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HUNGARIAN STUDIES

Katalin Keserü: Art Contacts between Great Britain and Hungary at the Turn of the Century

Katalin Gellér: Hungarian Art Nouveau and its English Sources

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REVIEWS

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THE METAPHORICITY OF THE NOVELS BY NÁNDOR GION

FERENC ODORICS

József Attila Tudományegyetem, Szeged, Hungary

1. When can we call a text metaphorical?

1.1.1. If we find "lots of metaphors" in a text, we qualify it metaphorical on the basis of the number of metaphors. In this case we have to do with *local metaphors* which exist independently of one another in the text.

1.1.2. We can also call a text metaphorical if the number of metaphors is not great, but they are associated with one another. In this case we can speak about a "system of metaphors" or a *metaphorical structure*. Obviously, a metaphorical structure does not exclude the existence of many local metaphors in a text; this distinction is relevant, because in the former case we can point out an aggregate characterized by the numerosity of its elements, while in the latter case there is a system, an organic whole.

1.1.3. Finally, we can call a text metaphorical when we understand it metaphorically; e.g. when the reader assumes that the *world of the text/textworld is the metaphor* of his own (or someone else's) world-model. In this case a metaphor is neither a constituent of the world of the text (see 1.1.1.), nor an ordering principle (see 1.1.2.) but it is the entire world of the text itself.

1.2. What conditions must be fulfilled so that we can understand the following sentence?

/1/ "In half a year I shall be here again on the Calvary by the Soldier with the Flower."¹

1.2.1. One primary condition for understanding this sentence is interpreting its metaphorical expression. What is the meaning of "the Soldier with the Flower"? When reading the novel we feel that it is something different from "the soldier with the flower". What is that "something different" and what is then "something similar"? However if the token of "something similar" stands here, then why does this token mean "something different"? Why is the token of "something different" not standing here or does "the Soldier with the Flower" mean "something similar" and "something different" at the same time? Are "similar" and "different" identical with each other? If they are identical why do we make a distinction between them? On the other hand if they are not identical, the token of "something similar" cannot stand for both and at most it can refer only to a part of the two meanings. Which is the part that is the same and different at the same time?

1.2.2. Moreover, I suppose that "the Soldier with the Flower" is not only a local metaphor in the novel by Gion Nándor (*He Also Played for Rogues* 1982) but it is a constituent of the metaphorical structure of the novel as well. The reader may observe

some connection among the constituents. What is more, he may feel that the connections multiply, and presume that there is a metaphorical structure. What is this structure established on?

Is there "something common" in the meaning of "the Soldier with the Flower" and "Rézi's picture postcard"? How is this common meaning established and what role does the "local" meaning of certain tokens play?

1.2.3. Finally, if we accept the assertion that *He Also Played for Rogues* is a metaphorically interpretable text, then what is the "world of the novel" a metaphor of? What conditions must be met so readers can take it as the metaphor of some world-model?

1.3. The purpose of this paper is to find answer to the following questions.

/1.1.1./ What is a metaphor?

What do we do when we understand a metaphor?

/1.1.2./ What is a metaphorical structure?

What do we do when we understand the metaphorical structure of a novel?

/1.1.3./ What is metaphorical understanding?

What do we do when understand the world of a text metaphorically?

2. The scope of validity of the paper's assertions about the understanding of metaphors

Can we give an explanation for understanding the metaphor/metaphorical structure in general? Can we consider our explanation definitive and irrefutable? Can we make universal assertions about linguistic phenomena? To find possible answer to these questions a brief digression into language theory and the philosophy of science is necessary.

2.1. I accept Wittgenstein's theory of language-games. According to Lars Haikola the principles of language-games are the following:

/i/ The meaning of an expression rests on its use.

/ii/ An expression has meaning only within a given area of usage or language-game.

/iii/ Every language-game has its own criteria of rationality.

/iv/ A language-game as a whole cannot be justified only described.

The /iv/ principle implies that Wittgenstein excludes epistemological considerations from his theory of meaning. However, this would mean that the rules which govern language-games could not be considered; and one could not explain the operation of language-games, either. In this paper I accept the first three principles, but dismiss the fourth, because – making use of the results of speech-act theory – I will put the communicative rules governing the understanding of metaphors into the focus of my considerations. I assume that a linguistic occurrence is part of a language-game and that it is an act as well. Therefore I never consider the Metaphor anything but a linguistic unit (text or part of a text) which operates as a metaphor in a language-game. I will

have a set of assertions which applies only to a text or a language-game (one system of conventions).

I will make statements about a novel (in which we can find metaphors) in Wittgenstein's conventionalist view, and about a type of reader who will consider certain texts' metaphors. I intend to describe rules which govern the act of understanding certain texts as metaphors.

2.2. My remarks on the theory of science are not independent of Wittgenstein's theory of language-games. We can take a theory (T) as a quadruple:

$$T \langle S, A, SC, t \rangle$$

where:

- S is a system of sentences,
- A is the set of intended applications of S ,
- SC is a scientific community,
- t is an interval of time.

That is: "The scientific community SC applies the system of sciences S to the set of intended applications A during an interval of time t ." Here SC involves the conventions, preferences, attitudes, knowledge etc. which are characteristic of a scientific community.

2.3. Therefore the scope of validity of my assertions about the understanding of metaphors is as follows:

- S : The system of rules governing the language-game $N-M$.
- A : The language-game, $N-M$, of a novel N (Gion Nándor: *He Also Played for Rogues*) and a certain type, M , of readers who will understand N or a part of N as a metaphor.
- SC : The scientific community which accepts the conventions, preferences etc. mentioned in 2.1. and 2.2. and probably further ones.
- t : The interval during which a representative of SC is able to apply S to some language-game $N-M$.

3. What do we do when we understand a metaphor?

3.1.1. According to Richards when we *use* a metaphor we have two thoughts at our disposal which are active *together* and whose interaction results in this very metaphor. He speaks action in two senses. Firstly, he describes the action of the persons using the metaphor, "usage", which does not say much about the metaphor itself, as all tokens become signs when used. Secondly, he speaks about the interactivity of two thoughts, but this statement itself seems to be metaphorical; Richards presumably refers to mental processes or mental activities. So, Richards seems to consider a metaphor definable with respect to *mental activities*.²

3.1.2. Similarly, Wheelright speaks about a double *imaginative act* which marks the *metaphorical process* substantially and which he calls semantic motion. He does not speak "metaphorically" as Richards does, but he considers the two modes of metaphor (epiphor, diaphor) to be tools which serve the extension of meaning and the creation of new meanings.³

3.1.3. Richards and Wheelright agree in that they both speak about mental activities and only imply language-users; they presume a fixed, and constant interpretive field, and do not account for the variety of the readers' habits.

3.1.4. Although Searle is the apostle of speech-act theory, he does not represent an unambiguous standpoint in the question of metaphors. He finds the essence of a metaphor in the way the sentence "*S is P*" is understood as "*S is R*". He assumes the extension of meaning from literal to metaphorical and takes the literal meaning for granted; as a result, he believes in the existence of a fixed semantic field (see the problem of "literal" meaning in 3.2.). But when he analyzes metaphorical interpretation he mentions strategies of understanding which the reader possesses already, leaving the reader to decide whether to choose the metaphorical interpretation or not.⁴

3.1.5. At first Wittgenstein, later Hester, gave an unambiguous answer to this problem. Wittgenstein uses the term "aspect blindness", which means that "someone is not able to see something as something else".⁵ He explains the understanding of metaphors on the basis of the ability of "seeing as". As a result, metaphors are treated as acts, fixed semantic fields are rejected and the reader's different habits are taken into account.

3.1.6. Before analyzing the process of understanding metaphors I intend to touch briefly on the process of understanding in general. George A. Miller, on the basis of Herbart's theory, classifies the mental processes which relate an experience to familiar conceptual system.⁶

Basically, understanding means that we learn new things by relating them to known ones. Miller assumes that in the process of understanding written texts, "when we finish reading, we have something that we did not have before we had begun".⁷

3.1.7. The process of understanding involves two mental processes: the constructive one and the selective one. The result of the *constructive* process is the memory image which is a single representation of the descriptions in the text, and whose particularities correspond closely to the particularities of the passage at issue. When constructing a memory image, the reader also integrates details into his memory image which were not found in the "original" description but which he "borrowed" from his own memory. As a result of the *selective* process certain *semantic models* are established, i.e. several possible states of affairs which correspond to the written passage only with respect to their common features, but which differ from one another in all other respects.

When beginning to read, the reader's attitude involves the possibility of constructing any kind of state of affairs. However, even when the reading is finished, some indefinite places remain.

An author uses a semantic model to select true descriptive sentences and a reader uses true descriptive sentences to select a model.⁸

Finally, when reading is finished, the reader has a memory image and a model which are synthesized in the course of reading; then he constructs a textual concept.

3.1.8. Consequently, the phenomenon which is to be considered here, is the understanding (apperception) of a text, the result of which is a textual concept.

3.2. Which meaning of the word is the "literal" one?

3.2.1. If we accept Miller's concept of understanding that already known information is linked with the new and the yet unknown, then we have to define "old" and "new" in the understanding of a metaphor. Most authors consider "literal" meaning to be the "old" one. B. Fraser says that a metaphor involves only the nonliteral use of a language,⁹ and literal use occurs when the speaker intends to say something by the literal meaning of the sentence. He maintains that literal meaning is the meaning of a "serious" utterance which requires *the existence of a general agreement*, a consensus.

3.2.2. In Wheelright's opinion the beginning of any metaphorical activity is a literal meaning, a *standard* usage. Who uses this meaning and, as regards the so-called general agreement, who agrees?

3.2.3. The American professor Searle mentions four kinds of meaning in his essay on *Metaphor*:

/i/ word meaning or sentence meaning.¹⁰

/ii/ speaker's meaning or the speaker's utterance meaning.¹¹

/iii/ literal meaning.¹²

/iv/ metaphorical meaning.¹³

He interpretes the distinction between *word meaning* and *speaker's meaning* as follows: the former is "what the words, sentences and expressions mean",¹⁴ the latter is "what a speaker means by uttering words".¹⁵ He speaks about *metaphorical meaning* when "a speaker may utter it to mean it in a way which differs from what the word, expression or sentence actually means".¹⁶ "The *literal meaning* of the sentence is the meaning it has independently of any context."¹⁷

Consequently, word meaning is *what the word means*, speaker's meaning is *what the speaker means*, literal meaning is *what the word means independently of any context*, and finally, metaphorical meaning is *what differs from what the word actually means*. Thus, in Searle's theory of meaning both the word and the speaker can mean something, and there are meanings which are independent of context and which differ from the actual meaning.

I cannot quite make a distinction between what the word means and what the speaker means. I think that meaning is a certain thing the speaker (or the listener) constructs through the word. On the other hand, Searle's system is not clear enough because the basis of his classification is.

3.2.3.1. firstly, by *the agent* (i.e. "word" and the speaker) who constructs the meaning.

3.2.3.2. then *the relationship* between meaning and context (literal meaning),

3.2.3.3. finally, *the meaning* which is, or is not, actual (metaphorical meaning).

3.2.4. We can see that 3.2.3.2. and 3.2.3.3. do not have a common basis, and as a result, Searle's system cannot account for the distinction between literal and metaphorical meaning. If there is meaning independent of context, it cannot be true that the speaker or listener assign the meaning to the word, but it must be contained in the word.¹⁸ But where? According to Searle it is in its semantic content. But where is this semantic content, between the ink and the paper? I am sure that Searle does not think so, but the expression "independent of any context" means that the meaning of a certain word is given in the same way for all users. He probably assumes some kind of a consensus, a general agreement which ensures the constant, fixed meaning of the word. Searle seems to have the lexical meaning in mind. The authors of dictionaries cannot say that this is *the* meaning of the word, either (only, that this is *one* of the meanings of the word). On what basis can Searle take for certain that e.g. the words "freedom", "democracy", "happiness" mean the same to everyone? I cannot imagine any kind of meaning to be independent of context; I think that *any meaning exists only in relation to some context.*

3.2.5. The argument above implies that there is no literal meaning at all. But without literal meaning what can we relate a metaphorical meaning to? Let *p* stand for "The word *x* has no literal meaning." and *q* for "The word *x* has a metaphorical meaning on the basis of its deviation from its literal meaning."

Then we can conclude that there is no metaphorical meaning. What are we talking about then?

3.2.6. Why is Searle's definition of literal meaning unacceptable? (see 3.2.3.) According to 3.2.5. we can suppose that literal meaning exists, whereas we cannot say the same about metaphorical meaning. Does the literal meaning of an expression mean the same to everybody? To someone who accepts the theses of anarchist philosophy "freedom" means "literally" the following:

/2/ "I do not accept authority, I do whatever I want to." To someone who accepts the theses of historical materialism "freedom" means "literally" that

/3/ "I am free if I recognize necessity."

Can we accept that /2/ and /3/ mean the same? I do not think so. Can we say that anarchist and the marxist use "freedom" „non-literally"? I do not think so. How is it possible that /2/ and /3/ do not have the same meaning despite the fact that both have the literal meaning of "freedom"? We have to conclude that the meaning of a word is given by the word and the user as well. Sentence /2/ contains the literal meaning of "freedom" used by an anarchist (and reflects, of course, the actual literal meaning of the word "freedom"). Sentence /3/ contains the literal meaning of the same word used by a marxist. Thus, I propose the following definition of the literal meaning of a word: *literal meaning is the meaning a language-user accepts as the literal meaning of a word (a meaning which corresponds both to the word and the reader's wish).*

A language-user always assumes a system of conventions, a language-game. If we qualify the former "lexicalist" conceptions as „contextualist", we can also explain metaphorical expressions on the basis of literal meaning that is meant by the word and the reader as well.

3.3. What can we begin the understanding of a metaphor with?

3.3.1. In this way we can accept Wheelright's view that the outset of any metaphorical activity is a "literal meaning" (meant both by the word and the reader). We do not exactly know what Wheelright means by "outset" (as *Metaphor and Reality* does not deal with this problem) but Searle represents a similar view.

In Searle's opinion the task of the theory of metaphor is to explain how the speaker and the listener are able to get from "*S is P*" (the literal meaning) to "*S is R*" (the metaphorical meaning). Searle distinguishes three sets of constituents in a metaphorical statement. "*S*" is the subject of the statement, "*P*" is the predicate of the statement to which the truth conditions of the literal meaning of "*P*" belong; finally, "*S is h*" is the meaning of the speaker's utterance together with its truth conditions. I do not quite agree with Searle on this question because I think a predicate cannot have truth conditions. Therefore Searle's assertion must be modified: a distinction must be made between the truth conditions of the literal meaning "*S is P*" and the truth conditions of "*S is R*" as a metaphorical meaning. Thus, we can add two meanings to the formula "*S is P*"; moreover, the reader also constructs two meanings in the process of metaphorical understanding. According to Searle, two meanings must be considered in the process of metaphorical understanding. Searle's example is as follows:

/4/ John is a block of ice.

In Searle's opinion, at first the reader understands this sentence as the statement of the identification of John with a block of ice. Later on he will understand this text as the statement: "John is not responsive." Is it certain in every case that at first the reader will understand the sentence /4/ as the identification of John with a block of ice? Can it be possible that at first he will think of John's insensitiveness?

Let's see the following example:

/5/ I love my rose.

Does the reader understand the expression "my rose" as the identification of "a rose" with a "beloved woman"?

3.3.2. I do not think so. Furthermore, I do not think that the identification of "*S*" with "*P*" is a real statement, but rather a quasi-statement. Moreover, I do not think that the real statement of a metaphorical expression is "*S is R*" either. Instead, in metaphors the real statement of identification does not occur in a straightforward way; that is, we can find only a kind of partial similarity between "*S*" and "*P*". Consequently, the metaphorical meaning of the expression "John is a block of ice" is not confined to the statement that John is not responsive; it also refers to the fact that in a certain sense

John is similar to a block of ice. The metaphor does not exactly tell the reader what the similarity lies in, because if the reader could express it he would, perhaps, say it literally.

3.4. How can we justify the assumption that the meaning of a metaphor involves the statement of partial similarity between two things?

3.4.1. First we have to decide what constituents operate in the understanding of a metaphor and what we can call them. Most scholars agree that a metaphor has *at least* two constituents. One of them is the "quasi-argument" which is stated to be identical with the second one, the "quasi-predicate". (This view is also held by Hester and Miller.)

3.4.1.1. Wheelright speaks about two constituents, too: one of them is a relatively well-known or concretely known thing whereas the other one is less known.¹⁹ Richards calls the two constituents of a metaphor *tenor* and *vehicle*. The tenor marks the underlying idea or the primary subject, the vehicle marks the borrowed idea or the one the subject resembles.²⁰ Later on I will use *the term tenor for marking the quasi-argument and the term vehicle for marking the quasi-predicate*.

3.4.2. Marcus B. Hester developed his theory of metaphor on the basis of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning. Hester deviates from the conception of the Viennese nominalist in that he does not exclude the latter's epistemological considerations from his theory, so we are in a position to base our description of the rules which govern the understanding of metaphors on Hester's account.²¹

3.4.2.1. According to Wittgenstein the understanding of an expression is identical with the recognition of the criteria of the expression. Criteria are observable features of an object selected by convention.²² ("An 'inner' process stands in need of outward criteria."²³) However, on the basis of C. Wellman's argument²⁴ Hester thinks that the features of a thing are not necessarily observable (this shows an intention to bring in epistemological considerations). Therefore we can define the criteria of an expression as *those features of a thing which are selected by convention*. According to Hester the conditions of understanding the meaning of a metaphor are the following:

/i/ necessary condition:

the understanding of the criteria involved in the words,

/ii/ sufficient condition:

the perception of relevant senses.

3.4.2.2. What is a relevant sense? It involves those features which are found both in the tenor and the vehicle, that is, "A relevant relation is one in which *x* is like *y* in *some* senses but *not in every sense*".²⁵ Logically we may regard relevant sense as the relation of *partial similarity*. Consequently, the sufficient condition for understanding a metaphoric meaning is the recognition of partial similarity between the things referred to by the tenor and vehicle. This recognition takes place in the act of "seeing as". The act of "seeing as" means to see something as if it were something else. In the case of the sentence "John is a block of ice" to see John as a block of ice is to see John

as if he were a block of ice. In Wittgenstein's opinion "to see as" is to notice an aspect which makes us see something as if it were something else; this supposes some kind of similarity between two things.

3.4.3. At the same time, in the process of understanding the meaning of a metaphor a specific "seeing as", the so-called *metaphorical "seeing as"* operates between elements of an *imaginary*

/i/ the empirical act of the sounding qualities of a metaphor,

/ii/ the act of constructing (quasi-sensory) imagery,

/iii/ the act of selecting relevant aspects from the constructed imagery (the selection of the relevant sense).

This conception is compatible with Miller's conception of understanding: the act of construction is compatible with the constructive mental process and the act of selecting with the selective mental process.

3.5. How can the statement of partial similarity of two things be established?

3.5.1. Miller thinks that the alethic contradiction in the expression "*x is y*" can be eliminated if one accepts the expression "*x is like y*" as true in a world-model. Thus, the convention of similarity operates in the understanding of a metaphor. In Miller's opinion similarity is not part of the textual concept of the meaning, but it is the basis of understanding.

3.5.1.1. Miller explains the understanding of a metaphor on the basis of similarity between tenor and vehicle. This relation is established by the reader who extends certain properties of the vehicle to the tenor. According to Miller's model of understanding (linking the known with the unknown) the way of metaphorical understanding is as follows: the vehicle is the old information, the tenor is the current topic and *the relation of similarity between them is the new information*.

3.5.1.2. He assumes that there are two aspects of understanding a simile:

/i/ the recognition of the occurrence of a simile in the text; there are two conditions for this:

/i-i/ the occurrence of a comparative statement in the text,

/i-ii/ the bases of comparison are not obvious;

/ii/ interpretation: a search for the bases according to which the author presumably compared two things.²⁷

3.5.1.3. The relation of similarity between two concept is expressed by the following formula:

$$SIM[F(x), G(y)]$$

SIM: the relation of similarity,

x: tenor,

F: (some) feature(s) of the tenor,

y: vehicle,

G: (some) feature(s) of the vehicle.

To interpret this formula:

/5/ A brain is like a machine.

The missing functions (F , G) are understood conceptually.

$(JF)(JG)\{SIM[F(a\ brain), G(a\ machine)]\}$ which can be paraphrased as "Some properties of the brain are similar to some properties of a machine".

3.5.1.4. Consequently, the general rule of understanding a simile is as follows:

$$SIM(x, y)\{(JF)(JG) \rightarrow SIM[F(x), G(y)]\}$$

It must be mentioned that this rule is a psychological and not a linguistic one. The reader is not compelled to produce any particular linguistic expression, but only to explore a range of conceptual possibilities.

This rule, which Miller labels reconstructive, serves as a basis for the understanding of metaphors.

3.5.2. Miller states that the understanding of a metaphor has three basic steps:

/i/ recognition,

/ii/ reconstruction,

/iii/ interpretation.

However, even in the simplest cases this process may take place so rapidly that all the steps merge into a single mental act.

Regarding the understanding of metaphors, the problem of fundamental importance seems to center around the relation of partial similarity which forms the basis of metaphor. Miller defines the process of reconstruction as a mental process in the course of which the reader formulates the structure of a concept which expresses similarity, that is, $SIM F(x) \cdot G(y)$.

With respect to the understanding of metaphors Miller distinguishes /i/ nominal metaphors, /ii/ predicative metaphors, and /iii/ sentence metaphors.

3.5.2.1. *The understanding of nominal metaphors*

In this case a nominal concept y is expressed by a noun phrase and is used metaphorically.

The rule of understanding is as follows:

$$R_1BE(x, y) \rightarrow (JF)(JG)\{SIM[F(x), G(y)]\}$$

Where "BE" is some form of the verb "to be". If the reader finds a text which expresses the formula $BE(x, y)$ e.g.:

/4/ John is a block of ice,

then he can construct the underlying similarity by $(JF)(JG)\{SIM[F(John), G(a\ block\ of\ ice)]\}$

Consequently, we can say that there are common properties which are characteristic of both John and a block of ice.

3.5.2.2. *The understanding of predicative metaphors*

Here a predicative concept G is expressed by a predicative phrase (verbs, verb phrases, or predicative adjectives) which is used metaphorically.

The rule of understanding is as follows:

$$R_2G(x) \rightarrow (JF)(JG)\{SIM[F(x), G(y)]\}$$

If the reader finds a text which expresses the formula $G(x)$ for example:

/6/ I heard the iron cry,

then he can construct the underlying similarity by $CRY(iron) \rightarrow (JF)(JG)SIM-[F(iron), CRY(g)]$.

Here the reader must find the thing y which has the property of "crying", that is, the common properties characteristic of both the iron and the thing y .

3.5.2.3. *The understanding of sentence metaphors*

In this case the concept of a sentence $F(x)$ has to be inferred from the text or context.

The rule of understanding is as follows:

$$R_3G(y) \rightarrow (JF)(JG)\{SIM[F(x), G(y)]\}$$

Miller does not say more about sentence metaphors (see the author's conception in 3.6.2.3. and the analysis of R_3 in 3.6.4.).

3.5.2.4. As we can see, rules of reconstruction reflect only the relation of partial similarity but not the content of this relation. The latter is constructed in the course of interpretation by the reader. In the process of reconstruction the reader intends to (re)construct the formula of similarity $SIMF(x) \cdot G(y)$; he established the components, which cannot be found in the text conceptually. The missing components are:

/i/ in nominal metaphors: G, F, SIM ,

/ii/ in predicative metaphors: F, y, SIM ,

/iii/ in sentence metaphors: F, x, SIM .

(SIM, F) of the five components (SIM, F, x, G, y) are always missing.

SIM is missing because it is a typical marker of the simile; if it appears in the text we cannot speak of a metaphor, only of a simile. F (the property of the tenor) is missing because the speaker's aim is to say something new about the tenor and to find something different from the conventional properties when using a metaphor. So as to understand a (metaphorical) expression, two constituents out of x, G, y , always occur in the text.

3.5.3. The process of understanding metaphors is as follows:

/i/ we realize that there is a metaphor in the text,

/ii/ in the processes of reconstruction and interpretation we take the properties of the vehicle into account,

/iii/ in the processes of reconstruction and interpretation we select those properties of the vehicle which can be extended to the tenor as well.

These phases are governed by rules of recognition, by one of the rules reconstruction R_1 , R_2 , R_3 and by rules of interpretation.

3.6. What rules operate when metaphors are understood?

3.6.1. *The rules of the recognition of metaphors*

On what basis can the reader consider a text metaphorical? What does the text mark?

3.6.1.1. In nominal metaphors the text marks the tenor x , the vehicle y , and their identity $BE(x, y)$, but does not specify their properties F, G . The reader can attribute metaphorical interpretation to an expression if it asserts *the identity of two things*, since two things can never be identical in our world-model. The first rule of the recognition of metaphors is as follows:

F_1 The reader recognizes that an expression can be considered metaphorical if it marks the identity of two things.

3.6.1.2. In predicative metaphors the text marks the tenor x , (some) attribute(s) G of the vehicle and it connects (some) attribute(s) of the vehicle to the tenor $G(x)$. The reader can interpret an expression metaphorically if the latter assigns properties to a thing which it does *not have conventionally* (the reader does not accept these properties as the criteria of the thing).

F_2 The reader accepts an expression as metaphorical if it attributes some feature to a thing which is not an accepted criteria.

3.6.1.3. The text may involve modal elements which *call* the reader's attention to a metaphorical interpretation *directly*, e.g. "Metaphorically speaking...". Thus we have:

F_3 The reader recognizes that an expression can be regarded as metaphorical if it involves modal elements which directly call for metaphorical interpretation.

These were the cases when semantic anomalies (F_1, F_2) or explicit elements (F_2) called the reader's attention to metaphorical interpretation. We must also consider cases when contextual elements behave in the same way.

3.6.1.4. In sentence metaphors the text marks only the vehicle y and its property G . The reader can interpret an expression metaphorically if it makes no sense literally in the actual context, that is, the actual context has no features to help the reader decide if the context satisfies the truth conditions of the expression. Accordingly, the next rule is:

F_4 The reader recognizes that an expression can be regarded as metaphorical if (on the basis of the actual context) he is not able to decide whether the truth conditions of the literal meaning of the expression can be satisfied or not.

3.6.2. *The rules of reconstruction of metaphors*

When on the basis of one of the rules of recognition (F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4) the reader decides to interpret the given expression metaphorically, he can start to look for the relation of partial similarity underlying the metaphor.

3.6.2.1. The rule of reconstruction R_1 can follow the rule of recognition F_1 .

R_1 If an expression marks the identity of two things then the reader assigns the relation of partial similarity to the expression.

The reader facilitates the destruction of semantic anomalies belonging to the expression by the application of R_1 .

3.6.2.2. The rule of reconstruction R_2 can follow the rule of recognition F_2 .

R_2 If an expression assigns a property to a thing which the reader does not accept as the criterion of the thing then the reader

/i/ determines the thing as whose criterion he will accept the property G ,

/ii/ assigns the relation of partial similarity between x and y to the expression.

The reader facilitates the destruction of semantic anomalies belonging to the expression by the application of R_2 , just as in R_1 .

3.6.2.3. The rule reconstruction R_3 can follow the rule of recognition F_4 .

R_3 If, on the basis of the actual context, the reader cannot decide if the truth conditions of the literal meaning of an expression can be satisfied, then he constructs a relation of partial similarity. One element of this will be the thing y marked in the expression together with its property G and the other one will be the unmarked thing x together with its property F .

Now the reader is able to satisfy the truth conditions of this relation of partial similarity based on actual context.

3.6.2.4. Finally, any rule of reconstruction (R_1, R_2, R_3) can follow the rule of recognition F_3 . The difference between the expressions governed by F_1, F_2, F_4 and those governed by F_3 comes from the existence of some modal elements. Namely: some modal elements (e.g.: "Metaphorically speaking..."), plus

/i/ the marker of the nominal metaphor $BE(x, y)$ or

/ii/ the marker of the predicative metaphor $G(x)$ or

/iii/ the marker of sentence metaphor $G(y)$.

All three rules of recognition have a common element in that they facilitate the verification of expressions which are literally false (in the case of R_1 and R_2) or unjustifiable (in the case of R_3).

3.6.3. *The rules of interpretation of metaphors*

When rules of interpretation operate the reader assigns appropriate meanings to "empty" terms (F, G, x, y) established by rules of reconstruction.

3.6.3.1. The rule of interpretation I_1 can follow the rule of reconstruction R_1 .

I_1 The reader supplies the terms (F, G) with appropriate meanings, which remained "empty" after the operation of the rule of reconstruction R_1 .

3.6.3.2. The rule of interpretation I_2 can follow the rule of reconstruction R_2 .

I_2 The reader supplies the terms (F, y) with appropriate meanings, which remained "empty" after the operation of the rule of reconstruction R_2 .

3.6.3.3. The rule of interpretation I_3 can follow the rule of reconstruction R_3 .

I_3 The reader supplies the terms (F, x) with appropriate meanings, which remained "empty" after the operation of the rule of reconstruction R_3 .

The meanings to be assigned to these "empty" terms is determined by their internally coherent configuration and the constituents of the context (the reader's attitude, preferences, knowledge etc.).

3.6.4. As a consequence, our question in 1.2 can be answered. The question is: "What conditions must be satisfied so that we can understand the following sentence?":

/1/ "In a half year I shall be here again on the Calvary by the Soldier with the Flower."

Our main problem was the metaphorical meaning of "the Soldier with the Flower". This is a sentence metaphor not preceded by any modal elements so when it is understood, the rule of recognition F_4 , the rule of reconstruction R_3 , and the rule of interpretation I_3 operate. In particular:

F_4 The reader recognizes that the expression /1/ can be interpreted metaphorically since he is not able to decide on the basis of the actual context whether the truth conditions of the literal meaning of the expression can be satisfied or not.

The formula of the expression /1/ is as follows:

$G(y) : G$ (the Soldier with the Flower).

G is not given in the expression /1/, it can be established on the basis of the text of the novel.

R_3 The reader constructs a relation of partial similarity between the thing y marked in the expression /1/ (the Soldier with the Flower) together with its property G , and the thing x not marked in the expression /1/ together with its property F .

$G(y) (F) (G) SIM F(x), ?$ (the Soldier with the Flower)

I_3 The reader supplies the terms (F, x) with appropriate meanings. $F: ?$

$x: ?$

G remains empty because /1/ can be interpreted only on the basis of the text of the novel. So we can attribute the following features (relations) to "the Soldier with the Flower":

/i/ he is *hitting the Saviour*²⁸

/ii/ he *wants to step out of the pictures*²⁹

/iii/ his face is *different* from that of the others³⁰

/iv/ he does *not suffer*³¹

/v/ he is *the only happy* man³²

/vi/ he looks at the people *as if they did not exist*³³

I select the following relevant properties out of these (on the basis of conventions of my language-game): *happy, outsider, violent*. These properties form G . Is there an object in the novel which is similar to "the Soldier with the Flower", or has G (or part of G)?

This "object" is Gallai István (hence: GI) who has G in a certain part of novel. The beginning of this section contains the episode in which GI first succeeds to conjure Bald Fischer (t_1). The end of this section contains the episode in which GI is wounded in the war (t_2). In this section GI has two of the relevant properties of "the Soldier

with the Flower". Consequently, we can say that "the Soldier with the Flower" and GI are partially similar because they have common properties: "happy", "outsider", and they also have different features. For example GI is a human being, whereas "the Soldier with the Flower" is inanimate and violent. One of the empty terms can be interpreted as follows:

x: GI between t_1 and t_2 in the novel.

How can we interpret *F*? *F* naturally involves the properties "happy" and "outsider" and the properties "artist", "meek", etc. The relation of partial similarity underlying the metaphorical understanding of "the Soldier with the Flower" is as follows:

SIM[ARTIST, HAPPY, OUTSIDER, MEEK (István Gallai),

VIOLENT, HAPPY, OUTSIDER, INANIMATE (the Soldier with the Flower)].

The relevant properties are "happy" and "outsider". Consequently, the expression /1/ carries the following metaphorical meaning: if István Gallai is on the Calvary by the Soldier with the Flower then he has a part of the features of "the Soldier with the Flower", namely, he is happy and stands outside.

3.7. What is the entity we call the understanding of a metaphor though in fact it is not that?

3.7.1. When analyzing Gion's novel the event of Jóska Ubonyi's fighting with Dusan Mandic can be regarded as metaphorical because this event is interpreted as the metaphorical expression of "brutality". But are "this fight" and "brutality" related to each other on the basis of partial similarity? Does Wittgenstein's concept of "seeing as" operate concerning this event when understanding the text? How can the relevant sense, the common properties, be defined?

Common properties can be found, but while all properties of "brutality" (more precisely: brutal events) are valid for "this fight", too, it is not the case that all properties of "this fight" can be regarded as valid for "brutal events". Consequently, the relation between "this fight" and "brutal events" is not that of partial similarity but of entailment.

3.7.2. The event when Gilike is playing with his fingers can also be regarded as metaphorical, because it can be interpreted as "awkwardness". In this case we cannot speak about the occurrence of "seeing as" or partial similarity either because the criteria of one object form a subset of the criteria of the other one. However, the criterion of "awkwardness" is not a necessary property of Gilike's playing with his fingers. Miller calls this type of understanding attribution.

3.7.3. When understanding a novel the following types of understanding must be taken into consideration: attribution (the traditional term is characterization), entailment (the traditional term is generalization) and ironic understanding (analyzed by Searle).³⁴ These types must be separated from metaphorical understanding.

3.7.4. As a result, the general rule of construction of non-literal understanding can be formulated. The text can involve the elements of understanding in three ways: *BE* (x, y) – nominal case, *G* (x) – predicative case, *G* (y) – sentence case.

As a result,

$$R_G BE (x, y) \text{ or } G (x) \text{ or } G (y) \rightarrow (JR), (JF) (JG) \{R [F (x), G (y)]\}.$$

Here we meet a new relation *R*. This relation can be specified on the basis of the types of understanding:

- /i/ metaphorical understanding
R: partial similarity (*SIM*),
- /ii/ generalizing understanding
R: entailment (*ENT*),
- /iii/ characterizing understanding
R: attribution (*ATTR*),
- /iv/ ironic understanding
R: opposition (*OPP*).

This rule governs the process in the course of which we facilitate the verification of a literally false or unjustifiable expression. The basis for verifying involves the relations *SIM*, *ENT*, *ATTR* and *OPP*.

4. What do we do when we understand a metaphorical structure?

4.1. The first condition that must be recognized is that the reader is reading a novel which can be connected with a metaphorical structure. Consequently, the rules of recognition start the understanding of a metaphorical structure. The function of these rules is the construction of an attitude "supposing a metaphorical structure" (*A_m*). How is this attitude established in Gion's novel?

4.1.1. The reader cannot explain the titles of the novel (*He Also Played for Rogues, The Soldier with the Flower, Rose-honey*) without interpreting them metaphorically. Similarly, he cannot explain certain parts of the text either. For example what is the function of the galloping Serbian riders at Christmas? Why is the description of Gallai's and Ádám Török's "great escape" so detailed? What does Gallai want to do with that rose-honey?

4.1.1. *The rules of the recognition of metaphorical structures*

F_{s1} The reader recognizes that a metaphorical structure can be assigned to a novel if he cannot explain certain parts or the whole of the novel.

This rule involves *the recognition of so-called gaps of interpretation*.

4.1.2. *F_{s2}* The reader recognizes that a metaphorical structure can be assigned to a novel only if he has recognized some local metaphors in the text.

This rule requires the operation of one of the rules F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4 , (which give the recognition of local metaphors), but none of the rules of reconstruction or that of interpretation.

The attitude A_m can also be established without the operation of F_{s1} and F_{s2} . For example in the case of readers who assume metaphorical structures occur in most novels. But this attitude A_m can be established also on the basis of the reader's previous literary knowledge e.g. if he knows that metaphorical structure is a standard constituent of Theodor Storm's novels. In the case mentioned above the reader's taste and knowledge play a relevant role in the construction of the attitude A_m . Also, the reader does not always apply both F_{s1} and F_{s2} at the same time; thus it is possible that only one of them forms the attitude A_m . This gives an opportunity to the classification of the reader's habits, too.

4.2. After the reader has recognized that a metaphorical structure can be assigned to a novel, he may start to construct it. What conditions must be satisfied for the reader to do so? The primary condition of a metaphorical structure is that there should be "something common" in the metaphors of the novel. This "something common" is called common designatum by Szegedy-Maszák.³⁵ On the basis of the theory of metaphor developed in section 2, the designatum of a metaphor is the relevant sense (the common property(s) of the tenor and the vehicle). Therefore I think that *the system of the relevant senses of metaphors forms a metaphorical structure*.

4.2.1. On what basis can we say that "the Soldier with the Flower" and "rose-honey" are associated with each other as metaphors? We have to suppose that they are understood. Consequently, the first rule of construction for understanding a metaphorical structure is as follows:

K_I The reader understands the local metaphors of the novel, that is, he constructs their relevant senses.

(This rule requires the operation of the rules of reconstruction and interpretation of local metaphors.)

The reader must understand as many local metaphors as are needed to construct a metaphorical structure.

4.2.2. After the operation of the rule K_I the reader has the following at his disposal (here I analyze the connection of two metaphors only):

/i/ the relevant sense (C) of one of the metaphors (m_1): $SIM [F(x), G(y)]$

The relevant sense appears to be the result of the interpretation of the relation of partial similarity (SIM) which can be defined as the intersection of F and G : $C = F \cap G$

/ii/ the relevant sense (D) of another metaphor (m_2): $SIM [F'(x'), G'(y')]$

$$D = F' \cap G'$$

The relation of the two metaphors is given by the relation of the relevant senses.

$$R [C(m_1), D(m_2)]$$

This formula shows the primary condition for connecting two metaphors. Therefore the general rule for connecting two metaphors is as follows:

GG The reader can connect two metaphors of a text if he recognizes a relation (*R*) between their relevant senses.

4.2.3. What relation can be established between “the Soldier with the Flower” and “rose-honey”? In the sequel I will mark the metaphorical expressions to be found in a text as m_1 (one metaphor) and m_2 (another metaphor) independently of their type, and the marking of relevant senses will be e.g. $C(m_1)$. In this way the simplified form of the formula K_G is $(m_1, m_2) \rightarrow R [C(m_1), D(m_2)]$

The interpretation of this simplified formula is as follows:

the text of Gion’s novel – *R* STANDING OUTSIDE,

HAPPY (the Soldier with the Flower), COMMUNAL, HAPPY (rose-honey).

We see that the two metaphors have both a common element (HAPPY) and different ones, so the relation between the relevant senses is that of partial similarity (*SIM*). The next rule of the understanding of a metaphorical structure is as follows:

$$K_2(m_1, m_2) \text{ SIM } [C(m_1), D(m_2).]$$

4.2.4. The next type of the creation of metaphorical structures is exemplified by the relation between the metaphors “Rézi’s picture postcard” and “holiday clothes”.

R PROTECTING, IN THE ABSTRACT HUMANE (Rézi’s picture postcard), IN THE ABSTRACT HUMANE (holiday clothes)

As C contains all the elements of D but D does not contain all the elements of C , R is the relation of containing (*CONT*).

(D is a subset of C .)

The next rule is:

$$K_3(m_1, m_2) \text{ CONT } [C(m_1), D(m_2).]$$

4.2.5. What relation can be established between “the Soldier with the Flower” and “Gildke’s playing with his fingers”?

R STANDING OUTSIDE, HAPPY (the Soldier with the Flower), STANDING OUTSIDE, HAPPY (Gildke’s playing with his fingers)

The relevant senses of the two metaphors are identical, therefore the relation between them is that of identity (*ID*):

$$K_4(m_1, m_2) \text{ ID } [C(m_1), D(m_2)]$$

4.2.5.1. When understanding a metaphor we cannot accept the relation identity because two things can never be identical with each other, though, when understanding a metaphorical structure it can be accepted, because the sets of features do not mark things but relations. Therefore, they can be identical with each other. The basic difference between the understanding of a metaphor and a metaphorical structure can be defined in the following way:

/i/ when understanding a metaphor we know about a *relation between two things*,
 /ii/ when understanding a metaphorical structure we know about *relations* (which are of different types) *between relations* (which are one type—that of similarity).

4.2.6. What relations can be found in this metaphorical structure:

R STANDING OUTSIDE, HAPPY (the Soldier with the Flower),
 BEING PARTICIPANT, UNHAPPY (mumbling).

The elements of the relevant senses of metaphors are not only different from each other but they are opposed to each other as well (e.g. HAPPY–UNHAPPY).

This is the relation of opposition (*OPP*).

$$K_5 (m_1, m_2) \text{ OPP } [C (m_1), D (m_2)]$$

4.2.7. Consider the following example:

R COMMUNAL, HAPPY (rose-honey), BEING PARTICIPANT, UNHAPPY (mumbling)

Some of the elements are opposed to each other, others are identical. (“Communal” and “being participant” can be regarded as identical, because these elements are not explicit in the text but they are constructed by the reader.) The relation between the relevant senses is that of equivalence–opposition (*EO*).

$$K_6 (m_1, m_2) \text{ EO } [C (m_1), D (m_2)]$$

4.2.8. In Gion’s novel these rules of construction seem to be relevant and capable of operation. Of course, theoretically other rules can be conceived of.

The creation of a metaphorical structure assumes that within the whole structure there are *indirect contacts*, that is, any metaphor can be brought into connection with any other metaphor “through” (by means of) the relevant senses.

4.2.9. Finally, we can speak of the understanding of a metaphorical structure only when, by means of this structure the reader explains the text which was inexplicable for him before constructing it. For example on the basis of the metaphorical structure “He also played for rogues”, the “galloping of Serbian riders at Christmas” can be explained, because it is this event of the novel that makes Gilike step out of his tales and learn to ride indeed, it makes him stop being an outsider. The expressions “the Soldier with the Flower”, “Gilike’s playing with his fingers”, “the Serbian riders” and “Gilike’s riding” play important roles as metaphors, as elements of the metaphorical structure of the novel in the explanation above. Consequently, the general rule of interpretation of a metaphorical structure is as follows:

I_{SG} By means of the metaphorical structure of a novel the reader can explain at least one part of the novel which he could not before the construction of this metaphorical structure.

The formulation of *I_{SG}* is necessary because if the reader constructs a “metaphorical structure” on the basis of which he does not understand any of the novel (he does

not fill any interpretative gap) then this structure does not exist as the metaphorical structure of the novel. It cannot be taken into consideration when understanding the novel.

5. What do we do when we understand a textworld metaphorically?

5.1. Ricoeur thinks that the process of the understanding of a metaphor is the key to the understanding of larger texts, say, e.g. of literary pieces.³⁶ Similarly, according to Lodge, a literary text is always metaphorical in the sense that when it is interpreted it is placed into a total metaphor: the text is the vehicle and the world is the tenor.³⁷ If we accept Lodge's view we face a "big" sentence metaphor in the description of the understanding of a novel. The text marks only the vehicle y and its property or properties G and the reader's task is to construct the tenor x , its property or properties F and relation SIM on the basis of the context. Therefore all the rules which govern the understanding of sentence metaphors operate specifically in the metaphorical understanding of a novel.

5.2. The rules of the metaphorical understanding of a novel

5.2.1. The rules of recognition

F_{m1} The reader recognizes that a novel can be interpreted metaphorically if he is not able to decide on the basis of the actual context (his world-model) whether the truth conditions of the textworld (a complex state of affairs) can be satisfied or not.

F_{m2} The reader recognizes that a novel can be interpreted metaphorically if he can state on the basis of the actual context (his world-model) that the textworld is false.

The function of F_{m1} and F_{m2} is to bring about an attitude of "metaphorical interpretation" A_{mi} in the reader. This attitude can also be established without the operation of these rules, e.g. in the case of readers who interpret novels mainly metaphorically. For example Sartre's novel *Les mots* can be regarded as an authentic biography. In this case the reader can satisfy the truth conditions of the textworld on the basis of the actual context (a world-model). But he can also interpret it metaphorically if he sees Sartre's life as someone else's life (or as his own life).

F_{m1} can operate when reading Gion's novel because we can assume readers who are not able to decide whether the first sentence of the novel is true or not: "In the autumn of 1898 Stefan Krebs came from Feketics to Szenttamás..."³⁸ The reader can raise the questions: "where is Feketics?" or "what is Feketics?"

F_{m2} can operate in that part of the novel in which Gallai tells us that Istenes Ribic Mihály and his wife left their children alone, fastening them to table legs with a string so long they could reach to the middle of the room "where cooked cold grains of corn looked yellow in a hole scooped in the earth".³⁹ Some of the readers would regard this state of affairs as false because they would think that "such a thing does not exist". (The expression "grains of corn" fulfills an important metaphorical function in the nov-

el.) F_{m1} and F_{m2} can operate together but at same time only one of them can be correlated with the given state of affairs. Here the expression "at the same time" means that what is unverifiable to one reader can be false to another.

5.2.2. *The rule of reconstruction of metaphorical understanding*

R_m The reader constructs a partial similarity one element of which is the textworld as vehicle y and its property or properties G and the other element is a part of his world-model as tenor and its property or properties F .

If F_{m1} and F_{m2} operate before the operation of R_m , the reader is able to satisfy the truth conditions of partial similarity. It has to be noted that if the truth conditions of a textworld can be satisfied, that is, the reader considers the world of novel to be true, we can speak about metaphorical understanding only if the relation of partial similarity between the textworld and a world-model holds as well. If the reader considers the textworld to be true, then the relation of partial similarity ("seeing as") is established between two different parts of a world-model. If the reader does not consider the textworld to be true, then the relation of partial similarity is established between a part of a world-model and a fictive world.

In the latter case a possible explanation for the problem of fictionality of a novel can be given. A fictive world can be considered true if we validate the relation of partial similarity between the former and a world-model. This is possible only if the text is interpretable metaphorically. This possibility can be extended to other types of understanding if we apply the following rule:

$$R_G V G (y) \rightarrow (JR) (JF) (JG) \{R [F (x), G (y)]\},$$

where

$G (y)$: the fictive world and its properties,

$F (x)$: a part of a world-model and its properties,

R : the relation between the fictive world and a part of a world-model.

This rule can be called *the general rule of verification*. This relation R can be specified as entailment, attribution, opposition and partial similarity; that is, the values of the general rule of reconstruction governing the non-literal understanding of texts supposedly with other values as well. On the basis of this rule the reader admits a fictive world which is "very similar".

5.2.3. *The rule of interpretation of metaphorical understanding*

I_m The reader assigns appropriate meanings to the terms (SIM, F, x) which remained "empty" after the operation of the rule of reconstruction R_m .

This rule establishes only that "part" of the meaning of a novel which is the result of metaphorical understanding. This partial (metaphorical) meaning of the novel can be established on the basis of the relation between the textworld and a part of a world-model. Since the purpose of this paper is not the interpretation of Gion's novel, I say nothing more about this.

Notes

1. Gion 1982, 199. p.
2. Cf. Richards 1936, 93. p.
3. Cf. Wheelright 1962, 72. p.
4. Cf. Searle 1979, 105. p.
5. Wittgenstein 1963, 213. p.
6. Cf. Miller 1979, 202. p.
7. Cf. Miller 1979, 203. p.
8. Cf. Miller 1979, 208–209. pp.
9. Cf. Fraser 1979, 174. p.
10. Searle 1979, 76. p.
11. Searle 1979, 76. and 77. pp.
12. Searle 1979, 78. p.
13. Searle 1979, 77. p.
14. Searle 1979, 77. p.
15. Searle 1979, 77. p.
16. Searle 1979, 77. p.
17. Searle 1979, 119. p.
18. It seems that the word meaning and the literal meaning are more or less the same. Then why does Searle make a distinction between them?
19. Cf. Wheelright 1962, 73. p.
20. Cf. Richards 1963, 96–97. pp.
21. Cf. Hester 1967, 17–21. pp.
22. Cf. Hester 1967, 58–59. pp.
23. Wittgenstein 1963, 153. p.
24. Cf. Wellman 1961, 434–446. pp.
25. Hester 1967, 174. p.
26. Hester 1967, 180. p.
27. Cf. Miller 1979, 220. p.
28. Gion 1982, 33. p.
29. Gion 1982, 33. p.
30. Gion 1982, 33. p.
31. Gion 1982, 33. p.
32. Gion 1982, 33. p.
33. Gion 1982, 34. p.
34. Cf. Searle 1979.
35. Szegedy-Maszák 1971, 67. p.
36. Ricoeur 1974, 100. p.
37. Lodge 1977, 109. p.
38. Gion 1982, 7. p.
39. Gion 1982, 57. p.

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