HUNGARIAN STUDIES

1991/92

Volume 7
Number 1–2

CONTENTS

HUNGARIAN STUDIES Vol. 7 Nos 1–2 1991/92

HUNGARIAN STUDIES

a Journal of the International Association of Hungarian Studies (Nemzetközi Magyar Filológiai Társaság)

Hungarian Studies appears twice a year. It publishes original essays — written in English, French and German — dealing with aspects of the Hungarian past and present. Multidisciplinary in its approach, it is envisaged as an international forum of literary, philological, historical and related studies. Each issue contains about 160 pages and will occasionally include illustrations. All manuscripts, books and other publications for review should be sent to the editorial address.

Hungarian Studies is published by

AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ
Publishing House of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

H-1117 Budapest, Prielle Kornélia u. 19–35.

Orders should be addressed to AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ, H-1519 Budapest, P.O. Box 245

Editorial address

H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30. Telephone: 175-9011/327
Mailing address: H-1250 Budapest, P.O. Box 34

HUNGARIAN STUDIES

VOLUME 7, 1991/1992 CONTENTS NUMBER 1–2

CHRONICLE

REVIEWS

National Identity and Culture: Hungarians in North America

Conference organized by the Hungarian Chair in the Department of Uralic and Altaic Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington (April 1–3, 1990)

HUNGAROLOGY: CHANGES AND VARIATIONS IN THE MEANING OF A WORD AND CONCEPT

LÁSZLÓ KÓSA

Eötvös Loránd University

"The word is not sufficient and yet is still necessary." Sándor Eckhardt, the director of the Institute of Hungarian Studies at the University of Budapest, wrote these words about the term *Hungarian Studies (Magyarságtudomány)* in 1942, which was then indisputably a synonym for *Hungarology (Hungarológia).* He had reservations about this term because although the term became generally known in the 20s in Hungary and soon after the other term, *Hungarian Studies,* was used regularly in the literature of science-administration and policy, both terms were also popular in publications, and in fact, the words did not have the same meaning to different researchers. Obviously, the concepts denoted by these words were multiple and complex. This diversity derived from two problems: what should be included in these concepts and what should be their theoretical base?

Half a century after Eckhardt's statement there is still no concensus on how to interpret the terms *Hungarology (Hungarológia)* and *Hungarian Studies (Magyarságtudomány).* They are real concepts and are used in spite of the lack of exact definitions. What is more, although over several decades the use of these terms was not permitted and later it was considered inappropriate to use them in scientific life in Hungary, and it seemed that the concepts themselves became obsolete, suddenly these terms were revived and a series of interpretations emerged.

In this presentation I would like to attempt to give a more precise definition of these concepts. My method will be to follow the development of the various conceptions of Hungarology which are closely or loosely related to each other and to follow the changes of its elements and interpretations. I shall analyze them chronologically, summarizing them in eight points.

1. According to our present knowledge, the word *Hungarology* was used by Róbert Gragger (1887–1926), a Hungarian professor at the University of Berlin, as a comprehensive term for the activities of different branches of science. He did not systematize his notions about Hungarology, but one can gather what the term meant to him from his significant work accomplished in his short life time. Originally he studied Hungarian–German comparative literary criticism, but his main goal was the introduction of Hungarian culture into Germany. He was appointed to the University of Berlin in 1916. Soon after his appointment he created a Hungarian Department, then in 1917 the Berlin Scientific Institute. He started the *Ungarische Jahrbücher* periodical and the *Un-*

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

garische Bibliothek book series in 1921, and later established the *Collegium Hungaricum* in Berlin, which served as a model for later educational and research institutes.

These institutes, together with the periodicals and the book series, were forums not only for Hungarian language and literature, but for historiography, art history, folklore and other similar fields as well. Besides papers in literary criticism, Gragger himself published excellent linguistic records, e.g., "The Lament of the Holy Virgin", which was discovered at that time. He also published an anthology of poetry, volumes of folk ballads and folk tales, and wrote articles about the fine arts. Obviously, in the Hungarian Department it was impossible to separate teaching the language from knowing the culture, but with Gragger there is no trace of anything beyond teaching subjects in their own settings, collaterally; he did not strive to show the relationships the subjects had one to another.

2. Gragger's theoretical framework is not known in publication, which is why we do not know whether, through personal communication, his notions about Hungarology met the ideas of Lajos Bartucz (1885–1966), who later became a famous anthropology professor at the University of Budapest. Not only Bartucz but other people as well referred to Gragger as a person who several times presented his point of view orally. In 1930, in one of his articles *(A modern nemzeti tudományról/On National Science)* Bartucz took the following thesis as a starting point: "... the attribute 'national' would go mainly to those sciences which are national in their subject matter and in their goals in addition to the scholar's national character and originality, since his methods and administration of science are based on national language and logic." What follows is much more concrete. "Such sciences are above all Hungarian anthropology, folklore, archeology, linguistics, history, social studies, the investigation of national character, the Hungarian land, culture, nature, and the study of various relationships between them." However, it was clear to him that "the biggest obstacle in clarification was the lack of impartial research and the imperfection of the research methods," which is why he warned against imaginative speculation and subjective opinions.

He strongly advised against the exaggeration of the national character of the sciences because, as he wrote, not every field is suitable for the expression of national character. In other words, he felt that his ideas were not on firm ground, but the encouragement given by the school of *Geistesgeschichte* and the great national tradition alleviated his fears. He felt afraid for national culture, for the disappearance of the Hungarian language, which had been worrying Hungarian intellectuals for more than a hundred years. The sense of danger increased after the Treaty of Trianon, and was accompanied by a concern for the differentiation and specialization of modern scientific life. He referred to the latter when he stated that the small nations had a diminishing chance to produce significant results in any field of science. It is not only an individual, but an absolute loss as well, because the small nations themselves are able to analyze their own culture most successfully. Because of this diversity, it would be necessary to undertake national research in the light of their common goals and to find the relationships among them. Hungarology is defined by Gragger as "an independent science which systematizes the knowledge referring to the nation" and this is in Bar-

tucz's interpretation as well. The enumeration of its content would have allowed the birth of a cultural anthropology if the theory had possessed a modern ethnological background. But this was not the case. Only romantic heritage revived in the *Geistesgeschichte* could be used as a theoretical support. Bartucz was able to find precedents in studies of national character written in the last century. But he did not give a more precise definition of the vague concept of the study of national character and he did not systematize his ideas.

In any event, by the time Bartucz had finished his first Hungarological paper, the Royal Hungarian University Press (Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Nyomda) had advertised its series entitled *Hungarian Encyclopedia (Magyar enciklopédia)* and furthermore the first book in the series *Hungarian History (Magyar Történet)* by Bálint Hóman and Gyula Szekfű had already been published (1925–). The first comprehensive folkloristic study, the four-volume *Folklore of the Hungarian People (A magyarság néprajza)* was published in 1933–37, and the combined geographic-anthropological study, *Hungarian Land–Hungarian Race,* was also published in four volumes (1936–1938). The proposed volumes on art history had not yet been completed. This vast undertaking made the term "Hungarology" widely known to the public, and the fact that the series was called "Hungarological" gives evidence for this fact. It is important to note that the volumes of the series were not consistent in their ideas and themes, that is to say they followed Gragger's pattern, cultivating the different sciences dealing with Hungarian ethnicity and culture as two distinct, but parallel, issues.

3. Meanwhile, the demand for Hungarology outside the field of science appeared with László Németh (1901–1975), a prominent figure in the Hungarian literature and intellectual life of the 20th century. In his periodical *Tanú* (Witness), written by himself, he tried to represent the mind as the receptacle of all the world's knowledge. Németh's concept of Hungarology, or Hungarian Studies as he called it, derived from his thirst for all knowledge.

The concept had emerged even earlier, in the first issue of *Tanú* in 1932. Soon after it was expounded in a shorter article (*A Plan for a Hungarological Association, Response,* 1934) and in a longer article (*The Tasks of Hungarian Studies, Hungarian Studies,* 1935). There is no evidence as to whether the writer knew of the precedents of this field of study. It hardly would be imaginable that he did not, but it is obvious that he saw the tasks of Hungarology in an individual way, differently from the scientists. He contrasted the scientists who, according to him, had lost touch with real life and had become morally empty, with laymen who, because of their integrity, are more devoted to the search for true knowledge. He considered himself to belong to the latter group.

"Man's most important concern in life is his behavior", wrote Németh. Not only the relation between man and his environment depends on this; but his whole fate as well. As the official science and its "serving priests" expelled the "secular congregation" from its sanctuary (he used this theological metaphor) the latter group is forced to create some sort of new "behavior-and fate-science" for themselves, in order to get the desired knowledge. And this knowledge is more than the totality of the sciences. "It

is necessary to stress their common features, and these features constitute Hungarian Studies." In other words, he did not accept the University Press series as Hungarology, rather he considered them as volumes representing an auxiliary science of Hungarology. He takes exception not only to the fact that the branches of science are separated from one another, but also to the unwillingness to combine them.

In Németh's opinion, Hungarian Studies is comparative studies. It is the province not only of "man" but of "Europeans", and within this, of "Central Europeans", and finally, "the innermost circle is the Hungarians". Around them there is Europe and the belt of ethnic minorities. Within this belt of minority peoples there is also the Hungarian tradition, as well as specifically Hungarian regions. What is the spirit of this geographical and historical area? What is the nature of the people who live here? How did they find their place among the other nations of Europe? What are their distinguishing characteristics? What is the Hungarian "essence", the Hungarian "calling"? And what kind of behavior is required from those who possess this calling? (Kiadatlan írások / *Unpublished Studies*, I. 386.)

The importance of searching for the "essential" and the "characteristic" often appears not only in his studies, but also in others inspired by *Geistesgeschichte.* We can find no concrete answer for the questions raised above. It would be especially difficult to obtain the scientific results expected by Bartucz and Gragger, because László Németh's attitude toward Hungarian Studies is moral rather than scientific. Sometimes it concerns the search for a "calling", while at other times it stresses the importance of the prophetic as the source of actions which transform the future. This, however, illuminates clearly the contradiction in his accusation that official science had lost touch with life, while he himself offers as a substitute a theory very far from practical life. Furthermore, he re-evaluated its concepts in a subjective way, calling them science, although they should belong to some other field, e.g., social policy or social education. Because of his vague theories, his general characterization of Hungarians, and his search for the "characteristic" and the "essential" is often highly subjective. His work over the following eight to ten years produced highly controversial issues which have been debated up to the present time. Bartucz had previously warned against this.

It was the young Ferenc Erdei (1910–1971), a politician and economist, who first initiated this debate with Németh in one issue of *Magyarságtudomány* in an article entitled "Hungarian Economic History". He enumerated his reservations regarding the search for "completeness", and while admitting the mediocrity of science he did not accept Németh's view of an "absolute science" which could replace disciplinary knowledge. Erdei, a rational thinker who tended toward Marxism, was not against the concept of general science, but against the approach of *Geistesgeschichte.* Erdei presented "Hungarian economic science" in a rational framework and gave it a role similar to that given by Németh to Hungarian Studies, although he did not call it "science of fate". He saw the largest problems of Hungarian ethnicity as economic rather than moral issues. He wanted to explore them in a detailed, scientific manner and investigated them systematically, exclusively in the field of political life, in hopes

of finding a way to solve them. This idea is the notion of Hungarian Studies from the perspective of social politics.

The standpoint of István Bibó (1911–1979), a jurist and politician, can be joined with Erdei's ideas. Bibó wrote his article "The Problems of Hungarian Studies" (*A magyarságtudomány problémája,* Budapest, 1948) during the Second World War, but it was published only later. He clearly separated the scientific and social-political issues of Hungarian Studies. Bibó did not doubt the importance of the disciplines of science, but he definitely warned against drawing political conclusions, or, worse yet, making political decisions based on national character as defined by these disciplines of science. He pointed out that it was a dead end to consider the traditional peasant culture as a source of renewal for national culture because it is a terminal culture which is not able to produce anything new. He took into consideration, although it was not true, that in the following decades the peasantry would play an essential part in the life of Hungary, which is why he attached so much importance to the state of the peasantry, but he did not remove it from the structure of national society. In other words, it is not the transformation of the fate of the peasantry which would make a crucial impact on the fate of the nation, but just the reverse, both socially and politically.

After all, Bibó did not deny the relationship between Hungarian Studies based on the research of rural culture and social politics, but he emphasized their possible, but indirect connections. In his concept of Hungarian Studies there is no trace of his being anti-science; he did not want to replace concrete research with a vague notion of "science of fate"; the achievements of the branches of science dealing with the history of civilization and language might be important for regenerating Hungarian culture; general historical research and investigation of society could provide politicians with a lesson worth following; and finally, it is the task of education and social policy to utilize those achievements in practical life.

Between Erdei and Bibó, Hungarology received impetus again from studies of Bartucz, behind which there was a historical scientific background stretching back to Romanticism. There is a possibility that László Németh influenced him, although there is no philological evidence of this. It is true that in his article *On Hungarian National Consciousness* ("A magyar nemzetismeretről", *Ethnographia,* 1936) Bartucz, just like Németh, speaks about the self-image and status-recognition of Hungarians, but by that time those terms had already become widely used. There is still no reference to this fact, but the terms "essence", and later "Hungarian essence recognition", and "Hungarian national consciousness", or so-called Hungarian Studies would suggest Németh's influence in Bartucz's work. Bartucz put a stronger emphasis on the national framework. By "essential" and "characteristic" he understood some kind of special surplus of physical and spiritual characteristics without offering any detailed explanation of his theory. "The body of the nation and national spirit is far more than simply the sum of the physical and spiritual characteristics of the individuals in the society, because the nation is a higher living unit, organized in a very complex way..." Here Bartucz clearly shows that he was a natural scientist. We do not refer here only to the fact that he used outdated theories of social Darwinism, but rather to the exaggerated em-

phasis on the subjects of his profession. The examination of physical appearance (without racist overtones) seems to be more important than the study of state organization (political science), historiography, linguistics, folklore, and the animate and inanimate environments. However, László Németh, who originally was a physician, did not attach much importance to anthropology although he often used physiological metaphors in his works.

4. Meanwhile, the quarterly journal *Magyarságtudomány* was not published after 1937 because of financial difficulties. The editorial board was in agreement with László Németh in their refusal of the dominant trend of cultural policy and the rigid "official" science; however, they could not accept his vague arguments for assuming a point of view outside of the disciplinary sciences, the confrontation of science and dilettantism, and his extreme subjective literary ideas. When in 1942 they started to republish the periodical, it was a forum of the anti-German middle class cautiously supported by the official government. (In 1944, not a single issue was published as a result of the German occupation.) One of its editors, Sándor Eckhardt (1890–1969), who was mentioned at the beginning of the lecture, can be called the pragmatic representative of Hungarology. Eckhardt, a scholar of Hungarian–French comparative studies, a literary critic, and university professor, recognized the reaction and failure that — in the given possible framework of Hungarology, however broad its interest could be — the validity of the universal science might become more narrow. But he considered this negative outcome, a result of the contradiction, as a necessary sacrifice for timely national goals, and as an essential concomitant of keeping the national awareness alert. He did not attempt to establish a theoretical base. He tried to avoid the obscurity in the concepts with his summary statement: "The word is not sufficient and yet is still necessary", on the one hand, and with enumerating tasks and subjects belonging to this group of science on the other hand: "... there is no new science or new method hidden in the word Hungarology; but only a program which contains all the goals of the sciences dealing with the Hungarians — goals that both link and complement each other. Thus, under Hungarian Studies there are all branches of Hungarian historical science: linguistics, literary criticism, history of law, history of music, folklore, anthropology, history of ethnic character, human geography, social history, archeology, and what is more, the science of Hungarian flora and fauna.

All the natural and human endowments which characterize the Hungarians, their past and present surroundings belong to Hungarology. He extends his attention to the neighboring nations as well with which the Hungarians have been living in symbiosis; he includes their history and folklore inasmuch as they are relevant to the Hungarians to some extent. In an ideal interpretation, Hungarian Studies contains the knowledge of Hungarians not only living in Hungary, but in the unity of historical Hungary and in the diaspora overseas." (*Magyarságtudomány,* 1942, 2–3.)

In his detailed program, Eckhard considered the task of shaping public opinion of the educated extremely important. It was true that shaping public opinion had been one of the goals of the Budapest University Press, but Eckhardt definitely acted against un-

scientific theories, especially against unscientific prehistory and dilettantism. He did not identify himself with Németh's prophetic fate-science.

There was an extensive organizational framework supporting the newly resumed publication of the journal — the Institute of Hungarian Studies (established in 1939) had been operating successfully for years with Sándor Eckhardt as Dean of the University. It coordinated the work of twelve departments and a seminar as a parent institute. Its board of directors consisted of the most distinguished scholars, professors of that time who are highly respected even today. In 1942, a social corporation was additionally organized, which was supported by the intellectual elite.

As they stated that it was not a new science, but rather the cooperation of the work of the old branches, the institute took direction to organize and financially support themes and unclaimed scientific fields. Large and small amounts of money and scholarships were awarded mainly to young researchers or teachers who had just begun their research careers, and for collecting materials. Considering the circumstances that it was war time, they achieved significant results. But it is not easy to judge the individual branches. Folklore and linguistics obtained most significant results. In his criticism, Bibó thought of the predominance of ethnography over the other fields. Historiography achieved a little less, and literary history almost nothing. Together with the periodical, the institute published seven book series and very interesting studies which have been used until the present time. They emphasized the objective introduction of the neighboring nations' cultural and historical connections.

5. The term Hungarology itself reappeared, quite unexpectedly for the outside observer, in Yugoslavia, twenty years later, in the 1960s. Its reappearance, however, was not surprising for those familiar with the circumstances. It occurred as the name of a definite research trend: in Novi Sad *(Újvidék)* in 1969 an Institute of Hungarology was set up in the cultural center of the Hungarians living in Yugoslavia. Its birth was determined by two facts: the intellectual need arising in the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia for examining the past of its own culture, and the favourable conditions provided by the Yugoslavian policy of nationalities. This time they did not attempt to determine the content of the term "Hungarology", but in their statutory document they specified the four scientific areas the Institute was to take care of: Hungarian language and literature, folklore, and the history of Hungarian civilization. (By the latter term they meant the history of theatre, journalism, publishing, and assocations.) In every field they paid particular attention to the study of the cultural and linguistic connections between South-Slavs and Hungarians.

The Novi Sad Institute represented a new version of experiments and attempts in the field of Hungarology. The scale of activities became narrower than in earlier ventures in Hungary, yet, it was the first example of setting up a research institute dealing with the Hungarian minority. Although they struggled with a shortage of specialists, very soon they produced valuable accomplishments. In 1975, in the spirit of the tenth Party Congress, which ordered to achieve the unity of education and scientific research, the Institute merged with the Hungarian Department of the University, under the name of Institute for Hungarian Linguistic, Literary, and Hungarological Studies.

Merging the research institute with the university in this particular case meant the loss of one of the institutions of minority research, but the majority of the research projects begun in the Institute were continued (István Szeli, "On the Institute for Hungarology in Novi Sad" / *Az újvidéki Hungarológiai Intézetről,* Kortárs, 1978, 3, pp. 437–440).

We can cite examples of both the independent research institutes and those connected with a university department. To the first type belonged the Hungarian Association for Science, Literature, and Art in Czechoslovakia, or Masaryk Academy, as it was also called, which existed in Slovensko between the two world wars and worked rather inefficiently. A better-organized version of this, with higher scientific respectability, was planned to be established by Slovakian Hungarians during "the Prague Spring" in 1968. Since they were not able to proceed, as soon as the changes in Czechoslovakia began in November, 1989, they included it among their requests again.

In establishing the institute in Novi Sad, and in choosing its name, they partly made use of the example of the Institute for Albanian Studies, already existing in Pristina, center of the Kosovo Autonomous Area. A number of similar institutions exist internationally. Nearly all significant linguistic–cultural minorities in Western Europe have a similar institution. What is more, from the pre-1918 period in Hungary, the Croatian, Serbian, and Slovak cultural–linguistic associations, the so-called Maticas, can also be considered as belonging here. Their intellectual roots are related to those of the precedents of Hungarology in the last century, inasmuch as they, too, were a product of national romanticism. Their situation changed significantly after 1918, when they became scientific institutions of majority nations and undertook the mission of spreading their culture and language among ethnic Hungarians (Matica Slovenska).

Of the centers of Hungarology collaborating with university departments, mention must be made of centers in Hamburg, Uzhgorod (Ungvár), Groningen (the Netherlands), and the most recently established center of Hungarology in Rome, inaugurated in 1990.

6. The proposition by Lajos Bartucz and László Németh to set up a society of Hungarology was only carried out after several decades in 1977, and then, too, the interpretation was again, in many aspects, different from the earlier attempts. For the first time in the history of Hungarology, the International Association of Hungarian Studies set as its aim the international coordination and construction of a framework for the activities of those studying Hungarian culture as a research subject and those working in Hungarian higher education. This was the first time that the notion of Hungarology, which in the 1920s had a still purely national justification, was acknowledged as having international validity. Accordingly, Miklós Szabolcsi, chairman of the statutory meeting, explained the above goals as follows:

> "The first thing we must honestly and openly deal with is that Hungarian literary history, linguistics and ethnography are relatively backward when compared with the research and education of other languages on the international stage... It is a serious handicap, since, as can be proved by several examples from scientific history, scholars and researchers of other nations have substantially contributed to the research of every national language and literature. So far we have had to go without these contributions, largely because of obstacles in the way of information or the total absence of it... This Association makes Hungarology capable

of attaining the form of international organization that characterizes other scientific disciplines..." (*Hungarológiai Értesítő,* 1979, p. 360)

The absence of historiography from among the above sub-disciplines is conspicuous and has served as a basis of rightful criticism. The absence cannot be justified, it can merely be explained by the fact that, prior to the actual establishment of the Association those working on the arrangements of setting it up had already planned to join the Fédération Internationale des Langues et Litératures Modernes (FILLM), which in fact took place in 1979. The member-associations of FILLM deal mainly with literature and linguistics. These facts apart, it is beyond doubt that historical research cannot and should not be left out of the range of activities of the now internationally acknowledged Hungarology. The equivalents in French and English translations of the name of the Association (études hongroises/Hungarian Studies) are obviously closer to Hungarian Studies in the broad sense, as well as to the title of the journal of the Association published in Hungary *(Hungarológiai Értesítő/Newsletter in Hungarology),* and comprise significantly broader fields of study than philology. As shown by Robert Gragger's practice and several further examples, teaching Hungarian in higher education to non-native speakers of the language cannot be successful without a profound knowledge of Hungarian culture and history. As is well-known, the case is the same with other languages.

The prestige of the International Association of Hungarian Studies was considerably raised by its two congresses, the first organized in Budapest in 1981 and the second in Vienna in 1986. The number of its members is close to one thousand, with more than half of them living in Hungary. To emphasize its significance in scientific history, it must be stressed that in the field of science this Association was the first to comprise in one organization Hungarians living in Hungary as the majority nation, ethnic Hungarians forming minorities abroad, as well as researchers and scholars of non-Hungarian origin dealing with Hungarian culture and language.

7. In view of the public interest in problems of national minorities, ethnic and religions groups, and the question of nationalities in general, which has significantly intensified in Hungary in the 1980s, the Institute of Hungarian Studies (Magyarságkutató Intézet) was established in Budapest, affiliated with the National Széchényi Library, the Hungarian national library. Its significance can only be appreciated if we point out that for over thirty years after World War II the cultural, political, demographic, economic, etc. situation for Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary was not continually researched. Although in some fields of study (as in literature and ethnography) important publications and books were written, there were years when, because of the alleged danger of internal nationalism or the sensitivity of nations neighbouring Hungary, these questions were regarded as taboo.

Not long after the formation of the Institute in the fall of 1985, Chairman Gyula Juhász, when asked about the responsibilities of the Institute, said:

"...(The tasks include) researching Hungarians beyond Hungary's border and the complex study of their social and cultural conditions, and so as to be able to do so, setting up a data bank based on substantial source material... Furthermore, we are coordinating domestic field research projects, giving assigments for research, supporting the education of new generations of researchers, and facilitating further training. We are determined to study the 20th century history of the Hungarian minority, the changing socio-economic conditions of Hungarians living beyond the border, their culture and the system of their cultural institutions, and the relations of minorities with the mother nation. The most important fields of interest are the problems of the Hungarian language, the conditions of Hungarians living in West European countries and America, trends and currents in their intellectual life, and their relation to today's Hungary." (Interview by György Halász, *Magyar Hírek,* March 28, 1986.)

Today the Institute of Hungarian Studies is the organization which deals, as an institution, with the scientific research into the questions of sporadic Hungarians living in the West. In this field, as well as in other areas, it has to make up for great losses. After such a short period of existence, some results of this activity can already be seen. Among other things, it provides organizational and financial support for research programs promoting education in Hungarology and spreading and teaching the Hungarian language outside Hungary. Last year, the idea of extending the Institute's range of study was raised, which would actually continue the tradition of research institutes of the period during World War II. The idea is for the Institute to include as well researchers and scholars dealing with the relations and historical contacts between East-Central European cultures and Hungarians, and minorities and ethnic groups in Hungary, thus broadening its range of interest and activity to include the whole process of Hungary's cultural adaptation to a European identity.

8. The International Center for Hungarology, created by decree in Hungary on July 1, 1989, is a completely new type of institution. Its functions include researching international education in Hungarology; exploring and analyzing the history and organizational structure as well as educational programs and methods of research institutions abroad; developing and maintaining the documentation in Hungarology necessary for work in the Center and for outside information; selecting and publishing textbooks, lecture notes, and other aids and materials to be used in higher education in Hungarology. On the agenda are also the preparation of educational aids, the organizing of postgraduate seminars, educational conferences and meetings, and conducting and organizing tenures for guest professors, and, as a task of exceptional importance, providing educational press publications for institutions abroad. (*Művelődési Közlöny,* 16, 1989, p. 1125.)

The Center operates as an independent budget entity under the authority of the Ministry of Culture. As can be seen, its activities consist mostly of methodological coordination and services. It also continues the work of its predecessor, the Center for Lecturers (Budapest), which helped teachers of Hungarian to visit institutions of higher education abroad, with matters of employment, and other issues. The Center of Hungarology started work with great impetus and under relatively good financial conditions, as borne out by its publications and the First International Conference on Education in Hungarology, organized in Hungary in August, 1989. It was during this conference that the International Association of Educators in Hungarology was established.

Because of its brief existence, there is no point in appraising the achievements of the Center in detail. There is just one more thing that needs mentioning, for the sake of impartiality. It is that the spheres of activity and responsibility of the International Association of Hungarian Studies and those of the International Center of Hungarology are not clearly separated from one another. Consequently, the Center is active in a number of areas which earlier had been the responsibility of the Association (e.g., one of the major themes of the Association's first conference was the teaching of Hungarian outside Hungary; another was compiling a basic library in Hungarology; and another surveying educational institutions of Hungarology). I do not intend to launch a debate here, I should simply like to draw attention to unfortunate overlaps. The significant difference between the legal positions of the two institutions and their respective concepts of Hungarology may, perhaps, serve as a basis to separate tasks and responsibilities. The Center, in spite of its name, is a genuinely national institution, while the Association, though its national commitments are beyond doubt, has in fact a truly international character. The Center sees as its objective the education and popularizing of the Hungarian culture outside Hungary. The Association, however, considers international research into the Hungarian culture to be the subject of Hungarology. The latter thinks of education as part of scientific activity.

I have come to the end of the first part of my lecture. Now, as I promised in the introduction, I want to draw some conclusions. The first will deal primarily with questions of terminology; the second with the ideological content of initiatives and attempts in Hungarology and their spheres of competence and methodology; while the third point is meant to outline one possible task for the Hungarology of the future.

1. As I mentioned in my first quotation, in 1942 *Hungarology* and *Hungarian Studies* were synonymous. Throughout my review, I have tried to use that term which was actually used in discussions at the time. Retrospectively, the dominance of the term *Hungarology* is apparent.

There is more than one reason for this. The word *Hungarology* was born earlier, and, though we have no immediate evidence, the method of word-formation was most probably analogy. I must also mention another form, similar, but much less frequently used, and nearly forgotten today: *Hungaristics*. In his excellent conceptual study, Péter Rákos points out the following possible differences between terms ending in "-istics" (Hung.: -isztika) or "-ology" (Hung.: -ológia): the suffix "-ology", used with the indication of a given research field, emphasizes scientific validity, while "-istics", not questioning the scientific nature, places more emphasis on naming the field of research in question. Other conceptions see "-ology" as a "science of rules", as opposed to "-istics", which is seen as a science having a more descriptive nature, and is often referred to as "the science of events". (*Hungarológia: a dolog és a szó, Hungarológiai Értesítő*, 1986, 1–2, p. 322.) Since the examples mentioned still do not give a sufficient basis for determining differences, Rákos finally speaks merely of tendencies.

In my view, it is more important to state that while Germanistics, Romanistics, Turkology, Scandinavistics, Slavistics, etc., deal with families or groups of languages, Hungarology, Bohemistics, Polonistics, Russistics, Albanology, etc., refer to a scien-

tific interest in cultures determined by one particular language. As for the above examples (and several others not mentioned here), some other questions might also be asked: Why is there no such general expression for the study of every language? Why didn't every nation create such a term, though they all had the opportunity to do so? Why are the Finns content with Finno–Ugristics, and when then aren't the Hungarians? Why are the Germans content with Germanistics, and what would the Dutch do with Netherlandistics? Further, within Slavistics, why is it exactly the above-mentioned nations that have a separate word for the scientific study of their culture and language, and not the others?

I think there is no unambiguous answer to these questions, since behind each of these designations there is a history of science, sometimes similar, but basically different. Each of them has something to do with the spiritual change that in modern Europe channelled attention away from ancient languages and toward living languages; though, if we only consider the most common cause of interest, notably the process of becoming a modern nation, or attempts at national unity, we come across numerous different varieties. There is a difference between belonging to a family of languages and being an isolated language. The formation of Hungarology is of course included in the latter group. A further distinction can be made that Hungarology, both as a name and as a notion, appeared relatively late, for two reasons: first, in comparison with models of this denomination, which originated mainly in the last century and second, in regard to its own predecessors, which, similarly, go back mostly to the last century (though, from exactly this latter point of view it can in fact be questioned whether or not they are really to be considered predecessors). In other words, what later came to be called Hungarology had been born earlier. Here I have discussed only the historical process and the changes in the concept behind the term from the point of its origin.

We must also face the fact that these terminological problems should be understood in the context of the romantic and positivistic German scientific life of the 19th century. English and French sciences had a different historical background. Hungarian science largely followed the German model, which in our case is shown by the fact that philology was placed at the center of scientific research. This is what Gragger meant, as well. It should be noted here that creating the term Hungarology, in an area where the German scientific attitude was prevalent, was also intended to support, with its Latin-like sound pattern, international acceptance and validity. However, as stated above, Hungarology, as it developed in Gragger's a work, for the time being remained within national boundaries, contrary to the models it followed, which, at the time, were already internationally cultivated scientific disciplines. It was at this time that a new complicating factor appeared, the term *Hungarian Studies,* which did not help to strengthen the international concept of the field. On the contrary, it seemed to suggest the idea of introversion, though neither Bartucz nor László Németh was in favor of the ethno-centrism implied by the term. We must not forget that Hungarian Studies is the Hungarian equivalent of a word. Despite the fact, however, that the two terms have been regarded by many as synonyms, it is known that the meaning of synonyms is rarely identical. This can be seen in the fact that the term *Hungarian Studies/Ma-*

gyarságtudomány cannot be precisely translated into other languages. Because of the danger of confusion and misunderstanding, there can only be tentative attempts to find a German equivalent. But *Ungarische Philologie* or *Hungarologie* are both lacking some special elements of the Hungarian lexical meaning. Paradoxically, these are the terms related to the Hungarian "history of ideas" (Geistesgeschichte) inspired by the Germans, and to the endeavours between the two world wars aimed at the creation of a modern national character. The question is, how much of this meaning is still carried by the term as we use it today?

2. Our historical review did not explain the disappearance of *Hungarology* after World War II, a fact requiring explanation.

Like every intellectual entity, Hungarology between the two world wars was also bearing the intellectual, ideological, and spiritual impact of its age. We must ultimately consider two facts. One is the above-mentioned "history of ideas", the other was Hungarian national feeling, which was deeply offended by the peace treaty of Trianon, as previously mentioned. This feeling of offense had manifestations on many different levels, ranging from official nationalism to a more realistic appraisal of the political situation. The second factor had two important consequences. Undoubtedly, there was a strengthening of ethnocentrism, which emphasized the protection of particular and specific national characteristics, whether real or presumed, and very often overshadowed social problems. Furthermore, it is also beyond doubt that those active in the fields of science identified more or less honestly with the official policy of culture and science, since the state was the greatest patron of scientific research. It can be understood from this that after the second World War Hungarology and Hungarian Studies, carrying the stigma of the fallen regime, did not appeal to communist policy makers, although the validity of their sub-disciplines was not questioned.

On the other hand, it is also true that they did not even make an attempt to save the lasting achievements and the method itself, choosing to drop the ideology of the previous period. What we have in mind is the fact that, after the Compromise of 1867 between Austria and Hungary, modern scientific life in Hungary was influenced by the diverse ideas of positivism. It followed from the very nature of these ideas, and from practical necessity also, that specialization developed on a large scale. The separation and isolation of some specialized areas was inevitable. László Németh fiercely attacked "academic scientific life", especially its isolation. Some sort of integration, and closer inter-scientific ties, proposed by Gragger, Bartucz, and other scientists and scholars, had become requirements of the general development of science. Later, this came to be known as complex research.

Another important result worth mentioning was that from the 1920s onward, research institutes also appeared in Hungary, and as we have seen, Hungarology had a catalytic role in this process.

Much to the detriment of the development of Hungarian Science, after World War II the implementation of an interdisciplinary program was delayed for fifteen years. (It is a different matter that in practice it often made its way into research work, as central political control was not able to suppress it.) Scientific research institutes were

either dismantled or, removing them from their university context, were placed for the most part under the authority of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, or some other controlling agency. Hungarology and Hungarian Studies were so successfully and lastingly stigmatized with the charges of nationalism between the two world wars, and were consequently so entirely exiled from Hungarian intellectual life, that as late as 1977, after the formation of the International Association of Hungarian Studies, and even at its first congress in 1981, the organizers repeatedly denounced these accusations, though the stigma had by then worn off both from the terms and the concept itself. (Sándor Iván Kovács: *Conversation with Tibor Klaniczay, on the International Association of Hungarian Philology. Kortárs*, 1978, 3, pp. 431–437; *The science of National Memory*, TV talk on Hungarology, *Alföld*, 1982, 5, pp. 51–62.)

It would be a mistake to deny that the question of the nature of national character, or putting it another way, the location and nature of particular traits of a civilization and culture determined by its language, which was first put forth in romanticism, has still not received a complete answer. These are particularities, which, exactly because they are unique and cannot be repeated or reproduced, may be of value to the whole of mankind. "However hard one tries, one just cannot get rid of the notion of a national character or frame of mind," writes Péter Rákos (p. 326).

So it seems that new initiatives in Hungarology are careful enough not to tackle this question, but at the same time do not doubt its validity. There can be no doubt that practice has failed to verify the ideas of the 1930s. A contradiction emerged between theory and practice, inasmuch as the official institutional research in Hungarology did not carry out the ideas and principles they were intended to. This fact provides a possibility for classifying these initiatives. One group would include purely theoretical endeavours illustrated by citations from studies by László Németh, Ferenc Erdei, István Bibó, the other comprises practical work done by people or organizations, beginning with Gragger, to the recently established International Center of Hungarology. The activities of the latter group have gained higher relevance, compared with the theoretical attempts. After World War II, Hungarology quite consistently refuses to refer to any theory as its dominant concept. The sentence I quoted from Sándor Eckhardt about the spoken word being unsuitable, but still necessary, best demonstrates this. Hungarology does not exist as an independent discipline, it is nothing but a collective term for the historical study of a language and culture. This seems to prove, on the other hand, that the kernel of the idea has remained unchanged over decades: it provides more hope for success, if the study of the relationship between Hungarian history, culture, the Hungarian ethnic group and its environment is conducted with the collaboration of several scientific disciplines. Practice requires this question to be answered. As for me, largely accepting the idea of non-discipline, I agree with Péter Rákos, repeatedly quoted in this lecture, who emphasizes the international nature of Hungarology. He writes: "It is not merely a summary of scientific disciplines, but also a specific case of national science" (p. 327).

What could be the aim of this "non-disciplinary" science apart from the fact that its subject of study is the nation itself? Péter Rákos does not undertake to answer this

question. My own interpretation has a double nature. On one hand, Hungarology examines the history of the Hungarian ethnic group, with a definitely comparative type of approach. It deals with the behaviour, the way of thinking, and the attitudes that manifest themselves in culture. It examines what this culture has accepted, what it has rejected, and in what ways it has formulated its own identity, which at the same time is similar and dissimilar to other nations of Europe. It can well be established that the subject of Hungarology has been formed historically and has been continuously changing. It is not merely historiographic research, but a summary of historical sciences (literary history, history of art, ethnography, history of the language, etc.). This concept of Hungarology, however, does not include a knowledge of economics, demography, present-day society, statistical data, geography, material culture, present-day Hungary, or a knowledge of the anthropological characteristics of Hungarians. All of the above aspects should be included in the other model of the aforementioned "national science". Between these two models, I can see relevant differences, even a contradiction. The first model is suitable to include all those speaking Hungarian, all the potential carriers of Hungarian culture, including, of course, national minorities, sporadic Hungarians, and emigrants, but for the same reason it cannot undertake to present economics, statistics, natural conditions, etc., which are determined by the actual type of state. The second model, however, if only for technical reasons, cannot go beyond the borders of today's Hungary. If it employed a historical perspective for its research within the presently given state frontiers, it would certainly lead to the falsification of history. Behind the contradiction there is the difference between "nation as culture" and "nation as state", and the characteristically peculiar, though not unique, situation of the Hungarian ethnic group in Europe.

Considering the given possibilities, I believe there is only one scientific complex, notable historical anthropology, that holds out a promise of significant achievements. It has been shaped over the past decade, combining historiography, traditional ethnography, and cultural anthropology. Amalgamating the methods and the factual knowledge of all three areas not only promises a scientific system on a higher level, but also carries the hope of solving the contradictions between the two concepts of nation.

3. I think it is quite clear that I attach a great deal of importance to the subject of my lecture. This is only natural. Still, I must ask the question, because the logic of my lecture requires it: What is the point of dealing with Hungarology, and why is it useful today? The question calls for a specific answer since it is beyond dispute that the creator of every language and culture is obliged to research what has been created. It is a task belonging to mankind. The question I am more specifically raising here is that of timeliness.

In press statements and interviews preceding and following the establishment of the International Association of Hungarian Studies it was often said and written that the event was a result of increased interest in Hungarian culture. This argument was used as a tactical weapon by those who, establishing the Association, broke with the earlier policy of state-controlled isolation. To me it seems, however, that, as regards contemporary official scientific and cultural policy, the above statement was meant to hold

another meaning as well: that of self-justification. The Association demonstrated to the world that it had not been without reason that it invested energy and money in popularizing and researching Hungarian culture and language on an international level. There was interest, and the venture was a success. There was also the suggestion that the international attention and interest may have increased as a result of the Hungarian government's policy of openness which was really laudable considering the position of Hungary's allies. International attention thus could be presented as a special phenomenon, singularly deserved by Hungarians.

Both of the above approaches were false. In the second half of the 20th century cultural, economic, and social rapprochement was increasingly apparent all over the world, and, thanks to the broadening of mass communication, every nation and language could take its share of the benefits, except for those, of course, which were, in some way or other, impeded from doing so. The responsibility rests with the Hungarian cultural administration for neglecting cultural diplomacy throughout the third quarter of our century. It had restricted interest from whichever direction it arrived. This was the case whenever interest in Hungarian culture was shown abroad, when Hungarians showed interest in other languages and cultures, or when the proposal referred to popularizing non-Hungarian cultures in Hungary. Handling international cultural relations as a party/state monopoly, they were careful enough to keep ideas they regarded as detrimental at a distance, and paid special attention to discouraging private initiative.

Through the establishment of a unified market within the European Community, the process of European integration is soon bound to reach a historically decisive state. Every country of the continent, including those in the Eastern half, has realized how vital it is for their future how and to what extent they become part of this integration. The most important area of the planned unification is, of course, the economy, which will surely have an impact on culture. There is a lot of talk these days of a common European consciousness which is still to be created. On the other hand, giving up national cultures seems to be out of the question. They are emphasized as elements of a precious heritage, something to be preserved. One needn't be a prophet, however, to see that, based on the rules of psychology, in the near future we shall face, as a reaction against integration, a revival of regional and national cultures throughout Europe. The reaction to this eventual integration is bound to bring a tremendous amount of tension and problems to be solved, both in general, and for each of its participants. This also applies to Hungarians, even if some kind of participation in this integration proves possible on their part. Let me just call your attention to one grave difficulty, which cannot really be understood outside of Europe, or even in the Western part of it. In the countries belonging to the USSR's sphere of influence, national feeling takes forms quite different from those in Western Europe. Because of the different historical paths they have taken, the attempts at independence and autarchy, some welling up of hatred and nationalism might be expected. Hungarians know this particularly well.

The different co-existing approaches to Hungarology might play an important part in integrating Hungarian culture into European culture. There is obviously going to be

a growing impetus to increase interest in Hungarian language and culture outside the country. Hungarology can be instrumental in demonstrating the Hungarians' share in the common European culture, and in calling attention to their enriching contributions. Analysis of national characteristics is an essential ingredient of the much sought-after European consciousness. I am not only thinking of the things discussed above. All significant initiatives in the realm of Hungarology include the objective study of the cultural, historical, and political relations between Hungarians and their neighbors. For Hungarians it might be a program of primary importance to at last take advantage of the heretofore rarely celebrated fact that Hungarian culture exists not within one, but in several neighboring countries. This program could emphasize linguistic and cultural regions instead of a framework of nations and states as determining factors, much in the spirit of European integration. This presupposes, of course, a change in attitude within the Hungarian ethnic group itself, and requires from it a realistic approach to the values of its national culture, historical events, and the political-geographic situation. In the shaping and consolidation of this approach, Hungarology might assume great responsibility.

I must admit that in this lecture I have used the conditional form, because my historical experience does not let me express wishes and proposals either in the affirmative or in the imperative. I have only mentioned just a small portion of the tasks and opportunities in order to draw your attention to them. It is not for this lecture to survey them in detail or to make a blueprint for carrying them out.

THE MANFRED WEISS–SS DEAL OF 1944

Excerpt from the Memoirs of George Hoff, Legal Counsel

GEORGE HOFF

Santa Barbara

Employment with the Manfred Weiss Works

In the fall of 1937 I was called in for military training. I had to quit my employment as the sole associate of an attorney in Budapest specializing in patent and trade mark matters and during my absence my position was filled. Thus, upon my discharge from military service I had to look for a new employment and, in line with my ambition eventually to become associated with a large business enterprise as its general counsel, I was interested, above all, in finding a legal position in the industry.

In the course of my inquiries I learned that the general counsel of the largest industrial concern in Hungary, headed by the Manfred Weiss Iron and Metal Works, had died a few months earlier, and although his associate, a former judge, was engaged by the company as legal counsel, his sphere of activity was limited. I was told that although at that time the company had no plan to engage an additional lawyer, either as general counsel or in any other capacity, the situation was fluid and an adroit young lawyer might find there a position with a bright future. This prospect ideally suited my ambitions.

The Manfred Weiss industrial concern developed out of a preserve factory established by Manfred and Berchtold Weiss, sons of a Hungarian Jewish mill owner, in 1884. Later Berchtold sold his interest in the company to his brother Manfred, who in a few decades developed it into the second largest iron mill in Central Europe. During World War I, the company supplied great quantities of war material for the Austria–Hungarian military and in recognition of his patriotic services, Manfred Weiss had been given the hereditary title of "baron" by the last king of Hungary.

In 1922 Baron Weiss died. His immense fortune was inherited by his two sons and four daughters who formed a holding company through which they controlled the industrial empire growing up around the Manfred Weiss Works. The two sons of Manfred Weiss, Eugene and Alfons, became directors (according to American terminology "vice presidents") of the company, Eugene in charge of engineering matters and Alfons supervising the commercial operations. Major policy decisions were made in family counsel, including two brothers-in-law, Francis Chorin, president of a coal mine and of the Hungarian Manufacturers Association and life member of the Upper House of the Hungarian parliament; and Baron Moritz Kornfeld, also a life member of the Upper House and a member of the counsel of the Hungarian National Bank.

One of my father's patients, Baroness Hatvany, was a close friend of Baron Alfons

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

Weiss and upon my father's request, she mentioned to Baron Alfons my interest in a legal position with the Manfred Weiss Works. Shortly afterward I was interviewed by Baron Alfons and, apparently, he was favorably impressed by me. As I learned later, Baron Alfons first considered employing me as an expert on patent law; however, the head of the company's engineering department was not interested in having a lawyer on his staff. Then Baron Alfons discussed my possible employment with the head of the business department, a certain director Jünker (brother of the deceased general counsel), who thought that a young and able business-oriented lawyer could be well used by the company; however, he wanted to have more information about my abilities.

Upon learning of this development I turned to Professor Edmund Kuncz for a letter of recommendation. In my last year as a law student I was professor Kuncz's "adjunctus" at the Law School of the University of Budapest and it was largely due to his recommendation that I obtained a government fellowship for study in Geneva, Switzerland in the academic year 1935–36. It turned out that Kuncz knew Baron Kornfeld personally and he suggested that I should draft and type up a letter of recommendation in his name addressed to Baron Kornfeld. As Kuncz put it, "You know best what they want to hear about you". Next day Baron Kornfeld learned from a letter signed by Prof. Kuncz that the Manfred Weiss concern had an opportunity to engage a well prepared, talented and most promising young lawyer as legal counsel.

A few weeks later I was employed by the Manfred Weiss Works and was given an office next to that of Judge Fenes, the former associate of the company's deceased general counsel. I made an excellent start. The business executives who had been frequently frustrated by the unbending attitude of Judge Fenes were pleased with my more practical approach to their problems. For a while occasionally I had to fake it because I lacked the necessary business and legal experience. However, I worked hard and learned fast.

I also soon gained the confidence of Baron Alfons Weiss. I was frequently called to his office for consultation or participation in negotiations and after a couple of years I was assigned a new office, right above the office of Baron Alfons in a building where up to that time only the Weiss family members and their financial advisor had offices.

Shortly thereafter Andreas Lázár, a former minister of justice, was appointed general counsel of the Manfred Weiss Works. However, until the German occupation of Hungary, Lázár was an outside counsel whose appointment had no effect on my responsibilities.

My work at the Manfred Weiss Works was interrupted twice because I was called in for military service for several months in connection with preparations for war first against Czechoslovakia and the second time against Romania. Baron Alfons disliked my absence and upon his order I was put on the short list of "indispensable" company employees. This was a boon for me because consequently I was exempted from further military service and — most importantly — I was saved from service in World War II.

In the morning of March 19, 1944 I was awakened by a telephone call merely

saying: "Our friends have arrived". The call came from Francis (Öcsi) Mauthner, a grandson of Manfred Weiss. At first I was annoyed by what I took for a silly joke. However, after a few seconds I became aware of the droning of airplanes, and it dawned on me what Öcsi meant to say and what had happened, namely that the Germans had arrived and occupied our country.

The Miracle

Hungary fell under German occupation on March 19, 1944. Life in Budapest changed immediately and drastically. I tried to ignore the occupation as much as I could and continued to go to my office regularly even though no member of the Baron Weiss family showed up any longer. Eugene and Alfons Weiss went into hiding with friends in Budapest. Eugene was found after two weeks and was put under arrest together with his son. Alfons remained in hiding. Kornfeld first to Oberlenzendorf then to Mauthausen, Chorin to Oberlenzendorf, from there back to Budapest.

A few days after the arrival of the German military forces in Hungary, a representative of the SS, Obersturmbannführer (corresponding to "colonel") Kurt Becher came to Budapest with the official mission to supervise and assure the orderly functioning of the Hungarian industry under the occupation. Becher had an additional, confidential assigment which was to try to build up for Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS, an industrial power base in Hungary modeled after the Göringswerke which had boosted Göring's influence in the Third Reich. The background of this confidential assignment was a bitter power struggle between Himmler on the one hand and Göring and Ribbentrop, on the other hand.

With the arrest of Baron Eugene Weiss a good opportunity arose for Becher to carry out his confidential assignment. He arranged a meeting with Eugene Weiss and expressed his interest in acquiring a majority interest in the Manfred Weiss Works. Eugene replied that financial matters were outside of his competence and suggested that Becher should discuss his offer with William Billitz, a trusted vice-president of the Manfred Weiss Works. Billitz, in turn, advised Becher to contact Chorin as the only person with enough clout in the Baron Weiss family to arrange any such deal. Billitz also intimated to Becher that Chorin could be of immense help to him in carrying out Becher's main mission of assuring the orderly functioning of the Hungarian industry during the occupation.

Heeding Billitz's advice, Becher promptly went to Mauthausen to see Chorin and after a mutually successful exchange of ideas, Chorin was brought back to Budapest in secrecy. He was under lock and key in his own house on the Andrássy Street which by that time served as headquarters of the SS. Becher offered to Chorin to obtain freedom and the guarantee of the SS for the safe-conduct of all members of the Manfred Weiss family in return for the transfer to the SS of a majority interest in the Manfred Weiss Works, including the exclusive power of management. Chorin rejected that offer and proposed that to the extent legally possible the Baron Weiss family group would transfer to the SS the entire Manfred Weiss Works — rather than only an interest in

it, as asked by Becher — but in return the SS should secure the transfer of the entire family group to some neutral territory, such as Switzerland or Portugal. This counter-proposal was accepted by the SS with one surprising modification: instead of becoming owners of the Manfred Weiss they wished to become mere trustees of that concern for a period of 33 years; and obtain the so-called right of pre-emption i.e. the right to buy it in preference to others if it were offered for sale during that 33 year period. (According to Becher's testimony after the war it was he who proposed that modification of Chorin's proposal in order to avoid violating Hitler's promise not to plunder the economic establishment of Hungary.)

At that point Billitz contacted me and asked me to meet with the attorneys of the SS on behalf of the Baron Weiss family and assist in putting the intended transaction in appropriate legal form. Billitz also suggested that in view of the urgency and highly confidential nature of the transaction I should move into the Chorin house where a guest room would be put at my disposal. (Billitz did not tell me and I found it out much later, that Chorin was already staying in the same house, albeit in a locked and carefully guarded room.)

Within a day or two two SS attorneys arrived in Budapest: Dr. Schneider, the top legal counsel of the SS in Berlin: and Dr. Zabransky, their counsel in Vienna. Dr. Schneider left after we agreed on the legal structure of the transaction, and Dr. Zabransky and I went to work to draft the required documents. We were faced with several problems.

A few years earlier the Manfred Weiss Works was "aryanized" in order to enable the company to receive government orders and thus to stay in business. This "aryanization" consisted in the transfer of 51% of the company shares to gentile members of the Baron Weiss family, such as the wife of Eugene Weiss, two sons-in-law of Mrs. Mauthner and a daughter-in-law of Moritz Kornfeld. With respect to the company shares which remained in Jewish hands, the main problem was that they were blocked by a Hungarian government order; while with respect to the other shares the main problem was that their gentile owners could not be coerced to part with them.

An additional problem was that according to Hungarian law any transfer of shares of stock to foreigners, or more exactly, persons who were not permanent residents of Hungary, required government permit. I suggested several ways to get around that problem but to my surprise the SS attorneys were not interested in them. As Dr. Zabransky advised me, the absence of any required permit of the Hungarian government did not disturb the SS.

Of course, the basic defect of the intended transaction, which no legal artifice could hide, was that it was made under duress and according to universally accepted principles of law, the Baron Weiss family could attack it and have it annulled at any time later. I was astounded to notice that even this fundamental defect was slighted by the SS attorneys while they insisted on minutely observing the formal requirements concerning details.

It took me some time to understand the legal attitude of the SS. Apparently they still believed in a German victory and on the basis of that assumption they were prob-

ably right in taking for granted that the SS, as an elite institution of the victorious German Reich, would have no difficulty in obtaining any required permits from the government of an allied or vanquished country; nor would they have to be concerned by any Jewish claims based on duress or anything else. Their concern was to have the transaction put in such a legal form that it should withstand any attack by a rival organization within Germany.

The drafts of the documents required for the transaction were virtually completed by Zabransky and me when Billitz announced a surprising new development. He persuaded Becher that those Hungarians who participated in the preparation of the transaction behind the back of the Hungarian government were in danger of retaliation by the government after the disclosure of the transaction; and Becher obtained Himmler's consent that these individuals, called "Erfüllungsgehilfe" or "aids of implementation" should also be taken out of Hungary together with the Baron Weiss family group.

When I saw the list of the individuals to be transported to Portugal as "aids of implementation" I noticed that in addition to Billitz, his assistant Máriássy and me, it included four members of the family of Billitz and the girlfriend of Máriássy. (Máriássy and his girlfriend were subsequently dropped from that list because of a serious car accident of Máriássy.) I immediately asked Billitz if my father and stepmother could also be included in that list. Billitz's answer was that unfortunately that was not possible; he had already tried to add to the list two close friends of Edith Weiss, the youngest daughter of Manfred Weiss but his request had been denied on the ground that the list was already longer than contemplated.

Thus, I was astounded when a couple of days later, during one of my rare five-o'clock teas with Becher and Billitz, Becher, with the list of the "Erfüllungsgehilfe" in hand, expressed his surprise that I had no wife or sweetheart whom I wanted to take with me abroad. I replied that I was single but I had not quite decided yet whether to take advantage of the possibility of going to Portugal because I hesitated leaving my parents alone. Apparently my filial concern impressed Becher, and after Billitz confirmed to him that my parents were not exposed politically, he offered to try to obtain Himmler's approval for including my parents in the group to be transported to Portugal. I was further surprised when a week later Becher told me that the transportation of my parents to Portugal had been approved.

Shortly after this favorable development came the bad news. Upon reviewing the drafts prepared for the transaction, Himmler's entourage made a new demand: they wanted hostages, including at least one prominent member of the Baron Weiss family group, to remain in Germany until the end of the war to guarantee that the SS had not been deceived in any manner in connection with the transaction, and, further, that the members of the group transported abroad would not engage in anti-Nazi propaganda.

Becher appeared to be sincerely embarrassed by that new requirement and as the most convenient way to meet the hostage requirement, he suggested that Eugene Weiss, his gentile wife of Austrian origin, and their three children stay in Austria as hostages. However, the Weiss family was afraid that because of his weak nerves Eugene could not endure the hostage position, whereupon Alfons volunteered to be the "prominent"

hostage; and Öcsi's adventurous younger brother Hans Mauthner and George Kornfeld, the son of Moritz Kornfeld, together with George's gentile, Austrian wife, and their baby were designated to serve as additional hostages.

Before inserting a hostage provision in the draft agreements, I went to see Alfons at his hiding place in the home of a friend of his in Buda. Alfons confirmed that he did not mind serving as a hostage so long as his children were safe. As a curiosity I wish to record here Alfons' statement that he was only bothered by a provision in the proposed agreement pursuant to which the protection of the hostages in Germany as most-favored guests of the SS were conditioned on the hostages complying with all German laws.

Soon thereafter Zabransky and I completed our drafts. We covered the transaction in four documents and a considerable number of attachments.

Agreement I provided for the transfer by Mrs. Eugene Weiss to representatives of the SS of an empty shell company, i.e., a company virtually without any assets or liabilities. The purpose of this was to convey to the SS a vehicle to be used by the SS for the truly intended acquisitions by means of Agreement II.

Agreement II provided for the transfer by the members of the Weiss family group of all of their interests in the Manfred Weiss Works and its affiliated companies to the aforementioned vehicle company in trust for 25 years, the trustee to receive during that period a management fee based on the volume of the business of these companies plus one half of any dividends declared and to have the right of pre-emption during the trust period and one year thereafter.

Agreement III dealt with the re-transfer of the vehicle company to the Weiss family after 26 years unless the SS representatives exercised their right of pre-emption.

Finally, Agreement IV provided for the payment to the Weiss family group of 600 000 U.S. dollars in Portugal and Switzerland and 250 000 German Marks in Vienna; and further, it provided that the Agreements I, II and III would become null and void if any of the listed individuals did not arrive safely in Portugal or Switzerland, as agreed, or if the hostages in Germany were not treated as the most favored non-Jewish foreigners or if the agreed payments were not made.

After the approval of our final drafts by the SS headquarters and Chorin, I had a memorable meeting with Zabransky. He advised me that he had been asked by the SS to sign an affidavit confirming that everything was in order with respect of the documentation of our transaction. This put him in a difficult position. On the one hand, the requirement of secrecy prevented him from determining whether all the information supplied by me and all documents delivered or to be delivered to him were correct and authentic; yet on the other hand, he did not want to take on his conscience what might happen to the Weiss family group if he indicated any doubts. After having searched his conscience, he decided to rely on me and sign the requested affidavit if I gave him my word of honor that to the best of my knowledge everything was in order and nobody had tried to deceive him. To this Zabransky added two compliments. First that he trusted my knowledge of the Hungarian law because he repeatedly

checked my advice with an outsider attorney and my counsel was confirmed each time. Second, that he trusted my character because during our discussions I was always forthright and firm even though in fact I was in the power of the SS. I thanked Zabransky for his compliments and gave my word of honor that no foul play was involved. We shook hands; and Zabransky signed his affidavit which was the last document needed for the conclusion of the transaction.

The 17th of May was set for the signing of the Agreements. On the preceding evening I went to see my parents and to their stupefaction I asked them to pack: we were going to Portugal.

In the afternoon of May 17, Öcsi and Hans Mauthner picked up all individuals concerned and took them to the Mauthner villa in Buda. The proposed Agreements were read from beginning to end, and after some short remarks, they were signed and witnessed in several copies. (The witnessing was done by the attorneys Schneider and Zabransky for Becher on behalf of the SS; and by me and the brother-in-law of Billitz, Zoltán Fenyvesi for the Weiss group. Fenyvesi was an engineer whose only contact with the transaction was that he had married the sister of Billitz. I mention this because according to the report of the transaction by Kassai and Zinai on page 701 of the 1961 volume of *Századok* — the official periodical of the Hungarian Historical Society — Fenyvesi acted as an attorney-at-law for the Baron Weiss family group.)

After the signing of the Agreements a caravan of sixteen cars with over forty passengers and some SS guards left for Vienna in the darkness of the night. The German border guards had been instructed in advance to let the group pass and the Hungarian border guards were too meek to oppose. At the Westbahnhof (Western Railroad Station) of Vienna the passengers were transferred into Pullman cars and later the Pullman cars were moved further away from the city as a safeguard against bombardments.

I returned to my room in the Chorin house — which did not house Francis Chorin any longer — to pick up some share certificates and other documents from bank deposits and deliver them to Zabransky. Although I expected to join my parents and the Weiss group within a few days, my departure was delayed by a couple of weeks because Chorin decided to add some of his personal shareholdings in unrelated companies to those given by the Weiss group to Becher in trust — in the belief that under Becher's management they would be in safer hands than otherwise. This required the drafting of some supplements to Agreement II. Finally, at the beginning of June, my work was completed and Zabransky took me in his car to the railroad station near Vienna where I joined the Weiss family group and my parents.

I brought with me a file containing all the documents relating to the Weiss-SS transaction which I intended to take with me to Lisbon. However, a couple of days after my arrival near Vienna, I learned that we would not be permitted to take with us the confidential Agreement IV or any copy of it. Thereupon I took a signed original of that Agreement out of my file and hid it among my personal papers. Subsequently the SS went a step further and demanded that all papers relative to our transaction should remain in German territory and I was asked to leave my entire file in Germany. I did so with the curious result that I, and through me, the Weiss family group, lost posses-

sion of all documents of the transaction — with the exception of the only truly confidential one, namely Agreement IV which was already hidden among my personal papers and which I smuggled out from Germany and gave to Chorin before I left Lisbon.

About ten days after my arrival near Vienna, we were told that finally our visas had been obtained and our Pullman cars were attached to a train going to Stuttgart. Next day we left Germany. The "Aryan" Mauthner sons-in-law with their families and the half "Aryan" cousin of Francis Chorin were flown to Zürich, as promised to them as a reward for their cooperation, while the rest of the group, including my parents and me, boarded two Lufthansa airplanes chartered by the SS bound for Lisbon.

At the Lisbon airport it turned out that our visas, procured by the SS, were not in order. They were not false; but they had apparently been issued by the Portuguese consulate in Berlin without the required clearance of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal. We were interrogated at the airport for several hours but ultimately were given permission to stay in a luxurious hotel in Lisbon until further notice — undoubtedly under police surveillance.

I do not recall whether Billitz came to Lisbon with us or shortly afterwards. At any rate, he stayed in Lisbon only for a couple of days to bid farewell to his family and to the rest of us. Thereafter he returned to Budapest, as he promised to do — ostensibly to help Becher to carry out his duties as trustee in care of the Manfred Weiss Works and actually in order to save for the Baron Weiss family whatever could be saved. The family expressed its thanks and gratitude for Billitz' devotion and for his achievements due, primarily, to his success in winning the trust of Becher. However, some family members immediately tried to push Billitz for further efforts in favor of relatives and friends left in Hungary. Billitz, already exhausted by the strain of two months of frantic activity under enormous pressure, was markedly irritated.

I never saw Billitz again. Before the end of the war he died in a hospital in Vienna, officially of typhus. However, it has been suspected that he was "disposed of" by the SS before his knowledge of many occurrences within the SS camp could have caused embarrassment or worse to some SS officials.

After the Miracle

Shortly after our arrival in Lisbon we were notified by the SS that they had not yet been able to come up with the entire sum due us, but $ 170 000 was available to us in a hotel in Lisbon and the rest would be paid later. According to Agreement IV, this money was to be paid either to Francis Chorin or to Eugene Weiss but neither of them was inclined to collect American banknotes in a hotel known to be used by German officials. Thus, I was asked to pick up the money. I agreed; and was greatly relieved when after having received the banknotes in the designated hotel and taken them to a bank for checking, they were found to be genuine. (This sum was later distributed by

Chorin among all members of our group in Portugal for living expenses in monthly installments, the same sum having been allotted with respect to each person. According to my understanding, around the same time $ 30 000 was paid by the SS to the Mauthner and Chorin relatives in Switzerland and $ 250 000 German marks to Alfons Weiss in Vienna. As far as I know, the family later relinquished its claim for the remaining $ 400 000 in return for the SS bringing out some further family friends from Hungary.)

After a couple of days the Portuguese authorities interned our entire group to Curia, a pleasant seaside resort half way between Lisbon and Porto. We stayed in good hotels, the only restriction imposed upon us being that we were not allowed to leave Curia without police permit. Even that restriction was not strictly enforced. I often went to nearby Coimbra by train to visit its famous university and to take out books from its library. Usually, but not always, I did so with police permission. At one occasion, when I did not bother to request a permit, I met a young man in the train who looked familiar to me. We got into a conversation, and I learned that I was talking to the man in charge of supervising our group on behalf of the police. We had a nice chat, and he assured me that my visit to Coimbra was o.k.

After a couple of months in Curia our internment was lifted and our entire group moved to Estoril, a fashionable seaside resort half an hour from Lisbon. Later, I moved to Lisbon but often went to Estoril to visit my parents and the Weiss group.

The Mauthner and Chorin relatives who had been flown to Switzerland also had initial visa problems, but after a while they too received regular residence permits. Thus, except for the fact that the hostages had to remain in German territory until the end of the war, the Weiss — SS transaction had been completed and carried out in all respects.

There remained one big problem for the Weiss family group, namely that of combating and removing the suspicion of having collaborated with the Nazis in exchange for freedom. This was important for the family, first, for moral reasons. In addition, it was important for them for financial reasons because they had substantial assets in the United States which were frozen when Hungary entered the war on the side of Germany and which probably would have ultimately been confiscated if the owners had been found to be Nazi collaborators.

This suspicion was widespread and had to be expected. Here was a wealthy family group of Jewish faith or extraction, including two influential members of the Upper House of the Hungarian Parliament who had already been arrested and taken to concentration camps. These two prominent figures were lifted from the concentration camps and the entire family group together with those who acted on their behalf in concluding the transaction and their families, a total of 46 persons, were transported by the SS to neutral countries. They were provided with visas obtained by the SS with great effort, probably by illegal means, and also with hard currency to cover their living expenses in their exile. How to believe that these fantastic favors were bestowed by the SS upon prominent members of a hated and despised race without exacting something of equal value in return?

The answer is that, evidently, Himmler regarded the acquisition of control over the

second largest heavy industry concern of Central Europe by ostensibly legal means, worth the favors which his organization accorded to the Weiss family group. It may be, indeed, that in the event of a German victory that acquisition would have helped Himmler to obtain the number two power position in the Third Reich and thus, Himmler personally may have greatly profited from it. However, the German nation, as a whole, acquired nothing that it did not have before because at that time the entire Hungarian industry already stood totally in the service of the German war efforts which had become the joint war efforts of Germany and the occupied and nazified Hungary. This applied with particular force to the Manfred Weiss Works which produced armaments with increased ardour under the direction of a Hungarian Nazi of German extraction appointed to the helm of the company by the Hungarian government shortly after the owner-director Weiss brothers went into hiding.

Initially even I had difficulty in believing that the SS, as one faction of the German government charged with the persecution and ultimate extermination of the Jewish race, was prepared to bring sacrifices and grant enormous favors to a Jewish group for the sole purpose of advancing its power position against another faction, apparently the Ribbentrop — Göring clique, of the same government. Yet, by now this is an established historical fact. (See C. A. Macartney, *A History of Hungary,* 1929–1945, Part II, p. 261.)

In a sense, our transaction was an ingenious ploy devised by Chorin, sold to the SS by Billitz and put in legal form with my assistance which, exploiting Himmler's greed for more political power, induced the SS to rescue and treat lavishly a large Jewish family, in return for the control of a Hungarian industry concern which operated already fully according to the orders of the German government and evidently had to continue to do so until Germany's defeat, no matter what.*

*The subsequent condemnation of the transaction by the Hungarian government was not only unjust; it was outrageous. Two life members of the Upper House of the Hungarian parliament, married to daughters of Manfred Weiss, had been taken to Nazi concentration camps and one of the two sons of Manfred Weiss, together with his ten year old son, was locked up in Budapest; — and the Hungarian government did not lift a finger to protect them. Thereafter an opportunity presented itself for the Manfred Weiss families to have these abused men freed and all members of the Manfred Weiss families transported to neutral territory in return for the signing of documents giving power to the SS to manage the Manfred Weiss companies for some time — instead of their being managed by Hungarian Nazis in conformity with the commands of the German government. The Weiss group accepted that astonishing offer; indeed, it would have been senseless and suicidal not to do so. — If the Hungarian government was seriously apprehensive about the temporary transfer of the management of the largest Hungarian heavy industry concern to the SS it could have declared the transaction invalid on the ground that by law all transfers of Hungarian shares of stock to foreigners required the consent of the Hungarian government; or on the ground that 49% of the shares controlling the Manfred Weiss companies was admittedly still in Jewish hands and thus blocked by government order — and could not be disposed of; or on the ground that plainly, the transaction was made under duress — in self defense by the Weiss families. However, the Hungarian government lacked the courage to antagonize the SS and, after some meek protests, acquiesced in the transaction; it was so much easier to blame the Weiss group for unpatriotic conduct — after they have been abandoned by their government.

After Billitz returned to Budapest and died in Vienna a few months later, Chorin and I were the only persons outside of the SS camp who had first-hand knowledge of the transaction and, as a lawyer not a party to it, I was eminently suited to give credible evidence with respect to the facts relating to the transaction. Yet, to my surprise, I was not asked to assist the Weiss family group concerning their rehabilitation, even when that was suggested by outsiders.

The main reason for the Weiss family's reserved attitude toward me probably was lack of confidence. This was understandable because my earlier professional contact with the family was restricted to the person of Alfons Weiss who, I believe, trusted me fully but was not with us in Portugal. An additional reason might have been the irritation of several members of the Weiss group about the fact that I and even my parents were able to leave Hungary on their coattails while they had to leave behind their closest friends and relatives — including a lawyer-nephew of Kornfeld who, according to Kornfeld, should have represented the family in that affair. Last, not least, the Chorin, Kornfeld and Weiss families enjoyed tremendous respect in Hungary and they had difficulty in adjusting themselves to their status as refugees — in need of assistance.

This may explain the position taken by the family when I received a letter of introduction to the military attaché of the American Embassy in Lisbon from a former classmate of mine who emigrated to America many years earlier and I offered to the family to attempt to have one or two of their members invited to the Embassy. I knew that Chorin and Kornfeld were in correspondence with a former Ambassador of Hungary in the West for the purpose of establishing a direct contact between them and representatives of the American government. Yet my offer to serve as an intermediary was rejected. As Kornfeld told me: they intended to use their own channels exclusively toward the Americans.

Shortly thereafter I went to see the military attaché at the Embassy. Upon having told him how I left Hungary, he said that the Weiss transaction had been discussed at the Embassy and he thought that the Ambassador might be interested in seeing me. A few minutes later I was in the office of Ambassador Bernard Baruch, a brother of the former financial advisor of President Roosevelt. He was surprisingly poorly informed about Central Europe and even asked me to show on the map where Hungary was located. In a nutshell I explained to him the substance of the Weiss–SS transaction, whereupon he suggested that I describe it in more detail in a memorandum and that I see him again with the memorandum. Despite the earlier rejection by the family of my offer of intervention on their behalf, at that moment I could not resist suggesting to the Ambassador that he should see Chorin, as the main architect of the transaction. However, the Ambassador declined seeing any member of the Weiss group before having obtained a better understanding of their deal with the SS.

When I reported my visit to Chorin, he immediately announced that he wished to prepare the memorandum for the American Ambassador. Presumably he went to work promptly, but as I learned later, Eugene Weiss objected to Chorin's draft because it failed to point out the history and importance of the Manfred Weiss Works. Apparent-

ly Kornfeld also wanted to make some changes, and it took three weeks before I received the draft for filling in some details and transmitting it to the American Ambassador.

On the day of my appointment with the Ambassador Chorin asked whether I had any objection to his accompanying me. I felt embarrassed but I did not object. We went together to the office of the Ambassador's secretary. I introduced Chorin to the secretary, and she announced both of us to the Ambassador. A few minutes later an adjutant came out of the Ambassador's office and took Chorin into a side room. I was ushered to the Ambassador who made no comment on Chorin's unexpected appearance but told me that he would have to study our memorandum before deciding what position to take.

After that embarrassing incident I expected a word of apology or an expression of thanks from Chorin. It never came — but that did not bother me.

*

I obtained my "first papers" for immigration into the U. S. A. in the summer of 1945 and departed for America in September of that year. As far as I know, in the following year the claim of the Manfred Weiss heirs to the American assets of the Manfred Weiss companies was recognized and these assets, as well as the assets individually owned in the U. S. A. by the participants in the transaction with the SS — seized during the war as enemy property — were freed. Subsequently most members of the Weiss family group moved from Portugal to the U. S. A.

ABOUT THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EMIGRÉ

JOHN LUKACS

Chestnut Hill College

I

About the title of my talk: I am a historian, not a psychologist. (But every historian worth his name *is* a walking psychologist.) Nor am I a sociologist; but the psychology of the emigré has interested me for a long time, not the least because of my own experiences.

To begin with: we must distinguish between the exile; the refugee; the expellee; the emigrant; the immigrant; the emigré. Many of these — necessarily often inexact — categories of people have punctuated the often tragic history of our native country. *Kivándorló. Bevándorló. Menekült. Kitelepített. Száműzött. Disszidens.* (This last a relatively recent coinage, beginning in 1941, and then resumed around 1947.) *Emigráns.* Keep in mind that no exact translation will do, given not only the different histories of different nations, but some of the differences inherent in English and in Hungarian usage. "Emigrant" and "exile", for example often overlap, even though they are not the same, as is the case with "száműzött" and "emigráns". Ovid or Mikes might fit in the latter category; yet consider how, in Hungarian, there is a greater difference between these two than in English. No leakproof definition will do; as Dr. Samuel Johnson once said: "definitions are tricks for pedants".

We are concerned, here with the psychic experiences of individuals. Yet my subject is something that is relatively new: the emigration of large numbers, of entire classes of people. There *were* precedents of this in the past, though not many. There was the expulsion of the Jews from Spain and Portugal in the 15th and 16th centuries; that was gradual. There was the emigration of the Huguenots and other Protestants from France in the 17th century, particularly after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. Most of them fled to Holland and England and Prussia (a few to Eastern America) where they became wonderfully assimilated and successful, because of their intellectual and mercantile talents. From 1791 to about 1795 came a relatively new phenomenon, the emigration of an entire social class: the aristocracy of France. This amounted to one per cent of an entire population; but after 1796 the majority of them returned, trickling back to France.

The first historian who wrote about some of the psychological conditions of such a class of emigrés was Alexis de Tocqueville, in the unfinished and for long unpublished portion of his history of the French Revolution. Following Tocqueville, Hyppolite Taine touched on the subject briefly. I cannot refrain here from mentioning, too, the

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

fine writer Rivarol, an emigré himself; his brilliant repartee when, in 1793, in a company of emigrés in a modest boarding house in Hamburg he heard a presumptuous man say: "nous aristocrates..."; "We aristocrats..." Thereupon Rivarol shot back: "C'est un usage du pluriel que je trouve bien singulier"; "This is a usage of the plural that I find indeed singular". Here Rivarol recognized instantly an example of a syndrome that is, alas, common in the psychology of many emigrés: their inflation or their exaggeration or often their outright falsification of their former social status. My generation of Hungarians know this syndrome, especially perhaps among the 1944–45 refugees: the "ezerholdasok", about whom some German or Austrian said that Hungary must have been a very large country indeed, since so many Hungarians had owned one thousand "acker" each...

Without summing up the history of Hungarian emigrés through the centuries, allow me to say something, first — for the purpose of an interesting comparison — about the phenomenon of the first large-scale emigration in recent centuries, that of 1849. Its exact extent and its precise numbers I cannot now reconstruct, except what we all know, that this was a fairly large exodus. It *did* have many similarities to later waves of such emigration, that I shall list in a moment; but there *is* an essential difference. Beginning about 1860, and surely after 1867, most of these emigrés returned to Hungary (indeed, many of them immediately took up positions in the Hungarian administration and political system after the Compromise of '67). Here comes the remarkable difference. Unlike around 1867, there are very few Hungarians who choose to return to Hungary permanently now — in spite of the drastic turn in the political fortunes of the country. This includes all of the successive waves after 1944. The vast majority of them do return, for a series of visits, seldom stretching for over a month. This phenomenon is entirely new. It is to a great extent a result of modern airline transport; but there are deeper and more complex factors involved in it. It amounts to a new kind of pendular commuting, pendular associations, pendular loyalties — *egy újfajta szellemi és egyéni ingázás* — the extent and the meaning and the psychic conditions and consequences of which are yet to be seriously described or studied by future social historians. It began around 1970, that is, nearly two decades before the recent radical turning-point in Hungary's history — and it has many, often superficial but nonetheless remarkable, varied manifestations, involving different people with different inclinations.

In any event, what is clearly discernible is the existence of five, perhaps, six waves of Hungarian emigrés during this century. Again it is difficult, and often impossible, to define them separately from Hungarian emigrants, that is, *kivándorlók*; there are many instances where the motives *and* the purposes of the emigré and the *kivándorló* were the same. Nevertheless, here they are: (1) the men and women who fled Hungary in 1919, predominantly because of their association the radical or Communist regimes of 1918–1919; (2) a numerically small but often significant number of people who left Hungary in view of the coming Nazi era (in 1939–41); (3) the men and women and their families of the winter of 1944–45, composed mostly (though not exclusively) of people associated with the nationalist or National Socialist order (a portion of them re-

turning to Hungary in 1945–47; (4) the men and women fleeing the gradual Communization of Hungary in 1947–49 (mostly members and leaders of the democratic parties and remnants of the upper bourgeoisie); (5) the large wave of those who fled in November–December 1956, after the Russian suppression of the national uprising; (6) a gradual and unceasing trickle of emigrés (often called "dissidents" by the regime) since about 1963.[1]

The social and ethnic and political and religious composition of these groups was often different; but what they have had in common is that most of them belonged to the middle and upper classes; and that — with all of the previously mentioned inexactitude of precise categories in mind — they have been emigrés, rather than exiles or refugees or expellees or emigrants.

II

I am coming now to the main theme, which is that of the evolving psychic and mental conditions of the emigré. To the best of my knowledge, including my observations of men and women, and including my own experiences, this evolution usually follows three stages.

In the first phase the emigré hopes and wishes that, once essential political changes in his homeland are over, he could and would return. Let me add here that in this respect there is no fundamental change (though there are subtle, and more than subtle, differences) between the inclinations of emigrés, refugees, emigrants, or immigrants. Few people, including American historians, are aware that except for certain nationalities (Eastern European Jews and Irish) *most* immigrants to the United States in the very period of mass immigration came to the United States with this purpose in mind; and that during the seventy years from 1870 to 1940 as many as 35 per cent of immigrants to the United States *did* return to their homelands. (To this we must add that a large portion of these returnees then changed their minds and chose to sail back to the United States again.) Beyond this, it is rather obvious that the desire to return to their native country is the *principal* inclination of people who were involved in the politics of the country before their departure. We are speaking, in this case, of political (and often intellectual) rather than economic, religious, racial, etc. motives and purposes. I insist again that these motives and purposes often overlap (whence the imprecision of categorical definitions); but, to put this in other words; the political refugee is, in almost every case, an emigré. When it comes to such people, it is not only their memories, but their very thinking, the concentration of their mental interests, which is focused on recent and contemporary events and developments in their native country.

The second phase follows sooner or later. It is that of their relative Americanization. This is not the place to describe that development in any detail. It is a complicated process. It has much to do with their existential situation, their profession, perhaps with a marriage or a remarriage; it is conditioned by their relative success and by their relative material prosperity in the United States; and it is strongly reflected (as

well as, in more subtle ways, caused) by their increasing knowledge and use of the American language. In some cases an actual self-identifications with their Americanness (and I do not mean only their acquisition of United States citizenship) occurs. In a few cases this happens together with their gradual abandonment of their Hungarian roots and interests. What we have to keep in mind is that — notwithstanding the self-assertion of the person — this Americanization is *never* complete. (This has something to do, too, with the, by no means simple, phenomenon of "Americanization" different as that is from the similar phenomenon occurring in other nations; to this I must, albeit very briefly, once more return.)

The third phase comes later, again; and this is a kind of rediscovery of their Hungarianness. There are many complex reasons for this, partly unconscious (for example, the inclination of advancing age whereby earlier memories are sharper and stronger, than more recent ones); more important, on the conscious level, is the condition that the rediscovery of a certain pride in their native nationality usually happens at a time when the emigré had come to feel that his "Americanness" is sufficiently secure.[2]

Now what is remarkable is that this — frequent, and observable — development within the life of the individual merely repeats the larger development among immigrants as well as emigrés, lasting through three generations. *That* is a relatively well-known American phenomenon, whereby the *second* generation (of immigrants more than of emigrés) wishes to distance themselves from their parents, since they (the second generation) are indiffirent or, at worst, ashamed of their foreign parentage. It is, then, the third generation, the children of the immigrants' children, who take pride in their ethnic provenance and who rediscover (alas, often sentimentally and inadequately) the cultural and national assets of their now faraway national origins. However; this three-phase development is more common among immigrants than among emigrés; and, unlike some other phenomena, it is a common experience among all American immigrant families, not only Central, Southern or Eastern European ones.[3]

III

All of this suggests that the psychology of the emigré contains a very strong and enduring element of split-mindedness, in which the strongest, deepest but also most obvious factor is his use (or sometimes misuse) of two languages. That split-mindedness (at times amounting to a certain extent of self-deception) is latent in the maxim of Horace: "Patriae exsul se quoque fugit" — the exile (or emigré) from the homeland flees himself — yet the factor of two languages was not one that Horace could observe or describe.[4]

One would think that this split-mindedness affects professional intellectuals among the emigrés least of all, once they are ensconced in safe and respectable position within the American academic word (or in other intellectual occupations). This is rarely so, mostly because the majority of emigré intellectuals are, after all, involved as interpreters of their native culture of Americans. They are teaching or writing about Hun-

gary — or about matters and places closely connected with Hungary; or doing their professional or creative work rooted in standards and practices that they had acquired in Hungary — to Americans, in American English. In sum, their mental tendencies are split between their knowledge and its expressions; and between the sources of their knowledge and the requirements of American professional status. When they know English well, their situation may be alleviated; but their split-mindedness does not disappear. (The contrary example is true, too: those who gradually forget some of their native language are usually the same people who do not know English well enough either; but that phenomenon mostly affects poorer and less educated people, and immigrants rather than emigrés.)

A frequent and often lamentable example of such splitmindedness occurs among emigré politicians of all kinds, who do not only continue to see everything in the light of their vivid and enduring memories of political situation and tendencies of their native country shortly before their departure, but who interpret everything in American politics according to their Hungarian political understanding. (The first of these two phenomena was acutely summed up by Toqueville about 135 years ago.) Very few emigré politicians grow beyond this self-imposed and restricted perspective, to the extent that they acquire a mature and judicious understanding of the political (and social) realities of the new country and of an evolving world, though not at the expense of their understanding of their native country and *its* evolving situation. (One of the very few such examples was the Hungarian peasant genius Imre Kovács, a politician and writer whose premature death in 1980 at age 66 is an *enduring* loss to Hungary; what an important role he could have assumed in the present situation!)

Nearing the end of this paper I must direct attention to another related, though almost never observed, phenomenon, particular to the United States. This is that there is a subtle difference between "Americanization" on the one hand and between, on the other, the "Anglicization" or the "Germanization", etc. of non-native people. In many ways "Americanization" is easier (of course I am not referring to mere acquisition of citizenship) than other assimilations; but in other ways it is more difficult and complex — mostly because of the overwhelming existence of the mass democratic society of the United States, including the popular usages, expressions and pronunciations of the American language. (Even for an emigré of great linguistic and cultural talents it becomes easier to learn near-perfect English or near-perfect French than near-perfect American.) One illustration of this may be the curious fact that most of the Hungarian emigrés of 1956 had an easier task in establishing themselves more or less successfully in the United States than the 1947–49 emigrés — in spite of the fact that levels of the cultural and social education of the latter were, generally speaking, higher than those of the former. Of course the American sympathy and generosity extended to the 1956 emigrés played a part in this; but — at least so I believe — only a part.[5]

Let me conclude, perhaps, with an example of emigré intellectuals on a high level. Let me contrast two famous figures: Joseph Conrad and Arthur Koestler. The first became one of the greatest English prose writers (even though he talked in a much accented English); he wrote Polish seldom, but identified himself with Poland throughout

his entire life. The second spoke and wrote English very well and he spoke Hungarian, too, perfectly; yet he chose not to write anything in the Hungarian language (and almost nothing about Hungary) after the 20th or 25th year of his life. He is the kind of intellectual emigré whose success in his finally adopted country grows parallel to the abandonment of his interests in his native one. I think that I am — in sentiment and in aspirations — much closer to Conrad than to Koestler; but allow me to end with a confession about myself. I think that I am (or, perhaps, was) a somewhat unusual case among emigrés, for one principal reason. When I fled Hungary in 1946, I was convinced that a long-lasting night was falling on my native country. I convinced myself that I must make my career as an English-speaking and English-writing historian, not as an emigré historian who interprets his native country (or that part of Europe) in English. This conviction was strengthened by the fact that I happened to know English well; and also by a great Hungarian mind, a university professor of mine, who told me that I should avoid getting involved in emigré affairs in the United States. ("You can do more for your native land" he said.) Well, this may be irrelevant to my subject; what remains relevant, however, is the fact that, yes, I have come through the years to think more and more in English; I dream mostly, if not always, in English; I count in English; I write easier in English than in Hungarian; and I also claim to have a fair critical knowledge and insight of English prose. *But: this is not true of poetry.* Magyar poetry, even modern and abstract poetry, is closer to me, and will remain closer to me than most of the poetry written in the English language. *I understand it at an instant; and deeper.* Perhaps, as George Orwell once wrote, poetry is something like a family story, or a family joke. So I, too, am a living and walking example of the split-mindedness of an emigré, to which I shall add only one last, though important note. A split mind does not amount to schizophrenia, that is, to a split consciousness.

I only hope that what I said does not resemble the speech of a Member of the House of Commons about 200 years ago, about whom Richard Sheridan remarked that he said much that was both new and true; but unfortunately what was new was not true, and what was true was not new...

Notes

1. I am leaving aside the expelled Swabians, or German-Hungarian, of 1946–47 (as well as the deportees to the death camps of 1944); they were expellees (or deportees) and not emigrés, with this difference: the former chose not to return to Hungary, indeed, they became well integrated within the prosperous society of postwar West Germany; of the latter relatively few survived to return.
2. This is a definite example of the similarities and the differences between emigrés and emigrants *(kivándorlók)*. The discrimination and occasional mistreatment of the latter, mostly poorer people, by native Americans, especially in the 1870–1925 period, was such that a considerable number of the emigrants did *not* arrive at the above-mentioned third stage. They — and especially their children — often chose to under-emphasize and, in some cases, even obscure their native origins, with which they felt uncomfortable, sometimes during their entire lives in the United States.
3. There is yet one last, fascinating phenomenon that I must say a word about. It is a phenomenon that seems to have affected mostly (if not exclusively) those of the 1947–49 emigré generation (including myself). It

is a phenomenon on the unconscience level (a word that I prefer to "subconscious"). It is a phenomenon of a common, and recurring, dream. The dream almost always takes the following form: the emigré has returned to his native city in Hungary, for a temporary visit; it was wrong and irresponsible for him to do so; he notices this on the faces of his friends and relatives who are anxious about him; he feels afraid and guilty himself, because he *knows* that he will *not* be able to leave again, that he will soon be arrested. It is amazing how many men and women of this generation have had this same dream, despite the fact that their fleeing Hungary took place in different ways and in different situations. Within the first five years of emigration this dream occurs fairly often; after that perhaps monthly, or several times each year; after about twenty years it no longer recurs. (It corresponds, perhaps, too, to the later experience of every emigré when he returns to Hungary: the joy of his arrival, and yet the deep sense of relief when his plane rises in the air or when from the window of a train or the windshield of a car he passes the first Austrian frontier marker.) I think it is a pity that no serious Hungarian psychologist has recorded or studied this extraordinary recurrence of dreams among a certain group of emigrés: a collective experience of a collective trauma where it is evidently the conscious that acts upon the unconscious, rather than the reverse (and in this way, contrary, too, to all of the accepted Freudian causalities).

4. Few emigrés, no matter how Americanized, and no matter how remote their lives and careers are from other Hungarians, arrive at a stage where they (1) dream, (2) count in English.
5. Another remarkable phenomenon, referring to a matter I mentioned in the early portion of this paper: travelling back and forth ("ingázás"). Despite their terrible experiences with the terror of the regime, many of the 1956 emigrés began to travel back and forth from Hungary *earlier* than most of the 1947–49 ones.

THE UNITED STATES, HUNGARY, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

LÁSZLÓ BORHI

Hungarian Academy of Sciences

According to the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. the Cold War "in its original form was a presumably mortal antagonism arising in the wake of the Second World War between two rigidly hostile blocs, one led by the Soviet Union, the other by the United States".[1] This interpretation is too narrow. It goes further than George Keenan's definition of the Cold War as a Soviet–American conflict by widening its scope to "two rigid blocs". This enables us to approach a fuller interpretation, which should include a synchronic approach, while retaining the historic-diachronic one. The Cold War was more than a quasi military conflict between two blocs. As a unique historical phenomenon two groups of countries were cut off from one another politically, economically and culturally. The loss of economic cooperation and the limited flow of technological and scientific information left a marked scar on Eastern Europe and has grave consequences for regional development. From the diachronic perspective the Cold War has ended; from the synchronic aspect it is still with us, as demonstrated by Eastern Europe's economic, scientific, technical, cultural backwardness resulting from Cold War measures. American economic politics after the end of 1947 partly caused Eastern Europe economic retardation. Economic isolation was more a product of the Soviet inspired policy of economic autarchy adopted by the Eastern bloc: "at the second, Sofia meeting of Comecon, the member countries were called upon to further limit their economic ties towards the Western countries, and this was the point where autarchy became a central issue".[2] Easier said than done: the Hungarian economy was largely dependent on Western trade and technology which could not be changed rapidly. This attempt at isolation from the West was strengthened by an American policy of embargo ostensibly implemented to curb the growth of Eastern military power and to hasten the collapse of Soviet domination in the region by fomenting economic difficulties. Economic policy was raised to the level of national security policy, resulting in an embargo on exporting commodities and technology considered to be of strategic value. The United States wanted Western Europe to adhere to this policy also.

This paper will show how this system came about through a case study of Hungary, in the hope of clarifying what we call the Cold War. A discussion of economic policy will confront the origins of the Cold War.

Revisionist historians argued that the Cold War was the product of American economic imperialism, contrary to the 'orthodox' assertion that it was a response to Soviet

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

expansionism. A group of these historians attempted to fit American post war policies into their general theory of economic determinism and the thesis that American foreign policy was involved in creating a so called 'informal empire' from the end of the 19th century. William Appelman Williams found that the U. S. sought to employ the "Open Door Policy", implemented first in late 19th century China, in post-1945 Eastern Europe. Others find U. S. policies were the logical extension of American drive for what Walter Le Feber called the informal empire. Some historians, like Lynn Ethridge Davies, asserted that all the Soviet Union wanted was a ring of friendly countries. They did not pay sufficient attention to the actual policies of the Soviet Union implemented in the region, which were those of Bolshevisation, cloning the Stalinist system in the 'friendly' ring of countries. Not even a country openly friendly and loyal to the Soviets like Czechoslovakia escaped this fate. Robert Maddox devoted a whole book to show how revisionist writers like Kolko and Williams distorted documents to prove that American leaders motivated by business interest were harboring imperialist economic ambitions. They were guilty of quoting sentences out of context, deleting parts to change the original meaning, and constructing nonexistent dialogues by putting together real ones. Williams quoted a dialogue between Molotov and Byrnes to "support" his argument. Maddox proves that "by culling out phrases and isolated sentences from the sources Williams badly garbled what Byrnes' proposal was all about and how the Russians reacted to it".[3] Maddox failed to show that policy documents on Eastern Europe, and policy actually implemented there, does not support the revisionist thesis even if the 'evidence' they compiled are genuine. The revisionist argument lingers on: John Lewis Gaddis in his "postrevisionist synthesis" asserts that the U. S. "was determined to make thorough use of this unique (economic) strength to promote specific political ends". He continues: "the aspect of New Left historiography that postrevisionists are most likely to find useful and point upon which their work will depart most noticeably from orthodox accounts is the argument that there was in fact an 'American Empire'".[4]

Even if the American Empire did exist, the U. S. gave no sign of establishing one in Eastern Europe. The argument that America used economic coercion to promote economic or political ends does not stand up to criticism. At most, the U. S. attempted to adhere to the principle of free trade with East Europe, and wished to protect legitimate on-site American business interests. This hardly suffices to comply with the theory that the U. S. was searching for new markets to solve its domestic economic problems. If American economic policy ever served political ends it was after Cold War conflict had taken shape, and then it was one of restriction rather than expansion. The Cold War "requires an awareness not only of power but of the limitations of national power... the U. S. like all great powers before it can act effectively only as it follows its own national interest and has the power to support the actions it chooses. Orthodox and revisionist historians alike are misled by either exaggerated estimate of national power" warns Kenneth W. Thompson.[5] The United States had no primary ties with Eastern Europe, and public opinion would not have accepted open intervention in that region. Yet, Soviet policies there were incompatible with post-war American political

objectives — self-determination, free trade, European integration — and complete acceptance of Soviet activities would have alienated public opinion and fostered the idea that the Soviets had a free hand in that region.

America's foreign policy had to solve the contradiction between the lack of interest in Central Europe and the publicly announced idealist principles in dealing with the Soviets. This meant that while the U. S. was publicly talking about implementing the Yalta principles in the whole of Europe, in practice it was letting the Soviets get away with policies contrary to these principles.

I will illustrate American policies in Eastern Europe by following the instance of Hungary using information available to policy makers at the time. The paper is centered around foreign economic issues so as to give insight into how the monolithic Cold War system evolved and to see how economic politics influenced the evolution of conflict.

The share of Eastern Europe in exports of nineteen European countries was 7% in 1937; 3.7% in 1948 and 3.2% in 1954. The figures for imports in the same year were 8.5%, 4%, and 2.9%, respectively. The total turnover within the Soviet bloc was $ 108 billion in 1948, out of which Western Europe and the U. S. A. accounted for 2.7%, while in 1952 this figure was $ 148.2 billion out of which the "free world" represented 1.6%. Their total trade with the West was $ 1.8 billion in 1953 while the same figure for the East Bloc countries was $ 2 billion in 1937, while trade among Western countries had risen from $ 23 billion to $ 68.4 billion during the same period.[8] Thus the relative, commercial importance of Eastern Europe fell even compared to the low prewar period. For Hungary the U. S. was the 12th most important partner in 1946–47 and the 21st in 1949 in export, while the Soviet Union was first. For the U. S. these figures correspond to the traditional ranking while the Soviet Union achieved such a prominent and previously unprecedented place because of reparation shipments and the 1945 Soviet–Hungarian economic treaty. Hungary's most important pre-1945 partner, Germany, lost its prominence. The United States, however, was Hungary's primary partner in imports in 1946/47 as a result of aid sent to Hungary. Apart from UNRRA aid, JOINT donated 657 wagons of foodstuffs. By 1949 America dropped to 19th place with the termination of aid shipments, demonstrating that the earlier figure was not a result of inorganic development. The Soviets advanced from third to first place in terms of Hungarian imports. While in 1938 Hungary's exports to the Soviet Union amounted to a mere 0.11% with 86.27% being conducted with the Western world, a drastic change altered these figures to 24% of the export to the Soviet Union with the Western share shrinking to 51% by 1949.[9] A similar trend occurred in imports.

Hungary was never an important target for American investors. The largest single company was Standard Oil with a value of $ 58 million, while U. S. total investment was $ 100 million. "Apart from Czechoslovakia, Poland and to some extent Hungary (Eastern Europe) had not received significant opportunities of American investment before the war and American cultural and political relations with those countries had been loose... American public opinion showed little interest in the fate of those people."[10] An American legation policy paper of July 1945 claimed Russian material

aid to the minority Communist party, presence of Soviet troops and political police pressuring anti-Marxist parties could lead to the establishment of a Communist regime and the subordination of Hungary to Soviet political and economic dictation.[11] Still, the U. S. was unwilling to give financial aid to the Smallholders Party, the strongest opposition party in Hungary.[12]

In summer 1945 the conditions for reorienting the Hungarian economy were created by a Soviet–Hungarian economic agreement signed on August 27. This envisioned a turnover of $ 30 million in commodities for the next 15 months, with Hungary shipping foodstuffs and manufactured goods in return for raw materials. The agreement began the process of basing Hungarian industry on Soviet raw material in return for goods that were impossible to sell on other markets. This set to a market of extremely low standard goods. Another part of the August 27 agreement gave the Soviet Union a leading role in aluminium and oil production and research, shipping and air transport by setting up Soviet–Hungarian "50–50" joint venture companies which enjoyed privileges not granted to purely Hungarian companies.[13] The country was already allocating the bulk of its industrial production to reparations. $ 5.5 million of industrial equipment was dismantled and carried to the Soviet Union, along with $ 6.5 million of products shipped there. International obligations arising from the Armistice agreement were more than 30% of national expenditure until 1948. The bulk of it went to Russia.[14] Half of Hungarian industry and virtually all of its heavy industry was preoccupied with reparations, supervised by Soviet overseers. "One time economically independent Hungary, has in the space of little more than a year gone far towards becoming a Soviet economic colony... In one year the USSR has acquired more far reaching control over Hungarian commerce and industry than the Germans..."[15] The state renewed wartime control of the economy. Industrial commissioners monitored production; the Minister of Industry was empowered to dispose of raw materials, full, and semi-finished goods held by companies or private persons in Hungary to maintain industrial production. An organization was set up to distribute raw materials and goods and was enabled to regulate the use of 550 materials and semi-finished goods. Paper, metals and coal distribution was centralized. This provided the possibility of nationalizing the Hungarian economy.[16] At the end of 1945 a body of economic coordination called the Economic High Council was set up. The Communist Zoltan Vas headed it, thereby giving the Communist party a decisive role in directing the economy. It became an executor of Communist economic policies, allocating raw materials, fixing prices and wages. Parliament lost its prerogative of drafting the budget. Administration gained power over legislation. By raising social expenditures and taxes, private enterprises lost profit when investments were most needed.[17] Resources were further depleted by having to cater to the half million Soviet occupation soldiers and by the Russian demand to relinquish German assets, which gave them important industrial and financial properties though some were clearly not German owned. In their interpretation of the Potsdam Declaration the Russians demanded all wartime German claims against Hungary, while the considerably higher Hungarian claims against Germany were waived. While Hungary was becoming a Russian economic satellite, the State

Department decided America should not enter into a bilateral trade agreement proposed by the Hungarian government. Byrnes wanted it made clear that, aside from considerations of international trade policy, it would be impossible for the U. S. to make any formal trade agreements with Hungary until it was no longer subject to the armistice agreements. "The American policy to be applied after such conditions are realized, is the principle of 'non-discrimination' in international trade."[18] Harriman, the American ambassador in Moscow, protested against the Soviet–Hungarian trade agreement violating the principle of non-discrimination, as he had for Romania and Bulgaria. On the other hand, Byrnes advised the American legation in Hungary not to indicate any support for refusal to ratify the economic agreement with the Soviet Union,[19] which was seriously being considered by the Hungarian government. After the parliamentary elections (where the Communists suffered a humiliating defeat, polling 17% against the Smallholders' 59%) Schonefeld, the American minister in Hungary, recommended a policy of economic assistance, since he believed the country was heading towards "economic chaos which development may liquidate the present government and recent progress to democracy in Hungary".[20] The State Department then assured Hungary of its willingness to aid in resuming Hungarian trade with private U. S. companies, and warned against denying access to states other than the USSR to the Hungarian market and against the denial of investment opportunities.[21]

Harriman told the Soviet government that the United States considered long-term bilateral agreements like the Hungarian and Romanian ones unjustified, while assuring the Soviets that the U. S. "fully understands mutual economic interests between the USSR and its neighbors... and desires to see those interests develop". Harriman recommended the U. S., France and Britain jointly solve East Europe's economic problems in the framework of the Council of Foreign Ministers.[22] No sanctions were held out against Soviet non-compliance with the American proposal. No support was given to Hungary to renounce the economic treaty, so it alone was held responsible for not complying with the principle of non-discrimination. Hungarian–American relations were strained by the maltreatment of MAORT (the Hungarian subsidiary of Standard Oil New Jersey) and the Russian direct control of its management. It was forced to overproduce, to the detriment of future production. Also, Vacuum Oil Company, one of the leading oil refining companies in prewar Hungary, was reinstated into the rights it enjoyed before 1942, when it was sequestered by the Hungarian government, even though all its stocks were owned by American citizens.[23]

Its oil allocation was decreased to the detriment of the newly set up Soviet–Hungarian refinery, which was allowed to operate at 80% while Standard Oil operated at 60%. The Soviets were engaged in carrying off MAORT equipment as war booty. The State Department authorized MAORT to ask General Key, the American representative of the ACC, to ask the Soviet ACC Chairman Marshall Voroshilov stop the removals. The company's property was operated contrary to sound oil field practice and superintended by Soviet commanders. Company administrative and supervisory staff had no freedom of movement.[24] Since the company feared nationalization, the Hungarian foreign ministry sent assurances that Hungary would not take over oil fields or

coal mines belonging to people from United Nations countries, while admitting that "state supervision" would be introduced in order to "improve productivity, and secure production".[25] The nonsensical argument proves that arrangements for nationalizing foreign property were made as early as 1945. Only a few months later the foreign ministry turned to the council ministers to declare those mines be nationalized with full restitution to the owners. A favorable decision would serve as a precedent for the nationalization of oil fields.[26] The elimination of American economic interest started in 1945 by the dismantling of "Tungsram" despite protests, and lasted until 1949.

The Potsdam Declaration gave the Soviet Union the right to dismantle and import all German assets in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and the Eastern (Soviet) zone of Austria. This provision was often abused, with non-German factories being carried off, too. This was the fate of Ford Ltd. of Budapest, 98% owned by the Ford company of Cologne, which in turn was owned 52% by Ford Motor Co. of Dearborn, Michigan.[27] Jóvátételi Hivatal (Board of Indemnities) wished to give all the company's capital to the Soviets under a decision brought by a Hungarian–Soviet committee set up for the implementation of the Potsdam Declaration. The United States intervened to annul the decision at the Economic High Council, thereby limiting damage to American interests.[28] The economic department of the ACC then modified the original decision which reduced the capital loss to 43%. A parcel of shares representing 57% of the Ford Motor Co. was returned.[29] Soviet–Hungarian joint stock companies and manipulating the Potsdam Declaration were not the only methods of centralizing industry. The American Legation requested the Hungarian Foreign Ministry to authorize Standard Electric Co. to use a portion of its output for export purposes, since its reparation orders exceeded capacity while it received payment in Hungarian money and had no access to foreign currency. The American note stated that raw materials and plant equipment was not available, nor was the company able to pay dividends. It was recommended that a percentage of the plant's production be set aside for free export to get hard currency for buying new equipment.

The importation of industrial material and equipment to Hungary would thus be possible.[30] Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy thought the Hungarian government should, as always, consider American financial interests in the case of Standard Electric.[31] Although Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi received Nagy's response the day after the U. S. note was sent, the official answer was given seven weeks later. The views of the Hungarian National Bank, the Office of Reparations and the Ministry of Industry were sought, nome of which was quick to respond. The National Bank offered that foreign currency could be allocated to the company "in case this is justified" and that the figure should be 30% of the exports, for the purpose of replacing machinery but not to pay dividends. A similar view was expressed by the Ministry of Industry; the Hungarian government could not guarantee the profit for foreign capital, but it was willing to negotiate with the Soviets for decreasing the company's reparation burdens.[32] This view contradicted that of the Premier. Eventually, the view expressed by the Reparations Committee was forwarded to the American Legation. Contrary to the recommendation of the Ministry of Industry, this claimed that Hungary was not competent

to negotiate the decrease reparation payments, but the American legation should intervene directly with the states where reparation was being shipped. Money received from exported products could be used to finance imports but not for paying dividends.[33] The 'liberation' of exports was carried out later that year in order to produce foreign currency. The policy objective was obvious: it fitted into a general pattern of keeping foreign owned companies functioning, but holding back dividends to prevent further investment and thus preparing for eventual nationalization. This policy was countered by the need to sustain economic ties with the U. S. to keep companies fulfilling reparation shipments running and which also represented high standards of production thus contributing to Hungarian economic stability. This is best summed up by a memorandum prepared by the Reparation Committee: American companies operating on Hungarian soil cannot enjoy extra-territoriality, since article 13 of the Armistice Agreement did not oblige the government to restore prewar rights of American citizens without changes. Foreign and Hungarian capital would be treated on the same terms, since the restoration of Hungarian economy and the payment of reparations could only be assured if exports were increased. Export projects initiated by American companies would be handled by the Foreign Trade Directorate.[34]

In compliance with the American request of April 3, 1940 the state commissioners were withdrawn from two American owned companies, Edelényi Kőszénbánya Rt. (Edelény Coal Mine Ltd.) and Borsodvidéki Kőszénbánya Rt. (Borsod Coal Mine Ltd.). In the autumn of 1946 the so-called Treasury Utilization against MAORT was terminated. In line with the temporary improvement of the situation, Gordon, the minister of finance assured the U. S. that "in order to improve U. S.–Hungarian economic and financial relations... the government will examine the export conditions of firms with an American interest and will, if possible, ease burdens on those companies, while negotiating with the USSR to decrease shipments of reparations by Standard Electric".[35] Another note pointed out that credit would be unfrozen as soon as the balance of payment was reestablished. However, the issue of dividends was premature.[36] Later in the year government payments to companies were blocked altogether as part of a by then institutionalized policy, which prevented the accumulation of private capital.[37]

The recovery of the Hungarian economy was in part dependent on trade with the U. S. Prewar American imports were raw materials like copper, iron, timber, oil and industrial products, machinery (textile, agricultural, household appliances) and motorcars. Exports were mostly agricultural products. According to a policy paper prepared by the foreign ministry Hungary was in desperate need of cars, trucks, agricultural equipment, machines for building roads and railroads and for food processing, all finer industrial goods than Russia was offering.[38] The second part of the paper stated that reconstruction would be feasible with the help of a foreign loan to restore production and stabilize currency. Normal trade relations were barred by Communist and U. S. policy. All export items exceeding the value of $ 25 had to be licensed. Imports to America were restricted also, mainly in agricultural products which were an important component of Hungarian exports. The United States government policy dictated that trade with foreign countries should proceed through private companies, while com-

merce conducted between governments and government agencies should be eliminated. Placing foreign trade on an entirely economic basis was disastrous to Hungary, whose prices were not competitive on the international market.[39] Although the U. S. signed a commercial treaty with Czechoslovakia, granting unconditional most favored nation treatment, no such agreement was signed with Hungary on the grounds that it was formerly an enemy country.

Stabilization loans were not forthcoming either. Although in late 1946 the American minister in Hungary predicted economic chaos and runaway inflation, he suggested no American countermeasures. "I attach little significance to Financial Minister Gordon's opinion that granting Ex-Im loan to Hungary would have important political effect." He claimed the situation had altered since February when assistance could have helped Hungary's ability to remain economically independent of the USSR. Unilateral American assistance now would make little contribution to Hungary's recovery because the Soviets would neutralize its beneficial effects. Key Hungarian officials would divert American aid to the USSR. Gordon counseled any American loans should be predicated on Soviet–American understanding.[40] Although the Secretary of State recommended a $ 10 million loan for Hungary, the acting secretary Acheson replied that the chairman and chief economist of the Bank declined to consider this possibility based on Schonefeld's above quoted telegram. Thus when Gordon raised the question of an Eximbank loan during the Hungarian government delegation's official visit to Washington in June 1946, his request was denied. State Department experts pointed out that the Bank did not want to make loans which the State Department desired made for broad political reasons but were contrary to good banking standards. The bank stated the possibility of Hungary getting a loan was almost nil, and told the state department to stop pressuring them. The conclusion was "given the present state of the Hungarian economy, the credit policy of Eximbank and other Federal agencies, the Department has no available means of extending economic assistance to Hungary and thereby implementing its political objectives" there.[41] Thus even when the State Department considered limited economic measures to keep Hungary out of the Bolshevisation zone it had no available means to do so since there was no financial interest involved in such a plan. By the end of 1946 the idea was given up of combating Soviet expansion in Hungary by economic counter moves. A similar policy was adopted towards Czechoslovakia and Romania. Steinhardt, the American minister in Czechoslovakia, advised against a large loan for reconstruction purposes until the Czechoslovakian people "rid themselves of the very real threat of Communist domination or until... American properties which have been nationalized will be paid for", recommending a loan of $ 30 million only. In September it was decided that no new credit would be given to Czechoslovakia since the Czechoslovakian delegation in Paris supported Vyshinsky's view that the U. S. was trying to enslave Europe by a policy of handouts and improvement in Czechoslovakia's economic conditions.[42] In spite of this Eximbank approved a $ 50 million loan to that country. However, Byrnes instructed Acheson to determine if the unused portion of this credit ($ 41 million) could be prevented from being used up. He wanted to see that no new contracts were made to subsidize

the Communists in Czechoslovakia. "I am convinced that the time has come... to assist our friends in Western Europe... rather than continue to extend material aid to those countries in East Europe at present engaged in the campaign of vilification of the U. S. and distortion of our motives and policies."[43] This time it was the other way round; in Czechoslovakia politics did not follow business. In Romania's case a general understanding was reached that Romania would not receive loans from the United States.[44]

Simultaneously the U. S. attempted to influence Hungarian economic revival through diplomatic channels with the Soviet Union. George Kennan demanded that in view of the disintegration of Hungarian economy due to reparations, requisitions, occupation and Soviet interference in Hungary's economy. Soviet representatives should join Britain and America in working out a program to stop disintegration and provide for the framework of rehabilitation and reintegration of Hungary with the general economy of Europe. At Byrnes' instruction, Kennan addressed a note to the Soviet government, expressing American "concern" over joint Soviet–Hungarian companies being guaranteed monopolistic rights and privileges not extended to other companies.[45] After the Soviets refuted charges brought by Kennan, Bedell-Smith, the American ambassador in Moscow, supported his position with economic data, again requesting the Soviet Union to take part in tripartite negotiations to devise a plan for Hungarian economic revival. This time the note was made public.[46] Dekanozov replied that only the Hungarian government could draft such a plan.[47] Accepting defeat, the charge in Moscow, Durbrow, stated that the American ACC representative was ready to consult with his Soviet and British colleagues to implement Yalta obligations by "assisting Hungary to stabilize its economy and reintegrate with the general economy of Europe".[48] Byrnes instructed the American legation in Budapest to inform Hungarians that the U. S. was assuming a 'helpful' attitude towards Hungary's domestic problems, but those were to be solved by the Hungarian government. In a note attached to the telegram Freeman Matthews recommended that a mild support given to the Hungarian government to combat minority pressure might be helpful.[49] A specific proposal for such an action was suggested earlier by Schonefeld for supporting a territorial modification of Transylvania in favor of Hungary to strengthen the Nagy government and to increase U. S. popularity in the country.[50] By 1946, Romania was in a far more hopeless situation regarding independence than Hungary.[51] In his visit to Washington Nagy found that State Department attitude towards this issue was not unhelpful.[52] In the course of the year, however, it seemed to Americans that Hungary was beyond help. The New York Times reported that the Russians, by gaining control of 50% of Hungary's largest mineral resource, bauxite, an agreement in oil, Danube river shipping, civil aircraft, banking, ports and telegraph meant that the entire Hungarian economic and communication system was under Soviet or pro-Soviet control. A similar fate befell the National Bank which issued currency, the National Credit Bank which held 33% of all Hungarian industry, oil resources not owned by Americans, postal and telegraph systems, the Budapest radio and Hungarian information service.[53]

A source of tension in Hungarian–U. S. relations was the issue of aviation rights,

because the Hungarian government refused to grant landing rights requested by the U. S. The Americans wished to use Hungarian airfields on the same terms as the Soviets but the Nagy government refused to comply. As a retaliatory measure Schonefeld suggested that Hungary be made ineligible for purchasing aviation equipment against surplus commodity credits. Relations improved somewhat after the government delegation's visit to Washington, where the return of Hungarian gold reserves from the U. S. occupation zone was promised. American attitude on the border question was encouraging. The Hungarian premier told Acheson that he expected a favorable decision on aviation rights from his cabinet, and promised to furnish the U. S. with information on Hungary's economic situation. Nagy undertook to compensate damages to American nationals in return for the restitution of gold reserves.[54] The matter of reducing Hungary's reparations burden was brought up at the Paris Peace Conference by the American assistant secretary of state for economic affairs, who thought that the country could not meet its obligation of $ 300 million without endangering political stability. Arguing that in signing the Armistice Agreement the United States reserved the right to reopen the question of reparation obligations, he sought their modification.[55] This was a minor diplomatic success for Hungarians who were pressing the U. S. to bring up the problem at the Conference. It could not bring any result against Soviet wishes; neither could such a gesture counterbalance U. S. inaction in connection with the territorial dispute over Transylvania, which was settled in Romania's favor without the slightest concession to Hungary.

In view of the arrest of opposition politicians falsely charged with "conspiracy to overthrow the republic" in early 1947, Szegedy-Maszák, the pro-western ambassador in Washington approached Barbour, the head of the Southeast Division of the State Department, to elicit an expression of American interest in maintaining democratic elements in Hungary. To strengthen Nagy in the crisis Barbour replied that his government was seeking ways to give economic assistance to Hungary.[56] Freeman Matthews arrived at the conclusion that the political struggle in Hungary was probably entering its most crucial stage and was considering "what steps, if any should be taken to assist the democratic elements".[57]

Secretary of State Marshall wished to forestall Communist efforts to weaken democratic elements in Hungary, but did not specify what exactly should be done. He stated the American position that no further concessions should be given to the Communists. He added that economic aid and means to make it available were being considered, but admitted that "difficulties have arisen as to possible sources of financing such assistance".[58]

Schonefeld modified his earlier view and suggested economic aid aimed at supporting a general rehabilitation plan to increase its political effectiveness.[59] However, Barbour informed Freeman Matthews that Eximbank would not approve of a general rehabilitation loan and the U. S. was not in the position to hold out hope for economic help as suggested by Schonefeld. As a stopgap measure it was decided that: (1) a $ 15 million increase in surplus property could be granted immediately; (2) previously denied cotton credit of $ 10 million could be arranged; (3) post UNRRA relief to Hun-

gary to be considered by congress as a matter of urgency.[60] These measures would be announced slowly so as to demonstrate continuous American interest in Hungary. "According to diplomatic circles," said The New York Times, the extension of the surplus credit was "calculated to strengthen the hands of the government in Budapest and the Smallholders Party which are under increasing pressure of the Communists".[61] Senator Ball of Minnesota asked the Secretary of State to "publicly protest most strongly the Communist purge now going on, stating that this is laying the ground for a Communist putsch".[62] Following the arrest of Béla Kovács, the general secretary of the Smallholders Party, by Soviet authorities, Undersecretary of State Hickerson urged energetic action, including the submission of the matter to the U. N.[63] U. S. policy attempted to salvage Hungary from Soviet domination. The State Department's quest for economic assistance to halt the political trend in Hungary met with refusal. The traditional pattern prevailed, namely that American business did not necessarily follow politics. Eximbank again refused to float a loan for political purposes. The State Department thought that no economic assistance other than humanitarian aid should be given to Romania so as not to strengthen the totalitarian regime there. Proving that the above statement on politics and business works both ways, the memorandum states that the U. S. government will not interfere with the $ 7.5 million loan the Romanians managed to get from Chase Manhattan Bank nor with the further $ 50 million under negotiation.[64] Economic relations between the United States and Hungary worsened again. The Hungarian Reparation Committee refused to redress Standard Oil's complaint against using the company for reparation purposes.[65] The government refused to pay for shipments made by American-owned companies on the pretext of protecting the balance of budget while the claim for payment was recognized to be valid. Trade relations were not satisfactory either. Szegedy-Maszák complained that there was not enough embassy staff to pursue wide range commercial activity, but because of the "rudimentary state of commercial relations and to save money" he did not recommend setting up a permanent commercial representation, but proposed to subscribe to the Journal of Commerce.[66] Until February 1947 Hungary, along with Romania, Bulgaria and Germany, was an "E" category country meaning that all exports over $ 25 to these countries needed a license. The ministry of commerce justified lifting the measure by citing the general U. S. policy of treating Hungary as a democratic state, a bit belatedly considering that the country had its internationally recognized democratic elections in 1945. This may be explained by the prospect of Hungarian compensation for American exports. Paprika, wine, feathers and meat were the traditional goods exported to the U. S., among which the export of meat products was expected to bring the best results. In 1947 the New York Hamex Trading Company imported Hungarian goose liver pate, for which the American meat inspectors refused an import permit, ostensibly because it could not accept certificates issued by Hungarian animal health authorities. The Secretary of State informed the Hungarian legation that the Department of Agriculture needed more information on the efficiency of that system.[67] Although earlier the U. S. recognized Hungarian and American meat inspection regulations to be comparable, the American Legation asked for the Hungarian text and an English transla-

tion for the Department of Agriculture.[68] The Secretary of Agriculture reversed an earlier position by refusing to accept meat inspection regulations. The Hungarian side was also to blame. The text they sent to the U. S. did not contain full information.[69] At this point the Hungarian Department of Agriculture sent an oral message through the foreign ministry, stating the American secretary of agriculture earlier had recognized Hungarian meat inspection regulations and their implementation to be equivalent to the American standards. It was requested that Hungary be removed from the list of countries under prohibition drawn up in 1938 because of foot and mouth disease since this "does not exist at this juncture on the whole territory of Hungary but in two communities".[70]

The affair dragged on into 1949, when the minister of commerce reported that U. S. authorities were obstructing the importation of Hungarian meat and meat products on the pretext that there was no animal health treaty in effect between the two countries. Since the minister saw a possibility to raise exports to the U. S. from an annual $ 1.5 million to $ 2.3 million by exporting meat products, he suggested the conclusion of such a treaty, but was turned down by the Foreign Ministry.[71]Hungary then decided to send samples of veterinarians' signatures. This was not a simple commercial decision: it was made by the political department of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party. This was true for the Americans, too, who kept finding something wrong with the documents submitted to them. The whole business bears resemblance to the American–German "pork" or "trichinae" dispute of the 1870's or the similar one between Hungary and Germany in 1932.[73] A shipment of paprika was refused by the FSA with the explanation that it did not meet U. S. health regulations, although the quality of this shipment was the same as those going to America for decades. The decision was "obviously due to the cavil of American authorities".[74] Obstructing the sale of paprika was a hard blow since this was Hungary's fifth largest export item to the U. S. in the period between 1934–1937.

American reluctance to trade with Hungary was countered by further Soviet economic penetration. Szegedy-Maszák summed up the objectives of the Soviet offensive: to extend Russian grip on Hungarian capital assets; to integrate Hungary into the Russian economic system; to achieve an exclusive Communist control of the economy through nationalization.[75] The Soviet Union did not support the idea of tripartite action for Hungary's rehabilitation and refused to release information on its economic and financial state to foreign missions except through the chairman of the ACC. Beside gaining control of heavy industry, they had the power to dismantle and remove factories considered to be German assets under the Potsdam Declaration. It was up to Hungarians to prove non-German ownership in a short period of time. The Hungarian government was made liable for creditors' claims on properties handed over to the USSR. Austrian owned assets were taken as German regardless of the circumstances of their acquisition. For example, the Hungarian interests of the Austrian Creditanstalt Bankverein were transferred to the USSR despite the ACC decision in Vienna that it was Austrian. Prior to the war the French Schneider Creusot group held 16% of Hungarian General Credit Bank stock, which in turn controlled almost 40% of Hungarian

industry. This 16% was transferred to Dresdnerbank after the German occupation of Paris. Another 2% was held by the Rothschild group in Austria. The Soviets seized both blocks of stock in spite of Hungarian, French and Austrian protests. However, at American representations they failed to acquire IT&T on the basis of a 14% holding of a German company; a 55% U. S. interest in Ford Motor Company was effectively protected.[76]

The Soviet Union claimed payments on a valorized basis of German claims against Hungarian industry. Hungary had a clearing agreement with Germany the balance of which had been overwhelmingly in Hungary's favor. Hungarian claims against Germany were waived by Article 30 paragraph 4 of the Paris Peace Treaty except those before September 1, 1939. The terminology of the Potsdam Declaration opened the way for Russia to claim all amounts due to Germany. Contemporary estimates placed the Soviet demand on these grounds at $ 158 million. In addition, inflation destroyed the working capital of the national economy, so that few companies could settle their debt to Soviet companies in cash, forcing them to turn over shares to the Soviets.

Soon after the arrest of Béla Kovács on anti-republic conspiracy charges, the prime minister Ferenc Nagy failed to return from his trip to Switzerland for fear of having to go through the same ordeal. In a memorandum to Molotov, the U. S. called the arrest of Kovács an unjustified interference in Hungary's affairs and demanded that the ACC and the Hungarian government examine and solve the issue, and that the Soviets take no further action without British and American approval.[77] But the proposal for tripartite action was rejected. It was decided that a new policy should be worked out. On March 8, 1947 Acheson allegedly mentioned to the British ambassador that Hungary was a country where independence and territorial integrity was closely related with the maintenance of Turkish and Greek independence.[78] In a telegram dated the same day, Schonefeld suggested that further action be considered by the administration.[79] However, on March 24 the British Ambassador was informed that the U. S. was considering economic aid rather than further political action. Acheson, stating that American protests had accomplished their task by emphasizing continued interest, reiterated to Schonefeld that no further political action would be taken, but economic assistance was being contemplated. Joint British American action was allegedly precluded by the fact that the Foreign Office did not fully agree with the March 8 and 17 American memoranda to the Soviet government.[80]

The resignation of Nagy created a new situation. The possibility appeared that the issue may be taken to the Security Council. Stronger action was never considered. Senator Vandenberg, qualifying the events as a Communist coup d'état rejected Senator Fulbright's motion to postpone the ratification of the peace treaty. Calling events in Hungary an ugly travesty on the word democracy, he declared that the U. S. "cannot deal with Hungary, a former enemy as it deals with Greece (a reference to Truman's containment speech). Hungary is under armed occupation by Soviet troops... Greece is an independent state. Hungary cannot, therefore ask or receive our aid in the Greek manner. They are parallel tragedies but cannot have parallel treatment".[81] Senator Eastland, concurring with Vandenberg demanded that the "Hungarian coup by Rus-

sia should be referred to the U. N. organization". He emphasized that the policy of appeasement as followed before World War II would again not work. Russia, he said violated the U. N. charter and the Yalta agreement. He proposed that the ratification of the Italian peace treaty be held in abeyance until the Hungarian issue was discussed in the U. N.[82] McClintock of the Office of Special Political Affairs of the State Department was of the opinion that "further invocation of the armistice agreements serves only to illustrate the futility of those agreements" but putting those events in spotlight might compel Russia to mitigate its politics in Hungary even if the Security Council could bring no specific decision because of Soviet veto.[83] Marshall told the British Foreign Office that unless a fact finding mission could operate in Hungary the U. S. government might refer the matter to an appropriate body of the U. N.[84] McKisson, a senior official of the State Department, concurred with the influential Vandenburg, recommending that U. S. action be carried through with the "utmost persistence... notwithstanding Soviet vetoes, until it may be possible to raise the matter in the general Assembly and press for action possibly on the basis of a general indictment of Soviet political actions in an entire East European area".[85] Even so, the American note handed over to Molotov made no reference to the Security Council. It again demanded the setting up of a three power commission to examine the situation, warning that the United States "will consider such further action as may be appropriate in the circumstances".[86] Why did the note not make a reference to the U. N.? This had to do with new developments on the international scene. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs expressed in his memorandum to Marshall that: (1) the Hungarian issue should be placed in a European context; (2) the support the U. S. would get from other countries in the U. N. was questionable. The British were unenthusiastic at first and did not join U. S. formal representations in the ACC; (3) "The Security Council is now considering the Greek case and the introduction of the Hungarian case into that body might well-deflect attention from that important matter." Thus, he proposed that submitting the case to the Security Council "should be postponed for the time being". Undersecretary of State Lovett and Marshall himself signalled their approval by writing their comment on the memorandum. Marshall then instructed the U. S. Embassy in London to inform the Foreign Office to this effect.[88]

The United States was eventually unwilling to push the Soviets on what was a relatively minor issue. Although further consideration was not ruled out, the fact that Hungary would have been discussed in the general East European context meant that the teeth of the action would have taken out anyway, not to mention the time factor, the fact that the Soviets were becoming more entrenched by the week. Beside the Greek issue, the lack of a common American–British resolution caused the issue to be dropped. Joint U. S.–British action might have influenced Stalin, who dreaded such an alliance against the Soviet Union. Hence his vehement reaction to Churchill's Fulton speech which he interpreted as a sign that such an alliance was in the making, and subsequently did his best to signal that he wished to "detach" the United States from Great Britain.[89]

The U. S. did not wish to alienate the Soviets over Hungary any further and as for

a possible Hungarian government in exile he declared that it would "serve no useful purpose".[90] Following Nagy's resignation Szegedy-Maszák announced that the would not execute the orders of the new government which he refused to regard as a free agent. However, he stated that this should not be interpreted as his resignation and he hoped to continue maintaining relations with the U. S. administration. Yet he was informed by Matthews that his mission was considered terminated and the new minister designate to Budapest, Chapin, would proceed to his new post.[91] Had the U. S. seriously considered diplomatic action, Chapin's deployment would have been stopped, at least until a final decision of action was made. The fact that the new minister was sent so hastily clearly demonstrated to the Soviets that the United States did not really mean business. Chapin criticized earlier American policy on Hungary, claiming that more support should have been given to Hungarian political claims, generous economic aid earlier would have been effective whereas now it might prove counter-productive. He thought that the Hungarian question should be taken to the Security Council before the new elections. He deemed the quick ratification of the Paris Treaty useful in order to remove legal unilateral power of the Soviet Union to intervene through the ACC.[92] In line with the American policy of non-involvement in domestic affairs, he did not think it useful to assist opposition parties financially. As a sign of the slight importance attached to Hungary no response was sent to Chapin's July 22 policy paper until the 6th of October. At that time Chapin thought many Hungarians felt abandoned by the U. S. and were emotionally unable to stand up against the challenge facing them. The Social Democratic Party called for strengthening and enforcing Hungary's "sincere, friendly relations with every progressive nation in the world, primarily with the Soviet Union, the neighboring countries, the democratic countries of the world and with the Social Democrats". According to the National Peasant Party — which was described as a communist fellow traveller, although with exceptions like Imre Kovács — "the United States, aware of its military and economic might is beginning to pursue an imperialist policy. President Truman's (March) speech is a veritable threat to the world... and (is) trying to gain a foothold in Hungary, and their two (March) memoranda mean that they are supporting the conspirators."[94] The Communists called for "closer contacts with the powers of peace and democracy (meaning the Soviet Union) and our neighbors".[95] In the coalition only the Smallholder Party pursued any pro-western policy, but even this party witnessed a change after Nagy's resignation. Dinnyés, the new pro-communist prime minister underlined the need for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union "while maintaining good relations with the United States and the British Empire".[96] One of the most influential opposition politicians, Dezső Sulyok, was for a policy of strict neutrality. His views were not altogether alien to the Smallholder foreign minister, Gyöngyösi, either.

The August parliamentary elections were burdened with fraud. The Communists cast many thousand fraudulent votes; hundreds of thousands were disenfranchised on false grounds; in November Zoltán Pfeiffer's Magyar Függetlenségi Párt — the strongest non-coalition party which received 13.4% of the votes in the August election — was deprived of its mandates on the pretext of cheating at the elections. The State De-

partment initiated a joint U. S.–British protest and instructed Chapin to seek an interview with the Prime Minister to urge him to take steps for the correction of abuses.[97] Chapin thought that "Soviet expansionism should be opposed by all legitimate means at our command short of actual collision", rather than retreat westward, yet he deemed U. N. action untimely, and admitted that it would take a miracle to halt Hungary's incorporation into the Soviet system.[98] An official answer finally arrived to Chapin's policy paper in October, outlining the essence of American policy. It noted that further U. S. action would depend on broader European development. "It must be recognized that Hungary itself is unlikely to become focal point of U. S. policy... issues which are taking shape in U. S.–Soviet relations are unlikely (to) assume most acute form in connection with Hungarian development." The State Department saw no possibility to provide funds and facilities to aid escaping Hungarians.[99]

Following the nonacceptance of the Marshall plan by Eastern Europe and the political developments there, the United States entered a new phase of economic and foreign policy towards that region, treating it for the first time as a homogeneous bloc of hostile countries. Economic and trade relations with these nations were raised to the level of national security policy.

In a paper submitted to the newly created National Security Council, Secretary of Commerce Harriman stated that by refusing to cooperate in the European Recovery Program, the USSR and its East European Satellites constituted a threat to world peace and U. S. security. In response, American national security required that shipping be stopped of all commodities that were needed in the U. S. or would help Soviet military potential. Europe and the USSR should be an area with controlled exports to avoid "overt acts of arbitrary discrimination against the USSR and its satellites".[100] This paper was America's first, symbolic move towards the creation of the Cold War system in Europe and set the pattern for American policy toward the "East Bloc" for the decades to come. Since this violated the avowed policy of free trade, Marshall wished to have it declared that the policy of normal trade would be readopted after the recovery program, and that goods in short supply should not be used for a detrimental purpose. The State Department thought it unnecessary for the U. S. to reverse its general trade policy reflected in the IMF or the World Bank, or to revert to economic warfare. National security justified exceptions to normal economic relations with the Soviet sphere, like acts increasing Soviet military potential, acts diminishing American economic welfare without contributing to recovery, the extension of credits except those expressly beneficial for America or in recovery programs it was involved in. Contries included in this policy were put into three groups. Group 1: USSR, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania; Group 2: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet zone of Germany; Group 3: Finland and Austria; the first group receiving the most rigorous, the last the most liberal treatment. The policy was not to be publicized in any way. The specific provisions of the policy were to be: (1) No military goods should be shipped to the Soviet zone. (2) Semi-military goods could be made permissible for groups II and III for civilian use, to be controlled by the proposed Munitions Control Act. (3) Capital equipment which permanently add to the capacity of industries close-

ly associated with production of war materials may be made available to Group III only. Curtailment of exports in this category could be undertaken cautiously to permit evaluation of Soviet reaction and its significance mainly in terms of availability of food, timber products and coal to Western Europe. (4) Other capital equipment and consumer goods could flow freely accept for those in short supply. (5) Goods used in production of atomic energy should not be shipped to the Soviet sphere. (6) The flow of the most valuable und unique types of information should be stopped. (7) Credits should be controlled both in the government and in the private sphere. International Bank loans could be granted to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia only in the Soviet sphere since these are member countries. This policy should be in line with the Bretton Woods agreements, that is credit policies are to be governed by economic considerations.[101] The policy of restriction was supported by the argument that the Soviet sphere held no vital U. S. economic interest, the only important import items being manganese, iridium and chrome. According to the Advisor of the Division of Commercial policy 31% of manganese, 47% of chrome and 57% of imported platinum came from the USSR.[102] Later it was a recurrent theme that the U. S. was heavily dependent on the import of these items from the USSR and losing these supplies could lead to crisis.

Article 94 of the ITO draft saying that action may be taken to protect national security interest in emergency situations was quoted to counter the argument that the U. S. had most favored nation treaties with most of these countries. The State Department envisioned no special controls for European shipments and no control at all for goods not in short supply. The Department of Commerce and the National Security Council wanted a more rigid policy: the screening of all shipments to Europe, providing no loophole for exports of non eligible goods for the Soviet area. The question was if the U. S. should uphold the principle of free trade or submit to the political necessity of national security and the containment of the Soviet Union. The policy planning staff believed this trade was insignificant enough to support the views held by the Department of Commerce, while the paper submitted by the Division of Commercial Policy thought it was significant enough to support the less rigid State Department view. The effective control of shipments posed serious technical problems, which served as a counter argument for the Commercial Department. Overall, the Policy Planning staff believed the loophole provided by ineffective screening inherent in the State's proposal "does not warrant extreme corrective measures which might embarrass our policy [of free trade] in other fields" because U. S.–Eastern bloc trade was insignificant.[103] The significant difference between the State and the Commerce Departments' views were not in goals but means. The Commerce Department wanted no embargoed products to reach the Soviet sphere by screening all European exports to avoid overt discrimination. The State Department, wanting to conclude the ITO agreement, wished to avoid violating the principle of free trade openly, and thus recommended open embargo on some goods but free flow of others even if the allowed loopholes endangered the policy objective itself.

A solution would have been to add more commodities to the world-wide restriction

list, but this would have placed a larger burden on the Department of Commerce. Eventually the National Security Council[104] adopted the proposal drafted by Commerce, with stricter control for perceived national security interests prevailing over the lofty principle of free trade so often declared by American leaders from Wilson to F. D. Roosevelt. "This procedure achieves total control of shipments to Eastern Europe without apparent discrimination which might lead to retaliation but in such a way that a quid pro quo be established for imports from that area."[105] From March 1, 1948, all commodities to Eastern Europe were subject to individual licensing. Later that month senior State Department economic policy makers discussed the possibility of economic warfare. The objective would be to inflict the greatest economic injury to the USSR and its satellites, while minimizing damage from Soviet retaliation and the inability of the East to continue export to the West.[106] Since East–West trade was seen as an important factor in Western European recovery, with grain, timber and coal obtained from Eastern Europe, "Soviet bloc" trade with ERP countries amounted to $ 1.5 billion in 1947, Marshall recommended that "key commodities" should be denied, while trade in other commodities be put on a *quid pro quo* basis to secure the flow of certain strategic materials from Eastern Europe.

As a departure from earlier policies, he recommended that Western Europe and Canada be persuaded not to provide alternative sources in commodities the U. S. was denying Eastern Europe.[107] The contradictory objectives of preventing the increase of Eastern European military potential through export controls and the maintenance of "necessary" Eastern exports to Western Europe like the "adequate flow" of manganese, chrome, platinum to the U. S. had to be balanced. The ad hoc subcommittee of the Secretary of Commerce reported that would reduce steel output "to a seriously low level within one year. Strenuous and unpopular conservation measures may be required". The paper advised the export of plentiful, non-strategic items in return for manganese and chrome. For this purpose items were to be grouped according to strategic importance. Group I would contain articles of direct military or strategic importance which forbidden to the Eastern Bloc export, while license items in less restricted groups would be allowed on the basis of economic or political concessions. It was imperative that Western Europe be persuaded through diplomatic channels to follow economic policies consistent with those of the U. S.[108] The U. S. was by now following a policy of economic coercion to the detriment of its economic interests. Coercion was to be applied through export controls to get results which hitherto escaped diplomatic efforts. Western Europe was to be persuaded to do the same, but without foiling their recovery.

The American ambassador in London was instructed to seek British cooperation in withholding rubber purchased by the Soviet Union from Singapore.[109] The Secretary of State instructed the embassy in Paris to initiate negotiations with ERP countries for their agreement in an export control program based on the recognition of common purpose while assuring East bloc imports essential for Western recovery. The list of prohibited items should be the same for ERP countries as for the U. S. though the latter might pursue a more restrictive policy, since its trade with the East was less signifi-

cant.[110] The effect of licensing was felt immediately. The requests for export licenses went unanswered for months, even for commodities that were not prohibited. In one instance Hungary ordered fire fighting equipment but the license did not appear. The Hungarian ministry was then informed that the Office of International Trade was slow at responding, not because of principle but for technical reasons. 15 000 export license requests were said to arrive weekly and more than 37 000 were unanswered at the time.[111] Difficulties came in ordering a transformer part since "because of special restrictions all shipments to Hungary face severe obstacles". Secretary of Commerce Sawyer promised to hasten the licensing procedure, but refused to order the Office of International Trade to license the fire equipment, which reportedly was recently introduced in Hungary against severe British competition.[112] Machines ordered by the Hungarian government awaiting the license included generators and lathes, some 42 types of industrial necessities.[113]

On the other hand, Americans complained that their firms in Hungary had no control over employees, production or products' disposition. Profits could not be transferred to the U. S. or used on normal expenditure. MAORT had to produce at prices which did not cover production costs, Vacuum Oil had not been paid for a large proportion of deliveries even at the low price set by the government, though it was required to restore damaged plant equipment. Its oil allocation was decreased. For these reasons a joint protest was made with the British legation on behalf of Vacuum Oil and Shell Oil. Ford was facing liquidation because of the loss and damage of its plant equipment for which no compensation was paid and because it failed to obtain import permits and the dollar exchange necessary for importing cars.[114] In retaliation, restitution to Hungary from the American zone was suspended until settlement of indemnities for American property seized by the Soviet Union. The problem of American companies was discussed by American and Soviet officials in a series of talks. The Americans complained about the damaging overproduction of MAORT ordered by the Hungarians, which would reduce their own investment return, and might later be charged against them as sabotage.[115] Vas, chief of the Economic High Council, replied that this economic question would be discussed with MAORT. He also promised to withdraw state managers sent to American owned companies. American attitude to nationalization was a conciliatory one. Secretary of State Marshall stated that nationalization programs in foreign countries fall within the jurisdiction of each country concerned, but the U. S. would insist on prompt, adequate and effective compensation for American owners involved. The United States would not take retaliatory action for the nationalization of its banking interest, American general attitude held that nationalization should take place "without discrimination".[116] However the Ajka power plant belonging to American-owned Tungsram was nationalized without indemnification. Chapin protested to the communist foreign minister Erik Molnár about the 1948 Nationalization Decree, which did not recognize the American citizenship of Hungarians nationalized after 1931 and consequently U. S. ownership of companies held by such persons. He expressed his wish that the Decree would be non applicable to American interest as far as discrimination was concerned.[117] Molnár replied that the criticized pro-

visions of the law were to forestall abuse of foreign citizenship. Hungary held that it was not the nationality of the stockholder, but the country in which it was incorporated which determined the nationality of the company. Companies with foreign ownership would receive compensation if they were nationalized. The American ownership of Standard Electric was recognized with a statement that it would not be nationalized. By August, discussions on implementing Articles 26 and 30 of the peace treaty reached an impasse, since neither side was willing for a compromise.[118] Also, the officials of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry were not competent to discuss key issues. An American participant thought that if the present trend continued "the Hungarian government would get everything they asked for without giving anything".[119] After twelve meetings practically the problems of war damages claims and nationalization were not solved.

Hungarians were unwilling give up their position on subsidiaries being regarded as Hungarian. MAORT did not get an increase in prices, nor was the state controller removed. There was no progress in Vacuum's oil allocation or tax exemption. No time limit was set for compensations. The Americans felt that even with minor concessions, not enough progress was made to discuss the restitution of remaining Hungarian property.[120] The Hungarians felt the nationalization decree was not discriminatory for American citizens and emphasized that Hungary had the right to set the conditions as a sovereign state. In turn, the U. S. legation protested again against putting U. S. citizens into arbitrary categories and nationalizing companies owned by American but controlled by Hungarian corporations. They demanded that compensation procedures for American citizens whose properties were nationalized be set up immediately, reiterating that according to the 1925 treaty of friendship the property of American nationals shall not be taken without due process of law and without the payment of just compensation. No positive answer came with the reply, reiterating the previous Hungarian position.[121] In retaliation for the suspension of Article 26 the Hungarian government did the same for Article 30. The Foreign Ministry refused to reply to any U. S. inquiry about war damages for a number of American companies in a note dated October 20, even though damage claims for these companies had been submitted much earlier.[122]

In the meantime, the American president and technical advisor of MAORT were taken into custody on charges of sabotage. Remember, earlier that year an American note demanded the halting of overproduction to preclude possible charges of sabotage. Acting Secretary of State Lovett wanted to secure the release of the two Americans even to the detriment of MAORT, and was considering countermeasures like denying visas and closing the New York and Cleveland consulates.[123] The Americans were released after lengthy diplomatic efforts, but the Hungarian government took control of the management of MAORT, including that of all assets and rights, on the pretext of wanting to "prevent willful sabotage of the production of crude oil". All charges brought against Hungarian and American MAORT leadership were entirely false, and their trial was one of many Soviet-type procedures where the verdict was brought beforehand to eliminate potential opponents of the new regime.

In 1950 the State Department worked out a long range policy paper for Hungary. General objectives like the revival of independent Hungary, securing for the Hungarian people to choose their own government, free trade, were deemed unattainable "until a major shift in international relations were brought about"; the Truman doctrine was held inapplicable for Hungary. A set of immediate goals were worked out, which aimed at the withdrawal of Soviet troops in the framework of an Austrian treaty, maintenance of U. S. prestige, protection of American rights where possible, implementation of human rights provisions in the peace treaty, stimulation of resistance against totalitarian rule, development of trade relations between Hungary and Western Europe, preservation of Hungarian economic ties to the West without aiding its war potential. A policy paper for Romania contained essentially the same recommendations. This contradicted the policy adopted by the Department of Commerce and the National Security Council to bring Western Europe in line with the American policy of embargo. Negotiations were under way to secure the agreement of OEEC countries to withhold certain specified strategic goods from export to Hungary. The Foreign Assistance Co-relation Committee thought that considerable success had already been achieved in this but warned that the negotiations of restrictions extending beyond items of clearly military nature was extremely delicate because of the great importance of East–West trade to many of the ERP countries. The Trizone of Germany was embargoing the full I A list, just like Austria, Italy and Norway; Denmark was controlling nearly the full list. Great Britain put controls over 128 items out of the 163 on the U. S. list, while France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg had initiated concurrence with the British list. Portugal, Iceland, Ireland, Greece and Turkey had no trade with Eastern Europe in I A items and prevented their shipment through their countries.[124]

Assuming that Soviet policy's objective remained the destruction and communization of the Western World, the American ambassador in Moscow believed that since the East was economically dependent on the West "Western trade policies towards the countries under Bolshevik leadership" were an effective alternative to the "disastrous consequences of Soviet industrial expansion".[125] At the Paris meeting of U. S. ambassadors it was agreed that U. S. Eastern trade policy be reviewed to determine if it was feasible to achieve greater effectiveness with multilateral action, and also if restrictions on East–West trade contributed to reducing industrial output or preventing expansion of industrial production in the Soviet orbit and caused economic strain between the Soviet Union and its satellites.[126]

With the Prague coup in February 1948, and the merger of the Social Democrats with the Communists in Hungary in the summer of the same year, the long descent of the iron curtain from Stettin to Trieste had finally ended. In 1949 the Cominform ranked Hungary among the People's Democracies, rather among those 'bourgeois' countries which 'contained elements of people's democracy'. This prompted Communist leaders to speed up the elimination of private enterprise and the collectivization of agriculture, and to introduce a centrally planned economy. By then, owners had no working capital because they could not resist nationalization which was part of the institutional system's transformation.[127] Vacuum Oil was brought to a state of virtual

economic collapse by failure to pay for the delivery of petroleum products, arbitrary price reductions, tax discrimination, reduction of crude oil allocations, and complete control of the company's operations.[128] By the autumn of 1949 the moveables of Ford were seized by the State owned company, MOGÜRT. UNIO Textilművek (Textileworks) was ordered to liquidate in September. The decree was not delivered to the firm or shareholders while its machinery and equipment were illegally moved to other firms.[129] In October the 90% American owned Royal Ipari és Kereskedelmi Rt. (Industrial and Commercial Ltd.) was placed under "national control". Borsodvidéki Bányaipari Rt. (Mining Ltd.), which had been exempted from the nationalization provisions of Act XIII of the Decree of 1946, was nationalized at the order of the Ministry of Industry. Small companies were not spared either. One example is the nationalization of Autóipari Kft. (Autoindustry Ltd.) owned by Szunyog, an American citizen who left Hungary in 1938. After protest by the U. S. legation, the Foreign Ministry found that the Ministry of Domestic Trade was "careless" in its action. The article on the basis of which the company's nationalization was ordered was inapplicable in this case and thus the action was "illegal". The Ministry of Domestic Trade then quoted another, equally incorrect, paragraph. At this point the Foreign Ministry demanded that they nullify the decision or find a proper reason that could be defended in face of the U. S. legation. The answer was that on legal reason could be provided: "it is hard to understand why the Foreign Ministry is so arrogant, they too are aware of what economic policy interests motivate nationalization". The Foreign Ministry remarked that this was not the first such instance.[130] Eventually the decision was not reversed. Nationalization was carried out overzealously by officials obviously eager to please their superiors, and the pattern of inter-departmental rivalry was not absent either. Foreign business was entirely driven out, which may not have been the original objective.

The aim of Hungarian trade policy with the West was twofold — to obtain strategic goods for non-strategic ones and at the same time to sever these relations as much as possible. However, the program of industrialization could not proceed without machinery and equipment from outside the Eastern bloc. Hungarian exports were unable to compensate imports, since Hungarian industry lacked modern exportable commodities. Exports were inhibited by political motives as well. American British Technology, Inc. wished to order 60 000 feet of seamless casing from Ganz Company, Budapest. The Minister of Foreign Trade, however, doubted whether "it would be all right in principle to accept such an order".[131] In 1947, Hungarian exports to the U. S. amounted to 140 million forints, with imports of 280 million forints.[132] In February 1949 Hungary claimed import came to 3.6 million forints, out of which 1.4 million were accounted for by chemical products (roughly 30%), 0.5 million by the machine and 150 000 by the electronic industry. Exports were 3.7 million forints, out of which 60% was from bed feathers. Second in importance was medicine (786 000 forints) and third glassware (196 000 forints). The figures for May were 10.4 million forints in imports, which agricultural products accounting for approximately 60%, followed by chemical, textile and electronic goods. Exports dropped to 2.6 million forints out of

which bed feathers were over 70%. In February of 1950 imports from the U. S. equalled 34 million forints, while exports were a mere 2 million.

In 1949 the total value of American–Hungarian turnover was less than $ 8 million compared to over $ 38 million in 1947.[133] Conspicuously absent from the list of exports are meat and meat products which were the main export items to the United States before the war, until exclusion from the American market by the animal health dispute. Although Hungary was unable fully to realize its project of reducing the value of Western trade in the realization of national income, the percentage in Hungarian exports dropped from 34% in 1950 to 17.5% in 1953. The figures for imports were 43% in 1950 and 27.3% in 1953.[134] Still, Hungary had a relatively high share of "capitalist" trade in Comecon. For example, in 1949 Hungary was the best market in the Soviet sphere for American motor vehicles.[135]

1949 saw a further deterioration of American–Hungarian relations. A State Department press release following the arrest of Cardinal Mindszenty stated that "the people of the United States are sickened and horrifed by these developments and fully comprehend the threat they constitute to free institutions everywhere". Yet the State Department advised the President not to support Mindszenty in fear of an adverse result.[136] A concurrent resolution in the Senate recommended that the Mindszenty and Stepinac (Yugoslavia) cases be submitted to the General Assembly of the U. N. as violations of the U. N. charter.

The National Security Council, following a policy paper prepared by the policy planning staff, recommended endorsement of a new policy more in line with the doctrine of containment than the previous one had been. It emphasized offensive measures as opposed to the defensive ones thus far pursued, to halt "the west-ward advance of Communism... in the current two-world struggle (the Eastern European satellite states) have meaning primarily because they are in varying degree politico-military adjuncts of Soviet power and extend that power to the heart of Europe. They are part of the Soviet monolith".[137] The recognition of sovereignty for the minor 'allies' of the Soviet Union was now being questioned. They became primary targets of "negative" American policy adopted from late 1947 on, as opposed to their secondary importance in the earlier period, when U. S. policy towards the Soviet Union was a "positive" one. "Positive" policy means one of cooperation where the support of the national interest of the small East European states and U. S. interest in those countries were subordinated to the primary objective of seeking a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. In the new "negative", confrontationist policy these small nations gained a primary role by being looked upon as potential instruments of reducing the Soviet Union's influence in Europe. It is worth giving thought to a scenario where in the period of "cooperation" these countries might have been given the same role as in that of confrontation. Although the conclusions of NSC 58 are not available, based on what we have plus the preparatory documents, the policy objective set by the paper was the uncoupling of the satellite states by economic pressure and other means short of war.

By 1950 the Cold War system had been established. Our case history followed this process in Hungary. We have shown that Soviet influence in the country was more

profound than a legitimate need of a friendly government would justify. The pattern of the Sovietization of Hungary followed a different course from that of Romania, Bulgaria or Poland, where the Gleischaltung of the economic and social systems were preceded by that of political leadership. In Hungary the instalment of a Soviet puppet regime was preceded by the elimination of the traditional economic structure. This manifested itself in the Soviet domination of heavy industry, mining and transport, and the reorientation of Hungarian foreign trade towards the Soviet Union. This was prepared by the exhaustion of Hungary's resources through various forms of reparations, the domination of key economic positions by pro-Soviet political elements, the signing of an exclusive economic agreement.

The United States never directly supported Hungarian resistance to economic or political penetration. The use of financial assistance to strengthen anti-Soviet political forces or resistance was continuously refused. No support was given to the effort of refusing the ratification of the 1945 economic treaty with the Soviet Union. The legitimacy of the Dinnyés government after Nagy's forced resignation was accepted. Imports from Hungary were kept at a minimum, and no attempt was made to promote new investments there. Even the principle of a trade agreement with the country was refused until the Peace Treaty was signed. There were attempts to protect the minimal existing business interests like Ford Co. or MAORT, but only as far as it was justified by their legitimate interests, that is remaining in business. No attempt was made to promote expansion or to violate Soviet or Hungarian business enterprises. Political action was taken with the Soviet Union directly in order to preserve Hungary's economic independence, but intervention for this end always kept the wider objective of modus vivendi with that power in sight, which was not to be prejudiced by positive action on behalf of such an unimportant country to the United States. Indeed, not only Hungary but the whole region was of such secondary importance in terms of economy, that it was not difficult to implement economic sanctions against Eastern Europe without endangering vital interests. When this was done, embargo threatened the interests of American steel industry, and the recovery of Western Europe which was to some extent dependent on East–West trade. This in turn might have had an adverse effect on American economy as a whole, even if indirectly.

Rather than American economic imperialism there was a pattern of Soviet economic penetration which prepared the ground for the full Sovietization of the country.

Notes

1. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Cold War Revisited.* In: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Cycles of American History* (Boston, 1986) p. 164.
2. Pető, Iván and Szakács, Sándor, *A hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története, 1945–1980* (The History of Four decades of Hungarian Economy, 1945–1980), Vol. I (Budapest, 1985) p. 162.
3. Robert James Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (Princeton, 1973) p. 25. For revisionist accounts of the Cold War see e.g. William Appelman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1962); Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War, the War and United States Foreign*

Policy 1943–1945 (New York, 1965). Also a revisionist, although not New Left account Lynn Etherdige Davis, *The Cold War Begins: Soviet American Conflict over Eastern Europe* (Princeton, 1974).

4. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Emerging Post Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War. Diplomatic History* 7/3 (Summer 1983).
5. Kenneth W. Thompson, *Cold War Theories* (Baton Rouge, London 1981).
6. Gottfried Haberler, *The Economic Consequences of a Divided World.* In: Stephen D. Kertész, *The Fate of East Central Europe.* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1956) p. 381.
7. Nicolas Spulber, *Problems of East West Trade and Economic Trends in the European Satellites of Soviet Russia.* In: Stephen D. Kertész, *op. cit.* pp. 399–401.
8. Gottfried Haberler, *op. cit.*
9. Pető and Szakács, *op. cit.* pp. 93–94.
10. Sipos, Péter and Vida, István, The Policy of the United States towards Hungary during the Second World War. *Acta Scientiarum Hungariae* 29 (1983) pp. 79–110.
11. National Archives Department of State (later NA. Dept. of State) Decimal File (later DF.) 40078-2145.
12. A prominent banker, Ullman approached Schonefeld for U. S. financial support to be given to the Smallholders' Party. Schonefeld responded in the negative. Schonefeld to Secretary of State. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00 1–1345.
13. Pető and Szakács, *op. cit.* pp. 90–91.
14. *Ibid.* p. 21.
15. NA. Dept. of State.
16. Pető, Iván Szakács, Sándor, *op. cit.* pp. 52–53.
17. *Ibid.* pp. 64–65.
18. The Foreign Relations of the United States (later FRUS) Vol. IV. 1945.
19. FRUS Vol. IV. 1945.
20. Schonefeld to the Secretary of State. FRUS Vol. IV. 1945.
21. FRUS Vol. IV. 1945. November 30.
22. FRUS Vol. IV. 1945. November 18.
23. Új Magyar Központi Levéltár (New Hungarian State Archives, later ÚMKL) XIXJ 1 Box 51 500214/1945. Vacuum Oil to the Minister of Industry.
24. FRUS Vol. IV. 1945. pp. 921–922.
25. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 51 23/d 1945.
26. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 51 23/d 1946.
27. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 51 23/d 40.150/4/1946.
28. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 51 23/d 40.803/4/1946.
29. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 51 23/d 42.254/4/1946.
30. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 51 23/c 40.579/1946.
31. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 3955 407.394/1946. Ferenc Nagy to János Gyöngyösi April 1946.
32. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 40.751/1946.
33. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 40.736/4/1946. The Reparations Committee to the Foreign Minister.
34. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 41.132/4/1946.
35. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 41.133/4/1946.
36. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 41.132/4/1946.
37. Pető and Szakács, *op. cit.* p. 74.
38. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 31.4/076/46.
39. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 9 4/640/4/46. Paper prepared by the Hungarian Legation in Washington August 3, 1946.
40. Schonefeld to the Secretary of State May 2, 1946. FRUS Vol. VI. 1946. pp. 293–294.
41. Memorandum of Conversation by Robert McKisson of the SE. Division. FRUS Vol. VI. 1946. pp. 228–229.
42. The Acting Secretary of State to Steinhardt September 28, 1946. FRUS Vol. VI. 1946. pp. 228–229.

43. The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary August 30, 1946. FRUS Vol. VI. 1946. pp. 216–217.
44. Memorandum of Conversation by Howard J. Hilton Jr. of the Division of Commercial Policy October 25, 1946. FRUS Vol. VI. 1946. pp. 641–642.
45. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union March 5, 1946. FRUS Vol. VI. 1946. pp. 269–270.
46. Department of State Bulletin 1946. pp. 228–232.
47. *Op. cit.* pp. 263–265.
48. *Op. cit.* pp. 638–639. Also in The New York Times, September 25, 1946.
49. Freeman to Schonefeld. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/12-646-2. # 1072 June 6, 1946.
50. Schonefeld to the Secretary of State. NA. Dept of State DF. 864.00 112-646-2 # 1072 June 6.
51. For the argument and documentation see Stanley M. Max, *The Anglo–American Response to the Sovietization of Hungary* (Ann Arbor, Michigan. 1983).
52. See Balogh, Sándor, *Magyarország külpolitikája 1945–1950* (The Foreign Policy of Hungary 1945–1950) (Budapest, 1988).
53. The New York Times, April 20, 1946.
54. NA. Dept. of State DF. 711.64/6-1346. June 13, 1946.
55. Department of State Bulletin, 1946. pp. 746–748.
56. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864/00/71–15. Memorandum of conversation between Szegedy-Maszák and Barbour January 15, 1947.
57. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/1-2347. Freeman to Acheson January 23, 1947.
58. Marshall to the American Legation in Budapest January 27, 1947. NA. Dept. of State. DF. 864.00/1-2047.
59. Schonefeld to the Secretary of State January 27, 1947. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/1-2047.
60. Marshall to the American Legation in Budapest February 11, 1947. FRUS Vol. IV. 1947. pp. 268–269.
61. The New York Times, February 15, 1947.
62. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/2-2247.
63. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/3-147. Hickerson to Acheson.
64. FRUS Vol. IV. 1947. pp. 482–484.
65. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 25/c. Reparations Committee to Standard Oil February 11, 1947.
66. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 25/c. Szegedy-Maszák to the Foreign Ministry December 10, 1946.
67. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 25/c. July 22, 1947.
68. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 25/c 44.454/4/46. November 14, 1947.
69. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 25/c 44.454/5/46.
70. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 25/c 44.740/48.
71. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 25/c 1698. January 14, 1949.
72. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 25/b. December 21, 1949.
73. See David M. Pletcher, *Awkward Years: American Foreign Relations under Arthur and Garfield* (Columbia, Mo., 1962) and Pritz Pál, *Magyarország külpolitikája Gömbös Gyula miniszterelnöksége idején* (The Foreign Policy of Hungary under Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös) (Budapest, 1982).
74. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 25/c 13784. December 19, 1947.
75. Szegedy-Maszák to the Secretary of State June 2, 1947. FRUS Vol. IV. 1947. pp. 304–305.
76. NA. Dept. of State DF. 4.50/5747. Memorandum on Soviet economic penetration of Hungary. Schonefeld to the State Department March 21, 1947.
77. Smith to Molotov March 5, 1947. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/3-347.
78. From the British Embassy in Washington to the Department of State March 21, 1947. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/3-2147.
79. Schonefeld to the State Department. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/3-2147.
80. Memorandum of Conversation. Lord Inverchapel, Peter Solly-Flood, Acheson, Barbour. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/3-244.
81. 80th Congress. Congressional Record Vol. 93, part 5, pp. 6306–6307. Also published in New York Times, June 4, 1947.

82. 80th Congress. Congressional Record Vol. 93, part 5, pp. 6307–6309. June 4, 1947.
83. McClintock to Rusk June 2, 1947. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/6-247.
84. Marshall to the US Embassy in London June 4, 1947. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/6-447.
85. Memorandum by McKisson June 3, 1947. NA. Dept. of State DF. S864.00/6-347.
86. June 12, 1947. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/6-647.
87. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/7-147. Matthews to the Secretary of State July 1, 1947.
88. NA. Dept. of State 864.00/7-347. Marshall to the American Embassy in London July 3, 1947.
89. For the details of argument see Fraser J. Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America and the Origins of the Cold War.*
90. NA. Dept. of State Df. 864.00/6/347. Marshall to the American Embassy in Prague June 6, 1947.
91. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/6-647. Memorandum of Conversation. Szegedy-Maszák, Matthews, Hickerson, Barbour. June 6, 1947.
92. FRUS Vol. IV. 1947. Chapin to the Secretary of State July 22, 1947. pp. 340–347.
93. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/7-2947. Chapin to the State Department July 29, 1947.
94. Balogh *op. cit.* pp. 253–254.
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Ibid.* p. 262.
97. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/8-164. The Secretary of State to Chapin August 16, 1947.
98. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.00/10-247. Chapin to State Department.
99. FRUS Vol. IV. 1947. The Acting Secretary of State (Lovett) to the American Legation October 6, 1947.
100. FRUS Vol. IV. 1948. Harriman to the National Security Council. November 14, 1947. pp. 506–507.
101. FRUS Vol. IV. 1948. Policy Paper prepared by the State Department. pp. 501–506.
102. FRUS Vol. IV. 1948. The Advisor of the Devision of Commercial Policy to the Deputy Director, Office of International Trade Policy. p. 570.
103. FRUS Vol. IV. 1947. Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff November 26. pp. 489–498.
104. FRUS Vol. IV. 1948. Report by the National Security Council. pp. 511–512.
105. FRUS Report by the National Security Council. p. 513.
106. FRUS Vol. IV. 1948. pp. 524–525.
107. *Op. cit.* p. 527.
108. *Op. cit.* pp. 536–542. Paper Prepared by the Ad Hoc Subcommittee of the Secretary of Commerce May 4, 1948.
109. FRUS Vol. IV. 1948. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in London July 15, 1948. pp. 554–555.
110. FRUS Vol. IV. 1948. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France August 27, 1948. pp. 564–568.
111. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 56 25/c 65 res/1948. The Hungarian Minister in Washington to the Foreign Ministry.
112. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 56 25/c 40.808/4-1948. The Hungarian Minister in Washington to the Foreign Ministry.
113. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 56 25/c 43.354/1948.
114. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.50/3148. Current Developments in Economic Relations between Hungary and the U. S. March 31, 1948.
115. NA. Dept. of State DF. 711.44/5-1448. Memorandum of Conversation May 14, 1948.
116. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.5034/5/1347. Marshall to Amley May 29, 1947.
117. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 50 23/d 100–289/8/1948. Chapin to Molnár.
118. Article 20 provided for the return of Hungarian property from the American zone, while Article 30 for Hungarian idemnification of damages to property owned by Allied nationals. The problem was the setting of time limits.
119. NA. Dept. of State DF. 711.64/8-1248S. Memorandum of Conversation.
120. NA. Dept. of State DF. 711.64/8-2448. Memorandum of Conversation August 12, 1948.
121. ÚML XIXJ 1 Box 50 43.725. August 26, 1948.
122. ÚML XIXJ 1 Box 50 44.524/48.

123. FRUS Vol. 17. 1948. Lovett to the American Legation in Budapest September 22, 1948. pp. 372–373.
124. FRUS Vol. V. 1949. Policy Paper Approved by the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee July, 1949. pp. 130–132.
125. FRUS Vol. V. 1949. Kirk to the Secretary of State October 1, 1949. pp. 142–143.
126. FRUS Vol. V. 1949. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to the Secretary of State.
127. Pető and Szakács, *op. cit.*
128. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 51 23/d 6151. The U. S. Legation to the Foreign Ministry January 20, 1949.
129. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 51 23/d 9727.
130. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 51 23/d 12846. December 1, 1949–August 20, 1950.
131. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 25/b. December 20, 1948.
132. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.50/3–3148. Current Developments.
133. ÚMKL XIXJ 1 Box 55 02 3282/1950.
134. Pető and Szakács, *op. cit.*
135. NA. Dept. of State DF. 864.50/11-249. The U. S. consul in Zurich to the State Department.
136. FRUS Vol. V. 1949. Memorandum to the President by Dean Acheson February 2, 1949. pp. 460–461.
137. FRUS Vol. V. 1949. pp. 42–54. The National Security Council to the President. NSC 58. December 8, 1949. pp. 42–54.

OSZKÁR JÁSZI AND THE HUNGARIAN DEMOCRATIC EMIGRATION

SAMUEL J. WILSON

University of Rio Grande

The years following the First World War were a period of transition and adjustment for all the nations and states of the Danubian basin. Hungary, for instance, which had previously occupied a dual relationship with Austria in the Austro–Hungarian Empire, was reduced to one-third its pre-war size and lost sixty percent of it population.[1] The war caused the collapse of the old world and forced individuals to adjust to the realities of a new Europe. This paper examines the plight of one individual, the Hungarian intellectual and former minister of nationalities in the post-war government of Mihály Károlyi, Oszkár Jászi (1875–1957), and his struggle to carry his dream of a democratic Hungary in a Danubian confederation to a new life in post-war Vienna and America.

This article will focus on three periods of Jászi's life: the first part covers his Hungarian period (from 1875 to May 21, 1919) when Jászi struggled to bring democratic reform to his country. These were the formative years of his life and influenced the course Jászi would follow until his death. The second period, from May 1919 to 1925, was characterized by Jászi's efforts to keep the Hungarian emigration together in Vienna while he negotiated with the leaders of the successor states and wrote about the importance of a democratic Hungary to the security of East Central Europe. Jászi hoped to awaken the successor states to the dangers that existed in a Danubian basin constructed of small idependent states between large expansive powers. The third period, from 1925 to 1957, concentrates on Jászi's life in America and his attempts to educate the American people on the need to bring a democratic confederation to the Danubian basin for the purpose of future European security.

Throughout his life, Jászi believed democracy could not develop in Hungary as long as its "feudal" landlords were allowed to exploit labor and hinder the implementation of democratic reforms. Hungary needed organic reforms, because its political system could not be relied upon to initiate reform from above. Like the West, Hungary needed a middle class. Jászi felt that universal secret suffrage was needed in order to initiate a middle-class movement. After all, the Industrial Revolution had not changed the political reality in Hungary. Before the war, Jászi saw the inequity of a system that allowed an electorate of less than 400 000 people the power to control and determine the destinies of over 17 million. The main culprit for this injustice was money earned without the usage of labor. The profits made off the latifundia and usury capital were

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

the forces behind the failure to pass a suffrage act that would benefit all the citizens of Hungary.[2] In 1908, in one of his article, "Miért kell az általános titkos választójog?" [Why is Universal Secret Suffrage Needed?], Jászi wrote that it was impossible to expect change from those in control of the present system. Hungary's "feudal" landlords, who, after the war, accommodated themselves to the regime of Miklós Horthy, were aware of any threat to their positions and power within the country. Those who had vision and hoped to change Hungary into a modern state were easily labeled agitators, socialists, or demagogues. Jászi believed that land reform was the key that unlocked the door to suffrage. Land of the great latifundia and churches had to be dispersed to the peasantry. Afterwards, those peasants who did not possess land would become members of the industrial work force and make the way open to universal secret suffrage, or what Jászi called the "midwife" of bourgeoise democracy.[3] In other words, Hungary had to destroy the last remnants of feudalism before embarking upon the next step towards a bourgeois society.

Jászi saw the democratic transformation of Hungary as vital for the continuation of historic Hungary, although, early on he had some difficulty escaping from the throngs of nationalism. He believed, somewhat in the fashion of Marxist–Leninist doctrine, that "mankind is so constituted that the road to internationalism leads through the national".[4] Jászi was a socialist. His brand of socialism, "liberal socialism," was to be the key to opening Hungary's door to democracy. Since Hungary did not possess a strong bourgeoisie or middle class, the organized proletariat was the next, perhaps only, choice to lead the state on the path to a democratic future.[5] Jászi did not advocate Marxist socialism. In actuality, he rejected all the existing political systems and trends during his lifetime: capitalism, fascism, communism, and social democracy.[6] He did not want to see the elimination of "private ownership and free competition" that the Marxist socialists thought necessary for their democratization program. He rejected capitalism because of its monopolistic stage. Liberal socialism, led by an organized proletariat, would destroy the evils of capitalism: surplus labor and unearned income.[7] Jászi and his followers in the Radical Party, through liberal socialism, would attempt to carry Hungary along the path that Ferenc Deák and József Eötvös had intended after the Ausgleich of 1867. They were going to carry Hungary on its next stage towards constitutional democratization.

Jászi's character and personality are important factors in assessing his support for the democratization of Hungary. He was born on 2 March 1875, in Nagykároly in a section of the northeastern border of Transylvania known as the Partium.[8] During the first two decades following the Ausgleich a new reform generation was born. Jászi, his childhood friend the poet Endre Ady, the socialist Ervin Szabó, just to name a few, were born during this time. Less than a year after Jászi's birth, Ferenc Deák died at the age of seventy-two. With Deák's death the classical liberal ideas he championed seem to have died with him. According to Lee Congdon "Classical liberalism had fallen into disrepute in Hungary". The Industrial Revolution and the liberal economic doctrines of the age caused the "exploitation of labor to the benefit of a few select individuals".[9] In Hungary this period was also one of chauvinist-integral nationalism. The

liberal gains of the past decades, particularly those concerning the nationalities, were ignored or violated to the benefit of the traditional Magyar land classes in their attempts to create a unified Hungarian nation-state. The second reform generation emerged as a reaction to the anti-democratic policies of the conservative class that supported the government of István Tisza. This new reform movement brought no less than an intellectual renaissance to Hungarian society.[10]

Jászi played an important role in introducing both sociology and political science into Hungary. As editor of the periodical *Huszadik Század* [Twentieth Century], established in January 1900, and as a member of the Társadalomtudományi Társaság [The Social Science Society], created in 1901, Jászi and his associates, from the law school in Péter Pázmány University in Budapest "provided a forum for the scientific analysis of society".[11] Jászi considered it vital "to examine the general rules governing social development in order to arrive at effective solutions to day to day issues".[12] "*Huszadik Század* introduced the Hungarian intelligentsia to the scholarly investigation of the entire range of Hungary's social, economic, and political problems ... the purpose of the Sociological Society, ... was to support and expand the works initiated the year before by *Huszadik Század.*"[13]

Huszadik Század published a variety of articles on a diverse number of topics, from different factions of Hungarian society. Endre Ady, Jászi, György Lukács, Mihály Polányi, Ervin Szabó, and others used *Huszadik Század* as an organ for their views on virtually every issue of significance in Hungary and Europe. Even though Lukács "was utterly opposed to Jászi's brand of philosophical positivism, ... [and] regarded Jászi as muddled and as a very untalented person as far as theory was concerned", he could never recollect "that Jászi ever failed to publish anything [he] had submitted to him".[14] Naturally Lukács was not a member of Jászi's circle, but, the original goal of the journal was to be, to a certain extent, apolitical.[15] By that they planned not to be an organ of any political movement or party. The founders, of whom Jászi said he had founded his circle with the establishnent of the journal,[16] eventually evolved into something that became more politically involved than initially anticipated. Jászi's success as an organizer and his growing political awareness can be seen through his involvement with the journal and the society.

Many of the reformers who were associated with the journal had noticeable similarities. The following is a general comparison of the members of the *Huszadik Század* circle:

> They were born in the middle of the 1870's to middle or petty bourgeios families, most of whom lived in Upper Hungary or Transylvania. Quite a few of them were Jews. They studied law, and their scholarly or artistic talents became apparent at an early age. Their ambition was to find independent jobs and a good livelihood, but initially they had little success. Partly because of family pressures and the need to earn their living, they took jobs around the turn of the century in some ministry or other office.[17]

Following his graduation from the university Jászi took a job as a rapporteur in the ministry of agriculture. But within ten years he left his job to follow a more active role in politics.[18]

Jászi's change towards an active role in politics was influenced by his trip to Paris in 1905. Both *Huszadik Század* and the Sociological Society reflected the change in Jászi's political awareness. Originally the society was to offer a forum for both conservative and radical views. The choice of Ágost Pulszky, son of Ferenc Pulszky and Lajos Kossuth's envoy in London, as president of the society was proof that a compromise or alliance had been worked out between the different factions.[19] Pulszky, along with his former student and colleague Gyula Pikler, had a profound effect upon Jászi and the radicals. Pulszky's age made him acceptable to the conservative faction of the society led by Professor Győző Concha and Jenő Rákosi.[20]

Until his Paris trip, Jászi was torn between active involvement in politics and dedicating his life to scholarship. Even before he left Paris it was apparent he was moving gradually away from scholarship. On 16 October 1904, in a letter to Ervin Szabó, Jászi wrote, "the earliest concrete [political] program to come from his pen".[21] Listed below is Jászi's basic party program included:

A. Universal Suffrage
B. Rights of Assembly and Association
C. Nationality Act
D. Popular Administration
E. Nationalize Church properties
F. (perhaps) Independent Customs Area.[22]

Jászi's Paris letter to Szabó is proof of "the gradual change in Jászi's conviction".[23] His letter of 2 April 1905 to Boldog Somló stated that his spiritual constitution was suited for scholarly work, but in a letter to Somló, dated 21 May 1905, Jászi decided on the side of politics, because "biologically [he] was not born a scholar".[24]

After his return from Paris, Jászi wrote that solving Hungary's nationality problems was a priority to democratization. In order to solve Hungary's multi-national problems, Jászi examined how the West had solved its nationality problems. Like many of the intelligentsia in Eastern Europe, Jászi looked westward to the more advanced democratic states as the examples to emulate. The more developed states of Western Europe, particularly Britain, France and Belgium, were all multinational states. By following their examples, Hungary hoped to solve its nationality problems and develop democracy for all its peoples.

Jászi abhorred the policy of magyarization because he believed forced assimilation made actual assimilation impossible everywhere.[25] In reality, Jászi overestimated the willingness of the minorities to assimilate with the Magyar nationality. It should also be assumed, of course, that he underestimated the effect nationalism had on obstructing assimilation. He felt that if cultural and linguistic demands were accorded to the nationalities, along with the proper implementation of the Nationality Law of 1868, they would willingly assimilate to the Magyar culture. This process may have been possible during the previous century, but it was impossible for the Romanians or Serbians to assimilate to Magyardom as long as their co-nationals lived free in states which bordered the empire. Later, when Jászi contemplated the effect of nationalism

upon the minorities, it was too late for any solution except the construction of separate nation-states. Jászi's faith in assimilation is evident in the Bourgeoise Radical Party program that he helped formulate in June 1914. Even at this late date it was a program that was anti-federal and supported assimilationist measures.[26] It was the war that convinced him to abandon his belief in assimilation as a solution to Hungary's nationality problems.

During the war Jászi briefly toyed with the idea of Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* because of the distinct economic advantages a large customs union offered Hungary. Once he realized its imperialistic designs inherent in the plan, however, he quickly abandoned the idea. Later, Jászi became actively involved against the war and militarism, and he supported both the peace movements within the monarchy and international peace based on the principle of Wilson's 14 points. Unfortunately, at the end of the war and during the early months of peace, hardly anyone was willing to listen to Jászi's ideas concerning peace and justice for the Danubian region. International events robbed Jászi of the opportunity to try and solve Hungary's nationality problems. Jászi's brief tenure as minister of nationalities (November 1918 to January 1919), in the Károlyi government was too short of time for him to implement his ideas.

As an exile, Jászi hoped to awaken the world to the dangers that existed in a Danubian region constructed of small independent states caught between expansive powers. The dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy created a power vacuum. Jászi hoped to convince the successor states to accept his idea of a Danubian confederation based on democratic principles to solve the nationality problems of the region and protect the area being exploited by its more powerful neighbors. Jászi realized that his old world no longer existed, so he began to work on ways to improve the new one and protect it from the problems that were left behind. Nationalism was the main obstacle to any lasting peace in the region.

On May 21, 1919, realizing the socialist regime of Béla Kun had failed and fearing reprisals from the counter-revolutionary movement that was gaining strength under Admiral Horthy, Jászi left Budapest for Vienna. For the next six years Jászi struggled to keep the Hungarian emigration together while his own life was transformed by the pressures of post-war Europe. Jászi realized his efforts had failed when the successor states negotiated post-war settlements with Gustáv Gratz, Horthy's foreign minister, and, in 1923, when the League of Nations, which was created as a result of the peace treaties, granted Hungary's request for a loan. This loan was granted to Horthy's government without the League receiving the democratic guarantees that Jászi and Károlyi demanded for Hungary's infrastructure. The failure to get these guarantees caused the Hungarian émigré to split, and paved the way for Jászi to start a new life in the United States.[27]

The Vienna years (1919–1925), were full of turmoil for Jászi. "He spent them in a feverish state of constant inner crisis and scruples, both public and private, and he could not calm down until he arrived to America."[28] During the early years of his exile Jászi was used by the successor states, and especially by Edvard Beneš, Czechoslovakia's foreign minister, to propagandize against the Hungarian claims at the Trianon

Peace Treaty of 1920. Jászi faced the tortorous discipline of trying to keep the émigré community together as a unified political body. Whereas Károlyi had been undisputed leader of the revolution, Jászi's organizational abilities made him one of the natural leader of the émigré community. Jászi was a tireless worker and dogmatic in his approach to the émigrés' goals. Besides going on numerous trips to see Károlyi in Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia, and his own family and friends in Slovakia and Transylvania, Jászi directed the Hungarian émigré paper, the daily *Bécsi Magyar Újság,* during its three years of existence. "He wrote hundreds of articles for Hungarian, German, and other journals in the successor states and several dozens for the Western press."[29] He also published four books including his work on the *Revolution and Counter-Revolution.*

On 16 November 1919, Admiral Horthy entered Budapest at the head of a new national army. Horthy became the real power in Hungary and was elected regent on 1 March 1920.[30] In January of that year election were held in Hungary in those constituencies that were under the control of the Hungarian authorities,[31] and on 14 March, a coalition headed by Sándor Simonyi–Semadam took over control of the government. Hungary would be allowed to go to Paris to be received by the peace commission only after some domestic stability was established following the Kun regime. Later, Simonyi-Semadam's government was forced to sign the Treaty of Trianon on June 1920.[32]

The economic and material losses of Trianon destined Hungary to the permanent status of an agricultural country with hardly any potential industrial base.[33] The settlement separated Hungary's industry from its raw materials sources in Transylvania and Slovakia, and made it impossible for Hungary to fulfill its reparation payments as stipulated by the treaty. Hungary was denied any chance to revise the settlement by force, because Trianon limited the size of Hungary's army to 35 000 officers and men to be used only for internal order and border defense. Also, Hungary was not allowed to have tanks, aircraft, or heavy artillery.[34] The construction of the Little Entente, an alliance of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania against Hungary, guaranteed that any attempt to revise the treaty by force would end in failure. Article 1 provided mutual assistance for any member that was the victim of an unprovoked attack from Hungary.[35]

After Trianon, Hungary's foreign policy was focused on the revision of the "injustices" of the treaty. Any effective cooperation in the basin could not take place until the treaty was altered to return those territories, particularly those regions that bordered Hungary, where ethnic Hungarians formed a majority. The successor states were aware of Hungary's attitude and sought the protection of military alliances to guard their new acquisitions against any attempts to revise the treaty. Hungary, however, was aware of the political reality and sought to acquire the appropriate international standing that would enable it to build up its military strength and acquire the economic aid and resources that would prepare the country for the struggle that was necessary to overturn the peace settlement.[36] Hungary's admission to the League of Nations and the subsequent loan granted by the League in 1923 was part of Horthy's plan to revise the settlement. His appointment of István Bethlen, a Transylvanian aristocrat, as foreign min-

ister was another consideration towards improving Hungarian relations with both Great Britain and France.[37]

The peace treaties and the new alliance system intended to bring security to Europe, but the disappearance of the Habsburg Monarchy created a power vacuum in East-Central Europe. The peace treaties were designed to make France the dominant continental power in Europe but the disastrous effects of the war made it impossible for the French to assert control of the region.

Europe wanted to put the war behind itself and move forward, but too many problems remained. Both France and Italy vied for control of the basin. In reality, only a few individuals held out hope for the future construction of a united Danubia. There was no attempt by any Danubian state to heal the wounds of war and develop an association for their mutual benefit and security. Jászi knew that a Danubian confederation could not take place as long as Horthy was in power in Hungary.[38] South-Central Europe was too weak, divided, and vulnerable to economic and political exploitation to withstand the crisis of the interwar years. Hungary, not willing to accept the settlement, realized that it could not revise Trianon without the assistance of a great power. This search took Hungary to Italy and Germany, where the Versailles settlement had alienated both powers, even though Italy was on the winning side.[39] As a result, the peace settlements possessed the seeds for their own destruction.

Jászi saw great problems for East-Central Europe if the two "Sick Men", Germany and Hungary, were not satisfied. They would demand a just revision of the peace treaties. In 1923 he wrote, "there can be no hope of a peace until the wounds of these two countries are healed".[40] Not only would a new war not solve these problems, but it "would be the final catastrophe for all the people of Central Europe".[41] In 1936, Jászi described the *Trianon complex* as a "social and economic doctrine ... which attributes all the misery and backwardness of the people exclusively to the peace treaty".[42] Jászi recognized the dual purpose of this doctrine to protest the injustices of the treaty and to act as a "defense mechanism [for the old ruling class], against the proletariat and landless peasants".[43]

Jászi wrote about the failure of Hungary's experiment in democracy. His writings, however, reveal an individual searching for answers. Jászi, the intellectual, could not understand why Hungarians and the rest of the world rejected his democratic ideas. With the rise of the Horthy regime, Jászi saw the failure of British diplomacy. He felt the British played the "principle part in rendering possible the bloodstained and reactionary rule"[44] that briefly followed Horthy's seizure of power. Showing his naïveté, Jászi believed the British had a role, or an obligation, to promote their democratic ideas to the rest of the world. Britain, like all countries, pursued a policy that safeguarded its own interest. The democratization of Hungary rested with the Magyars themselves. Jászi felt Britain left the principle of Wilson's 14 points behind when negotiating the Treaty of Trianon.

Jászi continued to expose the evils of Horthy's regime by vividly describing the horrors of the white terror in Hungary. His book, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary,* gives numerous accounts of these abuses. Jászi exposed the antidemocratic

nature of Horthy's regime and critized the Allies for granting it a League of Nations' loan. Jászi realized Hungarian democracy could not be achieved as long as Horthy remained in power. A democratic Hungary had been Jászi's goal for the greater part of his life. He made it a crusade following his return to Budapest from Paris in 1905, and he continued to pursue this goal as an exile in Vienna and the United States.

As an émigré, Jászi described his goal of a democratic Hungary in a Central European confederation.

> Only a through-going democratisation Hungary, and loyal and intimate relations between this democratised Hungary and the new states, can create such an atmosphere in Central Europe as can cure the gravest evils of the present situation and clear the way for a democratic Confederation of all the small nations which are now tormented by the rigid dogma of national sovereignty.[45]

The historian R. W. Seton-Watson agreed with Jászi and wrote on the necessity of Hungary's democratization as an "essential preliminary" to permanent peace in the region.[46]

By early 1920, Jászi was trying to create a united front among the Hungarian émigrés, and it became an issue whether the Communists should be included in the front. Károlyi wanted to include them, while Jászi disagreed with the Communists and knew they would be unwelcome by the West and among the successor states. He wished to keep them in a neutral position.[47] Jászi and Károlyi had begun to move in different political directions, Károlyi towards the Communists and Jászi westward.

The emigration was frustrated in its political orientation. Károlyi and the Communists, including György Lukács and Kun, looked towards Soviet Russia for help. The Social Democrats hoped for aid from the Socialist International, along with support from the Socialist and Liberal public opinion in the western democracies. Among the émigrés were Habsburgists, who refused to associate with the Communists, while moderates hoped the West would become disenchanted with the Hungarian White terror and support the implementation of a democracy in Hungary.[48]

On 30 March 1920, Jászi, Károlyi, and Pál Szende asked Beneš in Prague "whether [Beneš saw] the sense of an organized political emigration even without the participation of the Communist"? Beneš told them that success would be possible without the Communists.[49]

There were two other questions that the emigration proposed to Beneš in which he lent his support.

> 1. Whether Czechoslovakia is willing to redress the injustices of the Peace Treaty?
> 2. Whether he is ready to acknowledge the Emigration in a semi-official way?[50]

Beneš regarded the Horthy government as a threat to the democratic successor states.[51] He expressed his desire to Jászi and Károlyi "to create an honest and sincere communication between the democratic forces of their nations",[52] but the latter used them as a tool against the Horthy government's claims, while all the time giving Jászi and the democratic emigration the appearance of support. Beneš realized the strength

of the feudal structure in Hungary was too powerful to ignore, and Jászi's group was not in a positon to supplant Horthy without a full scale commitment from the West and the successor states. Suffice it to say, in March 1921, Beneš met Horthy's foreign minister Gusztáv Gratz and began to reconcile Czechoslovakia with the Horthy government.[53] Since the emigration had no popular base in Hungary, Beneš informed Károlyi that he could not be sure that they, after overthrowing Horthy, would pursue the "same nationalist policy of territorial integrity [as Horthy]".[54] Beneš, like most politican in the victor's camp, wanted to put the war behind him and begin the process of governing Czechoslovakia. The newly formed Little Entente, and the support of France, protected the successor states from any Hungarian attempt to forcibly regain its historic boundaries. As Jászi would admit later, he and his followers were very naïve to have trusted Beneš.

Jászi was not of the same political calibre of Beneš, the Serbian politician Nikola Pašić, or Romania's Take Ionescu. These men were politicians who understood the practical nature of everyday politics. Jászi was not pragmatic enough to handle the émigré politics. He still trusted the western democracies too much even after they destroyed the territorial integrity of historic Hungary and approved Horthy's request for a loan. In a letter to Seton-Watson, Jászi wrote, "I see... how wrong, [the] shortsighted policy of the Entente makes in Hungary".[55] According to György Litván, however, Jászi "never gave up faith in the values of Western Democracy and the helpfulness of its Liberal and Socialist forces".[56]

To Jászi's credit he accepted the reality of the successor states, and he renounced a forcible revision of the Trianon Treaty. During a memorial speech for Thomas Masaryk at Oberlin, Jászi recalled a conversation they had that pointed out the injustices of the treaty. Jászi quoted Masaryk as saying that if he were leader of Hungary he would peacefully seek out justice for the Hungarian minorities in the successor states where they formed a homogeneous mass, and the return of those border territories where Hungarians constituted a clear majority.[57] Jászi accepted the political reality of the peace treaties but he would not accept the moral injustice that had been inflicted upon the Hungarian minorities in the new states.

Besides negotiations with Beneš, Jászi made trips to both Yugoslavia and Romania in an attempt to find support for his programs. He tried to convince the Yugoslav government not to withdrawal from Pécs–Baranya.[58] He was well received by Nikola Pasić, Svetozar Pribičević, and others in Belgrade. He continued to work against the Horthy government and tried to convince the successor states of the danger of a revisionist government within their midst. In Bucharest he was received with much respect and sympathy, but as he remarked in a letter to Károlyi on 14 December 1920, the Romanian leaders, Alexander Averescu and Take Ionescu, would deal with one of Horthy's agents more easily than with the emigration.[59] In other words, "his person was received better than his proposals".[60]

As the successor states accommodated themselves to the Horthy government and showed less than a democratic resolve in the face of their new Hungarian problem, Jászi proposed his ideas of Danubian rapproachment and federation to the truly demo-

cratic forces — mainly the intelligentsia and enlightened politicians — within these states. Before the end of 1921, he proposed a Danubian Cultural League that was to be formed among the democratic elements and intelligentsia of the region.[61] He tried to create an enlarged version of the *Huszadik Század* Circle on a Danubian scale that could act as a democratic opposition and demand the introduction of justice, confederation, and foster Danubian patriotism. This organization would "combat chauvinism and defend the national and human rights of the minorities in each country".[62]

As time progressed, Jászi realized he had to differentiate between the governments in the successor states and the genuine democratic movements in those countries. Following Trianon, and after it became apparent that Soviet Russia was not a position to implement world revolution, the successor states adopted a business like attitude towards the Hungarian emigration.[63] Jászi understood this change of attitude and hoped to appeal directly to the democratic forces in the successor states. The problem was, however, that these forces were weak and disorganized. The Romanian intellectuals, in particular, showed the greatest interest in Jászi's ideas, and the left-wing Bucharest review *Revista Vremii,* even published Jászi's articles on the Danubian problem.[64]

In May 1923, Jászi visited Bucharest and was well received by Take Ionescu, Octavian Goga, Alexander Aversecu, Ion Brătianu, and Iuliu Maniu among others. There were even discussions over whether to introduce Jászi to King Ferdinand. Afterwards, Jászi traveled to Transylvania where he was confronted with the reality of Romania's nationality policy and its effect on the lives of the Hungarian minority. It became obvious to Jászi that, even though the Romanians in Bucharest listened sympathically to his ideas about a democratic Hungary, Romania's nationality policy in Transylvania was intolerant to the concerns of the minorities.

During his Vienna years, Jászi resurrected Kossuth's confederation and attempted to draw a link between his emigration and the post-1848 Kossuth emigration. In "Kossuth Lajos emigrációja és az októberi emigráció" (Louis Kossuth's Emigration and the October Emigration), published in *Bécsi Magyar Újság,* Jászi compared Kossuth's emigration with his own. The post-World War I emigration was the continuation of the emigration from 1849.[65] After 1862, Kossuth's confederation caused him to be regarded as a traitor among some circles in Hungary, but Jászi, who faced similar criticisms from Horthy's Hungary, saw Kossuth's ideas as being far more important than Ferenc Deák's "short sighted" Ausgleich with Austria in 1867. It becomes apparent, especially after his reflection on the revolution, that Jászi compared his role to Kossuth's misunderstood part in Hungarian history. Jászi still believed that a Danubian confederation was one of the ways to achieve Hungary's democratization.

At Oberlin in 1933, Jászi wrote an article, "Kossuth and the Treaty of Trianon", in which he drew parallels with Kossuth and the peace treaty. He maintained that all the clear sighted elements of the Hungarian emigration came to realize that Hungary's cause in 1848, "had been lost principally because of the opposition of the non-Magyar races, whose claims for equality had been repudiated by the revolutionary Magyar nobility and whose dissatisfaction was shrewdly fomented by the Viennese camarilla".[66] The failure of the revolution was a failure to come to an understanding with the

minorities. The war against Austria in 1849, was secondary, because success depended upon the nationality question.

Jászi explained that Kossuth's confederation, even in the 1850's, needed the Britain's help to be successful.[67] Also, Jászi stated that Trianon was a mistake because it detached ethnic Hungarian territories away from Hungary for purely strategical purposes. "But the gravest mistake of the victors was that they consented to the economic dismemberment of a territory the separate parts of which are in many respects incapable of independent healthy economic life".[68] What Kossuth's correspondence revealed, according to Jászi, was that Trianon was inevitable.[69]

By 1925, it was apparant that the emigration had failed in its attempt to supplant Horthy. Károlyi talked Jászi into returning to Oberlin College, where Jászi had stopped on a six-month speaking tour of the United States between 1923 and 1924. Jászi had been offered a position in the political science department at Oberlin College. Jászi, to Károlyi's great fortune, talked the latter out of going to Soviet Russia in favor of the West. Otherwise, Károlyi would have found himself in the same position that confronted Béla Kun in the face of Stalin's purges. In 1925, at the age of fifty, Jászi left his old world behind hoping for a new and more peaceful life in America. Ultimately, he wanted the chance to influence American public opinion and foreign policy to accept his ideas concerning the construction of a democratic confederation of Danubian states that could one day become a United States of Europe.[70] He hoped to draw America out of its isolationist policy thereby using its "strength and influence, on the European scene, to help change the conditions prevailing there and channel them in the direction of democracy and federalism".[71]

Jászi joined the faculty at Oberlin and taught political science for seventeen years. When he retired in 1942, Jászi's colleagues and former students donated funds for the creation of the Jászi Lectureship in his honor. In 1953, Oberlin awarded him an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws.[72]

In 1929, Jászi wrote his most famous work *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy,* which described the failure of democracy in the monarchy, and condemned those forces, in particular, the feudal structure that supported Horthy, for preventing the democratization of Hungary.[73] This book was a restatement of the major themes Jászi wrote about during his exile. It summarized the failure of the monarchy and restated Jászi's position on the necessity to bring democratic change to the Danubian basin and promote a confederation. According to Jászi, the Habsburg experiment still had "great theoretical and practical importance",[74] however, to prevent the destruction of Europe by the forces of nationalism it was necessary to "eliminate national rivalries or at least replace them by other methods".[75]

Jászi wrote that, "national solidarity [could not] be fostered where the progress of one nation is sacrificed to the interest of the other".[76] Nationalism, according to Jászi, was the "growing realization of the consciousness of the human soul which can reach its completeness only in a national existence fulfilling the work which the World-Spirit assigned to every national individuality".[77] National hatred, however, was only the transformation of class hatred,[78] whose solution was in essence a moral issue.[79] Jászi

still maintained that a federated structure, like Switzerland, was the answer to the Danubian problem, because, "it would satisfy the national aspirations of the various peoples".[80]

While in America, Jászi attempted to follow what he considered to be a just policy regarding the minorities in the Danubian basin. Even during the late inter-war period, Jászi still spoke out against the moral corruption of fascism and dictatorship, however, he was still only a candle in the wind.[81] Meanwhile, he continued to educate his American audiences on the importance of the peaceful and democratic advancement of the Danubian peoples.

During the Second World War, Jászi was actively involved in the anti-Fascist "United Front", because he understood the importance of joint cooperation against the Axis and its allies.[82] He was elected chairman of the Federation of Democratic Hungarians, but was distrustful of the Communists and disappointed Horthyites.[83] Jászi believed it was America's "fundamental interest" to democratize Europe after the war, because, once again, "hundreds of thousands of Americans will die on account of tension created by absolutist dictatorial or plutocratic powers".[84]

As the war ended, Jászi worried about the future of Central Europe under Russian control. He wrote that "Russian influence in that territory... will be preponderant. Russia will come out of this war as the greatest continental power of Europe".[85] At first, Jászi supported the Russians' moves that eliminated the threat of the past "feudal" regime to Hungary's democratic development, however, in 1947, the Communists, with Russian support, destroyed their political opposition and gained control of Hungary. Their takeover ended any hope Jászi had that the post-war Hungarian government would finally bring democratic reforms to Hungary.[86]

One of the many articles he wrote during his American years included, "Miért nem sikerült a dunavölgyi federációt megalkotni" [Why the Danubian Confederation Failed to Materialize]. Written in 1947, it exposed Jászi's reflections on that naïve period of his political development with the clear vision of hindsight. Naturally, those feudal forces that prohibited Hungary's democratization bear an enormous responsibility for the confederation's failure. The confederation failed to materialize because "a mouse and a lion cannot federate".[87]

Jászi believed that a confederation could only be created by states with common political, economic, and social structures, and this was not the case of Balkan and Danubian peoples. Also, those who enjoyed privileges in the old system opposed federation. A confederation would reduce their power and influence within their countries. The Hungarian state could not overcome the end of the First World War because the force of events was above its power and strength. Federation is a product of democracy. In the example of Switzerland, it was a political form of Christianity. In Hungary the confederation made headway with very few people. The last chance for its realization died with the failure of the Károlyi Revolution when the smaller states were more interested in getting what they could acquire from the Entente at Hungary's expense.[88]

In 1947, following the Second World War, Jászi made his last trip to Hungary. He

was somewhat hurt that the new Hungarian state only offered him a university position in Budapest as opposed to the political positions it offered other members of the émigré circle.[89] After his return to America he published a report entitled "Danubia: Old and New", in which he again attempted to show the need for a federalist solution for the future peace and independence of the region. The eventual socialist takeover of Hungary met with great displeasure in Jászi's writings during his remaining years. However, he still continued to write about the need for both democratic and moral justice for the Danubian peoples up until his death on 13 February 1957. It was his belief that a confederation, based on the democratic principles, was the key to unlock the economic, political, and social door for future cooperation and security among the Danubian and Balkan nations. Jászi's greatest legacy is the fact that his works and ideas are still discussed today as a possible road for future.[90]

Notes

1. Andrew C. Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1925–1945* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 205. Trianon left Hungary with 92,963 square kilometers from the 325,417 square kilometers it occupied under dualism.
2. Oszkár Jászi, "Miért kell az általános titkos választójog?", *Huszadik Század,* 7–12 (1908), pp. 636–638.
3. *Ibid.,* p. 638.
4. Oszkár Jászi, "Two Mighty Forces 1905", cited in György Litván, "Oscar Jászi (1875–1957), A Biographical Essay" (Manuscript, Budapest, 1984), p. 6.
5. *Ibid.* Jászi rejected the ideas of the Social Democrats, which adopted a Marxist platform and joined the Second International, because they thought in international terms and ignored the nationality question. For them, the proletariat revolution would render the nationality issue obsolete.
6. György Litván, "Oszkár Jászi, a Danubian Patriot in America", *The New Hungarian Quarterly;* 24/92 (1983) p. 120.
7. Lee W. Congdon, *Beyond the "Hungarian Wasteland": A Study in Ideology of National Regeneration, 1900–1919.* (Ph. D. Dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1973), p. 112; hereafter cited as Congdon, *Beyond the "Hungarian Wasteland".*
8. This city, known today as Carei, became part of the spoils rewarded to Romania after the First World War.
9. Congdon, *Beyond the "Hungarian Wasteland",* p. 112.
10. Joseph Held, "Young Hungary: The Nyugat Periodical, 1908–1914", *Intellectual Developments in the Habsburg Empire From Maria Theresa to World War I,* edited by Stanley B. Winters and Joseph Held (Boulder, Colorado: East European Quarterly: distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 1975), p. 272.
11. Attila Pók, "Jászi as Organizational Leader of a Reform Movement" (Oscar Jászi Memorial Conference, Oberlin, Ohio, 7–9 November 1985), p. 2.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Congdon, *Beyond the "Hungarian Wasteland",* pp. 72–74.
14. György Lukács, *George Lukács Record of a life,* edited by István Eörsi (Varso, London 1983), p. 51
15. Congdon, *Beyond the "Hungarian Wasteland",* p. 75.
16. Oszkár Jászi, "Emlékiratok, (1953–55)", *Jászi Oszkár publicisztikája,* edited by György Litván and János F. Varga (Magvető Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1982), p. 577; hereafter this publication cited as *JOP.*
17. Attila Pók, "The Social Function of Sociology in *Fin de Siècle* Budapest" (Conference, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, April 1985), p. 16.

18. Jászi probably got the job with the help from his uncle Leo Liebermann, a chemist and head of the Chemical Experimental Station in the ministry. Richard E. Allen, *Oscar Jászi and Radicalism in Hungary, 1900–1919* (Ph. D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1972), p. 58; hereafter cited as Allen, *Oscar Jászi and Radicalism in Hungary.*
19. Pulszky was Jászi's old mentor from the university. He is generally credited with having introducted English sociology into Hungary. Allen, *Oscar Jászi and Radicalism in Hungary,* p. 58.
20. Rákosi, who did not start his career as a conservative, was Endre Ady's chief literary antagonist. Congdon, *Beyond the "Hungarian Wasteland",* pp. 74–75.
21. Allen, *Oscar Jászi and Radicalism in Hungary,* p. 92.
22. Oszkár Jászi–Ervin Szabó, Budapest, 16 October 1904, *Szabó Ervin levelezése* I (Budapest, 1977), pp. 577–582. Jászi was an atheist and supported measures that would lessen the importance of the Church in Hungarian society.
23. Congdon, *Beyond the "Hungarian Wasteland",* p. 78.
24. Oszkár Jászi–Bóldog Somló, 21 May 1905, cited in Congdon, *Beyond the "Hungarian Wasteland",* p. 78.
25. Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* (Budapest, 1912), p. 490.
26. Gyula Mérei, *A magyar polgári pártok programjai 1867–1918* (Budapest, 1971), pp. 317–318.
27. Litván, "Oscar Jászi, A Biographical Essay", p. 10.
28. György Litván, "Jászi's Exile Years in Vienna: Attempts to Build Contacts with The Democratic Left in the Successor States" (Oscar Jászi Memorial Conference, Oberlin, Ohio, 1985), p. 1; hereafter cited as Litván, "Jászi's Exile Years in Vienna".
29. *Ibid.,* pp. 1–2.
30. Horthy was elected regent from a list of candidates because he, unlike Archduke Charles of the Habsburg dynasty, was acceptable to the Entente. Also, the West favored Horthy because of his unpolitical past and anti-Communist stance. For Horthy's story see: Nicholas Horthy, *Memoirs* (London, 1956).
31. Those areas allocated to the successor states or occupied by the Romanian and Allied troops were not involved in the election.
32. Carlile Aylmer (C. A.) Macartney, *October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, 1920–1945,* I (London, 1961), p. 24; hereafter cited as Macartney, *October Fifteenth.*
33. Hungary retained 48.6 percent of its wheat, 64.6 percent of its rye, and 35.8 percent of its corn-producing areas ... the rump country retained 50.9 percent of the total industrial population, 55.6 percent of all industries, 82 percent of the heavy industries, and 70 percent of the banks. The agricultural population was now 55.8 percent of the total population. László Buday, *A megcsonkított Magyarország* (Budapest, 1921), pp. 104, 209. Cited in Janos, *Politics of Backwardness in Hungary,* p. 206. Also, see: Iván T. Berend and György Ránki, *Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (New York, 1974), pp. 171–241.
34. Macartney, *October Fifteenth,* I, p. 5; and Gyula Juhász, Hungarian Foreign Policy 1919–1945 (Budapest, 1979), p. 50.
35. The Little Entente was a name given by Hungary to the Yugoslav–Romanian–Czechoslovak alliance. Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the official name for Yugoslavia, concluded the pact on 14 August 1920, the Romanians did not join the alliance until after the Polish–Soviet War of 1920. The Czechoslovak foreign minister Beneš was the principle architect of the alliance, but the Romanian Foreign Minister, Take Ionescu, had his own plans for the political organization of the basin. This was another reason Romania hesitated to sign the agreement. Also, the French, in the desire to control the region, attempted to create a Hungarian–Romanian reproachment. See Francis Deák, *The Hungarian–Rumanian Land Dispute* (New York, 1928), pp. 320–324, 332–333; J. O. Crane, *The Little Entente* (New York, 1931), pp. 7, 105 ff; Juhász, *Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1919–1945,* p. 57.
36. Juhász, *Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1919–1945,* pp. 42–43.
37. For Bethlen's role see: István Mócsy, "István Bethlen", *Hungarian Statesmen of Destiny, 1860–1960,* edited by Pál Bődy (Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., Hihland Lakes, New Jersey: distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 1989), pp. 121–153.

39. Lee Congdon, "Trianon and the Emigré Intellectuals", in *War and Society in East Central Europe* Vol. VI. *Essays on World War I: A Case Study on Trianon,* edited by Béla K. Király, Peter Pastor, and Ivan Sanders (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs: distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 1982), p. 397.
39. The Peace Commission awarded Yugoslavia territories which the Entente had previously promised Italy for joining the war against the Central Power.
40. Oscar Jászi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary* (London, 1924), p. viii; hereafter cited as Jászi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution.*
41. *Ibid.,* p. ix.
42. Oscar Jászi, "The Ideologic Foundations of the Danubian Dictatorships", in *Propaganda and Dictatorship,* edited by Harwood Lawrence Childs (Princeton, New Jersey, 1936), p. 96.
43. *Ibid.*
44. Jászi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution,* p. 110. György Lukács states that Jászi had nothing to fear form the Bolshevist regime. Lukács, *George Lukács Record of a Life,* p. 52.
45. Jászi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution,* p. ix.
46. *Ibid.,* pp. xxii–xxiii.
47. Micheal Károlyi, *Faith Without Illusion* (London, 1956), p. 208.
48. Litván, "Oscar Jászi, A Biographical Essay", p. 9.
49. Oszkár Jászi, *Diary,* 30 March 1920, Jászi Papers, Manuscripts and Special Collections, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York; Tibor Hajdu, *Károlyi Mihály Politikai életrajz* (Budapest, 1978), p. 352. In a letter, 5 May 1920, Jászi wrote Károlyi: "The emigration can be organized only with a Western orientation. Towards the East there is only one possible orientation and that already exists; in that concert we cannot play." Cited in György Litván, "Documents of Friendship: From the Correspondence of Michael Károlyi and Oscar Jászi", *East Central Europe,* 4, Part 2 (1977), p. 125.
50. Jászi, *Diary,* 30 March 1920; Hajdu, *Károlyi Mihály,* p. 352.
51. *Ibid.*
52. Litván, "Jászi's Exile Years in Vienna", p. 5.
53. Károlyi, *Faith Without Illusion,* p. 192.
54. Litván, "Jászi's Exile Years in Vienna", p. 8.
55. Jászi, cited in Litván, "Jászi's Exile Years in Vienna", p. 2.
56. Litván, "Jászi's Exile Years in Vienna", p. 2.
57. Oscar Jászi, Memorial talk for Masaryk, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, 1937.
58. Jászi–Károlyi, Bécs, 14 December 1920, *Károlyi Mihály levelezése 1905–1920,* I, edited by György Litván (Budapest, 1978), pp. 729–731.
59. *Ibid.*
60. Litván, "Jászi's Exile Years in Vienna", p. 6.
61. *Ibid.,* p. 7.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Ibid.,* pp. 7–8.
65. Oszkár Jászi, "Kossuth Lajos emigrációja és az októberi emigráció", *JOP,* p. 409. It needs to be mentioned that the post-World War I emigration was far less homogeneous than the post-1849 emigration. Also, Jászi was fond of comparing himself with Kossuth, but the latter's popularity at home and abroad was far greater.
66. Oscar Jászi, "Kossuth and the Treaty of Trianon", *Foreign Affairs,* 12, no. 1 (October 1933), p. 87. Jászi failed to mention the role of the Russian army in 1849.
67. *Ibid.,* p. 88.
68. *Ibid.,* p. 97.
69. *Ibid.,* pp. 91–92. Jászi compared two maps of Hungary to justify his position. One map showed what Kossuth feared would happen if the nationalities were not given democratic rights, and the other was post-Trianon Hungary, and there is a strong resemblance between the maps. Jászi believed it was Kossuth's

fear that Hungary, separated from Austria, and without "the support of a Great Power would be immediately dismembered into six parts".

70. György Litván, "Oszkár Jászi, A Danubian Patriot in America", *The New Hungarian Quarterly* 24/92 (1983) p. 118.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
72. Curtis L. Kendrick, Jászi Lectureship Committee, Oberlin College Library, Oberlin, Ohio, October, 1985.
73. Oscar Jászi, *Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago and London, 1971), p. 298.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
75. *Ibid.*
76. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 248.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 286.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 294.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
81. Jászi's article, "The Ideologic Foundations of the Danubian Dictatorships", is an example of his attempts to warn the United States of the upcoming crisis in Europe.
82. Litván, "Oscar Jászi, A Biographical Essay", p. 17.
83. *Ibid.*
84. Oszkár Jászi, "The Failure of a Declaration", Jászi Papers, Manuscripts and Special Collections, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, cited in Litván, "Oscar Jászi, A Biographical Essay", p. 18.
85. Litván, "Oscar Jászi, A Biographical Essay", p. 18.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 20. On July 14, 1947, Jászi wrote a letter to the *New York Times* that again stated Hungary's domestic dilemma was still "the absence of a conscious middle class and an independent intelligentsia".
87. Constantin Frantz cited in Oszkár Jászi, "Miért nem sikerült a dunavölgyi federációt megalkotni?", *Látóhatár* (January 1953), p. 15.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
89. Károlyi became Hungary's minister to France.
90. The works of Jászi and István Bibó have experienced a renaissance among those who study the history and problems of the Danubian basin.

CENTRAL EUROPE: OSZKÁR JÁSZI'S AMERICAN DREAM

RICHARD ACZEL

University of London

Addressing the Polish Sejm and Senate in January of this year, the Czech President, Václav Havel, claimed: "there is before us a real historic opportunity to fill with something meaningful the great political vacuum that arose in Central Europe after the breakup of the Habsburg Empire".[1] If only as a utopian projection, a cultural and moral hypothesis, or, to use a phrase that Masaryk was fond of quoting from Goethe, "eine exakte Phantasie" — Oszkár Jászi's dream of a United States of Danubia, as a first step towards integration into a fully United States of Europe, appears to have returned to the ideological agenda of Central Europe. It is not the aim of this paper to assess the prospects of this dream in the 1990s, nor to examine the political and historical reasons for the failure of Jászi's federalist fantasy in the first half of our century. These reasons are well known; and indeed were recognised by Jászi himself in his retrospective article of 1955, "Why the Danubian Confederation Failed to Materialize".[2] My interest lies, rather, in the consideration of a more narrowly intellectual phenomenon. In an attempt to move towards a fuller understanding of the historical limitations of Jászi's Central European vision, I should like to reconstruct the intellectual genealogy of an illusion. To read the fascinating and perplexing fusion of blindness and insight in the "American", "scholar-statesman" Jászi of *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Empire* and *The Future of Danubia,* through the *sociological* Jászi of *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century), the pioneering journal in and through which his distinctive view of the relationship between social science and international relations matured during the first two decades of the century. How, for example, could the American Jászi — for all his immense knowledge of national animosities in Central Europe — go on proposing the same federal solution to the "problems of Danubia" throughout his thirty-two years in the United States, when the antagonisms which had relegated the federalist idea to the level of a mere utopia in 1918 had only been exacerbated by the tensions which had both led to, and been exploited by, the Second World War and its aftermath. How could the American Jászi — for all his familiarity with Central European history and with the belligerent psychology of Bolshevism — claim at the end of 1944 that: "It seems not an overstrained optimism to assume that for the next twenty years or so Russia will loyally accept the new equilibrium, would not interfere with the cultural and national independence of Central European countries, and would abstain from any action which would disturb her cooperation with the democracies."?[3]

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

Let me begin by taking issue with what remains to date the most coherent attempt to explain the strain of illusionism which runs throughout Jászi's work, Péter Hanák's short but instructive monograph, *Oszkár Jászi's Danubian Patriotism* (Budapest, 1985). Hanák traces the limitations of Jászi's political utopianism back to what he sees as the "enlightened" or "common- sense" rationalism of European social thought in the 19th century. The social scientists of the 19th century, Hanák claims, "were not acquainted with the theory of relativity, the relation of matter to energy ... the new findings of depth psychology and social psychology". They failed to realise, he goes on, "that there existed certain phenomena and relationships which were incomprehensible to 'common sense', ... that the irrational too had rational causes, and that in order to understand social phenomena one needed to recognise determining principles of a higher order".[4]

While Hanák is undoubtedly right to relate Jászi's theoretical limitations to the sociological systems of the 19th century, his characterisation of these limitations is more problematic. For Jászi — especially during the interwar period — was profoundly aware of the enormous importance of apparently irrational forces in history, and sought to explain them in overtly, consciously mass-psychological terms. In his book *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary,* for example, he argues that "mass movements are not primarily rational and deliberate; they are the products of religious instincts".[5] This statement is from a chapter entitled "The Mass Psychology of the Bolshevist Movement", where Jászi criticises Marx for precisely the kind of excessive rationalism for which Hanák criticises Jászi. In this same chapter, Jászi also claims that one of the most powerful and dangerous lessons of the War was that it "seemed to have taught the relativity of moral law".[6]

As for the need to recognise a "higher order" of determining principles in history, it was precisely such an order that Jászi — and his key 19th century models, Spencer and Marx — set out to discover. And it was ultimately this very endeavour which so often led Jászi to sacrifice the implications of his rationalistic, positivistic approach to the facts of historical reality to the demands of an essentially transcendental, rather than strictly rational or even common-sense, approach to the laws of historical development.

At the heart of this transcendentalism lies the concept of social evolution formulated by the first *guru* of *Huszadik Század,* Herbert Spencer, who, it should be pointed out, contrary to Hanák's characterisation of 19th century social thought, was deeply preoccupied by the attempt to integrate the concepts of matter and energy. It is in the theoretical antinomies of this particular model of social evolution, and its far from common-sensical application to the sphere of social and inter-state affairs in Central Europe, that the real key to Jászi's peculiar fusion of blindness and insight can be found.

Jászi's tacit presumption of the relationship between sociological theory and international, political project is revealed most crucially in a famous statement of 1912 which was to determine his thinking on the nationality question throughout his career: *"Mankind",* Jászi claims, *"has been created in such a fashion that his path to inter-*

nationalism leads through the national, and his path to nationality through the mother-tongue of the masses".[7]

For Jászi, the status of this claim is not, above all, a matter of political strategy or historical ethics – that the national represents the most expedient or the most morally desirable road to the international — but one of *scientific necessity.* The developmental process which leads from the differentiation of national specificity to the integration of international unity is seen as an inevitable process. This inevitability or necessity is explained in metahistorical terms earlier in the same work: "from the Middle-Ages to the French Revolution and beyond, a single, uniform world-historical process has been progressing irresistibly forward: the integration of the peoples of Europe into ever wider and more organic unities".[8]

Once the scientific character of this "irresistible" process is understood, Jászi can confidently conclude, "it will be obvious to every thinking person that the movement towards nationality is, in the last analysis, a movement towards unity, towards greater economic and cultural association".[9]

To understand Jászi's representation of historical development in terms of an irresistible process of scientific necessity, we must return to the beginning of the 20th century and to the intellectual premises of the journal which bore that century's name, *Huszadik Század.* What is Jászi's concept of scienticity in 1900, the pioneering moment at which both century and journal are born? An immediate, if only somewhat provisional, answer to this question is supplied by Jászi's opening article in *Huszadik Század,* which follows Herbert Spencer's famous letter of approval and support. In this article, entitled "Scientific Journalism", Jászi argues that, in order to be scientific, any intellectual inquiry must satisfy two fundamental conditions: it must combine the "strict observation of phenomena"[10] with the causal induction of increasingly general laws. The theoretical relationship between phenomenon and law is never fully stated. All we are told is that the processes of induction and deduction must somehow be made to agree. While Jászi's positivistic commitment to the first of these conditions — the strict observation of phenomena — is responsible for some of his greatest insights (from the unprecedented factual detail afforded to the history and conditions of the nationalities in Central Europe in *The Evolution of Nation States and the Nationality Question,* 1912, to the wealth of instructive economic data collated in *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy,* 1929), the increasingly mechanical graduation from phenomenon to law constitutes the source of most of Jászi's blindnesses.

Jászi's conception of law, the scientific law of human development, is — and inspite of Jászi's growing disillusionment with Spencer's politics — would remain, profoundly indebted to Herbert Spencer's theory of evolution. In a contribution to *Huszadik Század,* entitled "Herbert Spencer and Our Future Tasks", Jászi claims that Spencer had been "the first to express and explain the development of the inorganic, organic and spiritual world according to the same mechanical laws of matter and motion".[11] Jászi does not go on to rehearse these "mechanical laws" in his article, but we can safely assume that he is thinking of Spencer's classic statement of the "Law of Evolution and Dissolution" as formulated in his *First Principles* of 1862: "Evolution

is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."[12] Or, as Spencer puts it a little more simply elsewhere in the same work: "Evolution is definable as a change from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of motion and the integration of matter."[13]

This law applies to all organisms, including what Spencer will go on to call the "social organism". The organic metaphor is an important one. For Spencer, societies are not the products of "manufacture or artificial arrangement",[14] but of "natural development". The structure of this development involves a dialectic of dissipation, or differentiation and integration. Like any other organism, the social organism increases in mass, becoming more complex and differentiated as it grows. At the same time, this complexity is accompanied by a greater degree of integration, towards the final goal of what Spencer calls complete "equilibration". Primitive societies are characterised by the repetition of essentially homogeneous elements; advanced societies by the integration of essentially heterogeneous elements. Thus the greater the differentiation, the greater the integration.

It is, of course, precisely this notion of integration through differentiation which informs Jászi's central commitment to the idea of national specificity as the path to international unity, and thus also his faith in the historical necessity of first Danubian, and then full European, confederation.

Looking back over the first ten years of *Huszadik Század* in 1910, Jászi claimed that: "if the first three years were dominated by Spencerism, the next three years brought us closer to Marxism".[15] This shift in intellectual allegiances, while it marked a clarification of Jászi's position on the relation of the theory of social development to the tasks of contemporary political organisation and strategy, did not, in essence, signify a change of direction in Jászi's fundamentally deterministic theory of social development or evolution. The road from Spencer to Marx may cross a sea of differences in political vision and methodological procedure, but their shared emphasis on teleology and determination, coupled with their shared deference towards Darwin, might suggest they have more in common than the simple fact that their tombs stand face to face in Highgate cemetery. If Spencer could derive his concept of the "survival of the fittest" from Darwin — and the phrase *is* Spencer's — Marx too could claim, looking into *The Origin of the Species* in 1860, that: "Darwin's book is very important and serves me as a basis in natural science for the class struggle in history."[16] It is revealing that in an article on "Darwin and Sociology", published in *Huszadik Század* in 1909, Jászi himself could conclude with an appeal to the necessity of combining the lessons drawn from Darwin by both Spencer and Marx. "Social Darwinism", he claims — or more accurately, "Sociological Darwinism" *(társadalomtudományi darwinizmus)* — and "historical materialism" represent "the two tendencies best equipped to keep the law of causality alive in the social sciences".[17]

The attempt to reconcile historical materialism with Spencerian evolution inevitably involved a very selective and qualified reading of Marx. In his book of 1908, *The His-*

torical Materialist Philosophy of the State, for example, Jászi claimed: "The eternal value of Marx's theory lies in the methodological principle which can be formulated as follows: In explaining social phenomena it is only legitimate to seek the assistance of intellectual motives (religion, morality, philosophy) when economic forces on their own are insufficient to explain the phenomenon in question."[18]

Jászi recognised that such a formulation was considerably more modest than the original historical materialist position. Its cautionary tone is largely the product of the strict and reductive economic determinism championed by Marxists internationally at the turn of the century, to which Engels himself had objected in the 1890s. Jászi, however, takes his qualifications still further by quoting approvingly from Ferdinand Tönnies: "Historical materialism is valid insofar as it expresses the scientific and positive tendency which traces the high back to the low, the noble to the vulgar, the complex to the simple. But it is invalid if its principle is extended and used in such a manner as to set it in opposition to the *psychological* explanation of social development. On the contrary, it is precisely this explanation it should be working towards."

This not only serves as further evidence against Hanák's representation of Jászi as an "enlightened rationalist" who had no time for psychology, but also points us towards the limitations of Jászi's theoretical appropriation of the systems of both Marx and Spencer. Just as, in adopting Spencer's notion of evolution as a purely theoretical construct, Jászi had ignored both Spencer's politics and the political and historical phenomena his theory was formulated to address, so, in accommodating historical materialism to this evolutionary theory as no more than a "methodological principle", he ignored the strikingly similar realities to which Marx was responding and the strikingly different political conclusions he reached. For what is missing from Jászi's appropriation of both evolutionism and historical materialism — as well as from the qualitatively different "phenomena" to which he applies these theories in considering social and national developments in Central Europe — is the *shared* historical context from which both Spencer and Marx had set out. That context is, above all, market society in 19th century England, with social Darwinism as the patron of its theoretical justification, and historical materialism as the committed herald of its practical negation. Had Jászi grasped the historical preconditions of these two movements, rather than merely their emphasis on scienticity, teleology and determination, he could surely have recognised that the second was proposed as a critique of, rather than a complement to, the first.

It is here that the problematic relationship between phenomenon and law in Jászi's social science becomes fully manifest. Ignoring the phenomena on which both Spencer and Marx had initially based their developmental laws, Jászi uncritically applies these laws — emptied of their historical content — to the very different social and national phenomena of what was still — in Jászi's own estimation — a residually feudal Central Europe. The problem is not that Jászi pays insufficient attention to these new phenomena — the "facts" of his own social and national context. Indeed, throughout his life he remains true to the dictum he attributes to Durkheim in an essay on *The Methods of Sociology,* published in *Huszadik Század* in 1905: "We need facts!! Then more facts!! Then still more facts!!"[19] It is, rather, that the laws he imposes on these facts

are taken ready-made from a different context, not as the products of, or responses to, *history,* but as science — mechanical, inevitable and necessary.

An animus to history is already implicit in the Spencerian model of evolution, and its roots can be traced directly back to Spencer's own intellectual development. For Spencer — like Jászi and the *Huszadik Század* circle in general — had a very low opinion of the contemporary state of historiography, and sought to set the study on a scientific footing. "I take but little interest in what are called histories", wrote Spencer in his *Autobiography,* "but am interested only in Sociology, which stands related to these so-called histories much as a vast building stands related to the heaps of stones and bricks around it".[20] Taking issue with the historians of his own age some seventy pages later, he argues: "the ordinary historian ... thinking of little else but the doings of kings, court intrigues, international quarrels, victories and defeats, concerning all of which no definite forecasts are possible, asserts there is no social science..."[21]

The same disposition is reproduced by Jászi in the opening article of *Huszadik Század* in 1900: "Scientific publicism differs as much from the unscientific as the chronicles which sing of kings and battles, or the so-called pragmatic history which investigates the intrigues of diplomacy, differ from the historical labours of [the] ... sociologists of the modern age."[22] That such a position was characteristic of the project of *Huszadik Század* as a whole is illustrated by Zoltán Szász's comments from a review of Max Nordau's *Der Sinn der Geschichte* in the same year: "It became clear that the intellectual activity subsumed under the category of historiography could not be called scientific research, that works of history do not constitute science, and with such works having been thus discredited, a new science was born, the science of sociology..."[23] Especially in its early years, *Huszadik Század* rarely concerned itself with historiography as such. It strove, rather, towards the empirical, sociological analysis of given realities, and towards the metahistorical foundation of the laws of social development.

The theoretical logic behind such a focus is again provided by Spencer. Already in 1852, in a letter to Edward Lott, he could explain: "My position, stated briefly, is that until you have got a true theory of humanity, you cannot interpret history; and when you have got a true theory of humanity *you do not want history.* You can draw no inference from the facts and alleged facts of history without your conceptions of human nature entering into that inference; and unless your conceptions of human nature are true your inference will be vicious. But if your conceptions of human nature be true, you need none of the inferences drawn from history for your guidance."[24]

Insofar as such a "theory of humanity" was proposed as scientific — answering to the fundamental requirements of causality and necessity — historical reality, with its awkward tendency to break the rules, was often viewed as simply recalcitrant. For Spencer, this recalcitrance took the form of, above all, the problem of what he called "re-barbarization". While Spencer believed he could see in the first half of the 19th century the practical realisation, and thus phenomenal justification, for his theory of evolution in the development of "industrial" society, he increasingly came to view the second half of the century as an age of regression, resulting in the re-emergence of

those forms of social organisation his evolutionary schema had designated as "militant", and had identified with a more primitive stage in the development of the social organism. Much of Spencer's later work focuses on this problem of re-barbarization and "militancy", leading him to precisely the kind of political conservatism — in particular the rejection of the principle of universal suffrage and a profound hostility towards socialism — which led Jászi to claim, characteristically, that "the future will undoubtedly justify the basic principles of Spencer's thought, while refuting his political conclusions".[25]

The point is not so much whether Jászi was right or wrong in this assessment — although one might argue that Spencer's anxieties concerning excessive state power have proved more prophetic than his faith in social evolution — rather, that Jászi, like Spencer himself, was ultimately unable to reconcile the phenomena of history with the laws of evolution. Historical developments which went against the great scientific plan of heterogeneous integration could never be fully accounted for, only rejected out of hand. As Jászi argued in *The Future of Hungary and the United States of Danubia* in 1918: "all initiatives which, in contradiction to the enormous impetus of integration, strive towards economic and political isolation are directed against the most powerful evolutionary forces of the 20th century".[26]

With this final contradiction between historical initiative and evolutionary law, eventuality and necessity, history and metahistory, our search for the intellectual genealogy of an illusion has reached, in a Jászian phrase, its "Archimedian point". Given the limitation of time, all I should like to do now is offer two illustrations of the *effects* of this contradiction in Jászi's work.

My first illustration concerns the concept of democracy, which, as Jászi's own "Archimedian point" of the nationality question, occupies a privileged place in his thought in general and in his conception of Danubian confederation in particular.

Jászi's fullest theoretical statement on this question is a major article entitled *The Future of Democracy,* published in two installments in *Huszadik Század* in 1907. Starting out from a polemic with Henry Maine's static, formalistic description of the democratic state (in *Popular Government,* 1890), Jászi proposes an alternative, organicist and developmental description, involving a characteristic attempt to draw upon both historical materialism and Spencerian evolution. "In the final analysis", Jászi argues, more or less with Marx, "the form of political rule is determined by the economic structure of society ... the final cause, character and nature of the external form of the constitution can only be understood through the material structure of society ... any profound change in the form of government or constitution can only be the product of a profound transformation of the social structure".[27] On this basis, Jászi offers the following, rather naive and schematic, definition of democracy: "Where, in place of a few rich people, wider circles have access to material well-being, and thus also to social independence: we shall find such constitutional forms as may be designated democratic."[28] In support of this thesis, Jászi cites approvingly from Gusztav Beksics's study of 1881, *Democracy in Hungary:* "If I want to know how the cause of democracy is faring in any given state, I must examine the division of public property."[29]

On the more Spencerian side, Jászi offers a still less historical definition of democracy as an eternal value. "For every time and age", he writes, "we can call democratic those tendencies which seek to place the organs of the state under the supervision of an ever widening stratum of society in order that they should be able to serve the interests of the community increasingly effectively against the interests of certain smaller circles".[30] In this way, Jászi can see democracy as an insurance of integration in a complex, expanding, and widely differentiated "social organism". The conclusion Jászi reaches towards the end of his essay is even more evolutionistic: "We have good reason to consider democratic development as a natural necessity, independent of human reason and will."[31]

It hardly needs saying that Jászi's far from consistent attempt to fuse historical materialism and Spencerian evolution in this crucial question does not stand up well to history. For the equation he proposes between a greater equality of wealth and property and a higher degree of democracy hardly constitutes a relation of scientific or historical necessity. If this *were* the case, we would be bound to consider Hungary in the 1950s a more democratic state than the USA today. Where Jászi himself turns to the evaluation of historical realities — in particular the state of democracy in England and America at the turn of the century — tensions between democracy as a historical reality and as a theoretical ideal become still more apparent. Democracy came into being, Jászi argues, "through the battle for equality before the law which the bourgeoisie waged against feudalism".[32] In contrast to this, he goes on, the new task of democracy is to "struggle for economic equality" by bringing into being "a social order and structure which, through the state ownership of the means of production, will eliminate all unproductive labour and all incomes which are not the product of labour".[33] That the democratic ideal which fought against the feudal state for equality before the law is inadequate for the creation of a genuinely democratic order today, is, Jászi claims, demonstrated quite "alarmingly" by the example of the current democratic states — an example which fills Jászi with feelings of "horror and disgust". "It is quite beyond doubt", he argues, "that the experience of the two classical democratic nations [England and America] do not show the present state of democracy in a very favourable light".[34] This experience, Jászi concludes, "only confirms our point of departure: that the democratic spirit and endeavour cannot prevail in a pure form where, in terms of property and influence, there are great differences between the constitutive elements of society".[35] As the most disturbing illustration of this, Jászi points to the American example, where, he writes, "even the inveterate forces and restraints of a long historical past are unable to impede the free development of a form of democracy which rests on oligarchic, capitalist foundations".[36]

Jászi is equally critical of parliamentary democracy in turn of the century England, where, he insists, "there is no genuine spirit of democracy in the parliamentary parties, which, in the hands of professional businessmen who make their living from politics, have become no more than machines for the election of representatives".[37] This criticism is remarkably reminiscent of a point made by Spencer, writing in *The Study of Sociology* in 1880: "While the outside form of free government remains, there has

grown up within it a reality which makes government not free. The body of professional politicians, entering public life to get incomes ... have ... in fact become a ruling class quite different from that which the constitution intended to secure..."[38] The ultimate historical irony of the similarity of their positions on this matter has already been referred to. Spencer's critique of parliamentarism would lead him over the next ten years to attack not only the principle of universal suffrage, but also the very socialism which Jászi saw as the driving force behind the emergence of a new and fully authentic democratic ideal.

My second illustration of the conflict between history and metahistory in Jászi's thought concerns the key work of his American period, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy,* published in 1929. In discussing this book, it is worth remembering that it was not written as a straightforward *history* of the last years of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy, but as a contribution to a series on Civic Education, the purpose of which was to answer the question: how do state systems achieve and sustain political cohesion? Thus the impetus behind the book is already partly theoretical, rather than purely historiographical, from the outset.

More important, however, are two further theoretical premises which inform Jászi's project in *The Dissolution;* one of which points back to Spencer, the other to Marx — or, rather, through Marx to Hegel. Just as Spencer had insisted in *The Social Organism* (1860) that "society is a growth, not a manufacture", a "natural development", not an "artificial arrangement", so Jászi could base the whole of his study of the ultimate failure of the Monarchy on the premise that "the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy was not a mechanical, but an organic process".[39]

The laws which govern this process, however, are derived not so much from Spencerian evolution in this instance, as from the dialectical teleology of Marx and Hegel. Jászi proposes to articulate the dissolution of the Monarchy in terms of two sets of opposing dynamics, identified as centripetal and centrifugal forces. He is quick to recognise that such a division, "like all scientific classification, is to some extent an artificial and arbitrary one, as it severs processes which in reality are united". But he is equally quick to attempt to resolve — or rather to dissolve — the dilema of arbitrariness by simply taking scientific classification to a further remove of inevitability and abstraction. "Each social force in history", he argues, "has a certain particular dialectic movement, by which itself and the institutions created by it receive, in the course of its historical development, such new tendencies as at the beginning were alien to it".[40] Far from overcoming the arbitrariness of the initial division — centripetal versus centrifugal forces — Jászi merely insists on their (no less arbitrary) dialectical relation: that is to say, the dialectical process whereby centripetal forces become centrifugal forces.

The way in which Jászi goes on to fill this empty theoretical framework with "historical" content represents the tension in his thought between phenomena and laws at its very sharpest. Jászi identifies eight essentially centripetal forces which constitute what he calls the "real pillars of Austrian internationalism": the dynasty, the army, the aristocracy, the Roman Catholic church, the bureaucracy, capitalism, free trade unity

and socialism. The first four of these centripetal forces come into conflict with the second four, producing their dialectical opposite, eight new *centrifugal* forces.

While the positivistic description of each of these forces and the internal contradictions they embody contains — especially in the case of Jászi's discussion of free trade and the Customs Union — much information and original analysis that continues to be invaluable to the student of the Monarchy, the dialectical schema into which these forces are so neatly slotted remains essentially arbitrary and unhistorical.

One is returned, once again, to the problem faced not only by Jászi, but also by Spencer and, in a rather different way, by Marx: the problem of the causal relationship between phenomenon and law, history and metahistory. By what criteria can the agreement of the former with the latter be reached in necessary, rather than contingent terms? Here the case of Marx is qualitatively different from that of either Spencer or Jászi. For Marx, the criterion remains — whether rightly or wrongly — an essentially rationalistic one: the principle of economic overdetermination, or determination "in the last instance". For Spencer and Jászi, on the other hand, the criterion is not one of "enlightened rationalism" — to use the misplaced term of Hanák with which I began — but one of an essentially religious nature: the criterion of *faith.* Spencer was ultimately forced to conclude that his commitment to the concept of evolution was "a profession of faith".[41] For Jászi, a similar conclusion is equally inescapable. This is best illustrated by an extensive article entitled "Is There Such a Thing as Social Progress?" published in *Huszadik Század* in 1912. Arguing, as one would expect, in the affirmative, Jászi concludes with the following exalted claim: "Faith in progress [a haladási hit] finds in the miserable and discouraging wilderness of the world-historical relativists a certain divine path, a certain ambitious order, which, if we choose to follow it and adapt ourselves to it, arouses within us the sensation of contact with a reality which goes beyond the confines of our own wordly lives ... faith in progress ... connects our finite, frail and aimless lives to something infinite, eternal and absolute."[42]

*

What, if anything — one is bound to ask in conclusion — can be retrieved from Jászi's religiously progressive, stubbornly evolutionary and artificially metahistorical project in the 1990s in the light of the methodological antinomies we have been highlighting? Our first answer to this question must surely be Jászi's undeniable moral example, which has fallen beyond the scope of this paper. His exemplary commitment to tolerance and mutual understanding in the nationality question cannot but be important in the transformations we are currently witnessing in Central Europe. Beyond this, however, the idea of federal union in the region seems to be as unrealistic as ever. All the same, it is possible to point to two developments which might have fired Jászi's optimism had he been living today.

The first is the emergence, since 1945, of an economically powerful, yet essentially democratic and European West Germany, now incorporating or — to shift back into a more Spencerian vocabulary — "integrating" a formerly "regressive" and "militant"

East Germany into its evolutionary process. Inspite of his repeated return to a Naumannesque concept of a German-led Mitteleuropa, Jászi, to be sure, always maintained, with Bismarck's great critic Constantin Frantz, that the "world mission" of German evolution was not unification, but the formation of "the base of a European federation".[43] He may, however, have found some encouragement in the strength of federal feeling in transitional East Germany today, particularly in such *Länder* as Saxony.

The second development is the current social and economic transformation of Central Europe, which may well yet provide the missing historical reality at the heart of Jászi's metahistorical dream: market society, which constitutes the crucial context of both its social darwinist justification and its historical materialist critique. Could it be that the emergence of the free market in the political context of liberal democracy, frustrated by both pre-war residual feudalism and post-war state socialism in Central Europe, might finally possess the resources to solve the nationality question, where both irredentist chauvinism and Marxist internationalism had failed. I have no intention of hazarding an answer to this question here — the form of which is probably anyway ill-conceived. My only purpose in reconstituting the terms of the argument in such a way at a time when Central Europe is at last breaking free from the Orwellian dystopia with which it has lived for the past forty years, is to give the utopian Oszkár Jászi the last word: "My policy", he wrote when forced to stare his own illusions in the face in 1924, four years after the treaty of Trianon, "was directed to the future, rather than to the present".[44] Looking at the disturbing revival of national hostilities in Central Europe today, it is hard to believe that the future of an illusion has finally arrived.

Notes

1. Cited from *The New York Review of Books* Vol XXXVII, No. 5, March 29 1990, pp. 18–19.
2. "Miért nem sikerült a dunai federációt megalkotni?" *Látóhatár,* 1955.
3. "Central Europe and Russia" in *Journal of Central European Affairs* Vol. V No. 1, April 1945, p. 13.
4. Péter Hanák, *Jászi Oszkár dunai patriotizmusa,* Budapest, 1985, p. 151.
5. *Revolution and Counter Revolution in Hungary,* London, 1924, p. 65.
6. *Ibid.,* p. 69.
7. *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* (1912), ed. György Litván, Budapest, 1986, p. 276.
8. *Ibid.,* p. 79.
9. *Ibid.,* p. 275.
10. "Tudományos publicisztika" in *Huszadik Század* I. January 1900, p. 23.
11. "Herbert Spencer és jövő feladataink" in *Huszadik Század,* V. p. 4.
12. Herbert Spencer, *First Principles* 1862, p. 367.
13. *Ibid.,* p. 291.
14. "The Social Organism" 1860, in *Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative* Vol. I, London, 1883. pp. 384–5. Also "society is a growth and not a manufacture".
15. "Tíz év", reprinted in *Jászi Oszkár publicisztikája* ed Gy. Litván and J. Varga, Budapest 1982, p. 80.
16. Cited by Raymond Williams in 'Social Darwinism', *Problems in Materialism and Culture,* London, 1980, p. 93.

17. "Darwin és a szociológia" in *Huszadik Század* Vol. XIX, p. 281.
18. *A történelmi materializmus állambölcselete,* Budapest, 1908.
19. "A szociológia módszere" in *Huszadik Század* Vol. XI, p. 332.
20. Herbert Spencer, *An Autobiography,* 1904, Vol. II, p. 185.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 253.
22. "Tudományos publicisztika", p. 24.
23. Cited by Attila Pók in *A Huszadik Század körének történetfelfogása,* Budapest, 1982, p. 9.
24. Letter to Edward Lott, 23 August 1852. Cited in J. D. Y. Peel, *Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist,* London, 1971, pp. 158–9.
25. "Herbert Spencer és jövő feladataink", p. 16.
26. *Magyarország jövője és a Dunai Egyesült Államok,* Budapest, 1918, p. 52.
27. "A demokrácia jövője" in *Huszadik Század* Vol VII, p. 7.
28. *Ibid.,* p. 6.
29. *Ibid.,* p. 6.
30. *Ibid.,* p. 7.
31. *Ibid.,* p. 121.
32. *Ibid.,* p. 110.
33. *Ibid.,* p. 111.
34. *Ibid.,* p. 111.
35. *Ibid.,* p. 113.
36. *Ibid.,* p. 113.
37. *Ibid.,* p. 111.
38. *The Study of Sociology,* London, 1880, p. 298.
39. *The Dissolution of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy,* Chicago, 1929, p. 3.
40. *Ibid.,* p. 133.
41. *An Autobiography* Vol. II, p. 8.
42. "Van-e társadalmi haladás?" in *Huszadik Század* Vol. XII, pp. 535–6.
43. See Jászi, "The Future of Danubia" in *Journal of Central European Affairs* Vol. I, No. 2, July 1941, pp. 139–143.
44. *Revolution and Counter Revolution in Hungary,* p. 60.

AT HOME IN THE UNITED STATES: ASSIMILATION WITHOUT THE BETRAYAL OF ROOTS

ENIKŐ MOLNÁR-BASA

Library of Congress

The topic of national identity has been much discussed, yet one aspect is, I believe, often neglected. Namely, that this identification with one's background is not only retained in those who form a community apart from the mainstream of the majority culture, but also by those who seem thoroughly assimilated into the culture of the majority. Those who study this topic tend to focus on its manifestations in groups, or the lack of such factors as belonging to a Hungarian community, supporting ethnic institutions, etc. In the latter case, the conclusion generally is that the person or group has lost its identity and has succumbed to the melting pot. But all of the parameters in which the maintenance of ethnic consciousness is defined are dependent on living in ethnic centers, or at least fairly close to them, and keeping close contacts with ethnic communities and networks. This is well and good, and such contact has much to offer. It also has its drawbacks, chiefly in that assimilation into the life of the host country is hindered. The danger exists that the immigrant — and even his children — will never really feel at home in the United States or Canada. He will not be comfortable with its social customs and business life, in its professional and political life, always comparing these to his former country and its customs.

During this conference, however, I was glad to hear other views on what constitutes the retention of ethnic identity represented, although the views did not surprise me, especially coming as they did from men such as John Lukács and Edward Teller, whose phrase "hagyományok együttélése" struck me as particularly apt. What I hope to present in this paper is that this double identity, or more appropriately "dual consciousness" (to use Károly Nagy's phrase) is not necessarily restricted to the first generation immigrant, but can be extended to the second, in some instances even to the third generation.

I wish to call attention to the sense of Hungarian-ness preserved in those who have moved into the mainstream without giving up their Hungarian identity and made a virtue of the differences. The inaugural issue of *Erdélyi Magyarság* has an article by "Ács" that states this well: "akik magyar szülők gyermekeiként valamilyen távoli idegen országban születtek, az vált szülőföldjükké vagy hazájukká. Azzá vált fizikailag, annak ellenére, hogy lelki hazájuk tán továbbra is szüleik vagy nagyszüleik szülőföldje, itt valahol a Duna–Tisza mentén, a Kárpát-medencében. Lehet, hogy még nem volt módjukban személyesen felkeresni. Lehet, hogy csak elbeszélésből, képeslapokról

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

ismerik, mégis vonzódnak hozzá. Vonzódnak hozzá, holott már csak törik a magyar nyelvet, vagy soha nem is beszélték azt."[1]

It is not necessary, therefore, to know Hungarian to possess a sense of Hungarian identity. This should be clear enough from a comparison with other nationalities. How many Irish–Americans know Gaelic, or even Italian–Americans Italian? How many Polish or Lithuanian Americans know those languages? Yet, I often hear accusations that one cannot be a Hungarian without a command of the language. Even more, much of the effort to instill a sense of identity is concentrated on language instruction. Such efforts can be counterproductive if the language is forced on unwilling children. Further, all the energy the individual or the community is able to muster is often exhausted in teaching language and other values are neglected. As Lajos Éltető remarked in an interview: "a család nem elég arra, hogy egyedül tanítson nyelvet s minden egyebet".[2] He does not elaborate on the "minden egyebet", but the implications are clear.

Again, retaining a sense of national identity does not mean being part of an ethnic community or even being active in ethnic organizations. It is an internal matter that can — and ideally does — have external repercussions but which should not be defined in external terms. Thus, the studies which assign the four broad categories of Hungarian immigrants certain characteristics ignore those who have largely moved beyond the confines of ethnic communities — physically or mentally. If indeed they ever belonged to them. Such persons can be members of any of the four broad categories of Hungarian immigrants, but it is generally in connection with the 1949–50 refugees and the 1956 group that this oversight occurs. They are dismissed as "assimilated". As if that were a negative process. I am thinking here of comments made by Béla Várdy in his book on Hungarians in America,[3] as well as at conferences and symposia. He characterized the first group of refugees as educated persons who settled in the old ghettos and sunk into occupations beneath their training and original status. Under the circumstances, of course, involvement in Hungarian affairs was an escape. Such activity, however, was restricted to the Hungarian community and not carried into their everyday lives. To some extent their children developed the same mentality. The 56ers, on the other hand, are dismissed as having assimilated so quickly that they abandoned their Hungarian background. This assessment completely ignores the many members of this diaspora who did not settle in ghettos and who made new lives for themselves, created new careers, and who moved into their new environments without the psychological problems attributed to the others. To a large extent this is the path taken by the 1956 refugees also. This group can not be dismissed, however, for not only did they retain their Hungarian identity, they passed it on to their children, and even acquainted their neighbors with this culture which was so much a part of their lives.

As a footnote to the debate on which group preserved its heritage better, and which passed on its sense of a Hungarian identity most successfully, we should reflect that while the earlier ones saw the possibility for such preservation in institutions based and maintained in the United States, the later ones (1956 and since) recognized the possibility of doing this through visits to Hungary and through active cultural contacts with Hungary.[4] As was pointed out in connection with the Hungarian and American–

Hungarian linguistic debate also, today's technology — and now even political realities — make this in increasingly viable option.

Assimilation is not a negative process. It is a positive one if used wisely. Assimilation should not mean the denial of one's heritage, one's roots. It should mean the enrichment of this heritage by a new one and of the new affinities by the cultural and emotional values of the old. We Hungarians are fond of quoting St. Stephen's *Intelmek* that foreigners should be welcomed because a nation is poor if inhabited only by one people. But, for the multi-national or ethnic society to work, a process of assimilation, of harmonization must occur. We cannot think in the terms an acquaintance from New Jersey professed: that he was an American from nine in the morning until five in the afternoon, and a Hungarian the rest of the time.

The question, however, might be asked: if these individuals, however faithful to their Hungarian identity, do not live in groups and form a community, what good is this sense of identity? And how permanent is it? Will their children and possibly grandchildren also remember their Hungarian roots? Can they, should they, be considered as Hungarians? The answer of course is an emphatic yes. They are Hungarians, and yes, they can do a great deal of good. It can be permanent enough to be passed onto the second and third generation. As "Ács" pointed out in the article I already cited, identity is associated with choice. A person is what he professes to be. Of the 1.8 million Hungarians in the U. S. census, only a fraction were born in Hungary, speak Hungarian, or even know much about Hungary. But they still identify with Hungary.

Similarly, the 1950 and 1956 refugees — and their children and grandchildren — identify with Hungary even if they no longer speak the language or live in a Hungarian community. They are propagandists for Hungary and its culture, and often more effective than ethnic/emigre publications or pronouncements can be. They can reach the majority audience not only because they know it better, but also because that audience is already interested, already involved with its colleagues, friends, or acquaintances. They are also more likely to do this in English and thus reach those who are unfamiliar with Hungarian culture, rather than Hungarian and reach those who probably share some of the same values anyway. I remember numerous occasions when members of my family were asked about Hungary in places such as Alabama and Oklahoma, Virginia and North Carolina. Sometimes we were requested to give a formal presentation, sometimes only to answer the general interest of teachers or colleagues. In 1956 the local television station wanted some background on Hungary. One of the colleagues asked me to speak, although I was still in high school. I know of other such instances, and there were doubtless many, many more.

Another way in which the personal conviction of national identity — as opposed to the organized one — is effective is in setting an example. Successful people are admired, and this casts its glow on the persons' national or ethnic background also. There are, of course, those who distinguished themselves and rose to the top of their careers. Some became internationally recognized even outside their careers. But there are many who earned the respect of their community, city, or state, or achieved prominence in

their profession. And in many cases this meant a change in careers on the part of men Béla Várdy has described as "declassé".

Those lawyers, landowners or military officers who did not think in terms of the past in a ghetto mentality but chose a new career did prosper. Some became high-ranking civil servants; a former naval officer in the Danube fleet became a Vice-President of the Lone Star Brewery in San Antonio, Texas. Nor was he the only one: the San Antonio Hungarian community that celebrated the opening of a Hungarian exhibit at the Institute of Texan Cultures last fall is made up of persons of similar backgrounds and experiences. While there are no Hungarian schools or churches and the community is scattered over the region, the Hungarian Club participates in the annual ethnic fiesta and demonstrates Hungarian culture to the community at large. The exhibit documents the same sort of involvement: it emphasizes the achievements of individual settlers and their contribution to Texan culture. Their contribution as Hungarians. Such examples could be multiplied in many Southern and Western states, and I suspect it is the rule rather than the exception in California. It is certainly the pattern for Hungarian immigrants who did not have the presumed "refuge" of ethnic communities.

Retaining a sense of national identity while becoming a part of the majority culture need not be incompatible or incongruous. Someone who feels "at home" in the United States or Canada finds it natural to bring his knowledge of Hungarian culture to bear on any relevant topic. In school, for example, assignments are approached from this aspect. Or, academic forums provide the opportunities. The Atlantic Studies series is a good example, as are the publications of Katharina Wilson at the University of Georgia. She has seen to it that Hungarian women writers are represented in the books she has edited.

The awareness of the American public about Hungary is best served by those who are within the mainstream and thus speak from a position of strength. Schools, clubs, associations that remain centered on the ethnic community often do not have an impact on the wider world. While they can be sources of information, the information imparted here must go beyond their confines to affect those who are not Hungarian, who do not share the same cultural background, the same perception of world events, or possibly even the same values. A few years ago at a similar forum here in Bloomington Lajos Éltető bemoaned the fact that Americans do not know Hungary well, and that many misconceptions or even falsehoods are found in textbooks at all levels. This might very well be the case; but, someone who considers himself a part of the American mainstream, not an observer from the outside, would simply correct the errors of fact, clear up the misconceptions, and inform his neighbors rather than rail at a lack of knowledge. Of course, this has to be done with tact and with a good command of the facts. And it should take American attitudes into consideration. Thus, one who is not at home in American life will have a hard time conveying his ideas effectively. So will one whose sense of identity is based on sentiment and emotion without adequate intellectual background. There should not be a split between a private "Hungarian" and a public "American" self.

And what is the role of language? I believe it is useful but not crucial. Hungarian

identity can be retained without a command of the language — and lost with it. "Ács" addressed this question in "Nyelvcsere előtt, nyelvcsere után" by stating: "Vallom, hogy igenis, lehetnek. Lehetnek azok is [magyarok], akik szüleikkel együtt még gyermekként hagyták itt az országot s évtizedek óta, idegen nyelvkörnyezetben élve szinte már csak törik az anyanyelvüket. Miért ne lehetnének? ... Egy nemzethez, egy kultúrához való tartozás mindig is vállalás kérdése." Of the close to two million Hungarian–Americans he estimates that more than half no longer know Hungarian: "Nem beszéli a magyar nyelvet, mert már nem az anyanyelve. S mégis, valami azt súgja nekik, hogy ők magyarok. Vállalták és vállalják a kötődést a magyarság egészében."[5]

He is, of course, right. I know a retired scientific researcher for example, who has found her relatives in Hungary through researching her family tree. She speaks no Hungarian, yet her interest in Hungary and Hungarian events is keen. She has visited there and plans to return to get to know the country and the people better. And while her lineage includes the usual American mix of other nationalities, her "identity" is Hungarian.

In conclusion, then, not only can national identity be preserved even with assimilation, but it can also be advantageous for the individual, the Hungarian–American community, Hungary, and not the least, the United States. For the individual because he can most fully live his life without an identity crisis — however fashionable this might be. For the Hungarian–American community, because it is thus represented by those who are familiar with the American system and who have a wide network of friends and acquaintances in the majority population sympathetic to the Hungarian cause. The most successful lobbying efforts capitalized on this. For Hungary, because there is a sympathetic and often knowledgeable population in the United States and Canada who can work for Hungarian interests and help cement relations between the two countries. And for the United States, because it has a group of experts who can educate, advise and inform about a part of the world not familiar to the majority.

Notes

1. "Ács", *Erdélyi Magyarság* 1/1 (1990. febr.), 26.
2. Miklós Kontra, "Változnak a csillagok felettünk; beszélgetés Éltető Lajossal", *Tiszatáj* (1990. jan.), 89.
3. Steven Béla Várdy, *The Hungarian Americans* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1985).
4. For this insight I am indebted to my sister Emese Molnár Bagley.
5. "Ács", *op. cit.* p. 26.

REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF HUNGARIANS IN NORTH AMERICA

THOMAS SZENDREY

Gannon University

More than twenty years ago, a Hungarian poet from Transylvania visited the United States and commented to me that he could foresee not much more than twenty years for the future of some form of Hungarian life in the United States, or for that matter in North America generally. Although much has changed these past twenty years, Hungarian life continues to be visible in this part of the world, although in different forms and motivated by different values, under altered demographic conditions and ever-changing political opinions; new or renewed institutional structures exist alongside the previous ones. In sum, there has been now, as throughout the history of the presence of Hungarians in North America, an ongoing change — possibly development — in the historical consciousness of many generations and individuals. The mutations of this historical consciousness in the life and work of Hungarians in North America should thus be examined.

I approach the initial task for the elucidation of this theme with some trepidation because of numerous definitional issues inherent in the concept of historical consciousness; nonetheless a working characterization of the term is necessary. In its simplest form, I would say that historical consciousness is the use of what is remembered and internalized about the past and the manner in which all that shapes and impacts our life and destiny. However, I also wish to cite from the *Pensées* of Pascal: "In every action we must consider, besides the act itself, our present, past, and future conditions, and others whom it touches, and must see the connexion of it all. And so we shall keep ourselves well in check." More briefly: "Memory is necessary for all operations of the Reason" (*Pensées,* 389).

From all this it should be quite evident that a discussion of the past as remembered by Hungarians in North America at different times may well be instructive in terms of understanding something of the attitudes and values of these people. My concern now will be not so much with the specifics of these historical attitudes and the changes wrought in them, but rather with the study of the concept itself and the transformations it underwent as it manifested itself in the life of Hungarians in North America.

The use of the terms commonly associated with departure from one's land of birth or some form of continuation of the values attached to that land of birth by the first, second, or subsequent generations, already reveals something of the historical consciousness of those peoples who have undergone this experience. Certain terms and

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

characterizations commonly used point to differences seldom examined. Allow me to list a number of terms commonly employed for this: immigrant, emigrant, emigré, refugee, settler, resettler, expellee, displaced person, exile, expatriate and escapee come to mind. The fact that persons choosing one of these terms or forced to choose one, are to a great extent determined in this choice (or the lack of it) by their condition, values, goals, or aspirations; obviously, this condition or situation can be passed on to subsequent generations. In that case the terms used more properly are ethnic or hyphenated American, multicultural citizen, foreign born, minority, among others. Here again, a historical consciousness is passed on to a subsequent generation or descendants of immigrants or refugees, which then influence to a greater or lesser extent the historical consciousness of such an individual, quite naturally with varying degrees of success or failure in maintaining a heritage.

Let us, however, return to the discussion of the meaning of these terms in the Hungarian context, evaluating and exemplifying the impact of the condition specific to a particular term in the context of historical consciousness. One brief comment is nonetheless necessary before doing this; in terms of the impact exercised by the use of these terms on our consciousness, it makes a substantial difference if an individual is characterized by one of these terms by other or self. For example, someone may self-define as an exile while being treated as an immigrant by the public authorities; this can have a variety of impacts on one's historical consciousness and the adaptation to the changed circumstances. The specific mixture of historical attitudes which individuals bring with themselves to a new land and how they adapt to that new land are shaped by self-perception as well as by the patterns of adjustment made possible by the altered conditions. It is not really possible to document more than the potential sources of the influences upon the historical consciousness of any individual or group — among the possible sources being the educational system (especially history textbooks), family background, the role of the media, the cultural milieu, and social and political involvements, among many others. Even so, it is still useful to examine, if only episodically, such an intensely personal phenomenon as historical consciousness; the past we use, even if only subconsciously, impels us toward the intersection points of our lives and impacts directly upon our individual human destinies, even if this all occurs of necessity in a social context. Something this intensely personal is best examined on the episodic level and from this one can venture some observations about emerging patterns which may lead to tenuous — hopefully meaningful — conclusions.

Let us now deal with the specific definitions of the terms applicable to the act of leaving one's place of birth and the conditions of being the descendant of someone who has left one's homeland and passed on something of the historical consciousness adhering to the place of birth. Emigrate and immigrate are the two most widely used words to describe the act of moving from or entering into a country and the difference between the two words focuses on the act of leaving or entering; while a useful distinction, the two terms generally refer to the two ends of the same process, but if looked at from the perspective of historical consciousness or motivation, the difference can be staggering. One example from the Hungarian context may well illustrate the

difference on this level. It has been stated in any number of writings about the Hungarian emigration that "kitántorgott több mint százezer..." (more than a 100 000 tottered out). The very use of these words denotes a process that impacted negatively not only on those who left, but also on those concerned with the loss of this mass of humanity to the Hungarian homeland and one may also — I believe validly — stress the fact that these emigrants had been mostly abandoned by the architects of the Hungarian dream-world of the fin-de-siècle era. Nonetheless, these emigrants still retained a sense of and attachment to the Hungarian past even after their arrival and eventual settlement in North America; their historical consciousness remained a sentimental one and for that reason exceedingly difficult to transmit to the next generation. To further compound the matter, many left with a desire to return and thus their sense of a historically based feeling of attachment was focused on the hope of returning to a Hungary socially transformed. This was not to happen and many of these motivations to return were frustrated by events beyond their control. This too, in my estimation, impacted negatively on their Hungarian consciousness and turned many in the direction of an American–Hungarian consciousness.

Turning now at this point to the word immigration one must inevitably state that on their arrival they became immigrants *to* the United States or Canada and the change wrought upon them by their arrival, or rather as a consequence of it, also transformed whatever historical consciousness they had brought with them. The impending prospect of living and working under changed circumstances wrenched them out of a prior style of life (whether they attached positive or negative values to that is at this level not a substantive issue, although it became one eventually) and they had to adapt without any sense of the historically developed patterns of life so essential to simply living in any society. I may just note at this juncture that this was one of the reasons for the establishment of self-help societies. However, as immigrants now, they of necessity adapted to the changed conditions by internalizing to a greater or lesser extent the American historical consciousness necessary for life in this new world. Obviously this caused problems and conflicts not only on the level of political and socio-economic adjustment, but less visibly and no less significantly resulted in conflicts and inner struggles on the level of historical consciousness; these tribulations were inevitably faced, seldom resolved satisfactorily, and for many years for some, fewer for others, agitated the consciousness of virtually all immigrants. I might note that this is a constant and ever-present theme — in addition to their daily problems and successes — in their correspondence as well as in their poetry and popular culture generally. Seen from the perspective of changes and adaptations in their historical consciousness, the terms emigration and immigration take on — hopefully — an added and more nuanced meaning.

One of the presidents of the United States during the peak immigration years (1880 to 1920), Woodrow Wilson, recognized that the rootlessness of the numerous immigrants was one of America's great tragedies. Certainly the newly arrived and mostly peasant immigrants had indeed been uprooted from the soil were placed upon the unyielding concrete crust of urban America or had to suffocate in the mills of the heavy

industries or were thrust deep into the darkness of American mines. The consciousness and cares born of this new immigrant life inevitably led to either the attenuation or surrender of the prior culture without anything substantial or rooted to take its place. Consequently, this resulted in a hybrid historical consciousness and the difficult search for a new sense of community, sometimes found, just as often not. It should thus not be shocking to witness the transformation, or much too often the decline and ultimate loss, of the prior historical sensibilities. Simply put, not everyone was capable of maintaining the essentials of a prior historical consciousness in a new land. Thus began the process which led to the gradual attenuation of Hungarian culture in North America, a process that seems inevitable, even with the continued arrival of new immigrants. However, this also raises the corresponding question of how long Hungary can sustain emigration, given its own demographic and attendant economic and social problems in our century and beyond. The analysis of these issues, however, falls beyond the scope of this essay.

Looking at the other words used to describe the condition of leaving one's homeland, a similar analysis of an episodic nature should be attempted. The term emigré is often used, in my estimation, to characterize someone who has left someplace, but never really arrived elsewhere; the attachment to a prior historical consciousness is simply too strong or stubborn to accept the reality of becoming an immigrant. Many of the other terms noted earlier (such as exile, expellee, refugee, displaced person, escapee) seem to be related to the notion of emigré, but each nevertheless possesses a distinctiveness of its own. The common feature of all these terms seems to be either an inability or unwillingness to become an immigrant, or more specifically a hyphenated American; the distinctions center mostly on the reasons or the means of departure from the homeland.

Let us examine these different terms in turn and reserve the term emigré as the collective concept to tie together the discussion. The term exile has a very specific meaning and is inevitably tied to a pervasive sense of historical consciousness; further, the exile holds a significant role in Hungarian history and this is quite evident in the consciousness of Hungarians whereever they may be in the world. After all, the two major individuals whose statues decorate the square in front of the Hungarian parliament both died as exiles, namely Ferenc Rákóczi II and Lajos Kossuth. Desirous of emulating them, many a Hungarian political leader has chosen exile after the cause he had embodied or supported had failed; for example, many of the soldiers and statesmen of the revolution of 1848–49 chose exile, some in European countries, but quite a number of them in North America and some even gave their names to settlements (as László Ujházy) or perpetuated the memory of Lajos Kossuth. However, all these efforts, while quite impressive at that time, had little if any long lasting impact; the intensity of the historical consciousness was not sustained and the settlements disappeared along with the initial enthusiasm. Many returned to Hungary, some entered the public service of the host countries. Exiles who chose to remain exiles usually had an extensive initial impact, but very seldom managed to institutionalize their cause or presence. The example of another eminent exile, Count Mihály Károlyi, was in many

respects similar, never having a really effective role in the immigrant, as opposed to the emigré community.

Something similar can be said about the expellee; the best known example of this category in our times was the late Cardinal József Mindszenty who attempted, actually quite successfully, to foster a renewed sense of historical consciousness among Hungarians throughout the world. In connection with his situation one must point to a specific feature of historical consciousness, although it could just as readily have been alluded to in other contexts. Quite simply, the image of Cardinal Mindszenty in the historical consciousness of many formerly radical right Hungarians (such as, for example, former Arrow Cross members and supporters) neglected to take note of the opposition of Mindszenty to the Arrow Cross and the radical right program generally; yet these people were among his staunchest supporters here. Even though this situation was noted with chagrin and frustration by Mindszenty himself, it nonetheless underlies the point I wish to make, namely that a historical consciousness does not have to be in accord with even well-known and documented historical facts to be an effective force. Indeed, it almost seems — much to the frustration of historians and scholars generally — that the opposite seems to be more prevalent among many individuals. Among other expellees in recent times, one can list the names of the philosophers Ágnes Heller and Ferenc Fehér and the sociologist Iván Szelényi; however, recent political development in Hungary have altered not only their status and position, but also that of Cardinal Mindszenty; in the latter case, the major square of Esztergom has been renamed in his memory. Just recently, his conviction was declared null and void by the Hungarian government.

The terms refugee and escapee can readily be discussed together. Obviously an individual who departs a country in order to leave behind a possible or potential political difficulty fits into this category, whether he does so as a consequence of a lost war, a failed revolution, or an unbearable political situation. In conjunction with a lost war, in this instance most generally World War II, its antecedents and consequences included, the term displaced person has also been used to refer to those who chose refuge in the face of advancing ideologies and armies. For example, before and during World War II, many Jews left Hungary on account of the spread of Hitlerism to this region of Europe. Immediately after the war, many Hungarians decided to escape the advance of the Soviet army into Hungary; some left on account of fear and reprisal, others because of their intimate association with the dominant elements of the interwar political system; it is to these that the term displaced person was applied most specifically. Nor must one fail to mention those who were deported or became prisoners of war. These people could well be classified as involuntary displaced persons and also represented a great loss for the country. Still others left Hungary at different times between 1945 and 1949 on account of the threatening nature of the political situation for their lives and fortunes. All of these peoples were in some sense refugees and in spite of the great differences among them in terms of political orientation, they had in common a substantially different, but nonetheless powerful and deeply held historical consciousness, one which accompanied them into exile and formed the basis of their new

life as political refugees. Needless to say, they were successful in maintaining this attitude for many years, often and perhaps inevitably at the price of alienation from American society and in some instances even at the cost of distancing themselves from those immigrants who perceived their historical consciousness or destiny quite differently. Something similar occurred in the case of the refugees of the 1956 revolution and the differentiation among them followed similar patterns. Furthermore, the differentiation of the historical consciousness of the post-1962 refugees, political and economic, has shown a marked decline in the level of commitment to Hungarian historical consciousness and a continued distancing from the immigrant or even emigré communities. Nevertheless, the important issue to remember is that this process was to a great extent shaped by the specific forms of their historical memories, and thus consciousness, of the character and understanding of the revolution of 1956. It remains to be seen what will be the impact of the 1989 political changes in Hungary on the sense of the historical responsibility and concern of the Hungarians outside Hungary. Another dimension of the problem is the passing on of this generally heightened sense of historical consciousness to a subsequent generation, a nearly obsessive concern among Hungarians in North America and elsewhere at the present juncture of life in the emigré and even among some elements of the immigrant community. One should note that the elements of a historical consciousnes may be passed on, but it must be internalized by the recipient if it is to have any impact on life. In cases where the recipient (rather subsequent generation) must learn the elements of another historical consciousness than the one which informs one's daily experiences, there can and do occur problems and concerns. Quite simply, it is really very difficult to construct also a Hungarian historical consciousness in an alien land and even if achieved in some form, will be different from the expectations of those who did not have to engage in that process. The difficulties are much too evident, but the rewards even greater.

Three terms noted earlier (settler, resettler, expatriate) remain to be dealt with, but these are not as significant for our present purposes as the others. The first two refer mostly to the movement of peoples across borders freely or for purposes motivated generally by a desire to advance personally or professionally; in this movement issues of historical consciousness are generally not a major consideration.

Something similar could be said about the substantial number of mostly so-called "refugees" who arrived and settled in various parts of North America after the mid-1970's and extending to our own day. The following comments are most directly applicable to them and not as directly to the numerous Hungarians arriving from Transylvania; their emigration is motivated to a much greater extent by a sense of historical and national consciousness. Virtually all those arriving from Hungary were seeking a better economic situation or came more for personal rather than strictly political reasons. Nonetheless the overwhelming majority of them have been received as refugees by Hungarians already here, simply because these previously arrived Hungarians (and Hungarian Americans) saw in them their successors as refugees. Whether the attitude of many of these new arrivals qualifies them as refugees (irregardless of their own self-definition as such) is a tenuous issue at best. Certainly their level of Hungarian his-

torical consciousness is rather minimal; there are, however, exceptions and some may yet have a role in continuing some type of Hungarian presence in North America.

The condition described by the term expatriate in the specific context of Hungarians in the world at this time has only minimal applicability, although given the ongoing political changes, we may well be seeing more expatriates from Hungary. The full consequence of these political changes and the establishment of a democratic Hungary undoubtedly have a vast impact on the historical consciousness of all Hungarians outside Hungary, however defined or self-defined. Certainly the future of very many political emigrés will be altered fundamentally. Indeed, it may be necessary to construct other models for the continued existence of Hungarian culture in North America and elsewhere in the world. Perhaps the example of the life of the Finns in North America may prove more instructive than the life patterns of other emigré and immigrant peoples here. A new category, although not wholly without precedent, will emerge and grow in significance, namely transient foreign resident. The reasons for this should not be sought, except perhaps marginally, in the realm of historical consciousness, but rather in economic and related aspirations. Even these temporary foreign resident Hungarians can nonetheless contribute after their return to Hungary to the improvement of the quality of life there. Then there is also the complex issue of reverse migration to Hungary, but these concerns are beyond our present purposes. A further analysis of these issues should remain for the future and in spite of these prospects we should concentrate upon what is transpiring now.

As we nonetheless, and with a sense of loss, witness the gradual demise (by no means irreversible) of an institutional Hungarian presence in North America — as well as a declining and aging population of Hungarians only partially counter-balanced by new arrivals from Hungary and Transylvania the past ten to fifteen years — one must of necessity think of the corresponding changes (one hesitates to say dissolution) of the historical consciousness which supported it and gave it life. The issue can then be posed as follows: How necessary are these institutions? This in turn only leads to more queries and concerns. The most pressing of these concerns would be the ongoing conflict between those who still perceive of themselves as emigrés — even though the reason for their emigré status has been eliminated with the establishment of Hungary as a democratic state — and those who consider themselves immigrants and ethnic Hungarians.

To place the issue on a more theoretical level let us ask if we can be really compensated by the argument that we are on the verge of a new anthropological plateau in the human condition (as Alexander Solzhenitsyn said in his Harvard commencement speech some years ago and seems to be saying in a different way in his more recent statements on the future of Russia), namely that a change in the quality, scope and depth of our Hungarian consciousness or uniqueness as a people can be fully or even mostly counter-balanced with the rapid decline of an institutional support system. Is it really possible to reduce the conscious Hungarian presence here or elsewhere to a small minority of concerned intellectuals (or negatively speaking, to a remnant of fanatic na-

tionalists) and a large number of people for whom national consciousness has been reduced to its least common denomitator? (Need I say what that is.)

These and related questions should be asked now, while there are still those who can argue about these issues and act upon them while still possessing a reasonably comprehensive, open-minded and tolerant Hungarian historical consciousness. These answers are beyond the competence of the historian to discuss, being in the realm of hope and belief, characteristics of life to which we respond — to paraphrase Pascal — not only with our minds, but also with our hearts.

May I conclude, however, with a thought from the Rev. László Tőkés who noted in a sermon delivered sometime in December 1989 in a small Transylvanian village to an audience of long-suffering and simple people, that on some level we Hungarians all belong together, possess a common destiny wherever we may live in the world. I would like to think that for Hungarians at the present juncture of history this sense should be on the level of a common historical consciousness.

THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY IN HUNGARIAN POETRY WRITTEN IN NORTH AMERICA

The ARKÁNUM-group

JÓZSEF JANKOVICS

Hungarian Academy of Sciences

The topic I am going to speak of in the next few minutes is neither an immanent part of literary theory, nor an aesthetic category, nevertheless, it is an important constituent of literature and literary studies: a content factor, having formal, structural, linguistic and stylistic consequences in the shaping of a work of art; an important contextual feature of literature, and especially of literature written in exile. This is the issue of identity, or, in our case, the Hungarian consciousness represented by Hungarian-born authors in North-America.

As there is a great amount of North-American Hungarian poetry, written by poets of different ages, tastes, programmes and circumstances, I decided to deal with one particular creative community. I chose this community because, within the rather sporadic American–Hungarian literature, its enterprise is absolutely unique. The members of this community belong to the same generation by birth; the generation of the 1956 emigrés; they share a close relationship with their common poetical programme. That they form a group is shown by their appearance together in an edition of the neo-avant-garde review: "ARKÁNUM". I think it is important to list their names here: Sándor András, József Bakucz, László Kemenes Géfin, György Vitéz.

Of course, the problem of identity or consciousness can be studied from many points of view, and appears on different levels of human existence and the creative process. It can have philosophical, psychological or moral aspects; similarly, the lack of identity or the crisis of identity can be of a human, artistic or ethnic nature, being built one upon the other.

In my paper I am interested in the complex meaning of the word, that is to say, not in the moods of the private life of an emigrant writer, but in the identity problem of the artist's self, the Hungarian or American consciousness of the poets mentioned above.

How do these poets perceive and use their Hungarian origin and heritage in literary works? What is their relation to it, and how are they determined by it? How deeply are they rooted in their primary culture and what is the connection to their secondary one? What is the role of their Hungarian consciousness in the answers given to the challenges of the new culture? What is the influence of the secondary cultural environment on their versification?

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

Too many questions to answer, though they are merely various external forms of the very same conflict, deriving from the author's existence among the difficult physical, material, moral and psychological circumstances of exile.

There is no sense in denying that these circumstances have a great and significant influence on the artist working among them. Lóránt Czigány has identified some constant characteristics of this creative state of mind when analyzing the components of consciousness of the '56 generation poets. These topical components of consciousness are bound to have the most definitive power and character in the formation of this very specific type of poetry. I think the core of Czigány's observations is worth summarizing. He mentions seven of the components responsible for the characteristic properties of the poetic works of the 1956 generation in general. These are as follows:

— Mythical cosmogony: the memories of the cataclysm
— The crisis of identity: rootlessness, alienation, the consciousness of exclusion
— Sense of guilt
— Fragmentary consciousness; the confusion of the scale of values
— Extraterritorial consciousness
— Nostalgia
— Uncertainty of language.[1]

As far as I can judge, we can accept this classification — because these types of components are recognizable in this poetry.

According to Lóránt Czigány and to other emigrant authors,[2] the issue of identity, or the crisis of consciousness is one of the major elements defining the versification of the poets belonging to the '56 generation.

Now, assuming that the general symptoms are also characteristic of the individual, let us focus our attention on the Arkánum group, in order to discover to what extent this problem has determined and formed their poetry.

At first sight it is surprising that the problem of identity, Hungarian consciousness, was not approached in the first volumes published in exile by these poets. Whether it has not surfaced naturally, or whether it has been suppressed — I am afraid it is not me who can answer this question. Of course, the hard reality of being an emigré, the lack of a homeland, of familiar faces and circumstances, the lost values or the shock of meeting a new environment, the uncertain conditions of existence play a dominant role in this poetry. Loneliness, alienation, black moods and horrifying scenes (quite different to the friendly landscapes of home) are the further everyday commonly occurring themes. These reflect the atmosphere stemming from the most difficult phase of the emigration, when the man, the poet is "exiled inside himself" (Kemenes Géfin).

These poems are the artistic elaborations of the process of settling down in an unknown country, a new home; they are examples of the confrontation with a strange, often unfriendly world:

A városkapunál hullabűz
fogadott, s hogy semmik se vagyunk,
lebetűztük a neonokról.

Napokig vártunk, összebújva;
holdfénynél útilaput szedtünk
s háltunk az elhagyott tereken.
Ha ugatni kellett, ugattunk,
ha félni, féltünk. Szunnyadozás,
tiszta hangok az űrben... béke...
Vagy mint őzek a vizes erdőn.

(Kemenes Géfin: *Zenit*)

The man, who started to discover the new world like Phaëton, has collapsed:

Társtalanul lebegek békém üszkei felett,
vonzás, taszítás többé nem érvényes reám,
Csillagtól dermesztő csillagnak ütődöm
S várom Jupiter sistergő villámait.

(Kemenes Géfin: *Phaëton*)

Attraction and repulsion; the old and new, past and present:

Kalifornia: széptestű szenvtelen nő,
izgató és frigid.
Termékenyíthető,
de a folyamat magányos,
feledhetetlenül.
Szeretem, taszítva vonz,
egy percre sem hagyja, hogy áltassam magam:
hegycsúcsaival,
az óceánpart egykedvű szikláival
és kétezeréves óriásfenyőivel
szüntelen elmetszett köldökömre mutat
és alatta az igyekvő zsinórra,
amellyel nem tudom újrakötni magam.

(Sándor András: *Tétova világ, XII.*)

The feeling of being no one is very near to the crisis of identity:

Senkiségem gyűlik: pocsolya,
amelybe a világ szűntelen
fájáról napokkal csöppenek,
de többnyire télben élek
és keserűségem kopárrá tisztult
fája feketén görcsösül
a könyörtelenség szikrázó hómezején

(XVII., XVIII.)

But there is only one way to go on: to accept this unnatural situation: to live and work in another language.

At this very first stage concerning the problems of their Hungarian consciousness, the problems are fundamentally not those of the creative artist, but those of the private person, the emigrant who is deprived of his mental and physical environment. At the same time one sees the first small signs of the danger that the artist will lose his identity. Think for instance of the Géfin-poem's Robot man's search for his identity, or of another poem by the same writer:

A kádban veszi észre, hogy
idegen fürdik a helyén.

It is also he, who — at about the same time — tries to find the role and place of the poet of Hungarian origin in the New World being neither here nor there:

hát igen: te (drága úrnő) jól hiszed,
ma költőül magyarni itt e tojjal-
mázzal fürdő káinaánban nem eset
csak cikk (vagy az se)
kár a gézért — mondja
200 ó-kos, ki nincsből vanba s onnan
többre áhul. jó — a hal halászik, elv-
halál halálzik, de:
a költő
(hogyha
nem sötétke birka, sem pirult) mivel
fedezze szükség-hitelét, hogy feles
itt s hogy haszna (?) *ott* a csonttörő, parázs-
kezű, -tól, -hoz hazácskában érvényes-
sülhet?

csak ír
lám, mily egyszerű bagázs
vagyunk&mégse frankó
hát légy (kegyes
hölgy) utó-babér helyett most apanázs

This poem, possessing a good many features common in the poetry of the Arkánum-group, also refers to the feeling of these writers of not belonging anywhere, a feeling characteristic of these poets in the '60s and '70s. László Baránszky — also closely connected with ARKÁNUM — wrote a book entitled: *Két világ között* in which Vitéz stands between, criticizing the extravagances of both of his homelands, while Sándor András, being unable to get out, stays (with a splendid allusion to Attila József's *Levegőt!*) in the waters of the Rubicon:

2.
Elmondhatom mi bánt
ma otthon?
Csak azt: mi bántott
és mi bántana.
Megfoszt már tér és idő
az előny örömeitől.

3.
Mivel megindultam
választanom kell:
átkelni, maradni: itt a Rubicon.
Fel kell lázadnom
tér, idő ellen
vagy meg kell szoknom a helyemet.

4.
Ruhám amiben jöttem
régen elkopott már;
testemben nem él sejt
amely kihozott;
ideje kivetnem a végső
ábrándot is, már ideje
megértenem hogy nincsen átkelés
a Rubicon vizéből kijutnom nem lehet.
Fel kell lázadnom
tér, idő ellen:
meg kell szoknom a helyemet.

(Száműzetésben)

What a difference between the two endings! It does, nonetheless, illustrate very well the tendencies of attitude to the question.

Kemenes Géfin seems to be the most sensitive towards the problem of identity. I think, although I am not certain, as other inaccessible writings may exist, that he is the only one among the Arkánum-editors who deals with it directly, and outspokenly, in his *Fehérlófia I.*

> Nézzél magaddal szembe, vond le a konzekvenciákat,
> beszélj nyíltan, szabatosan és világosan,
> ahogy én tanítottalak, meg az a Lajos (meg Thomas Wolfe
> és a többiek)
> lásd be végre, hogy nincs Kubla Khán, nincsen Xanadu,
> azt kell eldöntened, mivégre vagy a világon,
> *hogy uradat istenedet imádd és csak neki szolgálj*
> azt kell eldöntened, mivégre vagy a világon,
> nem régi elavult kategóriák szerint gondolkodsz-e, azaz
> a) nem lettél-e már úgy-ahogy kanadai?
> b) lehet-e még magyarságodról beszélni?
> c) miért akarsz még mindig hazamenni?
> d) mit gondolsz, kellesz-e otthon?
> e) nem mondják-e, na ennek se sikerült odakint,
> hát most hazagyütt a mi kenyerünket enni?
> f) mi szükség van idekint magyarul írni?
> g) félsz-e föladni szabadságodat?
> h) minek nyavalyogsz annyit?

The main question to clear up the situation and thoughts.

Géfin's curious masterpiece, *Pogány diaszpóra* convinces us — in Balassi's, Zrínyi's, Tinódi's masks — along with the latest parts of *Fehérlófia,* that he, in spite of his highly sophisticated Anglo–American poetical connections and commitments, is getting nearer and nearer to his cultural roots and traditions. The oeuvre of György Vitéz represents the very same significant values, especially his *Missa agnostica!*

The identity, never really lost, has been regained! Or rather: reaffirmed.

These poets have been able to handle this delicate balance of consciousness. As years have passed — the second phase — they have become more and more integrated into the everyday as well as the intellectual life of their new homeland, accepting its scale of values and acquiring or adopting its cultural heritage. But they have never given up their own identity, a tendency which has been strengthened by the new possibilities which have come about as a result of the shift in their second home's minority-policy and the chance of getting into closer contact with their native country's intellectual circles.

What were the main psychological motives and tools used to avoid the spiritual traps of the crisis of identity?

To answer this rather complex question I shall try to sum up the different ways, methods and techniques which have played an important role in preserving Hungarian consciousness in these artists.

First and foremost one can mention the role of language, the mother tongue which enabled them to keep their Hungarian consciousness vivid.

They have discovered it again and again, reaching unknown territories, testing unknown capacities, they have taken it to pieces, distorted it and put or shaken it together.

As the well-known quotation goes: "the nation survives by its language". So does the emigrant poet! To illustrate this, let me remind you of the famous *Halotti beszéd* by Márai or the *Óda a magyar nyelvhez* by Faludy, two of the many poems of this type. The mother tongue has proved to be the "virtual home" they could retire to, the only refuge where they could accomplish and realize their artistic personality.

I think Lóránt Czigány was right when speaking of the lingual uncertainty of this generation, but I should like to draw particular attention to the second part of his statement: this weakness could turn into a virtue, in the light of the last ten years' developments — the third phase — it would be more accurate to say that it is the Hungarian language that has provided the basic and renewed principle for their Hungarian consciousness to rely on. This vehicle has become the dominant constituent of their poetry, and one can not overemphasize the part played by the witty verbal quibbles, puns, magic games with words and linguistic inventions in their versification. The creative, free and often sacraligious relationship with their mother tongue kept the mind and soul fresh and alive and in addition resulted in the ironical process of language-reform and language re-creation. This action was aided by a way of writing they had in common: automatic poem-making, a kind of "stream of consciousness" by which mean they were able not only to discover or re-discover almost untouched or forgotten layers of vernacular, but at the same time to penetrate into the deepest strata of the mind, such as the memories of their childhood, the inspiration behind every poetic work. Furthermore, this procedure strengthened their self-knowledge and identity.

But the Hungarian consciousness of these poets was not rooted in and fed by their creative and protective relationship to the mother tongue alone. Historical consciousness is equally important. Hungarian historical and poetical tradition have also helped to form their poetical way of thinking. They thought of themselves and shaped their artistic programmes as the successors of the poetical and political freedom fighters of the Hungarian past. Their poetry is interwoven with open and hidden allusions to historical events and personalities, including such recent figures as Imre Nagy and Pál Maléter. They accepted Balassi's, Zrínyi's, Petőfi's heritage in keeping alive the hopes for Hungarian independence. Their poetry and prose absorbed the best Hungarian literary traditions from Tinódi through the folk songs to Attila József, Sándor Weöres and Bartók. There are lots of connecting links, hidden allusions and quotations, borrowed texts and references which prove that these modern authors are imbued with a sense of Hungarian literary tradition. To preserve their identity, they turned to the world of

mythology, to folk tales — remember Géfin's *Fehérlófia*-series —, or profaned the structural possibilities of the liturgy of a catholic mass. (Vitéz: *Missa agnostica* — full of Hungarian cultural references.) Of course they make use of everything, even witty archaizing, distorted quotations, false textual environment for the ironical alientation, for mental distinction, to put the important issues into a modern poetical context: a new dimension.

Their identity has a double character: carrying the features of the intermediate. Like their forerunners — Tótfalusi, Apáczai —, they act for better cultural communication as well.

These authors of Hungarian origin have had the opportunity of meeting persons, works, schools prohibited or unattainable to their colleagues at home. Their poems — influenced by modern European and American poetical tradition have been enriched by the new experiences and influences. So, not only by translating them, but by absorbing their technical, structural, rhetorical innovations into their own works of art, these poets have played an enormous part in the transmission of new, 20th century poetics towards Hungary. Of course, at the same time they fell victim to temptation: they themselves came under the influence of up-to-date western poetry and literary theory. Elemér Horváth, again a close friend of the Arkánum-circle, made an appropriate remark in his poem *Honfoglalás:*

Ez már nem is magyar mint Illyés népe
Laci Pound és kissé Eliot
Jóska Breton én inkább Yeats vagyok
Gottfried Benn és Montale keveréke
Oldódóban is egzotikus kéve
tibeti mantrák inka népdalok
el-ellepik az alapanyagot
Csokonai tüze Berzsenyi érce
  messzebbről és halványabban ragyog
  De vallatni magunkat hogy mivégre
  mártottuk tollunkat nyugati égbe
  nem kell többé ilyfajta aratók
  működtek már Adalbert idejébe,
  S a puszták népe megrágta a szót

According to this observation the intellectual conquest has taken place, but the people of the new conquest are aware of their roots. Having taken their latest products into consideration we can agree that this fact has not weakened their consciousness but has made their personality and works of art richer, more colourful, modern and complex.

Last but not least I would like to emphasize one more quality of their Hungarian consciousness. The avantgarde writers of the review Arkánum — along with the edi-

tors and authors of Magyar Műhely — hence been underestimated. They have not had the reputation they deserve in the leading intellectual circles of Hungarian emigrants. These writers usually stood aside from the political gatherings and enterprises of Hungarians living abroad. That is why they were thought to have no political sense or aims. Their poetry has been condemned as apolitical, *l'art pour l'art.* Their linguistic tricks with typographical and visual obstacles, annoying for the reader accustomed to linear reading, the sacrilegious attitudes, the obscene expressions, their epaterizm have challenged the mainly religious emigrant taste and good manners.

But one very important thing cannot and must not be denied: during the last two decades, by means of their own volumes on the one hand, and with their review Arkánum on the other, they have completely fulfilled a well defined task and programme (given in the first issue of the review): "Ezen a nyelven nem lehet bizonyos dolgokat kinyomtatni, sőt leírni sem. Ezt a nyelvet a politikai, prüdériai, nacionalista, vallási cenzúrák és öncenzúrák hályoga, a tekintélytisztelet, a finitizmus, a kisebbrendűségi érzet, az önbecsapás szutykos rétege borítja. A rettegés: mi lesz, ha ezen a nyelven az író azt írja le, ami eszébe jut? Káosz? Anarchia? Nemzethalál? Vagy tán a kényelmes homály felszakad, fény tör be, s akkor újra érezni kell, gondolkodni, határozni, felelősséget vállalni? Eszmélni? Élni?"

Regarding the production of the modern, avantgarde or post-avantgarde literature in Hungary today, I would say that their best achievements relating to the questions above have already been integrated into it, and the group of Arkánum while preserving its own Hungarian consciousness, has helped the younger poetic generations in Hungary to do the same.

Notes

1. Lóránt Czigány, *Gyökértelen mint a zászló nyele...*, A természetes világkép felbomlása az ötvenhatos nemzedék költészetében. Offprint from numbers 3–4 of *Új Látóhatár* (München, 1981).
2. Tibor Dénes, *A múltból a holnapba — A honból az otthonba,* Az emigráció lírájának mozaikjai in *Magyar Mérleg II.* (SMIKK, Zürich, 1980). pp. 84–134.; Károly Nagy, *Magyar szigetvilágban ma és holnap* (Püski, New York, 1984).

Volumes referred in the text

Sándor András, *Rohanó oázis* (London, 1970); *Mondolatok* (London, 1981)
József Bakucz, *Napfogyatkozás* (Paris, 1968); *Kövesedő ég* (Paris, 1973)
László Baránszky, *Két világ között* (Paris, 1979)
László Kemenes Géfin, *Jégvirág* (Paris, 1966); *Zenit* (München, 1969); *Pogány diaszpóra* (Toronto, 1974); *Fehérlófia I.* (Toronto, 1978); *Fehérlófia II.* (Washington–New York–Montreal, 1981)
György Vitéz, *Amerikai történet* (Paris, 1975); *Missa agnostica* (Paris, 1979); *Jel beszéd* (Paris, 1982); *Nyugati magyar költők antológiája,* 1980 (EPMSz, Bern, 1980)

SUB-ETHNIC IDENTITIES: RELIGION, CLASS, IDEOLOGY, ETC. AS CENTRIFUGAL FORCES IN HUNGARIAN–CANADIAN SOCIETY

NANDOR F. DREISZIGER

Royal Military College of Canada

"The essence of an ethnic group", remarked Jean Burnet and Howard Palmer in their book *Coming Canadians,* is a sense of identity". They go on to qualify this by saying that an ethnic group "is not a tightly closed group", that often its members have "some degree of choice of ethnic allegiance".[1] What these authors, as well as many other students of ethnic affairs fail to stress in their discussion of ethnic allegiances is that members of such groups often have identities within their ethnic identity that divide them into sub-groups. It seems that students of ethnic studies have tended to concentrate on what cultural and societal factors bring individuals together into ethnic groups, at the expense of examining the circumstances that separate their members into clusters of individuals that have distinct identities within a particular ethnic community. Indeed, systematic analyses of these sub-ethnic divisions within Canadian ethnic groups apparently have not been undertaken, although the late Professor Robert Harney was preparing an issue of the journal *Polyphony* that was dedicated to this theme.[2] It is certain, however, that no such study of the Hungarian community of Canada has been published.[3]

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to fill this gap — tentatively at least — in the literature. This will be done through the examination of both the more evident factors that break this ethnic group into subdivisions — such as religion, social class, political ideology, and local particularisms imported from the old country — as well as some of the less obvious ones, such as a sense of identity imposed by a common experience in the immigration process, and Canadian regional loyalties acquired after settlement in the new homeland.

Although individual Hungarians or small groups of them had started to arrive in Canada in the second half of the nineteenth century, the bulk of Canada's Hungarian community is the product of four waves or "streams" of Magyar immigration. The first came during and immediately after the turn of the century. The second and much larger wave came between 1924 and 1930. The third was made up of postwar "displaced persons" who came during 1948–52, and the fourth stream was composed of "refugees" who arrived during 1956–57. While members of these waves made up much of Hungarian immigration to Canada, it should be noted that Hungarians continued to arrive in smaller numbers throughout the first half of the twentieth century, with the exception of the time period of the two world wars when immigration to this country from most of East Central Europe was banned.[4]

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

In 1990 people of Hungarian background number over 150 000 in Canada. Over half of them can be found in the Province of Ontario, but there are also significant numbers of them in Quebec, British Columbia, and the prairie provinces. Most Hungarian Canadians live in Canada's large cities: Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, and Hamilton.[5] In terms of occupational distribution, Hungarians can be found in all walks of Canadian life, ranging from manual work to the professions.

Like most Canadian immigrant groups, the Hungarian–Canadian community has been divided in many ways ever since the establishment of the first Hungarian settlements near the end of the nineteenth century. The most obvious of these divisions are along religious, social and ideological lines. Often these differentiations between subsections of the Hungarian–Canadian community have been inherited from old country — in the case of Hungarians, the Carpathian Basin of East Central Europe. Sometimes, these subdivisions have been affected by Canadian conditions, or the impact of the emigrant experience. In a few cases, as a result of the evolution of the group in Canada, certain sub-ethnic identities appeared among Hungarian Canadians that have no parallels or equivalents in Hungarian society in the old country. One further preliminary remark that should be made on this subject is that the nature of Hungarian–Canadian society's subdivisions has kept changing throughout its century-old existence. Intra-ethnic divisions, sub-ethnic allegiances kept shifting in nature and intensity. A centrifugal force that had a dominant role in this group's evolution at one time might not have been a significant force earlier and again might have lost its importance at a later date.

An examination of the evolution of all the complex divisions of Hungarian–Canadian society through its more than one-hundred-year history could fill a volume. In a paper such as this not much more can be done than to offer an overview of the subject, highlighting significant aspects of the topic that prove interesting, or have been poorly understood in the past. It should be added that any investigation of this subject should begin with a survey of the most relevant and important of such phenomena in the old country. As is well known to students of Hungarian history, the most prominent divisions of Hungarian society in East Central Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were those that pertained to religion, class and ideology. The division of the population of Hungary, and especially the pre-1918 "old" Kingdom of Hungary, into various nationalities need not be considered, as our study is confined largely to an investigation of the characteristics of the Magyar ethnic group.

Religion

The most persistent and clearly identifiable rifts within Hungarian–Canadian society through the ages have been religious in nature. Religious attitudes and practices have been brought to Canada by Hungarian immigrants from their mother country. Only in a few cases has the immigrant experience altered these traditions or the religious al-

legiance of Hungarian settlers in Canada. For this reason it is useful to take a glance at the religious scene of the lands where Canada's Hungarians had come from.

Simple and straightforward statistics on the religious subdivision of Hungary's population are not easy to offer as these have varied greatly throughout the ages. Certain historical events had drastic effect on the size of certain religious groups in Hungary. The Treaty of Trianon detached regions from Hungary where there were large Calvinist, Greek Orthodox, and Unitarian populations. And, during the Hungarian holocaust, the country's Jewry was decimated everywhere except in Budapest. Nevertheless, it might be said for the purposes of a brief paper that roughly between two-thirds and three-quarters of Hungarians are members of the Roman Catholic Church, while the remainder is made up mostly of members of various Protestant faiths (in particular Calvinists and Lutherans). In some parts of Hungary, however, other denominations could be found: Greek Orthodox in the northeastern countries, Jews in cities, especially in Budapest.

In Hungary, religious groups were often separated from each other geographically. Even in districts of mixed religions, many villages were populated by people belonging mainly to one. In other villages or towns people of two (or more) different religions co-habited, sometimes living in different parts of the settlement. (These communities could be identified by travelers from a distance, as their skyline was dominated by two or more churches.) Only in some industrial and commercial centres was there a real mixture of religious denominations.

In Canada's Hungarian-populated districts, the situation was different. True, in the early years of Hungarian settlement in the country — especially on the Canadian prairies — there were some purely Catholic, or Calvinist, or Baptist settlements. Later, however, especially in the cities, Hungarian newcomers settled without regard to religion. As a result, most of Canada's Hungarian communities were religiously mixed. Catholics, Protestants, and others co-existed in any given geographical area. In every newly emerging colony of Hungarian immigrants, the members had to work out the problems of the inter-relationship of various religions, and their respective role and influence in Hungarian ethnic affairs.

There was still another reason why the question of religious divisions was more complicated for the Hungarian–Canadian community than it had been for Hungarian society in Hungary. In Canada many Protestant churches became divided over Church Union. In the mid-1920s, a movement for the union of Canada's Methodist, Congregationist and Presbyterian churches resulted in the creation of the United Church of Canada. Church Union split the Presbyterian Church, including the country's Hungarian Calvinists. Some of their congregations joined the United Church, while others remained with their old church. And the same was to some extent true of Hungarian Lutherans in Canada. Some of their congregations joined the new church, but others gravitated towards the Hungarian Lutheran Church of America.[6]

Once settled in Canada, Hungarian immigrants made strenuous efforts to resume their religious life if at all possible in the manner they were used to in the old country. This meant the establishment of ethnic congregations, headed by Hungarian, or at least

by Hungarian-speaking clergy. In this process certain Protestant communities (Baptists, Presbyterians) tended to have more luck, as their churches were more tolerant of congregations organized "from below" and administered in a populist fashion. The Roman Catholic Church in Canada was disinclined to allow these practices. Catholics were welcome in already existing parishes, or parishes that were newly established for all newcomers, but "ethnic" parishes — especially those lead by newly arrived clergymen — were frowned upon. Indeed, in some parts of Canada, French–Canadian priests were anxious to enroll Hungarian newcomers in parishes controlled by the Francophone church hierarchy, in order to lessen the chance of immigrant Catholic groups being assimilated into Anglophone society.[7]

During the 1920s and 1930s many Hungarian–Canadian communities established their religious organizations. Some Canadian churches were instrumental in this. For example, the newly founded United Church of Canada undertook missionary work among immigrant groups and helped their congregations in various ways. As far as work among Hungarians was concerned this help included the training of several Hungarian ministers, and the launching and subsidization of Hungarian-language religious periodicals. For the Catholics, success came later, as members of Canada's Catholic hierarchy continued to be reluctant to allow the establishment of ethnic parishes. Nevertheless, after the creation of lay organizations of Hungarian Catholics, the founding of their parishes usually followed. When numerous Hungarian priests and ministers arrived in the country in the aftermath of World War II, organized religious life among the country's Hungarian communities underwent still another expansion.

It is clear that religious differences divided Hungarian Canadians into sub-groups, and it is not difficult to find evidence that these differences had an impact on the community beyond the realm of spiritual affairs. One of its effects was that it fragmented community efforts and sapped the Hungarian–Canadian society's energies and resources in many centres. Each Hungarian–Canadian ethnic church sponsored its own Sunday school, organized its own "socials", sponsored its own public lectures, and lobbied Canadian church or municipal officials. In some cases competition between the Magyar ethnic churches damaged their community affairs, such as when social or religious functions were organized with a view to keeping people from attending a function organized by another ethnic church, and when the leaders of these ethnic churches lobbied against each other when dealing with the Canadian religious establishment or City Hall. One contemporary Hungarian–Canadian observer lamented that in some Canadian cities several Protestant clergymen competed for the allegiance of immigrant Magyars who were so few in number that they might not have been capable of maintaining a single viable congregation.[8] And religious rivalries permeated the group's politics as well. Toward the end of the 1920s, when Hungarian–Canadians had finally managed to set up a Canada-wide umbrella organization of their own, the Hungarian Canadian Federation, some detractors of the new body claimed that it was unworthy of representing the entire community since it was dominated by Calvinists.[9]

As time passed, the hold of the ethnic churches on the everyday life of Hungarian immigrants Canada gradually declined. In the mid-twentieth century, the ideological

conflict within Hungarian–Canadian society assumed much greater importance than inter-religious rivalries. The increasing secularization of both Hungarian and Canadian societies has also reduced the influence of the churches. Nevertheless, even nowadays Hungarian Canada's ethnic churches are important and influential in this ethnic group's affairs.

Social Class

Probably second in importance to religious divisions in Hungarian–Canadian society have been divisions based on class. This statement is especially true of the period from the 1920s to the 1950s, because of the arrival in Canada of people from all of Hungary's social classes. As wealth and, especially, social pretensions were brought to this country by Hungarian immigrants, an examination of the subject of social class in Hungarian–Canadian society should also start with a look at the Hungarian scene.

Nineteenth-century Hungarian society was notoriously class ridden, and social differentiations persisted during the interwar period. The social pretensions of the upper classes were matched by the generally-held expectation that the lower classes keep their place on the bottom rung of the social ladder. After the communist takeover following World War II, Hungary's new rulers conducted a systematic and brutal campaign to rid the country of the old class system, a campaign which amounted to a persecution of Hungary's upper and even middle classes. Landed estates were expropriated, financial and industrial enterprises were nationalized, the properties of the middle class (shops, rental properties, professional practices, etc.) were taken over by the state. In the countryside, kulaks (successful peasants) were harassed and country folk were driven into collectives. In this process, the bulk of Hungary's population became a brutalized proletariat, a large pool of labour for the country's artificially fostered heavy industry. Ironically, in this process there emerged a new class of privileged individuals serving the communist state.

The first Hungarian settlers in Canada hailed from the lower classes, from among the country's peasants or miners. Though there was a scattering of middle-class elements in this first influx of newcomers, their numbers did not foster conflict within Hungarian–Canadian settlements. The situation changed after the First World War. At that time a more substantial portion of Hungarian immigrants to Canada consisted of middle- and upper-class elements. Though Canadian immigration regulations gave preference to agricultural labourers, some Hungarians with money to start large-scale farming operations were admitted, while others of the gentry entered claiming they were peasants. It should be added that most of these people were refugees from the territories that had been detached from Hungary in the postwar peace settlement, and many had been landowners there before the war.

The arrival of "gentlemen" into communities of "ordinary folk" created some friction. Many of the former were disinclined to make a living through the backbreaking labour associated with homesteading, or mining, and took to selling life insurance or acting as agents for steamship companies. Fairly soon, the sentiments of some lower-

class Hungarian Canadians turned against these "men in trousers". The fact that some of these men gained prominence in certain conservative organizations, such as the above-mentioned Hungarian Canadian Federation, undoubtedly helped to propel some working-class Hungarian Canadians into leftist organizations.[10]

A still more critical situation developed in the wake of the Second World War. The post-war wave of Hungarian immigration to Canada included a very large contingent of middle- and upper-class elements. These were people who had fled Hungary when the Red Army advanced through the country in 1944–45. They were members of the establishment: bureaucrats, military officers, industrialists, professionals, etc. Their integration into a Hungarian–Canadian society composed largely of working-class people did not go without difficulties. Even the manners of these newly arrived people upset some old-timers. The Reverend Károly (Charles) Steinmetz, a Protestant clergyman explained that to the members of his congregation he had always been "Nagytiszteletes Úr" (loosely translated: The Reverend, Sir), even though he had known some of them for two decades. The aristocratic newcomers, however, soon after arrival in Toronto, began calling him Karcsikám (my dear Charley). The practice caused consternation among the old-time members of the congregation.[11] The arrival of numerous upper-class elements in the larger Hungarian–Canadian centres, resulted in the establishment of new and fairly exclusive Hungarian social organizations, as these newcomers were not inclined to join the organizations of "ordinary" old-timers.[12]

In time, class differences based on birth gradually declined among Hungarian Canadians. The democratizing influence of Canadian society had a certain impact. Also important was the fact that some of the worker or peasant old-timers had by the 1940s had become men of modest means, while their newly arrived social betters were penniless newcomers. True, new social differentiation arose in the community with the passage of time when some people grew rich while others remained wage-earners or small businessmen: But this differentiation did not necessarily lead to social pretensions and friction in the organizational life of the community.

Ideology

Closely related to class divisions in Hungary were ideological differences. This was especially true of the post-World War I period, when Marxism made inroads into Hungarian society. In fact, during the spring and summer of 1919 Hungary had a communist dictatorship. Although the radical left was suppressed during the Horthy era (1920–44), Marxist ideology had its covert as well as not-so-covert adherents in the country. After the Second World War, communism was re-imposed in Hungary with the help of Soviet occupation forces. Despite severe political repression, or in fact because of it, anti-communist sentiments persisted. The significance of this for the distant Hungarian community of Canada becomes obvious when we realize that political revolutions (or counter-revolutions) in Hungary tended to produce an exodus of political refugees, many of whom reached Canada.

After the collapse of the Commune of 1919, hundreds of its sympathizers and participants came to Canada. Many of them joined the ranks of the country's Communist Party and helped to spread Marxist propaganda among Hungarian Canadians. During the Great Depression they were quite successful. By the early 1930s, the Hungarian–Canadian community's ideological split had almost totally and irreparably divided Hungarian Canadians between the followers of Marx and members of the Christian-patriotic camp. The most important institution of the former was the Canadian Hungarian Sick-Benefit Federation (C.H.S–B.F.), the predecessor of the better-known Kossuth Federation of the 1940s and 1950s. The C.H.S–B.F.'s mouthpiece was the paper *Kanadai Magyar Munkás* [Canadian–Hungarian Worker]. During the first part of the 1930s, when economic conditions for immigrant workers in Canada were abysmal, the ranks of the Federation swelled, and the split between the radicals and the conservatives (those who stood by "God and country") permeated virtually every Hungarian–Canadian colony and affected every community association.[13]

Into the camp of the conservative or "patriotic" group of Hungarians belonged people with a variety of more-or-less defined attitudes. What characterized them above all was a deeply felt Hungarian nationalism, which can best be understood in the context of the impact of the dismemberment of Hungary on Hungarian society. In Hungary this event produced a national neurosis that created a pathological preoccupation with the question of "treaty revision" as the movement for the modification of the peace settlement's territorial provisions was called. In Hungarian–Canadian society the "shock of Trianon" produced a similar, if not more acute "syndrome". Hungarian–Canadian society was very much afflicted with this syndrome because a large portion of Magyar immigrants to interwar Canada were people who came from territories that had been taken away from Hungary in the postwar peace settlement. Most of these people had experienced the shock of Trianon directly. At the time of their arrival in Canada, these people exercised little influence over Hungarian–Canadian community affairs, but as time passed the newcomers worked their way into positions of influence and by the early 1930s, they had come to dominate many Hungarian immigrant institutions.[14]

The immigrant institutions of this conservative element of Hungarian–Canadian society were imbued with the "spirit of revisionism". We may take as an example the paper, *Kanadai Magyar Hírek* [Hungarian Canadian News], of Winnipeg. Established in the winter of 1924–25, the paper had a modest start, but in a few years it became a large, semi-weekly publication with subscribers in many parts of Canada. Within a decade-and-a-half of its founding, the *News* became one of the two Viable Hungarian newspapers in Canada; the other was the *Worker*.[15] Significantly enough, in 1941 an official of Canada's External Affairs Department described the *Worker* as the organ Canada's Hungarian Communists, and the *News* of Winnipeg as the voice of the "Magyar-speaking refugees from the old Hungarian provinces that had been turned over to Yugoslavia (sic!), Roumania and Czechoslovakia". It is not a mere coincidence that for much of the time under consideration in this paper the guiding spirit behind the *News*'s operations was an intelligent, energetic young man, Béla Bácskai Payerle, who hailed from the region of Hungary that had been transferred after the war to Yugoslavia. Other

refugees from Hungary's "old provinces" made it into the leadership of other institutions. Indeed, it is hard to think of any Hungarian–Canadian leader of the 1920s immigration stream who did not have close personal ties to one or more of the provinces taken away from Hungary.[18]

In the 1930s, the ideological split between the left and the right permeated all levels of the Hungarian community down to local social clubs and benevolent organizations. The ardent patriotism of the "patriotic right" was reinforced by official propaganda emanating from Hungary, while the left was feeding on communist propaganda and the miseries of the Depression. Not surprisingly, Hungarian Canadians were embracing widely divergent causes during the decade of the "dirty thirties". While some of them supported ventures designed to improve the chances of the revision of the Treaty of Trianon, others dedicated their lives to the struggle against fascism. Concrete examples of such efforts are not difficult to cite. One of the ventures undertaken in the name of revisionism was the "Justice for Hungary" ocean flight. It involved the sponsoring of a non-stop flight across the Atlantic, from Newfoundland to Budapest, to advertise the injustices of the peace treaty forced on Hungary. The venture was conceived in Canada, and was promoted in large part by Hungarian Canadians, although in the end it was brought to fruition through the efforts of Hungarians throughout North America.[17] While many Magyar Canadians were devoting their energies to such undertakings, others were fighting for leftist causes. During the second half of the decade, scores of Hungarian Canadians volunteered to fight for the loyalist cause in the Spanish Civil War.

The outbreak of the Second World War only complicated and acerbated the ideological conflict within Hungarian–Canadian society. The left was now expected (by the Communist International) to oppose the "imperialist" war against Germany, while the right had to decide whether to support the Canadian and Allied war effort against the Axis, or to declare its loyalty to the Hungary that would eventually become involved in the war on Germany's side. In the end the vast majority of non-communist Hungarian Canadians chose the latter option, and after the German invasion of the USSR in June of 1941, the left could begin to support the Allied war effort as well. Though by 1942 both political factions of the Hungarian–Canadian community were officially at least on the same side of the world conflict, bickering between them continued as if nothing had happened, in fact recriminations only intensified, each side accusing the other of disloyalty to Canada and past and/or present collaboration with the enemy.[18]

The events of 1944–45 and the post-war era brought no respite in the ideological fragmentation of the Hungarian–Canadian community. Concern for the victims of the war in Hungary during the winter of 1944–45 did allow for a union of Hungarian–Canadian organizations to provide "war relief", but this unity disintegrated with the outbreak of the Cold War. While some communist Hungarians returned to Hungary after the war, tens of thousands of people who had fled Hungary at the end of the war began arriving in Canada after spending many months or even years in refugee camps. Most of the new arrivals were ardent anti-communists. Their presence in Canada reinforced the camp of the "patriots". In time, these war-time refugees were joined by other Hun-

garian immigrants who had fled Hungary after the imposition of a communist dictatorship in 1947–48. The largest group of these were the "freedom fighters" of 1956. By the 1960s and, especially, the 1970s, the politics of the Hungarian–Canadian community became to be dominated by the anti-communist groups, as the old-line communists lost influence, in large part due to the aging of their membership. Interestingly enough, in the 1970s and the 1980s the right wing of this community became divided politically. The issue that induced this division was contacts with Hungary and her officials. One group of Hungarian Canadians was ready to resume ties with the mother country, while another group opposed these. A few ardent anti-communist Magyars took an extreme position and condemned even those among their co-ethnics who went to Hungary to visit relatives. The events in Hungary of 1989 brought this division to an end. Hungarian–Canadian society had reached a stage where it is not divided by serious political rifts. Only time will tell how long this situation will exist, and what new ideological divisions will be imposed on it in the future.

Local Particularisms

Less obvious and less dramatic a dividing force than the ideological one, is the one related to local particularisms. Yet, this factor has been, and to some extent continues to be a centrifugal force in Hungarian–Canadian community life. Local geographic loyalties constitute important sub-ethnic identities for Hungarians. This was especially true of the early immigrants. Among the pioneer settlers on the Canadian prairies there was a tendency for members of a Hungarian village community to settle in blocs or "ethnic islands". For example, the community of Békevár, near Kipling, Saskatchewan, was founded and settled by people from the village of Botrágy, in northeastern Hungary.[19] The members of such communities were known as *földi*(s), and being a *földi* to someone was the next best thing to being his relative. Though the importance of such ties based on local particularisms declined with the passing of the decades, it remained a factor in the sub-ethnic identity of Hungarian Canadians, especially among immigrants stemming from the countryside.

While the ties associated with the *földi* network were based on common geographic background limited to a village or a group of villages, the larger regional identities derived from identification with a larger region of Hungary, such as a county or group of counties sharing some common cultural, geographical, or political characteristics or legacies. Most prominent among such geographical loyalities were the ones associated with the territories that were taken from Hungary in the post-World War I peace settlement. Not surprisingly, in the 1920s organizations of Hungarian immigrants appeared in Canada which bore the names of the territories which had been detached from Hungary in the post-war peace settlement. There were clubs of Magyars from "Upper Hungary" [felvidéki magyarok], of Magyars from Bácska and Bánát (today's Vojvodina in Yugoslavia), and associations of Transylvanian Hungarians. In time, and especially in the post-Second World War period, some of the associations of Hungar-

ians from the "detached territories" became political organizations that lobbied for the revision of the territorial settlement in the Carpathian Basin.[20]

The regional loyalties that Hungarians had brought with them to Canada from their homelands in East Central Europe in time were supplemented, or even supplanted by regional loyalties acquired in Canada. Long term immigrant residents — and, especially, their children — of one region of Canada developed attitudes and sensitivities that were different from those acquired by Hungarian residents of another part of the country. A kind of solidarity evolved among people who settled in a certain part of the country. Especially noticeable was the differentiation between the Hungarian immigrant communities of the Canadian West, and those of Central Canada, usually referred to (both by Hungarian Canadians and Canadians in general) and the "East".

Ethnic minorities

The immigrants who came to Canada from Hungary in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries belonged to different ethnic groups. This was particularly true of the immigrants who came from the pre-World War I multinational Kingdom of Hungary. Though what was left of Hungary after the peace settlement was a predominantly Magyar nation, it still retained significant cultural minorities. Roughly five percent of the country's population was of German background, and about the same percentage was Jewish. There were also members of other minorities, including Slovaks and Gypsies. Many members of these national minorities had been assimilated into the Hungarian culture, but others had clung to the German, Jewish, or other cultural heritage as they came from ethnic enclaves or had been recent arrivals in Hungary.

Most of the non-Magyar immigrants who came to Canada from Hungary did not become associated with Hungarian–Canadians and their immigrant institutions. They did not become a part of that hardly definable ethnic group that students of ethnic studies call the Hungarian–Canadian community. Rather, they joined other Canadian ethnic groups such as the Slovak–Canadian, German–Canadian, Jewish–Canadian, etc. But a few of these non-Magyar immigrants or immigrant groups from Hungary remained on the periphery of Canada's Magyar ethnic group. From the archival and historical records we become aware of the activities or associations of immigrants. Historians can find references to clubs of German–Hungarians, of Hungarian Slovens, of Carpatho–Ruthenians, and of congregations of Magyar-speaking Jews.

Particularly interesting is the situation of the several thousand Jews who came to Canada from Hungary after the Hungarian revolution of 1956. Most of these newcomers settled in Toronto and Montreal, the largest centres of Jewish–Canadian ethnic life.[21] There they established an immigrant community of their own, one that had links to both the Jewish–Canadian ethnic group and the Hungarian–Canadian one. In Toronto for example, much of the cultural life of Gentile Hungarian Canadians and Jewish arrivals from Hungary merged or overlapped. A prime example of this is the Toronto Hungarian Theatre. In other ethnic institutional ventures Toronto's Hungarian Jewish

community went on its own way. It launched and maintained its own newspaper, the Menohra-Egyenlőség, the largest Jewish weekly in the Hungarian language in North America. Significantly, the paper was in Magyar, and for years during the 1960s, a debate raged in its letters to the editor section concerning the usefulness or otherwise of teaching children of Jewish newcomers from Hungary the Hungarian language.[22]

In this discussion of geographical and ethnic sub-identities a special chapter should be devoted to the Székelys of Transylvania. It is hard to classify their case either under the category of geographical heading or the ethnic one, though it might fit under both. Though they considered themselves Hungarian, they tended to maintain a strong sub-ethnic identity that manifested itself most clearly in their proclivity to settle in bloc settlements of their own members, and to establish their own immigrant organizations. A good example of their settlement is the community of Székelyföld in the Arbury district of Saskatchewan, and the most prominent of their organizations was the Székely kör [circle] of Montreal.[23] With the arrival of Magyar refugees from Rumania in the late 1980s, the revival of such organizations is made possible today.

The immigrant experience

One of the most interesting, most important but least understood subdivision of Hungarian–Canadian society is the one based on the differing nature of the immigrant experience of the various streams of Hungarian immigrants that came to Canada over the decades. The members of each of these streams tend to feel that a common bond unites them based upon their experiences in the processes of leaving the mother country and settling in the new. And the more these experiences differed from one stream of immigrants to the next, the stronger the feeling of solidarity became for the immigrants in question.

The circumstances under which the members of the four streams of Hungarian immigrants to Canada left their homeland and settled in their adopted land tended to differ a great deal.[24] Although a book could be written on this subject, a few generalizations will have to suffice here to describe the most important of these differences. The first stream of immigrants from Hungary were driven from their homeland by poverty, rural overpopulation, and economic dislocations. In Canada, they were confronted by the harsh conditions of life on the frontier, whether on the prairie homestead, or in the northern logging camp, or a mining community. These invariably involved heavy physical labour, a hazardous workplace, and social isolation. Many members of the second stream were "pushed" from Hungary by a variety of factors not dissimilar to those experienced by their pioneer predecessors. Others were prompted to leave Hungary by the political upheavals that country experienced during and after the First World War. Many members of this stream were in reality political refugees. Some fled a Hungary where socialists and liberals felt out of place, while others wished to escape ethnic discrimination in the territories that had been taken from Hungary after World War I. In their new homeland all of them faced anti-Hungarian prejudices

heightened by the war. As most of these people came to Canada during the second half of the 1920s, they all shared the fate of trying to put down roots just as the country plunged into a severe economic depression. The most common features of this process were unemployment and the accompanying psychological despair. Since many newcomers were young men who expected to send for their wives or fiancees after they had saved some money, their life in Canada was marked by solitude as most of them could not not reunite with their loved-ones in the 1930s because of the Depression, and in the 1940s because of the war.

The immigrant experience of the post-World War II stream was even more different. Most members of this stream left a "good life" behind: successful careers, social rank, and economic prosperity. They were driven from their country by the prospect of its conquest by the Red Army. These people were truly political refugees: had it not been for political changes in Europe, they would have never even thought of emigrating to Canada. The other important common experience that united members of this group was the years they spent in refugee camps. In Canada, they found themselves at the bottom of the social ladder, and faced wide spread prejudices directed against "displaced persons", especially newcomers from an enemy country. Obviously, members of this Hungarian emigration had little if anything in common with those that preceded them.

The refugees of the 1956 revolution also left their country and came to Canada under unique circumstances.[25] While they were also political refugees, unlike their 1945 predecessors they had no reasons to be nostalgic about the Hungary they had left behind. Their common legacy was the traumatic events that uprooted them and their families in the fall of 1956. And while they were welcomed by a sympathetic host society on arrival in Canada, most of them found adjustment to Canadian life difficult as they experienced what might be described as post-immigration trauma, caused by the sudden and dramatic changes in their lives. Members of previous streams of Hungarian newcomers to Canada had worked out the agony caused by the decision to emigrate before their departure from the mother country, or during their stay in refugee camps; but the 1956-ers were hit with it after their arrival.

In view if these widely differing "immigrant experiences" it is not surprising that there was disharmony and even friction between the different streams of Hungarian immigrants to Canada. The "pioneers" of the pre-World War I period tended to regard the newcomers of the 1920s as people who lacked perseverance and were reluctant to live by heavy manual labour. Another reason for which their leaders resented the Hungarian Canadian Federation when it was established in 1928 was because it was allegedly dominated by "inexperienced" newcomers to the country. And similar attitudes greeted the post-World War II arrivals on the part of the majority of Hungarians who has settled in Canada before then.

For their part, the post-war émigrés had little respect for their predecessors. They rarely joined their organizations but established new ones of their own. The justification for the creation of some of these was that institutions were needed for the preservation and promotion of Hungarian culture in Canada, forgetting that many of the clubs

and association that had been created by Hungarian immigrants before, served precisely this purpose. At the same time, the members of the "old" immigrant streams despised the newcomers for being reluctant to take on jobs involving physical labour.

Immediately after their arrival in Canada, the 1956 refugees tended to be well treated by members of all three streams of previous Magyar immigrants.[26] Soon thereafter, however, jealousies and suspicions emerged. The newcomers were reminded how difficult it had been for their predecessors in Canada: how the pre-World War II immigrants had to work in menial jobs for years, and how the post-war group had to confront strong anti-Hungarian prejudices. The refugees (many of whom suffered psychological problems after arrival) were considered restless, unable to persevere at most types of Canadian employment. Often they were ostracized from established immigrant social life, and courtship and intermarriage between newcomers and the children of Hungarian immigrants was discouraged. Time only would temper these inter-ethnic disharmonies and allow the integration of Magyar newcomers in Hungarian–Canadian community life. In the 1970s and the 1980s, when the members of the pre- and post-World War II emigration stream began to retire from organizational life, the prejudices based on the "immigrant experience" began to subside and would no longer exert an important influence on the group's community affairs.

Conclusions

Hungarians have been living in Canada for over hundred years. Canadians as well as non-Hungarian immigrants to this country have regarded them as members of the Magyar ethnic group, people who make up that rather vaguely definable Hungarian–Canadian community. These immigrants accepted this categorization, though their children occasionally rejected it emphasizing that they were not Hungarians but Canadians of Hungarian (or mixed-Hungarian) ancestry.

Within the Hungarian–Canadian community, however, people referred to themselves differently, depending on the context of the situation they were confronting. They were Catholics, Calvinists, Lutherans or Baptists; in other contexts they were workingmen or gentry folk, communists or patriots, the people of the village of Botrágy or of Farád, or immigrants from the Bánát or Transylvania. In some circumstances they saw themselves as German–Hungarians or Magyar-speaking Jews. Quite often they stressed that they were the members of a certain stream of newcomers: ókanadások [loosely translated: old immigrants or old Canadians], DPs (displaced persons), or refugees (56ers). Clearly, more-or-less definable sub-ethnic identities or loyalties persisted within the Hungarian–Canadian community for the entire existence of this ethnic group.

The importance of these various loyalties had varied through the years. Religious differences were often taken very seriously in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but not so in recent decades. The evidence of this is the strong ecumenical movement that built up in some Hungarian–Canadian circles during the last quarter century.

Some Hungarian Canadians had gone all the way to denouncing intra-ethnic religious differences and advocated the acceptance of an all-Hungarian Christian faith.[27] Similarly, ideological differences have declined in importance during recent times, especially in the late 1980s. While in the 1930s and 1940s Hungarian–Canadian society was split right down the middle between the Christian, patriotic camp on the one hand and communists and their fellow travelers on the other, today only a few people confess being adherents of communism.[28] Disharmony between members of different emigration streams also has tended to decline in time, and makes little difference for people who have been in Canada for decades, or for their children.

Some sub-ethnic identities and intra-ethnic divisions within Hungarian–Canadian society have not been adequately explored by social scientists and have not been touched on in this paper. The generational gap between the immigrants and their Canadian-born children, and between the latter and the members of the third generation, has not been touched on. While these differences seem to be real in Hungarian–Canadian society, they do not appear to be as acute and identifiable as they are between the Issei and the Nissei in Japanese–Canadian (or Japanese–American) society. Further, no speculation has been made in this paper on the loyalties of Hungarian–Canadians to their trades and professions, although such loyalties are undoubtedly considered important as evidenced by the fact that some Hungarian Canadians belong only to professional associations of their co-ethnics (Hungarian–Canadian Engineers, Hungarian–Canadian Foresters, etc.) and not to non-specific Hungarian cultural and social clubs.

What impact the division of Hungarian–Canadians into subgroupings has had on their community life could be the subject of controversy among historians and social scientists. It is possible to argue, indeed it has been argued that intra-ethnic divisions caused jealousies and rivalries within the community and sapped its energies and resources.[29] It has also been suggested that these divisions had inspired some Hungarian Canadians with a spirit of competition, and that squabbling within the ethnic group led to an atmosphere of "keeping up with the Joneses" and greater achievements in social and cultural life.[30] This debate could only be resolved after further research.

This bring us to our last comments. Much has been written about immigrant ethnic groups in Canada, but very little about ethnic sub-identities within their ranks. The historiography of the Hungarian community of Canada is equally if not more deficient. Only extensive research by students of social history and sociology will remedy this situation. Hungarian–Canadian academics are reluctant to enter this field as there seems to be very little interest in the subject either by Canadian social scientists or by the members of the Hungarian–Canadian public. One hope is that scholars from Hungary, often highly qualified and motivated, might come to the rescue. Unfortunately with the growing economic uncertainty in Hungary nowadays, even this prospect is dim. Research into the subject might not be conducted while some of the community's historical records are still available and while members of the community are still available for oral history projects.

Notes

1. Jean R. Burnet with Howard Palmer, *"Coming Canadians:" An Introduction to A History of Canada's Peoples* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988), p. 5. For a theoretical discussion of ethnicity, especially in the Canadian context, see Alan B. Anderson and James S. Frideres *Ethnicity in Canada: Theoretical Perspectives* (Toronto: Butterworth, 1981).
2. Information from Professor Jean Burnet.
3. For a comprehensive and up-to-date bibliography of works related to Hungarian–Canadian society see John Miska (compiler), *Canadian Studies on Hungarians, 1886–1986: An Annotated Bibliography of Primary and Secondary Sources* (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1987).
4. For an overview of Hungarian immigration to Canada see N. F. Dreisziger, M. L. Kovacs, Paul Bődy and Bennett Kovrig, *Struggle and Hope: The Hungarian–Canadian Experience* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), as well as John Kosa, *Land of Choice: Hungarians in Canada* (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1957).
5. A recent treatment of the geographic distribution of Hungarians in Canada can be found in N. F. Dreisziger, *Immigration and Re-migration: The Changing Urban-Rural Distribution of Hungarian Canadians,* 1886–1986, Hungarian Studies Review, 13/2 (1986), pp. 20–52.
6. Dreisziger et al., *Struggle and Hope,* p. 120f.
7. See M. L. Kovacs's chapter, The Saskatchewan Era, 1885–1914, in Dreisziger et al., *Struggle and Hope,* pp. 61–93; as well as by the same author: The Hungarian School Question, in Ethnic Canadians: Culture and Education, ed. *M. L. Kovacs* (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1978), pp. 333–58.
8. The Reverend Jenő Ruzsa, quoted in Dreisziger et al., *Struggle and Hope,* p. 152.
9. Dreisziger et al., *Struggle and Hope,* p. 129.
10. *Ibid.,* pp. 155–57.
11. Information from the late Reverend Charles Steinmetz, 1975.
12. Dreisziger et al., *Struggle and Hope,* pp. 199f.
13. N. F. Dreisziger, *The Hungarian Experience in Ontario* (Toronto: Hungarian Studies Review, 1985) special issue of the HSR (Pall, 1985), p. 32.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Carmela Patrias, *The Kanadai Magyar Újság and the Politics of the Hungarian Canadian Elite* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1978), pp. 38f.
16. Dreisziger, The Hungarian Experience in Ontario, p. 33.
17. Kornél, Nagy, *Igazságot Magyarországnak! A magyar óceánrepülés* [Justice for Hungary: The Hungarian Ocean Flight], *Magyar Szárnyak,* 10 (1981), pp. 63–75. Norbert Csanádi, Sándor Nagyváradi and László Winkler, *A magyar repülés története* [The History of Hungarian Aviation] (Budapest: Műszaki könyvkiadó, 1977), p. 140. Also, N. F. Dreisziger, 'Justice for Hungary' Ocean Flight: The Trianon Syndrome in Immigrant Hungarian Society, in S. B. Vardy and A. H. Vardy, eds. *Triumph in Adversity: Studies in Hungarian Civilization in Honor of Professor Ferenc Somogyi* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1988), pp. 573–89.
18. Dreisziger, *The Hungarian Experience in Ontario,* p. 38.
19. M. L. Kovacs, in Dreisziger et al., *Struggle and Hope,* pp. 66 and 70. The subject is discussed in Kovacs's *Peace and Strife: Some Facets of the History of an Early Prairie Community* (Kipling, Sask.: Kipling District Historical Society, 1980).
20. Dreisziger et al., *Struggle and Hope,* p. 200.
21. B. L. Vigod, *The Jews in Canada* (Ottawa, Canadian Historical Association, 1984), p. 6.
22. George Bisztray, The Hungarian Canadian Press, in Papp, *Hungarian in Ontario,* a special double issue of *Polyphony* (1979–80) pp. 54–58.
23. Dreisziger et al., *Struggle and Hope,* pp. 66, 70, 103–04.
24. Paul Bődy, Emigration from Hungary, 1880–1956, in Dreisziger, *Struggle and Hope,* pp. 74f. Also, Papp, *Hungarians in Ontario,* pp. 45–48.
25. N. F. Dreisziger, The Impact of the Revolution on Hungarians Abroad: The Case of the Hungarians of

Canada, in B. K. Kiraly et al., eds, *The First War Between Socialist States* (New York: Atlantic Publications, 1987), pp. 411–25.

26. *Ibid.*
27. There is a small group of people who have advocated the return to the pre-Christian traditions of the nomadic Hungarians; however, they have not attracted many followers. Their main congregation (complete with a place of worship) is in Toronto.
28. Most of these are no doubt people who find it difficult to admit that they had backed a bankrupt ideology most of their lives. However, there are some recent converts to communism, more particularly to its populist or "Kádárian" variety. One former high-ranking Arrow-Cross official (who shall remain nameless) became an admirer of János Kádár's Hungary, particularly what it had done for the people of Hungary's villages. He only regretted that Arrow-Cross leader Szálasi was never given a chance to do the same.
29. Dreisziger et al., *Struggle and Hope,* p. 156.
30. The point has been argued by Geraldine Vörös, one-time student at McMaster University, in a study of the Hungarian–Canadian community of Welland, Ontario. Cited *ibid.,* p. 166.

SIGNIFICANT HUNGARICA COLLECTIONS IN AMERICAN RESEARCH LIBRARIES

LÁSZLÓ KOVÁCS

Purdue University

We have witnessed in our lifetime one of history's greatest transfers of talent, the migration of scholars and scientists from Europe to America in the wake of wars and internal domestic strife. Over the last five decades Hungarian scientists and scholars, musicians and creative artists, architects and educators, brought to America and the academic world a breath of learning and a humanistic tradition that have enriched and enlarged the intellectual horizons of their colleagues as well as their students.

Needless to say that the growth of academic programs has had direct impact on the development of Hungarica collections in academic and research libraries. For years American scholars were dependent on European libraries for research. The major source of primary materials about historic Hungary will always remain in the archives and libraries of Hungary and Europe. But the acceptance of Hungarian studies as a legitimate academic subject signalled that libraries would be expected to acquire more scholarly materials about Hungary than they had in the past. It is the development and contents of some of these libraries which I will try to report on to you today.

I

An outgrowth of World War II, was a recognition that American library collection efforts had been primarily Western European in orientation. World War II revealed major gaps not only in the traditional areas of collecting but also in that vast area of Central Europe, and the Soviet Union. During the late 1940s and the 1950s, well established and new universities not only purchased large private collections but also entire bookstores. Furthermore, Europe was in ruins and countries were willing to part with the treasures of their libraries, many of which were confiscated from wealthy notables or from religious orders. In their zeal for building collections of material from hitherto neglected areas, American librarians roamed the globe so they could conclude purchases on the spot. The US sollar was strong and rebuilding the countries of Europe urgent.

It was during this twenty years of favorable world-wide acquisition climate that Indiana University purchased a significant part of Olmutz monastery collection. The University of Illinois bought a major private collection from Transylvania, and the

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

University of Michigan acquired a collection of undisclosed origin of considerable value.

If the acquisitions were great, so were the problems in processing the materials and making them accessible. For example, at the University of Michigan, I was permitted to visit in 1985 a remote storage location where the rare book collection just mentioned was still in piles of boxes and yet to be processed.

As funds for acquisition stabilized in the seventies, inflation took its heavy toll, and the devaluation of the US dollar halted this world-wide acquisition of rare books by US academic and research libraries. Yet until now no one took the time and personal financial investment to review this development with some systematic care. True, there had been successful attempts at evaluating Hungarica collections at several libraries, but without any attempt at comparative analysis.

II

Over the years I have been fortunate to visit nearly seventy academic, research, public and private libraries, and institutions in the United States and Canada. As the work progressed so did the level of comprehensiveness and skill in analyzing holdings with the use of the local card catalogue, the shelflist, bibliographies and the assistance of colleagues. With the technique which developed over the years I can now identify at least 95% of the pertinent Hungarica titles in the humanities and social sciences.

But there are other significant benefits of these personal visits to Hungarica collections. There are very few academically trained Hungarica experts in the United States who are directly responsible for the maintenance of these collections. The care of the Hungarica rare books and manuscripts, that is the pre-1850 imprints, are usually part of a rare book librarian's assignments who has some linguistic sophistication and general cultural orientation to the countries of Central Europe. These colleagues usually welcome the residency of an inquisitive expert who recognizes the intrinsic value of collections from a broader national and international perspective. This explains why such eminent scholars as Father Gabriel Astrik of Notre Dame, put at my disposal the good will of his cooperative staff.

And as the days pass by and the collegiate confidence grows, so does mutual acceptance. It is significant that I was able to recommend to many libraries, with success, the relocation of valuable materials from an open shelf area to a more controlled and secure location. For example, the Rare Book and Special Collections at the University of Illinois houses titles up to 1700. At the result of this policy, works that were published after that date were shelved in the open stack area where the temperature reached the 90s F during the summer months. Based on my selection and recommendation, over 300 volumes were removed from this scorching temperature and dust, to a climate-controlled, air-conditioned secure area. Other institutions, including the Huntington Library, also accepted my suggestion for the inclusion of the Hungarian collection into the preferential insurance package. During my examination of these

precious collections I also provide advice and consultation, free of charge, to scores of institutions, thus contributing to the preservation of thousands of titles across the country. For the future, this activity may well overshadow the compilation of reports, such as this, and the preparation of bibliographies, which you have before you.

III

So during the next few minutes I want to take you with me on an imaginary tour to a select few but significant Hungarica collections in the United States.

The general Hungarica collection at Indiana is close to the 25 000 volume mark, and growing. It is possibly the most balanced working collection and academically most comprehensive at any institution of higher education in the United States. The holdings include:

> history, political science, economics and economic theory, language, comparative linguistics, literature, fine arts, the theatre, music, folk art, ethnography and folklore, biographies, bibliographies, and essential reference works. These are primarily in Hungarian but one can locate the best English and German works by American, British, and Continental writers as well. There is a strong representation of scholarly periodicals.

The initial development of university and private libraries is quite interesting. Among them, the first decades of the Newberry Library of Chicago must be mentioned since it is of special interest to us.

The Newberry Library was established in 1885 and the doors of the now standing facility opened in 1893. Collection development from the beginning emphasized subjects in the humanities, and the library acquired large and significant collections from the very beginning. It was among these collections that the library purchased the private library of the late Prince Louis–Lucien Napoleon (1813–1891), the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte. It should be noted briefly that the younger Napoleon gained worldwide fame as a linguist while yet a young man, and books poured in from all quarters of the globe upon the relative of an Emperor who was known to value a rare work above all other treasures. His primary objective was the acquisition of every language and dialect represented in Europe; but in the course of years his ambition went further, and he hoped to assemble specimens of every known language which possessed even the most rudimentary literature. If a new language or dialect came to his knowledge, he had no peace of mind until he had secured a specimen for himself. He acquired works of the greatest bibliographical interest and rarity, many of which will be sought in vain in all the published records of the bibliographers. The Prince's library is one of extraordinary merit and value.

It was only three years after his death that a catalogue was prepared on the collection and published in 1894. I have the good fortune in possessing a copy of the complete volume. Subsequently, the entire collection was offered for sale, based on the catalog, when finally the Newberry Library purchased it in June, 1901. The collection constitutes 13 699 titles, and includes 18 914 volumes.

Under the "Finno–Tataric or Uralo–Altaic" language groups 559 titles are listed. From among these, 151 titles refer to an "Ugric–Magyaric" subdivision. The earliest six titles were issued in the 1600s, 1612 being the oldest imprint. There are twenty-one works from the 1700s, and the balance of 124 were published during the 1800s. It was under these colorful circumstances that we can identify in the United States a small but significant collection of 151 titles dealing with Hungarian linguistics in 1901.

One must ask the question: How many Hungarians knew about the existence of this major acquisition in 1901, or even several years later in 1990? One can indicate with a high degree of confidence that in 1901 this was the most cohesive and significant collection on any given Hungarian subject in the United States.

Since the turn of the century the Newberry Library assembled a very noteworthy Hungarica collection. Today one can identify nearly 400 titles under philology alone. Most of the titles were published during the inter-war period. Among them are titles on language education, comparative linguistics, polyglot dictionaries, history of language and literature, dialectology, collections of folk literature and ballads, and a variety of Bible translations. For the linguist this collection is a veritable goldmine and should be explored systematically.

But the Newberry Library has other attractions for the serious researchers. Rare works on history, description and travel, historical maps dating to the 18th century. About 8 000 volumes contribute to Hungarica research, the earliest title being none other than the 1490 Augsburg edition of Thuroczy's *Chronica Hungarorum.*

IV

Just a few blocks from the New York Public Library is the lesser known but important Pierpont Morgan Library. Pierpont Morgan (1837–1913), one of America's most notable financiers, philanthropists and patrons of the arts, began his career as a collector in 1890. Soon his vast collection of books, manuscripts and drawings required its own building which was completed in 1906. Today it is one of the nation's most distinguished museums and centers for scholarly research.

Among the Medieval and Renaissance Illuminated Manuscripts, with over 1 000 volumes, dating from the 5th to the 16th centuries, one can identify some high spots for Hungarica research.

Naturally, you will first want to see the two Corvina incunabula, from the collection of the great Renaissance Hungarian King, Mátyás. So the staff brings to you first one then the other representation of the truly lavish works of the famed Corvina Library which the Pierpont Morgan Library acquired in 1912. The works are: Didymus Alexandrinus, *De spiritu sancto,* identified as Manuscript No. 496. The other is: an incunabula by Marcus Tullius Cicero, *Opera,* catalogued as Manuscript No. 497.

But there are two works that date back to the 14th century. The first is a bilingual Italo–Hungarian Bible. The other is a set of eighty-nine miniatures on vellum, illuminated in Hungary possibly around 1340.

Your attention is also drawn to two other works of great significance and value. Johannes Thwrocz, *Chronica Hungarorum.* Now the first edition of the Turóczy Krónika was published at Brunn on March 20, 1488, and the second at Augsburg on June 3, 1488. The Pierpont Morgan Library is the only library in the United States where both the first and the second editions can be identified. I was permitted to have on the table both editions at the same time, thus having a rare opportunity to examine the textual and bibliographic distinction of the two volumes.

We need to note two other items, both published in 1497. The first is by Michael de Hungaria, *Sermones,* issued in Paris. The second is by a Hermann Schedel, *Liber chronicarum,* which appeared in Augsburg. The last thirty leaves contain contemporary geographical descriptions about Hungary. There are three items from the 16th century dated in 1522, 1540, and 1581. This last one is by Antonio Bonfini, *Rerum Hungaricarum decades quatuor,* issued at Frankfurt. The twenty items in the library relating to Hungary are significant due to the nature of each and contain key titles for the right researcher.

V

The New York Public Library's Hungarica rare book collection is quite extensive and would require considerable discussion. What we must note here, however, is the third beautiful sample from the Corvina collection by Titus Livius Patavinus, *De secundo bello Punico,* which is part of the famous Spencer Collection.

A few examples from among the titles will give you some indication about the variety of subjects from the New York Public Library holdings:

1. Thuroczy, Janos, *Chronica Hungarorum,* Brunn, 1488.
2. Tarducci, Archille, *Il Turco vincible in Ungaria,* Ferrara, 1597.
3. Joannis Sajnovics, *Demonstratio idioma Ungarorum et Lapporum edem esse,* Nagy-Szombat, 1770.
4. Istvan Csontos, *A szép-nem ügyvédje, az asszonyi becset sértegető vád-okok ellen,* Kassa, 1830.

The Beineke Rare Book and Manuscript Library on the Yale University campus is housed in a most magnificent and sumptuous modern building. The entire structure is wrapped around with see-through light pink marble panels which the sun penetrates and on a bright day creates within the interior an effervescent brightness throughout.

The fourth Corvina codex which is located in the United States is well secured in the vaults of the Beinecke Library. The copy of Publius Cornelius Tacitus, *Annalum* libri XI–XIV, and *Historiam* libri I–V, was purchased by Yale from a Robert Babcock in 1935. It is considered one of the price-possessions of Yale's 15th century collection.

The Hungarica rare material can be estimated at nearly 200 titles. It is particularly rich from the time of King Mátyás to about 1700. There is a title, published in 1514,

on the ill-fated crusade, and subsequent peasant revolt of Dózsa. The advancement of the Turks into Hungary and their eventual occupation of the land is dealt with in scores of contemporary German, Latin, Italian, French and English accounts. The period of the Counter-Reformation and the religious strife during the 17th century, the second great siege of Vienna in 1683, and the subsequent siege of Buda and the liberation of Hungary have major representations in the collection. No serious scholar can ignore the vast resources of this library in dealing with the Turkish occupation of Hungary.

By way of illustration let me list a few titles from among the Beinecke collection.

1. Thuroczy, Janos, *Chronica Hungarorum,* Brunn, 1488.
2. Bonfini, Antonio, *Rervm vngaricarvm,* Basiliae, 1543.
3. Bizari, Pietro, *Pannonicvm bellvm,* Basiliae, 1573.
4. Fumee, Martin, *The historie of the trovbles of Vngarie: containing the pitifvll losse and rvine of that kingdome, and the warres happened there ... between the Christians and Turks,* London, 1600.
5. Ahmed I, Sultan of the Turks, *Letter from the Great Turke lately sent vnto the Holy Father Pope and to Rodulphus, naming himself king of Hungarie, and to all the kings and princes of Christendome.* Tr. out of the Hebrew tongue into Italian, and out of the Italian into French, and now into English out of the French coppie, London, 1606, 11 p.
6. *A prospect of Hungary and Transylvania, with a catalogue of the kings of the one, and the princes of the other.* London, 1664, 54 p.
7. Széchenyi, István, *Lovakrul,* Pest, 1828.

One more item must be added for the literary historian. As we know, there was considerable interest in translating Jókai's works into English about a hundred years ago. Now the Yale general or Sterling Library has one of the finest and largest Jókai translations anywhere in this country. It would make an interesting M. A. thesis, for example, to investigate the English translators of Jókai.

VI

The Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington is our next stop. The Hungarica material is in the midst of one of the finest rare book collections which one can find on the East Coast. The nearly thirty Hungarica titles concentrate on the period between 1526 and 1686. In many ways the Folger Library complements the one at Yale in terms of historical coverage and emphasis.

Two titles deserve mention here:

1. Martin Luther, *Vom Kriege Widder die Turchen,* Wittemberg, 1529.
2. *The Hungarian rebellion: or, An historical relation of the late wicked practices of the three counts, Nadasdi, Serini, and Frangepani; tending to subvert the govern-*

ment of his present imperial majesty in Hungary, and introduce the Mahumetan, with their arraignment, condemnation, and manner of being executed for same. London, 1672.

The general collections of the Firestone Library at Princeton University may contain about 12 000 volumes about Hungary. Of these, about 120 fall into our pre-1850 period. The rare book collection includes a few titles from the 17th century. But it is the period extending from 1800 to about 1855 where the strength of the collection is. The Reform period and the 1848–49 War of Independence and its *dramatis personae* are dealt with in about sixty works.

1. LeClerc, Jean, *Memoirs of Emeric Count Teckely,* London, 1693.
2. Széchenyi, István, *Világ,* Pest, 1831.
3. Széchenyi, István, *Ein Blick auf den anonymen "Rückblick".* London, 1859.

We need to make a brief stop in Philadelphia at the University of Pennsylvania. The development of the Hungarica rare book collection is an engaging one and worth telling. The library's annual reports and discussions with colleagues on the library staff revealed the initial development of a collection on the Habsburg Lands. During the 1950s an academically well-trained librarian from Vienna, Austria, Rudolph Hirsch, was active as the head of the acquisition department. Having European/Austrian training, Hirsch possessed the necessary languages to develop a handsome collection. He also had the financial resources and fully recognized the power of the U. S. dollar at a crucial time, and invested well. Among the Habsburg related materials he naturally came across titles which had references to Hungary, Turkey and Poland. There are thirteen titles from the 16th, seven from the 17th, thirteen from the 18th titles. Seventeen titles were published between 1800 and 1855. The subject focus of these titles is primary Hungarian history.

The University of Michigan Library's Hungarica collection should also be reported. Here some two hundred rare book titles are housed dating from about 1600 to 1855. Political history for the 18th century dominates but there is considerable depth for the early 19th century as well. There are valuable titles on description and travel also, particularly from 1830 on, mostly in English.

A few examples may be helpful again.

1. Howell, James, *Florvs hvngaricus: or the history of Hungaria and Transylvania deduced from the original of that nation ... to the present Turkish invasion, anno 1664.* London, 1664, 302 p.
2. Békeházi Incze, *A korszellemi által fejtegetve. Igaz-e hogy mindenben hátra vagyunk,* Pest, 1838.
3. Eötvös József, *Die Reform in Ungarn,* Leipzig, 1846.

The library at Duke University possesses twenty-five rare books on Hungary. Just to satisfy the music minded listener, I want to share with you one title from the music collection. It is: *Hungarian waltz, as danced by Mrs. H. Wallock in the admired ballet of "Love among the roses"*. Philadelphia, 1819

The University of Colorado at Boulder, Colorado, has about 4 000 titles on Hungary in its general collections. We may recall that Colorado was one of the four institutions, along with Columbia, Indiana, and Berkeley, where Hungarian studies programs were supported through the National Defense Education Act of 1958, and was one of the four Uralic and Altaic Centers. In the general collection, language and literature dominate, along with history and representative titles from the Reform period.

1. Széchenyi, István, *Világ,* Pest, 1831.
2. Széchenyi, István, *Javaslat a magyar közlekedés ügy rendezésérül,* Pozsony, 1848. This by the way is what is termed: an "Author's presentation copy".

The Hungarica collection at Rice University in Houston is not large but is the most significant in Texas. The existence of the collection can only be explained by the fact that for a very long tenure Dr. John Rath, the former editor of the *Austrian History Yearbook,* taught there. The 150 or so rare titles concentrate on the 19th century from about the french Revolution to 1848–49, and its aftermath. The collection is surprisingly good on the Reform period and includes works on statistics, description and travel, and constitutional developments.

Unfortunately, there is not much time left for explaining the two other libraries in the Chicago area, namely the University of Chicago Regenstein Rare Book Collection, and the Northwestern University Library and its holdings. Suffice it to state that the University of Chicago Library has possibly the most comprehensive collection on legislative materials, laws and statutes for the last 150 years.

We should add one brief comment about the University of Illinois Hungarica collection. As it was indicated at the beginning of this presentation, the library purchased a collection of real merit from Romania around 1972. It most likely belonged to a Transylvanian noble family of intellectual leanings. It is an excellent source on the constitution of Hungary, and includes titles addressing the exposition of Werbőczy's *Tripartitum,* as well as the legal relationship between the Hungarian Crown and the Principality of Transylvania. The collection is a treasure for those who are truly interested in the scholarly investigation of this subject. Latin, German Hungarian and French works abound in the collections.

Among the public libraries the Boston Public Library deserves attention. However, a discussion on the Hungarica collection at that institution will have to wait for another time. The Cleveland Public Library collection was analyzed and fully described by me in a publication issued in 1976.

VII

By way of conclusion let me offer a few observations.

All I have presented is a short summary concerning a few American libraries where Hungarica rare book collections were built up beginning with the early part of our century into the 1960s. But even these collections, both large and small, warrant a more comprehensive description in two ways. First, within the context of the general Hungarica holdings at a given institution, and secondly within the development and history of the home institution's library.

As you will have noticed, not mentioned in my remarks are several major collections about which neither other colleagues or I have reported since 1970. The collections at the Library of Congress, Columbia University, Harvard, the Hoover Institution, the University of Minnesota, and the University of Notre Dame Hungarica collections, among others, fall into this category.

During my visits to libraries, which usually extend from a few to seven working days, I take careful note of the entire Hungarica holdings, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, including publications into the 1980s. But in all cases the focus remains on the "high spots", that is on the pre-1850 imprints. This is a very convenient date from the historical, political point of view, and also from the literary and cultural as well as the publishing aspects of Hungarian life and development in historic Hungary and of Hungarians abroad.

There is much similarity, for example, among the Hungarica collections of a Dartmouth College, the one at Smith College, Amherst College, the University of Virginia, and the University of Rochester. When one compares the bulk of the titles, they are mostly in English, and include the reception of Kossuth and his entourage in the United States, and the titles that were issued about Hungarian subjects during the second half of the 19th century both in the United States and in Europe.

But 1850 is also a necessary benchmark for a non-resident travelling researcher. One must control a travel schedule and the time which is devoted to each library. I also need to be sensitive to the good will of local librarians who not only welcome a colleague, but are also quite helpful and accommodating.

There are about ten more institutions which I need to visit. A comprehensive evaluation of the Huntington Library should be undertaken. The Crerar collection within the University of Chicago library system, and the two major Canadian collections in Toronto and Montreal are among them.

Of course in a project such as this, the help and encouragement of colleagues like you are always welcome.

URALIC STUDIES AND ENGLISH FOR HUNGARIANS AT INDIANA UNIVERSITY: A PERSONAL VIEW

THOMAS A. SEBEOK

Indiana University, Bloomington

Several participants in this assembly have asked me, in casual conversations since last Saturday evening, how it came about that Indiana University, located in a rural area on the Southern border of Midwestern America, with very few original residents of Hungarian extraction, came to be so closely associated with Hungarian affairs of considerable variety, ranging from education to business, from the arts to the sciences, and from high cultural affairs — our School of Music comes to mind — to puerile political posturing.

While I cannot begin to address this question fully this afternoon, I should like to relate just two episodes of this long and convoluted story in both of which I was deeply and personally involved: the earlier from the third term of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, i.e., the early 1940's; the later from the second term of Dwight D. Eisenhower, i.e., the late 1950's. I selected these because of their inherent and general interest. Both have to do with language and linguistics, which is my academic specialty.

Before World War II, Hungarian linguistics in America simply did not exist; and in no institution of post-secondary education was the Hungarian language ever taught. Robert A. Hall, jr.'s highly original *Outline of Hungarian Grammar* was printed by the LSA at the turn of the decade, and Leslie Tihany's *A Modern Hungarian Grammar* was privately published shortly thereafter. At Leonard Bloomfield request, I reviewed these, as well as John Lotz's *Das Ungarische Sprachsystem,* in the 1942 issues of *Language.*

With the quickening of the war, the situation of American universities grew increasingly precarious. The departure of male faculty members and students, having been called up for service in large numbers, left our campuses more and more depopulated and in academic disarray. At the same time, as the global nature of the war became evident, the Washington administration realized that the country simply lacked the most elementary expertise in pertinent foreign areas and languages of the world.

These two seemingly unrelated problems — how to arrest the degradation of university life and how to meet the pressing demands of our commanders in the field — were brilliantly solved in a single stroke by U. S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall.

In 1942, Marshall created an Army Specialised Training Program (ASTP), which, on the one hand, quickly repopulated enterprising university campuses, notably this one; and which, on the other hand, provided intensive training in dozens of languages

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

which had never previously been studied on this continent. In addition, Marshall devised and his staff designed a far-sighted infrastructure to fuel this voracious language-learning-machine with teaching materials. It so happened that I became deeply enmeshed, with a service ranking but in an essentially civilian capacity, with both enterprises: from the supply side as well as at the consuming end.

In 1941, the War Department established a large office in New York City, at 165 Broadway. I was appointed civilian chief of the Hungarian desk and the Finnish desk. It was my primary task to rapidly produce textbooks suitable for intensive Hungarian and Finnish language instruction for military personnel, in addition to several other types of language aids, including sizeable dictionaries. *Spoken Hungarian,* a book of ca. 500 pages, supplemented by four sides of audio materials, appeared in 1945; and the comparable *Spoken Finnish,* in 1947.

By the Fall of 1943, the ASTP became fully operational at this university. At various periods, the program involved about a dozen different languages, including particularly of Eastern Europe in the broad sense, comprehending also Russian, Finnish, and Turkish. I was originally hired to be in charge of the Hungarian and Finnish groups; eventually, I was made responsible for the entire operation, overseeing a large faculty of linguists and their corps of native speakers, the instructors for area studies, and of course the thousands of officers and enlisted men who were our students. The Hungarian faculty in Bloomington comprised six civilians, plus Army support personnel.

The language materials these students devoured in up to forty-four contact hours per week over a period of from nine to twelve months were normally the product of the New York staff, rushed to us here in mimeographed form practically daily. I myself commuted between my offices and billet in New York and my Bloomington home. (Parenthetically, one of my more entertaining assignments was to locate and hire reliable native speakers from ever more recondite language communities, at various times involving Azerbaijanis, Cheremis, Uzbeks, and the like, in search of whom I occasionally had to undertake hazardous trips overseas and to several prisoner or war camps.)

The vast IU segment of the national ASTP, including particularly its Hungarian component, was in part based, as we were to learn some years afterwards, on Winston Churchill's strategic intent and hope to launch the invasion of Europe via its southern soft "underbelly". In the event, and to their disappointment, most of the Hungarian alumni were sent to Africa or to Italy to monitor radio broadcasts in that language, to digest and interpret Hungarian printed materials, or to perform other remote intelligence functions. Some of our students joined the Foreign Service after 1945, many went into business, and a few are still pursuing academic careers.

Even before the war ended in 1945, I proposed to Herman B. Wells, our visionary and international-minded President, that we immediately commence building, solidly and with an eye to permanence, upon the resources that had serendipitously accumulated here during those years. He strongly supported all such endeavors, which ultimately flowered into an amazing diversity of research, teaching, and publication

schemes, including sizeable Departments of Anthropology, Linguistics, and others, plus a global variety of area-and-language programs. It would take a moderate tome to chronicle all of these, so let me only briefly dwell on the Hungarian programs.

Here, credit must go first of all to The Rockefeller Foundation, which committed large resources toward the creation of what in due course became our Department of Uralic and Altaic Studies. A bit later, an allied programmatic activity developed under the direction of my close friend and partner, John Lotz, at Columbia University. Eventually, especially in the early 1950's, the two of us, with the assistance of a growing number of European emigré scholars, were given invaluable moral assistance by the American Council of Learned Societies, which then translated into heavy financial provision on the part of the (then) U. S. Office of Education.

By the mid-1950's, I considered Uralic and Altaic studies adequately launched here at Indiana University, and, my attention having turned to other fields of study, I ceded my duties to my colleagues. The rest, as the saying goes, is history — literally so, in contrast with linguistics.

Eleven years then passed. The revolution had run its bloody course in Hungary just as the Eisenhower–Nixon team was being returned to the White House. In December of 1956, Eisenhower set up a high-level commission, headed by his Vice President, to deal with the flood of Hungarian refugees by then pouring into Austria, many hoping to enter the United States.

At the outset of 1957, between the Fall and the Spring Semesters, I was summoned to the office of our President, Dr. Wells, who informed me that, at Eisenhower's direct request, Indiana University was being designated to organize an emergency intensive spoken language training program for those Hungarian refugees who would shortly be heading either for this country or perhaps for other Anglophone countries, such as Australia, Canada, or Great Britain. I was that day being relieved of all my normal administrative and teaching duties for the next eight months, and ordered to devote, with ample funding, my full time and energies toward this goal. Next day, I left to consult with the Nixon team, already at work in Vienna.

The Hungarian refugees whom I interviewed overseas were, by and large, of College age, but not on the whole very well schooled. Practically none of them, as I recall, spoke any second language, save a little Russian. Considering the group's overall educational profile, I decided, on my return to Bloomington a week later, to set up three personnel modules.

The pivotal module was headed by an extremely able Ph. D. candidate of mine in the Department of Linguistics. Elaine's duty was to spend her days compiling an English-language training manual aimed specifically at Hungarian learners. Her partner was Victor, a Hungarian graduate student of ours, whose duty it became to translate at night into Hungarian the drafts produced by Elaine the previous day. Their joint product was typed and mimeographed the following morning, and copies were dispatched to Washington for distribution to all Anglophone training centers, world-wide, who requested them. The manual written by this team eventually well exceeded 1,000 pages.

A second team was formed to use the same materials in the English for Hungarians

classes here at IU. These classes, never exceeding ten individuals, received forty-four hours of language instruction per week for over seven months.

I also set up a third group, responsible for the day-to-day welfare of our Hungarian students, including their accommodations and feeding and their local social life, and also seeing to our complex liaisons with off-campus training centers using our materials. The short-range goal of this program was to enable those Hungarians who wished to do so — which was generally the case — to enter a college of their choice by the Fall of 1957. An added duty of the third module thus became channeling the students' entry into the normal higher educational life of this country.

By next August, this project, having fully met its integrative goal, came to an end. All of the Hungarians who had studied English on this campus at least, were settled in College communities across the nation. I still keep in touch with some of them.

HERITAGE EDUCATION AS A CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT FOR TEACHING HUNGARIAN

GEORGE BISZTRAY

University of Toronto

It would be nice to find a viable definition of "heritage education" somewhere. In a way, this term is a tautology, since any education aims at the perpetuation of the heritage of a culturally defined region or group. More specific is the definition of the term in a multicultural society like Canada where the transmission of the cultural heritage of individual "ethnic" groups is regarded as the primary function of heritage language education.[1] While this definition sets at least one concrete educational goal, it also poses two problems. One is the division of education into a general ("Canadian") and a limited ("ethnic") sphere and all the possible conflicts that implies. On the level of language education, for instance, the participation of a newly arrived young immigrant in the heritage language program is exemplary and considered an asset to the class. At the same time, the difficulty of the immigrant child in public school to communicate in either of the official languages is an obvious disadvantage. The official interpretation, naturally, is that the two spheres "enhance" each other. This structural-functionalist optimism characterizes the whole of multicultural state policy. The realities of life are more conflict-ridden, as we well know.

Another problem stems from the emphasis on teaching language as the criterion for heritage education. It is true that language is the primary means for the transmission of social values. Can we afford, however, to dwell indefinitely on the non-political and measurable field of language teaching without scrutinizing the content of communication and the values that the different languages express? My twelve years at the Hungarian Chair of the University of Toronto and my own irregular contact with the city's Hungarian community schools make me dissatisfied with such an easy proposition. For the purposes of this paper, I will rely mostly on my limited experience, having found no literature to guide me in my inquiry — possibly only available in sporadic publications, if at all.

The simplistic reduction of cultural heritage to language teaching tends to serve Canadian social coherence. In spite of the occasional concerns of the dominant Anglophone North Americans, one can argue that bilingualism is essentially an asset to any society. On the other hand, as soon as we include values, historical consciousness, standards of behaviour and forms of self-expression as well as interaction, among the variables of cultural heritage, we are faced with potential social conflict: between the host country and the group, between the group and other groups, and finally, within the

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

group itselt. It is this latter aspect — the diverging in-group views of heritage — that I wish to centre my discussion around.

N. F. Dreisziger raised the matter of "sub-ethnic identities", defining a whole new research field thus: "It seems that students of ethnic studies have tended to concentrate on what cultural and societal factors bring individuals together into ethnic groups, at the expense of examining the circumstances that separate their members into clusters of individuals that have distinct identities within a particular ethnic community."[2] Beginning with this statement, let us ask: which Hungarian heritage are we teaching in Canada? A few years ago, this question would have been much more polemic, when Hungary was ruled by a communist regime. The brief period under consideration in this article is the 1980s. I do not intend to discuss the current political situation in Hungary, nor do I intend to spell out any program or predictions for the 1990s, except perhaps indirectly by scrutinizing past problems and deficiencies.

The first type of conflict one can identify stems from differences in personal experience. Diachronically, it manifests itself in the distinct diversity of the consciousness of various immigrant waves. In Canada, we have the cultural consciousness of prewar immigrants, DPs, post-revolutionary refugees and the small but steady immigrant accumulation of the past quarter century.[3] These shifting indicators strongly influenced education in this country over the intervening years.

Once upon a time there may have been community teachers with strong leftist leanings, but no record can be found of their existence. On the other hand, until recently, the influence of community teachers who came from the ranks of the DPs was more decisive. Their values were perhaps most evident in the teaching of history. Classroom materials found in the archives of the Hungarian Chair offer predictable, but still interesting, insights in support of this observation. No less typical was their literary canon as seen in one reader, published in Toronto in the early 1980s, which was originally intended for the Hungarian Credit High School.[4] The selection cannot be called tendentious, yet it shows signs of a value system which, at the time of publication, differed from that found in Hungary. Authors are represented here whose names never appeared in the old country's school readers after World War II: László Mécs, Mrs. Elemér Papp-Váry, Lajos Pósa, Sándor Reményik, Dezső Szabó, Lajos Zilahy — authors of about 15 per cent of the readings. The historical and patriotic element is emphasized at the expense of the socially committed: the three poems by Attila József *(Altató, Mama, Anyám),* included in the reader, make the poet appear as a favourite for Mothers' Day recitals. In one curious respect, the selection coincides with official Hungarian priorities at the time. It includes very few works by Hungarian authors who lived outside the post-Trianon borders, with the exception of Nyírő, Reményik and Zilahy.

The ideological context of the personal experience not only has a historical extension, but it also derives from the socio-economic environment of the individual. This can be called the synchronic aspect of the human experience: the one which has moulded the teacher, his personal taste, vocabulary and priorities. Someone born in the Hungarian countryside may still attach values to teaching the meaning of words like

döndöle, pattantyú, sajtár, or the still actively used yet hardly essential *kéve, köcsög, menyecske.* These words appear in Hungarian folk songs and tales reprinted in a textbook published by the Mother Tongue Conference designated for "6–8 year old children abroad".[5] While folkloristic materials undoubtedly make attractive teaching aids, they also pose serious cultural semantic problems. At the same time, they illustrate the interplay between the diachronic and synchronic aspects, between history and sociology, as the vocabulary of such texts refers to a Hungarian countryside that has changed radically since they were first recorded.

On the other hand, another teacher born in Budapest may assign too much importance to city slang. A recent vocabulary test published in a Western Canadian Hungarian community paper posed a question about the meaning of the word *bájgúnár.* If ever there was a disposable word for Hungarian Canadians, this is it. Interestingly, however, the urban bias is less evident in educational materials than references to a bygone rural lifestyle. Although such speculations lie outside the scope of the present paper, one may still draw revealing conclusions about the origins and value motivations of the teachers in Hungarian Canadian heritage schools (and the educators in Hungary who wrote the schoolbooks intended for export).

Another difference in the personal experiences on the synchronic level stems from the educational background of the teacher and student. It is an old-fashioned axiom, even unpopular and considered reactionary in recent decades, that written expression is the highest form of civilization. (From this axiom the nonsensical jargon of bureaucracy, commerce and several sciences are exempt.) Similar to the public school system, Hungarian community schools tend to overemphasize verbal communication on the elementary and secondary level. As the pedagogical guidelines of a Toronto community school stated a few years ago: "The basis of language is speech. Consequently, thinking in a given language precedes in importance the teaching of grammatical rules."[6] While this thesis may be correct, the problem is that the development of verbal communication often remains the only pedagogical goal in community schools. It is less demanding than the development of writing skills, and equally convenient for the non-professional weekend teachers and less ambitious pupils. Hence, the abundance of poetic recitals, which are seldom matched by essay competitions. Many university students who have attended community schools take post-secondary Hungarian courses with the expectation of having an opportunity to practice written communication under guidance. In a sense, the community school system has retarded their language development.

As we know, extremes are always binary. At the opposite end of the scale sits the deskside educator who assumes too much regarding his students. In one of my publications from almost ten years ago, I criticized aesthetically oriented *(lomb, kolomp, dallam, fuvalom)* and overinformative *(államalapító, törökverő)*[7] language education. The latter, especially, is frequent in Canadian–Hungarian community schools. From history and geography handouts, once used in the Toronto Hungarian Credit High School and now housed in the archives of the Hungarian Chair, we find the innumerable question marks of a frustrated student at words like *ÁVÓ, népbíróság, háztáji*

(spelled with *ly*), *külterjes gazdálkodás* and nota bene, *UNO*. (The student may have queried the meaning of the English acronym appearing in a Hungarian text.)

Clearer than conflicting personal experiences have been the differences in collective values: those of North American immigrants as opposed to those of the Hungarian cultural establishment. All of us remember the Kádárian adage: "Whoever is not against us, is with us", and its version propagated among Hungarians in the West: "We look for whatever ties us together." The result was some unbearably dull readings published in Hungary for use abroad. In these textbooks, the Hungarian diaspora lived in a cultural vacuum, a no-man's land, without any political views or ideological conflicts. Their experiences became tangible and their drab life brightened only when they visited Hungary or enjoyed its cultural exports. In the publication, *Hogy mondjuk helyesen?* (used in our university language courses),[8] one reading describes a Hungarian family living in Canada. They have come to town from the farm to attend various events in "Hungarian Week". All the dance groups and choirs, the films and the circus, have come from Hungary to give Hungarian Canadians a taste of the "old country". The experience is generalized and the situation one-dimensional: obviously, the author never saw Canada, otherwise he couldn't have remained so impersonal. Neither did he (want to) know about the many Hungarian–Canadian folk ensembles which hold regular festivals of their own. The ideological message is: what would those poor Hungarian Canadians do without the generous cultural export of the Hungarian government?

In the education of the literary tradition, textbooks published in Hungary for diaspora youth differed widely from those used in Hungarian high schools. Tinódi, Balassi, Fazekas, Vörösmarty, Garay, Petőfi, Jókai, Weöres, Illyés, Lőrinc Szabó — who would not approve this selection?[9] Students in Hungary did receive a more complete education. Besides the above writers, they also studied, at least throughout the 1970s, László Benjámin, József Darvas, Imre Dobozy, Andor Gábor, Frigyes Karikás, Aladár Komját, Béla Illés, to name a few.[10] The double standard is obvious: indoctrination at home, sweet-talk overseas.

One may ask: what did Hungarian cultural policy have to do with heritage education in Canada? As we have seen, the Hungarian communist government targeted emigrant Hungarians and their offspring with vigorous educational and cultural propaganda. Ideological values proposed by the Hungarian establishment for the diaspora did affect this group and, as we know, raised considerable controversy. The "bridgebuilders" and the "national emigration" repeatedly clashed over the usefulness of educational materials published in Hungary.

Considering the total absence of up-to-date information on North American Hungarian community schools and their curricula, it is hardly surprising that the questions raised by the educational practice of the Hungarian heritage schools have no theoretical reflections. Methodological and empirical, maybe,[11] but definitely not theoretical. At least one — and, so far, only one — institution that represents community aspirations at the university level has done its best to keep North American Hungarians in-

formed about its educational activity. This institution is the Hungarian Chair of the University of Toronto.

Hungarian university courses in Toronto have a "heritage" character not so much because they are supported by an endowment fund, in part raised by the community, but rather out of necessity. Arguably, there are at least four reasons why Hungarian literature cannot be taught in English (illustrated here by examples from the novel and drama, samples from the readings of two Hungarian courses at the university). First of all, major novels (such as Margit Kaffka's *Színek és évek,* a unique statement of women's place in society) have not yet been translated into English (whereas many insignificant works have already been translated). Second, adequate earlier translations (such as Dezső Kosztolányi's *Édes Anna,* published under the title *Wonder Maid* in London, 1947), are no longer available. Third, existing translations (like that of Gyula Krúdy's *A vörös postakocsi,* under the title *The Crimson Coach*) are qualitatively inadequate to represent the author's true literary genius. Last but not least, we have to face an ethical problem: the eventual selective bias of a haphazard translation market. For some reason, several plays by István Örkény have been translated into English, while the works of other, equally representative and outstanding modern Hungarian playwrights (such as Illyés and Németh, Endre Illés and Sarkadi, Csurka and Szakonyi or Sütő), are still unavailable. Should we teach the plays of Örkény in a drama course offering readings in English, giving the impression that he was the only modern Hungarian playwright worth studying?

(In parentheses: one may argue that Hungarian poetry is better represented in English translation. Quantitatively this is true, but not qualitatively. Besides: is it fair to base a whole introduction to Hungarian literature on poetry alone — and these poems in translation?)

As a consequence, the prerequisite for Hungarian literary courses is a reading knowledge of the language. It is impossible to say how many students who cannot satisfy this prerequisite are lost to our statistics. Those who can read the language and have the necessary motivation, however, receive a much more gratifying education.

Why do these students take Hungarian courses in the first place? Precisely because they want to receive a true "heritage education": a curriculum reflecting the specifics of the Hungarian cultural tradition. When I visited several Hungarian chairs in Italy in the spring of 1987, I realized that most of us in Canada work in an educational setting which differs greatly from that of our Italian colleagues. In a nation-state, cultural analogies are emphasized: Hungarian literature is represented in its interplay with the major currents of European literature and, above all, the literature of the respective country. Because of the language barriere, literary courses in translation are frequent (in Italy they are almost exclusively so); only specialized students do meticulous, language-oriented readings in the original. On the other hand, my Hungarian–Canadian students want to know why their literary heritage is different from the European mainstream. As one student said, "If we wanted to learn only about avantgarde prose, we could take courses on Joyce and Virginia Woolf, on Robbe-Grillet, Sarraute and that crowd." Indeed, I am unable to provide them with examples of current Hungarian experimen-

tal prose to read. My timid attempts in this direction have all failed. Some of these writers could be included in a more traditional, "non-heritage" curriculum, though. On the other hand, in my one-year novel course and one-semester drama course, students easily read eight to ten complete works in the original with full comprehension of the language and its subtle nuances.

The concept of university level heritage education is advocated not only by the Toronto Hungarian Chair. I have been informed by colleagues in the Slavic and two romance language departments (Italian and Spanish–Portuguese) that the number of their students who come from their respective ethnic groups was equally high, occasionally even surpassing the estimated 70 per cent participation by Hungarian Canadians in the Hungarian courses. As my experience has proven, this phenomenon: that university education in various languages and cultures predominantly serves the interests of different communities in heritage maintenance, characterizes at least the major central and western provincial universities as well. Only a careful statistical comparison with a representative selection of American universities could determine whether a predominantly heritage-oriented education at the university level, at least in some cultural traditions, is a uniquely Canadian experience. (At some American universities there is also considerable community input — perceivable, for instance, in the teaching of Scandinavian languages and cultures at the universities of Minnesota and Wisconsin, in particular.)

One can surmise that the practice of heritage teaching does little else than re-emphasize pedestrianized values which are often mistakenly regarded as national characteristics. Shadows of conservatism, even chauvinism, are not far removed. As in everything, this kind of education can also be distorted, but it doesn't have to be. Besides, there are not only historical values but also moral, social and aesthetic ones which are more "Hungarian" than others, although perhaps not uniquely so. Some of these may not, as yet, be recognized. Heritage education is thus a continuing process of discovery. Besides, it provides the students with general information that they can utilize in other courses. A survey of European literary and artistic movements, glossaries of basic linguistic, stylistic, or poetic terminology, prove to the students that their Hungarian education is an organic part of their overall university education. In other words, the mutual enhancement of mainstream and heritage education can be practised positively.

The most nagging of our educational problems can be formulated in the following dilemma. On the one hand, we are still uncertain about what aspects of Hungarian heritage should guide curricula at different levels of education. On the other hand, there is a genuine demand for heritage-oriented schooling. After initial satisfaction with acquiring acceptable communication skills, students (aged ten and above) want to learn about their ancestral culture. Increasingly, they insist on moving beyond cliches and discussing controversial issues. Perhaps the easiest stage at which to satisfy their expectation for greater intellectual intake and critical inquiry is the university level. More difficult is the assessing of their expectations at lower levels. Authoritative deductivism can set educational work off balance, and back by years. It hurts as much as incompetence, and their combination is near fatal.

Obviously, the concept of heritage education is much wider and richer, but also more elusive, than its official Canadian definition. Nevertheless, its practice is here to stay. It has been in operation for some time with varying degrees of success. The question is, whether more exchange of ideas about the concept would help to coordinate educational activities and make them more efficient — a daunting task. Whether North American educators of the Hungarian heritage are up to the challenge is something that remains to be seen. For the time being, we lack even a current directory of community schools where Hungarian is presently being taught. For that matter, we have no university directory either. We should not pamper any vain illusion that we really know our Hungarian heritage, that it is fully shared by all of us, or, that we could not be more dynamic in transmitting it to the younger generation, while still being aware of its contradictions.

Notes

1. Cf. throughout *Heritage Languages in Canada: Research Perspectives. Report of the Heritage Language Conference, convened by the Multiculturalism Directorate, Ottawa, May 1984,* ed. Jim Cummins. 2 vols. (Ottawa, Secretary of State Multiculturalism, 1985).
2. Cf. his paper published in this volume.
3. Cf. esp. N. F. Dreisziger, *Struggle and Hope* (Toronto, McLelland and Stewart Ltd., 1982), pp. 94–232.
4. Magyar irodalom: versek és elbeszélések (Toronto, Hungarian Helicon Committee, n. d.)
5. *Tarka lepke: képes magyar nyelvkönyv külföldön élő 6–8 éves gyermekek részére,* 2nd ed. (Budapest, Tankönyvkiadó, 1977).
6. In the archives of the Hungarian Chair of the University of Toronto, file "Education".
7. Tematikai és kulturális szempontok a magyar nyelv és irodalom oktatásában", *A IV. Anyanyelvi Konferencia tanácskozásainak összefoglalása* (Budapest, Anyanyelvi Konferencia, 1981), pp. 305–9.
8. *Hogy mondjuk helyesen?* (Budapest, Tankönyvkiadó, n. d.), pp. 49–50.
9. Selected from the textbook series of the Mother Tongue Conference, *Tarka lepke* (1977), *Magyar szavak világa* (1975), *Beszéljünk magyarul!* (1979).
10. *Szöveggyűjtemény a XX. század magyar irodalmából a középiskolák IV. osztálya számára* (Budapest, Tankönyvkiadó, 1973), 5th ed.
11. Cf. e.g. such conference papers as Marg Csapó, "Issues and Concerns Related to Teaching Hungarian in Canada", American Hungarian Educators' Association 8th annual conference Toronto 1983; Ildikó Kovács, "Olvasói szokások a torontói magyar diákság körében", University of Toronto Triennial Hungarian Studies Conference 1989; Eva Tomory, "Motivations for Taking Hungarian Language at the University Level", Hungarian Studies Association of Canada 6th Annual Conference Victoria 1990.

THE VERHOVAY FRATERNAL ASSOCIATION'S EFFORTS TO PERPETUATE HUNGARIAN CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG ITS NATIVE-BORN MEMBERS (1930s–1950s)

STEVEN BÉLA VÁRDY

Duquesne University

American–Hungarian connections have very old roots. According to some experts, these roots reach back to the time of King St. Stephen (997/1000–1038) when a certain alleged Hungarian by the name of Tyrker accompanied Leif Erikson to the shores of North America. Others regard this claim as untenable and point to the late-16th-century Stephen Parmenius of Buda (ca. 1550–1583) as the first authentic Hungarian on the North American continent.

In the two and a half centuries following Parmenius, very few Hungarians attempted to visit the new continent. Those who did were mostly religious missionaries, romantic dreamers, and soldiers-of-fortune. Whatever their motivation, most of these visitors contributed something to the American dream.

The first relatively large-scale Hungarian emigration took place after the Hungarian Revolution of 1848–1849, when — in conjunction with those who came during the 1850s — perhaps as many as 4 000 political emigrés ended up in the United States. But these political emigrés did not come with the intention of staying — as did most of the other nationalities who preceded them in the previous two centuries. They only came to escape political persecution following Hungary's defeat. They also wished to return to Hungary at the first opportune moment.

Quite different in nature was the mass immigration in the period between 1880 and 1914, which transferred nearly two million Hungarian citizens, among them about 650 000 to 700 000 Magyars, to the United States. The members of this turn-of-the century mass immigration were motivated almost exclusively by economic considerations. But similarly to the Forty-Eighters, initially these economic immigrants also regarded themselves as temporary residents of the New World.

During the first phase of their immigration, this group consisted largely of young males who came with the intention of collecting funds for a better life back in Hungary. They were representatives of the peasant classes (from smallholders to landless peasantry), but their ranks also included a significant number of small-town artisans and semi-skilled workers. The majority of the latter were only slightly removed from the way of life and mentality of the peasants, and for this reason they did fit into this peasant immigration. Whatever their background, however, most of these immigrants ended up as unskilled or semi-skilled workers in Northeastern United States.

These economic immigrants were totally unprepared for conditions that awaited

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

them in the New World. They were certainly unprepared to confront American society as equal partners. In addition to their lack of English and relative low level of literacy, they also represented a social and cultural world that appeared rather primitive to contemporary Americans. For this reason the immigrants were pushed into occupations and working conditions that most native Americans were unwilling to assume. They thus became the exploited helots of turn-of-the-century America. They were used as the necessary cheap labor to fuel the engines of the ever-expanding American industrial establishment.

Their lives in the mines, steel mills, immigrant ghettos, and boarding houses of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio were close to inhuman. Because of the frequency of industrial accidents, their way of existence demanded an almost daily toll in human lives. In some ways their lives may even have been worse than back in Hungary's contemporary class society. They tolerated these conditions simply because they had no other options. They tolerated them because back home opportunities for a better future were even more limited. And they tolerated them because they viewed their living and working conditions in America as temporary, which is to be followed by a much better and brighter future back in Hungary.

In the midst of these inhuman conditions only the nearness of their fellow immigrants, who spoke the same language and subscribed to the same set of values, made their lives tolerable. This nearness and mutual need soon produced a system of self-help institutions. The most significant of these institutions were the religious congregations, the newspapers, and the fraternal societies. Congregations became centers of Hungarian religious and cultural life, newspapers emerged as the voices of survival, and fraternal societies became bastions of security. But these three institutional networks also became the repositories and heralds of Hungarian national consciousness. They fostered the immigrants' desire to survive as a nationality and their faithfulness to the mother country.

Naturally, the expression of this Hungarian national consciousness adjusted itself to the cultural level and needs of the immigrants; and this was true even in the case newspapers and institutions that were edited or lead by highly educated intellectuals. Thus, similarly to the people of rural Hungary, the immigrant masses also drew their inspiration from the Revolution of 1848. Their national consciousness was sustained by an over-simplified version of the Revolution's Kossuthist traditions and by an over-simplified anti-Habsburgism. For this reason, the centerpieces of Hungarian national traditions in America were the celebrations associated with March 15th (start of the revolution) and October 6th (execution of thirteen Hungarian revolutionary generals). These celebrations included dressing up in the national colors, making emotional speeches about "unparalleled Hungarian heroism" and "unmatched Habsburg treachery", and then — while eating, drinking, and living it up — shedding a few tears about the undeserved misfortunes of the nation. But these get-togethers also included repeated calls for the retention of the Hungarian language and identity among the second generation.

The efforts to counteract the de-nationalizing influences of American society occurred in three distinct steps, culminating in the years immediately preceding World

War II. It did have some success, but its efforts to perpetuate the Hungarian language among the native-born generations was doomed to failure. Although the first American-born generation still spoke some Hungarian, this fluency was on such a low level that even if married within the ethnic group, its members were unable to pass on this knowledge to their own children. Consequently, by the 1950s — notwithstanding the unexpected coming of the post-World War II political immigrants [Displaced Persons or DPs] — most of the Hungarian–American institutions, and even some of the newspapers switched over to English, or to a kind of bilingualism in which Hungarian came to occupy a secondary position to English. (Naturally, this was not true for the organizations and newspapers founded by the new political immigrants. But the Old Timers and their descendants had very few contacts with the DPs, their associations and newspapers.)

Although the turn-of-the-century immigrants eventually lost their battle for the perpetuation of the Hungarian language, they did not fail completely in instilling some national consciousness into their offspring. This consciousness, however, was only a pale copy of the original brought along by their elders. Moreover, it came to be expressed increasingly in English, or at best in a simple and broken Hungarian.

To illustrate the course and outcome of this struggle, let me briefly summarize the relevant efforts of the largest Hungarian–American fraternal association, the former Verhovay or the current William Penn Association. I shall do this on the basis of my brief history of that Association, which I prepared at the request of its president on the occasion of its centennial in 1986. I might add though that because of certain internal conflicts within the Association — which during the past ten years resulted the rise and fall of five national presidents — this centennial work is still unpublished today.

The Verhovay Fraternal Association

According to the so-called "Verhovay-Legend" perpetuated in most early publications, the Verhovay Fraternal Association was founded in February 1886 by thirteen Hungarian miners in the Central Pennsylvanian mining town of Hazleton. The Association's founding president was a certain Mihály Pálinkás (d. 1942) who occupies a prominent place in this founding legend and in its early history. Pálinkás had an impressive presence, and he appears to have embodied the best and the worst features of the turn-of-the-century economic immigrants. He represented the immigrants' determination to survive as Hungarians in the inhospitable world of late-19th-century industrial America. At the same time, he also projected a kind of ostentatious peasant nationalism and provocative personal presence that often lead to unwanted confrontations both within and without the Hungarian–American community.

For about three decades after its foundation, the Verhovay was only one of a multitude of similar fraternal associations established during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The goal of these associations was to satisfy the most elemental needs of the immigrants. They were designed to assume the traditional welfare and self-help

role of the Hungarian village, missing in the United States even for most native-born. In that age American society lacked even the most elemental features of welfare legislation, and the scorned immigrants could die and not even receive a decent burial. Nor would they receive any help in case of sickness or physical mutilation.

For the sake of interest, and because this also reflects upon the mentality of the immigrants, it should also be mentioned here that the Verhovay Association, this most successful of the Hungarian fraternal associations in America, was named after Gyula Verhovay (1849–1906), a well-known political demagogue, and one of the founders of anti-Semitic movement in late-19th-century Hungary. But this fact reflects more upon the naiveté of the immigrants' nationalism, than upon their alleged or real anti-Semitism. As a matter of fact, their being captivated by Verhovay was due less to their appreciation of his ideas, than to their above-mentioned anti-Habsburgism and their powerful dread of the urban classes. At one point, their dislike of the educated classes reached a level where they even incorporated this into their by-laws by specifically stating that no "learned gentleman" could ever be an elected leader of their association.

The Verhovay Fraternal Association's centennial history can be divided into three main epochs: (1) the four decades between 1886 and 1926, which saw the rise of the association into the ranks of a few competing national fraternals; (2) the three decades between 1926 and 1955, which witnessed an intensive rivalry among the top four Hungarian fraternals, ending with the ultimate triumph of the Verhovay; and finally (3) the three decades between 1955 and 1986, which saw the Association's near-complete Americanization. Although the last few decades also saw an occasional outburst of renewed Hungarian consciousness, none of them called for the restitution of the Hungarian language, nor for the re-establishment of a meaningful Hungarian consciousness. Given the limited linguistic competence of the Association's membership, however, both of these goals would have been totally unrealistic.

In light of the above, the struggle for the Hungarian language and national consciousness was of necessity limited to the second epoch of Verhovay's history.

In order to follow the story of this struggle, we have to re-emphasize once more that up to the end of World War I the majority of the Hungarian immigrants regarded themselves as temporary "guest workers" *[Gastarbeiter]* in America. Their original goal was to return to Hungary and to use their American savings to lift themselves out of a life of poverty and humiliation.

Most of the immigrants were never able to fulfill this goal. Partially because after having lived for several years in a less-structured society, it became almost impossible for them to readjust to the requirements of Hungary's extremely polarized class society; partially because after having established roots and families in the United States, their American-born children kept them here; and partially because by the time some of them have reached the desired level of material well-being, they were prevented from repatriating by the fact that their homelands were no longer part of Hungary. This fact, by the way, also explains the reason why the Trianon question became such an important issue among the immigrants.

Austria–Hungary's dismemberment, Hungary's truncation, and small rump Hun-

gary's economic plight following World War I ended all thoughts of repatriation. Hungarian–Americans were now free to turn their attention the making their stay permanent and of making sure that their American-born children would retain the language and culture of their forefathers. Naturally, the immigrants were fully aware that they themselves could never become true Americans. Not so their native-born children, who started out as Hungarians, grew up in a bilingual and bi-cultural world, and then ended up as hyphenated Americans. Although primarily English-speaking, their status in America's WASP society was still very tenuous. They were never accepted as full-fledged Americans, and were forced to live the life of a so-called "marginal man". The Anglo-Saxon Americans' off-handed attitude toward the immigrants' language, culture, society, and way of life lay heavily on their native-born children, and this rejection pushed them even more rapidly toward Americanization.

During the first five to six years of their lives, when they were still confined to their families and their ethnic ghettos, the immigrants' native-born offspring spoke and acted like their parents. After reaching school age and confronting American society, however, they suddenly began to be ashamed of their roots. They detested their parents' lowly social status and inability to speak an acceptable English. For this reason, after enrolling in American schools, these children often refused to identify themselves as Hungarians, and also increasingly declined to speak Hungarian with their parents. They were ashamed of their parents' simple peasant ways, which did not seem to fit into urbanized American society. Thus, by the time they reached teenage, they consciously shed their Hungarian image and language. At times they even tried to distance themselves from Hungarian organizations.

By the 1930s this phenomenon had reached a point where the aging members of the immigrant generation were beginning to be worried about their own future well-being. They were afraid for their institutions (churches and associations); they were pained by the progressive alienation of their children; and they were afraid that if this process of denationalization would continue, the whole infrastructure of Hungarian–American life would collapse. They would remain there in their old age without the support of Hungarian–American churches, fraternal associations, and other cultural organizations.

These were the conditions that compelled the spokesmen of Hungarian–American communities to redouble their efforts to retain their children for themselves and for the Hungarian–American community. The solutions proposed and accepted by these leaders consisted of the following: On the one hand, they grudgingly accepted that their native-born children were already more American than Hungarian who functioned primarily in English, and that Hungarian–American organizations would also have to adjusted themselves to the needs of this English-speaking generation. On the other hand, they initiated a comprehensive information campaign to instruct their children in the history, achievements, and merits of the Hungarian nation. They wanted to eradicate from their children's mind all inferiority complexes. They wanted to make the second generation proud of their Hungarian heritage, so that they would want to be part of that heritage.

This movement to save the young generation also became part of the goals and activities of the Verhovay Association. Initiated during the late 1920s, this undertaking reached its climax ten years later at the time of the outbreak of World War II. The leaders of the Verhovay first began by establishing of a series of English-speaking branches, which were placed under the direction of an elected English-speaking branch president. In 1934 they founded the *Verhovay Journal,* which was the English version of the much older *Verhovayak Lapja.* And by 1939 the English-speaking branches were given an official representation in the national leadership via a new associate president. In 1947 a new regulation obliged the English-speaking branches to represent themselves at national congresses by native-born delegates. And in 1948 the national congress officially introduced bilingualism. Following this decision, the use of Hungarian progressively declined both in national congresses as well as in the central office. By the mid-1950s official bilingualism turned into *de facto* English monolingualism.

The final step in this Americanization process came in 1955, when the Verhovay absorbed the Rákóczi Association, and then re-emerged under the name of William Penn Fraternal Association. Exchanging its original Hungarian name for that of a prominent American was the last straw in the Verhovay's rapid progress toward Americanization.

The gradual and apparently unavoidable triumph of the English language was paralleled in the history of the Verhovay Association by increased efforts to strengthen the young generation's Hungarian consciousness. The goal was to eradicate all feelings of inferiority so that they would want to remain Hungarian. To achieve this goal, the Verhovay's leaders created many opportunities to permit their children and grandchildren to learn about their heritage. They urged their chapters to establish scout troops and sports teams, to sponsor Hungarian language courses and summer camps, and to support weekend schools and radio programs.

The Verhovay's national leadership went even further. They also undertook to support college programs in Hungarian studies, and to subsidize some of their members' efforts to send their children to Hungarian secondary schools and colleges. At the same time they also subsidized the publication of Hungarian handbooks and grammar books geared to the American-born generation, and during World War II they commissioned the writing of so-called "letter writing books". These were essential because very few of the American-born enlisted men were able to write in Hungarian, at the same time when few of their parents were literate in English. Thus, the only way they could communicate with each other was in a simple Hungarian, aided by these "letter writing books". These handbooks contained several dozen short letters which could be used by the soldiers as models to convey simple messages to their parents and older relatives.

During the 1930s, the Verhovay Association also initiated public discussion on the questions of bilingualism, dual loyalty, and the desirability to retain one's Hungarian heritage. These questions were debated on the pages of the Hungarian–American press, including the two dailies, the Cleveland-based *Szabadság* [Liberty] and the New York-based *Amerikai Magyar Népszava* [American Hungarian People's Voice]. But the re-

flections of these debates can also be found in various Verhovay publications, including the *Golden Jubilee Book* of 1936, where a number of prominent spokesmen of the Hungarian community expressed their views on this issue. They included Joseph Daragó, the Association's president, as well as prominent literary critic Professor Joseph Reményi. But the resonance of this important issue also reached the 1938 Second Hungarian World Congress in Budapest, where Hungarian–American delegates openly discussed the problems they faced in their efforts to retain the second generation.

President Joseph Daragó played an especially significant role in this effort within the Verhovay Association. The gifted, energetic, but mostly self-educated Daragó was realistic enough to conclude that there is really very little hope for the retention of the native-born generations for the Hungarian cause without permitting the English language to take precedence over Hungarian. This was also one of his compelling reasons for resigning from the presidency in 1943. He wished to pass on the leadership of the Association in an orderly fashion into the hands of the second generation.

Parallel with these efforts to preserve at least the Hungarian consciousness, if not the Hungarian language, of the native-born generation, the Verhovay Association and its numerous local branches also undertook the establishment of various sport teams, including baseball, golf, and bowling teams. The purpose of these teams was to enhance the feeling of belonging among the members of the Association. Most of them functioned in connection with the so-called "Verhovay Homes" or "Hungarian Houses" that were being established during those years. By the 1940s, the Verhovay Association also organized regional and national competitions among these teams, which meets served as forums for promoting the idea of Hungarian ethnicity and Hungarian national consciousness among the native-born. As a result of these multifaceted activities, between the late 1920s and the mid-1950s, these Verhovay Homes or Hungarian Houses became the most important centers of Hungarian–American cultural and political life in America — especially as these activities related to the Old Timers and their descendants.

In general this does not hold true for the post-World War II political emigrés, who arrived during the early 1950s and who immediately established their own institutional infrastructure completely separate from that of the Old Timers.

The Verhovay Association's struggle for the retention and perpetuation of Hungarian consciousness in the United States is intimately linked with the Hungarian–Americans' fight against the unjust terms of the Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920). But this struggle, which was waged with varying intensity through the 1920s and 1930s, placed the Hungarian–Americans into a very uncomfortable position immediately upon the outbreak of World War II. As Hungarians they were naturally supportive of and overjoyed by the partial revision of the Hungarian frontiers in the course of 1938 to 1941 — even though these just revisions were achieved with the help of Italy and Germany. But as Americans they had to reject Nazism, as well as Hungary's formal if uncomfortable alliance with Hitler's Germany. This issue became especially critical after Pearl Harbor, when Germany and the United States became formal adversaries at the time when Hungary was fighting on Germany's side. As Americans they were now ob-

liged to support American and Allied war efforts, but as Hungarians they had to speak up for Hungary. At the same time, they still had to continue nurturing the Hungarian consciousness in their children and grandchildren.

In this difficult situation the Verhovay Association had no other alternative except to follow the basic policy of the American Hungarian Federation, which was to try to make a distinction between the Hungarian nation, on the one hand, and the Hungarian Government and its policies, on the other. Thus, while the Verhovay-leadership emphasized the Association's faithfulness to the United States and its support of America's war efforts, it also repeatedly pointed out that Hungary's alliance with Nazi Germany was simply the result of its government's fateful decision, made under the duress and under the impact of an unjust treaty which resulted in Historic Hungary's dismemberment.

At this stage in our discussion it is perhaps useful to point out that the policy followed by the Verhovay was basically identical with the policy of most of the major Hungarian–American organizations. These included the American Hungarian Federation [AHF], which was the oldest Hungarian umbrella organization founded in 1906, as well as the Free Hungarian Committee, that was founded by the exile politician Tibor Eckhart in 1941. It was actually the AHF that was responsible for working out this policy in 1939 when the United States was not yet involved in the war. But the leaders of the Verhovay also had a significant role in the AHF's leadership.

This policy of distinguishing between the Hungarian nation and its government had very little impact upon official American attitude toward Hungary either during or after the war. At the same time it did make the Association's relationship to its younger members more manageable. Moreover, it also permitted the Verhovay to continue its efforts to perpetuate Hungarian national consciousness among its younger members even while the United States was still officially at war with their mother country.

The decade of the 1950s created a totally new situation both for the Verhovay and for Hungarian–Americans in general. On the one hand, the influx of the new political immigrants — including the DPs and the Fifty-Sixers — transformed Hungarian–America into a much more complex, varied, and politically more sophisticated community; on the other hand, with the aging and dying out of the old immigrant generation, the leadership of the traditional organizations rapidly fell under the control of the native-born. Shorn of the presence of their Hungarian-born elders — while retaining some elements of simplified Hungarian consciousness — the native-born rapidly transformed their associations into English-speaking American organizations.

This is what happened also to the Verhovay Association. In 1955 Verhovay Association absorbed its main rival, the Rákóczi Aid Association. Then, in line with the Americanization trend of those years, it renamed itself the William Penn Fraternal Association. But by discarding two well-known Hungarian names, the restructured organization also altered its self- and public image. Its new leaders appeared to have little desire to continue the struggle for the perpetuation of Hungarian consciousness in the traditional form. Moreover, even if they had this desire, their own limited knowledge prevented them from doing so. Consequently, the task of perpetuating Hungarian lan-

over to the DPs — and to a lesser degree the Fifty-Sixers — who naturally cultivated these traditions on a different level than did the Old Timers and their late descendants.

Following the "great merger", the leaders of the Verhovay–William Penn continued to pay lip service to the need for Hungarian consciousness, but it is indicative of the great changes that even this lip-service was now done mostly in English. The major issues that used to motivate their elders (Hungarian language, Trianon, Hungary's position in the World, etc.) were simply too remote from them to interest them. They neither understood, nor cared for such esoteric problems. Thus, their manifestation of Hungarian consciousness came to be limited to the cultivation of a few village traditions, altered by American influences. They practiced and practice these at their social gatherings, but they are too American now to appreciate the problems of Hungary, or to know the meaning of true Hungarian consciousness.

It is an irony of history, that the same period which saws the decline of Hungarian consciousness in America, also witnessed the destruction of true Hungarian consciousness at home; much of it having been destroyed by the failed socialist-communist experimentations of the past four decades.

Main Sources

Puskás, Julianna, "A Willam Penn száz éve" [One Hundred Years of the William Penn Association], parts 1–4, in *Magyar Hírek* [Hungarian News], Budapest, vol. 39 (March 15, 28, April 10, 25, 1986). The historian Julianna Puskás was interviewed by János Bodnár.

Stelkovics, Albert J., *William Penn Association, 1886–1986. 100th Anniversary* (Delcroy Beach, Fl., 1986), 366 pp. An unpublished chronology based largely on the minutes of the Verhovay and William Penn Board of Directors' Meetings, and prepared for the Verhovay/William Penn centennial.

Várdy, Steven Béla, *The Centennial History of the William Penn Association: Hundred Years of a Hungarian Fraternal Association in America, 1886–1986* (Pittsburgh: William Penn Association, 1986) 92 pp. This is an unpublished typescript, commissioned by the Association's then president, Gay Banes. It is based partially on the Verhovay/William Penn Archives and the Archives of the Hungarian Reformed Federation, and partially on various secondary sources, including earlier anniversary publications and writings about the Association.

Vassady, Béla, Jr., "The Early Decades of the Hazleton-Based Hungarian Verhovay Sick Benefit Association", in *Hard Coal, Hard Times: Ethnicity and Labor in the Anthracite Region* (Scranton, PA: The Anthracite Museum Press, 1984), pp. 17–34.

Verhovayak Lapja. Verhovay Fraternal Insurance Association. Golden Jubilee, 1868–1938, ed. József Daragó (Pittsburgh, 1936).

Selected Bibliography

Balogh, J. E., *An Analysis of Cultural Organizations of Hungarian Americans in Pittsburgh and Allegheny County* (Pittsburgh: Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1945).

Amerikai betegsegélyező és életbiztosító szövetség ötven éves története, ed. János Walkó (Pittsburgh: Expert Printing Company, 1942).

Amerikai Magyar Népszava aranyjubileumi albuma [Golden Jubilee Album of the American Hungarian People's Voice] (New York: Amerikai Magyar Népszava, 1951).

Emlékkönyv a bridgeporti (Connecticut) Rákóczi Magyar Betegsegélyező Egylet 25. éves jubileumára, 1888–1913, ed. Vince Troll (New York: Amerikai Magyar Népszava Könyvnyomdája, 1913).

Hungarian Ethnic Heritage Study of Pittsburgh. Education Curriculum Kit Nos1–10. Director Paul Bődy (Pittsburgh: Hungarian Ethnic Heritage Studies Group, 1981). This work consists of ten pamphlets on various aspects of Hungarian life in Hungary and in the Pittsburgh area. The most important pamphlets for the purposes of this essay are: *Hungarian Immigrants in Greater Pittsburgh, 1880–1980,* and *Hungarian Community Life in Greater Pittsburgh,* both of them by Paul Bődy and Mary Boros-Kazai.

Hungarians in America. Az amerikai magyarság aranykönyve [The Golden Book of Hungarian Americans] (Cleveland: Szabadság Könyvnyomdája, 1941).

Kende Géza, Magyarok Amerikában. Az amerikai magyarság története, 1583–1926 [Hungarians in America. The History of Hungarian Americans, 1583–1926], *2 vols* (Cleveland: Szabadság, 1927). This anecdotal history by editor-publisher of the Cleveland-based Szabadság] is a mine of information about pre-World War I Hungarian–American life.

Magyarok Világkongresszusának tárgyalásai. Budapest, 1929. augusztus 22–24 [Deliberations of the Hungarian World Congress. Budapest, August 22–24, 1929], ed. Sándor Krisztics (Budapest, 1929).

Magyarok Világkongresszusának tárgyalásai. Budapest, 1938. augusztus 16–19 [Deliberations of the Hungarian World Congress. Budapest August 16–19, 1938] (Budapest, 1938).

Puskás, Julianna, *From Hungary to the United States 1880–1914* (Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1982).

Puskás Julianna, *Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Államokban, 1880–1940* [Immigrant Hungarians in the United States, 1880–1940] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1982).

Puskás, Julianna, "Magyar szervezetek Amerikában az 1880-as évektől az 1960-as évekig" [Hungarian Associations in America from the 1880s to the 1960s], in *Történelmi Szemle* [Historical Review], vol. 13 (1970), pp. 528–568.

Rákóczi Aid Association Golden Jubilee Book — Rákóczi Segélyező Egyesület Arany Jubileumi Könyve. 1888–1938, ed. László Lakatos (Bridgeport, CT: Rákóczi Aid Association, 1938).

Széplaki, Joseph, The Hungarians in America, 1583–1974: A Chronology and fact Book (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1975).

Várdy, Steven Béla, *Clio's Art in Hungary and in Hungarian–America* (New York: East European Monographs, Columbia University Press, 1985), 327 pp. This work contains an important chapter on research in Hungarian–American studies. It also contains a list of many relevant publications.

Várdy, Steven Béla, *The Hungarian–Americans* [The Immigrant Heritage of America Series] (Boston: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1985), 215 pp. The first book in English that summarized the history of post-World War II Hungarian immigration to the United States.

Várdy, Steven Béla, *The Hungarian Americans: The Hungarian Experience in North America* [The Peoples of North America Series] (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1989), 112 pp.

Várdy, Steven Béla & Ágnes Huszár Várdy, *The Austro–Hungarian Mind: At Home and Abroad* (New York: East European Monographs, Columbia University Press, 1989), 374 pp. Seven chapters of this work deal with various aspects of American–Hungarian life.

Weinstock, Alexander S., *Acculturation and Occupation: A Study of the 1956 Hungarian Refugees in the United States* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).

THIRTY YEARS IN VOLUNTARY MISSION: THE HUNGARIAN ALUMNI ASSOCIATION, "MAGYAR ÖREGDIÁK SZÖVETSÉG – BESSENYEI GYÖRGY KÖR" (1960–1990)

KÁROLY NAGY

Middlesex County College and Rutgers University, New Jersey

Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, was founded in 1766. It had 15 308 students in 1958 when a few dozen Hungarian students started and registered their organization under the name of "Hungarian Students at Rutgers University". Almost all of the founding members had left their country after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in which many of them participated and which was crushed by Soviet military intervention. They were continuing or beginning their studies at Rutgers with the help of scholarships, loans, and part-time jobs. Their organization's goal was to acquaint their university community with Hungary's culture and history and, especially, with the background, the events, and the meaning of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Their objectives had two sources. Their new experiences indicated to them that the American public, and even some intellectuals and most of their fellow students, were inadequately acquainted with Hungary. The Hungarian students concluded that such lack of familiarity could be the source — in the future, as it was in 1956 — of mistaken policy decisions at times when the United States could influence favorably the fate of Hungary. These Hungarian students also viewed their emigrants' role as a mission. They wanted to be unofficial ambassadors instead of nostalgia-ridden refugees. They strove to serve their former country's as well as their new country's people by helping to build bridges of better understanding between them.

They organized art exhibitions, concerts, poetry readings, history lectures, film reviews, panel discussions, and news conferences. They published and distributed translations of Hungarian literary, scientific, and documentary collections. They collected thousands of signatures demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops and free elections in Hungary and sent the petitions to the United Nations. In 1960, they also founded an organization which was to continue their work after they were graduated: the Hungarian Alumni Association.

Lecture Series

The Hungarian Alumni Association (which added the designation "György Bessenyei Circle" to its name in 1977) initiated a lecture, conference, and exhibition series. To this day some six-to-eight writers, scientists, and artists meet their audiences each

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

year, usually in the lecture halls of Rutgers University. In the past thirty years, 170 people were invited by the Association: 101 from Hungary, 34 from the United States, 14 from Rumania, 5 from West Germany, 3 each from Austria and England, 2 each from Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, and Switzerland, and 1 each from Australia and Yugoslavia. These intellectuals of the Hungarian mainland, the Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian Basin, and the Western Hungarian diaspora included some of the most outstanding representatives of Hungarian arts and sciences: poets like Sándor Csoóri, György Faludy, Árpád Farkas, György Gömöri, Győző Határ, Elemér Horváth, Gyula Illyés, Sándor Kányádi, Gyula Kodolányi, Gáspár Nagy, György Petri, György Somlyó, Géza Szőcs, József Tornai, and Sándor Weöres; prose writers like György Berkovits, Zsolt Csalog, István Csurka, András Domahidy, Gyula Fekete, György Ferdinandy, Erzsébet Galgóczi, Rózsa Ignácz, György Konrád, Miklós Mészöly, Dezső Monoszlóy, András Sütő, and Dániel Veress; literary historians and philosophers like Gyula Borbándi, Mihály Czine, Gyula Gombos, András Görömbei, István Király, János Kis, Csaba Könczöl, János Nagy, Béla Pomogáts, and Sándor Radnóti; historians and economists like József Antall, Kálmán Benda, Béla Borsi-Kálmán, Lajos Für, Péter Hanák, József Held, Géza Jeszenszky, Gyula Juhász, Gyula László, Tibor Liska, Sándor M. Kiss, Júlianna Puskás, Péter Püspöki Nagy, György Ránki, Konrád Salamon, and Ferenc Szakály; theater and film directors and representatives of the fine arts and the performing arts like Ferenc Béres, Tibor Csernus, József Domján, Katalin Gombos, György Harag, Adrienne Jancsó, Péter Korniss, Ferenc Kósa, Sándor Plugor, Zoltán Sellei, Pál Schiffer, Imre Sinkovits, Lajos Szalay, and Zsuzsa Szász; sociologists and linguists like Bálint Balla, György Csepeli, Tiborc Fazekas, Károly Ginter, Elemér Hankiss, István Kemény, Kálmán Kulcsár, Lajos Lőrincze, István Szathmári and Aladár Szende; and critics, journalists and organization leaders like Gábor Demszky, Miklós Haraszti, László Hámos, János Kenedi, Imre Mécs, and Sándor Szilágyi.

In addition to their lectures, exhibits, and performances for Hungarian–American audiences, the Association organized opportunities for many of these personalities to meet with American academic and cultural groups and mass media forums, enabling them to expose the realities and problems of the world's sixteen million Hungarians to the American public.

Hungarian School

Responding to a widely-expressed need by the area's Hungarian Americans the Association initiated the Hungarian Saturday Classes (Hétvégi Magyar Iskola) for children and adults in 1960. The school functioned for 26 years. (The 1980 US Census counted 1 776 902 Hungarian Americans, 168 500 of them in New Jersey. The Hungarian Alumni Association's center is New Brunswick, N. J., the "Hub City" of a tri-county area including Middlesex, Somerset, and Union counties, with 28 116 Americans of Hungarian origin living there.) Every Saturday from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. some 30 to 50 students attended beginner, intermediate, and advanced classes. The class-

rooms were provided by Rutgers University and, in the 1980's, by the New Brunswick Hungarian Reformed Church. Students learned the basics of Hungarian reading, writing, speaking, composition, history, literature, folk songs, and folk art. Most of the teachers had diplomas in education.

The curricula, the textbooks, and other instructional and audio-visual materials were experimental and innovative. There was no available professional material for once-a-week, thirty-hours-per-year Hungarian language and culture instruction for different age and language ability groups. (The available instructional material was structured for everyday education and contained much blatant political propoganda and falsified history.) Therefore, as one of the teachers, I started correspondence with other similar part time, week-end, and summer school teachers and conducted a survey of their functions. I published the results of the survey of Hungarian education in the United States ("Magyar iskolák az Egyesült Államokban", *Új Látóhatár,* München, March–April, 1965; "Hungarian Schools in the U. S.", *The Slavic and East European Journal,* Winter, 1965) and sent the results to some leading writers and pedagogues in Hungary: Gyula Illyés, Zoltán Kodály and Mihály Váci. I requested them to initiate a process by which experts in Hungary would help the educators beyond their country's borders so that they could teach Hungarian language and culture with better methods and material. Their responses resulted in an international meeting in 1970 in Debrecen. This assembly established the Native Language Conference (Anyanyelvi Konferencia) an international professional movement functioning to this day, assisting Hungarian language and culture maintenance and instruction beyond Hungary's borders with specialized books and workbooks, audio-visual aids, teachers' seminars, summer courses for children, a professional periodical: *Nyelvünk és Kultúránk* (Our Language and Culture), and quadrennial conferences.

The Hungarian Native Language Conference movement has, in 20 years, significantly increased the motivation for and the level of Hungarian language and culture instruction and maintenance in many countries, utilizing many of the educational experiences of the Hungarian Alumni Association's Hungarian Saturday Classes.

History Makers Testify

In 1977 the Association launched an oral history project. The objectives of the "History Makers Testify" (Tanúk–korukról) program are to enable some of those who actively participated or played leading roles in changing or influencing Hungarian (and in some cases the world's) history to talk about their actions in an open forum — almost like testifying in a court — and, thereby, to preserve their experiences for posterity. In the past 13 years 22 such key witnesses have "testified" by Hungarian Alumni Association invitation: Lajos Boros, Miklós Duray, Péter Gosztonyi, János Horváth, Mihály Hőgye, Pál Jónás, Béla Király, Sándor Kiss, Sándor Kopácsi, Andor Kovács, Imre Kovács, Elek Nagy, Zoltán Nyeste, László Papp, Gergely Pongrátz, Sándor Püski, Sándor Rácz, Pál Somody, István Szent-Miklósy, Miklós Vásárhelyi, Gyula Várallyay, and Eugene Wigner.

Eight of these lectures were published by the Association in book form as well. Three of these books were republished in facsimile editions by clandestine, "samizdat" publishers in Hungary. These eight books are now frequently cited and used as source material by historians in and beyond Hungary. The "Tanúk–korukról" books of the Association are the following: Király, Béla: *Az első háború szocialista országok között: személyes visszaemlékezések az 1956-os magyar forradalomra* (The First War Between Socialist Countries: Personal Reflexions on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution) (1981) and *Honvédségből Néphadsereg* (The Sovietization of the Hungarian Army) (1986); Kiss, Sándor: *A magyar demokráciáért. Ifjúsági mozgalmak, Magyar Parasztszövetség 1932–1947* (For Hungarian Democracy. Youth Movements, the Hungarian Peasant Alliance, 1932–1947) (1983); Kopácsi, Sándor: *Az 1956-os forradalom és a Nagy Imre per* (The 1956 Revolution and the Imre Nagy Trial) (1979, 1980); Kovács, Andor: *Forradalom Somogyban: az 1956-os forradalom és előzményei a csurgói járásban* (Revolution in Somogy County; the 1956 Revolution and its Background in the Csurgó District) (1988); Kovács, Imre: *A Márciusi Front* (The March Front) (1980); Nyeste, Zoltán: *Recsk, emberek az embertelenségben* (Recsk, Man in the Midst of Inhumanity) (1982) and Papp, László: *ÉMEFESZ, az amerikai magyar egyetemisták mozgalma az 1956-os forradalom után* (ÉMEFESZ, the Movement of American Hungarian College Students After the 1956 Revolution) (1988).

Membership, Political Activities

In 1990 the Hungarian Alumni Association had 73 members. Six of them are engineers, seven are historians and literary historians, five are chemists, two are publishers, and one each is an anthropologist, architect, artist, clergyman, economist, musicologists, poet, printer, and sociologist. Nine teach in colleges and universities, five in high schools, others work in college and corporation offices, libraries or laboratories. Four are college students.

The Association works in close cooperation with many other organizations which serve similar functions such as the American Association for the Study of Hungarian History, the American Hungarian Foundation, American Hungarian Educators' Association, Anyanyelvi Konferencia (Native Language Conference), Atlantic Research and Publications, Hungarian Chair–Indiana University, Hungarian Chair–University of Toronto, Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, Hungarian Protestant Academy in Europe, Institute on East Central Europe at Columbia University, International Association of Hungarian Studies, Irodalmi Újság (Literary Gazette), Magyar Baráti Közösség, Itt-ott (Hungarian Community of Friends), Magyar Műhely (Hungarian Workshop), Nyugati Magyarság (Hungarians of the West), Püski–Corvin, Recsk Association, Szepsi Csombor Circle, Szivárvány (Rainbow), The International P. E. N., Új Látóhatár (New Horizon), and Young Hungarians' Political Action Committee, among others.

The Association also conducts political activities including information distribution, publicity, lectures, publications, lobbying and fund raising. Some of these actions are

aimed at the protection of the nearly four million Hungarians who live as minorities in the countries surrounding Hungary. Others foster truth, freedom, self-determination, and democracy in Hungary and the spiritual, cultural integration of the world's sixteen million Hungarians.

ETHNIC COMMUNITIES AND THE RETENTION OF CULTURAL TRADITIONS IN THE 1990s

PAUL BŐDY

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

The purpose of my paper is to make a specific proposal on a very significant American–Hungarian need: the retention of cultural traditions in Hungarian ethnic communities. Since my purpose is not a detailed scholarly discussion, but the presentation of a public issue and proposals for addressing it, my approach will be necessarily one based on an analysis of current problems and their public significance in the 1990's.

I will begin by proposing two key definitions. By ethnic communities I mean immigrant settlements that were established since the 1880's in US urban centers and have preserved identities related to Hungarian immigrants and their descendants. These communities have preserved certain cultural traditions brought to America by Hungarian immigrants. These cultural traditions can be defined as customs, values, loyalties and ideals derived from Hungarian village society of the late nineteenth century. Special emphasis was placed on attachments to the family, the extended kinship system, the village as the larger community, religious values and customs, and the particular region of origin in Hungary. These attachments were retained, but in the course of the American experience were transferred to immigrant settlements, institutions and customs.

At the beginning of the 1990's Hungarian ethnic communities in the United States are experiencing complex changes that may lead to their dissolution as distinct communities. These changes have already transformed Hungarian communities in the past fifty years. The forces of change include economic, social, occupational, educational and demographic transformations with significant impacts on American society as well as ethnic communities. Therefore it is highly important, first, to understand how ethnic communities have been transformed by these forces of change, and secondly, to consider possible courses of action designed to retain, strengthen and revitalize Hungarian ethnic communities. This paper contributes to both these concerns by outlining the institutional evolution of Hungarian ethnic communities and recommending specific courses of action to strengthen their institutional and cultural capacities.

An understanding of the current condition of Hungarian ethnic communities requires consideration of four basic issues that have contributed to their past development. These are: (1) the Hungarian heritage of immigrants or the emigrant background, (2) the formation of immigrant settlements in the American historical, social and geographical environment, (3) the development and role of Hungarian organizations, and

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

(4) the social, economic and cultural transformations of Hungarian communities since their establishment and the impacts of those transformations on Hungarian community life.

The ethnic heritage or emigrant background of immigrants is unquestionably one of the most important and enduring characteristics of immigrant communities. The emigrant background refers to the specific social, cultural, economic and regional characteristics of emigrants at the time they enter the new society and those patterns of thought and activity that are formed by those characteristics. Studies of the immigrant experience or any aspect of that experience should give prominent attention to the key role of the emigrant background. The excellent analysis of Julianna Puskás provides us with a comprehensive study of the Hungarian emigrant background.[1] The key elements of the characteristics of Hungarian immigrants can be stated as follows. The great majority of Hungarian immigrants who established communities in the US prior to World War I were predominantly small landholders or agricultural wage earners. They originated from the peasant society of the late nineteenth century: the Hungarian village. Within that society, the family, kinship, the village community, customs and traditions emphasizing the primacy of the community were predominant. One of the important elements of the emigrant background was the motive to emigrate from Hungary and to select the United States as the country of destination. There existed substantial reasons for emigration in the late nineteenth century that are applicable to Hungary as a whole, but particularly to certain regions of the country that experienced severe social and economic dislocation. These regional differentiations explain to a great extent the patterns of emigration from northeastern Hungary and several other regions of heavy emigration. Beyond these national and regional patterns, we can note how the contemporary Hungarian emigrant justified emigration and still maintained close ties with the family and village community. The primary personal motivation to emigrate was the saving of financial resources in America to pay for land, a home and other investments in the native village. Emigration was a means by which a family sought to strengthen its economic position in the Hungarian village community. The process of emigration worked in such a way that community ties remained intact. Those who emigrated usually traveled in groups from the same village or region. They had a specific destination in America: New Brunswick, Pittsburgh, Cleveland. There a relative or family friend expected them and provided lodging, livelihood and employment. New immigrants joined an already existing Hungarian neighborhood, congregation or fraternal society. Thus, fellow Hungarians familiar with American conditions provided needed advice, assistance and fellowship. In this manner, first generation immigrants came to America with very strong attachments to their families, traditions, village and religious life. In America they continued to remain attached to their traditions, while seeking to adjust them to the urban new world environment. We can conclude therefore that loyalty to their traditional way of life, attachment to their community and the desire for social, economic and personal advancement were the principal values that Hungarians of the first generation brought with them and attempted to apply in America.

The second important element of immigrant institutional life was the immigrant settlement.[2] Immigrant community life developed in these communities. These settlements were generally established near major urban and industrial centers. They were residential clusters based on ethnic, religious and regional loyalties. While there certainly occurred residential intermingling of different ethnic groups, each of them maintained its group identity. This was accomplished primarily by the formation of religious (ethnic) congregations, fraternal societies, specialized organizations, and regularly scheduled cultural, educational and religious events.

We can observe this pattern of development in major metropolitan regions of the United States: Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Toledo, New York, Detroit, Buffalo, Chicago, Gary. As Table 1 indicates the favored locations of settlement for Hungarian immigrants were the urban areas of Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey. Although the Hungarian population shifted from these states to others throughout the United States by 1980, these four states still are the main population centers for Hungarians.

We can trace a fairly typical pattern of development in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. The two main centers of Hungarian settlement were Hazelwood (an industrial neighborhood within the city) and McKeesport, a municipality which was an old center of heavy manufacturing. There developed several other, smaller industrial centers near Pittsburgh that became the location of Hungarian settlements. These included Homestead, Duquesne, Leechburg, Johnstown and much smaller mining communities.

One important historical and contemporary consequence of this pattern of settlement was that immigrant community life occurred within a particular regional-urban area (Pittsburgh) and more specifically within small industrial settlements in that larger region (McKeesport, Hazelwood). Within these very specific geographical settlements, Hungarian immigrants lived, worked, developed and interacted with American society. This means also that the Hungarian community is very strongly identified with these small urban industrial settlements, which over time have experienced significant population decline, industrial redevelopment and major social transformations. Nevertheless, the Hungarian immigrant community is still very much attached to them as the location of their historical experience in America.

The Hungarian immigrant settlement can be characterized therefore by the following principal elements. It is an urban settlement, originally formed in the early twentieth century, in the prominent urban centers of the United States. Immigrant settlements evolved within these urban centers and were exposed to the many transformations of urban society as these restructured American social and economic life. Hungarian immigrant settlements are predominantly industrial settlements, located in proximity to major centers of industrial employment. They were shaped and influenced by the complex problems of industrial society, including unemployment, industrial accidents, economic exploitation, social, family and educational issues. The majority of Hungarian immigrants lived and worked as industrial workers, seeking economic advancement, educational qualifications and a better life in an industrial setting. The third principal characteristic of Hungarian immigrant settlement can be described as its bi-

polar commitment to traditional values and to adjustment to an industrial society. Its traditional values are clearly evident in the attachment to family, kinship and village traditions and the attempt to retain those traditions in the American environment. Adjustment to American industrial society can be observed in two principal historical patterns: the formation of organizations seeking to secure the individual and community well-being of immigrants in industrial society, such as fraternal insurance societies and community organizations, and the evolution of economic and social patterns seeking to attain acceptance and approval in American society.

The third important element of immigrant life was the formation of several types of organizations in immigrant communities.[3] These organizations responded to the needs of the immigrants in American industrial society and therefore a great number and type of such organizations were established. At the risk of simplification we can distinguish two types of organizations from the point of view of their role in the immigrant community: those that sought to preserve traditional values and institutions and those that attempted to make an adjustment to the problems and situations encountered in the new society. Examples of these two types of organizations are church congregations and organizations sponsored by them which were established to preserve religious, community and ethnic traditions in the Hungarian community, and fraternal insurance societies and civic organizations which were predominantly involved in securing economic, social and psychological adjustment to industrial life. In reality of course both types of organizations fulfilled the two functions simultaneously. For example, in the first period of settlement church congregations were the most dominant and supportive immigrant organizations, fulfilling not only functions of preservation but involved very much in social-economic assistance, education, information provision and resolution of personal problems for the immigrant. In fact, fraternal insurance societies at first were founded by church congregations at the community level, which in subsequent years were merged into such organizations as the William Penn Association and Hungarian Reformed Federation of the present. In the later phase of immigrant history, however, the fraternal benefit societies, civic organizations, business and professional groups became instrumental in promoting adjustment to American social patterns, while the church congregations fulfilled their original function of preserving traditional values.

The fourth important characteristic of Hungarian immigrant life is the transformation that affected Hungarian immigrants from the time they arrived in the United States to the present.[4] Three main stages of this transformation can be distinguished: the first-generation stage up to World War I, the interwar period from 1920 to 1940 and the period since 1940. In the first-generation stage, the immigrant lived and worked within an almost enclosed Hungarian immigrant community. Hungarian immigrant institutions played a predominant role in the life of the immigrant. Immigrant contacts with American society were quite limited. Usually religious leaders of the community provided the primary link with American society. No major adjustment to American social patterns evolved in this stage. In the second stage of development, in the period following 1920, the immigrant community was transformed. Large-scale immigration

came to an end, immigrants tended to settle down in America permanently. Civic and community organizations took the lead in promoting citizenship, encouraging fluency in English and becoming involved in American politics. Many Hungarian-owned businesses were established to serve Hungarian residents and neighborhoods. Second-generation immigrants became active in professional, business and political activities. All these changes brought the immigrant community into the mainstream of American society and made possible the social, economic and cultural progress made by the second generation. At the same time, immigrant institutions continued to play an important role, particularly in transmitting the traditions of immigrant life to the second and third generations.

The third stage of immigrant social development is the complex period since 1940. This stage witnessed the arrival of post-war immigrants in three major streams: in 1949–1951, in 1956–1958, and since 1960. These immigrants were usually well-educated, had professional attainments and were eager to establish themselves in professional careers. Their major impact was to accentuate the trends toward the growth of professional and business occupations. In the past three decades, they have become well integrated into American educational, social and business life, thereby giving strong encouragement to Hungarian immigrants and their descendants to integrate with and adapt to American society.

Throughout the three stages of development discussed, but particularly in the period since 1940, American society experienced unprecedented social, economic, demographic, institutional and geographical changes as well. Some of these changes can be indicated only in very general terms: increasing urbanization and industrialization in the eastern states, followed by suburban development, decline of urban centers, and movement of urban populations to suburban residential and employment centers. Another recent trend was the migration of population from urban centers in the east to suburban centers in the west, southwest and southeast. Still another change is the increasing professionalization of occupations, decline of manual labor occupations and higher educational requirements for employment. All these very significant changes have transformed the Hungarian community in the United States. The most significant general trends have been the decline of urban ethnic communities, suburban migration of immigrant groups, increasing assimilation into American society, and general decline of commitment to immigrant places, traditions, communities and values. As a result of the increasing professionalization of American life, immigrant groups have sought and obtained professional qualifications and have integrated into American professional occupations. In view of the strong geographical mobility of the population, there are now significant concentrations of Hungarians in California, Florida and Arizona.[5]

On the basis of the preceding discussion, I am prepared to state my first premise: Hungarian communities have preserved several major cultural traditions during their American presence which include the following:

1. Traditions expressing an attachment to family, kinship, religious values and ethnic traditions as understood by Hungarian immigrant communities. These ethnic tradi-

tions were centered on religious customs, ethnic loyalties, and memories of the village community or a particular Hungarian region.

2. Commitment to social and economic advancement in America. First generation immigrants were strongly committed to economic advancement and this commitment played a significant role in the second and third generations. The dedication and persistence of first generation ancestors is frequently cited as a strong motivating factor by members of the second and third generations.

3. Respect for values such as ethnic heritage, religious traditions, and regional identification both in Hungary and the United States. These attachments are considered highly significant and are approved. Immigrant communities are considered good examples of these values.

4. Hungarian communities and individuals have widely accepted American values of individualism, economic competition, personal advancement, freedom of expression and activity and have incorporated them into their value systems.

My second premise is that as a result of the substantial economic, social, demographic, and institutional transformations affecting Hungarian ethnic communities, there is a priority need to strengthen and reaffirm the cultural traditions of Hungarian ethnic communities. This can best be accomplished by recognizing those cultural traditions that are still of value and importance to Hungarian communities and strengthening them in such a way that they can be updated and made meaningful to the present generation. I propose therefore the definition and elaboration of a set of activities designed to strengthen and affirm cultural traditions in accordance with current perceptions. The following is a preliminary list of such activities which may form the basis of further discussion and resolution:

1. Affirmation and reinforcement of Hungarian national awareness in American society.

2. Provision of basic information pertaining to the history, political development, geography, literature, art, music and folk traditions of Hungary.

3. The practice of folk arts, crafts, folk dance, decorative arts in existing Hungarian communities.

4. Exchange programs, fellowships, university summer programs in Hungary.

5. Cultural events in the United States illustrating Hungarian traditions of music, arts, dance, history, customs and contemporary life.

6. Programs to preserve documents and historic places of the American–Hungarian experience, programs to publish and distribute sources and historical studies of American–Hungarian history.

7. University-level and academic programs to provide instruction, research and studies of Hungarian history, literature, ethnography, political development, urban development and economic life.

My third and final proposal is one that relates to the realization of such a set of priorities in the United States. Since I am familiar with the issues facing Hungarian organizations, I am well aware of the difficulties of proposing and executing program of this magnitude and complexity. For that reason I am proposing two preliminary steps at this time:

First, I propose the creation of an interdisciplinary, interorganizational coordinating committee with the responsibility of developing a detailed program and proposing an implementation for such a program. The committee would develop a more detailed definition of each of the seven points listed under my second premise. Following the completion of that task, the committee would propose an implementation mechanism for the programs it has defined. The key element of this proposal is the composition of the committee. It would be my suggestion that the committee should be representative of all major groups of the American–Hungarian community, including local and regional ethnic communities, local and national Hungarian organizations, professional, academic and educational organizations, including the Hungarian Chair at Indiana University. It is my contention that a committee representing all groups of the American Hungarian community can best define the programs to be established and propose the most effective mechanism for implementing those programs.

Second, I propose the establishment of an Information Clearinghouse which would collect, preserve and distribute on request significant information on issues relating to Hungary, as stated under point 2 in my second premise, as well as on issues and activities in the Hungarian community. In my view, such a clearinghouse would be essential for any future organized activity seeking to strengthen the Hungarian community. It would be premature to state at this time how this clearinghouse should be organized, but it would certainly be advisable that its establishment be supported by the proposed coordinating committee, as stated in my first proposal. It would be one of the key elements of a program to strengthen cultural traditions for American Hungarians.

I hope that this analysis and the proposals made to address the needs of the American Hungarian community will provoke further discussion, exchange of ideas, but above all, specific steps required to preserve American Hungarian cultural traditions.

As a final note I venture to suggest that the initiative of the Hungarian Chair in support of the two proposals indicated would be highly appropriate.

Notes

1. On the emigrant background, including statistical data on emigration, see the following studies: Julianna Puskás, *Emigration from Hungary to the United States before 1914* (Budapest, 1975); Julianna Puskás, *Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Államokban, 1880–1940* (Budapest, 1982); Julianna Puskás, *From Hungary to the United States, 1880–1914* (Budapest, 1982); István Rácz, *A paraszti migráció és politikai megítélése Magyarországon* (Budapest, 1980); Paul Bődy, *Emigration from Hungary, 1880–1956,* in *Struggle and Hope. The Hungarian–Canadian Experience* (Toronto, 1982).
2. On settlement history and patterns, see the following: Paul Bődy and Mary Boros-Kazai, *Hungarian Immigrants in Greater Pittsburgh, 1880–1980,* Hungarian Ethnic Heritage Study of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, 1981) Julianna Puskás, *Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Államokban, 1880–1940* (Budapest, 1982); M. H. Abonyi and J. A. Anderson, *Hungarians of Detroit* (Detroit, 1977); H. Bardin, *The Hungarians in Bridgeport* (Bridgeport, 1959); Susan M. Papp, *Hungarian Americans and their Communities of Cleveland* (Cleveland, 1981). Works in preparation include: a major study of Cleveland by J. Puskás, a study of Hungarians in Chicago by Zoltán Fejős and a study by A. Ludányi on Toledo.

3. Information on Hungarian organizations: Török István, *Katolikus magyarok Észak-Amerikában* (Youngstown, 1978); Béky Zoltán, *Az amerikai magyar református egyesület történetének főbb eseményei, 1896–1970* (Ligonier, 1970); Sándor Kalassay, *Educational and Religious History of the Hungarian Reformed Church in the US,* PhD. Diss. 1939, University of Pittsburgh; Mary Boros-Kazai and Paul Bődy, *Hungarian Community Life in Greater Pittsburgh,* Hungarian Ethnic Heritage Study of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, 1981); Paul Bődy, The William Penn Association, 1886–1986, Pennsylvania Ethnic Heritage Newsletter, 1987.
4. Transformation of Hungarian Communities: Steven B. Várdy, *The Hungarian Americans* (New York, 1985); Paul Bődy, Hungarian Immigrant Communities in Greater Pittsburgh, unpublished paper, 1986; Joshua Fishman, *Hungarian Language Maintenance in the United States* (Bloomington, 1966); Paul Bődy and Mary Boros-Kazai, Hungarian Immigrants in Greater Pittsburgh, 1880–1980, Hungarian Ethnic Heritage Study of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, 1981).
5. Bibliographies and Documentation: Mary Boros-Kazai, Hungarian Historical Sources and Collections in Greater Pittsburgh, Hungarian Ethnic Heritage Study of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, 1981); August J. Molnár, Hungarian American Archives and Other Research Resources, *The Folk Arts of Hungary* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981); Julianna Puskás, Fontosabb levéltári forráscsoportok és gyűjtemények, and Az Egyesült Államokban megjelent magyar nyelvű újságok és folyóiratok címjegyzéke 1853–1944, in *Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Államokban* (Budapest, 1982); Ruth Biro, Bibliographical Guide to Hungarian American Sources in *Hungarian Ethnic Heritage Study of Pittsburgh* (Pittsburgh, 1981).

Table 1
States Ranked by Hungarian (Native Language) Population
1910 US Census

State	Rank	%	Number
New York	1	24.1	76 100
Pennsylvania	2	19.9	62 779
Ohio	3	18.7	59 040
New Jersey	4	10.9	34 340
Illinois	5	6.1	19 270
Connecticut	6	4.4	13 725
Indiana	7	3.2	10 290
Michigan	8	2.4	7 653
West Virginia	9	1.5	4 866
Wisconsin	10	1.3	4 195

States Ranked by Hungarian (Native Language) Population
1920 US Census

State	Rank	%	Number
Ohio	1	20.7	97 962
New York	2	19.8	93 606
Pennsylvania	3	16.8	79 630
New Jersey	4	12.5	59 190
Illinois	5	6.1	29 041
Michigan	6	5.9	27 763
Connecticut	7	4.5	21 093
Indiana	8	3.2	15 357
West Virginia	9	2.0	9 420
Wisconsin	10	1.5	7 338

States Ranked by Hungarian Population
1980 US Census

State	Rank	%	Number
New York	1	13.8	244 672
Ohio	2	13.7	243 232
Pennsylvania	3	11.4	203 285
New Jersey	4	9.5	168 500
California	5	9.3	164 903
Michigan	6	7.1	126 819
Florida	7	5.0	89 587
Illinois	8	4.8	84 642
Connecticut	9	3.0	53 451
Indiana	10	2.5	44 312

Table 2
Hungarian Population by State, 1980 US Census

Alabama	4 480	Montana	3 129
Alaska	1 534	Nebraska	4 452
Arizona	19 199	Nevada	5 926
Arkansas	2 444	New Hampshire	3 390
California	164 903	New Jersey	168 500
Colorado	15 792	New Mexico	3 495
Connecticut	53 451	New York	244 672
Delaware	3 402	North Carolina	9 072
D. C.	2 500	North Dakota	4 291
Florida	89 587	Ohio	243 232
Georgia	9 877	Oklahoma	4 591
Hawaii	2 294	Oregon	10 908
Idaho	1 874	Pennsylvania	203 285
Illinois	84 642	Rhode Island	2 566
Indiana	44 312	South Carolina	4 071
Iowa	4 883	South Dakota	1 818
Kansas	5 122	Tennessee	5 983
Kentucky	5 627	Texas	27 964
Louisiana	6 630	Utah	2 639
Maine	2 387	Vermont	2 574
Maryland	27 901	Virginia	22 306
Massachusetts	20 122	Washington	15 885
Michigan	126 819	West Virginia	11 557
Minnesota	15 663	Wisconsin	33 124
Mississippi	1 794	Wyoming	1 416
Missouri	18 817		

These data are based on responses to question 14 in the 1980 US Census, as follows: Question 14. What is this person's ancestry? Print the ancestry group with which the person identifies. Ancestry (or origin or descent) may be viewed as the nationality group, the lineage, or the country in which the person or the person's parents or ancestors were born before their arrival in the United States. Source: 1980 Census of the Population. Ancestry of the Population by State, 1980. PC80-S1-10. Washington, D. C., April 1983.

Table 3
Emigration from Hungary, 1870–1970
(of Hungarian ethnic origin)

Period	Total Emigration	Emigration to US	Emigration to Canada
1870–1914	639 541	556 439	8 000
1921–1941	150 000	38 541	33 000
1945–1970	300 000	67 869	49 566
1870–1970	1 089 541	662 849	90 566

Source: N. F. Dreisziger, *Struggle and Hope: The Hungarian–Canadian Experience* (Toronto, 1982), p. 28.

HANDMADE HUNGARIANNESS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY AMONG ELDERLY NOODLEMAKERS IN MICHIGAN

ÉVA V. HUSEBY-DARVAS

University of Michigan

Introduction

Thousands of people stopped by the Hungarian–American *csiga*-noodlemakers' tent at the annual Michigan Folklife Festival in East Lansing in August of 1989. Like some of the occasional visitors at the Wednesday morning *csiga*-noodlemaking sessions at the Hungarian Reformed Church in Allen Park, many of these people were perplexed about the reasons for what they viewed as a fascinating, exotic and absurd activity. While some asked, "How long have these noodlemaking-events been regularly going on", others said "Why would anybody waste time with such an inefficient mode of production?" A few people wanted to know the reasons for the noodle-making women spending so much time and energy on twirling these small square pieces of dough, when one can buy noodles of practically any size and shape for relatively little money in the supermarket. Especially men were curious about the *exact* amount of time it takes a woman to make a pound of these *csiga*-noodles, and several visitors suggested "more efficient" ways of preparing them.

As it turned out, these concerns make very little impression on the noodlemakers. None of them remember, or seem to care about the length of time their group has been regularly gathering. As far as they are concerned, this question is as irrelevant as the comments about how painstaking *csiga*-noodle twirling is, or about its tremendously "inefficient mode of production".

What, then, *is* important for the noodlemakers and why? This is the central issue of this paper. Social scientists contend that more attention needs to be devoted to the elderly in various ethnic groups to examine attitudes toward food and food preparation because food-related activities show explicit and implicit expressions of community cohesion, cultural identity, acculturation and other behavioral changes (Newman 1985). Some (cf. Pasquali 1985) not only recognize the significance of this, but also remind us that, while traditional eating patterns give a sense of well-being and security to the elderly, immigration and acculturation often change these patterns at the cost of identity-confusion and loss of comfort and security.

In the present endeavor I examine *csiga*-noodlemaking among members of the Ladies' Aid Society of the Church in the southeast Michigan city, Allen Park. As mentioned already, my main focus will be on what is important for the noodlemakers, why do they engage in it week after week. After a brief description of these regular *csiga*-noodlemaking sessions, and of their counterparts in rural Hungary, I will explore the

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

meaning of these social gatherings for the participants in southeast Michigan. Finally, I will place this activity in the comparative social and cultural context of foodways in general, and ethnic foodways among the elderly in particular. I will show that, while there is definite continuation in the practice of a rural Hungarian tradition of *csiga*-making, there is important transformation in the meaning and ideology attached to this endeavor. The vocabulary of noodlemaking clearly illustrates that this activity has key social, cultural, and integrative functions in the community. For the participants of the weekly ritual, *csiga*-noodlemaking means many things. Among these I discuss the periodical reconstruction of ethnic boundaries, the affirmation of community, the enactment of a particular ethnic identity: the redefinition, performance and maintenance of their "Hungarianness".

Festive food or ethnic symbol? The concoction of Hungarianness

Noodlemaking among elderly American-Hungarians in Michigan

The *csiga*-noodlemaking gatherings at the Hungarian Reformed Church in Allen Park, Michigan regularly draw between 40 and 60 older women, and six to eight older men. By seven o'clock on an average Wednesday morning Mrs. Juliska Bíró prepares the dough by hand using a total of 40–45 pounds of flour — and for each five pounds of flour she puts in two dozen whole eggs, a bit of salt, and a tiny amount of water. After kneading the dough, she makes small, tennis ball-sized forms, puts these into stainless steel bowls, which she covers with aluminum foil. The dough "rests" for an hour or so, until the other noodlemakers arrive at 8 : 00–8 : 30. One man — usually Mr. Steve Savel — stretches the balls of dough with a rolling pin into foot, foot-and-a-half-long flats. Then two men — or, if there are not enough men, a man and a woman — place these into an Italian-made, manual crank-type pasta machine with which they stretch the dough into very thin, elongated sheets. Yet another man cuts these sheets into small, half an inch, to three-fourth of an inch squares. Still another man puts these little dough pieces onto a plate, covers them with another plate and delivers these to the long tables, where the noodlemaking women do the actual twirling of *csiga*, this snail-shaped soup garnish.

The women pick up the flat squares one at the time and lay them on their *csiga borda*, a serrated board made of wood, or reed, or even stainless steel. With the help of a long, pointed instrument, called *orsó* or *penderítő*, they twirl the small square from one corner toward the opposite corner while pressing down on the serrated board. The result is a *csiga*, a snail-shaped, rolled up, nickel-size noodle. One man, using a flat spatula, collects the ready noodles, and takes them on plates to one of several covered long tables, where a woman devotes all her time to lay these noodles out and turning them periodically, so they dry. Finally, the dry noodles are bagged and sold for $ 4.00 per pound. The production is rather slow and the demand is great. Therefore the waiting list is always long for *csiga*-noodles.

It deserves more than a mere footnote to call attention to the fact that, contrary to our usual pratice in American anthropology, I am using actual names in this paper. I am doing this with the enthusiastic consent of my informants, who are explicitly proud about their role in the Wednesday sessions. Mrs. Bíró — who was born in 1905 in the village of Matolcs, Szabolcs-Szatmár County, in eastern Hungary — is very proud of the fact that she is acknowledgedly the most experienced among the noodlemakers of this group. And as such, she is the *gyúróasszony,* the woman who is selected to kneed the dough. It is a sign of recognition, a highly prestigious achieved position among women in both the Hungarian village and the immigrant community, to be the *gyúróasszony* (cf. Bakó 1987; Fél and Hofer 1969; Huseby 1983).

The tradition of csiga-noodlemaking among rural Hungarians

At a quick and decidedly superficial glance these Wednesday events appear similar to noodlemaking encounters during the preparation for wedding feasts in the still tradition-maintaining villages of the Great Hungarian Plain, and elsewhere in northern and eastern Hungary. Describing weddings in these regions, Mihály Márkus (1983 : 236) writes that

> *Csiga-leves* [snail noodle soup] is considered among the most desirable foods at wedding feasts... It is believed to be endowed with magical powers, it helps to engender fertility. Its excellent flavor is attributed to the *csiga* [noodles] that are cooked into the soup. The snail-shaped noodles are made individually... [by the women of the kingroup] who help in its preparation the day before the wedding... The very best village cooks are invited to prepare this [soup base]...

I found the situation rather similar in the northern Hungarian village of Cserépfalu, although there groups of village women start preparing these noodles several months before each wedding (cf. Huseby 1983, 1984). Then on the day of the wedding the woman acknowledged as the best cook in the village leads other women in the preparation of a rooster or hen soup, which is served with boiled *csiga*-noodles as the first course both at noon and for the main wedding feast that is held in the evening. Here too, it is not only considered one of the most significant, indeed prominent of all foods at these festive events, but *csiga*-noodles are also endowed with fertility endowing magical powers. For instance in the late Summer of 1990, when with my husband I attended a wedding in this village, Ibolya, the mother of the bride proudly took us to one of the rooms where there were a couple of boxes filled with a total of 34 kilograms of dried *csiga* noodles. She picked up a handful of the *csiga* to show us their small size and fine, even grooves and said that, starting last January on dozens of evenings after work with the help of her female natal kin, fictive kin, and neighbors she prepared these noodles. When a few days after the wedding we were preparing to leave the village, Ibolya gave us a huge package comprised of meats, breads, and sweet baked goods. In a separate bundle she handed me a couple of kilograms of *csiga*-noodles. My protestations — about the weight of the package in air travel and the strict

rules about taking various edibles into the United States — did not dissuade her: "You know that you can't get this tiny, finely-made csiga anywhere else!" she said. "And just tell them in America that you need these noodles for your children's wedding. That even officials must understand."

Why is csiga good to think, good to make, good to eat?

Despite apparent similarities regarding these noodles in the Hungarian setting and in the immigrant one, I propose that in the pluralistic setting of urban North America the noodle-making gatherings serve additional functions. On the one hand, they fill very different social and economic roles; and on the other, they are considerably dissimilar nbt only in their symbolic value, but also in their organizational/integrative structure.

Of course it is significant that many Hungarian–American residents of Michigan were either born in the eastern or northern parts of Hungary, or are the offspring of immigrants from those regions. Listening to the noodlemakers discloses several key themes. One is that *csiga*-noodlemaking is a major philanthropic undertaking. As most of the women and a couple of the men stress, "we give to our church", and this means an ongoing economic benefit. Indeed, they contribute their time and labor, all the ingredients for the preparation of *csiga*-noodles, and the profit from this enterprise.[1] Also, individuals alternate in donating on Wednesdays hot lunches for the entire group, as well as for the Church office staff, and the Pastors and their families.

Another major theme is that these sessions are both significant and fun. It is evident from the behavior of the people, and the rapport between the individuals that these weekly gatherings offer for all present a very important social forum. No wonder, since most of the women and all the men who participate are in their late 70s, or early to mid-80s, and the majority live alone. Their children and grandchildren — even if they live close by, even if they do keep in touch regularly — are too busy to be *really* there for them. On Wednesdays, however, in the great *halle* of the church among their fellow *csiga*-noodlemakers, there is warmth. There is talk. There is singing. There is joking. There is gossip. There is exchange of information. Most significantly, there are Delray[2] anecdotes and much reminiscing about the old days. As 86 year old Mariska Takács mused, "did you notice, [that] when we make *csiga* we always talk about the time when we were young?!".

In addition, there is also a bit of flirting between some widows and widowers. Flirting that is not at all hindered by the sharp division of labor along gender lines. Rather, this obvious sexual division of labor gives rise to much of the light banter and to the substantial verbal sexual innuendo which accompanies it. With rare exception, the six or seven men do the chores that require walking around. As one of the regulars, Joe Pagan said, "here we men service all these women", while the women just "sit and twirl [the noodles]" and "when they want more" [dough, that is], they merely knock [on their plates]. Let me note here that in rural Hungary, where as I stressed, *csiga-*

noodlemaking is strictly women's activity, the "vocabulary" of *csiga* also includes a number of very explicit sexual denotations but of the type which I have not heard in Allen Park.[3] For example, Bakó (1987 : 168) notes that at the beginning of the wedding feast among the Palóc of northern Hungary the best man serves the first tureen of *csiga*-noodle soup and recites a clearly suggestive rhyme about the phallic-shape of *csiga*. Bakó also found (ibid: 164) that, in addition to her *csiga*-noodle soup, the bride is frequently served one huge *csiga*-noodle, "the 'size of a gopher' along with a spoon that has a hole in it 'because [as they say] 'she likes its thickness and stiffness'". Thus, in rural Hungary the *csiga* itself is a sexual and reproductive metaphor, while in the North American immigrant setting it is the production of *csiga* that evokes sexually-loaded references.

The Wednesday sessions at the Allen Park church are significant for the majority of the participants. They are also important for those who identify themselves as either second, third, or even fourth generation Hungarian–Americans; or some widows of Hungarian men, 'Wednesday Hungarians' who do not speak or do not do anything else Hungarian, but, as they declare, because they do a specifically Hungarian thing: make *csiga*-noodles on that day they are self-ascribed Hungarians. The Church's great hall on Wednesdays is the only public place where many of them say they feel really comfortable. "Because the others here really listen and care," Helen Kulcsár told me, "I miss coming, and feel genuinely missed if, for whatever reason, I cannot make it one week." Another woman said "I am Catholic, but I still rather come here than anywhere else".

A clearly stated and recognized sense of continuity is another salient theme that is ever present on these Wednesday sessions. As the older of two widowed sisters — born in 1911 and 1912, respectively, in Filbert, West Virginia of Szabolcs-Szatmár County villagers, and raised in Delray — said.

> [W]hen mother died... she impressed it upon us on her deathbed 'don't leave your church, do go regularly, do your work there properly'. The church was mother's life before she got so sick, you see. Besides, we both feel very comfortable here on Wednesdays among the Hungarian ladies... we like the social aspect of the church... Even though we often do not make it for the Sunday [church] services, we make sure to be here every Wednesday for the noodle making and we always help prepare for all the big church suppers and [other] fund raising events too...

Often women related *csiga*-noodlemaking with their own upbringing. They asserted that they are continuing something they learned as very young children either in the Hungarian village or in the United States from their Hungarian-born mother, grandmother, or other female natal kin. Recalling her childhood in Delray, Michigan, where the family moved from West Virginia, the younger sister of the woman cited above commented that

> Grandmother had a nice philosophy about raising us. She said that we must properly learn everything as children, so we could become decent and diligent adults. She taught us how to knead dough, and how to make *csiga* even before we could reach the top of the kitchen table without the help of standing on a bench...

Unlike in traditional rural Hungary, in the North American urban setting *csiga*-noodle soup is not served only or primarily — in Goode's (1984) words — at the highest feast, the weddings,[4] but also at lower feasts as Sunday dinners, name-days, anniversary celebrations, and similar meals (cf. Szathmáry 1983). For some immigrant women just simply having *csiga*-noodles in the cupboard at home, and the mere act of regularly making these noodles signify upward social and economic mobility. For example, Mrs. Juliska Bíró, the *gyúróasszony* in her eighties, who was raised as the daughter of a very poor peasant family, commented that in America she always keeps some *csiga* noodles at home, but "in the old country having *csiga* in the soup was *olyan úri dolog*", meaning roughly that it was such an upper-class-like thing" (cf. Fél and Hofer 1969; Kisbán 1989; Szathmáry 1983).

In spite of this transition from the highest level to lowest level feast, *csiga* is still considered a ritual food that symbolizes celebration.[5] Besides, the women in the Hungarian Reformed Church still clearly distinguish its original structural/temporal function: the serving of *csiga*-noodle soup — as the signal for the wedding feast to commence — continues to hold what Farb and Armegelagos (1980 : 104) call a "special place in the metaphors" of a real and proper Hungarian wedding meal. In other words, the traditional notion so evident in Cserépfalu and elsewhere in northern and eastern Hungary persists in the immigrant setting: i.e. that it would not be a wedding, or certainly not an *our kind of proper Hungarian* wedding without *csiga* in the soup. This was underlined during a conversation I had with the woman who was still outraged when she recalled the time when her son described a Hungarian–American wedding in California as "really very fancy and nice, but not properly followed by a Hungarian feast: they failed to put *csiga*-noodles into the soup. Imagine", she said, "what kind of a Hungarian wedding feast is that?!"

The manner in which this type of situation is publicly evaluated and retraced between the women on Wednesdays lead to still other active involvement in the continuation of what the noodlemakers interpret as their specifically Hungarian craft. For instance, when hearing about an upcoming wedding in the family of relatives, former neighbors, or friends in "remote settlements of [North America]" the women sign up on the waiting list. Then, in time, they could buy several pounds of dried *csiga*-noodles from the church which they then either take or send as gifts to the new couple and thus assure a "proper Hungarian wedding feast".

Discussion and conclusion

Students of immigrant communities and ethnic groups observed that foodways are very slow to change. Why? Because, some suggest (Childe 1933; Spiro 1955), they belong to the specific culture stratum which is formed very early in life, in one's family of origin, and which is the last to fade, to disappear.

It is also the case "[that] the preparation and presentation of food becomes the most accessible of crafts", as Molly Schuchat (1971) notes. Curiously, most of the meals

served at the various functions in the Church in Allen Park are decidedly not Hungarian. The lunches that are provided at the Wednesday noddlemaking sessions are the hamburger-helper, *paprikás* casserole, and macaroni-and-cheese types of cuisine. But so what? The *paprikás* casserole brings to mind Schuchat's notion, "the authenticity of recipes and other foodways are less important than making a recognizably ethnic dish. One does not have to be authetic to be ethnic" (ibid.). Based on some of my unforgettably woeful culinary experiences, I would hasten to add that simply *naming* or *labelling* an unrecognizable dish with a recognizable ethnic name, like *gulyás,* works too in this kind of ethnic construction.

Considering the entire complex of *csiga* production — particularly its vocabulary and labor intensity — I contend that, concurrently with the processes I just mentioned, some additional related processes are involved as well. For example, constructing boundaries around the group, defining social relations within it, and creating and perpetuating ethnic identities. Of course, the boundaries are rather permeable, the social relations are inherently changing, fluid, and the ethnic identities are potentially shifting and "nesting", as the case of Wednesday–Hungarians, or the Roman Catholic noodlemakers in the Reformed Church illustrate. Indeed, *csiga*-noodlemaking functions not merely in preserving a sense of who the majority of these participants are or think they are, but in most cases, particularly in those of the self-ascribed 'Wednesday Hungarians', it is used to negotiate various ethnic boundaries, and such "nested" identities as American, Hungarian–American, Magyar, Catholic, Calvinist, one from Szabolcs-Szatmár County, or Matolcs village, and so on. And, of course we know that ethnic identity is realized most dramatically in the negotiating of boundaries among (and certainly *within*) ethnic groups.

Even though *csiga*-noodles have not and are not likely to become such a generally recognized Hungarian national symbol like *gulyás* (cf. Kisbán 1989 : 54), in the multiethnic setting of North America these noodles are infused with particular meanings and properties that give them a mobilizing role. Similarly to other specialized foods, for example like *babka* and *pierogi* that are examined by Goldstein and Green (1978) *csiga*-noodles also obviously "carry cultural and ethnic associations; likewise the work itself [their preparation] is an act of symbolic as well as culinary significance" for the women. "Through their labor they express and affirm the values which shaped their lives."

Certainly for many of the participants the once-a-week event belongs to what some scholars call situational, and/or symbolic ethnic identity. After all, some merely display their ethnicity here, through the particular symbols of *csiga* noodles, in specific, bounded situations in which Hungarianness and its construction is most favorably looked upon. When ethnic identity is no longer taken for granted, and a person's group membership is no longer obvious, then, as Gans (1979) tells us,

> identity becomes the primary way of being ethnic, ethnicity takes on an expressive rather than instrumental function in people's lives, becoming more or less a leisure time activity and losing its relevance say, to earning a living, or regulating family life.

In summary: For most of the participants the very act of *csiga*-noodlemaking means *doing* something specifically Hungarian in both the social and the cultural sense of the word. To borrow Susan Kalčik's (1984 : 58) phrase, these elderly folks become "public producers of special ethnic foods, who are in a sense ritual specialists... [who thus] express their cultural identity through this particular activity". Wednesday noodlemaking becomes an ethnic construction of social reality on two distinct, yet related levels. The actual weekly process of making noodles redefines and rejuvenates an aging and dwindling community. And, simultaneously, the shared, communal production of valued physical objects — the *csiga*-noodles — is the material expression of that community. Yes, these gatherings are important weekly rituals that give both the individual participants and the entire community new life and then sustain and reproduce that life. And thus, through this "handmade Hungarianness", the generating and sustaining powers of *csiga* endure — in both the material and spiritual sense — in the urban-industrial milieu of North America.

Acknowledgements

I am most indebted to the noodlemakers, and to Bishop and Mrs. Dezső Ábrahám, to Reverend and Mrs. Imre Bertalan, and to the office staff of the Hungarian Reformed Church in Allen Park. I thank Linda Dégh and Joe Gaughan for constructive comments, and Martha Lampland for stimulating discussions about the meaning of *csiga* and its making. For his help with fieldwork, and kind consideration with providing photographs, slides, and other services I am grateful for Robert M. Darvas.

The present study relies on research that was supported by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX); NEA Research Grant No. RO-20663-84; and the 1989 Michigan Traditional Arts Program of the Michigan State University Museum. The endeavor is a revised version of oral presentations I gave at the conference "National Identity and Culture: Hungarians in North America" Indiana University–Bloomington, held between March 31 and April 3, 1990, and at the Ethnographic Institute in Zagreb, Yugoslavia on May 8, 1990. An earlier variation of the present undertaking, a brief report entitled "Wednesday Hungarians and *csiga*-noodlemaking in Southeast Michigan", was recently published (see Huseby–Darvas, 1990).

References

Bakó, Ferenc (1987), *Palócföldi Lakodalom [Palóc Wedding]* (Budapest: Gondolat).

Barthes, Roland (1975), Toward a Psychosociology of Contemporary Food Consumption. *European Diet from Pre-industrial to Modern Times.* Fostrer, Elborg and Robert Forstrer, eds. (New York: Harper and Row).

Benedek, Thomas (1972), Food and drink as aphrodisiacs. *Sexual Behavior,* Vol. 2, No. 75–10.

Brown, Linda Keller and Kay Mussel, eds. (1984), *Ethnic and Regional Foodways in the United States: The Performance of Group Identity* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee).

Childs, A. B. (1933), Some Dietary Studies of Poles, Mexicans, Italians and Negroes. *Child Health Bulletin* Vol. 9.

Counihan, Carole (1988), Female identity, food, and power in contemporary Florence. *Anthropological Quarterly* Vol. 61 : 51–62.

Douglass, Mary, ed. (1984), *Food in the Social Order* (New York: Russel Sage).

Farb, Peter and George Armelagos (1980), *Consuming Passions: The Anthropology of Eating* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin).

Fél, Edit and Tamás Hofer (1969), *Proper Peasants: Traditional Life in a Hungarian Village.* Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, No. 46 (New York: Wenner Gren Foundation).

Gans, Herbert (1979), Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol. 2. No. 1.

Goode, Judith, Jane Theophano and Karen Curtis (1984) *A Framework for the Analysis of Continuity and Change.* Shared Sociocultural Uses of Food Use: the Italian–American Pattern, pp. 66–90 in Brown and Mussel, eds.

Goldstein, Elizabeth and Gail Green (1978), Pierogi and Babka-Making at St. Mary's. *New York Folklore,* Vol. 4, Nos. 1–4.

Györgyi, Erzsébet (1977) Csigacsinálás [*Csiga*-noodle preparation] *IN Magyar Néprajzi Lexikon [Hungarian Ethnographic Encyclopedia],* I: 500 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó).

Hauk-Abonyi, Malvina and Charles Anderson (1977), *Hungarians in Detroit* (Detroit: Wayne State University Ethnic Studies Division, Center for Urban Studies).

Hofer, Tamás and Erzsébet István (1977), Csigacsináló [Implements for making csiga-noodle] IN *Magyar Néprajzi Lexikon [Hungarian Ethnographic Encyclopedia],* I: 500 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó).

Huseby, Éva Veronika (1983), *Fogalmak és élettörténetek az identitás vizsgálatához Cserépfaluban [Identity-related Concepts and Life-history-mosaics for a Study of Cserépfalu]* (Debrecen: KLTE).

Huseby, Éva Veronika (1984/a), *Community Cohesion and Identity Maintenance in Rural Hungary: Adaptations to Directed Social Change.* PhD Dissertation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan).

Huseby, Éva Veronika (1984/b), Ethnic Radio: the Study of Hungarian Language Radio Programs in Detroit and Windsor. IN William G. Lockwood, ed. *Beyond Ethnic Boundaries.* Michigan Discussions of Anthropology, No. 7. Ann Arbor.

Huseby-Darvas, Éva (1990), 'Wednesday Hungarians' and Csiga-noodlemaking in Southeast Michigan. *The Digest: A Review for the Interdisciplinary Study of the Uses of Food,* Vol. 9, No. 2 : 4–7 edited by Yvonne R. Lockwood and W. G. Lockwood.

Kalčik, Susan (1984), Ethnic Foodways in America: Symbol and the Performance of Identity. pp. 37–65 in Brown and Mussel, eds.

Kisbán, Eszter (1977), Csigatészta [*Csiga*-noodle]. *Magyar Néprajzi Lexikon [Hungarian Ethnographic Encyclopedia],* I : 500 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó).

Kisbán, Eszter (1989), Parasztételből Nemzeti Jelkép: a gulyás esete 1800 körül, [From Peasant-food to National Symbol: The case of the *gulyás* around 1800]. Péter Niedermüller, ed. Pécs: *Janus VI, Nemzeti Kultúra* (1) 53–58.

Márkus, Mihály (1983), Lakodalmi ételek és az étrend interetnikus kapcsolatai [The interethnic relationships of wedding food-types and menus], pp. 235–252, In *Lakodalom [Wedding],* László Novák and Ujváry Zoltán, eds. [Debrecen: KLTE).

Newman, Jacqueline (1985), Cultural, religious and regional food practices of the elderly. *Journal of Nutrition for the Elderly,* Vol. 5, No. 1: 15–19.

Pasquali, Elaine (1985), The Impact of Acculturation on the Eating Habits of Elderly Immigrants: a Cuban Example. *Journal of Nutrition for the Elderly,* Vol. 5, No. 1: 27–35.

Raspa, Richard (1984), Exotic Foods among Italian–Americans in Mormon Utah: Food as Nostalgic Enactment of Identity, pp. 185–194 in Brown and Mussel, eds.

Schuchat, Molly (1971), *Hungarian Refugees in America and their Counterparts in Hungary: The Interactions between Cosmopolitanism and Ethnicity.* PhD Dissertation (American University: Washington D. C.).

Spiro, Melville (1955), The Acculturation of American Ethnic Groups. *American Anthropologist,* Vol. 57, 1240–1252.

Szathmáry, Lajos (1983), How Festive Foods of the Old World Become Commonplace in the New, or the American Perception of Hungarian Gulyás. *Oxford Symposium on Foods and Eating Habits Proceedings* 2/1:137–143.

Theophano, Janet (1978), Feast, Fast, and Time. *Pennsylvania Folklife. Spring, 1978.*

Weinstock, Sandor Alexander (1964), Some Factors that Retard or Accelerate the Rate of Acculturation with Specific Reference to Hungarian Immigrants. *Human Relations,* Vol. 17.

Yoder, Don (1972), *Folk Cookery. Folklore and Folklife.* Richard Dorson, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago).

Notes

1. The clear profit is rather considerable. For example, in the early and mid-1980s there were times when the annual donation of the Women's Aid Society of the Hungarian Reformed Church of Allen Park from noodle-making and directly related activities was in access of $ 30 000 (information courtesy of Bishop Dezső Ábrahám). The participants at the 1989 Michigan Folklife Festival presented their honorarium to their church.
2. Delray (cf. Hauk-Abonyi and Anderson 1976; Huseby-Darvas 1984b), was the principal site of Hungarian settlement in southeast Michigan between the last years of the nineteenth century and the late 1930s, was the neighborhood where the majority of these noodlemakers grew up.
3. Certainly we should not forget, as Benedek (1972) reminds us in an another context, that in social connotations and courtship situations food does indeed influence sexual behavior.
4. On the significance of the preparation and use of *csiga*-noodle in rural Hungary see Bakó 1987; Fél and Hofer 1969; Hofer and István 1977; Huseby 1983, 1984a; Györgyi 1977; Márkus 1983; Kisbán 1977.
5. In his study of acculturation among recent Hungarian immigrants Weinstock (1964) notes that those who cooked exclusively Hungarian foods to be the lowest acculturation group.

A NUCLEAR PHYSICIST'S FORAY INTO THE REALM OF FICTION: LEO SZILARD'S *THE VOICE OF THE DOLPHINS*

ÁKOS FARKAS

Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

> "Maybe... you will be remembered by these light-hearted fancies long after your contributions to science will have joined the melting pot of anonymity."
>
> Michael Polanyi

It is probably not too difficult to imagine the excitement that a Hungarian student of American utopian fiction felt when he rediscovered a collection of short stories in the utopian mode, published exactly thirty years ago, here in the U. S., written by one of the most famous Hungarian-born Americans. The title of this, by now almost forgotten, book is *The Voice of the Dolphins* and the name of its author is Leo Szilard.[1]

That this name is remembered by achievements accomplished outside the field of literature by no means lessened the rediscoverer's delight. On the contrary, the fact that Leo Szilard was one of the leading nuclear physicists of his time, rather than a professional writer, makes the results of his experiments with literature, those seven short stories in *The Voice of the Dolphins,* appear all the more interesting.

The explanation of this additional interest is simple enough. This modern age of ours, increasingly divided by the conflicting interests and world pictures of what another physicist-writer called the "two cultures", i.e. those of the sciences and those of the humanities,[2] has been a period all too well known for its scarcity of such versatile geniuses as an Albert Schweitzer, a Bertrand Russell — or a Leo Szilard.

Moreover, not only did Szilard punch holes into the iron curtain segregating the arts from the sciences, but his intellectual activities also transcended the water-tight compartments *within* these two domains. In the realm of the "hard sciences", beside his historic contribution to nuclear physics, Szilard was present at the birth of at least two more twentieth century disciplines: cybernetics and molecular biology — not to mention the almost casual research work he did in the fields of medical radiology and geriatrics. In the other major arena of human thought, i.e. in the humanities, together with the "soft sciences", Szilard engaged himself in politology and politics — the father of the A-bomb tried to father the peace movement of scientists[3] — and, of course, in writing literature.

It is through the critical appreciation of this last terrain of his activities that this paper endeavors to enhance our understanding of Szilard's personality and significance. Beside this general purpose, it is also my intention here to demonstrate that these short stories deserve the attention they have so far been denied and that purely on account of their intrinsic aesthetical merits.[4]

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

Before undertaking such an evaluation, however, let us first examine what kind of writing, what genre of fiction, it is that the book to be examined represents.

There appear to be two features shared by at least five out of the six short stories in *The Voice of the Dolphins* on the basis of which such a generic identification can be made. The most striking common characteristic of these stories is their time-setting. All but one of them — the single exception being "Kathy and the Bear" — take place at some more or less distant future time. The other, concomitant, feature — stemming partly from the author's background — is the importance of science and scientists in the imaginary future (and, obliquely, Szilard's own, present) societies described in all but the last story.

The fact that the major concern of these writings is the role that science and scientists might play in the future of the human race could easily suggest that *The Voice of the Dolphins* is a collection of science fiction stories. And there would, after all, be nothing embarrassing about seeing Szilard in the company of a Verne, a Heinlein or an Asimov. The problem with such a facile classification is that however respectable a genre science fiction might be, it has at least two essential features that are marginal to, if not completely missing from, Szilard's short stories. One such trait of science-fiction *per se* is that the fictional worlds it creates are highly technicized universes, worlds characterized by an all-pervasive presence of technological gadgetry, whose detailed description is meant to be one of the greatest appeals of this popular genre.[5] The other main attraction of classic science fiction is that it lets loose an upsurge of the mixture of xenophobia and xenophilia that we feel when exposed to encounters of the 2+nth kind. Science fiction, in this respect, cashes in on the same kind of "alien-complex" that gothic stories exploit when they put the reader in contact with the otherworldly, the weird, the supernatural.[6]

These six stories by Szilard, however, depend on a totally different feature, i.e. on the originality of the author's perspective and/or ideas, for their effect. Only one of them — "The Mark Gable Foundation" — makes use of a (bio)technological process (the long-term hibernation of human beings) not yet feasible at the time of the story's conception, and just two of them — "Calling All Stars" and "Report on Grand Central Terminal" — feature some kind of alien civilization. Add to this that in all of these three cases, the quasi-science-fiction elements are, in themselves, rigidly conventional and utterly uninteresting: the familiar motif of hibernation had been around at least since Edward Bellamy's 1888 *Looking Backward,* whereas the community of superminds as depicted in "Calling All Stars" had, to my knowledge, first been conceived of in Olaf Stapledon's 1930 evolutionary utopia *Last and First Men.*

As for the alien visitors to Earth in "Report on Grand Central Terminal", they appear to be — to the extent that Szilard goes into the trouble of introducing them at all — pretty much the same complacently gullible lot that Szilard saw us Earthlings to be.

If science fiction is thus a misnomer for Szilard's literary work, what else do we have to describe his writing with? Future fiction could be a usable label, but as this term is perhaps too much of a neologism, utopia, in the broadest sense of the word, may be the best descriptive category. Broadest, I say, because if utopia is understood

as a term referring to wishful thinking or blueprints for an earthly paradise, then only the title story of *The Voice of the Dolphins* would qualify as a full-fledged utopia. ("My Trial as a War Criminal" would be a borderline case.) If, however, utopia is used in a sense that embraces extrapolations of social tendencies that can also lead to disastrous, as opposed to desirable, consequences, that is if we include *dys*topias, as opposed to *eu*topias, into our definition of utopias, then five out of six of these stories will be accounted for by the proposed generic term.[7] The only non-utopian piece is "Kathy and the Bears", the last story, whose realistic setting and mildly humorous tone are probably meant to serve as soothing antidotes to the sometimes depressing effect of the fantasizing that goes on in the previous five.

Though accurate, the classification of those five stories in *The Voice of the Dolphins* as specimens of utopian or future fiction would in itself give the reader a one-sided picture of Szilard's book. The originality of these utopian schemes would probably have faded by now had it not been for the distinctly Szilardian narrative tone. This tone is characterized by a unique sense of humor, whose manifestations range from the smiling puzzlement with which the aging narrator views the idiosyncratic ways his little niece tries to come to grips with the ultimate questions of human existence in "Kathy and the Bear", to the unsparing irony exposing the arrogant stupidity of politicians in the title piece, or to the bitter, despairing satire provoked by the self destructive irrationality of humankind in "Report on Grand Central Terminal" or "Calling on All Stars".

The unifying effect of the utopian genre and the all-pervasive humor notwithstanding, a closer look at the individual stories will reveal that their aesthetic quality is somewhat uneven. The best are probably those shorter ones where Szilard did not have the time to be distracted from fully developing one of his brilliant ideas by the fireworks of another dozen. In the title story, Szilard was, regrettably, unable to resist this temptation. It was probably "The Voice of the Dolphins" whose careless execution provoked some contemporary commentators to dismiss the whole collection as one "not notable for narrative style", or, even worse, as a work "particularly dull in its fiction".[8]

Although this kind of sweeping dismissal is just about as fair as it would be to judge, say, Daniel Defoe's merits as a writer by his "The Shortest Way with the Dissenters", if restricted to the title story, the gist of such unfavorable criticism is unfortunately valid. "The Voice of the Dolphins" is, in essence, a political tract wrapped in the very thin sugar-coating of fantasy fiction. Its central idea — almost lost among dozens of practical political tips — is that the fate of the world is in the wrong hands: all professional politicians are malicious half-wits, whose job would be done a hundred times better by the international — mainly American and Russian — elite of scientists, or, to reverse president Truman's motto, scientists should be "on top, not only on tap" at the White House.

Even if one were willing to reconsider the Wellsian (and ultimately Platonic) idea that a voluntary nobility of the intellectually and morally superior should provide a dictatorial but rationally benevolent leadership for the dull majority,[9] one would still prefer to be spared the not too exciting frame story with which Szilard sets out to en-

tertain the reader and/or himself. This frame story involves a scientific institute set up in Vienna in order to work out ways of communicating with the superintelligent species of the dolphins. On the basis of this communication the institute gradually becomes a latter-day oracle of dolphin-Delphoi and the staff of scientists, having convinced the whole world that their source of political insight is that omniscient dolphin-community, eventually succeed in selling their advice to the leaders of the superpowers on how to get out of the "atomic stalemate" and achieve lasting peace for the world. Their mission happily accomplished, and letting their advisors the wise dolphins mysteriously perish in some kind of viral disease, the scientists return to their respective homes in California and the Crimea, leaving the world to puzzle over the authenticity of the whole dolphin-affair. We, the readers, are of course cleverer than that and in case we are not, Szilard drops us a few hints to suggest that the dolphin-story was but a clever ruse that enabled those scientists to market their commodity: world peace.

The foregoing account of the plot might leave the reader with the impression that the "The Voice of the Dolphins" has a more or less elaborate narrative structure: to dispel such a misconception, let me quickly point out that the narrative versus treatise ratio, in terms of respective pages, is something like one to ten.

What can still save the title story from oblivion is, beside Szilard's benevolent political intentions, the author's irresistible wit and the surprising accuracy of some of his prophecies. For the former, consider the following acrimonious remark allegedly made by one of the dolphins about the freedom of speech in America:

> Pi Omega Ro [the dolphin] asked whether it would be correct to assume that Americans were free to say what they think, because they did not think what they were not free to say.[10]

As for Szilard's uncanny political foresight, that can be best illustrated by the fact that he was able to predict, around 1960, that America would, sooner or later face serious problems in two middle-eastern countries: Iran and Iraq.

For all the humor and political acumen manifested in "The Voice of the Dolphins", this very long short story of a treatise is by no means Szilard the writer at his best. For that, we should turn to some of the briefer stories. Of these, for reasons of space, it is only "Report on Grand Central Terminal" that I will now consider in some detail.

In this story, the reader is given an account, in the form of a scientific report, of the findings of an expedition from outer space to our planet Earth. The alien space travellers, whose identity, appearance or means of transportation Szilard thankfully does not bother to describe, find but the burnt out hulks of our terrestrial civilization, which has apparently been destroyed by an all-out nuclear war. Some of the buildings in a large city remained intact, however. Among them is an enormous hall with the sign "Grand Central Terminal" on it. It is in this huge construction that the alien scientists find two smaller halls labelled "Men" and "Women", respectively. While it takes the investigators little time to figure out what purposes these small halls with their cubicles could have served, the function of the complicated gadgets keeping each door locked from the outside and the small disks with the word "Liberty" on them that are

contained in the gadgets is beyond these intelligent creatures. It is eventually a young scientist, a certain Xram (please note the anagram), who comes up with a daringly original hypothesis. This is how Xram's older colleague, the ostensible narrator, in his officiously clumsy style summarizes his associate's theory:

> He believes that these disks were given out to earth dwellers as rewards for services. He says that the earth-dwellers were *not* rational beings and that they would not have collaborated in co-operative enterprises without some special incentive.[11]

On the basis of these premises, Xram, this extra-terrestrial economist, can even offer an explanation of why the thermo-nuclear disaster that killed off the population of the Earth occurred:

> He has made some elaborate calculations which show that a system of production and distribution of goods based on a system of exchanging disks cannot be stable but is necessarily subject to fluctuations vaguely reminiscent of the manic depressive cycles of the insane. He goes as far as to say that in such a depressive phase war becomes psychologically possible even *within* the same species.[12]

The unimaginative narrator who patronizingly dismisses his young colleague's conclusions is thoroughly ridiculed by the author, which fact suggest that the theories expounded by Xram may come quite close to what Szilard himself believed to be the possible causes of war. Unless, of course, this is just another of his deadpan hoaxes.

But even if Szilard was a crypto-Xramist, the overall effect of the story is by no means marred by the author's possible political-economic views, thanks to the unity of the satirical tone (no serious proposals or lectures here) and the manageably limited number of themes (there are just about two more besides the correlation that holds between lavatories and money on the one hand and between money and war on the other).[13] This unity of tone and purpose in "Report on Grand Central Terminal" are the assets so regrettably missing from the title story. Furthermore, unlike the dolphin-ruse which is quickly abandoned in "The Voice of the Dolphins", the heuristic device of peering at the suicidal irrationality of humankind through the money-slots of some public facilities is exploited to its full mock-epistemological effect in "Report on Grand Central Terminal".

It would be tempting to compare the total despair pervading "Calling All Stars" to such great pessimistic works of Hungarian and world literature as Madách's *The Tragedy of Man,* the late Vörösmarty's poetry, the fourth voyage in *Gulliver's Travels* or some of Samuel Beckett's absurd dramas, just as it would be pleasant to revisit the charming passages of the idyllic "Kathy and the Bear". The confines of this paper, however, only allow me to reiterate one of the opening remarks of this paper: the collection of Szilard's short stories would be worthy of much more recognition in the native country of their writer than has been accorded to it so far. And what could be a more fitting tribute to their author's manyfold talents than the long overdue publication in Hungarian of all the six stories in *The Voice of the Dolphins?* The thirtieth anniversary of their original, English, publication could be a splendid occasion for such an enterprise.[14]

Notes

1. The credits for the original discovery in Hungary go to Professor C. Kretzoi, whose Hungarian translation of "Report on Grand Central Terminal" appeared in *Magyar Nemzet* in the early sixties. (Date unavailable in Bloomington, Indiana, venue of research.)
2. It was in the title of Sir Charles P. Snow's seminal 1959 Rede Lecture, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution,* that this coinage was first publicly used in reference to the apparently unbridgeable schism between the arts and the sciences.
3. This *bon mot* on Szilard's "double fatherhood" (i.e. that of the bomb and that of the scientific peace movement) is taken from a box accompanying Edward Shils' 1964 memoir of Szilard in *Encounter* (Shils, 35).
4. Beside a handful of contemporary book-reviews and the occasional reference to *The Voice of the Dolphins* in the Introduction to *Toward a Liveable World,* a collection of documents relating to the Szilard-lead "crusade" for nuclear arms control, I am unaware of the existence of any attempt at a serious critical assessment of his literary heritage either in English or in Hungarian. Even more regrettable is the fact that while *The Voice of the Dolphins* can be read in Italian, French, German, Spanish, Japanese, and Danish, there exists no full Hungarian translation.
5. There are much broader definitions of the genre which, overlooking the sci-tech aspect as a feature less than universal and therefore not essential to sci-fi, would make utopia into a sub-genre of science fiction (e.g. Suvin throughout). Although I do not share Kingsley Widmer's intense aversion from science-fiction in general, I am rather inclined to agree with his observation that "Suvin nowhere pauses to consider the arbitrariness of sci-fi conventions, including the dehumanizing manias such as technological fetishism, techno-jargonized language, abstracted psychology, and the pathology of cosmic space fixation in its flight from the earthly human" (Widmer, 5).
6. Although it is used in a slightly different context, Stanislav Lem's term "pleasant creeps" provides us with a good description of this effect (quoted by Widmer on Widmer, 143).
7. "The playful printed matter prefixed to the body of the book [i.e. to Thomas More's *Utopia*] the poet Laureate of the island, in a brief self-congratulatory poem... claimed that his country deserved to be called 'Eutopia' with an *eu,* which in Greek connoted a broad spectrum of positive attributes from good through ideal, prosperous, and perfect." (Manuel and Manuel, 1) Hence *dy*stopia, the opposite of eutopia, a world with every possible kind of unpleasant connotation: the bad place. The term, though may sound unfamiliar to the educated layman, is of considerable currency among students of the utopian genre.
8. These harsh reviews appeared in *Booklist* (57:696 July 15, 1961) and in *Kirkus* (29:123 February 1, 1961), respectively. It is interesting to note that the reviewer of the *Christian Science Monitor* found *The Voice of the Dolphins* "imaginative [and] witty" and the columnist of the *Springfield Republican* celebrated the book as "an extremely satisfying work of art" (*Book Review Digest,* 1961:1386).
9. The two classic examples of elitist utopias referred to here are, of course, Plato's *Republic* and Wells' *A Modern Utopia.* Biographical evidence suggests that Szilard was an admirer of Wells and of Plato (Introduction to Szilard 1986 by B. J. Bernstein, xxvi; Shils, 36; Wigner, 34).
10. Szilard 1961, 54.
11. Szilard 1961, 167.
12. Szilard 1961, 168.
13. There is no indication in any of the biographical documents that I have the opportunity to study (for which please consider the relevant titles in the "Bibliography") that Szilard, as a political thinker ever seriously entertained Marxist thoughts. He does not appear to have been a fellow traveller.
14. Although first published in English, the stories were originally written in German — a circumstance apparently overlooked by the contemporary reviewer of the *Springfield Republican,* who was quite impressed by the foreign-born scientist's mastery of English (5D May 14, 1961, quoted in *Book Review Digest* 1961, 1386).

Bibliography

The Works of Leo Szilard

Szilard, Leo, *Leo Szilard, His Version of the Facts: Selected Recollections and Correspondence.* Edited by Spencer R. Weart and Gertrud Weiss Szilard. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1978.

Szilard, Leo, *Scientific Papers.* Edited by Bernard T. Feld and Gertrud Weiss Szilard; foreword by Jacques Monod; introductory essays by Carl Eckart ... (et al.) London, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1972.

Szilard, Leo, *Toward a Liveable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control.* Edited by Helen S. Hawkins, G. Allen Greb, Gertrud Weiss Szilard. London, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1986.

Szilard, Leo, *The Voice of the Dolphins, and Other Stories* London, Victor Gollancz, 1961.

Secondary Sources

(Book reviews on *The Voice of the Dolphins* in) *Book Review Digest.* Bronx, N. Y.: H. W. Wilson Co., 1961:1386.

Feld, Barnard, (Entry on Leo Szilard in) *Dictionary of Scientific Biography.* Charles Coulston Gillispie, editor-in-chief. New York, Scribner, 1976: 227–228.

Feld, Bernard, "Leo Szilard, Scientist for All Seasons." *Social Research.* 51.3 (Autumn 1984): 675–690.

Fleming, Donald and Bailyn, Bernard, eds. *The Intellectual Migration.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969.

Manuel, Frank Edward, *Utopian Thought in the Western World.* Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1979.

Shils, Edward, "Leo Szilard" *Encounter.* 23.135 (dec. 1964): 35–41.

Show, C. P. (Charles Percy), *The Two Cultures: And a Second Look.* (2nd ed.) Cambridge, University Press, 1964.

Suvin, Darko, *Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre.* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1979.

Widmer, Kingsley, *Counterings: Utopian Dialectics in Contemporary Contexts.* Ann Arbor/London, UMI Research Press, 1988.

Wigner, Eugene P., "Leo Szilard" *Biographical Memoirs. National Academy of Sciences* v. 40 (1969): 337–341. 2.

THE STORY OF ONE FAMILY'S UPROOTING FROM HUNGARY, NARRATED THROUGH THE PERSONS OF FATHER AND AMERICAN-BORN DAUGHTER

MARGA KAPKA

My presentation is not based on scholarly research. By contrast, it is a simple story, the story of my father, who at age 37 came to America with his wife and six children. He knew no English. My mother was 8 months pregnant. My father had no friends here, no money, no work. He was one of those Hungarians who had a fierce love for his country, but whose life was swept out of his control during and after World War II, and who felt he had to make a choice: either stay in Hungary and live under Soviet rule; or emigrate to America. Because he loved Hungary and hated oppression, neither choice appealed to his basic instincts. The post-war scare of communist expansion throughout Europe eventually convinced my father to emigrate to America.

Three weeks after they arrived, I was born. I'm seventh in a family of ten. I have always felt my birth was a pivotal event in the history of my parents' lives: they called me the "Lucky Seven" because my birth allowed them to make America their home; but because my father never really felt "at home" here, I have sometimes thought that the timing of my arrival was less than fortuitous. But, we do not choose these things, and — like my father — feel I've made the best of an ambiguous situation. So, my story — the story of my father, attempts to give human and familial context to the issues raised here at this conference.

Before I start reading, I'd like to mention the events leading up to their emigration.

My father was imprisoned in October, 1944 in Budapest (when Szálasi was briefly in power) for expressing a political opinion that was not sympathetic to the Nazi Regime. That previous summer, in order to escape the heavy bombing in Budapest, my father had taken my mother and their four children to Köröshegy, a village to the southwest of Budapest. He himself continued working in Budapest and would commute to the village on weekends. This went on until he was arrested. When the Red Army "liberated" Budapest in December 1945, and freed the prisoners, my father made his way — on foot — to Köröshegy to find my mother. Of course, no news could be sent, so neither really knew the fate of the other. Roads were closed. There were no trains running; there was little food; there was still fighting between German soldiers heading west, and advancing Soviet troops. My father spoke German, Russian and French, and somehow fabricated the right stories that kept him alive. One evening he found out he unknowingly traversed a field that had recently been planted with mines. He walked, sometimes out of his way, to avoid the possibility of capture. By the time

Hungarian Studies 7/1–2 1991/92
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

he reached Köröshegy, his shoes were flaps of weatherworn leather held together with rags and his feet were covered with sores. His relief at arriving in the village, however, was short-lived, for he couldn't find my mother anywhere. Finally a neighbor told him she had to go to Gyógypuszta, about 12 miles away. The neighbor tried to convince my father to stay the night because his feet were in such bad shape, but he refused. He walked on, knowing that if he fell, he would not be able to get up. Only his unwavering faith in God gave him strength enough to continue, and he was reunited with my mother. They stayed until he regained his health.

When my father brought his family back to Budapest in August, he returned to his job as an electronics executive at Orion. One day he was approached by the new Soviet director who praised my father's work, and advised him to leave Hungary for Moscow where he would be given a higher position and better pay. Of course my father — not wanting to leave his home — turned down the offer. After that he felt he was being watched. The apprehension this caused him, particularly since the memories of prison were still fresh — together with the chaos of day-to-day life in Budapest, convinced him to take his family to Belgium.

Promise (excerpts)

The Hungary János left behind frightened him. The continuing presence of Soviet troops in Central and Eastern Europe accentuated his uneasiness and fear that war would break out again. For two years he and his family, which now included another son, stayed in Belgium. His work, constructing model trains, was pleasant enough, but the pay was low, forcing him to take other jobs as well. He had heard about aircraft firms in California — in America — that were recruiting engineers and technicians. Could he go there? he wondered. He became intrigued with the idea of going to America. To János and Editke, like to most Eastern Europeans in the 1940s, America was the land of gold — golden sun rays shined by day, and by night golden stars filled the heavens.

When German refugees began pouring into Belgium with stories of imminent Soviet invasion and occupation János and Editke began to put some form to their dream of leaving for America. What he needed to do first was find out how, if possible, he could get travel documents and tickets for his entire family. Often one could secure passage on a steamer for an individual, but finding room for a family of three adults — for Editke's mother was now with them — and six children presented difficulties. To make matters worse, Editke was expecting their seventh child, and pregnant women close to term were not granted permission to travel. Undaunted, and refusing to be separated from his family again, János determined to find a way.

It cost the family much of their small fortune in jewels, which Editke had been astute enough to hide in babies' soiled diapers when Russian soldiers came looting, but he finally obtained the necessary documents. The destination assigned to their visa however was Venezuela. The quota for Hungarian refugees in America was filled.

Nevertheless, they were given a transit visa which would allow them to stay in New York for three weeks before continuing the journey to South America. To conceal her pregnancy, Editke wore a large coat under which she girdled her abdomen sufficiently but without causing herself or the growing baby harm. In this manner they boarded an American Liberty ship originally used to transfer American soldiers, now full of Belgians, Hungarians, Jews, French, Polish, English, Irish — Displaced Persons leaving their homelands. In late October, they left Antewerp, briefly stopping over in Liverpool where more passengers boarded, and from there the ship began its twelve day journey to America.

As the ship drew into the harbor, János held his pregnant wife who was cradling one year-old István, born in Belgium, and gathered his five other children around him. From the deck, they could see the Statue of Liberty, an imposing sight on this cold morning of November 1, 1947. He knew it was an important moment, and leaning toward Editke, his words were a mixture of joy and relief — and full of promise. "We left behind old Europe, and we'll start a new life."

Influenza kept me awake where I lay on the living room couch, savoring my mother's quiet kitchen noises — not the usual scrubbing of dishes — but rather the rustle of newspaper pages being turned. I loved it that my mother retreated to the large, warm kitchen to read after everyone else was asleep. Tonight was no different. She was waiting for my father to come home from work. My father would be making the long drive home after working all day in Cleveland on the trains. I thought of words he had recently spoken over Sunday dinner.

"Your father is the best diesel mechanic in the train yard. He can smell out any trouble with the trains. That is why he is gone so much of the time. Even on his days off, the yard superintendent will call and say, 'John, I know it is your day off, but we cannot get this engine to run, and you are the genius around here. Can you come?' And, of course, your father goes and finds the trouble immediately. He knows more then the others."

Finally the sound of my father's old car filled the driveway and then the familiar smell of diesel penetrated the kitchen. I detected sadness in his voice as he greeted my mother. I heard the clink of a bottle and knew they were sharing a glass of wine. My father began talking.

"They don't like it that I know everything about the engines, so they laugh at my English. So I want to learn better. When I take a book to read, to study, to learn the language, they laugh because I spend my lunch hour reading. Imagine, today I had to climb atop an engine and as I was bending over to inspect the injectors — they struck a match to the oil rag in my back pocket."

Tears filled my eyes, and then I felt rage. Then I felt sorry for my father. I got up and went into the kitchen, wanting to be included in the moment. But when my father saw me, his weariness vanished, and his eyes intensified with anger. "What the devil are you doing up at this late hour?" he demanded in Hungarian. "You should be in bed, asleep. Now go upstairs! Ten-year-olds should be sleeping by this time. Go on, get upstairs!"

I looked at my mother in supplication, and she did say that I was sick, but my father's insistant gaze banished me from the kitchen. I went upstairs and climbed into my bed, my heart hurting more than my stomach. Soon I heard footsteps coming upstairs and the light from the hallway fell across my blanket. I looked over at my sister's bed wondering if Elizabeth had gotten up during the night. But, no, she was sleeping soundly. Then father entered the room, carrying a mug full of something steaming.

"Here, drink this. It will do you good."

I took the cup and sipped the concoction. It was his all purpose remedy: tea with lemon, honey, and a splash of Mogan David Blackberry wine. I drank it down feeling the rush of warmth and wine circulate through my blood.

"Have you said your prayers?" he asked.

"Yes", but I hadn't. I never seemed to have time after staying awake too long trying to finish a book.

"Well, say them again. Cross your heart and God and your guardian angel will always protect you. Now go to sleep."

I placed my hands across my heart, leaving them there until I heard my father's footsteps fade at the bottom of the stairs. Then shifting my position, I thought about what a guardian angel might look like. I didn't believe in them, but if I had one, it probably looked like me.

When they landed, János and his family, along with the other refugees were met by Traveler's Aid representatives who handed out sandwiches on white bread, and candy to the children as they waited to pass through customs. Editke, beginning her ninth month of pregnancy, felt relief at being out of the ships's berth which the three adults and six children had shared with a Polish couple and their two children. On this crisp, sunny day in November, János felt jubilant, energetic. "How thoughtful these Americans are to bring us food", he remarked to Editke, and although he was unable to express his gratitude verbally, he smiled. They passed through customs clearing their transit visa, and, once again, assisted by Traveler's Aid, they found a hotel where they could stay until their visa expired.

They knew nobody. János had only one address, that of a Catholic priest who lived on the East Side, in the Hungarian section of the city. Unable to speak a word of English, János set out to find this priest, who, he felt sure, would help him settle his family. He knew he had to take a subway, but which one? where? how? Before he left the hotel, Editke, who had studied English in Hungary, had written out their address and the words, "WHERE" and "HOW MUCH" and "TELL ME PLEASE" on the other side of the paper holding the priest's name and address. With a confidence that surprised him, János left the hotel to find his priest. The subway station around the corner provided a helpful guide: János was lucky to find a passenger who spoke German, and soon enough he was heading for New York's East Side. Accustomed to traveling great distances on foot, he chose to walk rather than risk the buses, and trusting his intuitions, made his way to the Hungarian neighborhood where he found the church,

and inside, the priest. János delighted in speaking Hungarian in America, and the priest was kind and gave him advice and information. As he set out to return to the hotel, János formulated a plan. They would stay in America, that was for sure. He would move his family to the Hungarian neighborhood and look for a job. Since his wife was going to have a baby so soon, the priest had told János, they wouldn't be put on the boat to Venezuela. The priest even told János that he would be able to take his ticket to the port office and probably get a refund from the remainder of the trip to Caracas. He also gave János the address of the Catholic hospital nearby where many of the doctors were from Central Europe. János wanted to hurry back to give Editke the promi sing news. In his excitement, he lost track of the subway station. Now, where was it? he puzzled. He looked around, trying to focus on something familiar, but all the tenement apartments looked alike. Approaching a small cluster of people surrounding a busstop, János tried to look for facial features that spelled "immigrant" but felt confused searching these foreign faces. Utilizing every language he knew, but unable to speak the only one that mattered now — English — János asked a man for directions.

"AWWWWWWWW, SHADDUP ya damn DP!" the man spat at him.

I didn't notice his anger until he stood up and approached the chair in which I was curled reading Ian Fleming's latest James Bond thriller. "Oh, God", I thought, dreading the next moment, "what is it going to be this time?" My father neared, his eyes ablaze but his voice low and controlled. He showed me the Franklin Delano Roosevelt stamp which he had meant to apply to an envelope. Then he thundered, "Do you think I would lick this stamp? Do you think I would lick the man who ruined my country? Bah! No! I spit on that man!"

He spat on the stamp of FDR. And he continued with his condemnation of the dead American president who in 1945 negotiated the Yalta Agreement.

"There he sat with Stalin and Churchill and, just like a pie, cut up Hungary! This piece is for you — this piece is for you!"

My father's voice became louder as he described the helplessness of his country, the injustices it suffered, the resultant obscurity of its genius.

"DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT I AM SAYING?" the Hungarian words shouted at me.

"Yeah dad, sure, dad", I mumbled.

He glared at me. "When you are in your father's house, you speak your mother tongue, you speak in Hungarian to your father. Do you understand? *Érted?*

"I said, yes, father, I understand", I enunciated in Hungarian.

And I longed to say to him, but I didn't dare, *If you hate it so much here, why the hell did you ever come?*

With the help of Father Bodnár, János installed his family in a two bedroom apartment on New York's East Side whose open court in the middle served as a refuse dump attracting large, browsing rats and scurrying cockroaches. Because Editke was due to deliver any day, their transit visa was extended. When, on November 23, 1947,

János became a father for the seventh time, he had no way of knowing how his little daughter would alter the course of his life. She, being born in America, was a naturalized citizen and because of that, her birth allowed János and his family to stake their claim in this new country.

But good work was hard to find in New York for a middle-aged man who knew no English. When Father Bodnár told János about several Hungarians who found work in Cleveland, Ohio, János decided to leave New York. Thus, in October, 1948, almost one year after arriving in America, János moved his family to Cleveland where another daughter, Elizabeth was born the following May. They shared the large house, divided into two homes, with an old Hungarian woman. Once again János relied on the Hungarian community and its Catholic priest for assistance. He was not disappointed. Although he spoke very little English, he found a job working for an electronics firm which employed many other Hungarians. But within six months he realized how dispensible he was when a strike hit the firm, making demands and altering working conditions. János was one of the first to be laid off.

For a time he was out of work, and money was scarce. Inquiring for work, he was taken on by a Hungarian in a furniture-moving business. *But I was not educated to break my back for pennies,* János thought. He quit the hard work to take another job with a hearing-aid firm where his intuitive abilities with electronics were put to use. He liked this job; it challenged him and he felt useful. But the pay was very low, and he found he was unable to support his family. He knew he would have to find a better job, one which he hoped would pay medical benefits.

The question of insurance coverage had never been as important as it had been on a bright Easter morning when the family was gathered around the kitchen table after Sunday Mass. Suddenly someone realized that two-year-old Elizabeth was choking. The little girl had taken a huge bite of Editke's traditional *kalács,* the sweet, golden-raisin-filled bread. Editke, slapping the child on her back, ordered her eldest daughter, now fluent in English, to run across the street and summon the ambulance. Within minutes the sirens were outside their door and János and Editke climbed aboard with their baby whose face was beginning to lose color. During the short ride to the hospital, Editke tried to dislodge the bread from the baby's throat, but with no success. János wanted to help, but could only utter anxious words in Hungarian for the ambulance to hurry up. When they arrived at the emergency room, János felt relief with the knowledge that he could put his gasping daughter under the care of professionals. He and Editke rushed to the Emergency Room receptionist where János, in a voice louder than he intended, said, "PLEASE, THE DOCTOR!"

"Yes, I know that you would like to see the doctor", the receptionist began casually, "but we must fill out the medical history forms first. We also require the name and address of your insurance company. Now, is your coverage provided by one of the companies listed on the form? If not, then..."

"Laydee, PLEASE, the DOCTOR!" János interrupted frantically.

"Well, we can't very well get the doctor unless we know something about you and the patient", snapped the receptionist looking up from her paperwork.

János and Editke exchanged horrified looks, not understanding, but realizing that their daughter would die if she didn't get help soon. Editke, relying on her parochial school English, persisted, her voice now loud and shrill, "Can you not see my daughter is dying? A DOCTOR, NOW!!!"

The receptionist stared at Editke and then shot back at her in raised voice, "You need to put your place of birth on this form here, and if you can't read it..."

But János, seeing his daughter become passive and glazy-eyed, waited not a second longer. He stomped from the receptionist's desk towards the double doors that led to the inside of the hospital, in search of a doctor. He grabbed the nearest one, a young intern, who took one look at Elizabeth and whisked her off to the hospital's internal care unit where he held her upside-down while another physician administered a firm-fisted thud to her chest, finally dislodging the bread. The little girl could breath again.

On the ride home, János tried to understand what had happened at the hospital. "This would never have happened in my country", he decided. The incident reminded him of when he and Editke left Budapest five years ago. His three-month-old daughter, Alice was not getting enough milk because of the rationing. She was slowly starving. By the time Editke reached Belgium, Alice was seriously ill. But the nuns at the hospital wasted no time and began fussing over the baby. They fed her yogurt and buttermilk until she began chortling again. There was no paperwork to attend to; no, there was a life to be looked after.

So when New York Central Railroad offered János a job that provided medical benefits, he took it. He suspected that if he should ever have to struggle with hospital forms in his broken English again, the medical insurance coverage would translate on his behalf, and allow him admittance without interrogation. He also began attending night classes where he would learn English.

THE FOUNDATION OF THE HUNGARIAN FOLKLORE ASSOCIATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In December, 1989, the Central Folklore Specialists of the "Csemadok" Committee held what proved to be its last board meeting. The recent gradual strengthening of Hungarian folklore research in Slovakia, the demand for modern, co-ordinated scientific research methods and the socio-political changes in Czechoslovakia after November, 1989 induced the "Csemadok" to disband the Committee. Following the committee's dissolution, the remaining seventeen qualified folklore researchers voluntarily established the Hungarian Folklore Association in Czechoslovakia, an organization which endeavors to be the successor to a similarly named organization which had been founded in 1969.

The Association held its first statutory meeting on January 27, 1990 in Pozsony (Bratislava) with nearly one hundred visitors present. In attendance on behalf of the Hungarian Folklore Association was the Deputy Director of the Folklore Museum in Budapest, Attila Selmeczi Kovács, as well as Milan Leščák, former president of the Slovak Folklore Association and current director of the Folklore Institute of the Royal Academy of Sciences. The general assembly accepted Acting President József Liszka's submitted long-term goals, as well as the Association's fundamental policy, which the forthcoming meeting of the general assembly will validate. The general assembly passed a resolution allowing the Hungarian Folklore Association in Czechoslovakia to operate provisionally within the framework of "Csemadok" as an independently budgeted organization.

Institutionally, it does not belong to either the Slovak or the Hungarian Folklore Association, but at the same time, it would like to work with both of them in close professional cooperation based on an equal relationship with one another. Additionally, it seeks to establish a productive cooperation with János Kriza Folklore Association. The general assembly elected the board for one year and designated committees. For the time being, folk music, folk dance, folklore, social folklore and folklore musicology subcommittees were established with the understanding that this structure could change according to the needs required of this work.

The primary purpose and task of the Hungarian Folklore Association in Czechoslovakia is to support the professional exploration of the folk culture of Hungarians living either in Czechoslovakia or of expatriots (e.g., those who migrated from Czechoslovakia or were expelled). In addition, the Hungarian Folklore Association in

Czechoslovakia supports research on ethnocultural connections between Hungarians and Slovaks, scholarly publications, as well as the bringing together of individuals interested in this subject.

Given the broad outlines of the Association's long-term program, one can break it down into two basic research areas. The first would provide a scholarly program, as well as a protective program of employee rights. On the one hand, the program would establish appropriate academic channels (e.g. the Central Hungarian Museum, the Institute of Hungarology) for opening up new publication possibilities, etc.; on the other hand, it would also perform administrative tasks. The latter would be realized in three fields: the first would prepare and arrange independent research programs. (A suggested initial project for the Association would be to explore the Zobor region with a follow-up monograph.) The second field would include work with other academic institutes (e.g. museums in the countryside) in order to accomplish joint research programs. The third field would involve the Association's support of individuals or small folklore research teams through an established scholarship fund.

One of the Association's significant tasks is to publish its academic achievements regularly. To fulfill this task, the first issue of *Hírharang* was published during the general assembly in July, 1990. According to plans, this periodical will be issued quarterly with news pertaining to the Association and current events regarding Slovak–Hungarian Folklore issues. It will also provide anecdotal information and folklore descriptions. The Association's annual publication, the *Néprajzi Közlések,* inherited from the Central Folklore Committee of Csemadok, requires restructuring itself. Academic papers regarding folklore and data descriptions will be published in *Néprajzi Közlemények,* along with Slovak (and later Czecho–slovak as well) book reviews, and criticism dealing with Hungarian topics. In addition, the Association would like to publish in the near future independent publications, questionnaires, and methodological guides for collecting data about popular culture.

Since there is no point in making long-term plans without maintaining a staff of qualified researchers, the Czechoslovakian Hungarian Folklore Association takes the issue of recruitment very seriously. A primary goal of this Association is to make certain that it maintains a qualified staff of ethnic Hungarian personnel (preferably educated either entirely or partially in Hungarian universities) in central institutions and in the museums of Southern Slovakia. The movement among non-professional folklore data collecting can be strengthened by means of organizing courses and conducting competitions. Since the general assembly, concrete achievements have been made in the above-mentioned field. The Association organized its first continuation course in Domica in Gömör County from July 21st through July 28th 1990. More than thirty scholars gave lectures on basic folklore topics. Some of the scholars (Péter Halász, László Kósa, László Lukács) came from Hungary; others (József Faragó, Ferenc Pozsony) from Transylvania; and still others (Ferenc Ambrus, István B. Kovács) from Slovakia. Besides theoretical lectures given during the one-week course, the participants took part in tangible activities as well. Those volunteers who had not much experience in gathering data did field research in Kecso, Hosszúzó and Pelsocardo under

the guidance of professional ethnographers and folklorists. Topics investigated included the ruthless exploitation of the local forests, regional folk costumes, folk medicine, customs related to calendar feasts, and customs of the communities and their life in general. As a result, besides its success in pedagogy, the course also produced various scientific achievements which is attested to by specific data.

The above-mentioned leads us to the second important aspect of this long-range program, namely the sphere of public education. The Czechoslovak Hungarian Folklore Association has important goals in this field as well. In order to build and maintain folklore instruction in the primary schools and prepare instructors for this undertaking, a pedagogical committee was created under the direction of Mária Szanyi. As a result of the work of this committee, at a recent Hungarian session of the Teachers Training College in Nyitra, an optional course on folklore for faculty was offered during the summer semester. It is hoped that this course will continue to be offered. The "Peoples Education Movement" has been revived all over Slovakia, and the Association would like to take advantage of this development to place special emphasis on the subject of Slovak–Hungarian Civilization, and within it, the study of folklore. Besides such formal instruction, the Czechoslovak Folklore Association shall pay special attention to all aspects of general education, where the values of folk culture can be properly disseminated. The popularization of folk culture has already made some inroads (e. g., various local and nationwide folk art festivals, the occasional popular folk publications of the Slovak–Hungarian press, etc.). The task of the Association, then, is to observe whether different forms of mass education convey authentic folk materials of high standard. For example, there is a new undertaking on Radio Pozsony's (Bratislava) Hungarian Program. Last summer a new popular folk series was initiated which will be a regular program on the station as of this autumn. The program entitled, "Folklore for Everyone", is similar to an earlier program on Hungarian Radio entitled, "Little Hungarian Folklore for Everyone". This program acquaints the listeners with various topics in folklore. The texts of the radio broadcasts are published in Hét ("Week"), the weekly magazine of CSEMADOK.

József Liszka

THE FOUNDATION OF THE JÁNOS KRIZA FOLKLORE ASSOCIATION

The turn of events in December 1989 initiated changes in Romanian social and political life, which, at the outset, opened up promising, then sobering perspectives in the lives of the Hungarians in Romania.

It is almost natural that the change of power brought in its wake the foundation and reorganization of nationalist groups. As a consequence of this process, in January 1990, an issue was raised that the young folklorists should establish a protective organization; and moreover, that a broader organization would be required to bring together all the folklorists living and working in Romania.

In order to understand the current situation, one must realize that following World War II no folklore courses were being taught at Romanian universities. Some Hungarian folklorists did work in research teams at the Academy of Sciences in Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár) and Tirgu Mures (Marosvásárhely) (e.g. József Faragó, Olga Nagy, István Almási, Katalin Olosz); others worked in folklore sections of museums (e.g. Károly Kós, Klára Gazda). Many of them worked as teachers and pursued their profession only in their free time (e.g. Ilona Szenik, János Ráduly, János Jagamas, Judit Szentimrei, János Péntek, for a while Zoltán Kallós, etc.). After the events of 1968, when the possibility of publishing increased, these researchers printed numerous essays and books. Károly Kós, Jenő Nagy and Gabriella Vöő carried out similar research on folk poetry. The seventies were favorable to research in folk music as well; in this way the works of János Jagamas, István Almási and Ilona Szenik could be published. In addition, many researchers could publish their manuscripts, e.g. Ernő Albert, János Ráduly, Imre Fábián, László Bura, András Seres, Klára Gazda, etc. The five volumes of *Népismereti Dolgozatok* (Papers in Folk Knowledge), published irregularly, supported the non-professional researchers and encouraged them to continue their research. Only extraneous education could be realized at this time. The majority of researchers held degrees from Kolozsvár in Hungarian language and literature rather than folklore; however, these individuals were able to study folk poetry and ethnology during their university years. Finishing their studies, they often wrote their theses on folklore, and later for the various teachers' exams they were able to write papers on this subject. The majority of the papers were guided by János Péntek. The researchers began to work on their subjects through their own initiative and because of their love for this field. These individuals were self-taught. It is worth mentioning that in editing the different publications, József Faragó, Károly Kós, Zsolt Szabó and János András played a great part as well by contributing their advice and opinions to the philological education of the researchers.

In 1978–1983 under the auspices of *Korunk*, a periodical published in Kolozsvár, regular folklore and sociological lectures were presented to university students interested in folklore. The lectures were given by István Imreh, Ákos Egyed, József Faragó, Zoltán Kallós, István Almási, Ilona Szenik, Ernő Gáll, Ion Aluas, János Péntek, and especially Olga Nagy.

Those who took part in these undertakings became even more active in January 1990, after which the statutory meeting took place wherein the participants established the János Kriza Folklore Association, intended as the protective organization of the folklore researchers in Romania. The program of the Association was approved by the cultural minister and received legal status on June 15 from the public prosecutor's office in Kolozsvár. The statutes of the János Kriza Association are similar to the documents of the Hungarian Folklore Association. Its concrete aim is to create a legal framework for the cooperation of folklorists in Romania. It seeks new organizational forms to promote folklore research under new possibilities brought about by recent changes. It is their opinion that they can accomplish more together. Their projects include the establishment of a folklore data base in Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár), a documen-

tation center with a library, and an archive. They would also like to publish both a periodical and a yearbook, and duplicate guide-books for collecting folklore data.

Finally, they aim to organize scientific conferences and discussions. Study camps for young people are coordinated in Erdővidék from July 26 and in Gyimesközéplok from August 15. Since precise documentation is essential in scientific research, the organization plans to compile a bibliography of association members listing their published or forthcoming works. In their work they encounter many financial difficulties, yet they continue to proceed using their own resources.

The honorary president of the Association is István Almási; its president is Ferenc Pozsony, and its secretary is Erzsébet Zakariás Zalat.

They were happy to receive the information that the problems of university folklore education within the Department of Hungarian in Kolozsvár was being resolved. Since the beginning of 1990, it has become possible to study folklore as a minor with Hungarian as a major. If the program succeeds, it would lighten the problem of replacement of folklorists although only an independent folklore department would resolve the lack of qualified persons entirely.

The Association emphasizes that it would like to be an all-embracing protective organization of Hungarian folklore research in Romania, and not simply a transitory group lasting for only one generation. The younger ones rely on the knowledge of the more experienced ones, and the olders count on the energy and working capacity of the youngers. They know that they should not be isolated from the researchers who work in the neighboring countries, especially in the mother country — Hungary. They have common goals although the working, social and political conditions are not the same. They feel that from now on, the possibility to learn from each other is greatly enhanced; primarily from the great experts of the field, and secondly, from the exchange of information and communication by means of conferences, exchange of publications, and by taking part in common folklore research tours.

Ferenc Pozsony

IAN THOMSON

HUMANIST PIETAS
THE PANEGYRIC OF IANUS PANNONIUS ON GUARINUS VERONENSIS

Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University Uralic and Altaic Series
Volume 151, Bloomington, 1988, xvi + 251 pp.

Janus Pannonius spent seven years studying in Ferrara, where he lived in the home of his teacher and hero Guarino Veronese. When he left for home in 1454, he presented his master with a panegyric as a parting gift. It is a lengthy poem, consisting of a preface of eighteen elegiac couplets and the panegyric proper of 1073 hexameters; it was regarded by its author, then barely twenty years old, as his first major work. It is an astonishing achievement by any standards. By its very nature it has to be adulatory, hence it exaggerates the virtues of the recipient and the shortcomings of his rivals. The young student must also display his erudition, which he does with countless references to the classics, sometimes extremely obscure. His prosody must be impeccable, as indeed it is, though he complains about the difficulty of writing in even simple metre (line 773); and the whole poem must be well-constructed. Janus excelled in Latin verse technique, and here shows that his skill was not confined to the better-known short poems and epigrams. His panegyric contains some splendid purple passages like the hymn to the sun (lines 920–957); it also contains hints of the audacity he displayed in his epigrams. The ending, however, is a disappointment: his vision of the Golden Age and Guarino's birth comes as something of an anticlimax.

For the modern reader the panegyric is an outdated and obsolete form of verse; the closest equivalent is the mercifully shorter tribute customarily paid by a poet laureate to the monarch, a genre that often produces embarrassing results. In the humanist age, however, it was a show-piece to display the author's talents and to further his career; the poet alone chose characters for inclusion or rejection — Janus, for example, mentions only one of Guarino's numerous children by name, and that was his own particular friend Battista.

Ian Thomson's edition is a model of its kind. The introductory study is comprehensive, though inexplicably it omits any reference to Anthony Barrett's bilingual edition of the epigrams (Budapest, 1985). The Latin text of the poem is based on that edited by László Juhász (1934), the foremost Hungarian scholar of the period. The translation into English is admirable; it is faithful yet modern, and deals successfully with Janus's more lush passages which if too literally interpreted would cause most readers to squirm. The accompanying critical commentary is superb; scholarly, detailed and informative, it makes fascinating reading in its own right and provides a fine introduction to the whole and works of Janus Pannonius.

The unusual experimental typeface is generally acceptable, though the similarity between *I* and *l* has caused some problems, mainly in the middle of words. Among minor misprints *Dalmatia* for *Dalmata* (line 477 and note) is predictable. And the final word in line 17 should be transferred to the beginning of the next line. These, however, are minor blemishes in a splendid edition which deserves the highest praise.

G. F. Cushing

ÚJ MAGYAR SHAKESPEARE-TÁR

On February 10, 1987, some seventy drama historians, directors, literary critics, and translators met at ELTE for the purpose of organizing what was to become the third Hungarian Shakespeare Committee (the first was formed in 1860, the second in 1907). The organizers elected László Kéry, the dean of Hungarian Shakespeare studies, president, Dezső Mészöly vice president, and Tibor Fabiny executive secretary. In addition, they established as the Committee's official publication *Hungarian Studies in Shakespeare,* the first volume of which has now appeared. The book is divided into essentially two major divisions, the second of which presents the activities of the Shakespeare Committee and a 70-page bibliography, and the first of a group of sixteen essays dealing with historical and critical trends in Hungary and the United States; with one or another aspect of individual plays; and with the ins-and-outs of translations and stage performances. Many of the selections are papers that were read at various meetings of the Committee.

Writing as an American, I turned first to György Endre Szőnyi's review of contemporary American Shakespeare research. I would like to register my gratitude to Szőnyi for disregarding so much of what these days passes for literary criticism (Shakespearian or otherwise), and for concentrating on the one critical movement that has already achieved some noteworthy results in the less than ten years that it has been in existence, the new historicism. The gist of the matter is that, partly as a result of the turmoil of the 1960's, and partly because of the impact of French poststructuralism, the literary branch of American academia has become heavily politicized. With the exception of reader-response criticism, the newer critical schools of the last two decades belong more or less to what Paul Ricoeur has called "the school of suspicion". Whatever their point of departure or methodology, the adherents of these newer views seem to agree that the present order of things, both in the academy and society at large, must be overthrown. Radicalism is the fashion of the day, especially among graduate students at elite universities. Name-calling and slogan-labeling are common, together with the dismissal of other-than-radical views on the ground that their proponents are members of a privileged "race, gender or class". (So widespread are these practices that the distinguished historian Gertrude Himmelfarb has suggested that in the future word processors be manufactured with a new key marked Race–Gender–Class.) All this accounts for the dispriting spectacle of a senior critic, Gerald Graff, having to explain to his colleagues, junior and not so junior, what the *ad hominem* fallacy is all about. (Michael Sprinkler: *Criticism as Reaction* as quoted by Graff pp. 597–8 above.) As for those who speak up in favor of pursuing, insofar as that is humanly possible, the ideal of an ideology-free stance, they are taken severely to task for being the naive spokesmen for the "exploitative logocentrism (phallogocentrism, in the case of the radical feminists) of Western metaphysics". Thus a critic of this newer breed can write of the "growing *reactionary* movement in the academy to *recover* the ideals of logic, reason, and determinate meaning and to repudiate the radicalism of the sixties and the early seventies". (Gerald Graff: *The Pseudo-Politics of Interpretation,* Critical Inquiry, Vol. 9 (1983), 597–610.) (Italics mine.) To the best of my knowledge, never before have universities been *accused* of cultivating "the ideals of logic, reason, and determinate meaning". To repeat, I am most grateful to Szőnyi for his judicious selectivity.

The new historicism, to put it as succinctly as possible, strives to place the literary text back into the socio-cultural context in which it was produced. The older historical critics tended to explain the Zeitgeist in terms of one overarching principle, the best known of which would be the idea of hierarchy. All of society, it was argued, would be familiar with the idea of a "natural", divinely ordered hierarchy which governs the astronomical heavens, the political order, the structure of the family, and indeed the whole creation. When other critics of the older school, *e.g.* Hiram Haydn in his *The Counter-Renaissance,* traced various ideologies that stood opposed to the notion of cosmic harmony — Renaissance skepticism and pessimism, naturalism, fideism, and Macchiavellianism — they assumed that such subversive ideologies had a kind of free-floating existence in the minds of readers and audiences, and made no effort to connect concrete texts with concrete events of the day. Not so the new historicists. They seek to place the text back into the "dense" historical context of its origins and, more importantly, to explain the various forms of competing power — social, financial, legal, political — that surround the text. The older critics would search for harmonies, agreements, and generally shared values, while the new historicists, representing one or another variety of Marxism, see

matters in terms of struggle, clashing interests, and ideologies of domination, involving such things as male power, monied interests, aristocratic privileges, exploitative legalities, etc.

Szőnyi's overview, with his emphasis on the new historicism, deserves high praise, for it succeeds in packing so much into so short a space — a bare seventeen pages. Szőnyi's readers will receive a clear introduction not only to the American critical scene but, almost necessarily, to many of the major literary and philosophical developments of the last two decades in France and Germany. (It is certainly not Szőnyi's fault that throughout his study we get Athusser*l* instead of Althusser.) The intellectual density of this study makes re-reading mandatory: it is almost as if every sentence were a summary of one or another book or article. But never does the elegance of Szőnyi's style or the clarity of this organization allow his study to degenerate into a mere compendium.

A few years ago, Péter Egri published in English an entertaining study of Thomas Godfrey's *The Prince of Parthia,* the first professionally performed drama (1767) in America to be written by a born American. Egri's work, here reprinted in Hungarian, will provide readers with many a happy chuckle. "Godfrey", writes Egri, "a történelem tragédiáját kívánta bemutatni, ehelyett azonban az utánzás komédiáját írta meg". All told, Godfrey's play is a mish-mash of motifs, linguistic devices, and dramatic gestures found in one or another play of Shakespeare's, all of them reduced to melodramatic claptrap. With energy and obvious relish, Egri traces the Shakespearian sources of dozens of passages in Godfrey's work, amply supporting his thesis that Godfrey's "tragic" play becomes an unintended Shakespeare-parody. The serious side of Egri's argument is that neither Godfrey nor any other American playwright was able to transplant the Shakespearian ethos into the New World. The task of embodying the typically American experience belonged to the novel (in the 19th century) and to O'Neill (in the 20th).

It is the eight critical essays grouped under the heading *Mű és értelmezés* that will, I am sure, be the section of the book with the greatest appeal to most readers. Dealing with six plays — *King Lear, Othello, The Tempest, Love's Labour's Lost. 1 Henry IV,* and *Hamlet* — these essays reveal such a variety of interests and approaches that it is impossible to find a common thread running them. They range from Tibor Fabiny's study of Renaissance numerology and number symbolism in *Love's Labour's Lost* through two fine studies of *The Tempest* by Emma P. Szabó and Péter Litván, Géza Kállay's sensitive rhetorical analysis of the Temptation Scene in *Othello,* László Kéry's examination of the revenge motif in *Hamlet* in the light of Renaissance ideology, to two searching essays on *King Lear* by István Bogárdi Szabó and Marcell Gellért.

Is it possible to say something new (and worth-while) about a work like *Hamlet?* Kéry shows that it is. Placing the figure of Hamlet firmly in the conventions of the Elizabethan–Jacobean revenge tragedies, Kéry argues that *Hamlet* is unique, in that, first, the protagonist decides to test the truth of the evidence urging him on to revenge and, second, he does not actively promote circumstances that would favor his revenge, but waits for the propitious moment, thereby avoiding the self-created and self-imposed madness into which other revenge figures inevitably rushed. Hamlet's refusal to kill the praying Claudius must be seen neither as a sign of his becoming the devil's ally, nor as a symptom of the temporary predominance of the evil side of his nature, but as an indication of his radical firmness in achieving a truly perfect revenge for his murdered father — who was, we must remember, murdered without "shriving-time allowed". An eye for an eye. But unlike the revenge-protagonists of other plays, Hamlet, the Christian–Stoic figure, leaves it up to Providence (or Fate) to provide the opportune moment.

Intriguing as the exegetical problems of *Hamlet* may be, it is *King Lear* that has most engaged the attention of critics of the last half of our century. Nineteenth-century Shakespeare criticism, beguiled as it was by the overwhelming success of the novel, gave us a Shakespeare who was, like Dickens, a creator of a gallery of individual characters who were seen as unique in their life-like, vivid three-dimensionality. It became the critic's task to delineate and explore the complexities of these Shakespearian characters, and what more attractive object for character analysis than the melancholy Danish prince? As a result, it was on *Hamlet* that nineteenth-century Shakespeare criticism lavished the most and best of its energies. Conversely, the age showed itself unable to read *King Lear,* a work that plays fast and loose with the accepted criteria of realism and psychological verisimilitude. (One thinks of Tolstoy's bafflement by the play and by his rejection of all of Shakespeare as the "supreme delineator of character". We today, however, do much better by *King Lear,* as witnessed by the essays of Bogárdi Szabó and Gellért. Neither critic has a word to say about char-

acter as such, and neither considers one or another scene or passage as centrally illustrative of certain traits of this or that persona. They are after bigger, more significant game. Bogárdi Szabó, for instance, taking as his point of departure Paul Ricoeur's analysis of the concept of witnessing as basic to an understanding of many human phenomena, studies the manner in which the quasi-legal act of witnessing enables us to understand so much that is to be found in *King Lear:* adoption (Edmund) and disinheritances (Cordelia and Edgar), trials (the love-trial in the play's opening scene, the trial and blinding of Gloucester), the false witness borne by Goneril and Regan against their father, the theme of justice that appears throughout so much of the play, and the great Judgment Scene (III, 6) in which a mad King, a professional Fool, and a man playing the role of a madman sit in judgment on a supposedly sane world. Why then is Lear made to suffer? That he may be a true witness of the truth and to the truths of this world. The overwhelming emphasis therefore falls on the world, not on the idiosyncracies of Lear's personality. In much the same vein, Gellért argues that the essence of *King Lear* is the process of undressing of the *readers* (or the audience). The aim of the play is to move us out of our static selves as outside, objective observers, to alienate us from our rational selves, and to make us as exposed and as uncertain as are some of the personae within the play. Like so much of mannerist art, *King Lear* is replete with dualities and ambivalences: Christian monotheism and pagan polytheism, ethical objectivism and moral nihilism, the clash of traditional values with contemporary ones, belief in striving and belief in passive acquiescence — all resulting in a cosmic stalemate, the only solution to which is a new beginning. The Lear-universe is permeated by the meaninglessness of a continually reiterated "nothing", a category that constitutes the realm of power, the domain of tragedy. Only the uniquely human category of dignity, achieved by loyalty and love, enables man to achieve that positive something that sets limits to the "nothing" that fosters tragic meaninglessness. Gellért's close, sensitive reading of *King Lear* is a work of criticism that is as perceptive as it is moving.

Though limitations of space prevent me from commenting on the other essays in this book, I feel I must say something about the 70-page bibliography at the end of this work. Ágnes Gál and Júlia Gál give us a finding list of journals relating specifically to Shakespeare, the Renaissance, and English literature in general in 37 libraries throughout the country; Attila Kiss, Péter Nyáry, and Ágota Révész provide a selective annotated bibliography of some 30 pages of major books and articles published outside Hungary during the course of the last fifteen years, noting especially works that relate to emblems and iconography; Katalin Kürtösi offers an English-language compilation of Hungarian Shakespeare scholarship for 1986–7, each item on her list accompanied by an elegantly clear summary of the author's thesis. Clearly, this section of the book will prove eminently valuable and convenient for those with more than a cursory interest in Shakespeare.

In conclusion, I should like to return to February 10, 1987, the first organizational meeting of the new Hungarian Shakespeare Association, and to Géher István's inaugural address. Reviewing with satisfaction the various activities of the last twenty-five years — general volumes of Shakespeare studies, visits by the Royal Shakespeare Company, the BBC series of TV productions on Hungarian TV, the single-volume edition of individual plays — Géher notes that the cultivation of Shakespeare in Hungary is alive and well — on the stage, in the study, on radio and TV, and in the schoolroom. But, argues Géher, all this life, all these activities are diffuse, lacking a central focus, in other words, a national forum. The scholar who writes a study does so in the knowledge that his work will not enter "the bloodstream of international Shakespeare-scholarship" and, perhaps worse yet, that it will have hardly any impact on Hungarian intellectual life. It is to be hoped, says Géher, that the establishment of the new Association will help correct matters. But there is still one great need: new translations. The Hungarian Shakespeare canon is essentially 40–50 years old: six plays are classics from the 19th century; seventeen are from the Franklin edition of 1948, and eleven derive from the 1955 edition. Géher then calls on the new generation of poets to give us not just good Shakespeare, but contemporary Shakespeare, as well. Given the competence and the energy so clearly shown in this volume, one cannot doubt that Géher's call will be heeded.

Colorado State University
U.S.A.

Thomas R. Mark

Paul Bődy (ed.), *Hungarian Statesmen of Destiny, 1860–1960.* Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1989. Social Sciences Monograph series (Boulder, CO), Distributed by Columbia University Press. xx + 209 pp.

Péter Gosztonyi, *A kormányzó, Horthy Miklós* [The Regent, Miklós Horthy]. Budapest: Téka, 1990. 174 pp.

István Bethlen, *Bethlen István emlékirata, 1944* [István Bethlen's Memoir, 1944], ed. Ignác Romsics. Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1988. With introductions by Ignác Romsics and Ilona Bolza. 174 pp.

The first Hungarian statesman that comes to mind when one thinks of the age of the two world wars of the first half of our century is István Tisza. As the man who directed his country's destiny from 1903 to 1905 and from 1913 to 1917, Tisza is considered to have been the most controversial Hungarian politician of his day. The second such person must be Miklós Horthy, the Regent of Hungary from 1920 to 1944. Who the third most important Hungarian statesman of this era was, might not be obvious to those who are only casually familiar with the course of Hungarian history. But to the specialists it must be obvious that this person is none other than István Bethlen, Hungary's Prime Minister during the 1920s and a man who wielded considerable influence also during parts of each of the world wars. The books at hand contain useful information and new interpretations on the policies and ideas of these three historical personalities.

Paul Bődy's collection of essays provides case studies of eight Hungarian statesmen who had been leaders of the Magyar people between the middle of the nineteenth and the middle of the twentieth centuries. These eight are Ferenc Deák, József Eötvös, Gyula Andrássy, István Tisza, Miklós Horthy, István Bethlen, Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, and Imre Nagy.[1] The writers who deal with these individuals are highly qualified and experienced scholars. Béla K. Király, the author of the chapter on Deák, is a biographer of Deák.[2] Paul Bődy, the volume's editor and the author of the paper on Eötvös, has published a book-length study on the ideas and work of this man.[3] The same is true of János Décsy as far as Andrássy is concerned.[4] Gábor Vermes too, has written a comprehensive political biography of his subject, István Tisza.[5] The authors of the chapters on the next four statesmen have also published extensively on the period they deal with, though not every one of them is a biographer of the person they deal with (or, at least, not yet).[6] Whether written by a recognized biographer or not, the chapters in this book offer authoritative and quite up-to-date overviews of the ideas and politics of the statesmen treated.

The two most controversial men covered in Bődy's volume are Tisza and Horthy. The main reason why they achieved this status is no doubt the fact that they had been leaders of their nation during wartime. In this book both of these men are portrayed in a way that deviates from the image that is held by many people.

István Tisza was a towering figure on the Hungarian political scene during the first three years of World War I. His contemporaries, both within and outside of Hungary, were of divided opinion about him. He inspired some with respect and admiration, others with awe and resentment. Historians have reacted to him similarly; however, most researchers in the West ever since 1918, and nearly everyone in Hungary after the Communist takeover in 1948, treated him as a villain. In the words of one historian, he has been described as "an arch-conservative, a callous defender of an unjust system, a warmonger personally responsible for the outbreak of the First World War and for the Hungarian participation in it".[7] It is this highly negative assessment that is revised by Gábor Vermes, the author of the chapter on Tisza.

According to Vermes, "Tisza's leadership centered around a delicate balancing act between a forceful conservative statecraft and liberal constitutionalism" (p. 83). Behind his politics there was a "passionately-felt Hungarian nationalism". Tisza's nationalism was influenced mainly by two factors: a "profound attachment to Hungary's liberal heritage", and "persistent fears for his nation's survival" (p. 84). These fears stemmed from Hungary's demographic and geopolitical circumstances: Hungarians constituted only a half of the population of the Kingdom of Hungary, and they lived in a part of Europe that was populated largely by Slavs, and was wedged between the world of the Germans and the Russians.

The most weighty issues that preoccupied Tisza during his two terms in office stemmed from these circumstances. One of these issues was Hungary's relationship with one part of the German realm, Austria. On this question Tisza put aside his nationalist passion and listened to reason. He persistently and resolutely re-

sisted the demands of some of his compatriots for Hungarian independence, believing that the tie to Austria was essential for the protection of Hungary. He even refrained from advancing demands for a greater role for Hungary within the Habsburg Empire in the military and economic spheres, "above all to avoid antagonizing Austria" (85). On the question of the position of the Magyars in a kingdom where half the population was non-Magyar, Tisza also held strong views. He had formulated these early during his political career. The fact was that Rumanian peasants constituted nearly a half of the population of Bihar, Tisza's own home county. Already in 1893 he was calling for a fair and lawful treatment of Hungary's nationalities. He declared that moral example rather than government decrees would assure the minorities' loyalty to the Hungarian state. Then and later, Tisza insisted that ethnic minorities should be guaranteed the right to cultivate their own language and culture. In return, he expected these groups to be loyal to the Hungarian state, and to learn its official language (pp. 89–90). Tisza's efforts to make Hungarian the *lingua franca* of the Kingdom, however, got him few converts among the minorities, and his attempts to reach a compromise with the Rumanians floundered. They did so because by the time of Tisza's term in office cultural concessions could not placate the Rumanian nationalists, while the re-organization of Hungary into a loose confederation of regions was unthinkable to Tisza and the vast majority of his Magyar compatriots.

In 1914 Tisza at first reacted to the prospect of an Austro–Hungarian war against Serbia with revulsion. In the councils of the Habsburg state, for two weeks he single-handedly resisted the Austrian and German demands for the declaration of war. But the threat of losing Berlin as an ally of Vienna, as well as damaging his own reputation "as the Monarchy's strongman", caused him to change his mind (p. 92).

Once Tisza ended his opposition to the declaration of war on Serbia, he devoted his energies to the war effort. His "sense of mission" became stronger than ever, and he continued to uphold the old order in the face of mounting strains produced by total war. For Tisza, resisting the demand for change involved not only the obstructing of various plans for expansion of the suffrage or the federalization of the Monarchy, but also the opposing of calls for a more centralized and more authoritarian forms of wartime government. In the end, the forces calling for change gained the upper hand. Its advocates consolidated their power around the person of the new Emperor-King, Charles IV, who dismissed the Hungarian prime minister. Tisza spent part of the rest of the war as an officer of his old regiment, fighting on the Eastern front. In the fall of 1918 he witnessed the collapse of the Axis war effort and found his "entire life's work in ruins" (p. 94). He was spared witnessing the agony his country had to suffer in the next two years: on October 31st, in the midst of growing revolutionary chaos, a band of roving soldiers broke into his home and shot him.

For all his failures and shortcomings, according to Vermes, Tisza was a practitioner of conservative liberalism more akin to the liberalism of the aloof and aristocratic Lord Salisbury than to that of David Lloyd George. Both of these British statesmen were Tisza's contemporaries, but while Tisza's political attitudes underwent little change from the time of the former to that of the latter, the change that had taken place in British politics was "immense and drastic". According to Vermes, the tragedy of Tisza and Hungary was that "social and national considerations doomed Tisza's liberalism... to a strictly defensive position" (p. 92).

The image that the general public has of Miklós Horthy is often just as negative as that of István Tisza. He has been seen by many as a leader of a fascist country, a man tainted by chauvinism and anti-Semitism, and has been described by some as one of the architects of Hungary's alliance with Nazi Germany. While these views have been questioned by several historians, they have been most authoritatively revised or qualified by Thomas Sakmyster. Already in his introductory paragraphs, he points out that though Horthy has been accused of being rightwing and had no experience as a diplomat, he was one of the few statesmen who was "able to hold his own against Adolf Hitler". In connection with the Regent's alleged anti-Semitism, Sakmyster reminds his readers that this "notorious" anti-Semite is "often credited with saving" the Jewish community of Budapest in 1944 (p. 98). Yet, Sakmyster admits that Horthy was hardly suited by his training and intellect to lead a nation in wartime. His linguistic abilities notwithstanding (Horthy spoke several languages), the Regent's intellectual capacity is described as "modest at best", and his perspective on politics as "narrow and unsophisticated". All in all, Sakmyster suggests, Horthy would have been more at home in eighteenth century society than in the world of the twentieth.

The controversial subject of Horthy's relationship with Hitler is explored in detail. Horthy had misgivings about the German leader because of the latter's vulgarity and predilection for theatrics. The Regent, however, was impressed by Hitler's success in destroying the Versailles settlement, and was attracted by his hos-

tility to Communism and Czechoslovakia. Yet in August of 1938, when Hitler told Horthy that he wanted to move against this country, Horthy responded by refusing to commit Hungary's cooperation in such venture and by warning the Führer that in a European war England would prevail. Events of the next two years, however, did much to erode Horthy's distaste for collaboration with Germany. The collapse of France and the regaining of lost Hungarian territories with the help of Germany, made Horthy more prone to going along with the Germans. Not surprisingly, in the crises of the spring of 1941, Horthy failed to prevent his country's involvement in the war on Germany's side.

No sooner than the decision to join Germany was made, second thoughts began developing among the leaders in Hungary. Already in September, Horthy was warned of a "long and bloody war" in which his country could gain nothing (p. 113). The defeat of the German armies at Stalingrad, and of the Hungarian 2nd Army at Voronezh, gave further impetus to Hungarian efforts to leave the war. Despite secret negotiations with the Allies to this end, Hungary could not get out of the tentacles of the German alliance. If anything, evidence of Hungary's duplicity stiffened Hitler's resolve to occupy the country.

In the meantime, at home Horthy resisted calls for the ending of the pluralistic political system that had prevailed in Hungary since the 1920s. The socialist and liberal opposition continued to be tolerated and Jews were protected, despite demands from Berlin — and from radical right-wing elements in Hungary — to the contrary. All this ended in 1944. In March of that year the country was occupied by the Wehrmacht and, after the ill-fated attempt of October 15th to sign an armistice with Russia, Horthy was removed from power and was taken to Germany as prisoner.

In the final analysis, Sakmyster absolves Horthy of most charges held against him by his detractors. He reminds us that in Horthy's prisons communist leaders survived, while many of their colleagues were liquidated in Stalin's Russia. In early 1944, Sakmyster adds, "Hungary was the only country in Hitler's Europe to preserve a semblance of the rule of law and a pluralistic society" (p. 120). He suggests that Horthy should be "regarded as the last of the Hungarian kings". He had carried out his responsibilities as head-of-state "in a dignified and dutiful manner reminiscent of Francis Joseph. Like many successful monarchs, he became a symbol of authority and a link with a more glorious national past" (p. 119). Horthy could have used this authority to establish a dictatorship, but he did not do this because he believed that inhumanity was not a "Hungarian quality" and because he had a "fundamental respect for Hungarian political traditions" (p. 120). In the end Horthy, much like Tisza during the First World War, became the victim of circumstances far beyond his ability to control.

*

Historian Péter Gosztonyi presents a picture of Horthy similar to that offered by Sakmyster.[8] His book is a revised edition of a biography of Horthy he had written in German during the 1970s. With the political changes in Hungary in the late-1980s, it became possible to take steps toward the publication of such a work there as well.

Gosztonyi's study is a fast-paced, easy-to-read biography. It treats both Horthy's career as a naval officer and his post-1920 record as a statesman. It points out how on more than one occasion Horthy was in the "right place at the right time" to receive boosts in his ascent to prominence. One of these was early in 1918 when he was appointed commander of the Austro–Hungarian Navy. In this promotion nearly fifty officers with more seniority were passed over. The second such occasion happened two years later, during the period of communist rule in Budapest, when Hungarian politicians in exile looked to Admiral Horthy as the next Minister of War, mainly because the army generals in their midst would not tolerate the appointment of any one of their own kind to this exalted position. Because Horthy was the only senior admiral available for a prominent role, fate made sure that he would not be doomed to the obscurity to which many senior Habsburg officers were condemned after the collapse of Austria–Hungary.

According to Gosztonyi, Horthy was a conscientious officer who cared for his men. He valued loyalty and tradition. When fate thrust a great deal of power into his hands, he refused to use it to enhance his influence even further. Horthy expected respect from others but he never wished to become a dictator of his country. Like Sakmyster and other historians, Gosztonyi argues that Horthy refused to take the path of some of his contemporaries, such as Mussolini or even Pilsudsky. Unlike Sakmyster and others, he argues that in some of his moves Horthy demonstrated considerable political acumen. But Gosztonyi agrees with most of those who had studied Horthy that his conservative upbringing and outlook prevented him from accepting

many of the new ideas and ideals that were current in the twentieth century. He was suspicious of all radicalisms and hated communism with a particular vehemence. His sympathy for the Hungarian peasant did not extend to his country's masses of agrarian laborers, or to its workingmen. While he did not initiate the White Terror that became widespread in parts of Hungary after the collapse of Béla Kun's Commune, he was slow to curb it and was reluctant to bring its perpetrators to account. On the controversial question of Horthy's anti-semitism, Gosztonyi comes to the conclusion that the Admiral was not a hater of Jews, but was no philo-Semite either. He possessed what might be called gentlemanly anti-semitism that was far removed from the anti-semitism of people such as Hitler.

Throughout most of the 1920s Horthy was content to leave the administration of Hungary to his prime ministers, in particular to István Bethlen. In the 1930s, with the Great Depression, the increased influence of right-radical ideologies, and the growing international instability, Horthy found himself involved in decision making on several occasions. Gosztonyi rarely finds grounds for criticizing Horthy for the stands he had taken on these occasions. Many historians, and even memoir writers, have condemned Horthy for not doing more to prevent Hungary's complicity in the German attack on Yugoslavia in April of 1941; but not so Gosztonyi. He argues that in the light of Hungary's past record of friendship toward Germany, a denial of Hitler's request for passage through Hungary would not have been possible. Nor does Gosztonyi blame Horthy for Hungary's declaration of war on the Soviet Union and the United States. For the latter, he places the blame squarely on the shoulders of the then Prime Minister, László Bárdossy. In his sympathetic treatment of Horthy, Gosztonyi goes so far as to say that Horthy realized, long before other Axis statesmen, that Hitler would not have his quick victory in Russia and began to guide Hungary's fate accordingly. His first act was to dismiss the Chief-of-Staff, the pro-German Henrik Werth, in the fall of 1941. In early 1942 Horthy continued his efforts. His most important step was to replace Prime Minister Bárdossy with Miklós Kállay under whose leadership parliamentary government, respect for human rights, freedom of the press, and protection for refugees from Axis lands were the order of the day to a greater extent than in any other Axis country. Many German demands were denied by Kállay and contacts were made with Allied agents to prepare for Hungary's defection from the German camp. These efforts had limited success only, as Hungary's defection hinged on British and American troops reaching her borders.

While Gosztonyi explicitly approves Horthy's choice of Kállay as Hungary's leader in those difficult times, he acquits the Regent for some of his own actions during this time. He refutes the charges, made by the Regent's contemporary and latter-day critics, that Horthy thought of setting up a Horthy dynasty when he arranged that his son be made deputy Regent. This act, according to Gosztonyi, was designed to make sure that if the elder Horthy was prevented from performing his duties as head-of-state — by illness, death or abduction — Hungary would have a leader that would have the respect of her people and whose sympathies were squarely with the English and the Americans. Gosztonyi also disagrees completely with those detractors of the Regent who have suggested that when in March of 1944 Hitler threatened to occupy Hungary, Horthy should have resigned. By staying on, Gosztonyi argues, the Regent made the best choice in a very difficult situation.

The occupation of Hungary by the Wehrmacht in the late winter of 1943–44 was a watershed in the country's wartime history. In its wake the full burden of total war was visited on the country's people. Hitler insisted on the appointment of a pro-Nazi government, on Hungary's full support for the Axis war effort, and on the "solution" of Hungary's "Jewish question". Starting with the spring of 1944 Hungary lost her immunity from Allied bombing raids, while opposition elements were dealt with by the Gestapo who often acted as if they operated in occupied enemy territory. Further, the deportation of Hungary's Jews started under the supervision of Adolf Eichmann.

For a while Horthy watched these developments as if he had been in exile, but in June he began to take steps to try to ameliorate his country's sad situation. He appealed to Hitler to stop the Germans' worst excesses. At the same time he also consulted with his most trusted soldiers on the matter of armed resistance to German rule. In the end, he replaced the government the Germans had insisted on in March, and appointed a military cabinet whose task it was to prepare Hungary's exit from the war. Earlier, he had stopped the deportations of Jews from Hungary, just before these were to be extended to the large Jewish community of Budapest. It is only in this connection that Gosztonyi expresses regret that the Regent had not acted sooner.

In the summer of 1944 Horthy's days as Regent of Hungary were numbered. He was determined to end Hungary's involvement in the war, and persisted even after he was told by the Allies that he would have to surrender unconditionally to the Soviets. According to Gosztonyi, Hungary's attempt to leave the war failed mainly for two reasons. The Germans found out about it and took timely counter-measures (such as abducting Horthy's only living child, Miklós Horthy Jr.), and pro-German elements of Hungary's officer corps deserted the Regent in the hour of greatest need.

Horthy was not treated as a war criminal after the war. Marshal Tito's efforts to put him on trial were resisted by the English and the Americans, while the similar designs of Hungary's communists were discouraged by Stalin who apparently saw no need to try the "old man". So, in 1948 the octogenerarian Horthy was allowed to start his exile in Portugal.[9] In exile, Horthy stayed away from emigre politics, but remained a keen observer of world events and developments in Hungary. The crushing of the Hungarian Revolution by the Soviets late in 1956 dealt a great blow to his morale. He died early in the new year at the age of 88.

István Bethlen, the author of much of the third volume under review here and the subject of three essays (two in this book and one in Bódy's volume), was undoubtedly one of the outstanding Hungarian statesmen of our century. Though not a member of any of his country's wartime governments, he was an influential politician during both world wars.[10] In the interwar years, he was even more powerful. During the 1920s he was Hungary's Prime Minister. Though out of office in the 1930s, he continued to wield a great deal of power as one of Horthy's most trusted advisers. After the outbreak of the war, however, his ability to influence his country's policies declined, and reached its nadir in 1941.

In that year Hungary became entangled in the war. From the very beginning of Budapest's involvement in the conflict, Bethlen became part of that element of Hungary's elite which had second thoughts about their country's association with the Axis. The members of this elite strove to reduce Nazi influence in Hungary and to find a way to leave the war. In March of 1944 Hitler put an end to these efforts when he ordered the Wehrmacht to occupy Hungary. With the German military came agents of the Gestapo who began abducting Hungarians opposed to the Axis war effort. Under the changed circumstances Bethlen had to go into hiding. From this time until the war's end he would stay with friends or relatives in the countryside, changing hiding places occasionally to make it difficult for the Germans to track him down. Occasionally he would be smuggled into Budapest by trusted members of the Hungarian military, for consultation with Horthy.

Bethlen used his involuntary exile from Budapest to write an assessment of his country's involvement and role in the war. He entitled it "Hungarian Politics in the Second World War: A Study in Politics or an Indictment". In his essay Bethlen did not take issue with the direction of Hungarian foreign policy in the pre-war period, and not even during the first year of the war. The dismemberment of Hungary by the peacemakers after the First World War, according to him, made it impossible for Hungary to follow policies that did not aim for treaty revision. The most logical of such policies was cooperation with a Germany that gradually, without resort to war, re-asserted its dominant position in Europe and dismantled the post-war international order. Indeed, this had been Hungary's policy in the late 1930s and it resulted in a re-adjustment of the country's borders in its favor on three separate occasions. Bethlen basically approved the policies that achieved these treaty revisions, even though in one case (before the Second Vienna Award which resulted in the return to Hungary of Northern Transylvania) Budapest threatened war with Rumania, and another occasion (in the re-acquisition of Sub-Carpathia), under extenuating circumstances, Hungary resorted to the use of force.

Where Hungarian foreign policy began its calamitous course, according to Bethlen, was in acceding to the German–Italian–Japanese Tripartite Pact in November of 1940. Joining a pact designed to look after the interests of great powers offered nothing to Hungary, especially after her neighbors also joined. And it burdened the country with obligations that could not be assessed and foreseen in 1940. Hungary had no business risking entanglement in a struggle of great powers; therefore, it should have been her foremost task to stay clear of involvement in such confrontation.

The next blunders of Hungarian foreign policy, in Bethlen's view, were the declarations of war on the Soviet Union and the USA. In his opinion, the declaration of war against these great powers was an indirect consequence of Hungary's joining the Tripartite Pact, even though the actual letter of that agreement did not oblige Budapest to enter the war; however, membership in the league of aggressors made it difficult for Hun-

gary not to accede to the demands by her allies to join them in their struggle. Once the country became a partner in the Axis war, it became very difficult to reduce the scale of the Hungarian war effort, as steps in that direction were seen as treason by Hitler and resulted in the country's occupation and the imposition of a Quisling-like government. This is how Hungary became involved in the war, gradually, almost imperceptibly, against the wishes of her people and the best intentions of many of her leaders.

There were many in Hungary, Bethlen admits, who supported the idea of a military alliance with Germany. Bethlen spends several pages in outlining the reasoning of these men, and refutes it. He takes special pains to dispel the ideas that the First World War and the subsequent struggle against the Paris peace settlement consecrated a lasting Hungarian–German comradeship, and that the Nazi leadership could be trusted to have Hungary's interests at heart. And he accuses some of Hungary's pro-German politicians of hypocrisy when they argued that involvement in the war was necessary to make sure that the Germans did not return the territories Hungary had gained in 1938, 1939, and 1940, to her neighbors. Indeed, Bethlen argues that what these people had done through their ill-advised policies, was to risk the loss of these legitimately regained territories after the war as a consequence of Hungary's military alliance with the Axis.

Bethlen is convinced that Hungary could have stayed out of the war until the appearance of the Red Army on the slopes of the Carpathians. And even then, she might have avoided a German occupation if she had insisted on preventing the Soviets from entering on Hungarian soil. Had the Soviets refused to respect Hungarian neutrality and invaded Hungary, a Hungarian–German military partnership could then have been established. It would have been a defensive alliance for which the international community could not have blamed Hungary.

As Hungary's leadership had failed to avoid premature involvement in the war, by 1944 Hungary fell into a perilous situation unparalleled in the annals of modern Hungarian history, even though the country had suffered great disasters before, such as after the Hungarian War of Independence and in wake of the First World War. Bethlen attributes this calamity largely to the radicalization of Hungarian politics in the 1930s. He indicts most leading politicians of the time either for promoting this process, or for being too weak to stem it. With right-radicalism rampant in the country, entanglement in the Axis net became more difficult to avoid. Along with the radicalization of Hungarian politics, came the growth of Nazi influence, the worst aspect of which was systematic hate-mongering carried out by the Nazis and their Hungarian allies. These turned ethnic groups against each other, most significantly Hungary's German minority against her Magyar majority, and everyone against the Jews. Bethlen predicted that it would take a long time to heal the wounds inflicted this way during the war.

While Bethlen's indictment of Hungary's politics during the country's descent to the status of a German satellite is undoubtedly perceptive, it no doubt has benefited from hindsight. It tends to lack credibility in its treatment of Hungary's policy of collaboration with Germany. Bethlen condemns Hungary's involvement in Hitler's Russian campaign, but he condones her participation in the attack on Yugoslavia, on the grounds that (1) it came only after Croatia's declaration of independence when Yugoslavia had "ceased" to exist, (2) the Hungarian population in Voivodina had asked for intervention, and (3) the Yugoslav air force had bombed Hungarian cities in the first days of the German attack. Indeed, the sending of Hungarian troops into Voivodina is not on Bethlen's list of blunders committed by Hungary's leadership in 1941.[11]

Bethlen did not recommend a way out of Hungary's predicament. As we know, he was a proponent of a separate peace with the Anglo–Saxon powers, and when in the late summer of 1944 it became evident to him that this solution was unattainable, he advised Horthy to turn to the Soviets. But this is not an explicit part of Bethlen's memorandum. By outlining his country's disastrous situation in the summer of 1944, Bethlen is clearly preparing his audience — Horthy and his trusted generals in case the study remained uncirculated, but possibly his nation if circumstances made it possible to publish it — for drastic steps to remedy Hungary's desperate position. Those drastic steps were taken by Horthy in his attempt to reach an armistice with the Russians during mid-October. The attempt failed and Hungary plunged into an even more calamitous situation.

Bethlen's memoir is ably introduced by historian Ignác Romsics. The book also contains a second introduction by Ilona Bolza, a friend of the Bethlen family and an employee of Hungary's wartime Red Cross who in 1944 undertook to act as a secret go-between for the fugitive statesman. The manuscript was entrusted

to her and it was first made public in the West in 1985. Three years later the present Hungarian edition became possible. The new edition is enriched by Romsics's excellent biographical essay, his meticulous notes, as well as numerous illustrations and an index.

*

Each of the volumes at hand contributes in its own way to our knowledge and understanding of the subject of Hungarian statesmen and statesmanship during the first half of our century. One of the main merits of Bődy's book is the publication of two significant essays on Hungary's most prominent leaders in World War I and World War II. His volume is of much use also to students of modern Hungarian history in peacetime. One can only regret that essays on a few more of Hungary's statesmen of destiny were not included in the collection, such as Pál Teleki and Miklós Kállay. However, these matters are often beyond the editor's control, as papers promised for such publications as this one, sometimes do not get completed on time. This shortcoming notwithstanding, the editor should be congratulated on putting a remarkable collection of papers together. *Hungarian Statesmen of Destiny* should serve as a companion volume to any textbook of modern Hungarian history, in fact, in view of the dearth of such volumes in English, it might well serve as one of the basic reference works in any course dealing with the history of Hungary.

While Bődy's book might help to refine and revise the historical assessment that is held about Tisza and Horthy in the English-speaking world, Gosztonyi's book will probably give impetus to the achievement of the same regarding Horthy in Hungary. In view of the negative, polemical treatment this statesman had received for decades, this might be a wholesome development. Hopefully, the revising of Horthy's image will not lead to Hungarian public opinion going to the other extreme, resulting in the re-birth of a Horthy cult in that country. The shortcomings of Hungarian society and statecraft in the so-called "Horthy era" should not be forgotten. The publication of Bethlen's 1944 work helps to remind us of some of these shortcomings.

At the end of the twentieth century we can say with some satisfaction that, after many decades of historiographical abuse, an image has emerged about István Tisza that will probably stand the test of future historical inquiry. Our understanding of István Bethlen's personality and ideas has also improved recently, and will probably continue to improve in the near future.[12] Horthy, however, will probably remain a controversial historical figure for some time. The general public, especially in Hungary, will be buffeted between the vituperations that had been heaped on this man in the four decades after his departure from Budapest, and the sympathetic accounts of him that have started to appear recently. A balanced image of Horthy has yet to emerge, just as a truly scholarly, full-fledged biography of him remains to be written.[13]

Notes

1. For the reader who is not familiar with Hungarian history it might be useful to outline very briefly who these statesmen were. Ferenc Deák (1803–76) was the architect of the Austro–Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and the father of the political order that existed in Hungary during the period of the Austro–Hungarian Empire (1967–1918). Writer, philosopher, and liberal politician, József Eötvös was one of Deák's colleagues and collaborators whose ideas were incorporated in the early educational and nationality policies of Hungary's post-Compromise regime. Gyula Andrássy (1823–90) was still another prominent figure of the post-1876 settlement. He served as Hungary's Prime Minister after the Compromise, and in 1871 became the Habsburg empire's foreign minister. Rounding out the overview of Hungarian statesmen of the 1867–1918 period is the essay on István Tisza (1861–1918), the Prime Minister of the country in the era of World War I. The next three statesmen, Miklós Horthy, István Bethlen, Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, achieved prominence during the interwar and World War II period. Horthy (1868–1957) was the country's Regent from 1920 to 1944; Bethlen (1874–1946) was one of his Prime Ministers and trusted advisors, while Bajcsy-Zsilinszky (1886–1944), was one of the prominent opposition politicians of this period. The last of the statesmen examined is Imre Nagy (1896–1958), the leader of the ill-fated revolutionary government that came to power in Hungary during the anti-Soviet uprising of 1956.

2. Béla K. Király, *Ferenc Deák* (Boston, 1975). Before his return in 1989 from American exile to enter the Parliament of post-communist Hungary, Király was generally regarded as the doyen of Hungarian historians living in North America.
3. Paul Bődy, *Joseph Eötvös and the Modernization of Hungary, 1840–1870* (Boulder, 1985).
4. János Decsy, *Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy's Influence on Habsburg Foreign Policy during the Franco–German War of 1870–1871* (New York, 1979).
5. Gábor Vermes, *István Tisza, The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of a Magyar Nationalist* (Boulder, 1985).
6. István Mocsy's most prominent publication is *The Effects of World War I, The Uprooted: Hungarian Refugees and Their Impact on Hungary's Domestic Politics, 1918–1921* (New York, 1983). Thomas Sakmyster's is *Hungary, the Great Powers, and the Danubian Crisis, 1936–1939* (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1980).
7. This view of Tisza was shared by Stalinists as well as some of their opponents in post-1945 Hungary. See Géza Jeszenszky, "István Tisza: Villain or Tragic Hero? Reassessments in Hungary — Verdict in the U.S.". XIV, 2 (Fall, 1987), p. 46. Jeszenszky disagrees with this assessment.
8. This is interesting as the background of these two writers is quite different. Sakmyster is American-born and American-trained, he is a university teacher who publishes in the foremost academic journals of North America. Gosztonyi (known to his German readers as Gosztony) is Hungarian-born and had received some of his higher education in Mátyás Rákosi's Hungary. After his departure from Hungary in 1956, he continued his studies in Switzerland where he later became a librarian and started to write for the general German and Magyar reading public interested in Hungarian military history. His most substantial work is probably the massive *A magyar honvédség a Második Világháborúban* (Rome, 1986). He has also published extensively on the 1956 revolution in Hungary.
9. To save him from poverty, a few of his sympathizers established a fund for him. Among those who were responsible for this was American diplomat John F. Montgomery and a handful of Hungarian Jews (p. 157).
10. Bethlen's political career is the subject of several studies by Ignác Romsics. See, for example, Graf István Bethlens politische Ansichten (1901–1921). *Acta Historica* 32, nos. 3–4 (1986) pp. 271–289; and, Bethlen István konzervatizmusa, (Szeged: Móra Ferenc Múzeum Évkönyve, 1988), pp. 321–28. For offprints of these articles I am indebted to Dr. Romsics. In Canada, research on Bethlen has been conducted by Professor Géza Charles Kuun of the University of New Brunswick. The results of some of this research have been presented at various meetings of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada.
11. Historians might also take Bethlen to task on a few of his statements. Bethlen seems not to know that in June of 1941 no diplomatic *démarche* came from Berlin demanding that Hungary join the invasion of the USSR — the pressure was exerted through military channels. True, in June of 1941 Hitler certainly did not think that the Wehrmacht needed Hungarian help, but the situation had changed by the winter of 1942–43.
12. Ignác Romsics, *Bethlen István* (Magyarságkutató Intézet, Budapest, 1991).
13. In the United States Professor Sakmyster has been doing research that promises to lead to a scholarly biography of Horthy.

N. F. Dreisziger

JOSEPH ZSUFFA

BÉLA BALÁZS, THE MAN AND THE ARTIST

Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1987. xiii + 550 pp. $ 55.00

Why should a book be published in English about Béla Balázs? The answer to this question is by no means obvious.

The writer and film critic Herbert Bauer, who later changed his name to Béla Balázs, was born in 1884, in Szeged, a city in Southern Hungary, and died in 1949, in the capital of the same country. Although he tried his hand at writing of all sorts — he composed lyrics, plays, and prose narrative — he was fairly minor in all literary genres. Considering the fact that there is no book available on such major poets as Endre Ady, Mihály Babits, Attila József, Sándor Weöres, or János Pilinszky, and the only full-scale monograph on Kosztolányi was written with good intentions but without scholarly ambitions (Dalma Hunyadi–Brunauer and Stephen Brunauer, *Dezső Kosztolányi,* München, 1983.), the urgent need for a lengthy work on Balázs is rather questionable. Fortunately, Joseph Zsuffa focused on Balázs's activity as a film critic. In this field the author of *Der sichtbare Mensch, oder die Kultur des Films* (1924), a book largely based on the more than one hundred film-related articles written for the Viennese daily, *Der Tag,* was one of the pioneers.

Joseph Zsuffa must have spent many years with a close reading of manuscripts in city archives before he made his analysis of the role played by Balázs in the history of film criticism. The strength of the book lies in passages in which Joseph Zsuffa admits that his hero was mistaken to believe that *Der sichtbare Mensch* "was the first attempt to formulate the aesthetics of film" (p. 120), and in which he stresses the limitations of Balázs as a writer. Less convincing is the way the biographer defends his hero when commenting on his disagreements with such major artists as Bartók, Babits, Eisenstein, or Brecht. The moral grounds he tries to rely upon are hardly acceptable. What Zsuffa calls Balázs's "survival instinct" (p. 230) made him change his convictions several times in his life. During World War I he published chauvinistic poems; in 1919 he posed as a spokesman of international Communism; and during the years spent in the Soviet Union (1931–1945), he attacked Expressionism, in a style somewhat reminiscent of the language used by Goebbels. He sent a letter to the Comintern, distancing himself from his own brother who had been arrested in Leningrad, and composed not only a "Testimonial" on the occasion of the eighteenth congress of the Soviet party but also a poem "Auf ein Stalinbildniss".

Having stated this, all the written complaints Balázs made about being slighted by the Communist Party seem ridiculous. For similar reasons, it is absurd to suggest that "to pin down the cause of animosity against Balázs in postwar Hungary is well-nigh impossible" (p. 362). As Zsuffa himself mentions, Balázs reached Hungary in a Soviet military plane. Since he appeared as the representative of a foreign oppression and glorified Stalin, his alienation from the Hungarian people was complete from the very beginning. His quarrels with the Hungarian Communists, described in detail by his biographer, were of negligible significance if it is remembered that he was awarded the Kossuth Prize in a period when much better artists and writers were silenced, forced to leave the country, or persecuted.

Some of the inaccuracies in this book are of no great importance. The misspelling of the name of nineteenth-century Hungarian statesman Széchenyi may be due to a typographical error (p. 22), the statement that "both Bartók's and Kodály's wives were Jewish" is only partially untrue (p. 473), and the reference to "the Norwegian writer August Strindberg" (p. 473) must be an instance of oversight. There are, however, some distortions which may lead to serious misunderstandings. The remark that "all Bartók's compositions premiered abroad before they were — if ever — presented in his homeland" (p. 159) is in strange contradiction with facts mentioned by Zsuffa himself: both *The Wooden Prince* and *Bluebeard's Castle,* the two works with libretti by Balázs, had their first performances in Budapest.

The weakness of this book is at least partly caused by the biographer's reluctance to keep a certain distance from his hero. Zsuffa fails to compare the diary he kept with other documents. Balázs maintained that he "collected folk songs together" with Bartók (p. 29), but this statement is not supported by any other source.

"I had to have Bartók break through the front of Hungarian indifference" (pp. 60–61). Such claims were characteristic of Balázs's patronizing attitude towards greater talents. Zsuffa is too honest a scholar to deny that when *The Wooden Prince* and *Bluebeard's Castle* had their first performances, the Hungarian critics praised Bartók's music and flayed Balázs's libretto. What the biographer could have added is that time has not changed the verdict: today Balázs the writer is remembered mainly as the author of those two libretti.

Whenever Joseph Zsuffa steps beyond the field of film, he tends to lose perspective. He does not deny that in 1917 "Balázs favored German culture and hoped for its victory in the war" (p. 53). What he fails to mention is that the "animosity" of the major poet Mihály Babits (1883–1941) toward Balázs was the result of three factors: as were all the members of the circle of *Nyugat,* the most important Hungarian journal of the period, Babits was sharply critical of the war, wanted to see French as more influential than German culture in his country, and considered Balázs a minor poet.

Because of his almost unqualified admiration for his hero, the biographer is tempted to misinterpret not only the literary but also the historical context in which the career of Balázs has to be examined. To make the point that Balázs's father, a high-school teacher, was punished severely for his anti-clerical views, Zsuffa calls Lőcse, the place to which he was transferred, "an insignificant town" in which "during seven hundred years there was little change" (pp. 4–7). This is a gross simplification. Although by the 1890s Lőcse was in decline, it had been one of the centers of the rising bourgeoisie since the Middle Ages, and the strong cultural traditions of its largely German population must have been advantageous to an intellectual whose task was to teach Goethe in the original.

The portrait of an artist cannot be complete without an analysis of the circumstances under which he lived and worked. The time spent in the German-speaking community of Lőcse must have contributed to bilingualism, just as his spiritual education was largely the result of his membership of the "Sunday Circle", a group which played a major role in the preparation of the first Hungarian Commune (21 March–1 August 1919). (Cf. Mary Gluck, *Georg Lukács and His Generation 1900–1918,* Cambridge, MA 1985.) Unfortunately, this biography does not offer a satisfactory analysis of the activities of this intellectual movement. On the one hand, Zsuffa fails to mention two important members of the Sunday Circle, the writer Emma Ritoók, who turned against the Commune, and the art historian Lajos Fülep, who was the editor of the only periodical of the group. On the other hand, the biographer makes the sweeping generalization that "the Hungarians felt that they had been abandoned by the West and betrayed by Wilson, so they turned to the East and Lenin for deliverance" (p. 78). In view of the fact that the Party of the Communists of Hungary was founded in Moscow and the short-lived Commune led by Béla Kun and others (Béla Balázs and György Lukács among them) was extremely undemocratic and unpopular, this assumption is misleading. In any case, it cannot help us understand the reasons why Balázs spent the years 1919–1945 outside Hungary.

Joseph Zsuffa's biography succeeds in pointing out that Béla Balázs has a place in the history of film criticism. What it fails to emphasize is that he was a second-rate writer who served the dictatorships of Kun, Stalin, and Rákosi.

Mihály Szegedy-Maszák

SAMUEL R. WILLIAMSON, JR.
AUSTRIA–HUNAGRY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Macmillan. 1991, 272 pp. £ 35.00 Hardcover, £ 9.99 Paperback

The Habsburg contribution to the origins of the First World War is usually presented as a tale of two cheques. The first cheque is the blank one, given by the Kaiser and his Chancellor on 5–6 July, which guaranteed German support for Habsburg action against Serbia. The second is the 'lost cheque': Pasic's alleged

warning to Vienna that an assassination attempt on the heir-apparent was imminent. Supposedly, the message was sent not to the Ministry of Finance, which had responsibility for Bosnian affairs, but instead to the Ministry of the Interior, the institution which any well meaning foreigner might have thought discharged responsibility for matters of internal security. Having been misdirected, the warning was lost in the post.

The second of these cheques is a pure *canard*, of uncertain provenance, and it is thankfully not mentioned in the work under review. Nevertheless, both the lost cheque and the blank cheque have been frequently used to characterise the Monarchy on the eve of the First World War. The Monarchy is thus depicted as an anachronistic and moribund structure, held together by the type of bureaucracy which muddles its ministries and loses important correspondence. So great was its enfeeblement that the Monarchy was only prepared to go to war once it was sure of German support. Without the backing of its aggressive ally, so it is presumed, the 'senile empire' (as Barbara Tuchman described it) would not have had the courage for a fight.

Samuel Williamson entirely rejects this type of account. Instead, he apportions a good part of the blame for the First World War to Austria and fastens responsibility for the conflict on the Emperor's diplomats and generals. Despite the extensive perusal of unpublished material and twenty years of research, the author has not come across much new information. After all, plenty of scholars have been there before him, not least Luigi Albertini. Nevertheless, Williamson's interpretation is refreshing and runs contrary to some of the prevailing orthodoxies of today. As a consequence, instead of the Kaiser and Von Moltke, we have now a new set of villains: the Chief of the General Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, and the Governor General of Bosnia, Oskar Potiorek. And instead of railway timetables and the junction at Aachen, we have Plans B and R and the critical deployment of Echelon B.

The author begins by emphasising the strengths of the Monarchy: "bustling with intellectual and artistic activity, the monarchy enjoyed a robust economy and a steadily improving standard of living. In the years after 1900 crisis after crisis tested its political institutions, yet state services continued to expand, the quality of education advanced and a measure of political pragmatism prevailed" (pp. 5–6). In support of his contention that nobody in the Monarchy actually wanted it overthrown, Williamson quotes Palacky 1848. Nevertheless, his point is more or less valid for the later period. In addition, Williamson maintains, the Monarchy had recently achieved some notable foreign policy triumphs and had successfully stood up to international protests over the annexation of Bosnia–Herzegovina. In 1908–09 the Monarchy showed itself to be both decisive and independent in its policy-making; ministers and generals accordingly believed that a tough and determined stance yielded results.

The outcome of the Balkan Wars called into question many of the presuppositions on which Habsburg foreign policy rested. Turkey fell an easy victim to the League; Russian support for Serbia was incautious and overt; and Serbia itself was not only doubled in size but perilously close to gaining an outlet to the Adriatic. While Bulgaria had been wooed away from St Petersburg, relations with Romania had deteriorated, thus jeopardising the secret treaty of 1883. The new Albanian state, which had been created partly at Berchtold's instigation to block Serbia, was also soon attracting Italian interest. The Matscheko memorandum drafted on the eve of Sarajevo, revealed the disappointment and misgivings of the Ballhausplatz at the turn of events in south-eastern Europe. But it took the murder of Franz Ferdinand to convince the diplomats of the necessity for a military solution.

Williamson argues that Vienna was quite ready on its own account to go to war against Serbia and needed no encouragement from Berlin. Serbian complicity in the murders was regarded as proven and the governor-general in Bosnia was busy exaggerating the threat to security posed there by Serbian intrigues. However, Berchtold anticipated fighting a local war and obtaining "a final and fundamental reckoning with Belgrade". He regarded the promises of German assistance only as a way of frightening Russia into a position of neutrality. It was Conrad who by precipitously shifting the Second Army (Echelon B) from the Balkan theatre to Galicia, transformed what could have been the Third Balkan War into what became instead the First World War. Although Williamson does not mention this, by moving Echelon B northwards, Conrad also ensured that Austria could not fulfil the "Halt in Belgrade" plan proposed by the Kaiser on 28 July. For the Fifth and Sixth armies left in the Balkan theatre were positioned on the Bosnian frontier and so were beyond easy striking range of the Serbian capital.

To begin with, Williamson comes out against all attempts to make Habsburg foreign policy an adjunct of

domestic. He argues that every issue had an *Aussen* and *Innen* component as far as the Monarchy was concerned. Hungarian measures against the Romanian population in Transylvania, for instance, would typically elicit protests from Bucharest (or even worse, a fact-finding mission by a Russian Foreign Minister) thus transforming a domestic issue into an international one. Likewise, Russian support for the Pan-Slav cause obviously carried implications for the internal affairs of the Monarchy. Given the overlap between *Innen* and *Aussen,* there can thus be no question of a "primacy of domestic politics" (p. 10).

Unfortunately, having made this important point, Williamson goes on to argue that the decision to go war was determined almost exclusively by foreign policy considerations and by a desire "to settle accounts with Serbia". In fact, study of the July crisis amply reveals the extent to which internal affairs influenced the decision to go to war. Both Sturgkh and Bilinski therefore believed that the security of the annexed provinces was dependent upon the defeat of Serbia, while Tisza was convinced by Burián that the South Slav problem could easily spill over into Transylvania. In his anxiety to demonstrate that Austrian policy-making was different to German, Williamson loses sight of the valuable starting-point of his discussion. In place of the primacy of domestic politics, he argues for the primacy of foreign politics and so does not tease out the continuing close relationship between the two.

Given the new interest in public opinion on the eve of the war, it is to be regretted that Williamson confines his account to high politics. As Clausewitz pointed out, wars are shaped by a trinity of groups: the politicians for whom it is an instrument of policy; the generals for whom it is an exercise in skill, and the people as a whole, whose involvement determines the level of the war's intensity. In August 1914, the call to arms was greeted with enthusiasm across the Monarchy. Given his own background and upbringing, one expects little Dollfuss to stand on tip toe in the recruiting sergeant's office; but Hofmannsthal, Musil, Kokoschka and Wittgenstein also hastened to the front. It is their surprising readiness to participate in the war which best indicates the degree of strength and popular vitality which the old Monarchy still retained.

School of Slavonic and East European Studies,
University of London

Martyn Rady

FREDERICK GARBER (ED.)

ROMANTIC IRONY

Vol. VIII of the Comparative History of Literatures in European Languages.
Sponsored by the International Comparative Literature Association.
Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. 1988. 395 pp.

As René Wellek wrote of Friedrich Schlegel: "Irony is his recognition of the fact that the world in its essence is paradoxical and that an ambivalent attitude alone can grasp its contradictory totality. For Schlegel irony is the struggle between the absolute and the relative, the simultaneous consciousness of the impossibility and the necessity of a complete account of reality" (*A History of Modern Criticism: 1750–1950.* Vol 2, *The Romantic Age,* New Haven: Yale UP, 1955). This present volume seeks to trace the new understandings of irony, most strikingly formulated by Schlegel and his contemporaries, that characterized the Romantic movement across Europe as it was expressed in literary and critical works.

Romantic Irony is the first in the five-volume subseries on Romanticism within the multi-volumed *Comparative History of Europen Literature* sponsored by the International Comparative Literature Association, of which the first volume, *Expressionism,* edited by Ulrich Weisstein, appeared in 1973. It is also the last vol-

ume to be published by Akadémiai Kiadó, the Publishing House of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; the new publisher of the *Comparative History* is John Benjamins.

It speaks well for the subseries that it should open with an innovative volume — innovative in its choice of subject, far from a conventional "periodization" or generic formulation, and innovative in the fresh comparative material, including readings of particular texts, that it brings before us. There is a sense in which the volume deliberately evades the issue of periodization; the subseries on Romanticism has in any case already sprung the confines of the original plan for the *History*. The evasion is of course also, and more interestingly, an aspect of the nature of its own subject; we may recall that in the old debate between Lovejoy and Wellek on the question of whether a unitary Romanticism could be defined. Abrams (responding to critics who saw his *Natural Supernaturalism* as falling into the "realist" or Wellekian camp) sketched out an "imaginary history" based on the principles of Romantic irony (*Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History: A Reply to Wayne Booth*, Critical Inquiry 2 1976, 458). We have the paradox of trying to write a "synthesizing" Wellekian account of European Romantic irony about a phenomenon which by its very definition would deny the possibility of such an account. Some contributors heroically and self-consciously synthesize (Behler), some proceed in a briskly positivist way to chart be phenomenon (Bisztray), others choose a strand or two which they perceive as present in a particular national literature, ignoring the others and the question of whether any of them standing alone can be said to constitute Romantic irony (for example, in Portuguese prose fiction, self-consciousness of fictionality), while one or two deny that any of the single strands can qualify as Romantic Irony, which must be a "complex" — either a synthetic whole, or a congeries of partially self-contradictory tendencies. Or, possibly, it does not exist at all: but this can only be a limiting case, occasionally mooted, in a volume devoted to the phenomenon. The view of it as a 'congeries' approaches the deconstructive position on periodization of Hilllis Miller, in which every text belongs to (at least) two frames of reference. Romantic Irony then becomes, paradoxically, the most characteristic phenomenon of the "period", in accordance with the principles of our own critical age.

This volume is an appropriate "opener" for the Romanticism subseries; for no straightforward, seamless chronological history organized by periods and styles can go unchallenged in our time, indeed, no such history can be written. It will be interesting to see how the succeeding volumes, on *Romantic Drama, Romantic Poetry, Romantic Fiction,* and finally *Criticism,* will deal with this issue. It has already been determined in the case of *Poetry* and *Fiction* to use a "hermeneutic" approach which will take soundings of the state of reception of the Romantic phenomena at particular periods down to the present. Interpretations of Romanticism have of course figured prominently in the critical debates of the last twenty years.

Garber's Preface rightly calls attention to the surge of interest in the topic of Romantic Irony in recent years. Yet, as he points out, "much of the material on individual nations and areas has never been available to English-speaking readers". Moreover, the volume breaks new ground in that for several of the areas (for example, that of the Southern Slavs) the essays contained in the volume "initiate the history of Romantic irony". Until recently, it was looked upon as a topic confined to German Romanticism, and the Germans rightly remain at the centre of the treatment, with Friedrich Schlegel and Tieck as the main theorist and practitioner, respectively; to a large extent, as Wellek wrote in the already quoted volume 2 of his *History of Literary Criticism,* the theory of Romanticism in general was largely formulated by the Germans, and German Romantic Irony for long seemed one of its most distinctive contributions, not represented elsewhere. The essays offer considerable evidence that the dissemination of Romantic Irony in Europe also started largely from German materials. To some extent, of course, since all the contributors have set out with the German model in hand their formulations of what is taking place in other literatures will conform to that pattern or one of its several versions. The more recent the critical search for the phenomena is, the less divergence in national critical traditions can have played a role in developing distinctive types of Romantic Irony, the more likely this artificial superimposition is. At times, the volume seems to stop short of displaying recent divergences. To take just one example (perhaps owing to editorial modesty): The recognition of Romantic Irony in English Romanticism is very recent, yet has gained ground steadily, starting from Byron's *Don Juan* and extended gradually to other works. Garber himself has contributed ably to this process, with his *Self, Text, and Romantic Irony: The Example of Byron* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988), focussing not on *Don Juan* alone but on the Oriental tales. His contention in that work is that for Byron "the great western fable",

that is, "the idea of an original unity, implying a self already made, one that comes to be divided, and seeks to repair that primal fracture", is not operative, and it is the artifice of the construction of a self from the process of "moving along in the world, seeking, to possess the world" that Byron illustrates. Thus Garber is continuing the now well-advanced process of anglicizing Romantic irony: he explicitly rejects Fichte's idealist version of "the great fable" (Schlegel's source); and he makes Byron the champion of "the post-modern condition" in which we no longer give credence to the "great Western fables".

The volume opens with a very thin section on "Tradition and Background", consisting of two items only, Lowry Nelson's excellent discussion of Cervantes, fitting a broad topic with many ramifications compactly into the space; and Garber's own treatment of Sterne, which provides an essential basis for the many allusions to the seminal *Tristram Shandy* throughout the volume. Gerald Gillespie's wide-ranging treatment of the grotesque, from the final section of the book, amplifying and enriching Wolfgang Kayser's classic account with earlier baroque examples, can profitably be read with these two essays. But even including Gillespie's essay, one would have liked to see a much more extensive section here, for one of the main interests of Romantic Irony is its gradual emergence from a number of different sources. Garber points to the centrality of Cervantes, Diderot and Sterne in Schlegel's writings on irony, and elsewere, as models; but there is no chapter on Diderot, and he is barely mentioned even in Bourgeois; Lilian Furst's use of his *Jacques le Fataliste* as a major example, illuminating as it is, does not altogether make up the omission. Crucial to the development of new techniques is the subtle use of shifting irony to convey dangerously critical views of religious texts, dogmas, and church-backed scientific shibboleths. One very obvious topic would be the history of Socrates in the eighteenth century: the shift of his reputation from a model for stoic death, to that of a political rebel and a deist, and then to a religious model for a subterranean anti-Enlightenment protest. As such he also provides several of the genres most characteristic of Romantic Irony: the dialogue, and the fragment (as in Hamann's *Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten*). Hamann receives only three glancing references in the book (the page number of the first incorrectly given in the index), and there is no mention of *Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten*. The separation of the views of Socrates and Plato, further elaborated by Schleiermacher, served the differentiation of different kinds of irony that came to its head in Kierkegaard's *Concept of Irony*. (Behler does treat Socrates in a subsection of his paper on Schlegel; and Thorlby treats Kierkegaard's *Concept of Irony* as a source of useful definitions in the chapter on English Romantic Poetry; the Scandinavian chapter points to Kierkegaard's practice of Romantic Irony throughout his writing, but makes no reference to Socrates.) Another clear source of Romantic irony is the French *conte,* especially in its exotic, proto-romantic "oriental" forms, and the reception in England, by William Beckford and others; Beckford himself deserves a chapter. The plays of Gozzi, so important for their combination of *commedia dell'arte* and fairy-tale as critique of Goldoni's realism, receive only the barest of passing mentions, as there is no chapter on Italian literature; fortunately, we can expect Gozzi to be treated in the next volume of the series, *Romantic Drama,* edited by Gerald Gillespie. To enumerate what might well have found a place here, however, is no criticism of the editor, for the field is still expanding and he has made a signal contribution to it in this volume, bringing together what is known (itself a heroic task), drawing a map, and starting new directions. One of the purposes of the volume is to stimulate further research and comment, and it admirably fulfills it.

The bulk of the volume is taken up with thirteen essays on "National Manifestations", beginning with two essays on German Romanticism, on the theory, by Ernst Behler, and the practice, by Raymond Immerwahr; on France, by René Bourgeois, followed by "The ironic *récit* in Portuguese Romanticism", by Maria de Lourdes Ferraz and Jacinto do Prado Coelho, and "Imagination and Irony in English Romantic Poetry", by Anthony Thorlby (English fiction is untouched, except for Sterne). There are essays on "Thorbecke and the Resistance to Irony in the Netherlands", by Wim Van den Berg and Joost Kloek; on Scandinavia, by George Bisztray; on "Irony and World-Creation" in the work of the Romanian poet, Mihai Eminescu, by Vera Calin; on "Romantic Irony in Nineteenth-century Hungarian Literature", by Mihály Szegedy-Maszák; "Romantic Irony in Polish Literature and Criticism", by Edward Mozejko and Milan V. Dimič; "Puskin, Lermontov, Gogol: Ironic Modes in Russian Romanticism", by Roman S. Struc; "Romantic Irony and the Southern Slavs", by Milian Dimič; and finally, "The Development of Romantic Irony in the United States", by G. R. Thompson. There are no chapters on Italy or Spain.

The volume concludes with a section entitled "Syntheses", comprising five articles, including a "Coda"

by the editor on "Ironies, Domestic and Cosmopolitan": Lilian Furst, "Romantic Irony and Narrative Stance", Jean-Pierre Barricelli, "Musical Forms of Romantic Irony", and two articles by Gerald Gillespie, "Romantic Irony and the Grotesque", and "Romantic Irony in Modern Anti-Theatre".

There is a very brief, one-page Bibliography; one of the major disappointments of the volume is the failure of the publisher, the Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences, Budapest, to include the extensive bibliography which the editor and his collaborators had prepared during the years they worked on this project: this would have been an invaluable aid in itself, and worth the price of the volume. Presumably because of the expectation that the comprehensive Bibliography would be published, individual contributors' references have not been gathered together in Bibliographies at the end of their articles, but left buried in their footnotes, or omitted. There are exceptions to this. Bourgeois has appended a separate Bibliography, while some contributors (Behler, and Mozejko and Dimič) provide particularly rich footnotes. One misses especially information about available translations of at least the major works discussed. It is a pity too that the Index is only of names, not of concepts; for Romantic Irony is an amalgam of related concepts.

Few readers are likely to read straight through this book; all will have their own special interests. To find a highroad through it, they are advised to begin with Lilian Furst's article (if they have not already read it in her book, *Fictions of Romantic Irony,* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), which sets off from "stable irony" as normally understood, and through a series of central examples shows how Romantic irony differs from it. From here they are urged to proceed to Behler's admirable treatment of the central theoretical development, presenting the at first bewildering variety of Friedrich Schlegel's seminal claims for Romantic Irony, and the way it burgeoned still further in the hands of his contemporaries into the related concepts of Tragic irony (Adam Müller, Solger, and A. W. Schlegel) and World irony (Hegel), as well as the later contributions of Nietzsche, Dilthey and post-Wittgensteinian philosophy. Infinite self-reflection, perspectivism, and the power of caprice opened onto vistas of pessimism, melancholy, and a sense of absurdity. Behler has written on all these matters elsewhere, including a more recent book, *Irony and the Discourse of Modernity* (University of Washington Press, 1990); but this is a little masterpiece of compression. If they then pass to Szegedy-Maszák's essay, readers will find a persuasive account of Romantic irony in its existential form (nowhere else to be found in the volume, except in passing references to Kierkegaard), with an absorbing analysis of the sustained example, the novel *Phantom Visions on the Soul's Horizon*, by Zsigmond Kemény.

The other essays in the "National Manifestations" section are more guarded or cautious in their handling of the topic. Immerwahr, treating "The Practice of Irony in Early German Romanticism", begins with yet another version of Schlegel and a series of caveats: Friedrich Schlegel used the term "irony" and only rarely qualified it as "romantic"; when he did so, it applied to Shakespeare and Petrarch, and to "the fusion of the sentimental and the fantastic which in Schlegel's usage constitutes the romantic in a typological sense." (82) This specialized definition of Romantic Irony has been lost, and the term applied to the more general and sweeping use of irony. Although Romantic Irony has often been identified with the dramatic breaking of illusion typified by Tieck's *Der gestiefelte Kater,* Schlegel was cool towards the play. Immerwahr treats Friedrich Schlegel's own novel *Lucinde,* Jean Paul's *Flegeljahre* (the first imitator of Sterne in Germany), Tieck's fantastic comedies, and the novels Novalis's *Heinrich von Ofterdingen,* and Brentano's *Godwi.* He points out too that many of the fictional techniques later associated with Romantic Irony, especially the shifts in narrative level, were first described by Schlegel under the heading of "arabesque" (the subject of Polheim's excellent book of that name). The differences in view and emphasis in Behler and Immerwahr convey the density, scope, and suggestiveness of German thinking on Romantic Irony, and will, one hopes, send readers back to Friedrich Schlegel himself, now admirably edited by Behler in the *Kritische Ausgabe,* and to the detailed explications of his thought now available.

René Bourgeois, drawing on his own previous work, treats a number of French examples, which he holds were carried out without any awareness of the theory of Romantic Irony; only in the 1930's did it begin to be discussed consciously. The main meaning of "irony" remained (Voltairean) rhetorical irony. Mme de Stael in *De l'Allemagne* in this as in so much else German, brought across the first description of the aesthetics of irony, as the technique of rupturing illusions, located in Goethe and the new comedy of Tieck. The major figure was Hoffman; who as Bourgois showed in his book on Romantic Irony in France, provided in *Prin-*

zessin Brambilla (translated into French in 1830) a direct discussion of irony, as well as an example of it. But "the French had a rather nebulous image of Romantic irony, formed solely by the example of texts which, by their very disparity, could not suffice for the formation of a true aesthetic". (101) He goes on to outline techniques which served to bring the fictional quality of the work of art to the reader's conscious notice; most interesting is the discussion of the problem of evil as handled by Romantic irony (113–15). The artist who describes violence and evil makes them element of a game which renders them partially ineffective, and finally even the difference between life and death is erased. His examples are Jules Janin, *L'Ane mort* and Petrus Borel, as well as Quinet, *Ahasverus* and *Merlin l'Enchanteur.* Bourgeois concludes that in French literature Romantic irony is unable to give rise to other than marginal works, because, he thinks, of their ambiguity: if they are based on a sense of the game they are difficult to take seriously. (119) Yet isn't it typical of the way Romantic irony has come to our attention that it is first located in a single atypical or fringe work, and then is discovered in more and more central places? Moreover, critical concepts have the power to make the marginal work central; the canon shifts. In English an example is Hazlitt's partly fictional, partly autobiographical *Liber Amoris* — previously an embarrassing anomaly in his *oeuvre,* now moving steadily toward the centre. *Don Juan* now seems central — but much work had to be done to make it so. In French too there has been a complete revision of the canon: one might take the example of Lautréamont's *Les Chants de Maldoror,* a fringe work which the surrealists brought to centre stage, and which still more recently became the key work in the alternate canon of Barthes and Sollers, marking the beginning of the "open text". Is this a case of Bourgeois lagging well behind the current of contemporary criticism? Nowhere in the volume is one so convinced that the whole subject needs rethinking as in the crucial instance of French literature. Finally, these meditations lead one to suspect that the reader is not getting an account of the differences in Romantic irony as it manifested itself in different countries, but accounts of different cultures in which the absorption and application of the idea are at different stages of critical development.

A somewhat different stage is displayed in Thorlby's treatment of English Romantic irony. Behler still insists on the fundamental difference between German and English conceptions (53), while recent English critics scamper to bring the English Romantics into the fold of Romantic Irony. Thorlby, however, is still cautious. "Irony is not a quality that is likely to strike English readers immediately as being typical of Romantic poetry or prose writing in their own country", he begins. (131) Nevertheless, he moves directly into the traditional centre of English Romanticism and finds Romantic irony there. Thorlby suggests there is a "potentially ironic structure" to Wordsworth's famous definition of poetry, in the partial contradiction of "spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings" on the one hand, and "recollection in tranquillity" on the other. "Recognition of contradiction" begins to "show itself as a familiar feature of Romantic writing", particularly where its more or less philosophical pronouncements are concerned, the theoretical formulations of Coleridge (influenced by Schelling). Keats he finds grounded in the same set of contradictions as Wordsworth's *Preface.* He then turns to Shelley and finally Byron (though not to *Don Juan*), thus deliberately reversing the order in which critics in the past decade (none of them footnoted) have discovered Romantic irony in English poetry, starting with *Don Juan.* There is a certain vaguenes in his procedure, as he does not work via Coleridge's well documented knowledge of Solger, Müller, and both Schlegels as well as Tieck. Nor, while mining Kierkegaard for definitions, does he indicate the shared existential territory between Coleridge and Kierkegaard. Nor (most surprisingly) does he mention Shakespeare and dramatic irony, a vital context for Coleridge, Lamb, Hazlitt, De Quincey (these four are not mentioned) and Thirlwall. The latter is a particularly significant omission. Only the two articles on German criticism mention Thirlwall; in English the whole context of Thirlwall's essay on tragic irony has yet to be expounded. Blake, especially *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,* not treated by Thorlby, is interpolated by both Gillespie and Garber into their contributions. The rich field of English fiction is not broached. American fiction comes off much better, through George Thompson's piece on Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville (culminating in the *Confidence-Man*), and Furst's treatment of Saul Bellow.

Wim van den Berg and Joost Kloek, "Thorbecke and the Resistance to Irony in the Netherlands" offer the most negative and sceptical account in the book. This is valuable not simply historically, as an account of Dutch attitudes to Romanticism, but in its searching inspection of the current claims being made for Romantic Irony, not least by this volume. The Dutch play devil's advocate: They show the hostility of the Dutch

to German idealism; only in one case — which has been explored neither in Dutch nor in German — that of J. R. Thorbecke, the liberal statesman, was there a knowledge of Romantic irony. (165) He studied in Germany 1820–24 and made contact with a number of literati and philosophers. Solger's widow showed him her husband's papers. He began to draft philosophical dialogues. In the end, he did not write on the *Nachlass* as intended but on Solger's important dialogue *Erwin*. The authors conclude that the usual inclusion of Holland in the European movement of Romanticism is in need of rescrutiny: its right to inclusion could only be asserted by omitting all mention of the missing Romantic irony. The editor, for his part, welcomes the discovery of Thorbecke as a major addition to our knowledge of the reception of Romantic irony.

Bisztray also finds Romantic irony a rare concept in Scandinavian criticism, which when it is found usually means "the breaking of illusion" common to much dramatic literature and not necessarily Romantic irony; yet — as several contributors find — it is more widespread in the literature than this rarity in criticism would lead one to expect. (178) His examples are primarily Danish, such as Oehlenschläger's play *Midsummer Night's Play,* and Hans Christian Andersen's story, "The Galoshes of Fortune". and others, "kaleidoscopic stories with constant and rapid interchanges of two confronted levels of existence" (182), and, of course, the whole *oeuvre* of Kierkegaard (not simply his dissertation, *The Concept of Irony,* or the first part of *Either/Or*). Moreover, while Romanticism is imported from Germany nevertheless the objective social conditions obtained for its acclimatization: the disastrous instability in which Denmark went bankrupt (1813) and lost Norway. He suggests, however, that the "subjective recognition" that "everything could happen" triggered the cult of Romantic irony everywhere in Europe. (187) It is not clear whether he would claim that this subjective recognition is in each region grounded in the objective experience of disaster; or that Denmark had the "objective conditions" lacking in other places that merely borrowed or imitated the German technique. Only Bisztray and Szegedy-Maszák address themselves to the political and social conditions in which Romantic irony flourished.

Vera Calin contributes a study of the leading Rumanian Romantic writer, "Irony and World-Creation in the work of Mihai Eminescu', finding Romantic irony especially well illustrated in his prose. His use of the technique is rooted in philosophical idealism. Romantic irony is defined as the tendency toward the re-creation and re-dimensioning of the universe. Since the world viewed as a projection of the spirit can be annihilated, overturned, reshaped by it, irony can become the instrument of such a destruction or new creation". (190) Ironic fairy-tales that subvert the folk-tale genre such as "Tear-born Prince Charming", and the poem *Calin (Leaves from a Fairy Tale)* provide the main examples. Hoffmann's *Kater Murr* is suggested as a direct influence; other names invoked are Solger, and Jean Paul, but there is no account of Eminescu's acquaintance with the European materials of Romantic irony; nor are the original dates of the works given.

Mihály Szegedy-Maszák gives an absorbing account of the phase of Romantic irony in Hungarian literature from its emergence in the 1820's to the death of Madách. It based itself on German aesthetics, rather than any native theorists. The major literary influence in the first half of the century was Jean Paul. A parallel is drawn between Széchenyi and Kierkegaard as existentialists, who lived in the mode of Romantic irony. Another genre important for the development of Romantic irony is explored through Széchenyi's *journal intime,* in which he spoke of himself in the third person, and recorded fierce debates between his two selves. He ended in suicide; as Kierkegaard had said: "Irony is an abnormal growth, like the abnormally large liver of the Strassburg goose it ends by killing the individual." The late Vörösmarty, and the major writers of the 1850's, showed the powerful traces of Romantic irony: Arany, Kemény, and Madách. This flowering is laid at the door of the defeat of the Hungarian revolution. (209) Pride of place here goes to *Phantom Visions on the Soul's Horizon* (1853), by Kemény, an admirer of Sterne, in which irony is a state of mind, denying any alternative to an ironic world-view. The world-view (as opposed to the technical devices) of Romantic irony leads to a variety of moods of melancholy, *accidie,* despair, spleen, and *ennui,* which most readers will associate with Baudelaire, yet in the account of Romantic irony in France only Baudelaire's homage to Hoffmann in *De l'Essence de rire* is invoked. Madách's *Tragedy of Man* — "the last great Hungarian ironist" — is treated briefly. In this rich account, the variety of forms of Romantic irony are to be found in works described at sufficient length to convey their flavour to the reader unfamiliar with them. The tone of an existential irony is constructed by skillful allusion to major European writers who provide the parameters of the discussion, as well as by reference to the Hungarian works under discussion. One begins to inhabit a Dos-

toevskian world (a writer who is mentioned only once in the volume, by Lilian Furst). Again we miss a bibliography that might provide information about available translations of the works that this account whets the appetite for. This reviewer would very much like to read the story described thus: "Of his two selves one exists only for a single night in a dream inspired by a liar's Mesmeric influence." (213) Surely one of the aims of a comparative work of this scope is precisely this, to load readers to unfamiliar writers, not merely to give a mechanical headcount of writers and works that can be claimed on the mere say-so of the critic to display 'Romantic irony'.

Edward Mozejko and Milan V. Dimič, in "Romantic Irony in Polish Literature and Criticism", report that in Slavic literature and criticism there has been almost no mention of Romantic irony. The Dutch critics' claim that if Romantic Irony is not there, the place of a national literature in European Romanticism must be challenged, cannot hold good, for Polish Romanticism is undoubtedly one of the most important in Europe. Why was there no Romantic irony? Or was there Romantic irony, not recognized as such? On closer examination, the authors find, the writers did indeed employ Romantic irony and were conscious of their forerunners, and at least some critics have discussed Romantic irony in the leading Polish Romantics, Słowacki and Krašinski, whereas other critics have used other, more negative terms such as "chaotic composition", or "frequent digression" (228). Słowacki was aware of the full range of previous examples, and could be called a Byronist. Not only some of his poetry, especially the epic *Beniowska* (1843), but his dramas have the characteristics of Romantic irony, especially *Balladyna* (1839) and *Fantazy,* and were recognized as such at the time of writing. Ariosto, important to Friedrich Schlegel, is taken up here (and nowhere else in the volume): for Schlegel, folklore, Shakespearean tragedy, and what Schlegel called "Ariosto's smile", that is, a capricious imagination which constantly plays with the plot and the presentation of the protagonists, inhabit the same universe. (234) Krašinski experimented with prose; "almost all of his important narratives grow out of the premises of Romantic irony" (235). Yet there has been little discussion of it in criticism. The authors conclude that they have shown only the merest tip of the iceberg, and that a great deal of work needs to be done. In particular, it would seem, the types of Romantic irony present in these writers need more subtle discrimination; the stage of mere assertion that it is there recedes, with this volume, into the past. Dimič's inquiry into Romantic irony among the Southern Slavs indicates that to an even greater extent than in Polish its presence has not been a critical issue, and has passed largely unnoticed.

Roman Struc, in "Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol: Ironic Modes in Russian Romanticism" is essentially sceptical about the presence of Romantic irony in Russian literature. Schlegel's was a programme, he holds, that was not realized until the twentieth century in writers such as Mann, Joyce and Kafka. The dearth of discussion of this topic in Russian criticism is partly the result of the ideological caution of Soviet critics about using any current critical terms; indeed, irony itself is not a category that appears in most of their writing about Russian Romanticism. Romanticism itself has been minimized and seen as a passing, immature phase that at best saw some slight beginnings of realism.

Nevertheless, Pushkin, Lermontov and Gogol, who represent the three generations of Romantics, do show traces of Romantic Irony where literature, its production and strategy, becomes the subject-matter of literature; and when the writer enters the fabric of his own making and destroys the illusion he has created. (243) Pushkin exhibits the kind of ironic attitude Schlegel claimed to find in *Wilhelm Meister:* he seems to "smile from the heights of his spirit upon his masterwork". His irony is gentle, pervasive. *Evgeny Onegin* plays with the clash of incommensurate genres. The prose *Tales of Belkin,* each told by a different narrator, with Belkin as a kind of editor-in-chief and himself as a noncommittal publisher, complement, contradict and obliquely mirror each other. (246–7) In Lermontov the ironic stance is only occasional and incidental; "progressive pessimism is unrelieved by irony or self-irony". (247) Gogol's irony brings him close to Hoffmann, and he had demonstrable acquaintance with German Romanticism, yet his irony is more often a form of grotesque. (247–9) A few other writers are mentioned but not discussed.

The second section concludes, somewhat anomalously, with Romantic irony in America; the *Comparative History of European Literature* has taken on the extended task of charting the presence of European literature abroad, and a rich instance this turns out to be.

The third section, "Syntheses", has some of the most interesting material in the book, though it, like the

opening section, is somewhat haphazard in its coverage. Barricelli's speculative essay on musical examples ranges far into the twentieth century; only Gillespie on the grotesque treats any examples from the visual arts. Gillespie's second article might better have been kept for the next volume in the series, *Romantic Drama.* Garber's coda meditates on what his authors have brought, shifting the emphasis here and there, and giving us more on Heine, and on Byron, and still others. As he concludes, Romantic irony is not an anomaly: "the inner life of Romantic irony is a version of one of the essential rhythms of Romanticism, indeed a synecdoche for it". (380)

Small points, but that make for comfort of reading: careful editing has delivered a volume that despite its great range of linguistic reference is largely free from misprints. There are some unhappy translations, especially in the Portuguese contribution, which may not be attributable to the printing-house; and some unfortunate mistakes: an extra "word" in a quotation from Northrop Frye garbles it (201); Abrahams for M. H. Abrams (226); two errors in a quotation from *Middlemarch* (296); and two dozen or so more minor slips. Other readers will no doubt discover other slips, according to their expertise. The ample quotations are, pleasingly, in the same size typeface as the body of the text; and the originals are to be found in footnotes on the same page, for the most part: in fact, not all German passages are translated in Immerwahr; in the Dutch chapter while Dutch is translated into English, the most important citations are left in the German of Thorbecke, and no French is translated, presumably because French is an official language of the ICLA.

If, finally, the volume draws attention to its omissions and imbalances by its very ambition of encyclopaedic comparative coverage, it has made a very substantial contribution indeed to our knowledge and understanding of this subject. It is a worthy successor to René Wellek's treatment of European Romanticism in his *History of Literary Criticism,* and to Hans Eichner (ed.), *Romantic and its Cognates: the European History of a Word.*

University of East Anglia

E. S. Shaffer

HUNGARIAN STUDIES

a Journal of the International Association of Hungarian Studies

(Nemzetközi Magyar Filológiai Társaság)

Editor-in-Chief
Mihály Szegedy-Maszák

Volume 7
Numbers 1, 2



AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ, BUDAPEST
1991/92

HUNGARIAN STUDIES

VOLUME 7, 1991/1992 CONTENTS NUMBER 1–2

CHRONICLE

REVIEWS

PRINTED IN HUNGARY

Akadémiai Kiadó és Nyomda Vállalat, Budapest

CONTRIBUTORS

László KÓSA	Eötvös Loránd University
George HOFF	Santa Barbara, California
John LUKACS	Chestnut Hill College
László BORHI	Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Samuel J. WILSON	University of Rio Grande
Richard ACZEL	University of London
Enikő MOLNÁR-BASA	Library of Congress
Thomas SZENDREY	Hungarian Academy of Sciences
József JANKOVICS	Gannon University
Nandor F. DREISZIGER	Royal Military College of Canada
László KOVÁCS	Purdue University
Thomas A. SEBEOK	Indiana University
George BISZTRAY	University of Toronto
Steven Béla VÁRDY	Duquesne University
Károly NAGY	Middlesex County College and Rutgers University
Paul BŐDY	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Éva V. HUSEBY-DARVAS	University of Michigan
Ákos FARKAS	Eötvös Loránd University
Marga KAPKA	
József LISZKA	Czechoslovak–Hungarian Folklore Association
Ferenc POZSONY	Cluj-Napoca, Kolozsvár
George F. CUSHING	University of London
Thomas R. MARK	Colorado State University
Mihály SZEGEDY-MASZÁK	Indiana University
Martyn RADY	University of London
Eleanor S. SHAFFER	University of East Anglia

HU ISSN 0236—6568

From the Contents of Forthcoming Issues

Anthony Geber: Lajos (Louis) Márk: His Life and Art
Laura Dolby: Janus Pannonius: The Poetics of the Grotesque
Kathryn Milun: Translating Árgirus
György M. Vajda: Grablegung und Weiterleben der Monarchie in der ungarischen Literatur bis zur Mitte der 20er Jahre