Patnaik, History of Civilizations of Central Asia, p. 580; WHO, Regional Office for Europe, 2007, www.who.com.

⁶⁰ Medical Services in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, p. 124.

The result was that the infant mortality dropped almost five times in the years between 1940 and 1960 even though the death rate of new-born babies, particularly premature ones, was still high.⁶¹ General mortality declined by 71% and infant mortality by 90% at the close of 1960s⁶² (Picture 8).



Picture 8. Child care facilities in Kazakh hospitals

While all these figures and facts reveal a changed scenario in the mental setup of the natives, progressing beyond doubt to a level that was giving shape to a new society entirely believing in biomedicine. For example the infant mortality was one of the concerns of the state and accordingly family planning issue was taken up in such a manner that looked different from many other countries. The state allowed women opportunities to have more children in an effort to have more human resource for varied activities of the state; and accordingly discouraged birth control methods intermittently

⁶¹ Examining the reason for this the Health Minister of Kazakhstan remarked in 1961 that a survey was done in 1960 only 78.6 percent of new-born babies had been visited by doctors in the first three days after discharge from the maternity home; *Medical Services in Central Asia and Kazakhstan*, p. 124.

⁶² The consultation centres looked after children in the area up to age of three. They regularly examined the both healthy and sick children in specialized departments and at home and taught mothers how to protect their children's health, vaccinate children against smallpox, tuberculosis, diphtheria, polio, etc. and supervised the work of the infant-feeding centers where mothers received supplementary food for their babies. Children after reached the age of three were constantly looked after by the district clinic up to the age of 14, or until they finished school. Due to these efforts, with the passage of time Soviet children became stronger, taller, and healthier; *USSR: Questions and Answers, 1917-1967*, p. 323.

through the Soviet years. The fertility rate in Kazakhstan reached its peak about 3.1 births per woman, towards the collapse of Soviet Union.⁶³

Like in other parts of the Soviet Union induced abortion was introduced as one of the primary methods of birth control in the republic. After its initial legalization in 1920, abortion was banned in 1936 as part of a pro-natalist policy emphasizing population growth. Since this attempt to increase population growth proved unsuccessful and even harmful because of maternal deaths caused by illegal abortions, the Soviet government again legalized induced abortion for nonmedical reasons in 1955. But it was prescribed that abortions should be discouraged. Any abortion performed outside a medical establishment was regarded as illegal. Except the expectant mother, all persons performing such abortions were punished by law. The average Soviet woman had thus six abortions during her



reproductive span, which was the only method of birth control throughout the Soviet era. Since Soviets for many years promoted policies to encourage women to have more children therefore those who had seven or more children were traditionally glorified and recognized as “mother-heroes” and were provided with a number of benefits⁶⁴ (Picture 9).

Picture 9. Visiting a family planning physician

⁶³ Lincoln C. Chen, Jon E. Rohde & Richard Jolly, “Health Crisis in Central Asian Republics”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol.27, No.23, (Jun. 6, 1992), p. 1198.

⁶⁴ Akkumis Salkhanova & Holly Seyhan, “Induced Abortion”; *Kazakhstan Health and Demographic Survey*, Kazakhstan, 1999, p. 79; Fannina Hale, *Women in Soviet Russia*, Moscow, 1933 p. 144; Bashir Ahmad, “Reproductive Behavior in Central Asia”, *Central Asia: Introspection*, Eds. M. A. Kaw & A. A. Bandey, University of Kashmir, 2006, p. 348; Victor Agadjanian, *Ethnocultural Identity and Induced Abortion in Kazakhstan*, Arizona University, 1997, p.317.

While in 1937 the death rate in the USSR in general was 40% below the death rate in Russia in 1913 and was constantly being reduced implying a much higher life expectancy, on the other hand the birth rate increased constantly.⁶⁵ Even just from 1936 to 1937 the birth rate increased by 18%. In spite of the growth in population the authorities and health Ministries of the republics in the Union took measures to provide substantial infrastructural facilities to measure the health standards of the people. It was therefore mandatory for the entire adult population, to undergo a compulsory medical check-up once every two years. As an example example; 104.4 million people were examined by the doctors throughout the Soviet Union only in 1965.

To create high health standards Kazakhstan had more than 13,000 doctors and 53,000 feldshers, midwives and nurses by the year 1961.⁶⁶ That means there was one doctor for every 859 inhabitants. There were 23.8 physicians per 10,000 inhabitants in 1970 and 38.3 in 1981 in the Soviet Union as compared to 1.5 physicians per 10,000 inhabitants in 1913 in Russia.⁶⁷ The ratio of doctors in Kazakhstan was not the least as there were 21.8 in 1971 and it rose to 38.7 in 1988 doctors for 10,000 inhabitants.⁶⁸ It was a huge accomplishment as compared to 0.4 doctors per 10,000 populations in pre-Revolutionary days. Since by then education standards had also risen and medical education was well received by the Kazakh population more so by females therefore by the 1970s about three fourths of the total number of doctors in Kazakhstan was female.⁶⁹ By organizing the health system in such a way, the entire population was involved directly, and hence felt very strongly about improving the health of the nation.⁷⁰ Accordingly habits and attitudes of the people changed dramatically from the pre-Revolutionary days not only in Kazakhstan but throughout the Union.⁷¹

⁶⁵ Women's consultation centers, maternity homes, health stations at factories and offices, midwife and gynecological institutes and so on were mainly for expectant mothers, and were able to handle all the births in the country; *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*, pp. 670-674; *USSR: Questions and Answers, 1917-1967*, p. 322; *Rising Infant Mortality in the U.S.S.R. in the 1970s*, Washington, 1980; *Ethnocultural Identity and Induced Abortion in Kazakhstan*, p.319.

⁶⁶ Between 1926 and 1959 there was an 8.5 times increase in the number of medical personnel for the USSR as a whole, but as for the Central Asia and Kazakhstan is concerned the increase was 21 times; "Chislennost, Sostav i Razmeshcheniye SSSR", Moscow, 1961; "Kazakhstan Press (KP)", 19.05.1961; c.f. *Medical Services in Central Asia and Kazakhstan*, p.37; A K. Patnaik, *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, p. 580; *Health Care Policy in Four Nations*, p. 203.

⁶⁷ Sankar Basu, *Culture and Civilization of the USSR*, New Delhi, 1985, p. 120.

⁶⁸ A K. Patnaik, *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Vol. IV, p. 58

⁶⁹ Bejoy Kumar Sinha, *The New Man in Soviet Union*, New Delhi, 1971, p.185.

⁷⁰ It was pointed out that in 1956, 1.3 percent of the entire population of the Soviet Union including Kazakhstan worked in one way or another in the field of public health; Elizabeth Brainerd, "Reassessing the Standard of Living in the Soviet Union: An Analysis Using Archival and Anthropometric Data", *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 70, No. 1, 2010, pp. 83-99.

⁷¹ Sigerist (a prominent scholar of the time) describes some of his experiences in 1936: "The habits of the, Soviet people have changed radically in a very short time. The cities are spotlessly clean, and the foreigner soon learns that cigarette butts are not supposed to be thrown on the street but into special cans placed at every corner. I remember a long railroad ride from Moscow to Kazan during which the conductor came to clean my compartment every two hours, which was more often than I liked. When I asked her to let me sleep in peace, she said 'Well, citizen, I have to clean the compartment because the inspector may come in at any station, and the car must be kept as clean as it was when we left Moscow – but I will do it without disturbing you.' No visitor is allowed to go into food factories, medical institutions, or nurseries without sterilized gown and cap. Such regulations may sometimes seem exaggerated, but they are part of great educational programmes and far-reaching results cannot be expected unless there are strict rules which must be followed literally"; "The Russian Healthcare System: Sick in so many ways", *www.LaRussofobe.com*

Not only the human resource potential was becoming gradually high but other infrastructural facilities were also growing. Take for example the year 1913, there were 1.3 hospital beds per 1000 population throughout Russia, while as in the Soviet Union there were 11.1 beds for the same number of population in 1942.

All the facilities and human resource was of course because of the ever-increasing spending on health. By 1965 hospitals, hygiene institutes and health centres were to be found all over Kazakhstan as was the case in other parts of the Union. All types of hospitals, treatments, physiotherapy, radiotherapy, sanatorium cures, dental treatment, and maternity services and so on – were available to people free of charge. The public health budget of the USSR in 1937 was approximately 75 times that of Russia in 1913 and in 1965, 6.6% of the total budget was spent on health of the Soviet people.⁷² The lavish spending on health sector was made partly possible because of the social insurance system whereby all workers and peasants contributed a certain percentage of their earnings to the social insurance fund thereby contributing towards the overall well-being of people to make all aspects of health care free.

In USSR including Central Asia, unemployment, destitution and poverty have been permanently done away with on the basis of the abolition of the exploitation of man by man. In a remarkably short period of time the Socialist state succeeded in raising the material and cultural level of the entire population enormously, thereby laying a firm foundation for successful work in the field of public health. The Soviet Union wiped out slums and provided both town and country with water mains, sewer systems and electricity. In addition to this, the quality and quantity of the foods available were increased beyond all recognition. Nutritious food was made available to the entire population and its production and consumption increased constantly. The USSR by allowing the necessities of life to be supplied plentifully, and by providing decent leisure facilities, was able to improve peoples' psychological as well as material conditions, and hence allowed further improvement in health sector of the Union as well as that of people living there who got the facilities at various levels from that of the birth until their death⁷³ (Picture 10).



Picture 10. Health care facilities through ambulatory/flying hospitals

⁷² Murray Feshbach, *Health in the USSR: Organization, Trends, And Ethics*, USA, 2002, pp. 119-120.

⁷³ The Russian Health care System: Sick in so many ways, *www.LaRussophobe.com*

The health care system, therefore, ran parallel to material conditions as well as depended on improvements in the environment and the general standard of living. Socialized medicine did receive a great deal of the credit for such improvements. Wide health coverage, along with improved sanitation, clean water supply and reasonably good nutrition meant that the USSR was able to achieve high rates of immunization and deliver key interventions to improve infant and child mortality and reduce rates of communicable diseases. For example, following the introduction of universal childhood immunization in the late 1950s, diphtheria was well controlled for more than two decades with incidence levels in the USSR in the mid 1970s similar to those of the USA at 0.08 per 100,000.⁷⁴

Analysis

The health system functioned with excellent results. The life expectancy in Kazakhstan reached in the 1970s the levels close to those observed in Eastern Europe and European Russia as the average age of a Kazakh increased from mere 32 years in 1917 to 68.81 years (63.90 for men and 73.40 for women).⁷⁵ It was primarily because a wide range of preventive medicine including massive programmes of vaccination was carried out throughout the Union and accordingly by the year 1964, mortality and life expectancy indicators improved throughout the USSR.⁷⁶ The general population of all republics including Kazakhstan grew simultaneously from 232.2 million to 271.2 million between the years from 1965 to 1982, an increase of 17%.⁷⁷ These were no mean achievements, given that the Soviet Union was far more backward as compared to most of Europe at the time of the Russian Revolution in 1917.⁷⁸ The Soviet Union was industrially and technologically underdeveloped, by Western standards. Kazakhstan's socio-economic conditions were even worse than those of Russia at the time of Revolution. Disease and unsanitary living conditions were accepted as a normal part of life by the majority of the Kazakh population, before the Revolution. Moreover, during World War II the Soviet Union faced devastation and loss of lives (particularly both in Russia and Kazakhstan) that was greater than the rest of Europe put together.⁷⁹ The Soviet medical system helped carry the population through severe hardships and raised the life expectancy and living conditions to 20th century Western standards, as compared with countries with similar per capita income levels.⁸⁰ These gains were important to help the country to recover.

⁷⁴ Michael Borowitz & Rifat Atun, "The Unfinished Journey from Samashko to Bismarck: Health reform in Central Asia from 1991 to 2006", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, No.4, 2006, p. 421.

⁷⁵ WHO, regional office for Europe, 1994; Michael Borowitz & Rifat Atun, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, No.4, p. 421.

⁷⁶ Soviet life expectancy for women was 74 years and for men 66, while as in 1913 it was just under 32 years; *USSR: Questions and Answers, 1917-1967*, p. 316; *The New Man In Soviet Union*, p. 184.

⁷⁷ Health in the USSR: Organization, Trends, And Ethics, pp. 119-120.

⁷⁸ Mark. G. Field, *Health Care in Central Asia*, pp. 67-68.

⁷⁹ The difficult decade of the 1930s was followed by World War II devastations, massive losses of population were estimated at 26 to 27 million or 13.5% of the pre-war population; the population that survived endured horrific conditions including disease, severe rationing and malnourishment, and dislocation; Elizabeth Brainerd, *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 70, pp. 95-99; Amit Sen. Gupta, *The Soviet Health System*, Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), Nov.18, 2007.

⁸⁰ Elizabeth Brainerd, *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 70, pp. 83.

However, since the late 1970s, something seems to have gone awry in the health status of the Soviet people in general and Central Asian republics including Kazakhstan in particular. There was a striking reversal of mortality trends (particularly increase in infant and child mortality and decrease in adult male life expectancy) due to the combination of rising illness and ineffectual medical care. The main reason for it was limited and shrinking budgetary allocations (below 4% of the total budget in the 1980s as compared to 6.6 in 1964) together with smoking and wide spread drinking of alcohol, especially by men, accidents, poor sanitation, inadequate nutrition as well as hospitals and clinics were poorly equipped and maintained. Besides this most physicians were poorly trained to counter the new types of diseases that emerged by then as there were not sufficient funds to bring in new technology and take up researches in these fields. Added to it the medicos were inadequately paid. And finally extensive environmental pollution was the major cause of illness and premature mortality in the Soviet Central Asia and other parts of the USSR.⁸¹ It was in spite of the fact that the birth rate in Kazakhstan fell steadily since the end of the 1980s while as “crude” mortality rate of 6.9 deaths per 1000 reached its lowest level in 1990. The trends in mortality and hence also in average life expectancy showed a characteristic pattern as there was an improvement in the period 1985–1986 as a result of President Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign, but it was followed by a sharp deterioration in 1992–1995, owing partly to a return to former patterns of alcohol consumption and partly to the difficult socio-economic conditions during the transitional period.⁸² Even though at the end of the Soviet rule life expectancy of men in Kazakhstan was over 63 years and that of women was over 73 years, yet the 10 years gap between men and women was one of the largest gaps in the world followed by Russia.⁸³ This male mortality crisis began in the 1970s and continues even today.⁸⁴ Partly due to increased death rates from cardio-vascular diseases, cancers, car accidents, homicides and alcohol abuse showing that such causes of death have not been addressed well by the health ministry during the Soviet era. While the post 1970 Soviet Union has been found to have lacked the infrastructural growth at the rate comparable with that of Stalin era and as well the lack of funding for technological growth and research facilities to meet the growing requirement of the times.

Added to it, Kazakhstan like some other Asian republics faced chronic problems of clean drinking water and sanitation, compounded by the unmasking of long-standing man-made environmental health catastrophes. Clean drinking water remained a problem as reflected by the relatively high level of water-borne diseases (diarrhea, hepatitis, typhoid) from the late 1980s.⁸⁵ Although the majority of urban populations enjoyed piped water, less than half of the rural populations had access to safe piped water supplies⁸⁶ (Picture 11). What was making hazardous was that drinking water came from open sources,

⁸¹ Soviet Union: Declining Health Care in the 1970s and 1980s, www.who.com; The State of Soviet Medicine, HP.TIME.COM, 1970; Donald A. Barr & Mark G. Field, “The Current State of Health Care in the Former Soviet Union”, *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 86, No.3, 1996, p. 307.

⁸² Highlights on Health in Kazakhstan, WHO, 1999, p.5.

⁸³ Highlights on Health in Kazakhstan, WHO, 1999, p.5.

⁸⁴ Donald A. Barr & Mark G. Field, *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 86, No.3, p. 307.

⁸⁵ Jennifer Franz & Felix Fitzroy, “Child mortality In Central Asia: social policy, agriculture and the environment”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, No.4, December 2006, pp. 481-485.

⁸⁶ Jennifer Franz & Felix Fitzroy, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 481-485.

frequently contaminated by fecal organisms and chemical pollutants as in rural areas, sanitary facilities were often characterized by open latrines and untreated sewerage discharge into waterways.⁸⁷



Picture 11. A Kazakh takes water from well

To add to it the consequences of Soviet agricultural and industrial policies were disastrous for environmental health as the excessive use of fertilizers, cotton cultivation and chemical waste from industries leaked into these waterways. Women and men including children worked in cotton fields and thus get directly exposed to chemical hazards from pesticides. Industrial pollutants such as PCB-compounds and heavy metals, and also the use of large quantities of pesticides to control parasites and weeds accumulated not only in water, but also in soil and therefore deposited over large areas by atmospheric transport to enter the food chain of humans.⁸⁸ There were reports of high incidence of respiratory ailments, especially bronchial asthma, neurological and congenital disorders, and allergic reaction due to these chemical pollutants.⁸⁹ Mothers in certain regions in Kazakhstan (and Uzbekistan) were advised against nursing their babies because of toxins in breast milk.⁹⁰

For decades, anemia has been considered one of Kazakhstan's leading public health problems. In 1995, anemia levels among women and children were determined in conjunction with the 1995 KDHS. 49% of women and 69% of children under the age of three in Kazakhstan suffered from some degree of anemia. A study revealed that the highest rates of anemia are in areas close to the Aral Sea.⁹¹ These areas

⁸⁷ Jennifer Franz & Felix Fitzroy, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 481-485.

⁸⁸ Shirin Akiner, *Central Asian Voices*, 1990, London, pp.1-2.

⁸⁹ *Central Asian Voices*, p.2.

⁹⁰ *Central Asian Voices*, p.2.

⁹¹ Almaz T. Sharman & Bedel T. Sarbayev, "Anemia", *Kazakhstan Demographic and Health Survey*, p.151.

are characterized by severe agrochemical pollution and other environmental and socio-economic problems.⁹²

The ecological problems represent the cumulative result of decades of policies adopted for the development of agriculture and industries. The expansion of cotton cultivation has pushed out the cultivation of fruits and vegetables and has shrunk the pasture land for livestock. On the other hand, indiscriminate and excessive use of pesticides, fertilizer, and defoliant has severely disturbed the ecology. Compared with 3 kg of fertilizer used per hectare in other parts of the former Soviet Union, 20-25 kg of chemicals were used in Central Asia⁹³ to enhance the yield of cotton. What it resulted was that not only the ecological balance was disturbed but overall health hazards started to emerge. In addition the inefficient irrigation has led to water waste, water-logging, salinity, and contamination of underground sources. Illustrative of this environmental catastrophe is the 'slow death' of the Aral Sea, once the world's fourth largest inland water body. Fed by the Syr Darya (through Kazakhstan) and Amu Darya (through Uzbekistan), the Aral Sea Basin has been severely disturbed by water logging and salinity from over-use of irrigation water, chemical pollution, discharge of untreated sewage, and soil erosion. The health and livelihoods of three million people immediately surrounding the sea have thus got threatened. Other examples are air, industrial, and nuclear pollution. The production of air pollutants in Chimkent, Kazakhstan was in the order of 375 kg per capita per year in comparison to 20 kg in the rest of the former Soviet Union or 100 in New York City. In the Ust-Kamenogorsk region, pollution of air, water, and the physical environment has been caused by heavy mining and smelting industries.⁹⁴

Diseases widely linked to the external environment continue to dominate the causes of child mortality in Kazakhstan,⁹⁵ like anemia, tuberculosis, kidney and liver diseases, respiratory infections and specific types of cancer-rates within the Aral Sea basin, deaths from digestive and respiratory diseases linked to environmental contamination account for a dominant share of adult and child mortality. In the Aral Sea basin 40 million of the approximately 55 million inhabitants of Central Asia are surrounded by one of the worst environmental disasters from the late 20th century – an ongoing disaster that had wreaked social, economic as well as ecological havoc.⁹⁶

Another catastrophe for the Kazakh people came in the form of Cold War, erupted on 29 August 1949, when the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site in north-eastern Kazakhstan.⁹⁷ Altogether 2400 nuclear tests had been conducted worldwide between 1949 and 1989, the Soviet military conducted 456 tests at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site; compared to other nuclear test sites, the Kazakhstan Site ranks second in terms of explosive yield (after the Marshall

⁹² Almaz T. Sharman & Bedel T. Sarbayev, *Kazakhstan Demographic and Health Survey*, p.151.

⁹³ Lincoln C. Chen, Jon E. Rohde & Richard Jolly, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol.27, No.23, pp. 1199-1200.

⁹⁴ Lincoln C. Chen, Jon E. Rohde & Richard Jolly, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol.27, No.23, pp. 1200-1201.

⁹⁵ Children are adversely affected by unsafe and unhealthy environmental conditions, including air pollution, water, sanitation and chemical contamination; thus cause of child mortality and morbidity has attracted significant interest in recent decades in Kazakhstan and many other Asian republics; Jennifer Franz & Felix Fitzroy, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, No. 4, p.481.

⁹⁶ Central Asian Voices, pp. 2-9.

⁹⁷ C. Land & S. Bauer, *Fallout from nuclear tests: health effects in Kazakhstan*, online, 2002, pp. 75-78.

Islands) and second in terms of the total number of tests (after the Nevada Test Site). Studies were published during the glasnosty period which showed that people living near the Test Site have experienced higher rates of cancers (including leukemia), benign thyroid abnormalities, psychological problems and birth abnormalities⁹⁸ (Picture 12).



Picture 12. Abnormal child is bathed by his mother in Semey, Kazakhstan

Radiation-induced cancers were also commonly reported. Cancer incidence in the region reportedly was 150-200 per 1,00,000; and birth anomalies 1.5 per 1,000 births in 1991⁹⁹ (Picture 13).

⁹⁸ Murat Telekom, "Fallout exposure and health condition of the population in the semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan", International Congress Series, Vol. 1258, 2006, p. 466.

⁹⁹ Fallout from nuclear tests: health effects in Kazakhstan, pp. 75-78.



Picture 13. Nurse holds a two year old baby in a hospital in Semey, Kazakhstan

The Soviet government and its people were justifiably proud of post-war health records characterized by improvement in infant mortality, life expectancy, and overall mortality rates. The rapid development since the early 1930s of a system that provided universal access to primary health care services in local, cities and specialty services in regional centers was surely responsible in part for those achievements. Since the early 1970s, however, the state of the nation's health and, the quality of its health care system declined. In a country as developed and industrialized as the Soviet Union of the 1970s, these declining health indicators probably reflect a deterioration of general economic conditions. Health care, agriculture, and in fact all sectors of the economy suffered during the 1970s, a period of sluggish economic growth and deepening bureaucratization. Partly because of general declining standards, the early promises of the health care system were not sustained.



KHAYDAROV, M. Mirazim

The Prospects of Intensification of the Turkic World Integration

Abstract: Turkic peoples from ancient times played a key role in Central Eurasia. Their highly developed martial qualities let them conquer vast territories and create many empires in Central Eurasia. Nevertheless, Turkic peoples have never acted on the world arena as a single whole. During the 19th and 20th centuries Turkic nations became colonies or semi-colonies of the great powers. Parallel with the dissemination of the ethnic principle of self-identification, the idea of the Turkic world integration was spreading in the Turkic world. Ideas of ethnic integration are constructive under the condition of overcoming chauvinistic and extremist trends. One can see that by examples of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism that were in fact realized in the middle of the 20th century. At present there are several premises for the dissemination of the idea of intensification of the Turkic world integration. Relative equality of the integrating parties is one the integration terms. Civilization proximity of nations is the fundament of integration. It indicates necessity of increasing peoples' psychological and communicative proximity. In this connection and because of the existing political situation, it is expedient to concentrate the efforts on humanitarian integration of the Turkic world, rather than the political. Several priority measures of intensification of the Turkic world integration are recommended.

Key words: Central Eurasia, the Turkic world, ideas of ethnic integration, Turkism, humanitarian integration.

Formation of the Modern Turkic World

The modern Turkic world has been forming for centuries and the layout of the Turkic peoples settlement has formed under the influence of migration processes of the Turkic peoples, which had the nature of expansion before the 16th century; since then the area of the Turkic peoples settlement or supremacy has significantly shrunk.

The following regions can be symbolically separated on the Eurasian continent according to cultural-climatic attributes:

- 1) Europe – densely populated by predominantly Christian peoples, damp western side of Eurasia;
- 2) Asia – densely populated by predominantly Buddhist and Hindu peoples, monsoon damp eastern, south-eastern and southern sides of Eurasia;
- 3) Middle East – rarely populated by predominantly Muslim peoples, arid south-western side of Eurasia with the Mediterranean precipitation regime;

4) Central Eurasia – the region located between Europe and Asia and embracing both part of Europe and part of Asia, but differing from Europe and Asia with its vast surfaces, inland location, severe climate, and with low population density.

It should be noted that this division is to a large extent relative, and certain areas according to various attributes can be referred to different regions.

Central Eurasia for millennia has been the main region of the Turkic peoples' settlement. Inner Asia, i.e. the region embracing Southern Siberia and Central Asia is considered to be the historical motherland of the Turkic peoples, from where they moved mainly in western and south-western direction¹.

The moral values of Turkic peoples had formed particularly under the influence of conditions and living styles of an average Turk; they became the basis for the high martial qualities of the Turkic peoples. Turkic societies virtually corresponded to mobile and disciplined armies. Thanks to this, Turkic peoples over a period of millennia founded empires, particularly embracing adjacent regions (Europe, Asia and Middle East). This circumstance let the Turkic peoples expand their area of living or become ruling class on the territories from the Pacific Ocean and Bengal Bay to Central Europe and Maghreb.

Migration of the Turkic peoples to the West i.e. to Eastern and Central Europe proceeded in several waves and was extensive by amount and time. Suffice it to mention that the first known waves of Turkic expansion to Europe took place in the period of Roman Empire. The best known groups of Turkic peoples that consecutively founded their empires in Central and Eastern Europe were the Huns, the Avars, the Bulgars, and the Hazars.

However, the greatest influence on the formation of the modern East European Turkic peoples was exerted by the successors of the above mentioned groups – the Pechenegs and the Kypchaks, especially the latter. Migration of the Kypchaks to Eastern Europe and supplanting by them the Pechenegs took place mostly in the 11th century. It is this time which can be considered as the beginning of the Kypchak period in Eastern Europe, which is lasting till present.

Later on, after the accession of the fragments of the Golden Horde to the Moscow state, Kypchak peoples could retain only sedentary Muslim areas in Middle Volga-Ural, Crimea, and the part of Northern Caucasus. Nomadic Kypchaks, who had mostly accepted Orthodoxy, partly joined in the Moscow aristocracy; the most part of them formed the initial backbone of the military estate of the Russian Empire – the Cossacks, which afterwards (as per increase of the Slavic element) became the component of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. It should be noted that the Cossacks had played exceptional role in annexation by Russia of the territories of the Great Steppe and Siberia; the Cossacks played a very important role in the subsequent history of Russia particularly in the wars with European powers.

Part of the nomadic Kypchaks practicing Islam who had taken the name of Nogays was consecutively supplanted from Volga, South Ukrainian and North Caucasian steppes mostly to the Ottoman Empire and Central Asia.

¹ The Internal Classification & Migrations of Turkic Languages, 2010.

turkic-languages.scienceontheweb.net/migration_and_classification_of_turkic_languages.html

Though migration of Turkic tribes to the South-East – to Anatolia, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Iraq also proceeded in several waves, expansion of the Seljukids in the 11th century was determinant in the settling of the Turkic peoples in this region. Afterwards, through Anatolia, the Turkic ethnic groups moved to the Balkans. Turkic population settled on the Balkans was also supplanted during the wars of Christian Empires with the Ottoman Empire as a result of withdrawal of the latter.

In the 14th-15th centuries migration of Yakuts from South Siberia to the Lena Basin took place. Afterwards Yakuts widely spread along the Lena River tributaries across a vast territory.

Thereby the general layout of the modern settlement of Turkic peoples has formed. The general area of Turkic peoples settlement passes from the Lena Basin through southern Siberia, Central Asia, Central Volga and Ural, Caucasus and Crimea to Zagros, Anatolia and the Balkans. Thus the Turkic peoples occupy vast territory within the Eurasian continent, which does not have access to oceans only having access to some inner continental seas. This circumstance predetermined the historical prevalence of land interrelations and integrations among the Eurasian nations, played a considerable part in the Turkic peoples' life.

Availability of close interconnection and recurrent integration of the parts of the Turkic world in the past is proven by the level of proximity of languages and cultures of the Turkic peoples.

Ideas of Ethnical Integration in the 19th and the Beginning of the 20th Century

During the greater part of the medieval period Central Eurasia had been virtually divided between Turkic and Turkic-Mongol empires. For instance, to the end of medieval period, in the 16th century, practically all of Islamic Eurasia, as well as India, North Africa and South-East Europe were divided between the Ottoman, Safavid, Baburid empires, as well as the Sheibanid and other Turkic states. However, the Turkic world has never acted on the world arena as a single whole; the great empires created by the Turkic peoples wasted much of their energy to struggle with each other.

By the 19th and 20th centuries the situation had drastically changed and the Turkic peoples transformed from military and ruling caste of Eurasia to the group of nations who had become colonies and semi-colonies of the great powers.

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, under the influence of European nations, the ethnic principle of self-identification disseminated throughout the Turkic world. As the dissemination of this principle and the knowledge about the Turkic populated area, cultural proximity, geographical and historical community of the Turkic peoples continued, ideas of Turkism as a movement for the freedom of the Turkic peoples and for creation of their own center of power occurred and developed in the 20th century². Thus the idea of consolidation of the Turkic peoples based on ethnical principles rather than on dynastic, geographic and religious principles occurred for the first time in history. The objective necessity of this idea was manifested by the fact that the public figures of the various Turkic peoples, viewing Turkism as

² Gilyazov I. *Turkism: formation and development (characteristic of the main stages)*. Kazan State University, Kazan, 2002. (in Russian). www.ksu.ru/f11/bin_files/gilazov_tyurkizm!8.pdf

a part of the course for national revival, liberty, and cultural development of the Turkic peoples, became the followers of the idea independently from each other.

As a result of rigorous repressions pursued by totalitarian regimes in the beginning and the middle of the 20th century, Turkism collapsed as an idea. The greatest damage to Turkism was inflicted by Stalinism, by which particularly the majority of conspicuous Turkism followers had been repressed. It consisted in discrediting the idea of integration of the Turkic peoples itself and in the total informational silence regarding the historical and integration potential of Turkic peoples. The absence of awareness among the Turkic world's populace about the Turkic world as a community with a vast potential, plus the negative image of Turkism as a certain destructive movement propagated by Stalinism is a proof of the state of affairs mentioned briefly earlier.

Ideas played probably a greater role in the history of humanity than material values from the point of view of amount of wars and conflicts, forced or voluntary expenses of societies. One cannot characterize ideas by extreme categories, like searching only positive or only negative features. The level of constructivism or disruptiveness of ideas depends on which character the ideas predominantly acquire, and accordingly in which forms the ideas are implemented. The idea of integrating ethnically close groups is constructive from the point of view of consolidating peoples, conflict resolution between them, merger of regions etc. Though, isolationistic trends initially exist in such ideas, and these trends can prevail in case of excessive accentuation on ethnicity. And if the interests of an ethnic group are considered much of much higher value than the interests of other groups, the idea would take an undisguised aggressive character.

Thus in the 1930s and 1940s the idea of German nationalism containing pragmatic aspiration for review of the discriminatory Versailles system and for uniting the European Germans in a sole state, as per the victories of Germany, attained more and more the features of the idea of superiority of Germans and legitimacy of sacrificing the interests of other groups for the interests of Germans; hence the idea doomed the German nation to defeat.

The events of World War II are often viewed as a struggle between nations who belonged to capitalistic, national-socialistic and Bolshevik systems. But it is worth to remember that in the course of these events two ideas of ethnical integration – Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism – were implemented.

Unification of German-speaking countries of Europe into a sole state was carried out over a period of centuries, a national aspiration of European Germans. By reason of location of German territories in the midst of the great powers of Europe, and the antagonism between Prussia and Austria regarding the hegemony of Germany, Prussia under the rule of Bismarck had to levy three wars and administer a complicated diplomatic game until achieving the unification of Germany. In 1871 Bismarck managed to unite German states into a German empire except Austria, Luxemburg and Switzerland. After 1871, annexation of Austria into the Reich turned to be the main goal of Pan-Germanists.

The collapse of Germany in World War I not only led to detachment of several German-populated regions from Germany and Austria, but also put Germany into the state of limited sovereignty under the conditions of the Versailles system. Unification of Germany and Austria was deliberately inhibited.

Recovery of Germany's positions began with the coming to power of national-socialists in 1933. During the following years the limitations of the Versailles system against Germany were abrogated, and Austria, the Sudet-region and Klaipeda were reunified with Germany. Though these achievements of Germany were feasible by means of belligerent blackmail, in this stage the policy of national-socialists was focused on restitution of Germany's sovereignty and annexation of German-populated areas striving to unite with Germany.

Further expansion of the Reich acquired features of aggressive wars against other countries in the course of which the Reich annexed North-Western Poland, populated not only by Germans but predominantly by Poles, Alsace and Lorraine and Luxemburg, German-speaking population which had ambiguous attitude to unification with the Reich. Germany managed to unite a significant part of Europe under its authority but several European countries turned to a disparaged status; especially this was applicable for Poland and Czechia which were became directly occupied territories. It was clear that the further policy of the Nazi government was guided not by the interests of German people and the necessity to defend Europe, as they declared, but mainly by the purpose to oppress and plunder European nations. The policy of national-socialists pursued in the occupied territories of USSR was the peak of their aggression and chauvinism.

The defeat of Germany was the result of overwhelming dominance of resources mobilized against Germany in comparison with resources mobilized for Germany's benefit. Germany could have overcome this dominance if it involved the forces who viewed Germany as their ally in their own struggle for interests. For instance, France could have turned to be a valid ally since the public mood was clearly anti-British after the operations of the Royal Navy against the French navy in 1941. Following the intrusion of the German army into the USSR, Germans could have found allies in that segment of the soviet population who viewed Germans as possible ally in their struggle against the Bolshevik regime. However, the policy of the national-socialist regime was of oppressive nature and therefore of limited capability to mobilize allies in Europe; and in the USSR this policy resulted in a general resistance against the German army, not only from the Bolshevik regime but also from most parts of the USSR population.

The Nazi policy of plundering other nations was to a large extent driven by the problem of exigent lack of resources for their military campaigns. It was a constant problem that they faced from the very first years of the war and which had to be solved immediately and by any means. However, this policy was -to a large extent- justified and became possible because of the official legitimization and national-socialistic propaganda on the German superiority. Thus, the national-socialistic ideology doomed Germany to confront with other nations whose unified forces were disproportionate with Germany's resources. Nevertheless, even if the resources of the allied forces and that of Germany were comparable, the national-socialistic ideology was doomed to be defeated in the long-term due to its fundamental amorality.

The national-socialists' policy also discredited all achievements obtained during their reign. As a result, by the end of the war, all German-speaking regions annexed to the Third Reich, including Austria, were detached from Germany, and Germany lost about 13%³ of its pre-war territory. The

³ About 25% (editor's note)

German diasporas that traditionally had big influence in East Europe were deported from several East European countries. The plan of an even greater disintegration of Germany was not realized though Germany was separated into Western and Eastern parts because of disagreement between the Western Allies and the USSR. The German people suffered a massive psychic trauma and total humiliation; Germany henceforth was deprived of the chance to become a military-political center in the nearest future.

The German catastrophe provided opportunity for the realization of another idea of ethnic integration – Pan-Slavism. The unification of Slavic countries of Eastern, Central and South-Eastern Europe under Russian authority had been the purpose of the Russian Pan-Slavists during the 19th and early 20th centuries. This purpose was actually achieved in 1945 when the USSR took its control over the East European countries, including all Slavic countries.

Contrary to the Nazi ideology, ethnicity was not a key factor in the Bolshevik ideology. The main purpose of the USSR was to spread the communist regime and its own supremacy all over Europe, and the Slavic factor played a role in this expansion. For instance, in order to legitimize the territorial expansion in Eastern Europe, pro-Slavic and anti-German rhetoric was used to a certain extent in the political propaganda of the USSR.

The re-division of Europe at the end of the war also showed pro-Slavic traits. About one hundred thousand square kilometers of Germany's pre-war territory populated mainly by Germans was handed over to Poland (most probably as a compensation for Western Ukraine and West Belarus which before the war had belonged to Poland and were annexed by USSR). The German city Königsberg with the contiguous territory was handed over to Russia. About fifteen million Germans were deported from several regions of Eastern Europe, first of all from former German provinces: Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia⁴. Several Adriatic regions belonging to Italia were transferred to Yugoslavia, however, the transfer of South Dobruja from Romania to Bulgaria, which took place under the patronage of Nazi Germany, remained unchanged.

As a result of the above-mentioned boundary revisions, the Slavic countries also attained or expanded their strategic access to the sea. Thus, Poland acquired not only about one hundred thousand square kilometers of German territory but also some 500 kilometers of Baltic seashore, whereas before the war it had practically no access to the sea except for a narrow coastal zone that had separated Germany from East Prussia and became one of the formal reasons of the German-Polish war in 1939. Russia gained the Königsberg/Kaliningrad port at the Baltic Sea. Yugoslavia significantly increased its access to the Adriatic Sea at the expense of Italian territories and acquired the coastal territories that had for a long time been under Italian governance or had considerable Italian influence. Bulgaria increased its Black sea shore with the coastal zone of Southern Dobruja.

However, the Warsaw pact only existed for about 45 years. As a result of the collapse of socialism, the five⁵ Slavic countries united in the Warsaw pact separated into 13 Slavic countries of different political

⁴ The Expulsion of the "German" Communities from Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War. Edited by Steffen Prauser and Afron Rees. European University Institute, Florence, 2004.

cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/2599/HEC04-01.pdf;jsessionid=0B71E78D95F71D41F4E3F0FA709109B4?sequence=1

⁵ four (editor's note)

orientation. The breakup of Yugoslavia was accompanied by an inter-Slavic war. Some of the Slavic countries joined NATO, which was considered to be Russia's contestant.

The main reasons behind the collapse of the Slavic union within the Warsaw system were as follows: the unification processes happened to be realized under a regime which had certain achievements in industrial development, science and education, but discredited itself by aggressive and amoral policy; the unification had not been realized on equal rights, but on the basis of the country's military and political dominance; and that disintegrative elements were also incorporated.

The Warsaw pact had no sufficient foundation to cement the integration of the Slavic countries unified within the system. In this union the USSR -being more backward in social-economic aspect- tried to dominate above more progressed East European nations. Catholic Slavic nations, oriented mostly to Europe did not have popular intention to integrate with orthodox Slavic nations, and their forced unification did not last for long.

In contrast to Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism integration within the European Union became an example of successful integration for all integration initiatives of the world. The European Union has the following features distinguishing it from the cases of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism:

- 1) Integration within the European Union has been realized voluntarily, step-by-step, and based on relatively equal rights.
- 2) Integration within the European Union is not oriented against anybody, and is based primarily on economic and cultural relations.
- 3) The basis of integration is the cultural homology of the European nations.
- 4) The world-wide trend for regionalization and the emergence of new economic and political centers in America and East Asia promoted the establishment of the European Union.
- 5) The well-established democratic values and civil society helped overcoming the political barriers in Europe.

Development of Turkism ideas in the present

By the end of the 20th century, with the growth of ethnic self-consciousness of the Turkic peoples and with the emergence of independent Turkic states, the idea of convergence and cooperation between Turkic peoples gained a new impulse, though according to the above-mentioned reasons it did not become popular. However, based on the following premises, an intensification of the integrative endeavours is indispensable and therefore, a wider spread of the idea amongst the Turkic public is expected:

- 1) Requirement of joint activity on the conservation and development of the cultural and spiritual potential of the Turkic world.
- 2) Demand in consolidation of the Turkic region's potentials in terms of world-wide regionalization.

3) Requirement for centralized vindication of interests of the Turkic world subjects as a consequence of their geopolitical situation; in the center of Eurasia in the intersection of interests of the most powerful global actors.

4) Community of geo-economic interests which particularly proceed from: 1. Most Turkic countries are located inside the continent, therefore have no direct access to the sea; furthermore, they are closed up on each other which results in the necessity to cooperate in order to access the sea or other transport routes 2. Most Turkic countries are located at the centers of existing and potential transport routes of commodities and energy resources. Decreasing the barriers commonly on these routes would encourage the use of trans-Eurasian itineraries for the transport of commodities and energy resources.

So far as the ideas of ethnic integration proceed from national-patriotic sentiments, in which national goals occupy central position, they primordially contain a tendency to grow into chauvinism and extremism. This is comparable with the tendency of an individual to develop egocentrism. That's why level of constructiveness of such ideas directly depends on their ability to overcome the egocentric tendencies and their ability to harmonize the interests of the different groups. Thus, the ethnical integration endeavours should incorporate the ethics of respectful attitude towards the interests of other groups and be issued on grounds of moral priority; e.g. the unity of mankind is prior to ethnic interests.

The impossibility of integrating peoples by chauvinistic and compelling ways is proven throughout history. The "high energy" of a nation that enabled the creation of high culture and civilization in an unobtrusive manner, making it attractive for other nations, has always been the basis of founding an empire. And though the majority of empires in the past have been founded by military means, the "high energy" of an empire, which ensured the moral-psychological cementation of the union through attractiveness, has been the determinant factor for an empires' longevity. However, as cultural degradation occurs, the attractiveness of a union decreases. In parallel, the center applies measures in order to keep the people within the empire. This further reduces the attractiveness of the union and strengthens the centrifugal forces.

The viability of the Turkic empires relied upon a combination of high martial qualities and the general principle of tolerance. Lack of tolerance was a clear sign of decline, which can be observed on the examples of Baburid's Empire and the Ottoman Empire at their late existence.

As a consequence of the widespread settling of the ancient Turkic ethnic groups and the ethnic mixing, we can observe a very varied population in the modern-day Turkic speaking states.

One can often meet extremist opinions with regard to the origins of Turkic peoples; according to one of them, Turkic people originate exclusively from ancient Turkic tribes; the other such belief is that Turkic people descended exclusively from an aboriginal population that changed its language to one of the Turkic dialects. Naturally, the truth is in the middle, and there is genetic evidence that Turkic peoples are the descendants of both ancient Turkic tribes and the aboriginal population of the territories conquered by Turkic tribes.

The consequences of the above situation are twofold. Firstly, we accredit the Turkic people with the cultural heritage that has been created by Turkic people and the pre-Turkic heritage that had formed at

present-day Turkic territory. For instance, Turkish people can consider their own heritage both the Orkhon-Yenisei inscriptions and the antique monuments in Anatolia.

Secondly, it motivates integration endeavours, not on a racial-genetic foundation but grounds of self-consciousness, being itself a test for the ability to overcome racist and isolationistic tendencies. Progressive empires and religions have always been those who allowed anyone to become their member provided they served the common purpose.

Thus, the development of a common Turkic self-consciousness, i.e. the attractiveness of reckoning oneself within the Turkic community, rather than as member of a particular race, is the main factor of strengthening the Turkic world unity.

The formation of a common Turkic self-consciousness directly depends on the popularization of the common Turkic historical heritage.

In contrast, underestimation of the Turkic peoples' potential through historical misinterpretation has a potentially disjunctive effect.

For instance, when talking about the Crimean Tatars, some date the beginnings of Turkic inhabitations in Crimea at the 13th century intrusion of "Tatars" ("Mongol Tatars"), meanwhile it is clear that Turkic ethnic groups had inhabited the area long before the "Tatar" intrusion. Secondly, Crimean Tatar people have absorbed not only Turkic but also non-Turkic elements, inhabiting Crimea in the pre-Turkic as well as the Turkic period. It is obvious that binding the Crimean Tatars with the XIIIth century "Tatars" aim at representing Crimean Tatars as one of the episodic people that inhabited Crimea, and inherently try to diminish the negative perception of the Crimean Tatars' deportation.

Based on certain Turkic names these peoples were given long after their formation as ethnic groups, some Soviet sources attempted to lessen the importance of their culture, for instance by diminishing the period of literacy amongst them. The presentation of the history of certain Turkic peoples separately from the history of all ancient Turks understates significantly the historical potential of the Turkic peoples.

Such restricted vision to historical heritage occurs also by Turkic people's representatives, too. For instance, there are debates amongst Idel Tatar intellectuals regarding whose descendants the Idel Tatars are: do they come from Bulgars or from the Golden Horde Kypchaks. Such questions abridges considerably the historical heritage of Idel Tatars, whereas it is known that Idel Bulgaria had been a state founded by the ancestors of the modern Idel Tatars, which during the period of the Golden Horde transformed into one of the most culturally and economically advanced regions of the empire, along with Khorezm and Crimea, and played a great role in the political life of the empire; i.e. Idel Tatars are the descendants of Bulgars who substantially mixed with the Kypchak during the Golden Horde period, in other words, the Idel Tatars are the descendants of both Bulgars and Kypchaks.

However, glorification of the historical heritage of the Turkic peoples is not sufficient. Many great ancient civilizations later succumbed to mediocrity. We can therefore conclude that even though the historical heritage is an important factor for the people's self-consciousness, it is less important than the people's achievements at the present.

Various theories circulate at present questioning the indigeneity of Turkic peoples at certain territories. Such claims seem superfluous since there are many populations worldwide which inhabit a territory beyond their historical origin, and it has no influence on the legitimacy of their inhabitancy.

During the Cold War the dominance of the United States and the USSR was ensured not only by their military and technological potential but also by propagating their value systems in the world, which - together with the paragon of their achievements- was able to allure masses in various countries and to mobilize allies. The Turkic world has set a goal: if not to form a unique system of values then at least to form and expand a common Turkic spiritual platform from the national potentials. Such spiritual platform can be formed e.g. from singers who sing in several Turkic languages and are popular in several Turkic countries. Other possible examples include the popularization of famous writers such as Chingiz Aytmatov as a common Turkic author; or popularization of persons related to several Turkic people like Maqsud Shayhzoda and Alihantura Saguni; promotion of projects like Turkovision and Turkic award in cinema; promotion of Turkic championships in various sports, promotion of Turkic wrestling worldwide, etc.

The ways of practical realization of Turkism ideas

The level of attractiveness of Turkism directly depends on the practical application of the equality principle; i.e. the principle of inadmissibility of hegemony within the Turkic region, despite natural differences in the influencing capabilities.

Among the Turkic countries Turkey is the most potent and it is simultaneously a country with vast geopolitical significance and well-developed imperial self-consciousness. Turkey has a traditional influence in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus region, and considers these regions as priority directions of its foreign policy. Certain view the development of Turkism ideas as a means to strengthen Turkey's position within the Turkic world, a way to extend the territory of influence and thereby develop hegemony in the whole of Eurasia. However, we should admit that Turkism is generally considered as the consolidation of Turkic countries around Turkey.

Representing the idea of Turkism as an instrument for broadening Turkey's influence in Eurasia is extensively used by opponent parties and it discredits Turkism amongst the very Turkic public.

Turkey, thanks to its potentials, undoubtedly will play a key role in the Turkic world. Turkey has always searched for conservation and strengthening within the Turkic world, and therefore Turkey deserves the gratitude of the whole Turkic world. Next to it, Turkism is most beneficial when it helps the opening of Turkic world subjects towards each other. This tendency is beginning to dominate in accordance with the reinforcement on world arena of the positions of the Turkic states that gained independence in 1991, as well as other Turkic regions. There is clearly an intensification in the integration initiatives of Turkic countries other than Turkey, which is especially noticeable in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. It can be further promoted by propagating and financially supporting projects with common Turkic significance.

The cultural proximity of the integrating countries is the foundation which ensures the facility of the integration and its durability. Despite this cultural proximity, in the course of the last two centuries Turkic peoples were incorporated into different empires often hostile to each other and/or isolated from each other, which consequently led to disjunctive processes and a civilization split between the Turkic peoples.

It is to be noted that after the crash of the colonial system, new alignments between the former colonies and the mother countries emerged; such as the British Commonwealth of Nations, Commonwealth of Independent States, etc.; based on the relationships, common language and common standards that had been formed during the colonial period. For instance, the term "near abroad" is widely used in CIS countries and applied to regions some of which lies thousands kilometres away.

People, who grow up in the same cultural environment, often share common values which we can name psychological "points of contact". For instance, the classic soviet movies are such kind of "points of contact" for millions of people whose youth and childhood coincided with the soviet period. The World War II subject is an integrating factor for people in Russia and in some CIS countries and that's why this subject is actively supported by the Russian government.

The above-mentioned arguments support the primary importance of using psychological and communicative means in the formation of "the near abroad" within the Turkic world.

In this context the main objective of Turkism at present is to create a single cultural and informational space embracing the whole Turkic world, i.e. to extend the civilization community of the Turkic peoples.

It is expedient to concentrate our efforts on the humanitarian integration of the Turkic peoples, rather than on political integration, for the following reasons:

1) The example of parallel ideas makes it evident that politicization of an idea has the potential to strengthen radical tendencies, whereas humanitarian cooperation develops individual contacts and strengthens mutual understanding among people.

2) Since the Turkic population of Eurasia is partly located in countries where Turkic people are in ethnic minority and partly in countries with different political orientations, focusing on the political integration of the whole of the Turkic world would have a destabilizing effect.

3) Meanwhile political integration is usually limited due to tactical considerations of the governments, civilizational integration is unlimited and has a long-term effect. It can be proved on the examples of several political integrations that are declarative and formal whereas we find communities living in solid internal union despite formal disconnectedness.

4) A governmental implementation of the integration process entails contention for dominance and other negative phenomena.

In theory, the regional, economic and political integration of the Turkic peoples can be of either ethnical or non-ethnical character, because Turkic regions are economically and politically related to non-Turkic regions. In this context an isolationistic approach would result in great losses for all interconnected regions.

The civilization-based integration process emphasizes the Turkic community instead of the individual Turkic states and has a positive effect of promoting civil initiatives within the integration process; i.e. increases the role of non-governmental organizations.

As a priority measure in the intensification of the integration process it is recommended that both governmental and non-governmental bodies focus on the following activities:

1) Establishment of cultural-educational satellite TV channels (taking into consideration large-scale broadcasting and accessibility of television) which embrace the whole Turkic world.

Organization of such television channels seems to be the most urgent topic of integrating the Turkic world because the main problem that requires primary solution is a vacuum of information in the Turkic world itself as well as beyond the Turkic world.

As long as organization of such television is a matter of time and efforts, coordinated broadcasting of TV channels in the Turkic states and regions via single satellite at adjacent frequencies can be a preliminary solution to the problem, as well as organization of broadcasting of TV channels of one Turkic state at the territory of another.

Next to it, it is required to promote programs on state TV channels on the Turkic world which is presently inadequately represented.


2) Coordinated and concerted development of the Turkic languages with the aim of their mutual approximation.

The languages of the various Turkic peoples are mutually intelligible which is a specific advantage and also the main foundation of the Turkic peoples' unity. In this regard it is necessary to pursue a concerted policy of coordination of the Turkic language development, in order to vector their development in approximating directions.

3) Joint educational and scientific programs, based on translations of the cultural heritage of one Turkic people to the other Turkic peoples' language, including its popularization and joint cultural activities.

4) Consultations on the unification of norms and standards, on simplification of trade, investment and visa procedures, encouragement of business relations and tourist flows between the different Turkic regions.

5) Moral support of inter-Turkic marriages and media coverage of their most striking examples.



ХАЙДАРОВ, Миразим

Перспективы углубления интеграция тюркского мира

Аннотация: Тюркские народы издревле играли ключевые роли в Центральной Евразии. Высокие военные качества тюрков позволили им завоевать огромные пространства и создать множество империй в Евразии. Тем не менее, тюркские народы не выступали на мировой арене как единое целое. К XIX и XX векам тюркские страны превратились в колонии и полуколонии ведущих держав. С распространением этнического принципа самоидентификации в тюркском мире получила распространение идея интеграции тюркского мира. Идеи этнической интеграции являются конструктивными, при условии преодоления в них шовинистических и экстремистских проявлений. Это видно на примере пангерманизма и панславизма, которые были фактически реализованы в середине XX века. В настоящее время существует ряд предпосылок для распространения идеи углубления интеграции тюркского мира. Одним из условий интеграции является относительное равноправие интегрирующихся сторон. Фундаментом интеграции является цивилизационная близость стран. Это показывает необходимость увеличения степени психологической и коммуникативной близости людей. В этой связи, а также в связи с существующей политической конъюнктурой необходима концентрация усилий на гуманитарной, а не политической интеграции тюркского мира. В статье предлагается ряд первоочередных мер по углублению интеграции тюркского мира.

Ключевые слова: Центральная Евразия, тюркский мир, идеи этнической интеграции, тюркизм, гуманитарная интеграция.

Формирование современного тюркского мира

Современный тюркский мир складывался веками и на картину расселения тюркских народов большое влияние оказали миграционные процессы тюркских народов, которые до 16-века в основном носили характер экспансии; после 16-века ареал расселения или господства тюркских народов значительно сократился.

Если разделить евразийский континент по культурно-климатическим признакам, то можно условно выделить следующие области:

- 1) Европа – плотно заселенная преимущественно христианскими народами влажная западная окраина Евразии;
- 2) Азия – плотно заселенные преимущественно буддистскими и индуистскими народами муссонные влажные восточная, юго-восточная и южная окраины Евразии;

3) Ближний Восток – редко заселенная преимущественно мусульманскими народами аридная юго-западная окраина Евразии со средиземноморским режимом осадков;

4) Центральная Евразия – область, лежащая между Европой и Азией и охватывающая, как часть Европы, так и часть Азии, но отличающаяся от них огромными пространствами, внутриконтинентальным расположением, суровым климатом и, в целом, низкой плотностью населения.

При этом данное деление является во многом условным, и отдельные регионы по разным признакам могут относиться к той или иной области.

Центральная Евразия на протяжении тысячелетий являлась основной областью расселения тюркских народов. Прародиной тюркских народов считается внутренняя Азия, т.е. регион, охватывающий Южную Сибирь и Центральную Азию, откуда они продвигались в основном на западном и юго-западном направлении¹.

Моральные ценности тюркских народов, выработанные, в том числе, под влиянием условий и образа жизни среднего тюрка, явились основой их высоких воинских качеств. Тюркские общества, по сути, представляли собой мобильные и дисциплинированные армии. Благодаря этому, тюрки на протяжении тысячелетий создавали империи, в том числе, охватывающие соседние регионы (Европу, Азию и Ближний Восток). Это позволило тюркам расширить ареал распространения, либо стать правящей верхушкой на территориях от Тихого океана и Бенгальского залива до Центральной Европы и Магриба.

Продвижение тюрков на запад – в Восточную и Центральную Европу осуществлялось волнами, и было масштабным и растянутым по времени. Достаточно сказать, что первые известные волны тюркской экспансии пришлись на период Римской империи. Наиболее известные группы тюрков, последовательно основавших свои империи в Центральной и Восточной Европе – это гунны, авары, болгары, хазары.

Однако наибольшее влияние на формирование современных восточноевропейских тюрков оказали преемники вышеперечисленных народов – печенеги и кыпчаки, особенно последние. Продвижение кыпчаков в Восточную Европу и вытеснение ими печенегов на Балканы пришлось в основном на 11-век. Именно этот период можно считать началом кыпчакского периода в Восточной Европе, который длится до настоящего времени.

В дальнейшем, после присоединения осколков Золотой Орды к Московскому государству, кыпчакские народы в Восточной Европе смогли сохранить лишь оседлые мусульманские ареалы своего обитания в Среднем Поволжье, Крыму и части Северного Кавказа. Кочевые кыпчаки, в значительной части принявшие православие, частью влились в состав московской аристократии; основная же их часть образовала первоначальный костяк военного сословия русского государства – казаков, которые впоследствии (по мере увеличения славянского элемента) стали составной частью русского и украинского народов. Следует отметить исключительную роль казаков в

¹ The Internal Classification & Migrations of Turkic Languages, 2010.

turkic-languages.scienceontheweb.net/migration_and_classification_of_turkic_languages.html

присоединении к России территорий Великой Степи и Сибири; казаки сыграли значительную роль в дальнейшей истории России, включая войны с европейскими державами.

Часть кочевых кыпчаков, исповедовавших ислам, получившая название ногайцев была последовательно вытеснена с поволжских, южноукраинских и северокавказских степей, главным образом в Османскую империю и Центральную Азию.

Хотя продвижение тюрков на юго-запад – Турцию, Иран, Азербайджан и Ирак также происходило волнами, решающим этапом заселения тюрками этого региона стала экспансия Сельджукидов во 2-половине 11-века. Впоследствии через Анатолию тюрки продвинулись и на Балканы.

Тюрки, расселенные на Балканах, также были вытеснены в ходе войн христианских держав с Османской империей и отступления последней.

В XIV-XV веках произошло продвижение якутов с Южной Сибири в бассейн реки Лены и их постепенное расселение вдоль притоков Лены на огромной территории.

Таким образом, сложилась основная картина современного расселения тюркских народов. Основная зона расселения тюрков проходит от бассейна Лены через Южную Сибирь, Центральную Азию, Среднее Поволжье и Урал, Кавказ и Крым до Загроса, Малой Азии и Балкан. Таким образом, тюрки занимают громадную территорию внутри Евразийского континента, которая практически не выходит к океанам, лишь местами имея выход к внутриконтинентальным морям. Это обстоятельство предопределило историческое преобладание сухопутных взаимосвязей и интегрированности евроазиатских народов, значительную часть которых всегда составляли тюркские народы. Свидетельством этому служат многочисленные империи континентального характера, созданные и распавшиеся (и вновь воссозданные) на территории Евразии.

О наличии тесных взаимосвязей и периодического объединения частей тюркского мира в прошлом говорит и степень близости языка и культуры тюркских народов.

Идеи этнической интеграции XIX- и начала XX-веков

В течение большей части средневекового периода Центральная Евразия была фактически разделена между тюркскими и тюрко-монгольскими империями. Например, к концу средневекового периода, в XVI-веке, практически вся мусульманская Евразия, а также Индия, Северная Африка и Юго-Восточная Европа были разделены между державами Османидов, Сафавидов, Бабуридов, а также Шейбанидов, и другими тюркскими государствами. При этом тюркский мир никогда не выступал на мировой арене как единое целое, напротив великие империи, созданные тюркскими народами, сжигали значительную часть своей энергии на борьбу друг с другом.

К XIX- и XX-векам ситуация коренным образом изменилась, и тюркские народы из военной и правящей касты в Евразии превратились в группу народов, ставших колониями и полуколониями великих держав.

На рубеже XIX- и XX-веков под влиянием европейских народов в тюркском мире получает распространение этнический принцип самоопределения. По мере его распространения, а также распространения знаний о тюркской ойкумене, о культурной близости и географической и исторической общности тюркских народов, в XX-веке возникают и развиваются идеи тюркизма, как движения за свободу тюркских народов и за создание собственного центра силы². Таким образом, впервые возникла идея консолидации тюркских народов на основе этнических корней, а не династических, географических и религиозных принципов. Объективная необходимость такой идеи проявилась в том, что ее последователями становились общественные деятели самых различных тюркских народов, независимо друг от друга, считавших тюркизм частью курса на национальное возрождение, свободу, культурное развитие того или иного тюркского народа.

В результате жестоких репрессий со стороны тоталитарных систем в начале и середине XX-века тюркизм терпит полный крах как идея, достойная на существование. Больше всего урона тюркизму было нанесено сталинским режимом, со стороны которого, в том числе, было репрессировано большинство видных пантюркистов.

Наибольший урон, нанесенный тюркизму, заключался в дискредитировании самой идеи сближения тюркских народов и полном информационным табу касательно исторического и интеграционного потенциала тюркских народов.

Свидетельством тяжести нанесенного тюркизму урона является продолжающееся и после краха СССР отсутствие в общественных массах тюркских народов информированности о тюркском мире, как некоем сообществе с огромным потенциалом, а также распространение представления о тюркизме, как некоем деструктивном течении, изобретенном «врагами» или чем-то утопическом, отвлекающем от осуществления реалистических планов.

В истории человечества идеи играли не меньшую, а возможно и большую роль, чем материальные ценности, с точки зрения количества войн и конфликтов, принудительных или добровольных экономических издержек и т.д. При этом идеи невозможно характеризовать черно-белыми категориями, ища только положительные или только отрицательные черты. Степень созидательности либо деструктивности идей находится в зависимости от того, какие черты преимущественно приобретает та или иная идея и, соответственно, в каких формах эта идея реализуется.

Идеи сближения этнически родственных народов являются конструктивными в плане консолидации народов, разрешения между ними конфликтов, укрупнения регионов и т.д. Тем не менее, в таких идеях заложены и изоляционистские тенденции, которые возобладают в случае чрезмерной акцентуации на этничности в ущерб общечеловеческому единству. Если же интересы данной этнической группы будут приниматься намного выше интересов других групп, идея принимает откровенно агрессивный характер.

Так, в 30-е и 40-е годы XX-века, идея немецкого национализма, имея в себе прагматичное устремление к пересмотру дискриминационной для Германии Версальской системы и

² Гилязов И. *Тюркизм: становление и развитие (характеристика основных этапов)*. Казанский Государственный Университет, Казань, 2002. www.ksu.ru/f11/bin_files/gilazov_tyurkizm!8.pdf

объединению немцев Европы в едином государстве, по мере побед Германии все более приобретала черты идеи превосходства немцев и легитимности жертвования интересов других народов в пользу интересов немцев, тем самым эта идея обрекла немецкий народ на поражение.

События Второй мировой войны чаще представляются как противостояние между странами, относящимся к капиталистической, национал-социалистической и большевистской группировкам. Однако следует вспомнить, что в ходе этих событий были фактически реализованы две идеи этнической интеграции: пангерманизм и панславизм.

Объединение немецкоязычных стран Европы в единое государство на протяжении столетий являлось национальным чаянием немцев Европы. По причине нахождения германских территорий между великими державами Европы и наличия противоречий между Пруссией и Австрией по вопросу гегемонии в Германии, Пруссии Бисмарка пришлось вести три войны и сложную дипломатическую игру для объединения Германии. В 1871г. Бисмарку удалось объединить в Германской империи немецкоязычные государства, за исключением Австрии, Люксембурга и Швейцарии. После 1871г. основной целью пангерманистов стало присоединение к рейху Австрии.

Крах Германии в Первой мировой войне не только привел к отпаду от Германии и Австрии ряда немецкоязычных областей, но и поставил Германию в положение ограниченного суверенитета в рамках Версальской системы. Воссоединение Австрии и Германии было сознательно поставлено под запрет.

Восстановление позиций Германии началось с приходом к власти национал-социалистов в 1933г. В течение последующих лет были отменены ограничения Версальской системы в отношении Германии; Австрия, судетская область и Клайпеда были воссоединены с Германией. Хотя эти достижения Германии удавались ей путем шантажа войной, на данном этапе политика национал-социалистов была сфокусирована на восстановлении политического суверенитета Германии и присоединении немецких областей, стремящихся к присоединению к Германии.

Дальнейшая экспансия рейха приобрела характер агрессивной войны против других стран, в ходе которой к рейху были присоединены Северо-Западная Польша, населенная не только немцами, но преимущественно поляками, Эльзас и Лотарингия и Люксембург, немецкоязычное население которых неоднозначно оценивало свое присоединение к рейху. Германии удалось объединить под своей властью Европу, однако страны Европы попали в приниженное положение, особенно это касалось Польши и Чехии, превращенных в генерал-губернаторства. Ясно, что при дальнейшей политике нацистские правители руководствовались не столько интересами германского народа и необходимостью защиты Европы, как они декларировали, сколько желанием поработить и ограбить соседние народы.

Пиком агрессивности и шовинизма национал-социалистов стала их политика на оккупированной территории СССР.

Поражение Германии стало следствием подавляющего превосходства мобилизованных против нее ресурсов по сравнению с ресурсами, мобилизованными в ее пользу. Германия могла бы преломить это превосходство в свою пользу, используя она возможность вовлечения сил,

видящих в Германии своего партнера в борьбе за интересы. Например, Франция могла быть превращена в полноценного союзника после роста там антибританских настроений вследствие операций, предпринятых британцами против французского флота в 1940г. При вторжении в СССР германская армия обрела союзников из части населения СССР, видящих в Германии союзника в борьбе с большевистским режимом. Однако проводимая нацистами политика фактического подавления соседних народов, привела к ограниченной возможности мобилизации союзников в европейских странах; в СССР она привела к противостоянию германской армии не только большевистского аппарата, но и большей части населения СССР.

Политика нацистов была во многом продиктована требующей незамедлительного решения проблемой острой нехватки ресурсов для ведения войны, с которой Германия столкнулась с самых первых лет войны. Однако во многом эта политика была обоснована и стала возможной по причине официальной легитимизации и пропаганды превосходства немцев национал-социалистической идеологией. Таким образом, нацистская идеология обрекала Германию на противостояние с другими народами и консолидации многих стран против Германии, несоизмерное ресурсам Германии. Даже в случае достаточности ресурсов Германии, в долгосрочной перспективе нацистская идеология, по причине своей аморальности, была обречена на проигрыш.

Политика национал-социалистов также дискредитировала все достижения Германии в период правления национал-социалистов. По результатам окончания войны, от Германии были аннексированы все присоединенные к третьему рейху немецкоязычные области, включая Австрию, отторгнута четверть довоенной территории собственно Германии, из стран Восточной Европы депортированы немецкие диаспоры, традиционно имевшие большое влияние в этих странах. Не получили воплощения проекты еще большего дробления Германии; из-за противостояния Запада и СССР Германия была только разделена на Западную и Восточную. Германский народ перенес полную морально-психологическую катастрофу и унижение, Германия была лишена возможности стать военно-политическим центром впредь в ближайшем будущем.

Катастрофа Германии открыла путь для реализации в Европе другой идеи этнической интеграции – панславизма. Объединение славянских стран Восточной, Центральной и Юго-Восточной Европы под главенством России являлось целью российских панславистов на протяжении XIX- и начала XX-веков. Эту цель фактически удалось осуществить в 1945г., когда СССР установил контроль над странами Восточной Европы, в том числе, над всеми славянскими странами.

В отличие от Германии, этнический фактор не являлся ключевым в большевистской идеологии, и главной целью СССР было установление коммунистических режимов (и своего господства) на территории Европы, однако славянский фактор также играл роль при экспансии СССР в Европу. К примеру, в целях легитимизации переноса военных действий в пределы Восточной Европы в глазах собственной армии и оккупированных Германией восточноевропейских народов в военно-политической пропаганде СССР в определенной степени использовалась и прославянская риторика.

Передел Европы в результате окончания войны также имел прославянские тенденции. В пользу Польши было отторгнуто около ста тысяч километров довоенной территории Германии, основным населением которой были этнические немцы (скорее всего в качестве компенсации за отторгнутые в пользу СССР Западную Украину и Западную Белоруссию, до войны принадлежавших Польше). В пользу СССР отторгнут германский город Кёнигсберг с прилегающей областью. Из ряда регионов Восточной Европы, в первую очередь из бывших областей Германии, из Чехословакии, Польши и Югославии, было депортировано около 15 миллионов немцев³. В пользу Югославии было передано несколько областей Италии на Адриатике, при этом передача Южной Добруджи от Румынии к Болгарии, осуществленная под покровительством нацистской Германии, осталась без изменения.

В результате вышеизложенных изменений границ удалось также обеспечить и увеличить стратегический доступ к морю славянских стран. Так, Польша не только получила около 100 тыс. кв. км германской территории, но и балтийское побережье протяженностью около 500 км, тогда как до войны практически не имела выхода к Балтийскому морю, помимо узкой прибрежной полосы, отрезавшей Германию от Восточной Пруссии, ставшей одной из причин германо-польской войны в 1939г. Россия получила в Балтийском море незамерзающий порт Кёнигсберг/Калининград. Югославия значительно расширила свой выход к Адриатике за счет итальянских владений, а также окончательной привязки к Югославии прибрежных территорий, исторически находившейся под итальянским управлением или значительным влиянием итальянцев. Болгария расширила свое черноморское побережье за счет прибрежной зоны Южной Добруджи.

Однако Варшавский пакт просуществовал всего около 45 лет. В результате краха социалистической системы, 5 славянских государств объединенных в едином Варшавском пакте, разделились на 13 славянских государств различной политической ориентации. При этом раздел Югославии сопровождался войной между славянскими народами. Часть славянских государств вошла в состав НАТО, считающегося конкурентом России.

Основными причинами краха объединения славянских стран в рамках Варшавской системы стало то, что объединительные процессы произошли при режиме, имевшем достижения в сфере индустриального развития, науки и образования, но при этом дискредитировавшем себя агрессивной и аморальной политикой, не на равноправных условиях, а на основе военно-политического доминирования одной страны, при этом объединены и элементы, не имеющие интеграционную ориентированность.

Варшавская система не имела достаточного фундамента для цементирования интеграционного объединения славянских стран, входящих в его состав. В данном объединении более отсталый в социально-экономическом аспекте СССР пытался доминировать над более развитыми восточноевропейскими странами. Католические славянские народы, ориентированные на

³ The Expulsion of the "German" Communities from Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War. Edited by Steffen Prauser and Afron Rees. European University Institute, Florence, 2004.

cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/2599/HEC04-01.pdf;jsessionid=0B71E78D95F71D41F4E3F0FA709109B4?sequence=1

Западную Европу, не имели исторического устремления к объединению с православными славянскими народами, и их силовое объединение продлилось недолго.

В отличие от панславизма и пангерманизма объединение в Европейском Союзе стало образцом успешной интеграции для всех интеграционных объединений мира. Отличительными чертами интеграции в Европейском Союзе стали следующие:

- 1) объединение в Европейском Союзе протекало добровольно, поэтапно, и на более или менее равноправной основе.
- 2) объединение в ЕС не было направленным против кого-либо и основывалось, прежде всего, на экономическом и культурном сближении.
- 3) основой ЕС стало цивилизационное единство европейских народов.
- 4) основой интеграции в ЕС послужила ее необходимость в условиях регионализации всего мира и появления экономических и политических центров в Америке и Восточной Азии.
- 5) преодолению политических барьеров интеграции в Евросоюзе послужили развитые демократические ценности и развитое гражданское общество.

Развитие идей тюркизма в современный период

В конце XX-века, с возрастанием национального самосознания тюркских народов и образованием независимых тюркских государств, идея необходимости сближения и развития сотрудничества между тюркскими народами получила новый импульс, хотя по вышеизложенным причинам и не стала массовой. Тем не менее, следующие предпосылки интеграции тюркских народов делают очевидной ее необходимость и вероятным более широкое распространение этой идеи в среде тюркских народов:

- 1) необходимость совместных усилий по сохранению и развитию культурного и духовного потенциала тюркского мира
- 2) необходимость консолидации потенциалов тюркских регионов в условиях регионализации всего мира
- 3) необходимость централизованного отстаивания интересов субъектов тюркского мира, находящегося в центре Евразии на пересечении интересов наиболее мощных глобальных игроков
- 4) общность геоэкономических интересов, которые исходят, в том числе, и из: 1. внутриконтинентального расположения большинства тюркских стран и сопряженной с этим оторванности от моря и замкнутости друг на друге и необходимости совместного выхода к морю и к дополнительным транспортным маршрутам; 2. расположенности в центрах существующих и потенциальных маршрутов движения товаров и энергоресурсов и необходимости снижения барьеров на пути движения товаров, в целях стимулирования их потоков на трансевроазиатских маршрутах.

Поскольку идеи этнической интеграции проистекают из национал-патриотических сантиментов, для которых центральное место занимает достижение национальных целей, в них изначально присутствует тенденция перерастания в шовинизм и экстремизм. Это сравнимо с тем, как здоровое стремление защитить свои интересы у индивидуума способно перерасти в эгоцентризм. Поэтому степень конструктивности таких идей, находится в прямой зависимости от того, насколько они способны преодолевать эти проявления, гармонизируя свои интересы с интересами других групп и другими реалиями. Таким образом, перед этническими идеями стоит задача строгого соблюдения этики, связанной с уважительным отношением к интересам других групп и исходящей из изначального приоритета общечеловеческого единства над этническим.

Невозможность интегрирования народов шовинистическим и силовым путем доказана на примере создания империй и объединений прошлого. Основой создания империй являлась «высокая энергия» того или иного народа, позволяющая создать высокую культуру и цивилизацию, являющейся не навязчивой, а привлекательной для остальных народов. И, хотя большая часть империй прошлого создавалась военным путем, определяющим фактором их существования являлась именно «высокая энергия», которая, своей притягательностью, цементировала это объединение в морально-психологическом плане. Впоследствии, в результате деградации культуры, для народов, образующих империю, снижалась привлекательность объединения, что толкало центр на меры принудительного удержания в составе империи. Это, в свою очередь, еще более снижая притягательность объединения, еще более стимулировала центробежные тенденции.

Жизнеспособность тюркских империй определялась именно сочетанием военных качеств тюркских армий с принципом веротерпимости. Признаком упадка тюркских империй была именно утрата толерантности, это наблюдается на примере позднего периода существования империи Бабуридов, Османской империи и др.

Вследствие широкого расселения древних тюрков, современные тюркские народы сформировались путем слияния с нетюркскими этническими группами, свидетельством чему являются расовые различия между тюркскими народами.

Зачастую можно встретить взгляды, отражающие крайние точки зрения о происхождении тюркских народов: либо, что тот или иной тюркский народ является потомком только древнетюркских племен, либо только древних насельников данной территории, лишь сменивших свои языки на тюркские. Естественно, истина лежит посередине, и генетически тюркские народы являются потомками, как древних тюрков, так и местных народов, живших на территориях, куда проникли тюрки.

Данное обстоятельство, во-первых, является основанием того, что к наследию тюркских народов, проживающих на определенной территории, можно относить как тюркское наследие, сформированное за пределами данной территории, так и наследие дотюркского наследия данной территории. Например, турецкий народ может с полным основанием считать своим наследием, как Орхоно-енисейские рунические письмена, так и памятники античности в Анатолии.

Во-вторых, оно побуждает основывать интеграцию тюркских народов не на расово-генетическом фундаменте, а на факторе самосознания, при этом становясь экзаменом на

преодоление расистских и изоляционистских тенденций. Прогрессивными империями и религиями были те, которые позволяли любому войти в их иерархию и становиться полноправным членом, при условии службы общему делу.

Таким образом, основным фактором укрепления единства тюркского мира является развитие общетюркского самосознания, то есть привлекательность причисления себя к тюркскому сообществу, а не расово-генетические установки.

Формирование общетюркского самосознания напрямую зависит от популяризации общетюркского исторического наследия, тем более что большая часть исторического наследия, включая, культурное наследие, империи, исторические личности отдельных тюркских народов, так или иначе, причастна к нескольким тюркским народам или ко всему тюркскому миру.

Разделительный подход к истории тюркского мира, искаженное оперирование зачастую условными названиями тюркских народов, часто используется для занижения исторического потенциала тюркских народов.

Например, оперируя названием крымских татар, пытаются привязать начало пребывания крымских татар в Крыму с периода вторжения «татар» («монголо-татар») в Крым в XIII-веке. Между тем, ясно, что, во-первых, тюркские этносы проживали на территории Крыма задолго до периода проникновения на Крым «татар» XIII-века, во-вторых, крымскотатарский народ вобрал в себя не только тюркские, но и иные элементы, как жившие до тюрков, так и жившие в одно время с тюрками на территории Крыма. Очевидно, что, привязывание крымских татар к «татарам» XIII-века имеет целью представить крымскотатарский народ лишь как один из эпизодических народов живших в Крыму, и в основе этой цели лежит стремление создать более терпимое отношение к факту депортации крымских татар.

Опираясь на названия ряда тюркских народов, закрепившихся за ними много позднее их формирования, в некоторых советских источниках имелась тенденция сокращать период существования у этих народов отдельных элементов культуры, например, письменности. Вкупе с представлением истории конкретных тюркских народов отдельно от истории древних тюрков, все это значительно обедняет исторический потенциал тюркских народов.

Узкий подход к восприятию исторического наследия того или иного тюркского народа имеет место быть примененным и самими представителями тюркских народов. Например, среди некоторых татарских интеллектуалов распространены споры о том, чьими наследниками являются поволжские татары – болгар или золотоордынских кыпчаков. Данная постановка вопроса значительно сужает историческое наследие поволжских татар, по той причине, что Волжская Болгария была государством, созданным предками современных поволжских татар, которая в эпоху Золотой Орды всего лишь трансформировалась в одну из наиболее культурных областей империи наряду с Хорезмом и Крымом, игравшей важную роль в политической жизни империи, то есть поволжские татары являются потомками болгар, активно смешавшихся с кыпчаками в эпоху Золотой Орды, другими словами потомками как болгар, так и кыпчаков.

С другой стороны возвеличивание исторического потенциала тюркских народов как самоцель, приводит к появлению различных теорий касательно принадлежности каких-либо древних

народов к тюркам или иных достижений. На примере некоторых древних цивилизаций, которые в настоящее время являются не самыми развитыми странами мира, можно утверждать, что хоть исторический потенциал является важным звеном самосознания народа, гораздо важнее его состояние и достижения в настоящем.

Также неактуальными кажутся различные создаваемые в настоящее время теории об исконном проживании тюрков на тех или иных территориях (как реакция на притязания соседних народов), ввиду того, что за пределами территории исторического происхождения проживает значительная часть народов мира, что никоим образом не влияет на легитимность их проживания на новых территориях.

В эпоху холодной войны могущество США и СССР определялось не только их военно-технологическим потенциалом, но и тем, что у каждой из этих держав имелась своя система ценностей, предлагаемая миру, которая наряду с образцом достижений этих держав была способна увлечь за собой народные массы в различных странах и мобилизовать союзников. Перед тюркским миром стоит задача если не создать уникальную систему ценностей, то хотя бы формировать и расширять общетюркскую духовную платформу, складывающуюся из национальных потенциалов. Такой духовной платформой могут быть певцы, поющие на нескольких тюркских языках и популярные в ряде тюркских регионов, популяризация личностей одного из тюркских народов в качестве общетюркских, например Чингиза Айтматова, личностей, причастных к нескольким тюркским народам, таких как Максуд Шайхзода, Алихантура Сагуни и др., продвижение проектов вроде тюрковедения, тюркской премии в кино, тюркских чемпионатов по видам спорта и т.д., продвижение в мире тюркской борьбы и т.п.

Пути практической реализации идей тюркизма

Степень привлекательности тюркизма напрямую зависит от практического применения принципа равноправия, т.е. недопустимости гегемонии какой-либо страны, несмотря на естественную разницу во влиянии на этот процесс различных потенциалов отдельных тюркских народов и стран.

Тюркская страна с наибольшим потенциалом – Турция, одновременно является страной с большой геополитической значимостью и развитым имперским сознанием. Турция имеет традиционное влияние на Балканах, Ближнем Востоке и Кавказе и рассматривает эти регионы в качестве приоритетных направлений внешнеполитической активности. С развитием идей тюркизма в отдельных кругах Турции имеет место рассматривать тюркский мир как потенциальную сферу влияния Турции, наряду с вышеизложенными регионами, т.е. тюркизм для этих кругов является лишь средством укрепления позиций Турции в тюркском мире или, другими словами, в Евразии за счет тюркского мира. С другой стороны и за пределами Турции имеется представление о тюркизме как о группировании тюркских стран вокруг Турции.

Представление о тюркизме, как орудии распространения Турцией своего влияния в Евразии, было широко использовано в период гонений на тюркизм, и продолжает использоваться в этих

целях, поскольку оно максимально дискредитирует тюркизм, и главное – в среде самих тюркских народов.

Турция, благодаря своему потенциалу, вне всяких сомнений будет играть ключевую роль в тюркском мире. Потенциал Турции всегда объективно работал на сохранение и укрепление остальной части тюркского мира, в связи с чем, Турция заслуживает благодарность всего тюркского мира. При этом целесообразно формирование тюркизма не как укрепление влияния субъекта Турции на объект тюркский мир, а как движение субъектов тюркского мира навстречу друг другу. Данная тенденция начинает возобладать с укреплением на мировой арене позиций тюркских стран, приобретших независимость в 1991г. и других тюркских регионов, а также интенсификацией их роли в тюркской интеграции, что особенно заметно на примере Азербайджана и Казахстана. В целях поддержки данной тенденции необходима политика географического и финансового рассредоточения по всему тюркскому миру проектов, имеющих общетюркское значение.

Фундаментом, обеспечивающим возможность интегрирования стран и устойчивость данного объединения, является цивилизационная близость интегрирующихся стран. Несмотря на историческую культурную близость тюркских народов, в течение последних двух столетий они входили в состав различных, часто враждебных или изолированных друг от друга империй, внутри которых также проводилась политика разобщения тюркских народов, что явилось причиной цивилизационного раскола между тюркскими народами.

Уместно вспомнить, что после развала мировой колониальной системы сложились новые группировки стран бывших колоний связанных с метрополией, таких как Британское Содружество, Содружество Независимых Государств, что во многом определялось сложившейся в колониальный период системой взаимосвязей, общеупотребительным языком, стандартами. В настоящее время в СНГ, например, широко употребляется понятие «ближнее зарубежье» в которое включаются регионы, отстоящие на тысячи километров, и не включаются соседние страны и регионы.

Люди, выросшие в единой культурной среде имеют определенные общие ценности, своего рода психологические «точки соприкосновения». Например, для миллионов людей, выросших в советский период, такими «точками соприкосновения» до сих пор являются фильмы из разряда советской классики. В России и частично в странах СНГ фактором объединения людей является тема Второй мировой войны, в связи с чем, эта тема активно поддерживается правительством России.

Это доказывает первостепенную важность именно фактора психологической и коммуникативной близости и необходимости работы по формированию «ближнего зарубежья» в тюркском мире.

В этой связи, основная цель тюркизма в настоящее время заключается в создании единого культурного и информационного пространства, охватывающего весь тюркский мир, т.е. углублении цивилизационной общности тюркских народов.

Целесообразна концентрация усилий именно на гуманитарной, а не политической интеграции тюркских народов, что обусловлено следующими обстоятельствами:

1) На примере других идей видно, что политизация идеи является фактором развития в ней радикальных тенденций, в то время как гуманитарное сотрудничество, развивая человеческие контакты, укрепляет взаимопонимание между народами.

2) Учитывая специфику тюркского мира, которая состоит в том, что тюркское население Евразии проживает как в странах, где оно составляет этническое меньшинство, так и в странах, имеющих различную политическую ориентацию, смещение акцента на политическую интеграцию всего тюркского мира станет фактором дестабилизации в международной политике.

3) Политическая интеграция в любом случае ограничена определенными тактическими интересами правительств, в то время как цивилизационное единство имеет долгосрочный и фундаментальный характер. Свидетельством этому служат многочисленные интеграционные объединения, имеющие декларативный и формальный характер, и наоборот общности, имеющие прочное внутреннее единство, несмотря на формальную разобщенность.

4) Осуществление интеграции правительственными структурами сопряжено с конкуренцией за доминирование и другими противоречиями, которые в условиях неразвитости гражданского общества в тюркском мире, могут принять характер непреодолимых.

Региональная экономико-политическая интеграция тюркских народов может иметь как этнический, так и не принципиально этнический характер, поскольку тюркские регионы связаны экономическими и политическими узами с нетюркскими регионами, в связи с чем, изоляционистский подход привел бы к потерям для всех взаимосвязанных регионов. При этом, условием региональной интеграции является стремление к интегрированию всех тюркских народов в едином пространстве, а главное – обеспечение достойного представления интересов тюркских народов в данном объединении, в том числе и путем консолидированного отстаивания интересов тюркских народов.

Цивилизационный характер интеграции является основанием выбора в качестве объекта интегрирования тюркского сообщества, а не тюркских государств и интенсификации в процессе интеграции гражданской инициативы, т.е. возрастающей роли общественных организаций.

В качестве первоочередных мер по углублению интеграции тюркского мира рекомендуется сосредоточить усилия общественных и правительственных структур на следующих направлениях деятельности:

1) Создание культурно-просветительских спутниковых телевизионных каналов (учитывая массовость и максимальную доступность телевидения), охватывающих весь тюркский мир и по географии вещания и по информационной составляющей.

Организация такого телевидения видится наиболее актуальной в настоящее время задачей по интегрированию тюркского мира, поскольку проблемой, требующей первоочередного решения, является информационный вакуум о тюркском мире в самом тюркском мире, а также за его пределами.

Поскольку организация подобного телевидения является делом, требующим значительного времени и усилий, в качестве предварительного решения проблемы может служить согласованное вещание телеканалов тюркских государств и автономий через единый согласованный спутник на смежных частотах, а также организация вещания телеканалов одних тюркских государств на территории других.

В рамках данного курса необходимо стимулирование на телевизионных каналах тюркских государств в настоящее время очень незначительно представленной тематики тюркского мира.

2) Координация развития тюркских языков и политика по их сближению.

Взаимопонимаемость языков тюркских народов является их отличительной чертой и преимуществом по сравнению с языками других групп родственных народов, и одним из фундаментов единства тюркского мира. В этой связи необходима целенаправленная согласованная политика по координации развития тюркских языков, в целях придания направления их развития не по разноориентированным, а по сближающимся векторам.

3) Совместные образовательные и научные программы, перевод достояния одного тюркского народа на другие тюркские языки и их популяризация, совместные культурные проекты.

4) Консультации по унификации норм и стандартов, по упрощению торговых, инвестиционных и визовых процедур, стимулирование деловых связей и туристических потоков между тюркскими регионами.

5) Моральная поддержка межтюркских браков в виде номинального материального поощрения лиц, вступающих в такие браки и освещения наиболее ярких их примеров.



MISHRA, Manoj Kumar

**The Soviet Interests and Role in Afghanistan
— Intervention and Withdrawal —**

The paper examines the role and interest of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In order to understand the Soviet role after its intervention in Afghanistan, an attempt has been made to explain whether its role was driven by ideology or geopolitics and secondly, to analyse whether the Soviet role was defensive, primarily motivated as a reaction to the US and Pakistan's role in strengthening insurgency against the communist government in Afghanistan or it was offensive in nature. The paper also deals with the Soviet diplomacy to strengthen its role in Afghanistan and its failure to turn Afghanistan into its satellite and finally finds that though the Soviet Union entered into the stage of negotiation from a position of weakness, it did not want to leave Afghanistan without its interests being safeguarded.

Key words: Intervention, Geopolitics, Ideology, Development, Balance of Power, Asymmetric Warfare

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Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan — 1979

Afghanistan was considered geopolitically important by the Czarist Russia and later the former Soviet Union because historically it was considered the soft underbelly of the country. The British Empire and later the United States too got involved in Afghanistan for the same reason and manipulated Afghan politics to limit Soviet penetration further south. The US allowed the Soviet Union to play a more dominant role in the socio-economic development of Afghanistan without compromising its sovereignty. Failure of Hilmand project — the major American development project in Afghanistan, American rejection of the Afghan request for military aid and American preference to Pakistan over Afghanistan in its regional security alliance structure moved Afghanistan closer to the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, Daoud's espousal of Pashtunistan issue and the Soviet Union's support for it, Pakistan's trade blockade as a response to it and the Soviet Union's help in this regard further tightened the relationship between the two countries. During Daoud's premiership in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union penetrated into the Afghan society with its bureaucrats and advisors. When Zahir Shah came to power, the US tried to maintain the balance of power in Afghanistan by influencing him to bring liberal reforms. The US also increased its aid and had CIA agents working for it in Afghanistan. However, Daoud came to power in Afghanistan for the second time with Soviet help and courted the Soviets for economic and military aid. During this time the Soviets had effective presence in Afghanistan through their bureaucrats and

advisors. The balance of power in Afghanistan moved decisively in the Soviet Union's favour. Internationally, the attack on the American Embassy in Pakistan, fall of the Shah of Iran, loss of American will after the Vietnam War, and increased Soviet military capabilities in the 1970s moved the balance of power in the Soviet Union's favour. This in turn created favourable conditions for its southward march which influenced Soviet foreign policy and its decision to militarily intervene in Afghanistan. (For details on balance of power politics and ideology of development in Afghanistan see Lawrence Ziring, 1982, David Gibbs, 1987, Hafizullah Emadi, 1991, William H. Overholt, 1980, Maya Chadda, 1981.)

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was more of a military move than a decision to save the socialist revolution in a neighbouring third world country. According to Lawrence Ziring, the decision to militarily intervene in Afghanistan was a difficult one for the Politburo, and that it was only under pressure from the Army's high command that the order to advance across the Oxus was finally given (Lawrence Ziring, 1982: 137). The Soviet leadership did not consider Afghanistan to be a Socialist state, nor had Afghanistan truly undergone a Marxist revolution. In fact, the Soviet leadership perceived more threat from the Afghan leadership and their socialist policies than from the resistance groups. A Soviet official said "If there is one country in the developing world where we would like not to try scientific socialism at this point of time, it is Afghanistan" (David Gibbs, 1987: 373). A Soviet diplomat opined that, under PDPA, "The newspapers are terrible, and the cultural life is barren". A US Embassy report noted that "there are indications that the Soviets regret their close association with the Taraki regime" (Gibbs, 1987: 373). The Soviet Union developed strong dislike for Amin who promoted purges and radical policies. In a July 1979 speech, Amin stated publicly that the regime would not share power with classes that had been overthrown during the Saur Revolution. This speech was believed to be an affront towards the Soviets.

According to Fred Halliday, the comparison of Afghan intervention with those in Hungary or Czechoslovakia is quite inapposite. In the latter interventions there was no substantial counter-revolution sustained from abroad, and the sustained regimes, headed by Imre Nagy and Alexander Dubček respectively, were, on the available evidence, rather popular ones. In Afghanistan, by contrast, it was precisely the scale of this counter-revolution which had brought matters to a head, and Amin was an extremely unpopular President whose very position relied on day-to-day Russian support (Fred Halliday, 1980: 41). Halliday argues that intervention to be morally defensible has to satisfy two criteria: 1. that such interventions either commands a genuine basis of popular support in the country concerned or have a reasonable chance of subsequently winning that support; and 2. that the international consequences, in terms of provoking imperialist retaliation, are not such as to outweigh the probable advantages (Halliday, 1980: 41).

After the intervention, the Soviet Union justified its act with reference to the 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and declared that the Soviet troops had been invited in to defend the revolution. This was a highly contentious reading of events. Although Taraki, as leader, had requested military aid at various times since 1978, the fact that Amin, the internationally recognised leader of Afghanistan and the only person with the constitutional right to ask for military assistance, had been killed by the invading Soviet troops, undermined Moscow's case.

External interference in a country which was committed to a policy of Neutrality and Mutual Non-aggression with the Soviet Union signed on June 24, 1931 extended in December 1955 and pursued a policy of Non-Alignment proved the fact that it was not merely the ideology that governed the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was unlike that of Czechoslovakia and Hungary who were part of the Soviet Socialist system. Although the friendship treaty of 1978 between the USSR and Afghanistan provided the possibility of armed resistance, such intervention was to be voluntary not obligatory. Afghanistan was neither a member of Warsaw Pact nor of Comecon, though enjoyed observer status with the latter group. Thus, there was no governmental obligation for the USSR to protect communist government in Afghanistan.

Moscow's military intervention in Afghanistan cannot be explained solely or even primarily as a defensive reaction to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism either. The assumption is based on a facile comparison with the Khomeini revolution in Iran, but there are important differences between the two cases. It was relatively easy for Khomeini to blend nationalist and religious symbolism in Iran, where followers of the Shia branch of Islam are concentrated and Shi'ite religious identity has become fused historically with Iranian national identity. This fusion of nationalism and religion was complicated in Afghanistan by the fact that most of the Peshawar-based resistance groups espouse the militant, fundamentalist variety of pan-Islamism identified with the Muslim brotherhood. (Selig S. Harrison, 1980-81: 178). Operating throughout the Islamic world, the brotherhood denies the importance of separate Afghan nationalism. Just after the Soviet intervention, Afghan fundamentalist leaders were isolated from the mainstream of Afghan political life.

The Soviet Union also maintained that its action in Afghanistan was in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides for the states' inherent right to collective or individual self-defence for repelling aggression and restoring peace. A leading Soviet commentator asserted that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan was only "a reply action" to the thrust into Afghanistan undertaken by the US with the help of China and Pakistan's authorities. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Soviet invasion was largely provoked by the covert support that the US had begun providing to anti-government groups in Afghanistan months prior to the Soviet invasion. This assistance was provided despite the calculation that it would induce a Soviet military response. The US hoped to embroil the Soviet Union in a bloody conflict comparable to the American experience in Vietnam. This would slowly bleed the Soviet Union and prevent it from politically or militarily penetrating further south towards the Middle East. They wanted to use this space to build up a deterrent military capability in the Persian Gulf (Shibil Siddiqe, 2008: 22).

However, the Soviet Union's action in Afghanistan cannot be defined solely in defensive terms considering the growing nexus between Pakistan, China and the US in mounting insurgency against the Afghan government before the Soviet invasion. The American attention in 1979 was on the internal problems that Pakistan was facing rather than launching offensive actions against the Afghan government. The flow of refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan gained considerable momentum by the end of 1978. In early 1979, there was a possibility of a 'Bangladesh-type operation' being seriously considered in the corridors of power in Islamabad. Around this time the ruling military junta was also getting ready to hang Bhutto and the Carter administration was tightening the screws on the junta on the twin issues of human rights and the nuclear programme. The US policy around that time was clearly

aimed at disciplining Pakistan rather than encouraging it to launch an adventure in Afghanistan. Pakistan's announcement for purchasing a reprocessing plant from France in 1976 also soured its relationship with the US (Zalmay Khalizad, 1979-80: 13). Furthermore, until the tragic assassination of Ambassador Donald Dubs on February 14, 1979, the US was quite content to carry on business with the new government in Afghanistan. There was a regular exchange of contacts between the Afghan foreign office and the American diplomats, both in Kabul and elsewhere.

However, in contrast to the contention of some of the pro-American scholars that the US policy towards Afghanistan had consistently been one of neglect, the US had been constantly active in Afghanistan throughout the Cold War days (Khalizad, 1979-80: 11). In fact, during PDPA's regime in Afghanistan, the Department of State instructed its embassy in Kabul that "the DRA has not asked us to pack our bags and leave but on the contrary has accepted the policy of maintaining our interest and presence. Closing out our efforts in Afghanistan would likely to be seen as an abdication of responsibility and would accomplish for the Soviets one of their objectives, namely to reduce further the US and Western influence in Afghanistan and the region" (Hafizullah Emadi, 1991:181). The US began supporting and recognising Islamic fundamentalists who were in exile in Pakistan and providing them with financial and military assistance to fight the "democratic" regime in Kabul. The Pakistan based Islamic parties, however, carried out a repressive policy against nationalist, revolutionary, and patriotic individuals throughout the country under the pretext of fighting communism, which in turn isolated them from the people. Washington believed that the policies of the Pakistan-based Islamic parties do not serve the interests of the US in the region. It diversified its support to veteran bureaucrats, King Zahir, former premier Mohammad Yusuf along with feudal landowners and top businessmen and other pro-Western technocrats in the hope that these forces would be able to provide a leadership to the uprising in Afghanistan. (Harrison, 1980-81:177-178)

Therefore, it can be argued that neither the role of the US nor that of the Islamic forces posed an imminent threat to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the US was trying to invigorate its role in Afghanistan but due to Pakistan's internal problems and oppressive measures adopted by the Pakistan based Islamic parties it could not strengthen the insurgency against the ruling leftist party. Moreover, the Islamic fundamentalists failed to reconcile themselves with the Afghan national identity. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, flouted ideological and moral principles to give effect to its geopolitical interests in Southwest Asia. The Soviet Union tried to take advantage of the power vacuum in the region after the Shah was removed in Iran in an Islamic revolution and during this time Pakistan was undergoing internal problems and the US Embassy was attacked. Indira Gandhi's rising to power in India also came as an opportunity for the USSR to strengthen its role in the region.

Soviet Diplomacy after the Intervention in Afghanistan

The intervention in Afghanistan isolated the Soviet Union internationally. The purpose of fundamentalist groups and that of the supporters of the Afghan national identity got fused temporarily to get rid of a foreign power. The Third World retreated from what had become an increasingly anti-American position, and the Muslim world found that once again it had to confront two superpowers rather than concentrating its attentions on one. While Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Islamic nations

suspected that the Carter administration would give Israel permanent jurisdiction over the Muslim holy places and deprive Palestinians of a future homeland, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan spelt more danger for these nations. Egypt offered military bases and entered into joint military exercises with the US. Saudi Arabia denounced the invasion and became the first nation to commit itself to a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. Iraq, which was considered a Soviet ally prior to the intervention condemned the Soviet act and linked it with Soviet activities in other regions, such as its incursion into North Yemen. A Conference of Islamic nations convened in Rawalpindi in January 1980, issued a joint denunciation of the Soviet invasion. Ironically, the same conference issued a milder denunciation of US support for Israel which happened for the first time. The invasion also led to the institutionalisation of Sino-American military cooperation. In the US, the priorities of the domestic political debate were shifted away from economic problems towards foreign security issues. The focus of the defence budget debate was altered in favour of conventional armaments and logistical programmes at the cost of strategic nuclear weapons (William H. Overholt, 1980:205-217). An American nation deeply divided since Vietnam and Watergate responded with remarkable unity to what was seen as a major foreign policy challenge. In Iran, the Islamic revolutionaries maintained distance from the US and the Soviet Union. Just after Soviet intervention, Iran provided assistance to various Shiite groups in Afghanistan to thwart the possibility of a pro-Soviet regime there.

To tide over the emerging situations in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union adopted a three pronged strategy. Militarily, the USSR followed the policy of defeating the important Mujahideen units, protecting Soviet lines of supply, particularly the Panjsher Valley and acquiring full control over the cities and lines of communication. Politically, it tried to install a suitable candidate at the helm of affairs and broaden the base of PDPA so that it could become more popular. In fact, the Soviet Union instituted Barbrak Karmal, its preferred man, as the head of the Afghan government and instructed him to broaden his base. Diplomatically, the Soviet Union worked for the recognition of the Karmal regime, and at the same time, held out the prospect of negotiated settlement of the Afghan issue. It encouraged the UN to continue talks towards a settlement of the Afghan crisis until 1984.

As part of its diplomacy, the Soviet Union tried to woo Iran and Pakistan so as they would not take a hardline anti-Soviet stance against its intervention in Afghanistan. After the Islamic Revolution, Iran anticipated UN sanctions against it on the issue of hostage crisis and blockade of all of Iran's ports in the Persian Gulf. However, the erstwhile Soviet ambassador assured that Iran could use the Soviet Union as a transit route to Europe. Later, while the Soviet forces occupied most of the important regions in Afghanistan, it did not dominate the Hazarjat region in central Afghanistan, the stronghold of the Shia community (Mohsen Milani, 2006: 238). The Soviet Union did not want to antagonise Iran which had already turned anti-American.

Towards Pakistan, the Soviet Union adopted a carrot and stick policy. Sometimes it offered economic and technical assistance and other times threatened its independence. Gromyko, the then Foreign Minister of the USSR, had warned Pakistan that "it will lose its independence if it continues its present policy of supporting Afghan Mujahiddin in Afghanistan" (Zahid Ali Khan and Shabir Ahmad, 2010).

The Soviet Union to win away non-aligned India to its side raised the spectre of Chinese and US aggression in the region. The Pravda argued that India's fears of US and Chinese attempts to "encircle India" were justified. After the intervention, Moscow immediately sent its Foreign Minister Andrei

Gromyko to New Delhi to underline the significance of continued close relations between India and the Soviet Union. Gromyko tried to justify the Soviet act in Afghanistan as a defensive action to preempt interference and aggressive designs of the US, Pakistan and China. India's External Affairs Ministry's spokesman, J. N Dixit, though avoided anti-American language, said "many things are happening in the world which impinge on the situation in Afghanistan" (Robert C. Horn, 1983:248). India's friendly ties with the Soviet Union and conflicting relationship with China and Pakistan deterred India from taking an anti-Soviet stance while world opinion was slowly getting united in terms of denouncing the Soviet role in Afghanistan.

Domestically, the Soviet Union was engaged in false propaganda. A new security service known as Kedmat-e-Elela'at-e-Dawlati (KHAD) was formed in January 1980 to handle rebels. It was organised and trained by the Soviet intelligence agency KGB. While interrogating, KHAD tortured men, women and even children under the direction and presence of Soviet advisers. However, KHAD was immensely successful in gathering intelligence and in contributing to consolidation of power by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union tried to make Afghanistan look like itself in terms of institutions and ideology. The constitution and organisation of PDPA began to look like those of CPSU. The political terminologies used were Soviet terms. Russian was taught in schools. Textbooks printed in the USSR were brought to Afghanistan and distributed in schools. The Afghan history was rewritten. A former student from Ghazni said "we used to have books dealing with Islam and its philosophy. Now they have changed all these books about Lenin and Marxist thought...religious science has been repressed" (Edward Girardet, 1985:145).

When all these measures seemed to fail to consolidate the role of PDPA and the Soviet Union, Babrak Karmal was asked to broaden popular support to his regime by forming the National Fatherland Front (NFF), which included religious, tribal, ethnic and political leaders. The NFF came into existence on 15 June 1981. More than 900 representatives from different classes and sections participated in the founding Congress of the NFF. As per the Constitution, the purpose of the NFF was to attract vast masses of people to participate actively and consciously in constructing a democratic and progressive Afghanistan and in observing respect for the sacred religion of Islam. However, KHAD, a security and intelligence agency was allowed to play a significant role in the functioning of NFF. It followed a divide and rule policy to deal with different groups through the departments of the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs resulting in the loss of people's trust in NFF.

Soviet Failure to Turn Afghanistan into a Soviet Satellite

All the measures that the Soviet Union adopted in Afghanistan failed because of multiple reasons.

First, Afghanistan had historically prioritised nationalism above any other ideology. It was the Afghan nationalism that protected Afghanistan from the incursions of British and Russian Empire. The control and influence of PDPA was limited to Kabul while people in the rest of Afghanistan remained with their tribal and local identities. But such local identities usually got transformed into national identity at the time of threat to the country. According to Robert M. Cassidy, the Soviet invasion fused Islamic ideology with the cause of national liberation. After the invasion, thousands of officers and soldiers of the Afghan Army defected to the Mujahideen, and the insurgents seized hundreds of

government outposts, most of which had been abdicated by defecting soldiers. For example, Massoud gained control of the entire Panjshir Valley during the spring of 1980, whereas before the invasion his forces had been confined to a much smaller part of the upper valley (Robert M. Cassidy, 2003: 27).

Secondly, balance of power was always maintained in Afghanistan by the great powers either directly or through their proxies. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan disturbed such balance of power and therefore met with quick reprisal. Though international conditions prior to the invasion changed the balance in the Soviet Union's favour, the US quickly responded to the situation by increasing arms and aid to its allies. Moscow might have thought that Washington's half-hearted response to the Russian role in Hungary and Chechoslovakia might be repeated in the case of Afghanistan. Minton F. Goldman argues that the Soviet Union felt free to invade Afghanistan in December 1979 because it expected no serious resistance-beyond words and symbols of disapproval from the United States or any other concerned nation. (Milton. F Goldman, 1984:384-403). The fact that was overlooked was that Afghanistan was geopolitically more important for the US in terms of its containment strategy.

Thirdly, intervention in a neutral and non-aligned Third World Muslim country led to international opprobrium against the Soviet role. Despite Soviet propaganda, something close to a universal consensus quickly developed on the injustice of the Soviet Union. Even the leaders sympathetic to the Soviet Union such as Indira Gandhi of India, Assad of Syria, Gaddafi of Libya called upon the Soviets to withdraw their forces. The Muslim states of the Middle East were angered as the invasion increased the region's fragility and disunity. (Maya Chadda, 1981: 514). The world public opinion largely turned against the Soviet Union in the case of Afghanistan unlike on the issues of Soviet role in Chechoslovakia and Hungary.

Fourthly, the USSR became a victim to the asymmetric warfare that the hills and difficult terrains of Afghanistan facilitated. While for the Soviet Union the Afghan War was a limited war, for the resistance forces it was a total war. For the latter it was a war for the survival and the future of the country. The Afghan guerrillas proved Kissinger's maxim- "the guerrilla wins if does not lose; the conventional army loses if it does not win" (Cassidy, 2003: 15). The Afghani resistance forces effectively countered the Soviet strategy of annihilation by conducting a protracted war of attrition. The Afghan guerrillas did not require much time and creativity to anticipate the predictable offensives from the Soviet forces. They would simply leave the area under aerial and artillery bombardment and come back after the Soviet forces had returned to their bases. On the other hand, before and after each one of these offensives, the Afghan fighters knew the avenues of approach and return, and were able to ambush the weary Soviet columns.

Fifthly, using force indiscriminately without having a proper counterinsurgency campaign undermined the Soviet efforts in Afghanistan by alienating the population. The indiscriminate form of rural counter-offensive and the mass repression in the towns were not only morally reprehensible, but they also seemed to have fuelled the flames of counter-revolution and enabled the opponents of the PDPA to mobilise wider support. The Soviet policy of destroying agriculture and depopulating the countryside further alienated the rural masses. However, technologically, use of helicopters by the Soviet forces helped them cover vast areas and tackle the decentralised nature of operations in Afghanistan. It was after Gorbachev's assumption of power in March 1985 that the Soviet forces in Afghanistan better employed their technological advantage to improve their performance. They made particularly effective

use of the MI-24 and MI-25 Hind helicopters and of the insertion of Special Forces units behind enemy lines (Cassidy, 2003: 20-21). While on the one hand the process of negotiation was going on among the major powers involved in the Afghan war particularly after Gorbachev assumed power in the USSR, the volume and dangerousness of the war increased at the same time on the other hand. To turn the tide of the war militarily, Gorbachev named General Mikhail Zaitsev, one of the most illustrious generals, to oversee the Soviet war efforts (Rafael Reuveny, Aseem Prakash, 1999:697). In April 1986 the Americans decided to provide the Mujahideen with Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and this marked a turning point in the war. The Afghan fighters were then able to undermine a key Soviet technological advantage – the mobility and firepower of helicopters.

Sixthly, one of the mistakes that the Soviet Union committed in the conduct the Afghan War was to employ the ethnic forces of same origin from the Central Asian states as that of the Afghan guerrillas. As a result, they started helping the guerrilla forces when they realised that the only people they were fighting in Afghanistan were Afghans. The Afghan war accentuated ethnic unrest within the Soviet army and went a long way in discrediting it. Even in the early 1980s, the reliability of Central Asian soldiers was questioned and they were often removed from active combat duties in Afghanistan. When they served combat duties, the generals perceived them as being soft on Afghan civilians. For example, on September 12, 1985, following the execution of an Afghan civilian, there was an ethnic mutiny in the Dast-I Abdan base near the city of Kunduz in the northern part of Afghanistan. The Central Asian troops fired at the Russians and ‘some 450 people from both sides...and 500 military vehicles were entirely destroyed’ (Rafael, Aseem, 1999:697).

These are some of the very important reasons behind the weakness of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan which led subsequently to Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Ideology, culture (including ethnicity and religion) and technology played a very important role in determining success in the Afghan war. The first two are important in recruiting material support and legitimacy. However, the primary motive behind the major powers’ role in Afghanistan is geopolitical. While the Soviet Union’s decision to intervene in Afghanistan was moved by its geopolitical interest to take advantage of the power vacuum in the Southwest Asian region, ideological discrepancy with the PDPA, lack of true communist revolution in Afghanistan, neutral and non-aligned character of Afghanistan, intervention in an Islamic country in a region where Islamism was gaining strength after the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet decision to recruit the people of the same origin from Central Asian republics to fight Afghan guerrillas were some of the factors weakening Soviet hold in Afghanistan.

Negotiations for Settlement of the Afghan Problem

The UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim appointed Perez De Cuellar as his personal representative to Afghanistan in 1981 to study the complexities of the situation there and discuss with the parties concerned about a negotiated settlement of the problem. During Brezhnev's presidency Moscow took an unambiguous stance on the conditionalities of negotiation. Brezhnev told that before the Soviet Union withdraws “the infiltration of the counter-revolutionary gangs into Afghanistan must be completely stopped. This must be secured in accord between Afghanistan and its neighbours. Dependable

guarantees required that there will be no new intervention. Such is the fundamental position of the Soviet Union, and we adhere to it firmly" (K.B Usha, 2004: 179). The first proximity talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan began in June 1982 in Geneva but without any result. During the second round of talks which began in April 1983 Yuri Andropov was the Soviet head of the state. Unlike Brezhnev, he took a conciliatory approach towards the Afghan problem but during this time neither the US nor Pakistan was interested in a compromise solution. The last months of Andropov and the period of Chernenko's leadership (February 1984 to March 1985) saw no political and diplomatic movement on Afghanistan, but rather an intensification of military activities in the country. After Gorbachev assumed power, he underlined the importance of negotiations and talked about Soviet withdrawal. However, on the other hand he tried to turn the tide of the Afghan War in favour of the Soviet Union through technological superiority. During his regime helicopters were massively used to conduct the war. According to Fred Halliday, while at a meeting of the Politburo on 17 November 1985 Gorbachev said that he had told Karmal on the previous day that Soviet forces would be out 'by summer of 1986'; it took, however, more than two and a half years from that meeting for the Soviet withdrawal to begin (Fred Halliday, 1999:683).

The Soviet Union did not want to leave Afghanistan without its interests being safeguarded. It installed Najibullah in power after Babrak Karmal failed to broaden his base. The Soviet Union facilitated a new 'National Reconciliation Policy' to negotiate with declared enemies. However, after a brief period of success, the policy failed as both the government and Mujahideen received enormous funds from outside and the military-political situation remained deadlocked. The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan as part of a negotiated international peace process but at the same time it left enough military force to defend its interest in Afghanistan. According to Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, "despite post-war claims that they had been humiliatingly defeated, Soviet forces in reality withdrew in good order, and left in place a regime in Kabul with (in principle) more than sufficient military force to defend itself" (Tim Bird, Alfred Marshall, 2011: 25). According to GPD, Gorbachev assured everyone that "national reconciliation and the establishment of a coalition government" in Afghanistan "is purely an internal Afghan issue" and warned presumably the Americans and Pakistanis by saying it was neither "our business nor yours for that matter" to interfere in the reconciliation process (GPD, 1988:398-399). The Soviet Union knew that Najibullah's men were the biggest and most united force in Afghanistan. The Soviets had offered to withdraw probably because they were aware of the strategic importance of this group in an Afghanistan of warring tribes. Moscow thought that Najibullah and the ruling party in Kabul could not be thrown out as traitors nor were the Mujahidden going to inherit Kabul from them. To see an anti-American government in Kabul, Gorbachev courted Iran and said "it should not stand aside from a political settlement" (GPD, 1988:398-399).

The Soviet Union's support in terms of armaments went a long way in strengthening the Afghan regular army. It is argued that the collapse of the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan was not a consequence of Mujahideen military victory. It was the ongoing process of disintegration of the Soviet Union that led its foreign minister to pledge to cut off all military and economic aid to Najibullah by January 1992. However, despite all Soviet attempts to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan, the withdrawal of the Soviet Army and disintegration of the Soviet Union were related to the protracted Afghan War.

Conclusion

The Soviet Union militarily moved into Afghanistan taking advantage of the power vacuum. Though it tried to justify its act in terms of ideological necessity to save the revolution in Afghanistan, in actuality there was no such revolution as the authority and activities of PDPA were confined to Kabul. Moreover, the decision to intervene in Afghanistan was taken by the military. The interests underlying the Soviet role in Afghanistan were to lay down a land route to the Indian Ocean, to ensure overland communication routes to the Indian subcontinent by putting pressure on Pakistan and more importantly, to enhance its power through putting pressure on the West and the Gulf countries by situating itself near the Persian Gulf and straits of Hormuz. The Soviet Union, lacking a foothold in the Gulf region, had thought its presence in Afghanistan would place it nearest the important sea routes for oil supplies to the West.

To realise its geopolitical interests, the Soviet Union tried to eliminate insurgency against the PDPA, wiped out leaders assumed to be threats to its interests and advised pro-Soviet leaders to broaden their base. It also tried to influence the culture and history of Afghanistan. Internationally, it tried to diplomatically cultivate India, Iran and Pakistan so that none of the states took a hardline anti-Soviet stance. The long-term interest of the Soviet Union was in installing a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan without any substantial threat. The Soviet Union failed to turn Afghanistan into its satellite because of a number of factors. Historically Afghanistan prioritized nationalism over socialism or for that matter any other ideology. Furthermore, the Soviet intervention overlooked the fact that balance of power was always maintained in Afghanistan by the major powers. Besides, the Soviet Union intervened in a non-aligned Third World Muslim country which largely turned world public opinion against it. In addition, to conduct the Afghan War, it employed the people of same ethnic origin as that of the Afghan guerrillas who sympathised with their co-ethnics and it was also victimised by the asymmetric warfare techniques adopted by resistance forces. Though these factors weakened the Soviet position in Afghanistan and brought Gorbachev to the negotiating table, the Soviet Union kept supporting the Najibullah government and was not interested to withdraw without safeguarding its interests.

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This paper is the first part of a trilogy concerning Afghanistan's recent past. The second part will appear in the next issue and is entitled 'Changing Role of Russia in Afghanistan after Soviet Disintegration'. — Editor

