

HUNGARY IN THE SOVIET EMPIRE 1945–1956

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This paper will analyze Hungary's political, military and economic role in the Soviet Empire and the implications of this for the Soviet Union's response to the 1956 revolution and war of independence. The paper will review Soviet politics within the imperial-ideological paradigm and will argue that Hungary served as a Marxist-Leninist client state that fits the description given by Edward Luttwak with the exception that economics played a hitherto unappreciated, crucial role in Soviet expansion. Ideology shaped in the Kremlin's perception of the Hungarian scene as well as world politics.

Keywords: Hungary, Soviet Union, expansionism, ideology, empire

This paper will not attempt to provide a systematic narrative of Soviet-Hungarian relations. Instead we shall attempt to provide a framework of analysis in which to discuss it. Therefore our treatment of the topic will discuss a historical problem with the methods and the vocabulary of political science. To some extent at least, it is hoped that this approach will help remedy the problem arising from perspectives, namely, that a great power, in our case Russian view of Soviet role in Eastern Europe,¹ may differ significantly from the way a small power like Hungary may tell the same story. Not to mention the fact that – absurd as it was – the USSR was the victim of Hungarian aggression in 1941 while Hungary suffered the same from the Soviet part in 1945. Needless to say, the aggressor-victim role introduces further elements of divergence.² This is not to mention ideologically motivated explanations, which ascribed a messianic role to the Soviet Union's postwar policies. Hopefully then, the methods and language of international relations theory will help overcome at least some of these difficulties.

Two inextricably linked questions are to be answered: why was Hungary Sovietized and what was its position and function within the Soviet empire? Answering these basic questions will address the relationship between ideological and imperial aspects of Soviet conduct.³ Such discussion cannot escape dealing with the various forms of power as it is exercised in interstate relations. With Ger-

many's collapse the states of Soviet occupied Eastern Europe had no choice but to align themselves with the Soviet Union, the region's most threatening and only military great power. International relations theory actually predicts that weak states tend to bandwagon when allies are not available.⁴ It is easy to demonstrate that virtually all responsible Hungarian politicians and political movements wished to pursue a pro-Soviet political line as evidenced by the discussion on the Soviet-Hungarian economic treaty of 1945. The only question was whether this should be an all out pro-Soviet line, or whether friendly terms should be maintained with the Western world as well. Even the historian Gyula Szekfű in his capacity as Hungarian minister in Moscow advocated a unilateral Soviet line. The question we shall attempt to answer is why this fell short of Soviet expectations.

Recently scholars have pointed out that Stalin regarded conquered territories as war trophies. Stalin thought that each victor's share should be proportionate to the number of soldiers "spent" and enemy killed in the war.⁵ On the fiftieth anniversary of victory day the side of GUM overlooking the Red Square a gigantic image of Marshall Zhukov, the victor of Berlin was displayed. Clad in Marshall's uniform Zhukov was depicted riding a white horse.⁶ In fact the Red Army "spent" 44 thousand Soviets (plus 26 thousand Romanians) and killed 48 thousand enemy troops in the fighting in and around Budapest alone,⁷ meaning that Red Army losses exceeded 10 percent of the total US losses in World War II. Recent scholarship has shown that the Hungarian occupation units committed massive atrocities against the civilian population in Ukraine.⁸ Hungary was a country to be conquered, not liberated. The Soviet position was clearly formulated by Vladimir Dekanozov the deputy director of the State Directorate of Soviet Property Abroad, the former minister of foreign affairs, Beria's close associate, who explained Hungary's economic subjugation along the following lines: "the victorious country demands to assert its rights for the reason that the vanquished country started war against it."⁹

That Hungary was a closed zone in the 1950s, with human, commodity and other types of exchange reduced to a bare minimum towards the Western world should come as no surprise to anyone even vaguely familiar with the history of the Soviet bloc. But the fact that this was so right from the outset has not been adequately noted. As Chairman of the Allied Control Commission Kliment Voroshilov put it: "This is our zone of occupation and we are going to ask information on every person that comes in."¹⁰ Indeed for foreign travel the same rules were applied in Hungary as in the Soviet Union itself. Soviet authorities determined access to Hungary and granted exit visas for Hungarian officials that wished to travel abroad. Even the allied members of the ACC needed Soviet clearance to enter, which on quite a few occasions they did not get. Airspace was (and remained) under Soviet military control. When prime minister Ferenc Nagy sought landing rights for US civilian airlines on behalf of the Truman administra-

tion, the Soviet diplomatic representative, Georgii Pushkin, who regarded the American request as a question of military bases, asserted that “it would be easier for the US to get landing rights in the USSR itself.”¹¹ In fact Hungarian airspace remained under the control of the Soviet military authorities seated in Wiesbaden even after the peace treaty came into effect.

The armistice agreement signed with Hungary on January 20, 1945 provided the Soviet armed forces freedom of maneuvering on Hungarian territory without any measure of Hungarian oversight and this provision was never lifted in the period under examination. In fact this state of affairs was reaffirmed by the bilateral military treaties signed in 1948. That is, Hungary became part of the Soviet military space. Moreover as a result of Moscow’s unilateral decision the Hungarian budget financed the whole of the Soviet occupation costs, including transportation, industrial supplies, food and pay. This came to 511 million forints (50 million dollars) in 14 months from 1946,¹² meaning that Soviet occupation cost at least 150 million, almost the same amount as the official reparations to the USSR.

From 1945 onwards Hungary was both the Soviet Union’s military and economic space. As a result of the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 the Soviet Union established an economic empire in occupied territories, meaning that it seized allegedly German owned, in reality property of all kinds of ownership in key branches of the economy and transferred them under the State Directorate of Soviet Property abroad. In Hungary alone 400 companies came fully or partly under Soviet ownership. These were taken out of the jurisdiction of local authorities and were exempted from local dues and taxes. In Hungary Soviet or Soviet-Hungarian joint companies established in 1946 controlled much of the mining, machine and heavy industries, Danube shipping and air traffic. Most importantly perhaps for the Soviets, they controlled the strategic aluminum and bauxite industry. In fact Moscow controlled all natural resources in occupied territories it wished to acquire without legal or political constraint. This and other means of economic penetration such as foreign trade furthered political expansion as well. This fits well into theoretical constructs of economic imperialism. The structural realist Kenneth Waltz’s definition is an apt description of the Hungarian scene: “states use economic means for military and political ends and political means for economic ends.” For Waltz then economic imperialism is both means and an end.¹³ In fact states like Germany in the 1930s used economic penetration to create virtual colonies or economic satellites.¹⁴ Special mention needs to be made of reparations, which together with other payments such as the maintenance of the Soviet army destroyed Hungary’s prewar economic structure by generating the worst hyperinflation in history. Reparations, inflated by the arbitrary nature of Soviet pricing of commodities took up 29–32 percent of the national income between 1945 and 1947. In 1947 reparations consumed 18 percent of the national income, but all international obligations, the vast majority of which went to the USSR, the same

figure is 42 percent. In a matter of only three years Hungary serviced its full reparations to the USSR, although the armistice envisioned six years in January 1945, and even this figure was considered to be the absolute limit of the Hungarian economy. If one looks at the financial indicators of 1945 and 1946, there is no doubt about the causal relationship between reparation shipments and hyperinflation.¹⁵ It is interesting to note that the second largest hyperinflation in history, the German one of 1923 was caused by reparation payments as well, and coincided with the French occupation of the Ruhr region. The problem was not the fact that reparations were being paid, but by their unbridled nature, which exceeded the economy's capacity to pay. Shortly after the stabilization of the forint inflation got under way again – we don't read about it in the textbooks because this state of affairs was top secret – and as an emergency measure the Hungarian gold reserve held in Switzerland was used to curb another runaway price hike.¹⁶

Historians still debate whether Stalin intended the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, when he made the decision or whether it was a result of external influence. We may never know the definitive answer, or an answer possibly does not even exist. Similar debates are pursued around the origins of other momentous events. In the literature of the Holocaust for instance scholars still argue whether Hitler intended the destruction of Jews from the very outset, and if not, when exactly the Nazi leadership opted for the genocidal solution.¹⁷ Over half a century after the events there is still no consensus on this basic score. Moscow regarded Eastern Europe as a buffer shielding it from imperialist expansion. As the Novikov telegram of 1946 put it, the Soviet Union's influence in the countries of South Eastern Europe was an "obstacle in the path of the expansionist policy of the United States".¹⁸ Initial communist moderation in Hungary was a tactical measure as both Révai and Rákosi readily admitted. In his memoirs Rákosi claimed that "even at the party Congress we talked about the socialist nature of people's democracy in generalities ... this ... was not because we ourselves were unclear which way we were heading ... but because tactically this was correct at the time. We agreed to avoid the term dictatorship of the proletariat, which would have made it only harder for us domestically and internationally ... But for the politically literate what we said at the Congress was enough."¹⁹ Having met Stalin in April, in his secret speech of May 1946 Rákosi announced the construction of a proletarian dictatorship irrespectively of the domestic or international conditions. "Whenever a country achieves the conditions for the liberation of the proletariat or for socialism this will be carried out."²⁰ The statement that there was a causal relationship between the Marshall Plan and Sovietization cannot be substantiated with documentary evidence. It is also illogical in the sense of arguing post hoc ergo propter hoc and goes against counterfactual arguing – foreign aid seldom triggers political expansion. By the time it was announced the USSR was in absolute control of Eastern Europe politically, economically and militarily. The existence of a coal-

tion government explains very little since its scope of authority was so severely impaired that it had virtually no control on formulating policy. Moscow exercised external authority, and changed the makeup of the Hungarian government at will – a case in point was Molotov's intervention into the coalition arrangement as a result of which the Ministry of the Interior was given to the Communist Party. Soviet authorities also exercised police functions in Hungary and arrested the general secretary of the Smallholder Party in February 1947.

If, in Geir Lundestad's definition the American empire in Western Europe was an "empire by invitation",²¹ the Soviet Union's was undoubtedly an empire by coercion. Moscow enjoyed both power and influence having had the ability to exercise influence and the ability to prevent influence from being exercised over itself. But because its presence was uninvited, Moscow's power was limited to coercion and lacked a crucial component of power: the ability to attract.²² Hungary's function in the Soviet empire can be described within the paradigm offered by Edward Luttwak: "it was a Leninist client state which satisfied a growing hierarchy of Soviet imperial needs".²³

It has long been speculated that Eastern Europe served the Soviet Union's security. The Hungarian budget covered most, if not all occupation costs and provided unrestricted use of Hungarian territory for the Soviet military. The USSR paid an annual fee of less than two hundred dollars for all the Hungarian military installations used by the occupation army. The Hungarian army adopted the Soviet military doctrine and threat perception, thereby extending the Soviet defensive perimeter to Hungary (the Hungarian authorities were not even informed of the size of the Soviet army stationed there); contributed financially to Soviet military build-up: in 1951 at Stalin's instruction the plans for heavy industrialization were raised three fold in preparation for war; the size of the Hungarian army reached 240 000, the largest standing peacetime army in its history, a cost born by the domestic budget. Thus super industrialization can be explained only in part with ideological considerations, but perhaps more powerfully with the military and foreign policy needs of the hegemonic power.²⁴

Military services were intertwined with economic ones – maintenance of oversized armed forces plus the Soviet military (e.g., construction costs of airfields, facilities for occupation forces removed from Austria in 1955), war preparation, militarization of the economy; forced investments, such as the construction of an aluminum-oxide plant at Almásfüzitő in 1949–1950, where two-thirds of the 235 million forint construction cost was to be shouldered by the Hungarian budget. The investment was undertaken because the USSR signed a bauxite agreement with Yugoslavia.²⁵ Similarly, the expansion of the aluminum oxide plant of Ajka was undertaken under Soviet instruction, where 63 per cent of the 600 million forint construction cost plus the construction of a 30 km railroad line leading to it was financed by the Hungarian treasury.²⁶

There was also a considerable transfer of wealth: reparations (the very lowest figure can be estimated at 385 million dollars), other payments, such as Hungarian debts to Germany (over 45 million), share transfer, 1949 (15 million), compensation for damage to German property (up to 180 million), sale of Soviet companies in 1952 (165 million in commodities and cca. 110 million in investment); sale of mixed companies in 1954 (cca. 150 million, the rest of that payment was cancelled), war trophies (whole industrial plants, inventories, food, livestock, grain, art treasures, etc. – the value of this is impossible to quantify, Tungsram alone was worth \$12 million). Industrial removals involved the flagships of industry: Tungsram, Hofherr and Schrantz, Felten and Guillaume, Goldberger, Ganz, Weiss Manfred, MOM. 1200 tons of Neményi paper work machinery as packed up by 350 people. Moscow also benefited from preferential trade agreements; the transfer of dividends and profits made by the Soviet companies (in 1950 alone 138 million forints worth of commodities were taken to the USSR under this heading, including 25.8 million tons of bauxite); forced labor (the value of which cannot be quantified), maintenance of the Soviet army (cca. 150 million up to 1948 alone). Moscow continued to enjoy unlimited access to Hungarian natural resources even after 1954: the Soviet imposed uranium agreement of 1955 provided full access: sole purchaser under production costs – while Hungary paid for the bulk of the required investments, the amount being 380 million forints in the first year alone. Thus the USSR, if we include military costs took approximately 1.3 billion dollars up to 1956 excluding the many items which cannot be quantified. This roughly equals the Austrian figure, which in turn was compensated by US aid. The Hungarian figures show that the estimate of 22 billion dollars of Soviet compensation from occupied territories will probably have to be modified significantly upward.

Bilateral trade relations became a source of coercive power. In 1953 the USSR accounted for 34 percent of Hungarian foreign trade and then declined somewhat to 22 per cent in 1955. The Hungarian economy was so reliant on Soviet commodities to keep its economy going and on the Soviet market to be able to pay for its imports that this in itself provided a leverage of political control. Foreign trade becomes a source of power if other countries become economically dependent on the dominant state and thus provide it with an instrument of coercion. The power to interrupt and redefine commercial relations with any country helps provide the power position the dominant state acquires over other countries. This ability is achieved through the creation of exclusive complementarity.²⁷ This effect became apparent in 1955 when the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade refused to accept the list of goods Hungary desired to sell to and purchase from, the Soviet Union. The situation was so threatening to Hungarian economy that after an unsuccessful mission to Moscow by minister of foreign trade László Háy, Rákosi took the matter up himself but was able to achieve only a modification of the Soviet list of commodities.²⁸

During the 1950s Hungary arguably was not a sovereign state. Hedley Bull described the relationship between the USSR and its satellites as hegemonic in the descending hierarchy of dominance, hegemony and primacy. But considering that the Kremlin changed the Hungarian leadership in 1953 without having to resort to violence and used it to extract a variety of imperial services, this relationship may have constituted a stronger form of mastery, a most flagrant “exploitation of preponderance, dominance”.²⁹ Stephen Krasner articulated the Westphalian definition of sovereignty as an “institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external factors from domestic structures”, which is violated either by voluntary or coercive action, that is intervention and invitation.³⁰ Based on these criteria Hungary’s sovereignty was violated because it was subjected to external sources of authority. Similarly, according to Kenneth Waltz “to say that a nation is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its external and internal problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom of action by making commitments to them”. That is to say sovereignty is violated by coercion. While Waltz appreciates that there could be normally constraints on nations’ freedom of action, he does not regard a nation as sovereign unless it surrendered its freedom of action voluntarily.³¹ Although Hungary’s communist leaders sought Soviet political and even military intervention of their own accord, it is questionable that in this instance “voluntary” had any significance since the Hungarian leadership owed its very existence to the Soviet Union in the first place.

The importance of voluntary obedience to the USSR, stemming from the identification of Hungarian interest with the world communist movement and its leader, the USSR cannot be overestimated from the perspective of Soviet dominance. Hungarian leaders such as Nagy and Rákosi sought consultations to settle domestic disputes. When the danger of Soviet troop withdrawal resulting from the Austrian state treaty came up, the Political Committee resolved to petition the Soviets to stay. Hungarian leaders actually requested Soviet advisors they were not always imposed from Moscow. Occasionally the Soviets failed to send their advisors on time and the Hungarians had to urge them to do so.³² Soviet participation in domestic affairs was hence needed only at critical junctures. Thus for example Anastas Mikoyan participated in the decision making process on Rákosi’s removal in the summer of 1956, or appointment of Imre Nagy at the consultations in Moscow in June 1953. On some economic matters the Hungarian leadership did occasionally challenge the Soviets. In 1949 for instance Hungary rejected a Soviet proposal for the bilateral coordination of planning and prices. In 1954 a significant dispute emerged over the price Hungary was to pay the Soviet Union for the joint companies.

Soviet presence was in part of a traditional, imperial in nature in an effort to maximize political, economic and military power. Bolshevik regimes may have been introduced for the unhindered satisfaction of these needs, rather than, or beside ideological proselytism. Military occupation coupled with the ideologically motivated loyalty and voluntary obedience of the Hungarian leadership were the key factors in the maintenance of Soviet rule. Practice and ideology sustained each other. It seems that as many times before mundane imperial purposes were disguised under the mantle of ideological salvation, which is not to deny the messianic pretenses of powers like the Ottoman Empire, the United States or Soviet Russia. Moscow paid little attention to the projection of soft power, i.e., the internalization of its ideology or the dissemination of its culture. Cultural exchanges were kept on a minimum. Indeed, Soviet participants of cultural exchange programs sometimes did not show up in Hungary because they did not receive their exit permits in time. Poorly trained Hungarian cadres instructed Marxism-Leninism. The ubiquitous nature of Communist symbols underlined the weakness of the official ideology.

Eastern Europe was never integrated into the USSR. As far as we can tell this prospect was never seriously considered. But even from the Soviet perspective such a move would have been counterproductive. Hence Moscow got the best of all worlds: obedient sources economic and military power for a minimal outlay of economic and political capital.

These structural aspects of Soviet policies may explain not only why Eastern Europe was Bolshevized in the first place, but also the reason for surrendering it in 1989/1990. By then Eastern Europe was a political, economic and military liability – no longer an asset. Although I attempted to provide a framework of interpretation, lacking crucial Soviet sources much cannot be understood. But it seems from the evidence above that in 1956 even slight modifications in the status of bloc countries within the Soviet international system were barely conceivable. This gives meaning to Khrushchev's statement to Tito in 1956 that the USSR would go to any lengths to keep Hungary.

Notes

- ¹ The best known Russian account was published in English and I read it as a subtle attempt to restore the prestige of the Soviet Union which was out only to maximize its defense. Vladislav Zubok–Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War – From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
- ² The classic exposition of the divergent victim-aggressor account of expansionism can be found in Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian war.
- ³ In his seminal explanation of Soviet foreign policy George F. Kennan failed to clarify the *relationship* between ideology and power. On a recent discussion of ideology and power in Soviet

foreign policy see Hannes Adomeit, *Imperial Overstretch. Germany in Soviet Foreign Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998).

4 When the offensive power permits rapid conquest, vulnerable states may see little hope in resisting, and bandwagon because balancing alliances are not viable; the more aggressive a state's perceived intention is, the less likely others will align against it. Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 25–34.

5 Ralph B. Levering, Vladimir O. Pechatnov, Verena Botzenhart-Viehe, Earl C. Edmodson, *Debating the Origins of the Cold War. American and Russian Perspectives* (Lanham, Boulder, Oxford, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), pp. 92–93).

6 Interestingly a similar image exists of Hitler except that the Fuehrer is shown in a knight's armor.

7 For the figures, which include operations Konrad I-III designed to relieve Budapest, see Krisztián Ungváry, *The Siege of Budapest – 100 Days in World War II* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), appendix.

8 Truman O. Anderson, "A Hungarian Vernichtungskrieg? Hungarian Troops and the Soviet Partisan War in Ukraine, 1942" *Militär-geschichtliche Mitteilungen* Vol. 58 (1999) Heft 2; Krisztián Ungváry, *Magyarország a második világháborúban* (Budapest: Osiris, 2005).

9 A Magyar–szovjet gazdasági bizottság második, moszkvai ülészsaka. Az Állandó Bizottság második ülése, 11 April 1949. Magyar Országos Levéltár, Küm, Szu tük, XIX-J-1-j, IV-510, 26. doboz, sz. n.

10 Minutes of a normal Meeting of the ACC, 6 September 1945. In Cseh, Gergő Bendegúz ed.: *Documents of the Meetings of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary* (Budapest: MTA Jelenkor-kutató Bizottság, 2000), p. 78.

11 Questions Pertaining to the Economic Situation in Hungary. Congressional Hearing of Ferenc Nagy, 1947. Szegedy-Maszák Collection, Országos Széchényi Könyvtár Kézirattár.

12 See Borhi, László, *Magyarország a hidegháborúban – Az Egyesült Államok és a Szovjetunió között* (Budapest: Corvina, 2005), pp. 152–153.

13 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Random House, 1979), p. 94. Hans Morgenthau in his classic work listed economic imperialism as a tool and rarely as an end for conquest, stating that the common characteristics of economic imperialism are "on one hand to overthrow the status quo by changing the power relations between the imperialist nation and the other, and on the other hand not to do so through the conquest of territory, but by the way of economic control." Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson) (New York: Knopf, 1985).

14 K. J. Holsti, *International Politics – A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967), 292 pp. See also Ránki György, *Mozgásterek, kényszerpályák – válogatott tanulmányok* (Budapest: Magvető, 1983).

15 For the full argument see Borhi, *Magyarország a hidegháborúban*, pp. 154–159. The passage also contains the appropriate archival references.

16 *Ibid.*

17 For a good presentation of these arguments on the basis of archival evidence see Mark Roseman, *The Wannsee Conference and the Final Solution* (New York: Picador, 2003). The book shows that with all the tremendous array of archival evidence available we cannot establish the decisive point when Germany opted for the genocidal final solution.

18 The Novikov telegram, Washington, September 27 1946. *Diplomatic History*, no. 3, 1996 (Summer).

19 Rákosi, Mátyás, *Visszaemlékezések 1940–1956*. Vol. 1, edited by István Feitl et al. (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 1997), p. 325.

- ²⁰ Rákosi beszámolója az MKP Politikai Bizottságának ülésén, 17 May 1946. *Politikatörténeti Intézet Levéltára*, 274. f., 2. cs., 34. őe.
- ²¹ See Geir Lundestad, *The American "Empire" and Other Studies in U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1990).
- ²² On such definition of power see Marshall R. Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers – The Dynamics of International Relations* (New York: The Free Press, London: Collier-MacMillan Limited, 1972), pp. 54–59.
- ²³ Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 177.
- ²⁴ In stark contrast with the Soviet practice the US shouldered the costs of the military build-up if its allies. From 1950 to 1962 Western Europe received 15 billion dollars in military assistance directly from the United States. Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 71.
- ²⁵ See Borhi, *Magyarország a hidegháborúban*, pp. 182–183.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 235.
- ²⁷ Albert Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1945).
- ²⁸ For details see Borhi, *Magyarország a hidegháborúban*, pp. 219–220; Urbán, Károly, *Sztálin halálától a forradalom kitöréséig. A magyar–szovjet kapcsolatok története* (Budapest, unpublished manuscript, 1995).
- ²⁹ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 213–217.
- ³⁰ Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty – Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 20.
- ³¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 96. On the other hand Martin Wight argued that a nation can be sovereign without full national independence. Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1946).
- ³² Hence for example the Soviet Union's Council of Ministers resolved to send forty-five advisors to such ministries as Heavy Industry, Agriculture, etc. at the request of the Hungarian government. *Postanovlenie Sovieta Ministrov SSSR*, 30 April 1951. Galina P. Murashko, ed., *Vostochnaia Evropa v Dokumentakh Rossiskikh Arkhivov*, Vol. 2 (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Hronograf, 1998), pp. 296–297, document 96. In the same year Rákosi requested the sending of six experts to the oil industry. *Pismo Rakosi Stalinu s informatsiei o merakh po ukrepleniui armii i oboronosposobnosti Vengrii i s prosboi prislát spetsialistov po dobicbe nefti*, 31 October 1951. *Ibid.*, pp. 437–439, document 147. On the urging of the arrival of advisors already promised see *Pismo Rakosi sekretariu Ts. K. VKP(b) M. Suslovu s informatsiei o podgotovke k vioram, vengero-chekhoslovatskikh otnosheniakh i sotrudnichestve s SSSR po oboronnim voprosam*, 13 April 1949. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–74, document 22.