

INSURGENCY DURING THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION: THE RÁKÓCZI REVOLT

LINDA FREY and MARSHA FREY
University of Montana and Kansas State University

During the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1714), insurrections in the Cévennes, in Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and in Hungary disrupted the war effort. Whether in Spain, France, or Hungary, these struggles were part of a general crisis of the 17th century, differing manifestations of the particularistic struggle against the creation of a *Gesamtstaat*. In France the revolt centered in the Cévennes. The campaign to eradicate Calvinism amounted to a “deculturation” of the Protestants in that area. This religious oppression coupled with a general impoverishment caused by taxes, an underlying economic crisis and disruptions triggered by epidemics ignited the revolt. Prophetic neuroses, religious hysteria, and an apocalyptic mentality played a role in this struggle for freedom of conscience, a struggle not without political and social overtones. The government rightly feared both the spread of revolt and the intervention of foreign powers. Hatred of the French and political grievances, some of them long-standing, motivated the rebels in Spain while the Hungarians fought to redress both political and religious grievances. All obtained some degree of outside support from their sovereign’s enemies, but not enough to ensure success. Only the Hungarians received some diplomatic support from the Habsburgs’ allies. The last of these was also probably the most disruptive. This insurrection was led by Francis II Rákóczi,¹ a member of a prominent Hungarian noble family. In 1703 Rákóczi joined forces with Tamás Esze, a fugitive serf, to conduct a national war of independence. For eight years Rákóczi and his men would fight for “God, Fatherland, and Freedom.”² The Hungarians resented the abrogation of their constitution, the levying of taxes on the nobility, the abolition of the right of resistance, and the establishment of hereditary succession to the Hungarian crown in the male Habsburg line. The high taxes levied during the war and the religious persecution aggrieved peasant and noble alike. The numerous grievances which they had against Leopold I and later Joseph I motivated them to fight—and fight they did in 1703, capitalizing on the Habsburgs’ preoccupation with that much larger conflict to the West, the War of the Spanish Succession. But in order to be successful, Rákóczi realized that he had to transform a small localized struggle into an international one, to make the Hungarian insurrection a European affair. For that he needed the military, financial, and diplomatic support of

other powers. He turned to Leopold's enemies, France, Bavaria, and the Turks. He also had recourse to neutrals like Augustus II of Poland, Charles XII of Sweden and Peter I of Russia. For diplomatic pressure, he even appealed—and in part successfully—to Leopold's allies, England, the United Provinces and Brandenburg-Prussia.

Comparatively, Rákóczi had little success with Louis XIV of France who did subsidize the insurrection with approximately 50,000 *livres* per month, the payment of which was terminated in 1708. But this covered the pay of only 2,000 soldiers out of a total army of 80,000. Diplomatically, Louis XIV tried to encourage the Turks to ally with the Hungarians, but did little else except dissuade Rákóczi from settling with or even negotiating with the Habsburgs. Militarily, the insurgents did more for France for they collaborated with the French and the Bavarian armies, giving Louis more leverage in the war. In 1704, for example, the *kuruc* advance into Styria and toward Vienna coincided with the French thrust toward Passau. To the East in Poland, Russia, and Sweden, Rákóczi had less success; Peter, Charles and Augustus, bogged down in the ongoing Northern War (1700–1721), would not alienate the Habsburgs who might be provoked to intervene in the conflict in the North.³

Paradoxically, with Leopold's allies Rákóczi was more successful for through them pressure was exerted on Leopold and later Joseph to negotiate with the insurgents. The Maritime Powers were able to pressure the Habsburgs to negotiate because the Austrians were dependent on the Maritime Powers for both military and financial assistance. They were effective too because they presented a united front to the Austrians; they acted in concert, often submitting joint memorials. England, the dominant partner in the alliance, tended to express the views of both while the Dutch merely echoed English concerns. But at times the Dutch did pressure the English to act. It was the States-General who argued as early as 1704 that a special commission of Charles Spencer, Earl of Sunderland (1643–1722) and Count Adolf Hendrik Rechteren, Baron D'Almelo (1658–1731) should be sent to Vienna to buttress the efforts of their representatives George Stepney (1663–1707) and Jacob Jan Hamel-Bruyninckx (1662–1738). And it was the States-General from 1707 to 1709 who urged John Churchill, duke of Marlborough, the allied commander, to press the emperor to accept Anglo-Dutch mediation yet again.⁴

But why did the English and Dutch pressure their ally to negotiate with the insurgents? As protestant states and constitutional governments, England and the United Provinces felt a special kinship with the Hungarians whom they saw struggling against popery and despotism. Rákóczi frequently appealed to the so-called "Evangelical alliance" among protestant states and depicted himself not as a champion of toleration, but of Protestantism. He completely underplayed the multi-confessional nature of Hungary and won over both the English and the Dutch representatives stationed at Vienna. They in turn would support the views of

persuasive publicists like Henry St. John, viscount Bolingbroke, that "a spirit of bigotry, tyranny, and avarice" had caused the troubles in Hungary.⁵ Hamel-Bruyninx importuned the States-General to act, arguing that never again would there be "such a good opportunity to reestablish Protestant rights and privileges."⁶ Throughout the insurrection the Maritime Powers' and Prussia's sympathies at best only indirectly revealed through the press, remained with the Hungarians, "who were fighting only to protect their religion and liberty."⁷

The Maritime Powers were also trying to safeguard the imperial war effort. They feared that the Habsburgs, by withdrawing troops from the Rhine to Hungary could only prolong the war with France.⁸ Imperial resources, they argued, were already overtaxed. The emperor could not carry on a war in Italy, the Rhine, and Hungary simultaneously. The emperor did not even fulfill his quota of troops—and those he did supply were so poorly equipped that the imperial commander, Prince Eugene of Savoy, threatened to resign on more than one occasion.⁹ Financially, Austria was on the brink of bankruptcy. The insurgents' raids on the empire had further ruined trade reduced the imperial tax yields.¹⁰ Lastly, the Maritime Powers feared that the Turks might, at French instigation, launch yet another conflict with their old enemy, Austria.¹¹

Thus the English and the Dutch did pressure the Habsburgs to negotiate, but neither Leopold nor Joseph intended to honor Hungarian constitutionalist demands; they negotiated with the insurrectionists only in order to gain time for a military solution. The emperor never agreed to grant the Hungarians concessions which would diminish and/or endanger Habsburg power in the Danubian lands. In February 1704 Leopold accepted the Maritime Powers' mediation because his military and financial dependence necessitated it and because the involvement of other powers, such as Poland, Prussia, or Sweden was even less palatable.¹² Ironically, throughout the ill-fated negotiations both the imperialists and the Hungarians distrusted the Anglo-Dutch mediators, George Stepney and Hamel-Bruyninx—the Hungarians because of their alliance with the Habsburgs and the imperialists because of their belief, not unfounded, of allied partiality for the Hungarians.¹³ For example, the imperialists knew Stepney's attitude because, unbeknownst to him, they intercepted his mail, a not uncommon practice of the day. But in order to appease their allies, the Habsburgs did negotiate with the Hungarians intermittently from the spring of 1704 to the summer of 1706. Truces were periodically concluded, commissioners empowered to treat. But neither Leopold nor later Joseph would agree to sanction a foreign guarantee of the agreement, something on which Rákóczi insisted, or to abolish the hereditary succession, or to recognize Rákóczi as prince of Transylvania. They often negotiated only under allied pressure, harboring the illusion that once diplomacy had failed the Maritime Powers would provide them with not only financial but military assistance as well to quell the insurrection. The Maritime Powers were equally unrealistic in

thinking that they could impel either Leopold or Joseph to grant the Hungarians civil and religious liberties.

By the summer of 1706 an impasse had been reached and the negotiations broken off again. The emperor dispatched four regiments from the Rhine to Hungary to quash the uprising, arousing a storm of protest from the allies, who feared that such action would only prolong the war with France. The imperialists, however, argued that the "rebels" had grown more insolent and obstinate. Only force, they pointed out, would end the insurrection.¹⁴ By withdrawing his troops the emperor could end the war in Hungary and after that could concentrate his forces in the war with France. These arguments, however, did not propitiate the allies, who pointed out that the Austrians had never fulfilled their commitment. After 1706 the imperialists refused to countenance even the possibility of yet another allied mediation. One of Joseph's ministers, Wratislaw, pointedly told Marlborough that nothing, in his view "was more capable of retarding the peace in Hungary" than the prospect of another allied mediation. Still later, he plainly told the English commander that the imperial court would not "admit a foreign mediation under any pretext."¹⁵ The imperialists went even further and intermittently attempted to persuade their allies, especially the English, to send troops to Hungary.¹⁶ These demands only served to highlight the vast gulf between the emperor and the Maritime Powers. The Maritime Powers on their part, continued to insist, as late as the summer of 1711, but unavailingly, on the withdrawal of troops from Hungary. Even though the allied representative spoke "plainly and warmly" about the necessity of withdrawing the troops from Hungary and dispatching them to the Rhine, the troops remained in Hungary—even after Szatmár.¹⁷

The Austrians had as little success in countering the propaganda efforts of the Hungarians. They were never able to correct allied misconceptions about Hungary. The religious issue, for example, was one that the Hungarians did not hesitate to exploit. As late as 1709, Rákóczi would argue in a letter to the allied commander, Marlborough, that the Protestant religion would be extirpated in Hungary unless a settlement was reached with the emperor before the conclusion of a general peace.¹⁸ And still later, Rákóczi would attempt to have the Hungarian issue discussed at Utrecht, two years after the settlement at Szatmár. In the English press, there appeared—in English—pamphlets listing the demands of the malcontents.¹⁹ Both Hoffmann and Gallas, the Austrian representatives to England, tried, but in vain, to counter the erroneous conception that the emperor's persecution of the Protestants was the principle *casus belli*. Joseph found himself both astonished and enraged over the English attitude.²⁰ He resented their earlier interference and subsequent offers of mediation even more. Frustratingly aware of the English attitude toward the Hungarian Protestants, Wratislaw, one of Joseph's advisers, warned the imperial representative Gallas as late as 1708 to take particular care when reproaching the English for anti-Catholic laws in

Ireland not to mix this issue with that of the Hungarian Protestants.²¹ Both Wratislaw and Gallas knew that the issue of the Hungarian problem was poisoning the alliance and hoped for a speedy resolution.²² They had little chance of successfully countering allied misconceptions because both Stepney and Hamel-Bruyninx did all they could to foster them. In an eloquent letter to the States-General, Hamel-Bruyninx urged them to offer their mediation because he argued "there would never again be such a good opportunity to reestablish Protestant rights and privileges."²³ Queen Anne's mistaken belief at the outset of the revolt that the majority of the Hungarians were Protestant and only wanted liberty of conscience persisted in the minds of many in both England and the United Provinces.²⁴

In spite, or perhaps because, of this misconception, the governments of England, the United Provinces and Prussia remained empathetic to the plight of the Hungarians after the failure of the negotiations in 1706 and even after the settlement of Szatmár in 1711. In February 1711 Frederick would even offer his protection to Rákóczi and his followers who wanted to settle in Brandenburg-Prussia.²⁵ A combination of genuine empathy for the Hungarians and *Realpolitik* considerations had motivated the allies to intervene in 1704 even though they realized that the emperor would be offended by such a move. By 1706 they could only acknowledge that their intervention had been futile and had merely alienated the Habsburgs without accomplishing anything. The erosion of popular support for Rákóczi in the latter years of the revolt, the insoluble economic problems which the insurgents faced, and the subsequent imperial victories convinced the allies that the Hungarians no longer endangered the empire and that it was only a matter of time before the Habsburgs would overpower them.

The Habsburgs had determined to quash the revolt militarily and refused unconditionally to accept any further mediation from foreign powers be it England, the United Provinces, Prussia, Russia, or Sweden. The emperor ignored the allied protest that force alone would not end the insurrection.²⁶ After the failure of the 1706 negotiations, however, Rákóczi reversed his stance. He had earlier opposed the use of Anglo-Dutch diplomats because they were too closely tied to the Habsburgs' interests. In 1706, 1707, 1709, 1710, and 1711, he urged both the English and the Dutch to offer their mediation yet again and to pressure Joseph to accept.²⁷ He even went so far as to write to Queen Anne personally, urging her intercession for his "oppressed" people.²⁸ Sir Philip Meadows, English envoy extraordinary to Vienna, in a classic understatement maintained that the court was "not very fond of" treating with the malcontents and that malcontents were just as averse to treating with the imperial court. He went on to query how the mediating powers, England and the United Provinces, hoped to accomplish anything. He opposed, he said, "one pathetic offer more", but was willing to sound out the court.²⁹ In subsequent dispatches he made very clear that the imperial court had not changed its collective mind; they were as opposed as ever to allowing

another mediation. The English ministers realized the sensitivity of the issue and ordered Palmes, Meadows's successor, in 1710 not to offer the mediation directly, not even to mention it unless there was a chance of success. Palmes was instructed to "soften as much as possible the obstinacy of those ministers" and "smooth the way" for the mediation. But this proved more than a Herculean task—it proved an impossible one.³⁰ The Habsburgs insisted on treating with the Hungarians without the intercession of any foreign power and adamantly refused to sanction a foreign guarantee of the settlement. The imperial court was equally determined to keep secret the ongoing negotiations with the Hungarians; they did not keep any of the diplomats apprised of the discussions, determined not to let other powers meddle in their "domestic concerns".³¹ Major General Francis Palmes reported much the same to the English secretary of state in 1709/1710. "Further solicitation, on behalf of the malcontents", he warned, "would not be hearkened to".³² The English ambassador at Berlin, Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby, took a different view, urging the allies to continue pressuring the Habsburgs. "The more pressing we are in offering our mediation", he wrote, "the more ready (the Habsburgs) will be of concluding without it".³³

But even though both Palmes and the Dutch representative Hamel-Bruyninx knew of the imperialists' aversion toward Anglo-Dutch, indeed toward any foreign interference in the Habsburg affairs regarding Hungary, they could not overlook the chance of possibly aiding their fellow Protestants. Together they urged the emperor to assure the Hungarian Protestants of their religious liberties. This, they argued was the surest way to end the troubles in Hungary. The imperial ministers had stingingly rebuked them, pointing out that the religious issue was not the main concern in Hungary.³⁴ But even after this, Palmes would report home that he feared that the Protestants would be the ones who suffered the most in the upcoming settlement. As late as June 1710 Baron Raby again urged the English government to intervene. He forwarded Rákóczi's proposals for peace in Hungary to the English ministry, urging the government to do something for the Hungarian Protestants for if we do not "we can answer neither to God nor man".³⁵ Just such sentiments were echoed by the Berlin Court. Rákóczi's representatives urged the sympathetic court preacher Jablonski, the brilliant foreign minister Ilgen, and the wily courtier Wartenberg to press Rákóczi's case. They found in Frederick I a man committed to the Evangelical cause. A man, moreover, who would urge his allies to redress Protestant grievances. As late as June 1711, Ilgen drew up a project for peace in Hungary stressing: (1) mediation of Prussia, England and the United Provinces; (2) Hungarian recognition of the emperor as legitimate king and hereditary ruler; and (3) general amnesty for all the insurgents.³⁶ This was after the negotiated settlement at Szatmár for even after Szatmár, Rákóczi did not give up the hope of obtaining allied assistance.

He even cherished the illusion that he could convince the great powers to help the Hungarians at the subsequent peace conference. Rákóczi was well informed about the machinations, intrigues, and manipulations, ever present at peace conferences like Getruydenberg and later Utrecht and counted on convincing the allies of his "just pretensions". Again using the issue of Habsburg persecution of the Protestants, he hoped to prod the allies into aiding him. To that end he sent his own diplomatic agents, men like Domokos Brenner and János Klement, to present his position, particularly to the English. Thomas Wentworth, the English representative at Utrecht, was sympathetic as was his fellow envoy John Robinson, Bishop of Bristol. Realizing this, Rákóczi urged Brenner in December of 1711 to exploit the issue of Protestant persecution when he appealed to the English emissaries.³⁷ Strafford talks at length—as indeed he does about everything—of the conversations he held with the Hungarians. Rákóczi also sent his agents directly to the United Provinces, to Prussia, and to England. Again, particularly to the latter for he was convinced that the Tories, the English peace party, would play an important role in the subsequent treaty negotiations and that they in turn would help Rákóczi reach a settlement with Vienna. Taking advantage of both the English and Dutch empathy with the Hungarian Protestants, Rákóczi sent representatives from the Hungarian churches directly to the Protestant churches abroad in order to pressure the government. In England both the bishops of Ely and York, particularly the latter, John Sharpe, pressed Queen Anne and the parliament to intercede for the Protestants. Queen Anne even sent one of Sharpe's assistants, Robert Hales, an active member of the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, to investigate the condition of the Protestants in Hungary. It was not the first time that Hales had so acted for earlier he had investigated the conditions of the Protestants in France, the Palatinate, and Silesia. He had travelled widely in the service of the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, seeking to aid his coreligionists by printing religious books and giving succor to Protestants in the galleys. It was because of such men that the Anglican bishops again urged the queen to press the emperor about the Protestant issue. Deputies from the Protestant churches in Hungary went to The Hague and to London to press their case. They were moderately successful for they did convince the ungainly and usually exasperatingly slow acting States-General to urge the emperor to accept their mediation in 1709 and in 1710.³⁸ Rákóczi also wrote directly to the queen and to the States-General and even sent cases of the highly prized Tokay as a gesture of his esteem.

But in spite of all this pressure both direct and indirect by Rákóczi and through his agents, Rákóczi did not succeed in making the Hungarian insurrection a European affair. The Habsburgs had refused even to discuss the situation in Hungary with the allies after 1706. They had deliberately refused to keep the allies informed about the course of the imperial negotiations with the insurrectionists and so it remained. After the failure of the peace negotiations in 1706 and particularly after the conclusion of the

settlement at Szatmár in 1711, allied strategic concerns were not involved in Hungary. Rákóczi's hopes of persuading the allies to intervene were completely unrealistic. He deluded himself in thinking that they would, or could do anything about the Hungarian situation particularly after 1711. As the war progressed, the allies had less and less leverage over the imperial court. The recall of George Stepney, the English representative from Vienna, the dismissal of the imperial representative Gallas from the English court (October 1711), and the failure of Prince Eugene's mission to England in 1712 illustrated the widening fissures within the alliance. The notorious Restraining Order of May 1712, enjoining the English commander-in-chief, the Duke of Ormonde, not to fight, meant the English abandonment of her allies. The English and the Dutch would conclude a separate peace with France and Spain at Utrecht in 1713. Austria and the Holy Roman Empire would fight on alone until 1714 when they too concluded separate peace treaties with France and Spain at Rastadt and Baden. Rákóczi had tried, but failed, to merge a local national war into the ongoing international conflict in the West. Many, such as Wentworth, felt that the allies could not "in conscience refuse doing something for these people at a General Peace".³⁹ Brenner maintains that the allies had promised to include Rákóczi in the general peace.⁴⁰ This is extremely doubtful and probably not true for the English knew very well the attitude of the imperial court toward Hungary. Joseph had made it quite clear that Rákóczi would have nothing to hope for in the general peace. In his view, the Hungarian War had nothing to do with the War of the Spanish Succession.⁴¹ The allies had given Rákóczi no false promises as they had the Catalans. Both the English and Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor, had assured the Catalans that they would secure their rights at the general peace. Emboldened by such a promise, the Catalans had fought on desperately on their own even after the allied withdrawal. Philip V's forces did not take Barcelona until 1714 more than a year after Utrecht was signed. But the imperial and English promises were not kept. The Catalans had continued to fight and Rákóczi to hope. But both were chimeras. Rákóczi had continued to hope the international situation would change and that Hungary would benefit from it. The international situation did change, but not for the better, at least not for the Hungarians. Hungary did not become an international issue, but the Hungarians had undoubtedly benefitted from Habsburg commitment to the War of the Spanish Succession. By 1711, the Viennese court, concerned about the upcoming general peace, was anxious to conciliate the Hungarians and end the war. Although Rákóczi had failed to establish an independent Hungarian state, the war had ensured an autonomous position for Hungary within the Habsburg lands. The *Gesamtstaat* had triumphed in France and Spain, but not in the Danubian monarchy. Thus, in an important sense though Rákóczi lost, he won as well.

Notes

1. For Rákóczi's life consult Émile Horn, *François Rákóczy II, Prince de Transylvanie* (Paris, Librairie Académique, 1906), pp. 1–101; François Rákóczy II, *Testament politique et moral* (The Hague, Scheurleer, 1751), pp. 1–72; François Rákóczy II, *Histoire* (Cassovie, Francis Lancelot, 1707), pp. 1–77; Alvert Lafavre, *Les Magyars pendant la domination ottomane en Hongrie 1526–1721* (Paris, 1902), p. 306; Onno Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart*, X (Vienna, Wilhelm Braumüller, 1879), pp. 291–292; George Michel de Boislisle, ed., *Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, vol. V. (Paris, Librairie Hachette, 1928), p. 260. All dates will be given in New Style.
2. Joseph Joubert, *Francis Rákóczy II, Prince de Transylvanie* (Angiers, J. Siradeay, 1907), p. 11; Redlich, *Österreich*, pp. 155–161; for the Hungarian rebellion up to 1707 refer to Fritz Posch, *Flammende Grenze, Die Steiermark in den Kuruzzenstürmen* (Vienna, Verlag Styria, 1968), pp. 1–277; Francis Rákóczy II, *Histoire des révolutions de Hongrie avec les mémoires* (The Hague, Jean Neaulme, 1739), pp. 80–306; Prince Eugene Francis of Savoy, *Feldzüge* (Vienna, Verlag des K. K. Generalstabes, 1876), pp. 83–86; London Public Record Office, State Papers, Germany, 105/71, pp. 365–370, 371–372, 393–398, hereafter cited as P.R.O., S.P. Germany; Gy. Rázsó, "La situation militaire générale et la guerre d'indépendance de Rákóczi", *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 22 (1976), pp. 367–375.
3. Béla Köpeczi, *La France et la Hongrie au début du XVIII^e siècle* (Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1971), Kálmán Benda, "The Rákóczi War of Independence and the European Powers", Béla Köpeczi, "The Hungarian Wars of Independence of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries in Their European Context", and Peter Pastor, "Hungarian–Russian Relations during the Rákóczi War of Independence", in *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi, War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary*, edited by Janos M. Bak and Béla Király (New York, Columbia, 1982), pp. 433–444, 445–454, and 467–492; Onno Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart*, vol. X (Vienna, Wilhelm Braumüller, 1879), p. 291; Arsène Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*, vol. V (Paris, Fl. Dullé-Plus 1892), pp. 120–129; Jean Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy, *Mémoires*, vol. I (The Hague, 1757), pp. 221–222.
4. Kálmán Benda, "Le projet d'alliance hungaro-suédo-prussienne de 1704", *Études Historiques* (Budapest, 1960), vol. 1, pp. 669–694; Linda and Marsha Frey, "The Rákóczi Insurrection and the Disruption of the Grand Alliance", *Canadian American Review of Hungarian Studies* 5 (Fall 1978), pp. 17–29; "Rákóczi and the Maritime Powers: Uncertain Friendship", in *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi*, pp. 455–466, and "II. Rákóczi Ferenc és a tengeri hatalmak", *Történelmi Szemle* 25 (June 1982), pp. 663–674; John Hattendorf, "The Rákóczi Insurrection in English War Policy, 1703–1711", *Canadian–American Review of Hungarian Studies*, (Fall 1980).
5. Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, *Works* (London, G. G. and J. Robinson, 1754) 2: p. 459.
6. Algemeen Rijksarchief Archief, Staten General 6587, Hamel-Bruyincx Report of 5 February 1704, hereafter cited as Alg. Rijks.
7. British Museum, Additional Manuscripts, B. M., Add. MSS. 31, 132, f. 164, Raby to Hill, Berlin, 10 May 1704, hereafter cited as B. M.
8. B. M., 28, 915, ff. 99–101, Ellis to Stanhope, 21 December 1703; Add. MSS. 37, 351, ff. 217–218, Hedges to Whitworth, 21 December 1703 and in P.R.O., S. P. Germany, 105/71/51; B. M., Add. MSS. 31, 132, f. 37, Raby's Letter of 26 January 1704, Berlin and f. 39, Raby to Hill, Berlin, 26 January 1704; Alg. Rijks., Arch. Staten Generaal 6587, Hamel-Bruyincx Report of 19 February 1704.
9. B. M., Add. MSS. 9096, f. 180, Halifax to Marlborough, The Hague, 18 August 1706, Add. MSS. 7059, ff. 180–182, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, Add. MSS. 37, 351, f. 369, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 16 January 1704, B. M., Blenheim Papers, M38, Stepney Papers, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 4 April 1703, Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv, England Kart, 37, Bericht Wratislaw to Leopold, 5 January 1703, hereafter cited as HHSA.
10. B. M., Add. MSS. 37, 353 ff. 350–351, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 9 January 1704; Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart*, XI, pp. 46–48; Franz Mensi, *Die Finanzen Österreichs von 1701 bis 1740* (Vienna, Hof-

- Verlags-und-Universität-Buchhandlung, 1890); Max Grunwald, *Samuel Oppenheimer und sein Kreis, Ein Kapitel aus der Finanzgeschichte Österreichs* (Vienna, Wilhelm Braumüller, 1913).
11. B. M., Add. MSS. 37, 352, and in P. R. O., S. P. Germany, 80/21, Sutton to Whitworth, Pera of Constantinople, 7 November 1703; P. R. O., S. P. 80/22, Sutton to Whitworth, Pera of Constantinople, 27 October 1703, B. M., Add. MSS. 28, 914, f. 237, Stepney to Ellis, 24 July 1703 and 4 August 1703; Add. MSS. 36, 351, f. 92, Whitworth to Hedges, 25 November 1703; B. M., Add. MSS. 37, 156, ff. 217–224, Réflexions sur les Affaires d'Hongrie, 5 October 1704; Alg. Rijks., Arch. Staten Generaal 6587, Hamel-Bruyninx to States Generaal, 30 August 1704; P. R. O., S. P. Germany, 80/23/200, Sutton to Stepney, Pera of Constantinople, 2 March 1704, B. M., Add. MSS. 21, 551, f. 23, Sutton to Stepney, Pera of Constantinople, 26 March 1704. Also refer to Akdes Nimet Kurat, *The Despatches of Sir Robert Sutton, Ambassador to Constantinople (1710–1714)* (London, Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1953). Rákóczi too feared Turkish intentions and worried, as he told Des Alleurs, about the Turkish "pretensions" to the lands he had seized. See B. M., Blenheim Papers, Sunderland Papers, S 2, Journal of the Ministers of England and the United Provinces for the Hungarian Mediation (27 August–4 November 1705). Particularly see inclusions therein of the Memoir of Des Alleurs to Rákóczi and Rákóczi's response of 18 March 1705 and Reflections of Des Alleurs on the Present State of Affairs in Hungary regarding the Ottoman porte, 1 April 1705.
 12. Max Braubach, "Die Bedeutung der Subsidiën für die Politik im spanischen Erbfolgekriege", *Bücherei der Kultur und Geschichte*, 28 (1923). B. M., Blenheim Papers, Sunderland Correspondence, S 2, Stanhope to Sunderland, The Hague, 4 August 1705.
 13. HHSA, England, Kart. 32 Leopold to Gallas, 20 February 1705 and Kart. 39 Bericht Hoffmann to Wratislaw, 13 March 1705; Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart*, XI, p. 167; B. M., Add. MSS. 37, 352, ff. 4–5, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 2 February 1704; Redlich, *Österreich*, p. 167; P. R. O., S. P. 80/22/261, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 27 February 1704; S. P. Germany, 80/23/190, Stepney to Hedges, Whitehall, 13 May 1704, B. M., Add. MSS. 28, 916, f. 7, Ellis to Stepney, 13 May 1704.
 14. B. M., Blenheim Papers, Foreign Correspondence, Austria M95, Salm to Marlborough, Vienna, 13 July 1706 and M98, Wratislaw to Marlborough, Vienna, 13 July 1706.
 15. B. M., Blenheim Papers, Foreign Correspondence, 1799, Wratislaw to Marlborough, Vienna, 20 February 1709 and 13 April 1709.
 16. B. M., Add. MSS. 37, 352, f. 336, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 12 September 1704; HHSA England Kart, 37–40 passim. For the imperial court's views on the Hungarians demands see B. M. Blenheim Papers, Foreign Correspondence, Austria, M98, Wratislaw to Marlborough, Vienna, 23 June 1706, 14 July 1706, 17 July 1706, 21 July 1706, 24 July 1706, 18 August 1706, 22 September 1706, 16 January 1706, 27 February 1706, 3 March 1706, and 24 March 1706; Foreign Correspondence, Austria, M 96 B, Sinzendorf to Marlborough, Vienna, 9 June 1706; Foreign Correspondence, Austria M 95, Salm to Marlborough, Vienna, 13 July 1706, 23 July 1706, and 4 September 1706; Foreign Correspondence, Austria, M 97, Wratislaw to Marlborough, Vienna, 18 March 1705; Diplomatic Correspondence, Stepney, M 38, Stepney to Marlborough, Vienna, 18 June 1704.
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26. P. R. O., S. P. 104/40, Foreign Entry Books, Emperor, St. John to Palmes, Whitehall, 30 January 1710/1711.
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30. P. R. O., S. P. 104, Foreign Entry Books, Emperor, Boyle to Palmes, 5 September 1710 and St. John to Palmes, 26 September 1710.
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