

In Kekkonen and Kádár We Trust

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1 The Years of Evil

In Hungary there are two political lines: the first one is trying to get out of the war and eager to get into the Anglo-American sphere and the other one is willing to fight with Germans because Hungary's destiny will anyway be bad when Germany loses the war.¹

This is one of the last messages Finnish authorities got from Budapest in April, 1944, before the Allied forces started bombing it. In these bombings the residence of the Legation of Finland was also destroyed and the last official information channel from Hungary to Finland silenced although the last Finnish diplomats left the country as late as in October. Diplomatic relationships had already been cut off in September due to the regulations of the peace treaty Finland had concluded with the Soviet Union on September 17th 1944.² By this time Hungary fell under the Red Flag. Finland was still waiting for her destiny.

Politically and militarily Finland and Hungary were in a somewhat similar situation in spring 1944. Both countries had German troops on their soil and both were under the threat of becoming occupied by the Red Army. During the year 1944 the Finns succeeded in preventing the Russian troops from entering Finland, but according to the peace treaty, Russians leased the naval base of Porkkala near Helsinki and occupied it. The Hungarians were forced to accept Red Army occupation. If we seek any similarities between post-war Hungary and Finland, one of them was the Allied Control Commission. In Hungary it was led by

Marshal Kliment Voroshilov and in Finland the authority was exercised by General Andrei Zhdanov, both high in the Soviet Union's *nomenklatura*. However, politically the differences were striking. During the era 1945–1948 Finland succeeded in securing her political position both internally and also partly in foreign politics but Hungary glided rapidly towards communist dictatorship.

The Finns did not know what was going on in Hungary right after the War. The reasons were obvious. First, there was the armistice agreement with the Russians which dictated that Finland break off official relations with Hungary. Finland lost its only reliable source of information from Hungary. Second, Finland had enough domestic problems of her own and there was not much time or capacity to follow what was going on in Hungary. The Allied Control Commission – run determinedly by Russians – was the actual authority in Finland. Domestic policy was in turmoil. Communists gained power and there were serious doubts whether Finland would remain an independent country or not. In these circumstances the problems in the eastern part of Central Europe were not so very interesting in Finland. Nevertheless, the free press mentioned pieces of news which told the depressing fact. At the same time when Finland was struggling for her independence, Hungary was losing it.³

The years 1945–1949 are crucial when we start to evaluate two different processes of the two small countries. In Finland a unique political development was started but Hungary became one of the Eastern European communist states, one of the Soviet Union's European satellites.

Finland and Hungary did not have any official relations during the years 1945–1949.⁴ The Finnish press was concerned about what was going on in Eastern Europe in general but it did not worry so much about the destiny of Hungary, because the looming fear in Finland was all the time the same. If the Russians were bold enough to act in the way they did in the Central Europe, what would happen to Finland? This was the point and the mood, which can be sensed in President Paasikivi's diary in which he quotes Anthony Eden's speech in the British Parliament printed in *The Times* 20 June 1947:⁵

Where was the next move to be? Would it be in Finland, hitherto comparatively free from external pressure? There have already been rumors of threats [of Russians] against the right-wing Agrarians and to a lesser degree against the Social Democrats.

Paasikivi himself was more confident about Finland's future when he met a representative of *Agence France-Press*, Maurice Chourot in November 1947. The President pointed out that Finland is in a totally different situation compared to Hungary and other central Eastern European Countries. The range of difference was wide, it was philosophical and intellectual. Paasikivi emphasized that in his opinion Finland would never become occupied by the Red Army.⁶ He based his political thinking on the long experience of dealings with the Russians and thought that the geopolitical position of Finland was not a reason why Russians would occupy Finland. Later studies have proved his view correct. Russians hoped that Finland would eventually become a communist country, but only if the Finnish communists themselves could accomplish it. However, they failed.⁷ In the heart of Europe the situation was quite different. Hungary among other small countries of the Eastern part of Europe was in trouble.

Hungary made an unofficial request to Paasikivi in November 1946, asking to re-establish diplomatic relations because Finland's political position was better than theirs. The President was not interested in the idea. Hungary and Finland were waiting for the Peace Conference to be held in Paris and before that it was practically impossible even to think about restoring official relations. The request can be seen as a desperate gesture to gain more appreciation from the West. It was only after the Peace Treaty that relations could be re-established on the 20th of May 1947.⁸ By that time Hungary was already under the harsh leadership of Mátyás Rákosi.⁹

It is worthwhile studying the attitude of the Rákosi regime towards Finland especially in the late 1940s and particularly how Hungary reacted to Paasikivi's re-election in February, 1950, and to the Finnish survival story. It was obvious that the Hungarian post-war political society would be different compared to the one in Finland. How to explain this to the Hungarians? One may assume that Paasikivi was a respected

figure in Hungary, not because of his non-socialist political background but because he was known to be a peace-maker and a man who was evidently respected by the Russians. Surprisingly the attitude was completely the opposite. The Finnish *chargé d' affaires*, Uno Koistinen, who arrived in Hungary in February 1950, seems to have been extremely surprised by the writings he read in the Hungarian newspapers. Actually he was so astonished that he wrote his first report from Hungary as a secret one and not in the series of the normal confidential reports from Budapest.¹⁰

Koistinen was very annoyed by the way the Hungarian Press wrote about Paasikivi. Basically, Paasikivi should have been a good choice but that was not the opinion of the Hungarian press. For example, *Szabad Nép* wrote: 'The Finns have chosen a President for the next six years. He is J. K. Paasikivi who represents the reactionary powers and the capitalists'. The paper also mentions the names of two other candidates, supposedly more suitable ones; they were Finnish People's Democratic League's (FPDL) Mauno Pekkala and Urho Kekkonen (Agrarian Party). Another newspaper, *Világosság*, was even cruder. It told to its readers that Paasikivi was a butcher of the Finnish working class; it was he who was responsible for killing 40,000 workers and for torturing 84,000 more in internment camps.¹¹ *Világosság* referred with these false accusations to the losses of Reds during the Finnish Civil War of 1918 in which Paasikivi played an insignificant role.

Why did the official Hungary see Paasikivi as an advocate of evil capitalism and 'reactionary' forces. Did Rákosi's regime collect political points from the Soviet Union? This cannot be the reason. Even though Paasikivi was a capitalist he was after all a realist. To Paasikivi the foundation of foreign policy was the fact that the Soviet Union was Finland's neighbour, had won the war, and the only way Finland could survive as an independent state was to achieve good and mutually reliable relations with the new superpower. The Russians appreciated this and a man such as Paasikivi.¹² A more likely explanation is that the official, ultra-communist ideology hated everything that came from the West.

This could be coupled with the bitterness Paasikivi had caused in resisting the Russians and the Finnish communists in particular. The most obvious reason, however, was the Soviet attitude towards Paasikivi; the Russians did not want Paasikivi to be re-elected.¹³ To summarize the situation: Finland did not follow the Hungarian road to Communism and it was easy to put the blame on the President. The communists had started to persecute various enemies from 'old' social democrats to freemasons and the church. Hungary had turned inwards; the world outside was either an enemy or a friend. Paasikivi was a capitalist enemy.

In view of this background the meeting of the first post-war Finnish diplomat in Budapest with the representatives of the Hungarian government in February 1950 must have been filled with expectation. At first Koistinen met Foreign Minister Gyula Kállai in an uninformative meeting, filled with protocol, and a few days later he met the President of the Council of Ministers, István Dobi. Discussions with him were longer and the atmosphere was good but it was clear that Dobi had very little political power. Later on Koistinen met quite a few minor civil servants and the discussions were polite but lacked substance. Politicians did not talk politics, and nobody seemed to be really interested in Finland with only one exception. The Minister of Finance, István Kossá, had visited Finland in the previous year as a guest at the congress of the Finnish Communist Party and he was very excited. Koistinen never met Ernő Gerő, Zoltán Vas or Mátyás Rákosi.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the arrival of the new *chargé d' affaires* made a new start in the relations, and the Finnish government started to get updated information from Hungary for the first time in six years.

Although the political development in the countries was different, both Hungary and Finland aimed at stabilizing the political atmosphere although the methods were totally different. Finland had secured her political credibility in the eyes of the western world in the general election of 1945. The election was free and also the communists participated in it. After the wars Finland had three majority governments, the first two led by Paasikivi and the third one led the by a left-wing socialist, Mauno

Pekkala. There were rumours and fears concerning the aims of Finnish communists but the truth was that they lacked both power and the Soviet support in order to attain a coup. Finland remained a democratic country. In Finland it was the people who chose their representatives, not the Russians while in Hungary Rákosi and his comrades stabilized the communist *regimé* with the Soviet support and Hungary became a loyal member of the Eastern bloc. Consequently, in the beginning of the 1950s both countries, different though they were, were politically stable, Finland as a Soviet-oriented democratic country and Hungary as a communist country controlled by the Russians.¹⁵

For the Finns the attitude the Hungarian press had towards Paasikivi as a person did not cause any depression. Hungary was so negligible a country that it was insignificant what the Hungarian press wrote. If the Finns had read the same kind of evaluations in *Pravda*, as they did for a moment, the situation would have been different but not serious.

The next step in Hungarian plans to re-establish relations with Finland was to launch the Finnish-Hungarian Society (FHS) in October 1950. The initiative came from Ferenc Münnich, the Ambassador of Hungary in Finland. His idea was to create a society whose members would feel kinship towards Hungary. A correct attitude of the members of the society was the main point. The society should be led by well-known leftist politicians and the members could be from working-class as well as from academic circles.¹⁶ Now the scene had been set; Finland had a *charge d' affaires* in Budapest and Hungary had her representative in Helsinki. The society enabled the communication between countries, both at the official and partly at the unofficial level. The state of the Finnish-Hungarian relationship was as good as it could be in those circumstances.

2 Koistinen as an Observer

Uno Koistinen was possibly the best man to reopen relations with Hungary. He did not speak Hungarian but he spoke Russian fluently. The only thinkable disadvantage was his age, Koistinen

was already 62 years old. He was a career diplomat who had served in Tallinn, Moscow, St. Petersburg and at home.¹⁷

When Koistinen arrived in Budapest in February 1950 Rákosi had recently secured his position and Hungary was transforming rapidly and violently into a totalitarian society. For example, the clergy was under heavy pressure, legal proceedings based on political accusations were part of everyday life and nobody knew who would be the next one to face a random arrest by the feared security police, *ÁVH*. Did the Finns get to know about these measures?

In October 1950 Koistinen wrote a splendidly informative report. In his opinion, Hungary had achieved a remarkable status as a leading communist country among the satellites of the Soviet Union. Rákosi was definitely the leading politician with Moscow's absolute and unchanged support. The former President, Árpád Szakasits, disappeared, Prime Minister István Dobi had lost his post and hard-line stalinists were in power. The most important men behind Rákosi were the Minister of Defence, Mihály Farkas and Minister of Economics Ernő Gerő. Koistinen noticed also the basic problem Hungary had to face. Koistinen considered that the country's economy was in shambles. Agriculture was neglected because of huge investments which were concentrated on heavy industry. The countryside was lacking a labour force, the harvest was poorly organized and Hungary had serious problems with the food-supply. Koistinen also marked the huge impact the Russians had. They were everywhere: in ministries, universities, hospitals and even in ordinary farming jobs. And there was also the question of language: Russian was compulsory in every school.¹⁸

Koistinen's report of October 1950 was the most informative one written before his sudden death in January 1951. It contained all the basic elements of Hungary's situation after the communists had taken power. Its conclusion was: Hungary had become a satellite of the Soviet Union.

Koistinen did not mention the kinship between the Finns and the Hungarians that was so very strongly emphasized before the Second World War. Neither the Hungarians nor the Finns used it

as an instrument to deepen relations. No one in Hungary pointed it out, but it was only natural that they denied the old rhetoric. Communists wanted to secure their political position both internally and externally and operate in general in the way the Russians told them to. The Finnish diplomats did not cherish the kinship either but the Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki, working very hard to get more members into the FHS, emphasized the importance of the kinship in a very strange way. Anybody could not become a member, and the Embassy tried to use the theme of kinship as a bluff to keep the Finns interested in matters of Hungary. The problem was the huge difference between the Hungary of the 1930s and the Hungary of the 1950s. Many Finns turned down the request to join the Society because Hungary had become a communist country. The Society had a suitable chairman, a genuine socialist, Ele Alenius, but that was not enough. Alenius lacked the charisma and authority to make the Society 'presentable at the court'.¹⁹ The FHS did not grow in the same way as the Finland Soviet Union Society did, for example. The main idea of policy-making of the FHS had to be changed.

Hungarians returned to the basics. The good old kinship-romance was reinstated. The FHS started to distribute Hungarian films, books and other materials, it arranged a range of discussions and even special meetings for kids. Folk art was a natural choice and one of the exhibitions was opened by a well-known cultural personality, Prime Minister Kekkonen's wife, Sylvi Kekkonen. By the year 1953 the society had stabilized its main function to organize cultural activities. It was planned that Finns should be told about the new Hungarian mentality, movies, folk art, ethnography, literature and music. In addition, Finns got information about the new five-year plans, and about the new politics of Hungary in general. One could say that the FHS changed drastically in a few years and became a very effective channel of distinctive propaganda. In this sense it was a success. By the beginning of the year 1952 the number of the members of the FHS had increased to 839. Hungarians categorized them according to their ideological scales: 433 were workers, 195 intellectuals, 136 petty-bourgeois and 75 students.²⁰

These figures seem impressive but the truth was that the FHS remained marginal without real political importance.

Evidently the year 1952 meant a breakthrough in Finnish-Hungarian relations. Finland and Finnish politicians were becoming familiar to the Hungarians. Or, at least one politician, Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen. Why was that? The political system in Hungary – as in every communist county – concentrated on emphasizing one personality at a time. In Finland that could not be Paasikivi but Kekkonen who was neither a communist nor a socialist, he was an Agrarian and a prominent new figure in Finnish political life. The main reason for his success was Kekkonen's new political line which suited the Hungarians. Kekkonen's way of thinking was a mixture of modern political realism and patriotism. Furthermore, he was appreciated by the Russians. The statement Kekkonen made in the newspaper *Maakansa* in January, 1952 about peaceful co-existence was widely quoted in the Hungarian Press and it was regarded as a very important opening in constructing a peaceful *status quo* in Europe. In April 1952 Kekkonen was featured again; this time it was because of the speech he gave on the 4th anniversary of the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with Russians in Helsinki. Kekkonen emphasized the advantages the agreement had given to Finland and pointed out that it was clear evidence of how two countries with different political systems and sizes could live in peace and could both gain politically and economically from it.²¹

It is obvious that Hungary's leaders saw that the man of the future in Finland was Kekkonen. Everybody understood that Paasikivi who was in his eighties was too old to continue as President after 1956. The most prominent candidate was Kekkonen. Others would not do; a member of the National Coalition Party (NCP) would be a capitalist and social democrats (SDP) were regarded as anti-Soviet. The SDP was considered ideologically reactionary since the Soviets regarded Väinö Tanner, who had led Finnish workers to the war against the Soviet Union, a war criminal. Only the communists were

left but their support among the voters was too weak. The only choice was Kekkonen.

It is noteworthy that during the period 1950–1952 Finnish-Hungarian relations were very formal and lacked discussion about the kinship of the two nations. Hungarians were so concentrated on their domestic policy that it looks like they had no room for manoeuvring in the field of foreign policy. Hungary did not have its own foreign policy in the Rákosi era. Rákosi himself represented the Kremlin, not Hungary, and the relations with the other socialist countries and especially with the Soviet Union were paramount. The West was imperialist and among capitalist countries there was only one country that could be considered slightly different. It was Finland. Not only were Kekkonen and his speeches noticed, but also the Helsinki Olympic Games in 1952 made Finland known in Hungary. At the time, the FHS used kinship as a tool to create a positive image of Hungary in Finland, but in Hungary this rhetoric was not popular at all.²² The situation was rather irrational during the 1950s before Rákosi fell: in Hungary nobody talked about kinship but in Finland the Hungarians dedicated their efforts to promoting it.

3 The New Beginning

The successor of Koistinen, Lauri Hjelt, in Budapest since May 1951, reported to Helsinki at the end of December 1953 about rather radical changes in Finnish-Hungarian relations. The Finnish Embassy in Hungary had been engaged in prolonged negotiations with the Press Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry concerning the visit of Hungarian journalists to Finland and reciprocally about their Finnish colleagues' trip to Hungary. Nothing seemed to happen, but suddenly in April 1953 everything was clear. The Hungarians visited in Finland and at the end of the same year the Finns paid a return visit to Hungary. It was a modest but important beginning; the countries opened mutual communicative relations. Even more surprising was the interest Hungarians suddenly showed in the idea of kinship between the Finns and the Hungarians at the highest political level. Hjelt was flabbergasted by this development. And what was

more: Finland and Hungary started to expand their very modest commercial relations with each other. Finland had proposed a tripartite trade agreement with Hungary and the Soviet Union and there were no problems in the negotiations.²³

Why did Hungary start to open? The simple reason was that the first five-year plan (1950–1954) had led Hungary into an economic crisis. The stalinist model of industrialization saddled Hungary with an autarchic industry, which functioned at high cost and at the same time weakened the existing industrial structure. The result was that the standard of living decreased significantly, below the level reached before the five-year plan.²⁴ People were still randomly arrested, the secret police was an instrument of terror, intellectuals and clergy were under surveillance and party control. In the countryside the situation was even worse. The soil of Hungary was very fertile and in normal circumstances it had been able to provide plenty of foodstuffs. After brutal collectivisation, the level of production collapsed, the peasantry fell into apathy and suffered famine.²⁵

From the Finnish point of view the changes in Hungary were drastic. After Stalin's death a short relaxed period ensued but already in June, 1953, Hjelt reported new arrests; people who had been waiting for general amnesty, were disappointed. Actually, the system of justice was tightened by replacing about 250 judges by new ones who all had a working-class or peasant background.²⁶

Hjelt's conclusions from the period following Stalin's death were far too optimistic. Although the political situation in Hungary had not changed much, the attitude towards Finns and the atmosphere in general was quite different. Hjelt observed the rise of political activity and heard of open criticism of the government's policy – at least in Budapest. Also propaganda and the line of the communist party had become slightly more moderate, visible in minor events. One of these was Christmas, which the Hungarians were allowed to celebrate for the first time since Rákosi came to the power. A most surprising phenomenon for Hjelt was the rebirth of the old kinship theme. He noticed that even high rank politicians started to stress the importance of the

common ancient history of Finland and Hungary. This was the very first time Hjelt heard about it.²⁷

Obviously the Hungarians re-evaluated their attitude towards Finland. Because Hungary was both politically and economically isolated something had to be done, although the basic political line could not be changed. Hungary was to remain a communist country but it could establish closer relations with Finland under the banner of 'kinship'. Common roots and linguistic kinship served the purpose well. Kekkonen's foreign political opening of the years 1952 and 1953, Hungary's economic crisis and Stalin's death, which shook the world, all helped to accomplish this.

4 The Turbulent Years

Great changes followed the death of Stalin. Stalin's best pupil, Rákosi had to confess his mistakes and to step down. Imre Nagy, who had advocated a reform programme, became the Prime Minister.²⁸ His almost two year period in power yielded many corrections of economic, social and cultural policy. More investments were allocated to agriculture and housing at the expense of heavy industry. A slackening of oppression brought relief to the general mood of the population. Rákosi and his supporters did their best to bar Nagy's reformist policy.

During the change, diplomatic circles of Budapest were filled with rumours. Everybody was waiting with great interest what would happen. It was widely known that Rákosi and Farkas had been in Moscow. Some informants mentioned that Voroshilov had visited Budapest. Hjelt could tell Helsinki in July 1953 that most of the former ministers had lost their posts. But this was not the real news; more significant was the analysis Hjelt made right after the official announcement of Stalin's death. He was sure that the change of government would make a deeper impact on Hungarian society than was generally expected. The end of Hjelt's report was far-sighted.²⁹

A significant change has occurred in Hungarian politics. It can be detected from the inauguration speech of the new Prime Minister.

What was Nagy's message to the Hungarians? It can be said that his visions were critical. First, there was the five-year plan, which was deemed to be a mistake, one of the many Rákosi had made. It was time to slow down industrialization, give up the idea of being self-sufficient and to focus on the existing resources of the Hungarian economy and on lighter industry. Nagy stressed the importance of peasants and intellectuals and he was ready to bring back law and order: no more illegal arrests, no more proceedings based on false accusations and no more internment camps. It seemed as if Hungary was waking up from a bad dream. There remained the question, what was the difference between a promise and real life? Nobody knew it, Hjelt himself was hopeful but suspicious. He took Nagy's speech as an indication of the new political spirit of the Kremlin, not an idea that emerged from the hearts of the Hungarian people.³⁰

The dry comments Hjelt made continued at the beginning of the year 1954. The economic situation of Hungary was a mystery to him. During the session of Parliament Hjelt heard quite a different economic analysis than he had heard from various unofficial sources. The director of the Board of Planning, Béla Szalai's figures were contradictory with the ones Nagy had made public. Hjelt was abashed as to whether the situation was getting better or worse or from bad to even more depressing. His conclusion was that Hungary's national economy was in a deadlock and the easing of terror had made the situation worse.³¹ During the spring 1954 his reports became even more alarming. When the government decided to reduce the investments to heavy industry and at the same time the army and security police were cut the result was that a new problem appeared in Hungary, unemployment. The government did try to move unemployed people to the countryside but also this caused trouble. During the Rákosi era the peasants were forced to work at new industrial sites. Now they had to go back to the countryside which in many cases they did not want to do. This caused upheaval because people were no longer afraid of the security police. Nagy did not want to force the

people into the agricultural sector. He tried to repair the mistakes made in the late 1940s and early 1950s but he simultaneously created more problems. These were Hjelt's quite accurate conclusions, and he was almost gleeful in pointing out that indeed there could be unemployment in a communist country.³²

The year 1955 was not the easiest one for a foreign diplomat to estimate what was going on in Hungary. The essential point was the question of leadership. Who was the most powerful man in Hungary? Hjelt did not know. Sometimes it looked like Nagy had secured his position, sometimes it was Rákosi who made very powerful statements and for a while the most prominent politician seemed to be Gerő. The one and only specific conclusion Hjelt made was about the difference with the period of Nagy to the one of Rákosi: 'If the old regime could have had possibilities to continue, the situation would have been much worse both to the government and to the communist party.'³³

At the beginning of the year 1955 Hjelt was quite confused. The basic combination of political power in Hungary appeared to be impenetrable. This impression was issued from the speeches given in Debrecen during a celebratory meeting of the Parliament. On the spot there were all the top politicians: the Chairman of Parliament, Sándor Rónai, Chairman of the Speakers' Council, István Dobi, and Nagy and Rákosi. Nagy spoke enigmatically emphasizing the importance of the role of workers and peasants but he neither referred to the middle-class or intellectuals nor mentioned the economic mistakes. Rónai was on the same line and Dobi said nothing new by praising the kolkhoz-system. Rákosi instead was back on his feet with a powerful harangue in which he stressed three issues: the importance of the heavy industry, the significance of the Party as the leading political power and the importance of the security of the nation – or as Hjelt understood it, strengthening of the secret police. Rákosi spoke as if nothing had happened after the year 1952. To Hjelt this was very hard to understand:

was Hungary looking backward or forward?³⁴ The internal policy of Hungary remained a mystery to an external observer.

What could have been the reason for the different opinions of the leaders of Hungary? The most obvious must have been the definition of policy Moscow had made. By the year 1955 it was clear that the strong man in the Soviet Union was Nikita Khrushchev who had not only initiated the *détente* in Europe but also machinated the Warsaw Pact in April 1955.³⁵ There were two contradictory elements in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. By stressing the importance of better relations with the West, Khrushchev also forced the Hungarians to re-evaluate their policies towards moderation but because of the Warsaw Pact and re-armament of West-Germany, military and political tension had increased in Central Europe. This meant that Hungary did not have too much moving space in the political sense. The result was an unfathomable mishmash of political rhetoric. The West was still the main enemy but what kind of enemy? It looks like Rákosi's line of tight internal and external policy might have been winning, even though there was still a possibility of more fruitful *détente*. Hungary's decision was to sit on two chairs. Rákosi kept a hard line and Nagy was the more conciliatory man.

The economic decisions and re-evaluations made after the year 1952 had not improved Hungary's economic situation. If *détente* would continue there could be possibilities to increase trade with the West, but if the Cold War was to continue it would inevitably mean that Hungary's economy was tied solely with the economy of the Soviet Union.

The year 1955 was to show the direction. In January both Nagy and Rákosi attended the meeting of the Soviet Presidium in Moscow. There the definition of policy had changed. The man who was criticized was not Rákosi but Nagy who was considered to be guilty of 'rightist deviation'.³⁶ This accusation must have been very hard for Nagy to accept. What he had been trying to do was to reorganize the Hungarian economy after the devastating years of the Rákosi regime 1949–1952. There was not a hint of rightist deviation or slipping away from the road towards

Socialism. Nagy was seeking some alternatives to Hungary's economic structure and had tried to expand trade with foreign countries. This automatically predicated a slightly more open attitude towards the Western countries.

Presumably accusations levelled against Nagy in Moscow were the cause of Nagy's his mild heart attack in February 1955. The field was now free for Rákosi's comeback. The Central Committee of the HWP (The Hungarian Workers' Party) decided on the 18th of April to dismiss Nagy from all his offices.³⁷ By the end of the spring 1955 Nagy was politically a *persona non grata*. For Hjelte Nagy's illness was naturally big news. The diplomatic circles were uncertain whether Nagy really was ill or suffered from a 'political disease' called *morbis Malenkovenssis*, but soon they found out that the news about Nagy was correct. In his first report on the Politburo's meeting in April Hjelte made a correct estimate: It was only a question of time when Nagy was to retire. Understandably Hjelte could not have any specific information about what was going on behind the scenes but when the retirement was announced on the 18th of April he was not surprised but wrote: 'The dismissal of Nagy was an awaited fact' More to the point were the estimates Hjelte made about the reasons for the overthrow. In his view, the most important reason was his behaviour which showed humility, self-criticism and apology – Nagy did not act by the established rules of the communist movement. Self-flagellation was a virtue in those circumstances. The other reason why Nagy had to go was linked to his personality. Hjelte supposed that Nagy was too democratic a person and because of that trait he also had some support among the members of the HWP, i.e. a respectable rival.³⁸ Actually Hjelte did not see any drama in the events that occurred during the spring 1955. It was just another episode of the communists' political game.

The annual publication of the budget was an occasion Hjelte was always interested in. Even the astronomical figures could not hide the fact that Hungary's economy was in tatters. Hungary did not have enough capacity to maintain the prevailing standard of living. There was no economic boom in sight and the government

did not have means to solve the problem. The Parliament had only one option to save face: the year 1955 was declared as an experiment year and the big economic rise should start next year, when the new five-year plan should come into effect. The only saviour was the Soviet Union.³⁹

There was one incident during the year 1955 that significantly increased both Finland's and Kekkonen's visibility in Hungary. The incident was the Soviet Union's decision to return the Porkkala Naval Base to the Finns. The lease was due to end in the year 1994 but the Soviets decided to give up the base after ten years. Historians have debated the motives of the Soviet leaders. Did they want to ensure Kekkonen's election as the President? The election was to be carried out in March 1956. Was Porkkala a gift to the retiring President Paasikivi or was the gesture just a part of a larger political manoeuvre? Evaluations have been made, but according to Khrushchev's memoirs the reason was both economic and practical: the naval base was expensive to maintain and because of the rapid development of armament technology it was useless in safeguarding Leningrad. Long-range missiles could destroy Leningrad irrespective of whether the Russians had a naval base in Porkkala or not. There was also the international political situation. By giving up the base the Soviets could imply that they were aiming at peace and could ask why the West was not doing the same. And if there was a possibility to boost Kekkonen's campaign, all the better. Kekkonen was the only choice in the Kremlin's eyes and surely the Soviets wanted the new President to be someone they knew and could trust. The decision to give Porkkala back to the Finns was a very skilful political and tactical move by the Soviets.⁴⁰

In Hungary the Porkkala affair was big news. It was not a surprise that the role of the Finns was played down and the peaceful attitude and forgiveness of the Soviet Union was highly admired. The return of the base was interpreted as yet another proof of the Soviet Union's consistent policy of peace and as an example of peaceful co-existence of the two countries with different political and economic systems. In other words, all the

credit was given to the Russians. All the major newspapers (*Esti Budapest, Szabad Nép, Magyar Nemzet, Népszava*) wrote with a similar overtone: the Russians are good, the West is bad. But what about Finland and the Finns? President Paasikivi was described earlier in 1950 as an evil man and an ultimate enemy of the Finnish working class. This time he was featured as the head of the Finnish deputation in the negotiations but now the papers made no evaluations at all concerning Paasikivi's person or past. The other man mentioned was Kekkonen. Nobody gave any special credit to him but, for example, the Ambassador of East Germany was very pleased about the fact that Kekkonen was among the negotiators in Moscow. But what about the ordinary Hungarians? Hjelt got some information from the grass and root levels. The message was: 'Why is there not happening anything such as this in Hungary?'⁴¹ A very good question with a simple answer: Hungary was not an independent country but a solid part of the Eastern block and geographically in a precarious location.

Both Finland and Hungary gained membership at the United Nations in December 1955, an achievement which should have stirred political commentators. Surprisingly, Hjelt gave to Finland very diverse information about the feelings in Hungary. The official Hungary was naturally pleased, but the general public was depressed. The interpretation of the decision was that the West had recognized the fact that Hungary was and would also in the future be a communist society.⁴² In the context of Finnish-Hungarian relations there were new elements of political developments in sight, although the basic situation remained static: the countries were geographically far away from each other, their political systems were different and they built their foreign policy on the idea of cherishing good relations with the Soviet Union. The novelty was that the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc as a whole started to pursue the policy of peaceful coexistence, the policy Finland and Kekkonen in particular supported. The result was that Finland became one of the most popular non-communist countries in Hungary, which was made visible during the celebration of Finland's Independence Day in December 1955. The Hungarian

delegation was exceptionally eminent: the new PM András Hegedűs, two deputy PMs, members of the government and of the politburo, highly-ranked civil servants and other minor officials, altogether about 300 guests took part in the reception at the Embassy of Finland. The delegation was a thermometer of the friendship with Finland showing relations were cordial. But as Hjelt reported, they had no real importance. It was better that in Hungary Finland was not regarded as an enemy. But if things had been different, would it have caused any stress in Finland? No. This attitude can be sensed in Paasikivi's diaries. The only serious remark on Hungary is dated from the 10th October 1955 and the only matter was Hjelt's complaint that it was very hard to get any accurate information from Hungary.⁴³

The year 1956 began in a depressing mood in Hungary because Rákosi seemed to have regained his position and the Hungarians appeared to be tired with politics. Hjelt's assumption was that the hope of a possible liberation had faded away. The Hungarians had acquiesced to their destiny. But there was still something in the air:⁴⁴

There is the same expectant mood in Hungary just as all around the world in the beginning of the new year.

Then came the twentieth congress of the CPSU in February 1956. At first nobody knew exactly what was said in Moscow but the basic note was clear: the crimes of the Stalin era were disclosed and the stalinist ideology was deemed an incorrect one. The thesis of an intensifying class struggle and the doctrine of the inevitability of war were abandoned. There could no longer be only one wise leader as Stalin had been. The times of total despotism were over⁴⁵ which meant for Hungary that the Rákosi era was reaching its end.

Before the dramatic events of the autumn 1956 Finland got more publicity in Hungary than ever before after the Second World War. The reason was the presidential elections in February 1956 and Kekkonen's victory by an extremely narrow margin. The result caused a flow of enthusiastic comments from the Hungarian press. They show concretely how an historical

event can be interpreted so very differently in a different political environment. In Finland Kekkonen's victory was far from being a stunning event. Actually, it had divided the country and created bitterness. In spring 1956 there were in Finland almost as many winners as there were losers. Seen from the Hungarian point of view the situation was totally different: the election of Kekkonen was definitely the best thing that could happen to Finland and Kekkonen was without any doubt the best and probably the only man who could be the President of Finland.

From the early 1950s Kekkonen had been an eager advocate of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The Eastern block adopted it after Stalin's death. Thus Kekkonen was the man who accidentally, 'invented' the political doctrine Khrushchev asserted into international political discourse in the mid 1950s. Another fact that secured Kekkonen's fame was his active participation in the most important negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union. Whenever there was something peaceful going on in Finnish-Soviet relations, Kekkonen was there. His election contributed to the reincarnation of the old idea of kinship. As Hjelt reported discussions about this subject had previously caused only uneasiness among the leading Hungarian politicians and high-ranked civil servants.⁴⁶

After the election of Kekkonen the retiring President Paasikivi also gained some respect from Hungary. Apart from Kekkonen, he was the only other official person Hungary recognized in spring 1956. Formerly he had been compared with Miklós Horthy but now he became one of the key-figures in creating Finland's peaceful foreign policy. Hungarian papers explained that it was Paasikivi who was the founder of this policy, Kekkonen had only participated in the process.⁴⁷ After the spring 1956, Finland had gained the status of an example for peaceful coexistence between a big and a small country and between a capitalist and a communist system. Correspondingly, Hjelt sensed a Hungarian tendency: it was unofficially or indirectly hoped that their country could also achieve a position similar to that of Finland, both in the eyes of the Western block

and the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, the Hungarians remembered quite well that Finland and Hungary had been in a similar political situation after the Second World War but now the countries were politically and socio-economically far from each other, and the comparison did not favour Hungarians. The status Finland had and the position of Kekkonen was something to strive for.

During the spring 1956, when the internal political situation in Hungary was getting more charged, Finnish politicians gained an exceptional opportunity to make observations. The PM Hegedús had invited in February a delegation of the Finnish Parliament to Hungary. The visit took place in June 1956, which was only a few weeks after Rákosi's public speech of self-criticism. He had admitted to an adequate amount of mistakes: the personality cult, illegal activities of the secret police etc. The message was clear: there had been some mistakes but it was all past. Now it was time to go ahead and keep the wheels of Socialism rolling. According to Hjelt, the Hungarians were disappointed; Rákosi had confessed his mistakes but was not going to resign. Hjelt thought that the Hungarians had lost their interest in politics and surmised that Rákosi might be able to hold on to his position, but for how long was unforeseeable.⁴⁸

The visit of the Finnish delegation took place just after the Hungarians had recovered from Stalin's death and Rákosi's mild self-criticism. Its delegation had been chosen on the basis of parliamentary importance. Three of the members were communists, two from the Agrarian Union, and one from the Swedish People's Party, NCP and People's Party respectively.⁴⁹ Could the delegation have had any opportunities to make sense of the situation in Hungary? Highly unlikely as the programme of the visit was planned by the host and everybody had to travel from one place to another in the group. The Finns saw what the Hungarians wanted them to see. What did they see? Museums, factories, and they made short trips to Debrecen, Hortobágy, Lake Balaton and the Mátra mountains. The hosts were as generous as the Hungarians could be and everything the Finns

wanted – or asked to be shown was shown to them – except the massive industrial site Sztálinváros. The Finns and the Hungarians became friends and now everybody talked about the kinship between Finns and Hungarians, but the facades of Potemkin were too obvious. The hosts tried, for example, to demonstrate that Hungary was a liberal state when it came to religion but unsuccessfully. There were also disputes about the methods of education but, on the whole, the visit was a success for the Hungarians. Because the Finns found the best Hungary had to offer there was not too much room for criticism and the table speeches were all the time cordial. It was a propaganda tour, the Finns got new experiences and representation but the Hungarians scored the propaganda points.⁵⁰

It was remarkable how the Hungarian press wrote about the visit. Before the year 1956 Finland had been mentioned quite seldom, and especially about Finnish politics the papers wrote only the basic incidents: who was elected President and what were the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. There had been news but no actual contact with the men and women behind it. Now the Hungarians had a group of living politicians from the North in their country, and what was the most important thing, not only communists but also some capitalists, even one member of the NCP, a true reactionary. For example, *Szabad Nép* wrote immediately after the Finnish delegation had arrived in Budapest the following:⁵¹

Yesterday morning our beloved guests arrived in our country. We are cordially happy to welcome the representatives of our relative country, Finland, and we wish that throughout their visit the relations of our countries will become even closer.

The paper stressed three main themes as cornerstones in Finnish-Hungarian relations. Those were the suddenly so popular idea of kinship, the ultimate friendship and as the most important matter, the burning desire for peace. The last one was the urge that brought Finland and Hungary even closer to each other. Because of this task, it was irrelevant whether a country was communist or capitalist.⁵² In a wider political perspective,

the timing of the visit was interesting because Mihail Suslov, a far more important visitor than any of the Finns, had simultaneously talks with HWP leaders, including János Kádár.⁵³ One can assume that there was some tension in the air, but the Finns knew nothing about it.

Before 1955 Finland had been a country which could not be considered a 'friend'. The only friends Hungary had were the other members of the communist block and neighbouring Austria. Hungary needed a window to the West. Finland was just what Hungary needed. It was on good terms with the Soviet Union, with the West, and it was gaining reputation as an international mediator. In 1955 the leaders of Hungary started to put forward the idea of kinship. In contrast, in Finland Hungary aroused little interest. It was still a minor communist country and it seems that the Finnish authorities were fully satisfied with the information they got from Hjelt who regularly wrote quite competent reports – the evaluations he made were seldom totally wrong. During the summer 1956 the events in Hungary ran rapidly for Hjelt, actually too rapidly for almost everybody.

Finnish authorities were always concerned about the risk of an open conflict, and if it would develop in Europe that was even worse. In 1956 the Suez crisis broke out, in which the USA, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Egypt were involved. It did not cause any real problems for Finnish foreign policy. There had been symptoms of disharmony in the Eastern bloc, at first in East Germany and then in Poland, but they were solved more or less peacefully or at least in a way which did not shake the balance of the Cold War.

In July 1956 Hjelt wrote to Helsinki about the internal situation in Hungary. He knew of Suslov's visit and rumours circulated. Was Rákosi falling? The information Hjelt was able to gather, gave him a wrong impression; he wrote that the most likely option would be that Rákosi would stay in power even though there was heavy pressure on him. Hjelt found several reasons to back up his supposition. The most important source of information seems to have been the Ambassador of Yugoslavia, who told Hjelt that

Rákosi could stay in power. Hjelt could not see anyone replacing him and assumed that the most important matter to the Kremlin was to maintain peaceful conditions in Hungary and that Rákosi was the right man to secure that.⁵⁴ Continuity was the key issue for the Soviets.

Just a week after Hjelt's prediction Anastas Mikoyan, a member of the CPSU CC Presidium, visited Budapest for the meeting of the HWP. Mikoyan was in Hungary to get a clear picture of what was going on. The Party was losing its authority and support, and practically all the problems focused on Rákosi. He had lost credibility in the eyes of the Hungarians. After lengthy discussions Mikoyan wrote to the CPSU CC on the 14th July 1956. The letter was devastating. The HWP was losing its leading impetus. Rákosi was politically a dead man and the first thing the Hungarians should do was to get rid of him. All the HWP CC members who were not on the same line with the Soviet Union would be dismissed and new, young and loyal members would be recruited from the cadres.⁵⁵ The Soviet Union planned a controlled transfer of power.

Hungarian politicians did as their masters had told them to do. The HWP CC announced Rákosi's resignation on the 18th July 1956. They not announce any official reason, but only hinted at Rákosi's bad health and high age. The new first secretary of the HWP CC Politburo was the former vice-PM Gerő. Hjelt tried to disentangle what was behind this political manoeuvre. What were the reasons that forced Rákosi to resign? After all he had been the leading figure of Hungarian politics for almost a decade. Now it was time for Hjelt to explain and show whether he understood anything about the country where he was posted.

Hjelt's analysis was a sharp one. He saw four main reasons why Rákosi had had to go. First, there was the general development in the Eastern European communist countries after Stalin's death. Second, Rákosi's reluctance to adjust his politics to suit to the policy lines created after Stalin's era. Third, the great economic problems which Hungary had, and fourth, the dissatisfaction with Rákosi's policy in general.

Surprisingly, Hjelt assumed that Moscow would have desired Rákosi to continue, although in the letter to CPSU CC Mikoyan had said that both the Soviet Union and quite many of the members of the HWSP Politburo agreed with the idea that it was time for Rákosi to resign. Also Rákosi himself was willing to give up his position. In the meeting with Mikoyan and the leaders of the HWSP on the 13th July 1956, Rákosi had said that the only reason he had stayed in power was that he wanted to correct the mistakes he had done and then resign. But now the time for an effort such as this had passed. Hjelt made one very clever observation by pointing to the role of the new member of the HWSP CC whose name was János Kádár. On the base of Hjelt's report, the Finnish authorities were quite well-informed about the transfer of power in Hungarian internal policy. The things Hjelt did not know were of the kind that only very few, if any, knew.⁵⁶

5 The Uprising and Aftermath

The pressure against the HWP was growing during the summer 1956. Students and intellectuals gathered in the Petőfi Club. In almost every town there were discussion groups, and Hjelt noticed that the rise of popular movements did not aim at getting out of the Soviet orbit but it created a totally new forum for debate and criticism. In his estimation in September 1956, Hjelt was pessimistic. Although a freer atmosphere was a good thing in itself and the Hungarian government was at least accepting some criticism, there were also dangerous factors. The more people were given freedom, the harder it would be to control their movements, but if the government chose a harder line, the reaction would be incalculable. For the Soviets the situation was clear: the people in the Petőfi Club represented counter-revolutionary forces.⁵⁷ The leaders of Hungary were not able to deal with the dilemma on their hands. What is the tolerable amount of freedom in a communist country? This is a question to which no communist dictatorship has ever found a satisfying answer.

Disturbances also hit Poland in 1956. The workers' uprising in Poznan in July 1956 forced the Polish United Workers' Party to make changes in its leadership. A formerly imprisoned highly-ranked party member, of Wladyslaw Gomulka, returned to power. The Poles and the Soviets eventually reached a peaceful solution in October, 1956.⁵⁸

The uprising in Hungary started 23 October 1956 and practically ended during the first weeks of November. The history of the revolution has been studied thoroughly; here we concentrate on Hjelt's reports on it. In one of them, dated 10th of November, he expounded on the reason for the uprising: the Hungarians wanted to root out stalinism, they wanted democratisation of Hungarian society, and there were also demands to investigate what had happened during the Rákosi era. According to Hjelt people also wanted to know what was Hungary's economic situation, what was wrong with Communism, where were the promised better times? The demonstrations and fighting started the 23rd of October and Nagy was elected the PM. The next day the hated Gerő resigned and a general strike was started. By the end of the month the violence was over and the Soviet troops left Budapest. Days of chaos started and there was confusion about who was in charge in Hungary. Nagy was the PM but he could not control the masses. A few days later, 4th of November the Russian troops started the invasion and fighting broke out again, now mainly in Budapest. The uprising was practically over on the 9th of November, and the new PM was János Kádár.⁵⁹

A few days later, 14th of November Hjelt was able to write a careful analysis: the impulse for the uprising had come from Poland. Polish communists could remodel the leadership of their party even though ideological changes were very moderate. This was an example for Hungarians. When they took to the barricades they gained a minor victory – the Soviet troops withdrew – but not from Hungary, only from Budapest. The most significant matter for Hjelt was the composition of the revolutionary forces: they were basically students, soldiers and workers, the key groups which should have been the most loyal supporters of communist power.

He made also one very important observation: the uprising as a whole was not against Socialism or Communism; it was against the Soviet model of Communism. What was at stake was not a change of the political system but to reform it. There was only one thing which Hjelt did not notice, when he compared Poland and Hungary. Poland was in the middle of the communist camp, the Soviet Union lies in the East, and the GDR in the West and Hungary in the South. Hungary was geopolitically in a precarious position, situated on the front line of the communist bloc. Capitalist Austria had a common border with Hungary, Tito's Yugoslavia was nearby and so was the feared FRG. According to Hjelt it was impossible for the Soviet Union to allow the liberation of Hungary.⁶⁰ In this way Hjelt gave the Finns a reasonably correct and detailed analysis about the uprising of 1956.

How was it possible for Hjelt to write such a competent analysis about the events in Budapest and elsewhere in Hungary? Hjelt actually referred to radio broadcasts many times but they could not tell everything and it is quite obvious that he went to the streets and saw it all, broken windows, collapsed walls, destroyed barricades and so on. He must have heard local informants, too because he could report about fighting in the countryside, for example, in Pécs, on the island of Csepel, in Dunapentele and in Miskolc. He knew who was fighting and who was not. He followed the high-level political manoeuvres without any illusions, and he saw that Nagy was a weak leader of the masses he could not control. For Hjelt, he was no better than Kádár whose position was based on the Soviet army, or as Hjelt wrote: 'Kádár's government hangs in the air at least as much as Nagy's did, or, in other words, it sits on the Russian tanks.'⁶¹

For Kekkonen the violence in Hungary was a shock. He made a very exceptional gesture by contacting the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki and offering himself as a mediator between the Hungarians and the Soviets. He even offered to travel to Budapest so that the bloodshed could be ended. It is hard to find any rational reason for Kekkonen's action. Did he really think he could have had enough political capital to make any

impact on the dramatic situation in Hungary? Undoubtedly not. However, his initiative can also be seen from another perspective. For Kekkonen and especially for his closest friends such as Kustaa Vilkuna, the kinship with Hungarians was emotionally a sensitive matter. When far-away located relatives were in trouble, Kekkonen felt he had to do something, whether it was useful or not. After the uprising Kekkonen commanded the Finnish Ambassador of the UN very strictly in every vote the General Assembly had. His line was clear: in the resolutions which condemned the Soviets Finland abstained but in the ones which emphasized the right of freedom and independence of the Hungarian nation Finland voted for them. At the moment nobody knew that this definition of policy would be the Finnish line at the UN for the next forty years.⁶²

In Finland the brutalities carried out by the Red Army caused intensive debate and the person in the eye of this whirlwind was Kekkonen. The majority of the Finnish newspapers expected Finland to react on the Soviet occupation more strongly both domestically and internationally. The way the Finns reacted was very emotional and unwise. Should there have been any reason to do damage to the 'friendly' relations with the Soviet Union because of the dramatic events in Hungary? Finland could not have been able to do anything. Hungary was one of the Soviet Union's satellites, a frontline country especially in view of the fact that the FRG had just started to rebuild its army. Considered in a wider political perspective or only from the point of Finnish-Russian relations, the Finns and Kekkonen did everything they had in their power to do. In the UN Finland did not accept the military intervention but, on the other hand, there was no real-political reason to judge everything the Soviet Union had done. The decisions concerning the policy towards the uprising were made by Kekkonen but he was not alone. The Hungarian uprising was the one and only foreign political issue about which Kekkonen asked advice from a higher Finnish authority. This authority was former President Paasikivi who told

Kekkonen: 'There is no reason for us to slander the Soviets now; that does not benefit us at all, rather it might harm us'.⁶³

The Hungarians tried unilaterally to change their political position in the divided Europe with catastrophic consequences. It was self-evident that the Soviet Union would not give any chance to change the power political balance in Europe. It was ready to take brutal actions in order to maintain this situation and this was a fact the Finns should have also taken into consideration. There was only one superpower in Europe and it was right next to Finland. Thus the uprising in Hungary was a reminder also to the Finns.

6 The Kádár-Kekkonen Era Begins

President Kekkonen had made his stand clear: Finland would not accept violence but at the same time he accepted the fact that the Soviet Union could not allow any kind of dissident actions from her satellites. The constellation that was created in Europe after the Second World War was immutable. After the year 1956 this idea was widely accepted both in NATO and especially among the so called non-aligned countries.⁶⁴

The Finnish *chargé d'affaires* was there at the focal point of the events in Hungary and he was able to report on the situation after the uprising. Especially the meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in January 1957 was worth looking at. Restless Poland, the uncertain GDR and China-oriented Albania were absent and only the most loyal communist countries, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union and Hungary were represented. According to Hjelt, the other communist countries agreed to give Hungary all material aid they could and the Soviet Union gave at least one solid promise: the Red Army would stay in Hungary.⁶⁵ The last promise must have been a pleasant one for the new leader, Kádár, whose position was on very shaky ground.

Kádár's first definition of policy that was given in his name was harsh: all counter-revolutionary activities would be rooted out. In Hungary there was room only for one party, the HWP, which had changed its name to Hungarian Socialist Workers'

Party (HSWP). All political liberalization was to be recalled. A declaration like this was no surprise for Hjelt and he did not comment on it in any way. The most significant estimation Hjelt made was about Kádár's personality: he was not a strong man in political rhetoric and it was not at all clear whether Kádár would stay in power. At the moment he seemed to be just another puppet-leader and his power was based on the sad fact that the Soviet Union had occupied the country.⁶⁶

Hjelt turned out to be wrong since Kádár soon demonstrated his ruthlessness. The period of reprisals started in April 1957 and ended in summer 1961. The new leader showed that there was no room for active opposition in 'his' country and all subversive elements were destroyed both physically and mentally. Hjelt already reported the executions and internments. In reality they amounted to 341 hanged in 1956–1961, while 22,000 Hungarians were sentenced to prison, about 13,000 persons were interned, and many others lived with panic and fear in their minds.⁶⁷ It was as if the times of Rákosi's terror were back.

Hjelt saw the beginning of the dark chapter of Hungary's post-war history. The mood as a whole was depressing. Kádár commenced his policy of eradicating the memory of October 1956. Hjelt pointed to the hasty court proceedings – almost anybody could be prosecuted and sentenced to prison for a minor offence. There was also new legislation which made it more difficult to leave the collectives. The new government and its servants were everywhere. The Hungarian Literary Union was abolished as was the Union of Journalists. Universities were closed and the news about executions caused depression. The first victims of Kádár's reprisals were former members of the Smallholders' Party, József Dudás and József Szabó, the hero of Széna Square. Hjelt heard that the prisons were filled with members of intelligentsia; writers, journalists, students and members of the Workers' Councils. As Hjelt had it, there was a kind of witch-hunt going on in Hungary.⁶⁸ The country was again on its way to year zero, to the times of revenge.

The spring 1957 was the last for Hjelt in Budapest. He concentrated on observing the policy of the new regime. The propaganda against Nagy was bitter and aggravating; now he

was nothing but a traitor, a puppet of the Western counter-revolutionary movement. The biggest issue for Kádár was the reorganization of the HSWP, which had serious problems in increasing membership. Hjelt's estimate was that the old party (HWP) had had at least one million members but the new one only about 170,000. Another serious problem was that the ideas and the memory of October 1956 still lived vividly among students. Kádár's policy did not make the atmosphere any better. One example of the pronouncements Kádár made was the claim that there were no foreign troops in Hungary because the soldiers of the Red Army were not foreigners but only guests or sons of a friendly nation who came to help in times of trouble. Hjelt played the Hungarians down quite strongly even though he had seen the passionate fighting only a few months ago, because he estimated that there could be some resistance still coming, but it would have been in Hjelt's words 'typical Hungarian stargazing'.⁶⁹

Consolidation of the Kádár regime was agreed in Moscow in March 1957 when Kádár met the leaders of the Soviet Union. As a result of the negotiations it was decided that Rákosi would not come back to Hungary and that the ex-party-leader would resign from all his public offices. The most important issue was the CPSU's support for Kádár. The Soviets agreed that he would restore the status of Hungary. Kádár himself raised the question in the Kremlin and his outlook can be crystallized in one sentence: 'To pull out a bad tooth, we cannot wait from eight to ten months, or years.'⁷⁰

Hjelt's opinion of the consequences of Kádár's visit to Moscow was well-founded. The need of liquidation of the 'counter-revolutionary elements' from the Hungarian society was imminent and there would be no essential changes in Hungarian policy; it would not, for example, follow the Yugoslavian model, Polish model or any other alternative. Hjelt reported on the financial support the Soviet Union had promised and how Kádár's regime suppressed dissidents. Internment camps were in use again, capital punishments were carried out and the propaganda in general was rude – consequently, Hjelt did not appreciate Kádár very highly. To him he was still a marionette, a leader who was lacking the support of his countrymen. One matter had not changed: Finland was still counted in Hungary

among the friendly countries. Kádár told the session of the executive committee of the HSWP in April 1957 that there had been only a few representatives of the friendly nations at the reception in the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow during Kádár's visit: from Western Europe there were only the Ambassadors of Finland and Sweden, not the Ambassador of Yugoslavia, for example.⁷¹

In his last report in May 1957 Hjelt made some observations which in the long-term proved to be far-sighted. According to it, Kádár had made a totally different public appearance, his image was changing. The forum for this change was the Parliament, which was one of the few places where foreign diplomats could hear the Hungarian leaders talking live even though it had only symbolic political power. Hjelt, who was present during the session, realized that politically Kádár's speech did not have any new content. The line chosen by Kádár had not changed: no general election, no multi-party system and no changes in the policy of 'restoration of order'. However, Kádár's tone was not the same, he spoke very warmly about the new Polish leader, Gomulka, and in general he was friendly, joyful and the audience seemed to like the man. Hjelt reported that Kádár had possibly increased his popularity among ordinary people. But as Hjelt sarcastically added: there was still lot to do in that area.⁷²

What did Hjelt actually see? He might have seen the first glimpse of the future Kádárist Hungary. Law and order would be severe, but Kádár himself was relaxed, filled with internal peace and amusement, a real contrast to Rákosi and Nagy. One reason for Kádár's relaxation might have been that he had secured his position as a definite leader of the HSWP. During the meeting of the HSWP CC in December 1957 the Party made all the essential decisions regarding the punishment of the counter-revolutionaries and of the amnesty. First, there would be the period of more severe sentences followed by years of forgiveness. Afterwards Kádár could create an image of a firm leader who could reunite the quarrelsome nation and become a congenial and respected father-figure to the nation.⁷³

In Finland there was a leader who had similar ideas regarding his own future. The victory by a one vote margin in 1956 had

plausibly brought Kekkonen more enemies than friends. To compare Kádár with Kekkonen may sound tasteless, but there are some basic similarities. Both had bitter enemies; Kádár was brought to power by the Soviets and there were also in Finland some discussions regarding whether the Soviets had exercised some influence on public opinion in favour of Kekkonen before the elections. Some political observers suspected that the Soviet Union had restored the Porkkala just to boost Kekkonen's election. Both Kekkonen and Kádár had a lot to do if they wanted to become respected leaders of their nations. However, one very significant difference remains: Kádár's hands were bloody and his way to power was covered with corpses whereas Kekkonen left only political corpses behind.

6 From the Night Frost to Mutual Understanding

The new Finnish *chargé d'affaires* was a very experienced and respected career diplomat T. H. (Toivo Heikki) Heikkilä. He had been posted in Berlin as an attaché as early as 1934 and after that in Budapest during the Second World War in 1941–1943. In Finland Heikkilä was Paasikivi's secretary during the critical years 1944–1948. Before arriving at Budapest he had been in the GDR a few years and was well aware of the circumstances in the smaller Eastern European communist countries. The years as Paasikivi's secretary taught him how the communists operated when they were aiming to gain power in a democratic society. One can state that Heikkilä was a man who also knew all the essential facts of Finnish domestic politics.⁷⁴

Heikkilä's start in Budapest was promising. The first highly-ranked Hungarian official Heikkilä met was the Foreign Minister Imre Horváth. It did not take long before they realized they were old friends from years in East-Berlin from the late 1940s. There were no problems with language because both spoke German fluently. The message Horváth gave to Heikkilä about the policy of Hungary was unambiguous: The best friend Hungary has is the Soviet Union and the other countries which were members of the 'peace-group' were not the best friends but very good ones anyway. Among these peaceful nations was

no other Western capitalist country but Finland. Heikkilä put this down as a compliment or as an insult. The Hungarians had created this classification according to a respective country's policy towards Hungarian emigrants. For example, in all the other Nordic countries – especially in Sweden – there were very active Hungarian emigrant groups but not in Finland. The reason was that Finland did not accept Hungarian political refugees on her soil. Actually, Finland did not grant asylum to refugees no matter where they came from. Later Heikkilä had a long discussion with an old friend of Finland, the vice-Prime Minister Ferenc Münnich who also clarified to Heikkilä the situation in Hungary after the uprising. Münnich spoke relatively openly about the political problems Hungary was facing and admitted that there was still some active resistance against the government but the worst was over. Probably the most disinterested statement was Münnich's estimate concerning the Hungarians themselves whom he said to be a nation with a very peculiar character. Heikkilä construed this to mean that Hungarians were not easily converted to Communism. Münnich, who had also been posted in Finland talked about Kekkonen and emphasized his great admiration for the Finnish president stating that Hungarian leaders had been following his career with great interest.⁷⁵

Even though Heikkilä's arrival in Budapest had been made warm and pleasant by the Hungarians, Heikkilä was not bluffed. He was well aware that there was another life behind the curtains of the political elite. The repression of the participants of the uprising was reaching its peak and it was impossible for the foreign diplomats not to hear about it. As early as in July 1957, in his second report to Helsinki, Heikkilä told about the depressing events occurring especially in Budapest, of which he knew best because the countryside was practically isolated from the capital. Heikkilä wrote that random arrests, long interrogations which included also torture and deportations were familiar for almost everybody who could have been linked somehow with the events of the autumn 1956. The ambience in general was depressing.⁷⁶

During the summer 1957 Heikkilä tried to find out what kind of men the new leaders of Hungary were. The picture he conveyed to Finland was not a very positive one. In late August 1957 he travelled to Kisújszállás where the Hungarian leaders had decided to celebrate the day of the constitution. Both Dobi and Kádár appeared in public, a rare occasion at the time. Kádár was the only speaker who made a neutral impression to Heikkilä: he was a blond, tall, youngish (Kádár was 44 years of age) Hungarian whose eyes and voice were devoid of fanaticism. In his speech Kádár admitted that there were people under house arrest but justified the 'method' by saying that these people were protected from a possible death in freedom. Regarding foreign policy, Kádár insisted that the UN had no right to interfere in Hungary's domestic affairs, and pointed out that the Soviets had not intervened in Hungary; they had only fulfilled their obligation to 'help' another socialist country against counter-revolutionary rebellion. It is hard to say whether Heikkilä was disappointed or not at Kádár's performance; he was a pragmatic diplomat and understood that there had been so much bloodshed on the streets of Budapest that even the idea of loosening control was impossible. In any case, Heikkilä was convinced that there would not be any disturbance in Hungary, and if anyone else could not guarantee peace, the Red Army could.⁷⁷ The personality of Kádár haunted Heikkilä: in the last analysis he was still a 'petty district ex-secretary' whose position as the leader was uncertain and his government seemed temporary, although Kádár himself might become a figurehead for future leadership. His wisest decision was to postpone court proceedings against former Deputy Minister of Defence, Pál Maléter – Heikkilä's informants could not know that he was doomed. In all, Heikkilä's forecast was not quite amiss:⁷⁸

This discussion enhanced the impression that the consequences of the uprising will have a very deep and far-reaching impact on the future. It will be especially difficult for the HSWP to recover from the setback it has suffered. It is quite possible that the Party will never fully get over the autumn 1956.

It was as early as in October 1957 when Heikkilä was able to report of the first visible signs of Kádár's new 'stick and carrot' policy; private business was allowed, for example, for doctors, restaurant- and coffee shopkeepers, and there was also some relaxation of the regulations concerning travelling abroad for students and scientists. Also 'ordinary people' were allowed to have contacts with foreigners.⁷⁹

The relations between Finland and Hungary in the late 1950s remained 'miraculously good despite the political 'earthquakes' or they became better after 'the shattering intermezzo' of 1956, as Heikkilä viewed it. One reason was that Finland condemned the Soviet occupation and violence, but the Soviet Union itself was not criticized. In the resurrected atmosphere of kinship, Heikki Hosia, the Minister of Education, renewed the agreement of cultural co-operation in 1959 and the PM V.J. Sukselainen and the Second Spokesman of the Finnish Parliament, Johannes Virolainen, visited Hungary. Henceforth dealings between Finland and Hungary became more intensive and the journalists had more opportunities to observe life over the Iron Curtain.⁸⁰

The proof of who dictated Hungary's foreign policy was given to Finns during the so-called night frost period in the end of 1958 and at the beginning of the year 1959 when a new government was formed in Finland. It was a 'normal' one, based on the co-operation of the Agrarian Union and social democrats, but it had one serious drawback: the Kremlin did not accept it and Finnish-Soviet relations practically broke up and with Hungary Finland could not progress in negotiations for wider trade because the official Hungary assumed a very calm attitude; the Independence Day of Finland was celebrated in 'an intentional coolness of atmosphere' in the Embassy of Finland,⁸¹ but finally, at the beginning of January 1959, the new agreement of trade payments was signed, and Heikkilä decided to organize a festive occasion. The date for this was well set: Fagerholm's government resigned on the 13th of January and the new one, Sukselainen's government, started its work on the very same day, and Heikkilä had decided to have the celebration on the 14th. Information about the occasion was given to Hungarians, but until the 13th only the representatives of the

non-aligned countries had answered. Heikkilä called the Protocol Department of Hungary's Foreign Ministry. At first, the answer was a cryptic one: 'Maybe somebody is coming' but, in the end, a couple of vice-Ministers, would attend. On the successful occasion, the Hungarian guests were hilarious, and the atmosphere was much better than during the celebration of Independence Day. Heikkilä estimated quite correctly that the resignation of Fagerholm's government and the inauguration of the new government had made a positive impact on the Hungarian attitude.⁸²

The warm breath of mutual understanding reached the highest level in 1963. Finns frequented Hungary; FM Ahti Karjalainen, Johannes Virolainen, Minister of Foreign Trade, Olavi J. Mattila, and Kekkonen's friend, Vilkuna with his clients.⁸³ The climax was to come; Kekkonen was planning an official visit to Yugoslavia in May 1963, and thereafter an unofficial visit to Hungary. It was time for Kekkonen and Kádár to meet for the first time.

One must keep in mind that in Kekkonen's program meeting with Tito was the most important item. He set himself to publicising more widely his idea of the Nordic non-nuclear zone and explored if the rather self-opinionated Tito would support him. According to Kekkonen's diary, Tito thought the idea was sensible. Before leaving Yugoslavia Kekkonen requested Tito characterize Kádár. Tito's answer was: 'Kádár is a very good and wise man'.⁸⁴

There is no direct evidence as to whether Kekkonen had much information about Kádár in advance. Official representatives had written their characterizations and possibly Vilkuna had told Kekkonen something. Even though the visit was a private one, Kekkonen was an old friend of Hungary and he must have been curious to see what the situation was in the country. Kádár just might engulf the fresh idea of the Nordic nuclear-free-zone.⁸⁵

In Hungary Kekkonen's visit was a big event and the new Ambassador – Finland and Hungary had elevated their diplomatic relations to the highest level in 1960 – Reino Palas had a demanding task. He had arrived in Hungary at the

beginning of May 1963, only two weeks before Kekkonen's visit. The reception organized in his honour was imposing. The accreditation took place in the Parliament; Palas left his letter of appointment to Dobi on the 6th of May. Soon Palas met three persons: the Spokesman of the Parliament, the Mayor of Budapest and Kádár. The first two meetings did not excite the experienced diplomat but the last one did. As Palas put it: 'Kádár is a very well-known and world famous man, whose policy of destalinization is well-reputed and closely watched around the world.' Possibly Palas knew that this might be the only occasion when he could meet him privately. Unfortunately, the meeting was not a discussion but a monologue. Kádár talked a lot and Palas listened. The first topic was the kinship between Finland and Hungary, already taken up by Dobi. Kádár then pointed out that Hungary wanted to maintain good relations with every country, both in the East and the West. This message was rather familiar from the policy of Kekkonen who had introduced it in Finland. For Kádár, Yugoslavia and Austria were 'friends' even though Yugoslavia was a revisionist country and Austria a capitalist one. This was not a matter of ideology but of realistic policy. The way Finland conducted her foreign policy was highly appreciated by Kádár. Especially, the manner Finland had managed the relations with the Soviet Union was also internationally remarkable, and Kádár was looking forward to seeing Kekkonen in Hungary.⁸⁶

Thus there were only good omens for Kekkonen's visit. Both Kádár's and Kekkonen's arguments concerning international politics and the position of small countries in the duopolic world of the Cold War were very similar. Small countries should try to maintain good relations with at least their close neighbours. Once again Kádár emphasized the kinship of Finns and Hungarians, which enabled good cultural and trading relations.⁸⁷

How accurate were Palas's estimates? For him Kádár was an example of a new style leader in a communist county, a man who was testing the limits of the Kremlin's attitude towards the liberalization of society while remaining a loyal friend of the Soviet Union. This was parallel with Kekkonen's policy. The

main difference between Hungary and Finland was the fact that Hungary was a true satellite of the Soviet Union and a communist country, whereas Finland was a solid friend of the Soviet Union and a capitalist country. Yet both were hoping and searching for peace, good relations with neighbouring countries and no change in political systems.

Palas's report was truly professional showing wide general knowledge. He had previously been posted in Stockholm, in Copenhagen and in Washington, and he had been in service since 1941. He was also very well educated; he had a Ph.D. in psychology and good language proficiency: he knew English, French and German.⁸⁸ Basically, he was a diplomat to the bone and capable of preparing the ground for Kekkonen.

Kekkonen arrived in Hungary on the 12th of May 1963 and met Kádár in Debrecen. The meeting must have been a pleasant surprise at least to Kekkonen. According to the information received by Finnish diplomats from Budapest, Kádár was expected to be dull and uninspiring. It should be remembered that Kekkonen could not have seen Palas's rather positive report which was dated 20th of May which had dealt with the meeting in Debrecen during which Kádár spoke very openly about the painful period after the year 1956 and also about the background of the uprising. He had found Rákosi the main culprit. Dobi, who was also present in Debrecen, made similar remarks. 'Better times are coming', was what both Kádár and Dobi emphasized. How did Kekkonen react? He was positively impressed. Afterwards he wrote in his diary:

Kádár seems to be a really likeable and sensible man. He spoke openly about the year 1956. Rákosi had made big mistakes but the promises of the West made a crucial impact on the developments that caused the uprising.⁸⁹

What was the meaning of the visit? The difference between the official visit to Yugoslavia and the unofficial visit to Hungary is apparent. In Yugoslavia Kekkonen was conducting international politics and in Hungary he was the leader of a kinship country. All the notes made by Kekkonen and all the documents and press

releases demonstrate the visit's apolitical nature. And again: Kádár talked a lot and the visitor listened.⁹⁰ For Kekkonen the visit had no special political goals. He was genuinely interested in Hungary and appreciated the way his trustee, Vilkuna, had created cultural relations with the country for years.

The Hungarian press was fascinated: the readership could not but be aware of Kekkonen's career and of his liking of Hungary. Even though the visit lacked political dimensions, the visit was interpreted as an approval of the Kádár regime.⁹¹ But Sándor Kurtán, Hungary's Ambassador in Finland, was critical. There had been some disappointments, especially the trip to Hortobágy and Debrecen were unsuccessful; the interpreter had been poor and Kekkonen had not met enough important persons. The Hungarians had wanted personal contacts with Kekkonen, and they saw Kekkonen's closest advisor, Permanent Secretary Reino Hallama, as the best source of introduction on the lines of Finnish foreign policy. The Minister of the Foreign Affairs, Veli Merikoski, was not in the eyes of the Hungarians a man who had any political power. Kurtán knew quite well that it was Kekkonen himself and his close friends whose words were worth listening to.⁹² And his estimate was completely correct. All came to this: possibly in the future there might be even closer relations between Hungary and Finland, but not yet. At first, Hungary had to re-establish its international position.

When Kekkonen started to lift his profile in the field of international politics, Kádár's reputation among the leaders of the West was getting better. His new domestic policy was bearing its first fruits. Palas wrote to Helsinki in June 1963 about the 'new line', as he put it. The atmosphere in Hungary in general was rather free, ordinary citizens were able to travel even to the West, tourism was taking its first cautious steps, almost everybody had an opportunity to study at the universities, and political prisoners were gradually released. Even the churches were allowed to operate quite freely. Palas had the courage to make a rather radical estimate that Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia might be planning to form a more liberal group within the communist camp.⁹³

One sign of the new attitude of the West was the growing number of high-level visits to Budapest. The General Secretary of the UN, U Thant, paid a visit to Budapest in July 1963 and after him came Richard Nixon. Especially the visit of U Thant was important. The General Secretary and Kádár had a three hour private discussion, and Palas estimated that Kádár's personality had made a great impact on the visitor. It was quite obvious that Hungary was slowly getting out of the cornered position in the field of international politics. As U Thant had it: 'The discussion with the PM Kádár contributed to a better understanding of Hungary in the UN and to an improvement of the relations between Hungary and other member states of the world organization'. No wonder the Foreign Ministry of Hungary was very pleased about the positive development which made its impact also at the diplomatic level because after 1963 the status of most of the Western delegations in Budapest was elevated to embassy level.⁹⁴

In the early 1960s Kádár and Kekkonen had one especially good mutual friend, the General Secretary of the CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev. He had repeatedly declared his good relations with Kekkonen and through Kekkonen with Finland. To Khrushchev they were a fine example of the peaceful co-existence of two different nations and two different political systems. In April 1964 Khrushchev visited Hungary, an occasion which was the peak of Kádár's political career. The relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union were perfect. Palas's evaluation at the meeting is worth quoting:⁹⁵

It seems as if it were important to Khrushchev to show to the world that there is at least one ally which is 100 percent behind him [Kádár]. On the other hand, it was important for Kádár to gain Khrushchev's approval of his "socialist democracy", so called Kádárism which was politically a sort of middle-way between "right-wing" and "left-wing" Communism.

The similarity of Kádár's and Kekkonen's reactions to Khrushchev's dismissal was salient. Kekkonen wrote in his diary about a great shock. He continued: 'He [Khrushchev] was a friend of Finland and I was able to discuss openly with him'.

Kádár, for his part, praised Khrushchev's achievements and recalled that the Hungarians had admired the fallen leader. Kádár took it personally, too, because it had been Khrushchev who had made Kádár the leader of Hungary. The Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Budapest, Denisov, told Palas that also he understood the sadness of the Finns, because Khrushchev had been a great friend of Finland, and consoled him by saying that there were now two leaders in the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin who followed the politics of friendship and trust. Kekkonen himself was more than worried and cynical. He knew the new Soviet leaders and Kosygin was a kind of friend of Kekkonen's, but about Brezhnev he had not much to say. And there was the possibility of a bigger danger if the main ideologist, Suslov, could get an important position. For Kekkonen, Suslov was the worst choice because he was 'a fanatic', without any sense of humour. According to Kekkonen he did not even drink alcohol. For Kádár the adaptation to the new situation was not a problem at all. He bluntly stated that every leader of the Soviet Union was a friend of Hungary and that no great political changes were in sight.⁹⁶

For Kekkonen Khrushchev had been the first (and presumably the last) reliable link to the Soviet regime and it was hard to see how personal contacts with new leaders would develop. This was an important question because Kekkonen had realized that the best way to manage with the Soviets was to depend on personal, mutual trust. Also for Kádár the loss was big but he was a leader of a communist country and had less to lose. The Soviet Union would anyhow maintain good relations with her small satellite and it was very unlikely that Kádár's position as a leader of Hungary was in danger.

7 On the Way to CSCE

Although Kekkonen had secured his second term as a President in 1962, problems in internal politics remained there. For the SDP Kekkonen was still the main enemy and *vice versa*. The leader of the SDP, Väinö Tanner, was a fervent opponent of

Kekkonen, and there was distrust of Kekkonen even in his own Agrarian Union.⁹⁷

Kekkonen tried to win support for his foreign policy in Finland but the result was poor. Many politicians thought that it was too favourable to the Soviet Union and did not sufficiently take into account the power of the Western bloc. Since 1963 Kekkonen began to market his idea of a nuclear-free zone, at first for the Nordic countries and then in general. It was a question of regional peace to avoid mass destruction. This was an idea that also suited Kádár. Since gaining power Kádár had been talking about peace and had noticed that Kekkonen had similar ideas. On the ideological level, when it came to peace and peaceful co-existence, Kekkonen's and Kádár's political aims were congruous.

The importance of Kekkonen's visit to Hungary was proved in the Hungarian Parliament in November 1964 when Foreign Minister János Péter spoke long and warmly about Finland and Kekkonen. According to him, Finnish-Hungarian relations were at the moment much more than the old romantic kinship – the relations were good in every way, especially at an economic level. The most important factor in this development was, as Péter put it, the recent high-level 'delightful' meeting, Kekkonen's visit.⁹⁸

It was not only the official Hungary that favoured Kekkonen. For example, *Népszabadság* published a long article in December 1963 about Finland and him, in which it was evident that Finland's foreign policy was the same as Kekkonen's. Finland's position on the playground of international politics was something special: 'positive neutrality' What did this mean? Simply that Finland could maintain good relations with every country, communist, capitalist and the neutral ones. The most important thing was that Finland was not a member of any military alliance. Among the Nordic countries Finland was the one that represented 'most firmly the idea of international peace and security', and it had been Kekkonen who had introduced the idea of nuclear-free zones. The most interesting point concerning the idea of the nuclear-free zone was that the Western bloc supposed that Kekkonen was acting on the orders

of the Kremlin, a claim that at the moment had no proof. The reason why other Nordic countries were not interested in it was simple: Norway and Denmark were members of NATO and Sweden was planning to build her own nuclear weapons.⁹⁹ Palas cited *Magyar Nemzet*: 'Finland decides her foreign policy independently. It is not forced by the East or the West'.¹⁰⁰

In the mid-1960s both Kekkonen and Kádár had consolidated their positions both internally and internationally, but on a different scale. In Finland Kekkonen had won the last contested elections in 1962 (there were normal elections in Finland after that but the year 1962 was the last one when Kekkonen had real opponents) and in Hungary Kádár's position was solid. Kekkonen established quite soon reasonably good relations with the new leaders of the Soviet Union. In 1963 he was unchallenged in Finland: his last powerful opponent retired and social democrats chose a new leader, Rafael Paasio, and the man the Soviet Union hated most, Väinö Tanner, was history. The SDP was united and it became one of the leading powers of Finnish internal politics and was finally accepted by the Soviets by the end of the 1960s.¹⁰¹ Now Kekkonen was free to conduct the policy he wanted, although he had at the same time to remember or guess the Soviet attitude. Kekkonen became an international politician. At the same time Kádár's Hungary was gradually accepted by the West and Kádár had slightly more room to carry through his own policy.

The politically relaxed years in Europe ended on the 20th August 1968 when the troops of the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia. The attitudes of Kádár and Kekkonen towards the events in Czechoslovakia were partly similar and partly quite different. The main concern for both was the destiny of their own nations but the vision of the future was different. For Kekkonen the Czechoslovakian crisis was a catastrophe. He wrote in his diary:¹⁰²

It feels like a string has been cut. I have done all I could that our indispensable policy towards the East would become a clear policy of friendship and it would be a common persuasion for every Finn. The events in Czechoslovakia have destroyed these achievements and the ground for this development.

Kekkonen felt betrayed. The Soviet Union was using force again and highly-ranked Soviet diplomats had lied to him. Was there anyone to trust? What would be Finland's fate? What would happen to 'peaceful co-existence'? The foundation of Kekkonen's foreign policy seemed to have disappeared. No wonder Kekkonen was deeply depressed.

Kádár took it differently. Naturally he was concerned about the brutal intervention in which also Hungarian troops took part. But what was paramount was that it re-established the *status quo* in the Eastern bloc. The Czechs had gone too far and there was always a danger that their ideas would reach Hungary. In Kádár's view the year 1956 could not be allowed to repeat itself. This was the main concern he emphasized in discussions with Dubcek before the intervention. There was a serious danger of disturbances and the Hungarians would be obliged to participate in the action. Later he told the Soviets that the intervention was 'not worth the first prize'.¹⁰³ One can ask whether Hungary had any other alternative than to accept the Soviet decision and to participate in the intervention. The Finnish Ambassador, E. O. Raustila, had heard a statement of a highly-ranked Hungarian politician: 'Joining the intervention was for Hungary a most unpleasant duty, but one can ask whether we still existed as a nation if we had refused to do it.'¹⁰⁴

Actually Kádár's foreign policy can be described as a communist version of Kekkonen's foreign policy. Both Kádár and Kekkonen had two dimensions in their activities with other countries, the main difference being the emphasis of the context. For Kekkonen it was at least as important to stress to the West that Finland was a neutral state as to point out to the Soviets that Finland was a loyal friend of the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵ That was a strange doctrine but it worked. In Finnish-Soviet bilateral relations Finland's policy of neutrality was included in the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance from 1948 but internationally the idea of Finland being a neutral country did not cause any trouble with the Soviets. This was the state of affairs before the CSCE meeting in Helsinki.¹⁰⁶

In April 1969 the Soviet Union send to all the European nations a letter in which it proposed actions to convene a European security meeting. This was not the first time the Soviet Union made a suggestion like this; the previous had been made in 1954 but it had failed. Finland refused to organize the meeting on the ground that all European nations would not participate in it. In 1969 the situation was different. Kekkonen had been very active during the 1960s and he saw the CSCE as an opportunity to secure Finland's international position as a neutral country.¹⁰⁷

The CSCE meeting was designed to bring stability and peace to Europe. It did not bring peace but it finished indirectly the career of one Finnish diplomat. The man who fell was the Finnish Ambassador in Budapest. He had committed a majestic crime by accusing the Soviet Union of pressing Finland for four weeks to make a proposal for the CSCE meeting. Kekkonen was furious, and he immediately ordered Raustila to Finland.¹⁰⁸ What was his mistake? It was the biggest one a Finnish diplomat or politician could make in the field of foreign policy. If Raustila's statement had been true it would have meant that Finns were taking orders from the Soviets.

The idea of the security meeting really came from the Soviet Union, and it had a certain political cue for Finland. It was the reason why Kekkonen took it seriously. There was only one problem; if Finland would say yes straight-away people would think that Finland was a Soviet Union's advocate. Kekkonen decided that Finland should draft her own proposal, different from the one the Soviets had made and with the suggestion that the venue for the final summit would be Helsinki. This was the reason why the CSCE was so strongly attached to Kekkonen as a person.¹⁰⁹ The Soviet Union made the initial proposition but Kekkonen made the idea agreeable to every European nation and also to the USA and Canada. Here we can spot the reason why Kekkonen acted so rudely when he heard about Raustila's statements. The CSCE was becoming a mission for Kekkonen. A comic detail in this chain of events was that neither Kekkonen

nor his closest political advisers believed in the possibility that Helsinki indeed would be the venue.¹¹⁰

In Hungary the idea of a large scale security conference was warmly welcomed and the attitude towards it was very optimistic. For example, *Magyar Nemzet* of the 30th October and *Népszabadság* of the 26th October were certain that the time had come to stabilize the security situation in Europe. The Hungarians were so enthusiastic that the Finnish PM Mauno Koivisto warned them during his visit to Budapest in October not to be overoptimistic about the conference.¹¹¹

Hope for a peaceful and politically stable Europe was in principle acceptable to every European nation. But there were other big issues twined to it: the question of two Germanys, the Soviet desire to maintain her political influence in Europe, NATO's wish to secure Western Europe's position so that there would be no fear from the Soviet Union.

Finland's aims can be reflected through *Népszabadság's* article published on the 23 September 1969, shortly before Kekkonen's first state visit to Hungary. It was an extensive and well-studied summary of Kekkonen's public speeches and announcements by István L. Szabó. According to him, Finland's foreign policy was now entirely different compared to what it had been in the 1920s and 1930s when the basic line was isolation. But now, in the 1960s, everything that happened in the world was also Finland's concern and modern Finnish foreign policy could be described as 'a positive' foreign policy. This meant that every conflict between the East and the West was a test also to Finland's neutrality. Szabó wrote also that the Paasikivi-Kekkonen -line meant that Finland had tied her destiny on the question of peace. The concrete suggestions of creating nuclear-free zones were the clearest evidence of this policy. It was this very policy that was named by Szabó cryptically as 'positive foreign policy' Kekkonen who was a highly appreciated politician both in the East and West was its designer.¹¹² Szabó's estimate was quite accurate in view of the basic line of Finnish foreign policy; in his description we can find also the reason why Kekkonen hoped for success from the CSCE: he wanted Finland to become recognized world-

wide as a fully independent, neutral country which was not under the Soviet Union's command. This policy was welcomed also by the Hungarians, and the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately after the proposal made an analysis of the benefits the Eastern bloc could and would gain from the conference. First, the socialist countries would benefit from it because the original idea was proposed by the Soviets. Secondly, it could impinge on the unity of NATO and the Western countries in general.¹¹³

Finnish politicians were able to discuss with their colleagues during Kekkonen's visit in September 1969. Kekkonen and Kádár, who had become good friends appreciated each other very highly, had a long talk, but surprisingly not about the CSCE. Once again Kádár spoke, and Kekkonen listened to how Kádár explained Hungary's policy before and during the Czechoslovakian crisis and the developments in the socialist camp in general. With president Pál Losonczi Kekkonen had discussions about the CSCE, and Losonczi pointed out that Hungary's position differed from that of Finland only because of geography – Finland is far in the north and Hungary lies in the heart of Europe, and that was why, for example, the question of Germany was so important to Hungary. The Foreign Ministers, Ahti Karjalainen and János Péter had similar views about the security conference. The preparations had gone so well that even the NATO countries had reacted on the proposal positively.¹¹⁴

If we study the aims Finland and Hungary had concerning the CSCE summit, there are many similarities. The most important motive both to Kekkonen and Kádár was peace. In the Second World War both countries had been on the 'wrong' side and after that Hungary had to endure the Soviet occupation since 1956. The crisis in Czechoslovakia had shown that the dangers of military action had not disappeared and in that sense a large conference with participants which could end the post-war political interregnum in Europe was a goal worth aspiring to.

The Summit took place in Finlandia House in Helsinki in August 1975 and all the participants signed the final act. Everybody won something: the first 'basket' was a victory for

the Soviets because in it was the affirmation of the borders of Europe. The second 'basket' was balanced, being mainly about economical matters and in the longer term it proved to be useless. In the third basket there was the question of human rights. It was a point to the USA. The real winner, however, was Finland because this was the first time since the Congress of Vienna that every nation was granted the right to neutrality and Kekkonen utilized the situation fully by stressing that the summit was now being held on neutral ground.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless the Cold War was still lurking behind the curtains, as the US State Secretary Henry Kissinger put it:¹¹⁶

In Helsinki all the Eastern European countries increased their maneuvering room and felt encouraged by Ford's demonstrative visit to the most independent of them (These countries had, of course, invited the President precisely to make that point).

Why was the summit important to Hungary? Henry Kissinger has an interesting quotation in his memoirs about the meeting with the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, James Callaghan, who told Kissinger what Kádár thought about the conference. To Kádár the conference was a moral and political commitment to accept the *status quo* of the borders in Europe. Both Callaghan and Kissinger agreed that the CSCE could not prevent crises like in Hungary in 1956, but the Soviet Union could never again justify or explain invasion.¹¹⁷ It was evident that the CSCE was for Kádár a meeting where he was securing Hungary's position as a sovereign socialist nation which did not have to fear brutal actions from the Soviet Union. It was a security guarantee within the Eastern European communist camp that Kádár aspired to, and that was what he got. The CSCE gave every nation in theory the permission to declare to remain a non-aligned and neutral country. The statement can be found in the final act of the CSCE. The achievement for Hungary was to secure territorial integrity in principle. Even though the future was to show that the declarations made in Helsinki had little bearing on political reality in Europe, in summer 1975 it gave to all the smaller countries in

Europe hope that there would be a longer period of peace ahead, albeit no one knew what kind of peace. Henry Kissinger put it in another way: 'One conference does not change the Soviet Union a bit.'¹¹⁸

8 The Aftermath

After 1975 Kekkonen and Kádár met only once, in November 1976 during Kekkonen's state visit to Budapest. Two old, experienced and in their own countries very popular statesmen had a long discussion in the Parliament on the 17th and 18th of November. They explained the latest developments in their own countries' internal politics. Kekkonen told of the troubles Finland had had in the economy and especially in the field of domestic policy. The conflicts had been mainly between the working class and farmers. Soon Kekkonen moved on to expound international affairs. The CSCE was naturally the main topic and there was some scepticism in Kekkonen's tone. To him the détente was still the crucial question for small countries and that is the reason why everybody should, in his view, focus on the CSCE's follow-up conferences. If Kekkonen spoke openly about Finnish domestic policy, so did Kádár of Hungarian. He informed Kekkonen about the situation: the country was 'homogenous' but there were also in Hungary different social classes; peasants, workers and petty bourgeoisie, but no capitalists. The aim was, according to Kádár, the co-operation between different classes, including the religious circles. The goal was to build a socialist society. In foreign policy Hungary and Finland had common aims. Finland was a neutral country and Hungary a socialist one. The most important friend Hungary was the Soviet Union but according to the agreements signed in Helsinki, Hungary was willing to have good relations with every country. The common interest was détente and because of it Hungary was willing to fight. In a nutshell:¹¹⁹

Primarily the leaders of Hungary seek the interest of their own nation because the Hungarians have gone through so many agonies that there is no reason for causing any more grief. This is what the Hungarians appreciate and that is the reason why they support the regime.

The principles Kádár explained to Kekkonen were very similar to the basic line Kekkonen had had during his long Presidency. Without good relations with the Soviet Union it was impossible to carry through one's own foreign policy. It was not a question of whether the Soviet Union accepted everything but the relations had to be based on mutual trust. Finland and Hungary were secure because they were only not acting against the Soviet Union but also in the interest of their own nation's future. This was the reason why Kekkonen and Kádár could understand each other so well. They both had been in politics for over 30 years in the shadow of the Soviet Union and both claimed credit for remarkable achievements. Hungary in the year 1976 was a totally different nation than it had been 20 years earlier and thanks to his reformist policy Kádár had gained a good reputation in the West. Finland had gone even further as it was widely accepted as at least a relatively neutral country. If Hungary was a model student of the socialist camp, Finland was an excellent example of how a democratic country could survive under the constant pressure of the Soviet Union. However, both success stories had their darker sides. In Hungary it was inefficient economy. As a member of the Soviet bloc Hungary was unable to develop her own industry the way it would have served the Hungarian economy¹²⁰, and there was also a serious lack of democracy. In Finland the long Kekkonen-era disturbed the domestic atmosphere and caused also a deficit of democracy. In Hungary it was impossible to see the future without the Soviet Union, in Finland it was impossible to see the future without Kekkonen.

Hungary and Finland had 'friendly' relations, not only in political declarations but also on a personal level. Kekkonen and Kádár liked each other, they both were very pragmatic in their policy, especially towards the Soviet Union. Neither of them had illusions about it. Finland and Hungary just had to live with it; there was no option. The influence of the Soviet Union could be felt also during the 1976 visit. The problem was the final *communiqué*. Kekkonen wanted, actually demanded, that there would be a mention of Finland's neutrality in the text. Kádár had told Kekkonen privately that he considered Finland a neutral country, but it was

not so easy to put it on paper. After lengthy and frustrating negotiations the magic word was added in the document, but later Kekkonen found out that the promise to use that word had come from Moscow.¹²¹ That was the price Kádár had to pay for his policy and that was the prize Kekkonen had achieved with his policy.

No matter how good friends or relatives Finland and Hungary were, there was always the mighty Soviet Union somewhere there. The greatness (or to some scholars the weakness) of Kekkonen and Kádár was that they realized this perfectly and acted in the field of domestic and international policy precisely so that the Soviets could not find reason to criticize them publicly. They had no other alternative but to notice that in Kekkonen they could trust and in Kádár they had chosen to trust. Kekkonen and Kádár knew it. They both created partly different, partly similar political cultures: Kekkonen and Kádár believed that if the Soviet Union trusted them, they both had more space to carry out their own policy. There were two important sectors for both: international status and economy. For Kekkonen international recognition and neutrality were the most important but for Kádár the economic matters were more important because they thwarted the danger of internal unrest. They both managed their missions quite well.

NOTES

- ¹ Uno Koistinen to Helsinki, 21 January 1950. UM 5/27 C. The Archives of the Foreign Ministry (=UMA).
- ² Jukka Nevakivi, *Ulkoasiainhallinnon historia 1918-1956*. Helsinki: Ulkoasianministeriö 1988, 243: *Ulkoasiainhallinnon matrikkeli*, toim. Jussi Nuorteva ja Tuire Raitio. Länsi-Savo Oy, Mikkeli: Ulkoasianministeriö, 413.
- ³ A very good example can be found in the President Paasikivi's diaries. In June 1947 Paasikivi received a letter from Foreign Minister Carl Enckell in which he wrote about his anxiety of the developments in Hungary. Enckell was worried about what was going on but the essence of the letter was the concern over Finland's destiny. *J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat 1944-1956. Ensimmäinen osa 28.6.1944-24.4.1949*. eds Yrjö Blomstedt and Matti Klinge. WSOY. Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva (5th edition) 1985. date 19 June 1947. See also Tuomo Polvinen, *Jaltasta Pariisiin raUMAan. Suomi kansainvälisessä politiikassa 3, 1945-1947*. Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva 1981, 271-280 and passim.
- ⁴ This means naturally only the state level. The first Chairman of the Finnish-Hungarian Society, Mr. Ele Alenius visited Hungary in 1947. See: *Meidän Unkari. Suomi-Unkari 1950-2000*. Ed. Helena Honka-Hallila, Jyväskylä 2000, 11. There was also an International Youth Festival in Budapest in 1949 with participants from Finland, and the Central Hungarian Trade Union and the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions created relations during the summer 1947. See: Jaakko Numminen, 'The Development of Cultural Relations between Hungary and Finland', in Jaakko Numminen, János Nagy et al. (eds.), *Friends and Relatives. Finnish-Hungarian Cultural Relations*. Budapest: Corvina 1984, 9-18.
- ⁵ *Presidentti Paasikiven päiväkirja 21.6.1947*.
- ⁶ *Presidentti Paasikiven päiväkirja 11.11.1947*.
- ⁷ Kimmo Rentola, *Niin kylmää että polttaa. Kommunistit, Kekkonen ja Kreml 1947-1958*. Keuruu: WSOY 1997, 9-80 and passim.; Lasse Lehtinen, *Aatosta jaloa ja alhaista mieltä. SDP:n ja Urho Kekkosen suhteet, 1944-1981*. Keuruu: WSOY 2002, 145-151; Jukka Nevakivi, *Miten Kekkonen pääsi valtaan ja Suomi suomettui*, Keuruu: Otava 1996, 29-45; Lauri Haataja. *Demokratian opissa. SKP, vaaran vuodet ja Neuvostoliitto*. Helsinki: Tammi, 1988, 213-276; Juhani Suomi. *Vonkamies. Urho Kekkonen 1944-1950*. Keuruu: Otava 1986, 263-276 and 335-349; see also Hermann Beyer-Thoma, *Kommunisten und Sozialdemokraten in Finnland 1944-1948*. Wiesbaden 1990, passim.

- ⁸ *Presidentti Paasikiven päiväkirja 4.11.1946; Ulkoasiainhallinnon matrikkeli, toinen osa.* Helsinki: Ulkoasiainministeriö 1996, 413.
- ⁹ For example: Paul Lendvai, *The Hungarians. 1000 Years of Victory in Defeat.* London: Hurst & Company 2003, 427-448.
- ¹⁰ Uno Koistinen sent to Finland two reports in February 1950. Both were dated the 23rd but the first one is without a running number and the other one is the report number one. Both reports can be found in the Foreign Ministry Archives, first from series UM 5/27 C and the second one from 94 B. Unkari. UMA.
- ¹¹ *Szabad Nép* 6.2.1950 and *Világosság* 17.2.1950. The extreme leftists in Finland did not like Paasikivi either; they criticized him of the amnesty of the former President Risto Ryti. SUPO's personal and confidential report to J.K. Paasikivi, May 1949, JKP V:8. National Archives of Finland (=KA).
- ¹² Tuomo Polvinen, *J.K.Paasikivi, Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 4, 1944-1948*, Porvoo, Helsinki, Juva: WSOY 1999, 33, 71, 103, 125, 535, 541, 555, 557-558 and passim. For example, the head of the Allied Control Commission, General Grigori Savonenkov told that in his opinion Paasikivi is a 'clever and far-sighted politician who understood the advantages Finland could gain from good relations with the Soviet Union'.
- ¹³ Tuomo Polvinen - Hannu Immonen, *J.K. Paasikivi. Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 5, 1948-1956*, Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY 2003, 70-71.
- ¹⁴ Uno Koistinen to Helsinki 23 February 1950. UM 5/27 C. UMA.
- ¹⁵ For Finland during the late 1940s and early 1950s, see for example, Juhani Suomi, *Urho Kekkonen, kuningastie 1950-1956.* Helsinki: Otava 1990; Juhani Suomi, *Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962.* Helsinki: Otava; Max Jakobson, *Den finländska paradoxen: linjen i Finlands utrikespolitik 1953-1965.* Stockholm: Norstedt 1982; Max Jakobson, *Kuumalla linjalla: Suomen ulkopoliittikan ydinkysymyksiä 1944-1968.* Helsinki: WSOY; *Isänmaan puolesta. Suojelupoliisi 50 vuotta*, Toim. Matti Simola and Tuulia Sirviö. Jyväskylä: Gummerus 1999; Kimmo Rentola, *Niin Kylmää että polttaa. Kommunistit, Kekkonen ja Kreml 1947-1958.* Helsinki: Otava 1997; Hannu Rautkallio, *Kekkonen ja KGB 1944-1962.* Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva. WSOY, 1996; Timo Soikkanen, *Presidentin ministeriö 1956-1969. Ulkoasianhallinto ja ulkopoliittikan hoito Kekkosen kaudella.* Hämeenlinna: Ulkoasianministeriö 2003. For Hungary see e.g. Jörg K. Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary 1867-1986.* London and New York: Longman 1988, 187-206.
- ¹⁶ Münnich to Budapest, 5 April and 1 March 1950. MOL, Finn-KüM-XIX-J-1-Finn 7d. 12/a -020217; 019651.

- ¹⁷ *Ulkoasianministeriön matrikkeli I*. Mikkeli: Länsi-Savo Oy 1993, 329-330.
- ¹⁸ Uno Koistinen to Helsinki 6 October 1950. UM 5/27 C. UMA.
- ¹⁹ Forgacs Egon to Budapest, 8 October 1950. MOL, Finn-Küm-XIX-J-1-k. 7 d. 028367.
- ²⁰ Dömötör Ferenc to Budapest, 2 November 1951, XIX-J-1-k-Finn. 18d. 016606; Budapest to Dömötör 29 November 1951. XIX-J-1-k-Finn 18d. 016606/I/3/3 and Helsinki to Budapest, 6 January 1952. MOL, XIX-J-1-Finn 18d.21/a-01155. The Finnish Security Police (SUPO) kept an eye on the FHS with great interest and found out that it was in the hands of extreme leftists. The Society was on constant surveillance during the 1960s. Suojelupoliisin ilmoitus 5357/25.4.1960. SUPO Archives.
- ²¹ Lauri Hjelt to Helsinki, 17 March 1952 and 28 April 1952. UM 5/27 C. UMA. (The newspapers Hjelt quoted were *Szabad Nép* of 26 January and *Magyar Nemzet* of 7 April 1952).
- ²² Hjelt's reports especially from the year 1952 and partly from the year 1953 to Helsinki. UM 5/27 C. UMA.
- ²³ Hjelt to Helsinki, 31 December 1953. UM 5/27 C. UMA.
- ²⁴ Nigel Swain, *Hungary. The Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism*. London, New York: Verso 1992, 54-81.
- ²⁵ G. Schöpflin, 'Hungary after the Second World War', in György Litván (ed.) *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Reform, Revolt and repression 1953-1956*. London: Longman 1996, 20-22. Very similar information Finland got from Hjelt's reports from the years 1951-1953.
- ²⁶ Hjelt to Helsinki, 10 June 1953 UM 5/27 C. UMA.
- ²⁷ Hjelt's two reports, both on the 31 December 1953 to Helsinki. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ²⁸ Schöpflin, 'Hungary after the Second World War', 24-25.
- ²⁹ Hjelt to Helsinki, 5 July 1953. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ³⁰ Hjelt to Helsinki, 5 July 1953. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ³¹ Hjelt to Helsinki, 6 February 1954. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ³² Hjelt to Helsinki, 10 March 1954. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ³³ Hjelt to Helsinki, 20 July 1954. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ³⁴ Hjelt to Helsinki, 20 January 1955. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ³⁵ Vojtech Mastny, 'Learning from the Enemy', in Gustav Schmidt (ed.). *A History of Nato. The First Fifty Years. Volume 2*. N.Y: Palgrave 2001, 158-159.
- ³⁶ Schöpflin, 'Hungary after the Second World War', 30-32.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, 32.
- ³⁸ Hjelt to Helsinki, 25 February and 27 April and 22 April 1955. UM 5/C 27. UMA.

- ³⁹ Hjelt to Helsinki, 23 April 1955. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁴⁰ Nikita Khrushchev. *Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament*. Boston 1974, 222-225, see also Matti Kosonen, Juha Pohjonen. *Isänmaan Portinvartijat. Suomen rajojen vartiointi 1918-1994*. Keuruu: Otava 1994, 419-422.
- ⁴¹ Hjelt to Helsinki, 27 September 1955. UM 5/C 27. UMA. Actually the Soviets wanted at this moment that Paasikivi would stay as the President of Finland.
- ⁴² Hjelt to Helsinki, 31st of December 1955. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁴³ Hjelt to Helsinki, 13 January 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA; J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat (10 October, 1955) Juva: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö 1986; Anssi Halmesvirta, 'Unkarilaisia illuusioita ja reaalipolitiikkaa: Vuoden 1956 kansannousu Suomen Budapestin lähettiläiden silmin'. *Hungarologische Beiträge, vol 11*. Universitat Jyvaskyla, 1998, 132, n. 19 and passim.
- ⁴⁴ Hjelt to Helsinki, 6 January 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA
- ⁴⁵ *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*. Edited by Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, Janos M. Rainer. Budapest: Central European University Press 2002, 10-11.
- ⁴⁶ Hjelt to Helsinki, 2 March 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid.
- ⁴⁸ Hjelt to Helsinki 25 May 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁴⁹ The members of the delegation were: Toivo Kujala (FPDL), Kaisa Hiitela (SDP), Eino Heikura (Agr.), Kaiho Haapanen (FPDL), Hilja Vaananen (Agr.), Juho Lindqvist (FPDL), Kalervo Saura (CP), Arne Ohman and Harras Kytta. Source: Finnish Embassy's letter to Helsinki, 16 June 1956. UM/106 G/Eduskunnan vierailu Unkarissa. UMA.
- ⁵⁰ Hjelt to Helsinki, 16 June 1956. UM 5/C 27; Eduskunnan vierailusta Unkarista UM/106 G. UMA.
- ⁵¹ *Szabad Nep* 5.6.1956.
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, Csaba Békés. Malcolm Byrne and Janos M. Rainer (eds.), CEU Press 2002, XXXV.
- ⁵⁴ Hjelt to Helsinki 6 July 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁵⁵ Report from Anastas Mikoyan on the Situation in the Hungarian Workers' Party, 14 July 1956 to CPSU CC. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 142-147.
- ⁵⁶ Hjelt to Helsinki, 26 July 1956. UM 5/C 27 UMA: Report from Anastas Mikoyan on the situation in the Hungarian Worker's Party, 14 July 1956 to CPSU CC. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, pp. 142-147.

- ⁵⁷ Hjelt to Helsinki, 3 September 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA; Report from Ambassador Yuri Andropov on Deteriorating Condition in Hungary August 29, 1956 to the Presidium of the CPSU CC. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 159-167.
- ⁵⁸ G. Schöpflin, 'From Mass Protest to Armed Uprising', in *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956*, 50-52.
- ⁵⁹ Hjelt to Helsinki, 10 November 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁶⁰ Hjelt to Helsinki, 14 November 1956. UM 5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁶¹ Hjelt to Helsinki 10th, 14th and 21st of November, 1956. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁶² Juhani Suomi, *Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962*, Keuruu: Otava 1992, 60-68; Max Jakobson, *Pelon ja toivon aika. 20. vuosisadan tilinpäätös II*. Keuruu: Otava, 204-213.
- ⁶³ Kekkonen's notes, 4 December 1956, UKA 21/85 (quotation). UKA (=Urho Kekkonen's Archives, Orimattila, Finland)
- ⁶⁴ About the United States' attitude: National Security Council report 5811, "Policy To the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe", May 9 1958. In *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 543-550.
- ⁶⁵ Romanian and Czechoslovakian Minutes on the Meeting of the Five East European States Leaders in Budapest 1 - 4 Jan. 1957. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 489-490; Hjelt to Helsinki, 8 January 1956. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁶⁶ Hjelt to Helsinki, 10th January 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁶⁷ *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 374-376.
- ⁶⁸ Hjelt to Helsinki 26 January 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁶⁹ Hjelt to Helsinki 14th February 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁷⁰ Kádár's report to the HSWP Provisional Executive Committee on Soviet-Hungarian Negotiations in Moscow, April 2, 1957. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 517-523.
- ⁷¹ Hjelt to Helsinki, 3 and 4 May 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA; Kádár's report to the HSWP Provisional Executive Committee on Soviet-Hungarian Negotiations in Moscow, April 2, 1957. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 522.
- ⁷² Hjelt to Helsinki, 17 May 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁷³ Minutes of the HSWP Central Committee Meeting, December 21, 1957. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 532-538.
- ⁷⁴ *Ulkoasiainhallinnon matrikkeli I*, 211.

- ⁷⁵ Heikkilä to Helsinki, 3 July 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA. For a sharper interpretation of the discussion, see Halmesvirta, 'Unkarilaisia illuusioita ja reaali politiikkaa', 138
- ⁷⁶ Heikkilä to Helsinki, 24 July and 29 August 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁷⁷ Heikkilä to Helsinki, 29 August 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁷⁸ Heikkilä to Helsinki, 24 September 1957. UM 5/ C 27.UMA. About the decisions made concerning the trial against the 'Nagy-group', see the memorandum from Yuri Andropov to the CPSU CC, August 29th 1957. It could not be arranged any earlier than in December 1957 – January 1958. *The Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, 541-542.
- ⁷⁹ Heikkilä to Helsinki, 23 October 1957. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁸⁰ Memorandum of Finnish-Hungarian relations, dated 4 December 1962. UKA 23/9. UMA.
- ⁸¹ Heikkilä to Helsinki, 8 December 1958 and 22 January 1959. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁸² Heikkilä to Helsinki 22 January 1959. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁸³ Akcióterv: a magyar-finn kapcsolatok alakítása 1964-ben. MOL, Finn-KüM, XIV-J-1-Finn-4/bd. 3d. -524.
- ⁸⁴ Kekkonen's diary, from 5th to 9th, May 1963. *Urho Kekkonen päiväkirjat 1963-1968*, ed. Juhani Suomi. Keuruu: Otava 2002.
- ⁸⁵ About the plan, see, *Juhani Suomi, Urho Kekkonen 1962-1968*. Keuruu: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava 1994, 121-123.
- ⁸⁶ Reino Palas to Helsinki, 20 May 1963 (The discussion took place on 6 of May 1963). UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸⁸ *Ulkoasianhallinnon matrikkeli II*. Mikkeli: Länsi-Savo Oy 1996, 84.
- ⁸⁹ *Urho Kekkonen päiväkirjat 2 (years 1963-1968)*, Juhani Suomi (ed), 11 May 1963. Keuruu: Otava 2002. There is a mistake in Kekkonen's diary because on the 11 May he was still in Yugoslavia and he arrived in Budapest on the 12 May. The reason for this contradiction is security. Kekkonen never had his diaries with him abroad but made his remarks after the trip. In this case he just remembered the date he met Kádár incorrectly.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid.
- ⁹¹ *Hájdú-Bihari Napló* 12 May 1963; *Esti Hírlap* 15 and 16 May 1963 and *Népszabadság* 8 May 1964. UM 94 B. UMA.
- ⁹² Kurtán to KÜM 22 August 1963. MOL, Finn-KüM, XIX-J-1-j-Finn/f. 8.d.-006502 and Feljegyzés Kekkonen látogatásáról 20.5.1963. XIX-J-1-k-Finn. 4/b-S24-3 d.
- ⁹³ Palas to Helsinki, 11 June 1963. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.

- ⁹⁴ Palas to Helsinki, 12th and 26 July 1963 and a special report 'Hungary and the Western block' on the 25 February 1964. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁹⁵ Palas to Helsinki, 13 April 1964. UM5/C 27. UMA.
- ⁹⁶ *Urho Kekkonen päiväkirjat 2 20.10.1964*; Palas to Helsinki, 2 November 1964. UM C 27. UMA. About Khrushchev's downfall see Dmitri Volkogonov, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire. Political Leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev* (ed. and translated by Harold Schukman). London: Harper & Collins 1999, 248-259.
- ⁹⁷ *Urho Kekkonen päiväkirjat 2*, 89-97.
- ⁹⁸ Palas to Helsinki 26 November 1964. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ⁹⁹ Max Jakobson, *Tilinpäätös*. Keuruu: Otava 2003, 80-90.
- ¹⁰⁰ Palas to Helsinki 9 December 1963 (Press release). UM 94 B. UMA.
- ¹⁰¹ Lehtinen, *Aatosta jaloa ja alhaista mieltä*, 413-471.
- ¹⁰² Urho Kekkonen's diary, 23 August 1968. *Urho Kekkonen päiväkirjat 3*, Keuruu: Otava 2003.
- ¹⁰³ Andrew Felkay, *Hungary and the USSR 1956-1988. Kádár's Political Leadership*, Contributions in political science: no 227. New York: Greenwood Press 1989, 208-217; Jukka Nevakivi to Helsinki, 7 August 1968, 24 August 1968, 30 August 1968 and E.O. Raustila to Helsinki, 9 September 1968. UM 5/C 27, UMA. Kekkonen was well-informed about the crisis for the Intelligent Department of the Staff of the Armed forces could provide very accurate information as early as the 22 August 1968. See UKA/21/117. It could have come only from the West. One must emphasize that also the reports from Hungary were very informative. See also: Huszár Tibor, *Kádár. Politikai életrajza. 2 kötet*. Budapest: Szabad Tér Kiadó 1989, 210-222.
- ¹⁰⁴ Raustila to Helsinki, 9 September 1968. UM 5/ C 27. UMA.
- ¹⁰⁵ Jakobson, *Tilinpäätös*, 64.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁷ Max Jakobson, 38. kerros. *Havainnot ja muistiinpanoja vuosilta 1965-1971*. Helsinki: Otava 1983, 220-221.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Urho Kekkonen päiväkirjat 3*,. 50-51.
- ¹⁰⁹ Jakobson, *Tilinpäätös*, 64-65. See also Jakobson, 38. kerros, 221-223.
- ¹¹⁰ Jakobson, *Tilinpäätös*, p.64.
- ¹¹¹ Martti Ingman to Helsinki, 28.10.1968. UM 7 B; Budapestin lähetystön lehdistökatsaukset 4.11.1969 ja 2.12.1969. UM 94 B. UMA.
- ¹¹² Budapestin lähetystön lehdistökatsaus 6.10.1969, tiivistelmä *Népszabadság*-lehden artikkelista 23.9.1969. UM 94 B. UMA; Actually president Kekkonen spoke about 'active' foreign policy. This term was presented in November 1965 when Kekkonen made a speech in the Young Generation's Society for

- Foreign Policy, see *Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikka. Tasavallan presidentti Urho Kekkosen turvallisuuspoliittisia puheita vuosilta 1943-1979*, Helsinki 1982.
- ¹¹³ MOL, Finn-KüM, XIX-J-l-Finn-l-001386 (melléklet: Az európai biztonsági konferencia).
- ¹¹⁴ Feljegyzés Kádár elvtárs és Kekkonen között 1969 szeptember 29-én történt tárgyalásról. MOL. XIX-J-l-Finn-l. 37.d-002242; Feljegyzés Losonczi elvtárs Kekkonen elnökkel folytatott tárgyalásáról. Budapest, 1969, október 2. XIX-J-l-J-Finn-l. 37. d.-002242; Feljegyzés Péter elvtárs Karjalainen külügyminiszterrel folytatott tárgyalásáról. Budapest, 1969, október 2. MOL, XIX-J-i-j-Finn-1. 27.d-002242.
- ¹¹⁵ Jakobson, *Tilinpäättös*, p. 65; Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal. The Concluding Volume of His Memoirs*, New York: Simon & Schuster 1999, 657-663; Juhani Suomi, *Liennytyksen akanvirrassa*, Keuruu: Otava 1998, 666-670.
- ¹¹⁶ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p. 660.
- ¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 644.
- ¹¹⁸ Jakobson, *Tilinpäättös*, 66.
- ¹¹⁹ Memorandum of the discussion with Kádár and Kekkonen in Budapest 18 November 1976, Tájékoztató a központi bizottság tagjai részére időszerű nemzetközi kérdésekről. Budapest, 1976. december. M-KS-288f - 4 cs -148öe - 1976 12.01. MOL, Finn-KüM; Juhani Suomi, *Umpeutuva latu*, Keuruu: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava 2000, 88.
- ¹²⁰ On Hungarian economics, see Nigel Swain, *Hungary. The Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism*. London, New York: Verso 1992.
- ¹²¹ Suomi, *Umpeutuva latu*, 127.