

**Political Cultures in Urho Kekkonen's Finland and
János Kádár's Hungary**

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1 Introduction

Comparing Finland and Hungary is a fruitful task despite the apparent historical differences: after the Second World War the former remained a democracy whilst the latter became a dictatorship. Also their relation to their greatest and most powerful neighbour, Soviet Union, seems to be different. Hungary belonged to the same military pact as the Soviet Union, but Finland's foreign policy was based on the idea of neutrality. However, the difference between the most eastern country of the West and the most western country of the East is not that evident.

According to an old standpoint Finns and Hungarians are relatives and with special relationship. We can, however, doubt that the structural similarities in language and common roots 6,000 years ago hardly make sense, when we study recent political culture. Rather than 'kinship' the concept of national interest gained a more important role in mutual co-operation after 1945. Nevertheless, maintaining the old idea of a relationship, defined as 'scientific truth', made communication easier between these two nations. Already in the end of the 1960s Hungary had most connections with Finland among capitalist countries. In Europe Finland became a forerunner also in the 1970s, when visa between the two countries was abolished.

The purpose of this article is to compare political cultures in Finland and Hungary during the Urho Kekkonen and János Kádár era. The critical question is, what kind of results we can get,

when we compare these two countries to each other and not to their 'traditional' frames i.e. Nordic countries and the Eastern Bloc. After a few theoretical and historical remarks we will focus on the post-1956 era until the late 1980s. In Hungary János Kádár was superseded in May 1988 and he died in July 1989. President Urho Kekkonen resigned in October 1981 and passed away in the end of August 1986. Less than a year later a new type of a political coalition emerged, which argued to be representing a new political culture in Finland. In Hungary, on the contrary, the first government change in twelve years took place in 1987.¹

My thesis is that in spite of structural differences we can find things in common on the level of politics. Pragmatic *Realpolitik* united the two small nations of Europe despite their different political systems. The years 1986–1987 will be mentioned in this article so often that they can be regarded as a certain closure of an epoch.² Signs of new thinking emerged in both countries but became internationally acknowledged and observed a few years later.

The main focus is on comparative aspect and on two countries during a historical period. Beside historical similarities and theoretical approaches I will study foreign relations, history and commemoration but also more peculiar features such as traveling, sport and personality cult. These phenomena can be found in the source material and they labeled under the concept of political culture, a highly contested concept itself. The comparison, however, is not one to one. Because of the nature of the source material I concentrate sometimes more either on Finland or Hungary.

In addition to documents and historiography I will use periodicals as my main source material. In the course of years the periodical *Suomen Kuvalehti* has institutionalised its position in Finnish politics and in the history of journalism. In Hungary *Magyarország* was founded in 1964 as a political and social weekly. Although both more or less represented the 'official political culture', nothing prevents us to 'read between the lines' as well. Because of a comparative approach we would pay a particular attention to the way in which these weeklies described the other country and mutual relations to their readers.

2 Remarks Concerning the Concept of Political Culture

According to John Street, there is a tendency to treat political culture like a familiar piece of furniture. Everybody is vaguely aware of its existence but hardly anyone makes the question, how it came to be there. Already Plato and Aristotle discussed the problem implicitly, but the discussion began in particular after Almond and Verba's book *Civic Culture*, published in 1963. For Almond and Verba political culture was linked to a strong civic culture, which made democracy possible.³

However, Almond and Verba have been widely criticized since then, and even the supporters of the concept of political culture find it problematic. Already the idea of 'political' could be highly contested, and 'culture' is not less complicated. We are facing a serious problem, if we only accept political culture as a conceptual umbrella, which in its broadness is finally leading us to a deadlock.⁴

In political culture there are two general views to approach the topic. On one hand there is the subjective orientation to a political structure and on the other hand political behaviour. We do not need to be marxists by arguing that structures influence on political thought. Instead we should ask how they influence and how people signify structures and symbols in different cultures. Thus, political culture might include ideas varying from attitudes to different authorities or education, family, government etc. Furthermore, various signs reveal the world of political images, symbols, myths and traditions, which frame and define everyday life. Hence, we could focus on culture as values and beliefs, which are taken as granted and which signify politics.⁵

One of the most famous definitions of political culture derives from Archie Brown (1979): 'The subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectation of nations and groups'.⁶ This rather complicated definition in the strictest sense means how people define their own surroundings and attitudes to politics and analyse their own notion of politics. Frequently political thought comes into being with less rational

simplifications and stereotypes. In effect the concept of stereotype was invented to substitute concepts like 'national character' or 'modal personality' – to simplify complicated social phenomena by organ metaphors.⁷

We will use Brown's category as a point of departure. His criticism of Almond and Verba was based on the idea that instead of stable political cultures we meet political cultures in constant change. Moreover, Brown separated a dominant political culture from an official one. Communist states in particular promoted official political culture in mass media, education and other bodies of socialisation, which, however, did not necessarily dominate in 'the minds of the majority'. In studying the cases of Finland and Hungary we will also discuss characteristics and problems of monolithic and unified political cultures during the Kekkonen-Kádár era.

Brown distinguished a dominant political culture which has various political subcultures. Unquestionably, an official political culture existed also in Finland and in Hungary but it is more difficult to define the dominant one. Also ethnic and cultural minorities existed to represent political subcultures. Finally, Brown discussed about a fragmented political culture. This occurs when there is no state-wide political culture that emerged to dominate political cultures or subcultures, which were based upon tribe, locality or social or national group.⁸

Nevertheless, we do not locate Hungary or Finland in any of Brown's categories described above as such. It leads us to doubt that the whole idea of a single political culture, which Almond and Verba's book implicated, is a stereotype. Instead I will use all those categories to analyse both countries from several perspectives. In the following chapters I shall analyse current political customs and practices as political peculiarities in the twentieth century. I do not understand politics only as a universal phenomenon but also as a phenomenon bound to different cultures. In what follows I will ask what was considered 'political' or 'normal' in these cultures and relate it to our present context.

Finally I would like to broaden Brown's category further and examine historical political culture as well. Since the late 1980s Hungary and Finland have faced such fundamental changes in their po-

litical system that both Kádár and Kekkonen seemed to represent already another, past era. However, the recent past is still present and makes itself felt in current political debate. There are those who would like to charge, reckon and deprecate the era, while the others defend and understand the era relating it to current policy making and political culture. We could argue that the ways in which a nation or a group of people deal with their past also belong to a political culture.

3 Historical Similarities and Differences Before 1956

In the twentieth century Finland and Hungary have belonged to small countries of Europe. Both appeared as independent nations on the map in the end of the First World War in the belt of new states between Germany and Russia. Contrary to the Finns Hungarians, however, do not celebrate Independence Day but the foundation of the 'state' in the year 1000. In this sense Finland's nationhood and the state are essentially younger.

Historical Hungary could be considered a medieval great power of Europe. After the battle of Mohács in 1526 the Old Kingdom was divided into three parts. The country was occupied by Turks and later by Habsburgs, who ruled Hungary since then – in co-operation with the Hungarian aristocracy. In Finland the experience of being between two powers meant being located between Sweden and Russia, which both conquered Finland. Until the Napoleonic wars Finland belonged to Sweden – although some Finnish nationalist historians later tried to name this territory as Sweden-Finland for further stability. Particularly Finland's eastern border was constantly on the move – some parts were inhabited only in the sixteenth century by the order of the King of Sweden. Since 1808 Russians occupied Finland, their Napoleonic 'reward', and added it to the Empire as a Grand Duchy until 1917.

In 1918–1919 both countries faced a failed revolution. Finland had gained one of the most radical franchises in the world based on universal suffrage in 1906. However, the Russian Tsar suppressed the activity of the Parliament until 1917. Partly as a consequence of the defeat in the elections in autumn 1917 and the revolution in Russia, radicalized socialists started the revolution. In Hungary the revolu-

tion began as a bourgeois liberal one in October 1918. It encountered the hostility of the neighbouring countries with their allies. In March 1919 it led to the establishment of a Soviet Republic – lasting relatively as long as the Finnish ‘Red’ experiment a year earlier.

The commanders of the winning armies emerged from the old elites: Miklós Horthy had served in the Austria-Hungarian army, whilst Carl Gustav Mannerheim belonged to chevalier officers of the Tsar. In Finland, however, the liberal minded K.J. Ståhlberg drafted the new constitution and the Parliament appointed him for the first President of Finland. Ståhlberg represented a softer line towards the revolutionaries, and even social democrats supported him. In the 1920s Finnish governments were based mainly on the parties in the centre, agrarians and liberals, although even social democrats had an opportunity to form a short-lived minority government in 1927.

In Hungary Horthy remained in power and ruled until 1944. In the early 1920s his conservative Prime Minister István Bethlen consolidated power, raised the age limit to vote and restricted political activity of social democrats. A reader of *Magyarország* noticed in 1986 that this development could have been parallel for Finland had Mannerheim held power until the Second World War.⁹ Neither in Finland did emerge such a unity party, which would have gained a majority in parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, both faced a threat of a more authoritarian rule in the 1930s. The Hungarian attempt, failed *de facto* because of the unexpected premature death of Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös in 1936.

In Finland the principle of legality became prevalent in the ruling circles after the 1932 right-wing Mäntsälä mutiny, and the governments became stabilized. In 1937 a new type of government was formed, when social democrats and agrarians formed a coalition. This red-green, ‘red ochre’, ‘workers-peasants coalition’ built the axis in the ‘second republic’, i.e. after 1945, as well. No doubt this co-operation with other signs of political compromise influenced the integration of the country. This became apparent in the Winter War (1939–1940), when neither the former rebels nor their heirs put the Soviet attack in question. At that time Finland gained international admiration

– volunteers arrived even from Hungary. In March 1940 Finland had to cede areas, particularly the Karelia isthmus to the Soviet Union. These losses helped leading Finnish politicians to agree with Hitler's Germany and participate in another war and this time with Nazi-Germany in 1941.

In Hungary the question of borders played an important role already since the end of the First World War. In Trianon 1920 Hungary lost two thirds of her former territory to the new neighbours. This political tragedy led to a policy of an open revisionism, at first with the support of Italy and then Germany. With the help of her new allies Hungary managed to gain some territories back but had to participate in the attack against Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1941. In the end of the war Hungary tried to follow the Finnish path to get out of it. Finnish attempt had led to a cease fire in September 1944 but Hungary faced a coup d'état and fascist rule until the Soviet army liberated the country in April 1945.

The year 1945 meant a turning point in whole Europe – also in Finland and Hungary. Although Helsinki was not occupied, like Budapest, Allied Control Commissions defined and restricted political space of former enemies. In spite of this, bourgeois parties were able to gain a majority in the elections of 1945. In Finland the centre and the right-wing parties won an extremely slight majority of two seats. In Hungary bourgeois forces gathered in the tiny Smallholders' Party, which gained a landslide victory of 57 per cent. In both countries communists with their allies became as strong as social democrats: Hungarian communists received 17 per cent of the votes, whilst social democrats had to be satisfied with 14 per cent. In Finland the new Finnish People's Democratic League (FPDL) gained 49 seats and social democrats 50 out of total 200.

A coalition of the centre and left governed in both countries during the years 1945–1948. In this sense we could find similarities, because communists, social democrats and agrarians were the leading forces in the new political circumstances. However, the Hungarian smallholders remained considerably more heterogeneous than Finnish agrarians and gained much support in urban areas, too.

After the election defeat in 1948 FPD was ousted from the government. A social democratic minority government guided Finland out of the 'years of danger'. In 1950 Finland returned to the age of 'red ochre', this time under the direction of the agrarian Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen. Until then Hungary had followed the path of the rest of 'Eastern Europe', in which social democrats were merged into communist parties, and other parties were either suppressed or subjugated to communist power.

4 Capitalist Finland, Socialist Hungary – Unified Political Cultures?

In European comparison countries like Finland, Sweden, Britain or Switzerland belong to a minority, which have not experienced a radical change of political system since the 1920s. Despite her domestic cleavages Finland remained a political democracy also in the 'second republic'. New politicians emerged but the presidential system and the old civil servant stratum did not essentially change after 1945.

According to the Finnish constitution of 1919, the President had the right to dissolve the Parliament, led foreign policy and was the commander in chief of the army. On the European level the rights of the Finnish President resembled those of the President of the French Fifth Republic. Thus, the question of the personality of the President has been one of the most essential in Finnish politics. Before 1994 people voted in presidential elections particular electors nominated by parties or movements, who finally were not committed to support their original candidate. The system caused a lot of speculation and made it possible to choose a so-called 'black horse', i.e. an unknown candidate as a potential compromise.

In Hungary the 1945 turn was more revolutionary and wiped away the old rulers and the state. The red army occupied the country, and a wide land reform changed the structure of the society. In contrast, Finnish land reforms in 1922 and 1945 integrated potentially revolutionary rural proletariat into the traditional peasant society rather than changed the society. The idea of reconstruction worked until the 1960s, when migration to cities and Sweden started. Although transformation took place all over Europe, in the

OECD-countries only Greece faced a more radical structural change than Finland between 1950 and 1980. We cannot, however, play down the Hungarian situation either: villages on the Hungarian pusta lost 800,000 people, ca. 10 per cent of the country's population in 1949–1990. Although this does not reach the Finnish level either in per cents or in absolute numbers, it is likely that the change influenced on political cultures in both countries.¹⁰

Beside traditional peasant societies the post-war era became famous of significant industrialization, which created new political cultures as well. In Finland, industrialization became a victory in defeat: the country had to develop industry to pay her war reparations. At the same time new industry laid the basis for further bilateral trade with the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister of the time, Urho Kekkonen even wrote a pamphlet, in which he asked whether Finland could keep her temper to gain prosperity.

A unified political culture, according to Brown, has been a goal almost for all political cultures but has usually not been realised. This task could be found in Finland and Hungary. A unified political culture in Kekkonen's Finland meant support first of all to Kekkonen's foreign policy. In many ways Kekkonen achieved this but remained as contested a person as János Kádár, who also could somehow unify Hungary's political culture. First and foremost the politics of Finland was based on *détente* and peaceful co-existence of two different political systems. In April 1948 Finland and the Soviet Union had signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), which essentially defined Finland's political culture. The draft version was based on treaties with Hungary and Rumania.

In Hungary the whole idea of Soviet security zone and the contemporary form of Socialism were questioned in the uprising of 1956. According to Kádár and his colleagues a counter-revolution had taken place. Although the revolution was crushed, the idea of a political unity did not vanish from the minds of the people. Since then Hungarian political leaders tried to praise the unity. Under the concept of socialist patriotism, patriotic and progressive values were put together in 1959. The idea was further developed in the 1960s – Socialism for some, patriotism to others. In 1974 the party accepted also 'pro-

gressive bourgeois' and 'democratic peasant' legacies to a part of 'national tradition'¹¹.

According to *Realpolitik*, Hungary remained a socialist state ruled by a communist party dictatorship. Kádár, like Kekkonen in Finland, became personal guarantor of stable relations with the Soviet Union. In Hungary the policy meant supporting Socialism and the policy of small steps. A period of recovery in the 1960s, economic reform between 1968 and 1973 or finally the growing stagnation since the late 1970s, are features of the unifying Hungarian 'goulash Communism'.

Finland finally remained the only capitalist and non-aligned neighbour of the Soviet Union in Europe. Finland represented the 'show window' of Soviet policy in public and maintained her independence. However, it happened with the cost of 'finlandization', a contested term of the *de facto* Soviet right of veto in Finnish politics. Some have argued that even Kekkonen believed in the triumph of world Communism (cf. pp. 44-45). If this were the case he was not alone in the 1960s. However, he dared to argue to Khrushchev that Finland would remain a traditional Nordic democracy even if the whole Europe would become communist. Khrushchev's replied that Finland would remain a museum of Capitalism.¹²

Evidently the idea of progress and social justice were common goals for unified political cultures in both countries. Kekkonen and Kádár – like Khrushchev – believed in progress in the course of history but understood it in a different way, one in Marxism-Leninism and in the vanguard of the party, the other in a society with a mixed economy. In fact, 'progress' was an idea, which could be found in many different, even antagonist political systems, in the twentieth century.

5 Dominant Political Culture with Various Political Subcultures

Kekkonen and Kádár represented not only progress and social justice but also official political cultures in their countries. However, one of the starting points in *Politics and Political Culture in Communist States* is the idea that official political culture is not necessarily also the dominant one. Therefore we have also to ask the question concerning the relationship of official and dominant political culture.

Traditionally religion has been an essential feature of culture. Hungary has been a Catholic country with significant Protestant and Jewish minorities. Finland on the contrary belongs to Protestant countries, in which over 90 per cent of the population belonged to the church at least formally. In Finland we could discuss about a national ethos, which was based on peasant culture, Christian and Protestant virtues combined with quietness and high work ethics. This longing for the nature and silence are still present and proved by ever-increasing amount of summer cottages in the middle of wilderness.

National but progressive peasant ethos had consequences for political culture. After the Second World War agrarians – from 1965 the Centre Party – participated in every political government, except two minority governments by social democrats, of the country. Social democrats were their most favored partner, and nearly every second coalition has included also social democratic ministers. In 1966 this dominant axis emerged again and lasted with some variations until 1987, when a new type of coalition came to being.

In addition to the social democratic-agrarian coalitions, efforts of integration have dominated. Still in the mid-1970s Kekkonen considered it important that the dividing line was not found between socialists and non-socialists.¹³ In practice the idea was more difficult to carry out. At the European level only in Italy there were more governments than Finland during the post-1945 period¹⁴. Attempts to dismiss a government have belonged to constant power struggles. Kekkonen himself used his right to dissolve the Parliament three times, and nominated six non-political governments. A new era, a more parliamentary political culture came into being in the 1980s during the Presidency Mauno Koivisto.

Stability of parties has been another dominant feature in Finnish political culture. Most of political parties emerged in the beginning of the twentieth century in a reaction to questions of mother tongue, social or the Russian question. The composition of the Parliament has remained stable: if a party won more than 10-15 new seats – more than 5 per cent of the seats – in the Parliament, it was a landslide victory in the Finnish context. Two such victories have taken place by parties already in the

Parliament, and they are still unbeaten: in 1966 social democrats won 17 new seats as did the populist Veikko Vennamo's rural party four years later.

Furthermore, non-socialist parties and their political cultures have dominated in the Parliament: only in 1916, 1958 and 1966 the left has gained a majority. Particularly, the dominance of a powerful agrarian party has been a Finnish phenomenon. In spite of structural changes in the society the support of the party has not declined. On the other hand, a particular Christian party remained relatively small as in Scandinavian countries. The Centre Party absorbed also Christian conservative values and more or less is still compatible to Christian democrats. Christian, national and right wing features dominated in the National Coalition Party (NCP), too. In the 1970s party's support outdid the Centre Party, which was the ideological home of Kekkonen.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to argue that patriotic and Christian values did not exist – or even dominated – in the ranks of the left-wing parties. When explicating dominant political culture, we argue that social democrats were integrated into the Finnish society already in the 1930s and 1940s. Religion and patriotism played essential role in the party although they emphasised political slogans like 'Home, Religion and Country' less, which were popular in the right. Symbols and their memories, anyhow, live longer: for the first time in 1978 social democrats participated in the elections without red flags and used only the national flag, traditionally monopolised by the political right.

The other left-wing party, FPD, was forced into opposition in 1948, in which it grew to be the biggest party in 1958. Contrary to Scandinavian countries social democrats were, thus, not the absolutely leading political force of the left. Partly this was due to legalisation of the communist party in 1944, which since then functioned in the frame of the FPD, and gathered some former social democrats in its ranks. Although there are similarities with other big communist parties of France and Italy, there communists did not form such a rigid alliance with left wing socialists which they did in Finland.

In 1966 Finland became an interesting laboratory of the old People's Front tactics. There has been some speculation of the possible future of Finland, but already in November 1966 even the Radio Free Europe commented that the FPDL 'has contributed to the growth of political stability in that country'.¹⁵ With a few variants this experiment lasted until the end of the Kekkonen era. At that time the majority of communists and their sympathizers had either fully integrated in the society or politically split and marginalised.

Thus, Protestant virtues combined with national progress and integration gave special flavour to the dominant political culture in Finland. In this process of political integration Kekkonen was an essential initiator. Young Kekkonen had made a long run first from the ranks of the 'Whites' and nationalist circles to support ideologies of national unity between social classes. In the agrarian left wing Kekkonen found a suitable political platform to cross political gaps hindering the unity.

Frankly speaking, the dominating political culture had quite conservative, moralist social features until mid-1960s. This is evident in moralist 'book wars', i.e. cultural struggles of the 1960s; blasphemy, intercessions prohibiting dancing, beer available only in state shops, etc. Times, however, changed quickly: for example, in 1970 *Viikkosanomat* reported how the small county of Kitee had become famous nation-wide, because of official use of Christian names in the municipal assembly¹⁶. Kekkonen's role was essential in the dominant political culture and its liberalisation, which finally modernised and 'social democratised' Finland.

When we compare Hungary with Finland, we realize that the state and the political structure were different. Stability of parties dominated in Finland but in Hungary a continuity of parties did not exist at all. The role of the Parliament has frequently been viewed as a rubber stamp, without any real political significance – they enacted approximately only five laws a year in 1950–1986.¹⁷ The election system favoured one candidate for one seat until 1966, then running two candidates in the same constituency. However, we could not idealise the previous Horthy era either: open ballots were abolished as late as in 1938,

when unambiguous secret voting became possible. During the Kádár era they defended the existing system by presenting figures of a progress such as constantly broadened franchise. However, the progress was compared only to history not to other current models and states¹⁸.

Even if Hungary was a one party state it is interesting to notice that not all the MPs needed to belong to the ruling party: the amount of party members was the lowest in 1953, 69.1 per cent and in 1958, after the revolutionary attempt, the highest 81,6 per cent. The amount of women remained always under the international 11 per cent, contrary to Finland, in which the amount grew rapidly since 1966 from the level of 15 per cent up to 38.5 per cent at the highest in 1991.

Nevertheless, the Hungarian Parliament chosen in 1985 introduced essential changes. Only 36,8 per cent of the old MPs were re-elected – compared to 65 per cent still in 1980. According to Gabriella Ilonszki, the election brought with it the biggest change after 1949. In 1985 new legislation concerning the election was used for the first time. It made the existence of more than one candidate in every electoral district compulsory.¹⁹

A Hungarian curiosity was the Patriotic People's Front, although different 'fronts' existed also in other socialist countries. One of its founding fathers was Prime Minister Imre Nagy in 1954 for whom the front represented the role of the multiparty system in Socialism. The organisation tried to integrate social classes, published the newspaper *Magyar Nemzet*, and thus offered a means to act in the frame of official channels outside the party. The most important task of the front was to organise elections. Officially candidates represented the front, the political programme of which all candidates had to accept.²⁰

Hereafter the point, however, is not to stress further such fundamental differences but to outline some less known features of the systems and how they were linked to dominant political culture. Whilst the great amount of governments is striking in Finland, there were only seven governments during the whole Kádár era. Particularly two of them lived long: Jenő Fock held his position over eight years (1967–1975) and his successor György

Lázár (1975–1987) over twelve years. Although this reveals a growing stability, at the same time we could doubt the whole political role of the government. In the party state the Parliament and the government were linked to the bureaucratic state apparatus under the leading party.

In public the role of the state bureaucracy remained obscure and eternal. A clear symptom was Toma's and Völgyes's survey from 1977: only 17 per cent of the 300 persons inquired knew the name of the Chairman of the Presidium. This is amazing for at the time Pál Losonczy had filled the post already over ten years. Even less, 12 per cent could name the highest organ of state power, the Presidential Council.²¹ The party itself, its Central Committee and finally the Political Bureau formed the core of political power in the state.

From historical point of view the party state was quite a new phenomenon. However, a broader consensus dominated that the state as such was not identical with the communist rule – it with its glorious past had existed through centuries. The historical continuity of the Hungarian State was essential as well as the role of the Hungarian nation within that state. In addition, Hungarians retained a strong sense of their national or ethnic uniqueness, which was most obviously felt in the isolation of their language in the region.²²

The relation between the society and the state remained alien in the dominant political culture. Contrary to Nordic countries an ambiguous law was not to be changed but to be utilised (*kijátszani*) with protection and personal relations.²³ Services needed other services, clients, unofficial networks and intrigues to cope with in the society. These created the 'small liberties', and in fact, passive acceptance of the 'eternal' Kádár system. Phenomena had historical predecessors, because also both the post-1867 k.u.k. and neo-k.u.k systems also had been étatist authoritarian regimes with a constitutional facade. It is striking how only three influential men have ruled Hungary over a decade since 1848: Francis Joseph, Miklós Horthy and János Kádár. None of them was a democrat in the proper sense of the word but represented a paternalist centralist rule.

Moreover, there is the question of various political subcultures in Finland and Hungary. In 1977 Toma and Völgyes complained about the difficulties to describe Hungarian political culture in the lack of empirical material. However, they considered it 'reasonable to estimate' that two general subcultures existed in Hungary. The first was a dedicated and ideologically motivated left. Secondly, there were few but strong, anticommunist proponents of national independence. Toma and Völgyes did not discuss about great masses; both these subcultures together amounted to five per cent of Hungarians.²⁴ In addition, a few representatives of Jewish and nationalist populist peasant cultures survived during the Kádár era. According to Ignác Romsics, the impression of a distinction between Jew and non-Jew was identified but mainly only in the ranks of the Budapest intelligentsia.²⁵

When we still discuss subcultures and concentrate on the parties in the government, we surprisingly note that in Finland the Swedish People's Party has, in fact, participated more often in the government than social democrats. Heterogeneous groups have supported the party, among them cultural liberals, Kekkonen's early supporters but also true right wingers. Although the party has successfully defended minority rights in Finland, we have to bear in mind that there are two official languages, Finnish and Swedish, in the country. In spite of some separatist efforts in 1918 or the question of Aland Islands, we should not speak about 'Swedish' minorities but Swedish-speaking Finnish citizens. Evidently the old 'language strife' i.e. opposing bilingualism belonged already to the past during the long presidency of Kekkonen. At that time fluent Swedish was a great advantage particularly in the Parliament and the high societies of the capital.

Obviously the Finnish Swedish-speaking minority forms a political subculture of their own. By contrast, the Lapp people did not have ethnical rights, cultural autonomy or popular assembly before the 1990s. In Finland they were considered Finns, not really ethnic or aborigines of the country. This is in spite of the dominant ideas of progress and integration, which changed and further modernised Finland during the Kekkonen era.

6 Dichotomy and Fragmentation

Integration in the name of progress had historical reasons in Finland and Hungary. Class conflict had existed in both countries although 'class' was not the only reason for all antagonisms. However, the rhetoric dichotomy of 'people' and 'rulers' is still essential in politics. Finns even have a concept for hate of masters, *herraviha*. It usually reveals a suspicious attitude to bosses, politicians, capitalists or even academics making prognoses (*roknoosiherra*) concerning the results of parliamentary elections. Thus, the narrative of integration is only one part of political culture, when we analyse beliefs, values and political knowledge of nations and groups.

In Finland the most serious clash had taken place in 1918, when the young republic faced a civil war between the 'Reds' and the 'Whites'. No doubt the terror in Hungary also divided people and left a trauma in the Hungarian society. Compared to contemporary Hungary the revolution in Finland, however, demanded more casualties. Although the Winter War in 1939–1940 forced former enemies to a united front, the memory left a long shadow. In this sense the historical dichotomy ended only in 1982, when the first social democrat, Mauno Koivisto, was elected the leader of the country.

Thus, at first we study dichotomies concerning the nature of the political system. Since 1956 it became clear that Hungary's political structure would remain 'socialist', which was confirmed in the constitution in 1972. According to Kádár, the vast majority of Hungarians had understood and accepted his activities – if not immediately, at least quite soon.²⁶

On the basis of the famous speech of Kádár those who were not against the Hungarian People's Republic, were in fact with it. By contrast Jenő Bangó argued after the collapse of Communism that the whole concept of dissident was too narrow, because in Hungary everybody was against. Bangó suggested a concept of non-conformism instead, which in principle could be found in every sector of a society. The third definition comes from George Schöpfunglin, who wrote about opposition and para-opposition. The latter did not overtly question the ideological bases but accepted the semi-autonomous political role permitted by the system.²⁷ We face a difficult question: which kind of activity should be interpreted as

of being against. In the lack of trustful sources we do not know, who 'supported' or 'opposed' the system in the end. In any case, existing bureaucracy was a matter of fact and framed the political field. Finally, the amount of proper dissidents and activists remained small.

However, one of the most obvious dividers emerged in the party membership: a member and a non-member. According to Lenin's theory, the party represented the vanguard of the people and not everybody was allowed to join in the 'elite'. However, the other side of coin reveals how this dichotomy retaliated in the 1970s and 1980s. The ruling party began to offer a competitive channel to develop the country inside the existing structures. One of the striking features of the later Kádár era was how cultural intelligentsia, literature as its medium was supplanted by economists, sociologists, historians and jurists.

In principle Socialism and the New Economic Mechanism had to provide the entrepreneurial spirit of Capitalism and the egalitarian ideas of communism simultaneously. As long as the system functioned to the satisfaction of the new bourgeoisie, interests in alternative political models tended to remain inchoate. In the 1980s the crisis started to feed ideas which on one hand stressed Hungary's own identity as a model and on the other hand showed Western Capitalism as a possible way.

Elemér Hankiss (1989) found another dichotomy, when he defined two societies, the first and the second society. The first, the official, society organised vertically, in which the state and ideology played essential roles. These principles did not work in the second, in the unofficial society, in which also alternative principles, like the second public, started to grow.²⁸ However, it seems that both societies needed each other – finally even as good 'enemies' to strengthen one's own identity. People played many roles, thus, official intellectuals read *samizdats* and the 'opposition' i.e. critical intellectuals published in official newspapers etc.

In Finland the idea of Socialism and the political system caused serious debates in the mid-1970s for the last time. According to an opinion poll in 1977, one third of the population supported Socialism. It was less than the current per centage of the leftist parties in

the Parliament. Relation to 'Socialism' divided the social democratic party most. In the summer of 1975 SDP had accepted the task to nationalise commercial banks, insurance companies and drug-stores. However, socialist ideas were in the air internationally as well, and an independent weekly revealed some current expectations in 1975: in standard interviews *Viikkosanomat* systematically asked what would be the nature of the political system in ten years from now. Before the general elections of 1975 the National Coalition Party tried to revive an ideological aspect and defined itself as a firm counterbalance of Socialism.²⁹

However, we should not only concentrate on history or left-right division, when we study dichotomies during Kekkonen's reign. In 1956 Kekkonen was elected mainly by the votes of the agrarians and the FPDL, when the members of the coalition party in the electoral council were even ready to support a socialist candidate. For a traditional bourgeois supporter Kekkonen appeared to be too leftist and pro-Soviet. Some right-wingers stressed companionship in arms and the wartime unity with the social democrats, which still worked well particularly in some southern cities. Agrarian Union and the pro-communist FPDL were stronger in the eastern and northern part of Finland and the others in the south and west. Thus, one dichotomy in Finnish political culture has dealt with regional policy, the relations between the south and the north and the capital and the other regions of the country. The division between the more agrarian north and the richer south was noticed by Hungarians in *Magyarország* as well³⁰.

In 1956 Kekkonen had been elected with an extremely narrow margin in a clearly divided situation. An essential change took place in the 1960s. In 1968 also the Social Democratic Party bent to support him. Five years later the majority of the NCP backed him as well. In the course of the 1970s the 'dichotomy' concerned only pro-Kekkonen forces and the small remnants of his opponents. Finally in the 1978 elections Kekkonen did not represent parties anymore but the association *Paasikivi-Seura*, which since 1958 propagated Finnish foreign policy. Whilst real dichotomies disappeared, undemocratic features emerged in official political culture, too. Not only monarchist metaphors

like *hovi* (court), *perintöprinssi* (successor/prince) emerged but even the word dissident (*toisinajattelija*), which usually referred to communist counties. First in 1978 *Suomen Kuvalehti* speculated on possibilities whether one of Kekkonen's early supporters, Jouko Tyyri, was a dissident in Kekkonen's Finland or not.³¹

Moreover, age became a political force and represented a dichotomy even in countries like Hungary and Finland. Margaret Mead argued in the 1970s that the gap between generations had become permanent in modern society. It was already questionable whether children could understand their parents and their stories concerning the past anymore. For example, in 1968 Kekkonen understood the importance of radicalism and argued that he was closer to radical youngsters than their 'academic fathers'. Also *Magyarország* had noticed how new forms of patriotism started to appear in Finland in the 1960s.³²

In Hungary news agency UPI used the phrase 'youngster question', when a journalist interviewed Kádár in 1971. According to Kádár, problems of finding own career, lack of experience and patience were basically the same all over the world. However, Kádár stressed differences between capitalist and socialist countries, and the fact that the vast majority of Hungarian youngsters accepted the socialist ideas and the aims of the society. Of course, according to Kádár, there were 'radicals' or 'leftist' petit bourgeois people but them he branded as a small minority – supporters of Capitalism could only be found with a torch.³³

Still, as János Bródy later argued, the agenda was somehow different in the East: it became paradoxical to oppose the war in Vietnam, because the government already did it. The party worried about the tenacity of pre-communist attitudes, thus, a dichotomy between collective and petit bourgeois values. The latter was supposed to belong to the remnants of the pre-war era but at the same time the 1968 reform had strengthened those values. Talented rock bands like *Omega* and *Illés* or film makers Jancsó and Szabó became relatively famous at the same time. On the other hand, also the origins of New Left emerged in the Budapest University during the years of the economic reform.

In Finland 1960s radicalism led soon to domination of parties. Relatively soon emerged the era of over-politicisation and party mandated territories. Political balance became a slogan in the 1970s: even the Finnish Broadcasting Company, *Yleisradio*, made a decision that beside journalistic criteria, reporters should be hired according to the 'amount' of existing political opinions of the society. Impartiality and balancing found many ways: when the right-wing reformer Harri Holkeri was asked to join the Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society, he joined the *Pohjola-Norden*, the Finnish-American and the Finnish-Hungarian Societies on the same day.³⁴

Little by little the idea of political balance created also certain consensus and responsibility in the main parties. In the midst of economic depression consensus was raised as an official political aim in 1977. Consensus-oriented policy gained upper hand in economy but parliamentary elections could no longer bring clear political alternatives. Erkki Tuomioja noted this growing unanimity, which was typical for the main parties and coalitions during the late Kekkonen era.³⁵

However, in the 1980s political consensus started to break Finnish political cultures. The disintegration of the broadcasting monopoly is a good example of this development. A commercial TV-corporation could finally establish its own news service in 1981 – coincidentally in the same year when organised *samizdat* publishing, *Beszélő*, emerged in Hungary. Local commercial radios began their broadcasting four years later in 1985. Even the already repeated year 1987 is significant in this field as well: the third national TV-channel and satellite televisions started their broadcasts in Finland.³⁶

In Hungary, compared to Finland, it would be wrong to speak about general fragmentation in the 1980s. Although an open terror had not existed in decades, free speech was still limited, informers were being uncovered and people were kept under surveillance. Instead of fragmentation, politics began to (re)culminate between the dichotomy of 'us' and 'them'. Also the party's 'social contract' started to grow old: in 1987 for the first time the *samizdat* publication *Beszélő* demanded Kádár's resignation. We cannot underestimate the years 1986–1987, when critical intelligentsia could still debate. Particularly, this

concerned historical 'questions of life and death' (*sorskérdések*) such as the fate of 1956 in 1986 or in Lakitelek a year later. In 1987, 100 intellectuals also boycotted the new programme of Károly Grósz's government. Even the youth organisation of the party demanded different kind of Socialism.

7 Catching the Rainbow

When we explicate political culture we cannot ignore general technological optimism of the era or the frames of the Cold War either. 'Keeping up with the Joneses', the consumer society in the making evidently influenced on political cultures in different countries, too. At the end of the 1960s Sweden – in many sense considered the older 'brother' and a model for Finns – was still twice as rich as Finland. At that time Finland's national GNP, 1399 dollars, was less than both Germanys' but more than, for example, Hungary's which stood at 1031 dollars, per year.³⁷

On the other hand, expectations of the future were high in the socialist camp in the early 1970s. Hungarian communists and officials expected the growth to be around 30-35 per cent. Thus the current Western level was assumed to take approximately 15–20 years.³⁸ Nevertheless, Hungarian political optimism vanished by the beginning of the 1980s if not even before. In 1985 Hungarian standard of living decreased for the first time. A sign of new thinking was a new weekly *Heti Világgazdaság*, which since 1979 concentrated on fluctuations in the world economy and reflected a more open and business-oriented political culture. In 1980 the magazine reported, for example, how McDonalds' had 5,700 restaurants in the world.³⁹ In Finland the company landed four years later, in 1984, for the first time. Three years later Budapest was the first city in the former Eastern Europe to accept this vanguard of globalisation.

Increasing commercialism and consumer oriented way of living could be found both in *Suomen Kuvalehti* and *Magyarország*. In 1964 *Magyarország* advertised 'television to every house', while *Suomen Kuvalehti* argued in 1977 that colour television would in five years be as cheap as the current black and white one. Catching the rainbow meant also the dream of a private car. In the late 1970s every fourth Hungarian car was the Soviet made

Lada.⁴⁰ In Finland Lada became relatively cheap and popular particularly among the working class – in 1981 Toyota, Datsun and Lada were the three most popular cars sold in Finland. There were even years in the 1980s, when civil servants in both countries used vehicles coming from the Soviet Togliatti factory.

Soviet trade and particularly Soviet oil played an important role in the relative welfare of both – two thirds of the Finnish oil originated from the Soviet Union as the journalist of the *Heti Világgazdaság* observed in 1981. During those days the Soviet Union was with its 25 per cent of import Finland's strongest trading partner. The amount had increased close to the Hungarian level, 28-29 per cent in 1979.⁴¹ Pictures of Soviet delegations raising toasts after successful negotiations became current collective experience of Finns. However, prosperous trade was linked with political relations as later will be emphasised.

On the contrary, trade between Finland and Hungary remained small. In the 1970s Hungary and Finland signed an agreement and abolished customs in the transition period of 1975–1985. In spite of some progress Finland remained only among the dozen most important trading partner of Hungary. The export consisted of tubes and textiles while the import included mainly paper and chemical pulp. In addition to Finland, Mexico and Iraq had entered into an agreement with COMECON in the mid 1970s.⁴²

'Keeping up with the Joneses' presupposed hard work and did not always succeed. In the 1960s '*kicsi vagy kocsi*' i.e. the choice between a baby and a car became a slogan in Hungary. On the other hand, the state could not offer enough of some consumer goods either. For example, in 1978 there were only 103 telephones per 1,000 inhabitants. The amount was seven times less than in the leading countries United States and Sweden. In this sense Czechoslovakia was the most advanced in the socialist camp and outstripped Hungary almost two times.⁴³ The slogan '*Csak egy telefon*' – just a call – could have solved many problems but the lack of telephone became itself a problem in everyday life.

A five-day working week was established in Hungary in 1981, balanced to 40 hours three years later, modelling on other countries in the Soviet bloc. Not only one or two Hungarians noticed that they needed several jobs to maintain their standard of living in the 1980s. The idea of the 'second economy' was officially accepted in 1980 to complete state socialist structures. Reforms were re-activated in 1983 to encourage small scale private business. Those known as the 'new rich' had either connections and networks around the party, worked abroad or participated in private business already at that time. The first income tax in the former Soviet bloc was enacted in 1987. According to a slogan, Hungarians had Ethiopian wages but Swedish taxes.

Hungarians had started to rethink their reforms in 1983 at the same time, when one of the Finnish leading bankers began to demand liberalisation of the money markets for the first time.⁴⁴ In the 1980s Finns had already more self-confidence – not least because during the first half of the decade the economy grew as fast as the Japanese. The expression 'the Northern Japan' originates in *Suomen Kuvallehti* from 1984 and was a few years later spread out even into Hungary. In general we could read the idea in between the lines of *Magyarország* that Hungarians were rather surprised that Finns had industrialised their country since 1960s and done it surprisingly silently.

Although Finland was not a command economy, planning had existed in Finland as in many other capitalist mixed economies. Particular community planning came to the fore in 1960s and broadened in the sectors of economy, too. It is important to emphasize that in the first place community planning concentrated on the futures of different communities, not on the society as a whole. Planning took place in provinces, counties, schools etc. The first 'five year plan' came into being in 1968 and it dealt with the economy of the country, drawn by the Ministry of Finance.

8 The Priority of Foreign Relations

In the 1970s Brezhnev argued that if political relations were in order, also other relations will be good.⁴⁵ In the Finnish case this meant first of all the interpretation of the 1948 FCMA, a cornerstone of Finnish post-war policy. Therefore we study in the follow-

ing chapters the influence of foreign relations on political culture in Finland and Hungary. A fundamental point in FCMA was the idea that if Germany or her allies would attack to Finland or the Soviet Union through Finland, Finland will fight with all of her forces available. They would do it inside Finland's borders, and 'in case of need assisted by the Soviet Union or together with it.'⁴⁶

When the West integrated Germany in the late 1950s, indirectly the FCMA concerned NATO operations as well. According to the second paragraph of FCMA, Finland and the Soviet Union 'will negotiate with each other, if the threat of a military attack [...] has been noted'. These words introduced the key to understand Finland's post-war policy, political culture and power struggles. The questions how the threat of a military attack should be defined, when it should be noted, and by whom, became highly essential issues in sophisticated political debate.

From the Finnish point of view the best alternative was to keep the initiative in Finnish hands. It was a hard task for the Finns to persuade the Soviets to trust that the treaty was enough and no other means were needed to secure the Soviet border. For the first time the treaty was tested before the presidential elections in 1961. Khrushchev had warned earlier that those who do not vote Kekkonen, vote also against the friendship of Finland and the Soviet Union. The conflict known as the note crisis was solved by a personal meeting and mutual talks. The incident further strengthened Kekkonen's position, and the importance of personality in the political culture.

In politics words matter and when dealing with the Soviets they were particularly important. Diplomatic culture was based on communiqués which became an essential part of political culture. They defined Finland's international position and, thus played a great role in the 'struggle of neutrality', as Juhani Suomi named his book. By recognising the idea that the country was not neutral Finland would have deteriorated her own position in negotiations. Finnish negotiators had to maintain their trust in the eyes of the Soviet leaders. At the same time, they had to persuade them to accept the Finnish view, i.e. to believe that the state of affairs was as Finns wanted it to be.⁴⁷

Instead of neutrality the Soviet Union recognised only Finland's efforts to be neutral until 1989. Crucial point in the debate was whether neutrality or the FCMA should come first. The Soviets doubted, whether by emphasizing neutrality Finns would diminish their military commitments expressed in FCMA. In 1957 negotiating parties accepted a communiqué, which highlighted neutrality. However, in 1969 the communiqué did not mention the word at all but stressed the idea of FCMA for the first time. After a long political wrist-wrestling a new definition of 'peace loving neutral policy' emerged in 1971. These formulas belonged to diplomacy with the other communist state leaders as well. Among them the GDR seemed to be a more loyal follower of the Soviet path than Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria.⁴⁸

On a metaphoric level the struggle of words in foreign policy started to resemble the trinity schism in the medieval church. Policy was known as the 'line', named after its high priests Paasikivi and Kekkonen, and had its 'liturgy', 'heretics' and 'orthodox' followers. There were even Mauno Koivisto's 'fortune-tellers', a concept which tried to cut down speculative comments concerning the potential threat of nuclear weapons on Finnish territory. Features of mysticism and 'occultism' emerged in political culture in the fear that open discussion leads to speculations, which could come true and finally harm the country. Instead, it was frequently more convenient only to turn to 'liturgy' and repeat old but well-known phrases of friendship and policy of good neighbourhood.

In spite of the FCMA Finland strove to represent herself as a neutral country for domestic and international audiences. Finland's political leaders described the policy as an exception and neutrality 'of a particular kind'. At the international level Kekkonen's Finland liked to act with the metaphor of a doctor and avoid direct judgements and moral statements. In the UN, for example, this policy led to abstaining from voting if a statement interfered to matters, in which the interests of the superpowers were in contradiction. The policy caused also problems and speculation like in the case of Hungary 1956, of Afghanistan 1979 or of US policy in Vietnam.

However, Finland's international position was not as stable as the contemporary public wanted to see it. The Soviet Union opposed Finland's western integration including criticism for joining the EFTA and the OECD – or even the membership in the Nordic Council. Although nothing 'very serious' happened the last major attempt to bind Finland tighter to the Soviet sphere of influence took place in 1978. At that time the idea of joint military practices was floated, but was not presented for the greater public, for example in contemporary *Suomen Kuvalehti*.⁴⁹

The idea of Finnish neutrality was very significant for small socialist countries.⁵⁰ This is one of the reasons why Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia were reluctant to accept the Soviet formula of 'peace loving neutral policy', when they were dealing with Finland. They desired to maintain and increase their own political space. However, we must acknowledge that already the whole point of departure was different. Hungary and the others belonged to a military alliance and participated in military co-operation in the frame of Warsaw Pact. Moreover, Soviet troops did not leave Hungary as they had left the base of Porkkala in Finland in 1956.

Internationally Hungary had become quite isolated during the first post-1956 years. The situation changed essentially in 1962, when the Hungarian question was lifted from the UN's agenda – reciprocally a general amnesty of 1956 revolutionaries took place in March 1963. The year 1964 particularly seemed to promise a new era. Several new embassies opened in Budapest, the weekly *Magyarország* was launched and even Finns started organised tours to Hungary that year.

In Hungary communist ideology was not the only factor to define international relations. Already in 1957 Kádár had made the distinction between capitalist and imperialist countries: If Sweden was not imperialist; Finland was even less so.⁵¹ However, the Soviet Union, the first state-socialist state and a superpower, was without doubt in a privileged position in relations to other states. The Central Committee defined several times its fundamental theoretical thesis, i.e. the tight co-operation with the Soviet Union.⁵²

Until 1967 USA was one of the last three countries in the world with whom Hungary maintained diplomatic relations only at the level of legation. After the Cardinal Mindszenty's case was finally closed in 1973, relations with the Vatican also normalised. Finally the Hungarian government gained a moral victory when the old crown, the crown of Saint Stephen was returned from the United States in 1978, where it had been stored since 1945.⁵³

In Europe Hungarians started to open relations with Finland and Austria, and even with West-Germany in the 1970s. In fact, both Finns and Hungarians had had a troublesome relation with the FRG and her strengthening role in the NATO. The Western countries had established relations to the Federal Republic and the Eastern Bloc with the Democratic Republic, but Finland did not have normal relations to either of them. Finally both Hungary and Finland confirmed diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1973. At the same time Finland set up the relations with the GDR as well.

In the 1970s Hungary's foreign policy was further activated by the visits of Gandhi, Tito, Kreisky and Mitterrand in 1982, and Bush in 1983. When Margaret Thatcher prepared for a visit to Hungary in 1984, mutual communication with the two superpowers was reduced to a minimum. Years later, in 1993, Thatcher recalled her trip that 'it was through eastern Europe that we would have to work.' Her message to Kádár (read: to Kremlin) was that 'the West and Reagan personally were genuinely seeking disarmament'. However, Thatcher noted how she had to take seriously Prime Minister Lázár's caution that the worst thing she could do 'was to cast doubt on Hungary's remaining part of the socialist bloc'. Hungary had gone the 'furthest along the path of economic reform, although they (sic!) were anxious to describe it as anything but Capitalism'.⁵⁴

Thatcher's notes disclosed not only limits of political space or how good relations to the East opened more space in the West. In addition, they revealed the Cold War political context, in which also rash and unwise statements of the West could harm small countries. Particularly during the first half of the 1980s it is strik-

ing how *Magyarország* is full of concern of the consequences of the armament.⁵⁵ Both in Hungary and Finland the Soviet relations played a decisive role although their military relations were based on different policy. Despite the FCMA there are no signs that Hungarians would have considered Finland as a 'brother country', viz. neutral, in the weekly *Magyarország*.

9 A Few Peculiar Features

In fact, relations with the Soviet Union limited political space in both countries. In Hungary Kádár stressed that the domestic status quo was the best Hungarians could achieve. Kekkonen referred to John F. Kennedy's words that foreign and internal affairs were inseparable. However, if either of them was not in order, in Kekkonen's interpretation it had always to be domestic politics.

In Finland say in foreign relations increased domestic political power. Politicians divided each other to goats and sheep on the basis of how they could cultivate friendly relations with the Soviet Union. At first FPDL tried to monopolise the idea of friendship arguing that they were the true friends of the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ Mediating political role between the states subsequently increased the power of the agrarians. Until 1968, social democrats had adjusted their foreign relations, and thus became 'fit for the court', *hovikelpoinen* as Finns used to say. The right wing NCP tried to follow the path and reformed itself towards the end of the 1970s. In spite of these efforts it could not participate in the government between 1966 and 1987.

Building trust in the eyes of the Soviets was one of the most peculiar phenomena in Finland. Politicians tried to find out the Soviet point of view in advance and estimate what the Soviets might think. A glimpse of this was noted also by the Hungarian reporter Endre Sümegi: if the trust is missing between Helsinki and Moscow, everything remains a dead letter in spite of international agreements.⁵⁷ Kekkonen was the prime example of building personal relations, whose behaviour was followed gradually by other politicians. Numerous consultations in the Soviet Embassy at *Tehtaankatu* in Helsinki are already a concept in the laity discussion of the Kekkonen era.

Politicians aiming at reaching the top level of national politics needed special relations and had to build connections. In politics everybody needs connections, but in Finland an unofficial institution came to being: *kotiryssä*, the 'home Russian'. *Kotiryssä* made friends only with the most significant politicians to exchange information. For the greater public the 'habit' of unofficial form of political friendship was unknown until the pamphlet *Tamminiemen pesänjakajat* was published in 1981. Instead of normal newspaper channels journalists of the national daily *Helsingin Sanomat* published this '*samizdat*' under the pseudonym *Lauantaiseura*. Journalists needed anonymity just at the time, when Kekkonen finally resigned and the struggle over his successor tempered political agenda. In Kekkonen's Finland many journalists had accompanied official political culture and avoided critical publicity contrary to Britain, for example.

The second peculiarity in Finnish official political culture concerned the KGB. Until the beginning of the 1990s politics of trust was carried out not only through normal diplomatic channels but also with the more direct 'party channel', the KGB. Intelligence and counter-espionage had belonged to the traditions of Kremlin and even Kekkonen himself had served in the Finnish secret police in the 1920s. Although rumours and pieces of information belong to everyday diplomacy, there is also the grey area dividing national interest from high treason. As Seppo Hentilä has noted, the majority of discussions stayed in the frame of normal, official diplomacy. Nevertheless, some politicians crossed the borders of propriety, and information was received in the embassies particularly of both Germanys, United States and the Soviet Union. More typical, however, was it to maintain good relations with the *kotiryssä* than to spy him or her.⁵⁸

The Soviet influence increased after Kekkonen had personally solved the night frost crisis of 1958. At that time the FPDL had won the elections but other parties refused to co-operate with it. The crisis broke out, when the Soviet leaders did not hold trust in the new broadly based government. Since then Finns have debated whether Kekkonen crossed a Rubicon and let the Soviet Union intervene on domestic political agenda. One of the most obvi-

ous examples is the 1979 elections, when the Soviet Ambassador to Finland wrote in *Pravda*, which parties were acceptable in the government and which, like the National Coalition Party, were not. Although the Ambassador had to leave Finland after the elections, the winner of the elections, the NCP did not participate in the government.

However, election victory constitutes only one factor in the formation of government. The fact was not typical only for Finland but for the whole Western Europe after 1945. Victory has only guaranteed positions in the negotiating table. Particularly in Italy those who lost the election participated also in the new government.⁵⁹ In 1979, the left was not yet ready to cooperate with the NCP, and Finnish traditions did not favor purely left-wing or bourgeois coalitions. Although some MPs welcomed the idea of a 'red-blue' coalition already in 1979, social democrats were only ready to co-operate with the NCP in 1987, which also ended the era of 'red-ochre' and is considered a closure of the 'second republic'.

These phenomena could be placed under the umbrella of 'finlandization', a highly contested concept since its appearance in the FRG in the 1960s. In 1978 Walter Laqueur threw further oil into flames and argued that Finland's internal adaptation had exceeded its geographical limits. Scholars have found several origins to 'finlandization' since then: already the end of war in 1944, the Hungarian crises of 1956 and the night frost crisis in 1958. The most clever politicians, however, have understood the political realities, and the whole situation appears more Machiavellian in both Paasikivi's and Kekkonen's diaries.⁶⁰

Still, the years 1978–1981 provide more or less serious examples for further discussion of 'finlandization', either referring to the Soviet influence and its consequences in Finland or in the use of foreign policy as a weapon in domestic power struggles. For example, the subscription of the comic *Aku Ankka* (Donald Duck) was cancelled from some public libraries in Helsinki, effectively sending a negative image of the country to the international community. A year later, in 1979 leading politicians refused to give an interview to the BBC, the President refused to

comment on the experiences of the Winter War in Swedish radio. The way in which Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen intrigued with the Soviets to gain support in the President campaign of 1982 is the striking example of this practise.⁶¹ However, on the eve of the elections Mihail Suslov anticipated that there were no essential differences between the candidates Koivisto and Holkeri, the former chairman and the reformer of the NCP. The statement was not a clear recognition for Koivisto, whose opponents reminded of the lack of his personal connections with the Soviets.

At the time, however, even the *Radio Free Europe* criticized the concept of 'finlandization' in its background materials. Its commentator Kevin Devlin argued how this 'complex of policies is sometimes viewed in oversimplified terms as being based on special relationship with Finland's superpower neighbour, the Soviet Union. In fact, it involves much more than that, which is why the use of that vaguely evocative word "finlandization" generally contributes a lot more heat than light to discussion of international affairs [...]' Devlin concluded his report by stating: '(I)f commentators insist on using the abrasive term "finlandization", they may perhaps be reminded that so far it has been successfully exemplified only in Finland'.⁶²

For the Hungarian public 'finlandization' (*finnesítés*) was a positive concept. In Hungary Kádár tried to strike a balance between international commitments and national interests, between principles of socialist internationalism and Hungarian national consciousness. In principle, foreign relations had to be adjusted in the frames of communism, the ultimate interpreters of which were in Moscow. In 1971 Kádár argued to news agency UPI that international laws existed in building Socialism, but at the same time the work was done in national frames. Kádár continued that Hungarians were developing socialist democracy, finding proper answers to the contemporary questions. He denied consistently the existence of a certain 'Hungarian road'. When the same question was asked again years later, Kádár referred again to the 'international laws in building Socialism', but also to historical examples, to socialist patriotism and interna-

tionalism, which hinted that socialist models could not be copied. Nevertheless, in 1982 and 1983 he still denied the existence of a particular Hungarian model.⁶³

Compared to the Finnish policy of trust, the constellation in Hungary appeared more complicated. Why should the Soviet Union trust Hungary? After all, Imre Nagy had declared Hungary's sovereignty in 1956 and withdrew from the Warsaw Pact. The burden of testimony became even harder, because Stalin had named the Hungarians 'a guilty nation' referring to the Second World War. Kádár stressed that no anti-Soviet Communism had existed, exists or will exist. The emergence of Euro-Communism particularly in France and Italy was a particular theme in official political culture. When Kádár replied an inquiry of *New York Times*, he used the term 'so called Euro-Communism'. Still in 1986 the concept was put in brackets in the political dictionary together with the concept of national Communism.⁶⁴ In Kádár's political culture 'national' emerged only in the framework of the party and in co-operation with the Patriotic People's Front.

Although Soviet comrades guided the interpretation of the principles of Communism, the bloc itself did not appear as a model for all Finnish supporters of Socialism, for example. Acknowledging it publicly, however, caused protests by the Soviet authorities. When right-wing parties opposed Socialism in general, they could defend the *status quo* even by the reversed Brezhnev doctrine: only a capitalist Finland could remain independent, a socialist would slide into the Soviet bloc. Contrary to many other countries, FCP did not split until mid-1980s but maintained an artificial unity with the help of the Soviet Communist Party.⁶⁵ *Radio Free Europe* observed carefully the steps of the dispute, but *Magyarország* did not pay much attention to it. Interestingly, the weekly referred frequently to the more 'national' and 'Euro-Communist' *Kansan Uutiset*, instead of the clearly pro-Soviet *Tiedonantaja*. Finally, the Moscow oriented Democratic Alternative participated in the parliamentary elections in 1987 for the first time – also symbolising the end of the 'second republic'.

In the 1990s, Hungarians have argued that taboo topics existed during the state socialist era. Among these were Trianon, 1956 or the Soviet troops in the country. Furthermore, there was the question of Hungarian minorities. In fact, a demonstration supporting Hungarian minority in Transylvania in the summer of 1988 was the biggest gathering since 1956. Kádár's Hungary was vigorously careful not to provoke neighbouring countries in minority questions. In fact, early statements in 1958 helped to deteriorate minority statuses in Czechoslovakia and Romania. In the end of 1960s the situation had recovered in some sense. In the Helsinki Summit of 1975 Kádár was ready to give an account of the losses in Trianon for the first time.⁶⁶

In Finland, politically delicate matters were leaked to Swedish newspapers whilst Hungarians learned to use Western press to publish certain information. Instead of pre-censorship, the decision depended on individual journalists and publications in both countries. For example, György Aczél denied censorship but finally admitted that he might have had some kind of influence on matters.⁶⁷ In Finland there are some delicate cases related to foreign relations, when either the publisher refused to publish the book or later withdrew it from the markets. Still in the mid-1980s publishing Paasikivi's diaries or general Syrjä's book *Gruppen Finlandija* recalling his experiences in the Soviet military academy caused debates in political leadership. We cannot generalise the extent of Soviet control, but at least one case is known when the Soviet Ambassador himself checked the supply of bookshops in Helsinki.⁶⁸

On the other hand censorship existed in Finnish film industry and mostly concentrated on sex and violence. Also a few political cases of censorship occurred, such as films full of anti-Russian pathos before 1945, films reflecting presumptions of the Cold War or finally the debut action film of the Finnish director Renny Harlin in 1986. Although Hungarian cultural policy was dictated by the party, it could deal with relative delicate topics as well. Beside Hungarian pop classics and literature, we should definitely mention one of the best but not the most famous political satire in the socialist bloc *A tanú* (The Witness, 1969/1979). Although the film drifted between the categories of 'forbidden and tolerated', it is

likely that the making of the film could not have been possible in Kekkonen's Finland.

In the light of the earlier chapters, it is not surprising that the high-budget film of Finnish-Soviet co-operation was titled *Luottamus* (Trust, 1975). The film tells a story of Finnish independence and Lenin's role as a guarantor of it. Particularly after 1989, this mass production has become a symbol of 'finlandization', not least because it was shown at schools as a part of a teaching curriculum. However, we ought to bear in mind that co-productions existed also in other countries as a part of *détente*, for example in Yugoslavia. Hungarians had some experiences from these already in the 1960s. Finally, even Hungarians and Finns worked together in *Vámmentes házasság* (Duty-Free Marriage, 1980), a script of a delicate nature: a Hungarian woman and a Finnish man entered into matrimony on paper in order to get the woman out of Hungary.⁶⁹

In the 1970s *Suomen Kuvalehti* noted that Finns 'enjoyed' at least twice as much eastern TV programme as the other West-European countries. Generally speaking the 'East', however, bought three times more television programme from the 'West' in the beginning of the 1970s than the 'West' from the East'. The amount took ca. 10 per cent of the broadcasting time in the 'East' contrary to two per cent in the 'West'. However, a large number of 'Eastern' films represented new cinematography art in the West, among them many Hungarian films.⁷⁰

Evidently the Soviet shadow led also to peculiar features both in Finland and Hungary. In Hungary, however, culture flourished on the outskirts of the officially supported and unofficially tolerated. Despite 'Eastern' signs, in Finland we have to admit that in the late 1970s, 'punks', 'teddies' or 'duskiness' i.e. the strong Western influence could not have been further estranged from official political culture.

10 Politics, History and Commemoration

In the late 1980s some Finnish journalists and publishers tried to argue that the Winter War had been 'forgotten'. At the time a new spectacle film *Talvisota* (The Winter War) was under way. Although

filmmakers and the media concentrated more on the new version of the film *Tuntematon Sotilas* (The Unknown Soldier, 1985), historical information about the Winter War was also available. Moreover, a long TV-serial *Sodan ja Rauhan miehet* (The Men of War and Peace) was seen on television in the end of 1970s. Peculiar to Finland was also that novels on the World War II were published annually, a phenomenon absolutely absent in Kádár's Hungary.⁷¹

These examples lead us to focus on public representations of history and history writing. They certainly are tied to politics and political cultures. The education system in general takes a stand on how the past should be remembered and understood. In addition to these, there are deeper culture based differences. These existed even inside the socialist bloc: communist regimes re-built badly damaged Royal Castles in Budapest and Warsaw contrary to Berlin, in which they blew them up. A difference was found between Finland and Hungary when reception of literature was studied in the late 1980s. An experience of the presence of history was part and parcel of being a Hungarian, whereas committing oneself to history was surprisingly insignificant for Finnish readership.⁷²

Hungarian Miklós Szabó considered the legacy of Romanticism a part of political culture of the region: in East Central Europe people express their political views through historical examples and myths. The stalinist system between 1948 and 1953 created its own historical myths and progressive traditions of the poor and oppressed people. According to Szabó, however, Kádár's system denied and annihilated the whole history.⁷³ This is not true, but, as later will become clear, relation to history and politics was problematic in Hungary.

In Finland the recent history, the era since the independence in 1917, has been studied particularly well – in this comparison Hungarian perspective is essentially longer beginning already from the 10th century. Especially two contested eras have come to being in Finland: the years 1917–1918 and the period of the Wars. What was studied in the first period was the Finnish independence and Lenin's role in it, the controversial civil war in 1918, both of which were revisited in Kekkonen era.

Lenin's role in being the first to recognise Finnish independence, was – whether only of tactical nature and temporary or not – important in creating an excellent model of stabile co-existence between two political systems. President Kekkonen used this argument a couple of times since he unveiled a plaque in Leningrad in 1959 which commemorates Lenin's recognition of Finnish independence. The fact that Finnish independence was recognised by the founder of the Soviet state could be used to propagate the country's position to the contemporary Soviet leadership. This in mind, Kekkonen criticized Finnish historians, who had doubted the genuineness of Lenin's motives. More or less Lenin's role was praised in diplomatic speeches until late 1980s. In 1987 historian Eino Ketola argued in *Suomen Kuvalehti* that Lenin's views should be forgotten – a standpoint which still caused to ban his lecture.⁷⁴

The second and more controversial topic, the war in 1918 and particularly bloody reprisals afterwards, gained new perspectives in the Kekkonen era. Until the 1960s, the history of losers was neglected until Väinö Linna published a trilogy *Täällä Pohjantähden alla* (Under the North Star). The book was filmed on the fiftieth anniversary of the war and shown in television in 1970. At the time one million Finns saw the film, which, according to *Viikkosanomat*, was roughly the same number as saw the popular contemporary American soap opera, *Peyton Place*. Not only did the film influence people's views of the conflict but also the new studies, which similarly reflected the views of the losers. It seems evident that even Kekkonen himself had participated at least in one of those executions, which moulded his later political thought and ideas of integration.⁷⁵

The second period that preoccupied historians and politicians was the one of the Wars (Winter and Continuation). Since the 1960s Finns committed self-criticism and speculated, whether the war in 1939 could have been avoided. In a speech for the 25th anniversary celebration of the FCMA Kekkonen dealt with the topic, and on the 30th anniversary of the armistice in 1974 Kekkonen criticised the theory that Finland had just drifted like a log in a river to the German side in the Second World War. These speeches raised a political storm in conserva-

tive circles.⁷⁶ According to Kekkonen, Finland's policy of neutrality was possible, but at the expense of disengaging and breaking with the past, the 'political 1930s'. In this sense Kekkonen represented historical thinking, in which future was definitely more important than the past. Recent history was seen as a story of success whilst more critical light was cast onto earlier decades. In his role as a President he used history several times in the service of foreign policy. In this he was not alone, as Dieter Langewiesche has noted, all Presidents of the German Federal Republic used to interpret history in their speeches.⁷⁷

Moreover, the lessons of the World War played a role in contemporary policy as well. The threat that 'history repeats itself' flavoured with subjective conclusions of the war influenced on political thought. Kekkonen emphasised Prime Minister Kosygin's words about the shock how German troops could push until the river Volga in the Second World War. In *Magyarország* Kekkonen stressed that the Soviets will never forget it and will not let it happen for the second time. Kekkonen feared particularly that the uprising of 1953 would repeat in the GDR and nationalists in the Federal Republic would join them.⁷⁸ In Hungary open mourning of the Second World War did not happen. On the contrary, erecting memorials to the liberating Soviets had been one of the first activities of the new Hungarian state after the war. Plaques commemorated resistance and martyrs but not in general those who had fell in the fronts or vanished in the catastrophe of Don, when the whole army perished. It is amazing to notice that the idea of a memorial was brought up so late as in February 1989 in the Central Committee.⁷⁹

The Day of Liberation, 4 April, was defined the most important official festival, although it did not appear to attract substantial popular identification.⁸⁰ The provisional government declared it a public holiday immediately in April 1945. The anniversary of the 1848 Revolution, March the 15th and the International Labour Day, May the 1st, were also declared holidays at the same time. However, 15 March became complicated for the new rulers and partly for its 'bourgeois' nature. In the 1950s they abolished the holiday status of the day but Imre Nagy re-

stored it during the 1956 uprising, and in 1957 Kádár and his companions restored the former practice. Instead, Kádár wanted to found the new Communist Youth Organisation, KISZ, precisely on 15 March. The appeal was finally published on 21 March, which was the anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet Republic in 1919.⁸¹ Politicians struggled about the legacy of Hungarian history and about who could complete these historical demands in the present.

No doubt communist regimes carefully prepared themselves for different celebrations and anniversaries. We cannot underestimate May the 1st or the anniversary of the Russian Revolution 7th November either, a holiday as well as a public square in Budapest. Contrary to Hungary, the day did not have the same status in Finland. Political elite participated in the celebrations in the Soviet Embassy, which was also the custom on the anniversaries of the FCMA.

The most important feast in Finland, however, takes place on the Independence Day, 6 December. The President of the Republic organises a reception in the President's palace. Beside foreign Ambassadors, prominent citizens have the honour to receive an invitation to this pseudo-Monarchist event. Moreover, days for national Great Men have been striking in Finland. The army marched in parades on the birthday of Mannerheim, and Johan Ludwig Runeberg, J.W. Snellman and Aleksis Kivi had all their special days. In politics Snellman's birthday, 12 May has also had a nationalist flavour as the 'Finnish Day', whilst the death of Swedish King, Gustavus the Second was commemorated as the 'Swedish Day'.

In addition to public commemoration, we must ask also the opposite: what was not commemorated in official political cultures. In Hungary the new meaning of the Saint Stephen's Day, 20 August, is a good example. In 1949 the new constitution of The People's Republic was timed and celebrated on that day. In official political culture the day was dedicated for new bread as well, which tried to diminish the religious meaning of the day. In Finland Mannerheim's birthday was more suitable for the whole nation after 1945 and it substituted the 1918 victory parade of the white army. In the 1970s there was a proposal to

celebrate the day of the 1944 armistice as a second Independence Day. The idea was quickly shot down and nowadays represents a clear symptom of 'finlandization'. Another failed attempt came from the Soviet side in 1986: the seventieth anniversaries of the October revolution and Finnish independence could be celebrated together.⁸²

In the Hungarian code of law there are particular memorial statutes, which since the nineteenth century have 'codified' extraordinary events or persons. During the Kádár era the Soviet liberation was enacted into law both on the fiftieth and twentieth anniversaries. The memory of the first Soviet Republic was codified on its fortieth anniversary in 1959. A peculiar form of commemoration emerged in the Academy of Sciences, which organised particular sessions to commemorate anniversaries of historical Great Men. The fiftieth anniversary of the October revolution was honored in the Academy as well.

When we deal with commemoration, we could notice that Hungarians had to come to terms with a loss of an empire. As Schöpflin formulated it, 'a substantial proportion of Hungarian opinion feels that the body of the nation [...] has been cut off from it'.⁸³ This historical experience has ignited wider historical debate as well. In 1960 historian Erik Molnár demystified the concepts of nation, people and homeland, which he considered as unities which had not been questioned even during the stalinist years. Aladár Mód answered that patriotism had not been false consciousness, and thus influenced on the further development of the concept of socialist patriotism. Another debate became public in 1987, now between Hungary and Romania, when Hungarians had published a history of Transylvania. In the socialist Hungary a public commemoration of the losses of Trianon, such as Transylvania, was not allowed.⁸⁴

Evidently lost territories have influenced mentality and political culture also in Finland. The first award of selling 30,000 records was given away in Finland in 1960 for the song *Muistatko Monrepos'n?* (Do you remember Monrepos?), which referred to a park in the city of Vyborg, which was lost to the Soviet Union, in 1940 and 1944. In official political culture the question of regaining Karelia to Finland did not exist

during the Kekkonen era, although it still played a small role in his election campaign in 1956. Lost territories were a delicate matter: for example, Mauno Koivisto and Björn Alholm have told in their autobiographical writings a humorous detail, how the Soviet Ambassador disapproved of *Karjala* (Karelia) beer, which was served at a reception in the late 1960s.⁸⁵

We should not dramatise these nostalgic signs, but there is no use to underestimate them either. Particularly this is true for the memory of 1956 during the Kádár era. As late as in 1988 the party prohibited 'a commemorative procession to memorialise the events of 23 October 1956'. First black mourning flags had appeared on 15 March, 1957, and some placed candles in their windows for the honour of 1956. In this sense, All Souls Day on the 1st November repeated commemoration to feed political expectations.

In Kádár's Hungary public commemoration of 1956 represented official political culture and history of winners, who considered the event as a counter-revolution. For the ruling HWSP, the attack on the party headquarters at *Köztársaság tér* on 30 October 1956 had been the most important evidence of the counter-revolutionary character of the rebellion. Laying wreaths at the square and the cemetery of Kerepesi, became a part of annual communist rituals. Although Kádár could emphasize socialist achievements and boasted to Kekkonen in 1973 that 1956 was hardly remembered anymore⁸⁶, forgetting was not that simple. Between 1957–1962 ca. 22,000 people were sentenced in courts, among them 250-350 to death including the former Prime Minister Imre Nagy. Beside these also earlier injustices caused bitterness as discrimination 'for political reasons'.

Challenging openly the history of winners would have endangered an individual's career. Beside general dissatisfaction, 1956, however, was finally the main factor in unifying various groups, including former neo-marxists in the 1980s. The years 1986–1987 repeat again here: in December 1986, non-conformist activists organised the first illegal conference in a private apartment. The organisers collected a bibliography of 1956, used a pseudonym and published it as a *samizdat*. Political nature of history became even more apparent, when the Committee for His-

torical Justice, *Történelmi Igazságtétel Bizottsága*, was founded illegally in June 1988. In the founding document they insisted on 'the full moral, political and juridical rehabilitation of victims, both alive and dead, from the revenge which followed the revolution'. They demanded reliable history writing on the post-1945 period, documents from 1956 to be published, and national memorial as well as the reburial of the executed persons.⁸⁷

In general, history writing in Hungary had more room for manoeuvre than in other socialist countries. Still recent history and particularly 1956 were the most difficult topics of all, in particular, because of the origins of the existing power structure and contemporary leadership and their responsibility in 1956. In political culture, there was an atmosphere of secrecy and concealment, because not everyone had the access to documents or Western literature. Such literature was branded in libraries with the letters Z.A. (closed material) and required a special permission.

The questions of power and its relation to history writing were not unknown in Finland either. The law concerning documents was changed a couple of times since 1952. Particularly documents concerning foreign policy have been the Achilles heel. In 1986 Juhani Suomi, a civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, received exclusive rights, in fact a monopoly, to Kekkonen's papers. Suomi, a professional historian, had made a political career in the same party as Kekkonen. Suomi's role in the history writing of Kekkonen has been a constant topic after each volume, which he has published.⁸⁸ Although Suomi has completed a good job, we cannot avoid the conclusion that his privileged situation resembled the position of party historians in Kádár's Hungary.

11 Cult and Sport as Politics

In addition to history writing and commemoration we have to study different forms of cult more closely. Particularly when we deal with the political cult of death and Great Men, there are numerous examples to commemorate. We can speculate that even the naming of national broadcasting channels reveals some differences between Finnish and Hungarian (political) cultures.

In Finland they used quite pure and simple naming *Yleisohjelma* and *Rinnakkaisohjelma* ('General Programme' and 'Parallel Programme'), whereas Hungarians stressed their bold national history and Great Men. Their national radio channels were named after revolutionary heroes of 1848, Lajos Kossuth and Sándor Petőfi. In 1987 the third programme was named after composer Béla Bartók.

In the late 1950s the construction of a special Workers' Movement Memorial got under way at the Kerepesi Cemetery in Budapest. From then on, communist politicians and other high officials were buried in the same cemetery in which other important figures in Hungarian history, such as Lajos Batthyány, Lajos Kossuth and Ferenc Deák. They represented the 1848 tradition and were visible all over Hungary alongside with the National Poet, Vörösmarty, military hero Hunyadi, nobles Rákóczi and Széchenyi. Although Lenin Boulevard and the Road of the Red Army existed in the centre of Budapest, the above mentioned national heroes were the most popular street names in the capital. In other words the number of national heroes commemorated was striking also in Kádár's Hungary.⁸⁹

However, we could not underestimate the value of Great Men in Finland either. The Russian Tsar Alexander the Second still stands in the centre of Helsinki. The vast majority of late Finnish Presidents have their statues in the capital. During the Kekkonen era, five of Kekkonen's predecessors received a memorial statue near the Finnish Parliament. From the remaining two Risto Ryti was more problematic, because he had been sentenced to imprisonment on the basis of responsibility in the Continuation War. As late as in 1989 his case was politically delicate, and Prime Minister Harri Holkeri was reluctant to make a speech at his tomb on the centenary of his birth.

According to the current *Suomen Kuvalehti*, politics in Finland was still made at graveyards. However, the case of Holkeri on Ryti's grave was quite insignificant compared to Hungary of the time where the past was literally dug up. In spring 1989, Imre Nagy and his compatriots were exhumed and reburied. The ceremony took place on the Heroes Square, which is also the site of the unknown soldier and had symbolic value as well. In Finland So-

viet leaders used to commemorate and lay a wreath on Paasikivi's tomb – Kádár followed the same path in 1983 – until Yeltsin honoured Mannerheim during his visit in 1992. Until then Mannerheim had represented reactionary traditions for the Soviets: in the 1960s the Soviet Union sent a note to the Romanian government, when Romanians had laid a wreath on Mannerheim's grave.⁹⁰

When we deal with the political cult of *living* political leaders, it seems that it was not the stalinist leader Mátyás Rákosi, who brought personality cult to Hungary. Roots of the phenomenon are older: it is enough to study Hungarian legislation during the Dual Monarchy and Horthy era. Although Rákosi celebrated his own 60th birthday in 1952 in a pure stalinist pattern, the Hungarian party 'de-canonised' him in September 1956. At the same time they changed the name of the factory, named after him. Party organs also pushed through a principle that streets should not be named after living persons.⁹¹

Kádár seemed to follow this line of thinking and lived relatively modestly compared to some other communists. Contrary to his predecessor, Kádár's 60th birthday was neither compatible to Rákosi's nor were there as many pictures of contemporary leaders hung on party conventions⁹². Neither did Kádár reveal much of his personal life; Hungarians themselves did not know much about their leader. In *Magyarország* Kádár only once disclosed something about of his free time: if there was any time left he used to read books⁹³.

However, it seems evident that in this sense a wider cult of a leader existed in Finland than in Hungary. Kekkonen was 'pop' and an idol in Finland. He was presented as a superman, who skied, fished and even might have been able to dance rock and roll – as Jarkko Laine and his band crystallised it to the public in the late 1960s. Kekkonen, already called with the nicknames 'UKK' and 'Urkki', won three times the title of the 'most popular Finn' published by the periodical *Viikkosanomat* since 1953. *De facto*, he was the only politician who could compete with writers, sportsmen or the Finnish Miss Universe Armi Kuusela. For example, in 1970 *Viikkosanomat* wrote that 'UKK is still pop and the second popular Finn' – when a javelin-thrower had passed him.⁹⁴

No doubt Kekkonen was popular, and particularly among peasants and working people. Kekkonen did not behave like a 'master' but rather like a 'lumberjack', who met ordinate people and spent his leisure time out in the nature. A public image of a common man has been an advantage for a prominent leader in Finland. Biographers and journalists, for example, stressed Koivisto's working class background and noted his big 'worker's hands'. Still Kekkonen and Koivisto essentially helped their own careers through academic channels and degrees, whilst Kádár's working class background was combined with some self-education.⁹⁵

Kekkonen was a democrat in his principles but an autocrat of his character, as Max Jakobson has pointed out. Still many people considered the President as a counterpart to 'party power', who should take positions beyond party intrigues *pelin politiikka* ('politics of game'). Many understood this Bonapartism and expected their leader to use his power. This mentality could be read, for example, from numerous delegations, which arrived from provinces and asked an audience from the President. Even the activity of the leading protest singer, Irwin Goodman, seemed to culminate in an intention to write a letter to Kekkonen, who should stop unemployment in Finland.⁹⁶

When Kekkonen's period in office was prolonged by an *ad hoc* law, the leading political cartoonist Kari Suomalainen commented the event with his cartoon, set in a school: 'If we do not behave ourselves, the Principal would come'.⁹⁷ Thus, we ought not to underestimate the mentality of subjection; people believed that they need a higher authority, which to honour, to be afraid of but also to use against political rivals. Finnish political culture resembled a play of children on a sandpit boasting and giving a fright to each one of their potential and powerful pals.

Kekkonen represented the continued tradition of powerful leadership in which a Russian Tsar had substituted Swedish King. Loyalty to ruler helped the nation. In these circumstances it was no wonder that a street was named after Kekkonen in the capital, when he celebrated his 80th birthday. The same year also an institute, National Park and a medal bore his name. An icebreaker *Urho* had been christened years earlier. *Suomen Ku-*

valehti also participated in the building of this personality cult. In the autumn of 1975 the magazine published a supplement with 165 photos to the honour of the 75 years old President.⁹⁸

However, more embarrassing is the fact that Kekkonen's face was found in the new 500 Fmk banknote. Contemporary banknotes had the pictures of two other presidents, Ståhlberg and Paasikivi, as had 'Finland's National Philosopher', J.W. Snellman. They represented the canon from the mid-1950s to mid-1980s, in fact the Kekkonen era. When new notes were put in circulation in December 1986, they introduced composers and scientists, not Presidents anymore, not even Kekkonen. In Hungary artists and rebels represented the canon of the era, culminating in Béla Bartók in 1983. In the 1990s they had to give space for older kings, which further strengthened the canon of historical Great Men.

However, Kekkonen's critics should not forget how the extensive rights of the President were guaranteed by the constitution. The constitution was created only a year after the civil war as a compromise between the leftist and rightist political forces, the latter of which had favoured a king. In fact the constitution fed to the idea of leader cult in political culture and allowed for the concentration of political power to one person. Even more essential is to bear in mind that the 1973 extraordinary law was not as extraordinary as usually thought to be. Instead, it derived from political culture in which national interest was considered the highest value and surpassed the idea of democracy. Already the first President Ståhlberg was chosen by the Parliament in 1919, and the 1937 electors were used also in 1941 (Ryti) and 1944 (Mannerheim). In 1946, the Parliament chose President Paasikivi by an extraordinary law. The undemocratic idea further appeared in discussion several times: in 1949 by Paasikivi, and then by other politicians in 1955, 1966 and 1976, thus somehow before almost all elections.⁹⁹

Evidently Kekkonen was perceived as a great and a startling man in his time. According to *Magyarország* 'still at the age of 69 there is posture and lightness in his step'. In 1970 the periodical told how Kekkonen had surprised international journalists in Helsinki. Kekkonen had gone to skiing and could be reached

only after two days.¹⁰⁰ The periodical claimed that as a young man Kekkonen had become a national champion in skiing. Although this is not true – Kekkonen won the championship in high and triple jump – he, nevertheless, also led a national sport organisation in the 1930s and 1940s. Two nation-wide sport organisations, Finnish Central Sports Federation and the Workers' Sports Federation represented Finland's dichotomic political culture for many decades after 1918.

Definitely, sport played a role in both countries and represented political strength on national and international scene. Particularly in the Cold War, world-wide competitions were more than sports. Some of the Hungarian highlights concern particularly the stalinist era of Rákosi like the Olympics in Helsinki 1952 or the football match against England in 1953. The water polo game between Hungary and the Soviet Union in Melbourne 1956 represented already a tragedy. The boycott of Los Angeles 1984 only continued the tradition to use international arena for political purposes. At this time most communist ruled countries stayed home – Romania participated but Hungary supported the initiative of the Soviet Union.

Finns were on the top specially in skiing: before 1968 *de facto* Scandinavian countries and Finland had shared the medals. Skiing was also the most popular winter sport among citizens and it was encouraged by the state. No wonder if 'Finns were born with skies': particular skiing holidays were organized at schools and even the Parliament, *Eduskunta*, had skiing championships. During Kekkonen's reign collective phenomenon *kansanhiihto* (people's skiing) challenged men to ski ten kilometres, women five, and three kilometres was the norm for children. In 1970 a record number over 1.3 million Finns participated in the competition. A mass skiing event, *Finlandia-hiihto*, existed since 1974, and because of Kekkonen was a diligent skier, sport happenings were even named after him.

When Koivisto was elected President, even the cover of *Suomen Kuvalehti* introduced the brand new President and his wife with skies.¹⁰¹ Thus, definitely skiing had also to do with political cultures of Finland. Even a pejorative concept of *perässähiihtäjä* (literally, the skier who follows in the shadow) emerged in the political

vocabulary. He/she was a person, who waited his/her own chances next to the President, – might even have skied with him but did not dare to win. Frankly speaking, ageing actualised the question of successor, which then shadowed politics in the 1970s. In Hungary the same problem personified a decade later in Kádár, who was twelve years younger than Kekkonen.

Besides skiing, sauna and bathing belonged to Finnish political cultures. A Hungarian commentator even pointed out in *Magyarország* that Finns did not have only work lunches or diners but the sauna as well: in its heat they decided the questions of the country.¹⁰² Particularly Kekkonen's sauna in Tamminiemi and the sauna in the Parliament became famous. In addition, the sauna was an excellent place for silent unofficial negotiations. According to Kekkonen, gentle atmosphere created a mood of reconciliation. The core of Finnish political culture, however, did not always become clear outside the country. Minister Max Jakobson wrote that US Secretary of State Dean Rusk joined only with great difficulties the other bathers, when he visited Finland in 1966.¹⁰³

Although the sauna has become a concept in Finnish political culture, it has raised also criticism against politics and politicians. Sitting in the heat and intriguing outside the session hall was not considered work in the proper sense. Like hunting and other unofficial networks in the socialist countries, the sauna frequently ousted women from ultimate decision process. The sauna united but evidently created inner circles and other obscure cliques, who could agree the political agenda in advance.

In other words, the sauna is a peculiarity in Finnish political culture. Also sport was considered particularly important, and Kekkonen himself posed as a vital sportsman. Not only in sport but in many other ways Finland's personality cult reached startling dimensions, when we compare it to Kádár's Hungary, in which the cult of historical Great Men was striking even during the communist rule.

12 Travelling Politics

When Archie Brown explored political culture, he paid attention also to tourism and workers travelling abroad for employment. Both lead people to compare living conditions in differ-

ent countries. Moreover, travelling is a structural phenomenon to influence on the change of political culture: between 1950 and 1990 international passenger traffic grew 18 times. The semi-official trips between particular friendship cities are important, too. The idea of friendship towns resulted in the Finnish-Hungarian case in the first agreement between Lahti and Pécs in 1956, followed by many other contacts.

In Finland the high amount of visits Kekkonen made to the Soviet Union is striking. In fact Kekkonen visited Soviet Union annually after 1958, representing Finland either in state visits or combining unofficial discussions to his holidays. Partly this was due to his task to create personal contacts to Soviet leaders, partly as a consequence of the night frost crises in 1958. The number of official and unofficial visits reached already 30 in 1977. The Eastern 'orientation' strengthened even, when Kekkonen visited first GDR in 1977 and then FRG two years later.¹⁰⁴

In Britain and in the USA Finland's foreign policy was understood better after Kekkonen's first visits in 1961. Kekkonen was also the first West-European leader to travel to Hungary in the 1960s. Kekkonen arrived unofficially only a few months after the general amnesty in 1963, and before UN General Secretary U Thant's visit. When Kekkonen arrived for the second time in 1969, the status of the visit was raised to a state level at a time, when *détente* was a general slogan of the date. Mutual dialogue continued at the highest level in Finland four years later and again in Budapest in 1976. In the 1980s Koivisto visited Hungary twice, during his first year in office 1982 and later in 1988, whilst Kádár returned the call in 1983.

Kekkonen's visits were highly valued in Hungary. In 1976, according to *Magyarország*, his name had become a concept. On the contrary, a report of Koivisto's first visit was surprisingly lacking in the magazine. The question was not of any disagreement. According to Kádár a year later, Koivisto and Kádár did not need many words to understand each other. After Kekkonen, Koivisto seemed to remain somehow more distant and 'abstruse' also for Hungarians, for example, in an interview of *Magyarország* in 1986.¹⁰⁵

When Kádár met the Finnish Ambassador Jyrkänkallio in 1973 he told he regretted that he was not one of the most diligent travellers.¹⁰⁶ If this was the proper reason, Kádár made an effort in the subsequent years: Austria 1976, Italy, West Germany and Yugoslavia in 1977 and France a year later. To Britain he travelled for the first time in autumn 1985 as a return visit Thatcher's visit. The new Prime Minister of 1987, Károly Grósz was in 1988 the first Prime Minister to negotiate with the British PM. The new party leader Grósz visited United States also in the summer of 1988. In the Soviet Union and particularly at the receptions of the anniversaries of the Great Socialist October Revolution Kádár was present alongside other communist leaders.

In addition to their Presidents, Finnish politicians loved to travel, particularly to Hungary. *Suomen Kuvalehti* noticed the popularity of Budapest already in the beginning of 1975. After Moscow Budapest had become the second most visited city by Finnish ministers in the mid-1980s. Between 1983 and 1986 official visits were directed to Hungary more often than to Washington. Budapest was four times more popular than Bonn and surpassed three times East Berlin.¹⁰⁷

In addition to this 'Eastern deviation' there has been some popular disapproval of this whole 'privilege' of travels the politicians had. Beside Risto Ryti the President who had no statue in the capital and therefore was not particularly famous but instead remembered of his travels as 'Reissu-Lassi', the Traveller, President Lauri Relander. However, travelling belongs to the duties of politicians but evidently both countries also 'rewarded' their representatives in terms of trips. Therefore we cannot underestimate the question of who was able to travel and was invited. The argument whether a politician had an official invitation to Moscow was repeated in the 1981 presidential campaign. The official delegation of the NCP did not receive invitation to the Soviet Union until 1988.¹⁰⁸

In Hungary, it became possible to travel to the 'East' without visa in the 1960s. Travellers needed a so-called red passport, whilst a blue passport entitled a journey to the 'West'. One tourist trip was possible in three years, for seeing relatives the limit was two years.

Organised tourism, i.e. by the tourist agencies was not included to these limits. Since 1982, Hungarians could do travel abroad once a year, but hard currency was guaranteed only every three years. New passport without any restrictions was introduced in 1987.¹⁰⁹

Despite these restrictions, tourism was an important topic in Hungary. For example, *Magyarország* published annually advertisements of the state owned tourist company, which reached their peak in the end of the 1970s. On the first three-quarters of 1964, 1.077,909 Hungarians had travelled abroad, although a small minority, 56,143, to non-socialist countries. Organised tourism had, however, quite different rates: 120,000 already in 1963. In 1975 five days in Krakow cost 1950 forints and two weeks in Kiev-Riga-Tallinn-Moscow 6,900ft – compared to monthly salary of 3,100 forints of a salaried staff.¹¹⁰

On the other hand we should not forget those, who travel *into* the country. For example in January-August 1973, around 5.1 million tourists visited Hungary. Two years later Finns dominated mutual rates more than nine times: 2,500 Hungarians visited Finland whilst 23,000 Finns travelled to Hungary. When visa between both countries was abolished in 1970, for Hungarians Finland was ‘the only one from the so-called Western countries without a visa’ at the time. In 1978 compulsory currency exchange was cancelled, and Austria became a visa-free country the following year.¹¹¹

No doubt, holidays abroad and possibilities to increase political knowledge by travelling were luxury in both countries. In an international comparison from 1967, Finland did not belong to the top 12 countries (10 European, USA and Canada) from where the 103.9 million out of the total 139.1 million tourists originated. In the 1970s economic growth brought with it upstarts as well, for example, Kalevi Keihänen, a bohemian businessman, who started his own charters to ‘the South’. According to current Finnish Tourist Office, travelling abroad was considered either a status symbol or a fashion at the time. Towards the 1980s the status slowly vanished and mass tourism topped in around two million.¹¹²

Soviet Union was the most popular country to travel from Hungary in the beginning of the 1980s. Finns, with 15 per cent, formed the biggest group arriving from capitalist countries –

every fourth trip from Finland was directed there during those years. Some of the visitors became politically even more critical towards the Soviet Union, whilst the others explained shortcomings as labour pains, and the rest did not care. After 1945, Finnish official political culture did not use the pejorative word 'ryssä' (ruskie) but travelling warmed these memories up. Also a special concept, *vodkaturismi*, vodka tourism, emerged in Finnish political vocabulary. For example, in 1969 44,000 Finns visited Soviet Union, among them 700, one and a half per cent, who caused some disorder during their travel.¹¹³

Finally, traveling was part of 'the youngster question' i.e. related to the post-1945 generation. In Hungary the number of these travellers doubled to 180,000 between 1967 and 1972. When inter-rail train ticket was established in 1972, also GDR, Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia participated in the agreement. In 1973 international discount ticket was sold also in Hungary: Rail Europe Junior gave discount in 11 eleven European countries.¹¹⁴

So, Kádár-Kekkonen era has been significant in travelling and mass tourism. Unfortunately, no information was found how travelling was connected to travellers' or their parent's political and economical status. Still we can suppose that tourism, cheaper travelling possibilities and student exchange programmes helped to open political views or even the systems and political cultures as well. In the Finnish case we must bear in mind that new methods in education started to stress more international views in the 1980s. Internationalism in education (*kansainvälisyyskasvatus*) was still a quite controversial idea in the 1970s. In Hungary there is some evidence that travelling encouraged *samizdat* literature. Finally some 'voted with their feet' and did not come back from abroad. For example, in 1986 3,295 Hungarians did not return – which was under 0.5 per cent out of 708,000 who travelled.¹¹⁵

13 Finns and Finland in Hungarian Eyes and Vice Versa

When Kekkonen described Finnish foreign policy in Kremlin in 1958, he used an expression of 'national character'. According to Kekkonen foreign policy was in congruence with some essential features of Finnish national character: it reflected seriousness,

peaceful, moderate and realistic approach to political matters. Many, many years later a Hollywood script writer of Hungarian origin, Joe Esterhas described his ex-countrymen's character of being aggressive and passionate bordering self-destructive. Moreover, they judge their opinions too hastily, are narrow-minded and even anti-semitist and racist.¹¹⁶

We may consider both statements extreme, and, in the latter case coloured by the bitterness of an emigrant. Nevertheless, in Finnish literature there are metaphors of a quiet, little slow but pig-headed figures like Runeberg's Sven Dufva or Topelius's servant Matti, who was not a beautiful man contrary to Topelius's image of brave and high-minded Hungarians. On the other hand, as Elek Fényes has pointed out, temperament, haughtiness combined to friendliness and hospitality characterised Hungarians of the same era in the 19th Century. Even if these are rough generalisations and stereotypes, they express something about preconditions and circumstances, in which people live. In political culture they reveal also attitudes and prejudices of the rhetorician itself and how people relate themselves and their history to other cultures.¹¹⁷

For example, a Hungarian journalist wrote in 1971 that according to a Hungarian popular belief Finns belong to world's calmest (*leghiggadtabb*) peoples and travelling to Finland confirms it. The writer wondered particularly the nature of 'the silently functioning parliament', in which they dealt with social and domestic problems without particular emotions.¹¹⁸ Therefore, finally, we study how Finns and Hungarians saw each other, and their political cultures, in *Magyarország* and *Suomen Kuvalehti* respectively. It seems possible that Mauno Koivisto's idea of keeping 'low profile' reveals something essential from Finland and her recent political culture. The low profile in a discussion made it possible to leave sharper stands in reserve for potential use. By contrast, the Hungarian way to debate seems to take a more 'provocative' profile.

In politics *Magyarország* considered Finland's constructive policy to be a stabilising element in Northern Europe representing peaceful coexistence between different political systems. The weekly also confirmed the essential idea of this article, i.e. how important the word

ulkopolitiikka, foreign policy, was in Finland. Rapid development of the country was considered as a good example of achievements of rational, peaceful and realistic politics. In 1978 they defined Paasikivi-Kekkonen line already as 'political realism based on historical lessons and the acknowledgement of the geographic situation.'¹¹⁹

Although the reports sometimes praised Finland, the whole picture is still much more realistic than idealistic. Crisis in the government was not considered extraordinary and the question of Presidency essential in Finnish political system. A Hungarian observer emphasized in 1973 that not even the French president had such a political power as his Finnish colleague. In 1977 Kekkonen had already become 'the symbol of the country's international position'. The picture of the Finlandia House, the venue of the 1975 European Summit in Helsinki, repeated in the stories, thus, symbolized the country itself. 'Finlandization' was explained positively, i.e. from the point of view of Finnish leadership and as a phenomenon, which was insulting Finns.¹²⁰

A critical point was found in tourism: for the Hungarian observer Finland's paradoxical attraction was based on the fact that it did not have any attraction at all. Moreover, prices in hotels and restaurants were high, 'beyond Hungarian pockets'. The writer concluded that Hungarians should carefully consider to which country to travel once in following three years. At the time, 1976, a week in Finland cost more than ten days in Vienna or London. Finns themselves were described positively: a tourist cannot feel any discrimination in spite of economic limits, as it is 'alien for Finnish mentality' (*lélektől idegen*). Finns were 'silent, modest people, who do not boast and brag.'¹²¹

However, we must bear in mind that *Magyarország* and *Suomen Kuvalehti* wrote to their domestic audiences in the first place – usually only a few times a year appeared an article concerning the other country. In some reports there were, naturally, simplifications – like the Finnish economy ruled by 20 families, Swedish People's Party representing big capital, etc. Maybe more serious was the article on Kekkonen's 70th birthday, when they tried to make him 'one of the most determined opponents of the war' referring to the Second World War. In spite of these defects the weekly concen-

trated on world politics dedicating usually one page for a country. More ideologically tainted language was used in the editorials, and particularly in the mid-1970s.¹²²

Advertisements in Hungary were considered such an extraordinary thing that they were worth a story in *Suomen Kuvalehti*. At the time, 1972–1973, the fate of the market mechanism was speculated in the weekly. When related to increasing mutual cultural connections, Hungary was, however, more or less absent in the magazine. The few articles between 1975 and 1979 dealt with the end of free abortion and the literature scandal (see Raija Oikari's article), Hungarian children, letters from Balaton and Budapest and its spas in 1979.¹²³ On the other hand, the first years of the 1980s seemed to be somehow more active. *Suomen Kuvalehti* noticed how Kádár had admitted that the country could not reach the aims of five-year plan, and the norms for the years 1981–1985 would be more moderate. Although Hungary would be loyal to her foreign political commitments, the country liked to decide its standard of living and culture itself. According to journalist Marketta Kopinski, intellectuals in neighbouring countries envy relatively broad freedom of speech.¹²⁴

Thus, economy was one of the most focused points in Hungary in the 1980s. Already in 1981 Finnish Broadcasting Company's reporters paid attention to Hungary '*Toisenlainen talous*' (Another kind of Economy). Two years later Hungary was already 'a surprise in the socialist camp', foodstuffs 'overflowed' in the market-hall. The 'old beauty' was 'almost like a Western city today'. The good image of Hungary further developed, and political commentator Knud Möller already could estimate in 1983 that Kádár would probably be chosen in free elections as well. A year later *Suomen Kuvalehti* noted first forint millionaires in a country without a feeling of 'the big brother' – even the general greyness of socialist environment had vanished.¹²⁵

On the other hand, particularly critical or 'hostile' articles were not published in *Suomen Kuvalehti* in the 1970s and 1980s. Journalists viewed Hungary in the frame of socialist countries – not in the context of Nordic countries or West Germany. In 1976, the anniversary of 1956 was present as well, when they interviewed István Nemeskürty, the later grey eminence of the Hun-

garian conservatism. At the time Nemeskürty had the view that Kádár was the most glorious statesman in Hungary in three hundred years. Nemeskürty stated that he did not belong to the party but was 'on the same side with Kádár [...] Kádár's chosen road was maybe not the best but it was the only one'. Ten years later non-conformist László Rajk had his turn in *Suomen Kuvalehti*. According to Rajk, Hungarians did not speak about their actions in 1956. None of Rajk's friends had mentioned whether their father had been a freedom fighter. For the non-conformist activist the reason was that they were still afraid.¹²⁶

In 1986 Hungary was the country which already 'tosses on the borders of Socialism'. A 'turbo era' had arrived in Socialism in the form of the first formula competition. Other new phenomena paid attention to were 'Hungarian Rambos', body building and punk rock. Later, in March 1988 the weekly foretold political crisis and how the trust in Kádár was eroding. A peaceful revolution was observed already in March 1989, by journalist Harri Saukkomaa, thus before the negotiations in the round table and the reburial of Imre Nagy. Finally, according to Saukkomaa, the MDF won the elections in 1990 by stressing national consciousness and history, compared to free democrats, who had favored more rational and European values.¹²⁷

14 Conclusion

In this piece of research I have studied political cultures in Finland and Hungary. Instead of a seeing political culture as a single unit, I have taken the concept as a methodological tool and a starting point to compare both societies. At the same time comparative aspect has been a great challenge simply because political culture could not be separated from culture in a wider sense.

Evidently the idea of progress and social justice were common tasks for unified political cultures in both countries. The idea of a dominant political culture in Kekkonen's Finland emphasized integration and avoided sharpening conflicts and dividing people. In Hungary, the old statehood, 'small liberties' combined with passive acceptance of the Kádárism characterised the system since the 1960s.

At structural level there are more differences than similarities between presidential democracy of Finland and Hungary's 'soft dictatorship'. Although Hungary showed signs of market mechanism, Kádár could still argue in the 1980s that 98 per cent of the means of production were in social ownership, which is a huge difference compared to a mixed economies. However, similar phenomena and problems existed at the level of politics, although the answers to current problems differed. Both lived in the shadow of the Soviet Union, had a common border with it and faced the political interference of the super power.

Communication between Finland and Hungary increased considerably since the late 1960s. However, it is striking that in *Magyarország* the special relationship was not given special attention. The Hungarian weekly concentrated on world politics and referred to the most important events, usually dedicating one page for one country. Sometimes Finland was considered 'friendly', however, not a brother country, a concept, which was reserved for communist ruled countries. Although some liturgy and rhetoric of friendship repeated in speeches of occasion, compared to Soviet friendship they were at much more equal level. Concepts like 'realism', 'national interest' and 'spirit of Helsinki' appeared beside 'kinship' to describe mutual relations.

Finland's personality cult reached startling dimensions, when compared to Kádár's Hungary. Although politics and political cultures became personified in both countries, Hungary at the time was lacking these outer signs of strong personal leadership. At a personal level Finnish and Hungarian leaders seemed to understand each other very well. Kekkonen commented in his diary already during his first visit that Kádár had made an impression of a really pleasant and reasonable man with a sense of humour and quiet irony.¹²⁸ When Kekkonen passed away, it was Kádár, who commemorated him at a request of a Finnish publisher in an article, which was published both in Finland and Hungary.¹²⁹

The relation to national history in political cultures is revealing in both countries. Finnish independence and 'statehood' were considered young, whilst Hungarians stress their long-

standing medieval traditions. Moreover, it seems evident that traditional historical thinking, in spite of communist indoctrination, remained stronger in Hungary than in Finland. We can find a difference in political cultures, which was confirmed in the comparative study of literature in the late 1980s. An experience of the presence of history was a part of being Hungarian, whilst committing oneself to history was surprisingly insignificant in Finland. However, national identity did not 'vanish' in Finland either but compared to earlier decades it was revisited during the Kekkonen era. Hungarians have been – and may still be – ready for more radical changes than Finns on the basis of their political cultures, subjective views of politics and history.

Finally, as Seppo Kääriäinen has noticed, 1987 ended the 'red-ochre' agrarian-industrial project, which he considered as the answer on the challenges of the Finnish 'second republic'.¹³⁰ The same year was essential also in Hungary, although the proper Rubicon was not yet crossed. In this sense Kekkonen's death in 1986 – he had resigned in 1981 – finally closed an epoch in Finland, whilst Kádár's burial less than three years later belonged already to a new era. Finally, Finland was the last 'most eastern country of the West' to become a member of the Council of Europe in 1989. Hungary, 'the most western country of the East', was the next to join a year later.

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