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Intentions and perspectives in the social forms of language use*

Abstract

The present paper aims to analyse, on the one hand, how speakers can realize their intentions through their perspectives and what perspectives speakers intend to develop in their partners of verbal interactions in the social forms of language use, and, on the other hand, how partners can infer the speakers' intentions evaluating and taking their perspectives. The paper also attempts to show that the success of social forms of language use seems to be partly predicted by the extent to which speakers' and partners' perspectives coincide or differ from each other.

Keywords: social forms of language use, intentions, perspectives, perspective taking, intentional viewpoint, egocentrism

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and motivation of the paper

Although in the study of language use the main focus is devoted to the investigation of verbal communication, it is not the only form of language use. There are various other forms including the use of language to inform, manipulate, think, memorize, learn, play, sing for fun, etc., as has been exemplified and argued for in some grammatical and pragmatics tradition (cf. Bierwisch 1980, Chomsky 1977, Kasher 1986, 1991, Nida 1990, Németh T. 2004, 2008). The forms of language use can be differentiated according to their social characteristics. In the social forms of language use the language user performs utterances aimed at other persons, while in non-social, i.e. individual, forms of language use – such as using language to think, memorize, learn, and sing for fun under the shower – the performance of utterances is not addressed to other persons. The social and individual forms of language use can be culturally different.

Investigating social forms of language use, in my previous work (Németh T. 2008), I made an explicit distinction between informative, communicative and manipulative uses of language on the basis of intentions assigned to the language users. Speakers' intentions cannot be identified directly by the partners (or by researchers). The latter need to take into account

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various linguistic and non-linguistic clues to infer speakers' intentions and decide what kind of language use speakers are involved in. These clues include both speakers' and hearers' perspectives.

1.2 Aims

In the present paper I have three goals. First, I aim to analyse how speakers can realize their intentions through their perspectives, and what perspectives speakers intend to foster in their partners of verbal interactions in social forms of language use. Second, I want to examine how partners can infer speakers' intentions by evaluating and taking speakers' perspectives on the basis of the indicators provided by the speakers and according to their own perspectives. And third, I want to shed some light on whether the success of social forms of language use can be predicted on the basis of the extent to which the speakers' and hearers' perspectives coincide or differ from each other.

1.3 The organization of the paper

The organization of my paper is as follows. First, I will briefly refer to my previous results on the relationship between speakers' intentions and successful social forms of language use. Then, I will investigate the role of speakers' and hearers' perspectives. I will concentrate on the relationship between intentions and perspectives assuming an intentional viewpoint inside the speakers' and hearers' perspectives in addition to the spatial, temporal, social and other viewpoints. In this part of my paper, I will also show, on the one hand, how a harmonization of coincidence of speakers' and hearers' perspectives can lead to successful verbal communication and information transmission as well as unsuccessful manipulation, and, on the other hand, how differences between speakers' and hearers' perspectives can yield unsuccessful forms of communicative language use as well as successful informative and manipulative language use. Finally, I will summarize my results.

2 The role of intentions in distinguishing between social forms of language use

While communication is a central research topic for several disciplines which aim to study language use, the term *communication* is very often left unreflected on, therefore, it is reasonable to start out from a clear notion of communication. If we can define communication, the definition can serve as a basis for checking particular forms of language use, whether they can be considered communication or not. If a particular form of language use fits this definition, it should be evaluated as communication, but if a particular form of language use does not, it cannot be accounted for as communication. We should further investigate these latter non-communicative forms of language use, what they are, what characteristic features they have, and how they can be explained.

One of the traditions in philosophical and, later, cognitive pragmatics attempts to define communication according to the speakers' intentions. The success of communication in this tradition is guaranteed if the speakers' intentions are fulfilled, i.e. hearers recognize them. Let us start out from Sperber and Wilson's definition of ostensive-inferential communication.

- (1) “the communicator produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions $\{I\}$ ” (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 63).

Two intentions are involved in this definition, namely, the informative and communicative ones. The content of the informative intention is to inform the communicative partner about a set of assumptions $\{I\}$, while the content of communicative intention is to make mutually manifest the communicator’s informative intention. The communicator aims to achieve her/his goals in communication by her/his ostensive behaviour. Ostensive behaviour is a behaviour which makes an intention mutually manifest in order to make something manifest (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 49). There are two layers of ostension in communication. The first layer of ostension shows the content of the informative intention, while the second layer of ostensive behaviour makes it mutually manifest that the communicator has an informative intention (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 54-63). Observing communicators’ ostension, communicative partners make inferences concerning the communicators’ intentions and process the intended information.

One can think that in Sperber and Wilson’s opinion communication is always intentional. However, this is not the case. Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 63-64) emphasize that their definition does not exclude the possibility of unintentional communication. A stimulus merely intended to inform might make mutually manifest the informative intention, and this, in accordance with their definition, would count as communication. Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 64) do not refuse to call this a case of unintended ostensive-inferential communication, and they do not consider it necessary to modify their definition in this regard. However, on the basis of their conception of ostension as well as informative and communicative intentions (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 49-63), intentionality should be a defining feature of communication. If a speaker does not have a communicative intention, i.e. an intention to make mutually manifest her/his informative intention, the stimulus is only intended to convey some pieces of information. In such a situation, the speaker has only an intention to inform. Of course, this informative intention is manifest to the speaker. If in a situation the speaker’s informative intention becomes also manifest to the hearer, since s/he realizes it independently of the speaker’s intention, this case can hardly be evaluated as communication – despite the mutual manifestness – because of the lack of the speaker’s communicative intention. It must be emphasized that human communication is always intentional and informative, and communicative intentions are always involved in it. Thus, the definition of ostensive-inferential communication must be modified slightly:

- (2) The modified definition of communication: the communicator produces a stimulus by which the communicator makes it mutually manifest to herself/himself and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions $\{I\}$ (Németh T. 2013).

According to the intentions a speaker may have, various forms of language use can be differentiated. In communication the communicator has both informative and communicative intentions toward her/his partner. In information transmission the speaker has only an informative intention toward a person. In manipulative information transmission the speaker

has an informative intention and a manipulative intention toward a person. If a speaker has a manipulative intention, s/he attempts to hide the intention to influence the partner and/or some pieces of information. In manipulative communication the communicator has a manipulative intention in addition to her/his informative and communicative intentions toward her/his partner. It must be highlighted that the various combinations of intentions result in various forms of language use. Moreover, with one and the same utterance, the speaker can perform different forms of language use toward the different participants in the situation.

As to the success of these forms of language use, we can say that verbal communication is successful if the hearer recognizes the speaker's informative intention and processes all pieces of information conveyed explicitly and implicitly by the speaker. In successful verbal information transmission the hearer processes all pieces of information conveyed explicitly and implicitly by the speaker. It can happen that the hearer also recognizes the speaker's informative intention, but this case cannot be evaluated as successful communication because the speaker does not have communicative intention, i.e. the necessary conditions for successful communication do not hold. In successful manipulation the speaker's manipulative intention is not recognized by the hearer. If manipulative information transmission is successful, the hearer must process all pieces of information, conveyed both explicitly and implicitly by the speaker without recognizing the speaker's influencing intention. In successful manipulative communication, the hearer recognizes the speaker's informative intention and processes all pieces of information conveyed explicitly and implicitly by the speaker but does not recognize the speaker's influencing intention.

3 Perspectives in various forms of language use

3.1 On the notion of perspective

Recently, the notions of perspective and point of view (viewpoint) have become one of the most discussed topics, among others, in the field of narratology, cognitive linguistics, discourse analysis, formal semantics as well as in developmental and social psycholinguistics (cf. e.g. Sanders & Redeker 1996, Sanders & Spooren 1997, Predelly 2005, Keysar 2007, Epley 2008, Niederhoff 2011, Bezuidenhout 2013). There are various interpretations of perspective and point of view which either make a distinction between these concepts or handle them as synonyms. For example, some cognitive linguistic approaches differentiate these concepts. The distinction between them lies in whom the informational content of the speaker's utterance is assigned to. If the speaker is the subject who is responsible for the informational content of the utterance, the term *point of view* is used. People in social forms of language use can take their partners' perspectives, and this perspective taking is often called perspectivization or shift of point of view. The other persons' perspectives can be established explicitly and implicitly by means of various linguistic and non-linguistic elements in the speaker's utterance. Sanders and Spooren (1997: 89-91) as well as MacWinney (2005) provide a range of examples for perspectivization from the most explicit expression of another person's perspective by direct quotation to implicit establishing of a person's perspective by representing her/him as an active subject of consciousness without representing her/his inner or spoken discourse. Let us consider the conversation in (3), which takes place in the following situation: on a Saturday morning the father is talking to his children in their room

while the mother is preparing breakfast in the kitchen. The father and the children are planning the day, and the children enumerate what they want to do.

- (3) Father: Kids, what do you want to eat for lunch today?
 Daughter: Fish soup would be OK, Daddy, as Mum said yesterday.
 Son: If we also have pancakes.

The mother in the kitchen can hear the father's utterance and create a representation, furthermore, she can also report on what she heard creating a new actual speaker who is identical with the father whose utterance is embedded in her utterance. Consider (4).

- (4) Father asked: "Kids, what do you want to eat for lunch today?"

It is worth noting that in the mother's report on what she heard there is another perspective taken by her, namely, that of her kids. When the mother starts her utterance with the noun *father*, she introduces the man who asked the question *Kids, what would you like to eat for lunch today?* in (4) as the father but evidently he is not her father, instead he is her husband and her children's father. Naming the man in (4) as father means that the mother has taken the children's perspective. If "world creating" predicates such as verbs of utterance (e.g. *tell, say, ask, answer*) and cognition (e.g. *think, believe, like, understand*) occur in utterances, a perspective is created, since speech, thoughts, beliefs, and perceptions, etc. are attributed to a subject other than the speaker (Sanders & Spooren 1997: 89). In (4) the mother uses such a predicate (*said*) and after that a direct quotation, explicitly indicating the father's perspective. In (5) the mother also uses a world creating mental predicate, but she does not express explicitly her son's utterance as she did in (4) with her husband's, instead she implicitly creates a perspective by using the mental state predicate *like*, by which she attributes a feeling to her son.

- (5) My son likes pancakes.

In psycholinguistics, developmental and social psychology the terms *perspective* and *point of view* are not differentiated. The idea that people's perceptions of the physical as well as social world can occasionally differ from the perceptions of others since they are perspective bound is supported by various experiments and analyses (cf. e.g. Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich 2004, Epley, Morewedge, and Keysar 2004, Semin 2000, Maass 1999). People are aware of this perspectiveness, they can recognize that their impressions, evaluations, arguments, assessments, storytelling, etc. can be influenced, for instance, by their idiosyncratic associations, expectations, stereotypes, and motivations which are involved in their egocentric perspectives (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich 2004, Keysar 2007). At the same time, since people are social-cognitive beings, they are able to take perspectives of their partners in social interactions (Tomasello 1999), and they are also capable of representing and expressing their partners' perspectives in their utterances by means of various linguistic elements and other ostensive stimuli. However, it is worth noting that people cannot usually set aside entirely their own perspective when they take others' perspectives, because perspective taking can also happen only through an initial, individual perspective which is altered by taking other people's perspectives.

The cognitively oriented accounts of perspective taking in communication can be classified into two opposing approach types. Bezuidenhout (2013) discusses them in detail, associating them with two different conceptions of communication. First conception regards

communication as individual-centred and focuses on narrow time slices of conversations, sometimes just a single utterance. The other conception is multi-agent-centred and focuses on a wide range of conversational turn takings, sometimes even a whole conversation. Individualistic approaches to perspective taking suggest that both the speakers and listeners automatically and subconsciously use their own anchored egocentric perspective in communication as a starting point, and in a second phase they subsequently, serially, and effortfully account for differences between their own and others' perspectives until a plausible estimate is reached (cf. e.g. Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich 2004, Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar 2004, Keysar 2007). In contrast, non-individualistic theories emphasize the cooperative nature of communication and consider speakers and hearers not-egocentric (cf. e.g. Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson, & Tanenhaus 2008, Heller, Grodner, & Tanenhaus 2008, Bezuidenhout 2013). These latter studies assume that common ground information is used from the very beginning of the production and comprehension processes, from which it follows that perspective taking occurs from the very first moments of conversations.

Since participants in communicative interactions are individuals and social beings simultaneously, there are important points in both opposing approaches. Direct human perceptions such as vision, hearing, and touch are always individual, egocentric processes which can differ from others' perceptions, sometimes in very fundamental ways (Epley 2008: 1458) and it is the same with mental phenomena such as knowledge, intentions, attitudes, and emotions. However, in spite of individual differences, direct perceptions and various mental phenomena should have relevant common properties between people as well. Perception systems and mechanisms as well as mental phenomena and procedures are embodied in very similar ways into very similar bodies and brains. In other words, cognition is grounded in the human body (MacWhinney 2005). The bodies and brains of human beings operate very similarly, therefore, people cannot perceive the physical world in an arbitrary way, and there must be a common ground for cognition. The egocentrism of speakers and hearers in communication is not so egocentric, on the one hand, because of the biological and physical embodiment, and, on the other hand, because social aspects in communicative interactions also decrease the egocentric character of perspective. At the same time, perspective taking, which, by definition, has a social character, has egocentric properties as well. Thus, in a plausible account of communication both egocentric and social phenomena must be assumed in the case of having a perspective and perspective taking.

3.2 Relationship between intentions and perspectives in language use

In the remaining part of my paper, I will use the terms *perspective* and *point of view* as synonyms and define them as an egocentric mental position of a language user which is grounded in her/his individual brain. In social forms of language use such as communication, information transmission without communicative intention, and manipulation, speakers and listeners should take into account their partner's perspective altering their own starting egocentric perspective. This is the phenomenon of perspective taking which can be captured in utterances and other accompanying ostensive stimuli performed by actual speakers. For example, saying the utterance in (5), the mother expresses her son's perspective attributing him the feeling that he likes pancakes, and, at the same time, she also takes her son's perspective. Hearing her son's utterance *If we also have pancakes* in (3) and relying on her previous experience regarding her son's favourite food, the mother can say the utterance in (5). Furthermore, the mother can also infer her son's implicit wish that he wants to eat

pancakes and an implicit indirect request that he wants his mother to make them. If the mother does not take her son's perspective, she may infer her son's wish that he would like to eat pancakes, but she would not infer her son's indirect request. To infer this indirect request as conversational implicature, the mother needs to situate herself in her son's mental position which involves the pieces of information that (i) 'I like mother's pancakes much more than father's', (ii) 'it is enough to express my wish by an exclamative utterance', and (iii) 'mother will know that she should make pancakes'. If the mother does not take her son's perspective, she may think that her son's indirect request is addressed to her husband, who is also involved as a participant in the conversation in (3). It is obvious from this analysis that to infer someone's intention, it is necessary to take her/his perspective.

A perspective or point of view is a complex mental position which is basically formulated from two kinds of information in particular situations of language use. The first information package in perspective contains all the pieces of information which are empirically accessed by language users in a situation by means of various forms of perception. These pieces of information concern the elements of the directly observable physical and social environment such as time, space, different kinds of participants, and social relations. According to the observable categories spatial, temporal, and social viewpoints can be assumed within one's perspective. The different viewpoints have various linguistic indicators. In many approaches the linguistic indicators of spatial, temporal, and social viewpoints are treated under the label of deixis, which is conceived as the relationship between language and context in language use. Traditional categories of deixis such as person encoding of the role of participants in the speech event, time and place as well as additional categories such as social deixis (cf. various kinds of honorifics) and discourse deixis are usually organized in an egocentric way (Levinson 1983: 54-68). Let us consider one of Levinson's (1983: 72) examples for person deixis, in which a mother says the utterance in (6) to her husband in the presence of little Billie:

(6) Can Billie have an ice-cream, Daddy?

The mother communicates with her husband: her utterance in (6) is addressed to her husband who is Billie's father, and since Billie is also present in the speech situation, the mother takes his social point of view and uses *Daddy* for the purpose of vocative selection. Perspective taking is mirrored in the category of person deixis. If the mother behaves in this communicative interaction only egocentrically, based on her own social viewpoint, she should say something like (7), ignoring Billie's presence:

(7) Can Billie have an ice-cream, Darling?

The other part of information in one's perspective includes her/his mental states such as representations of previous experience, background knowledge, emotions, and attitudes, etc. The analyses of (6) and (7) reveal that social viewpoint, which can be expressed by means of linguistic elements of social deixis, is also a complex position which is formed not only from information originating in perceptions, but also from general and particular background knowledge concerning family relations.

Let us modify Levinson's example and imagine a situation in which the father has punished little Billie for his unacceptable behaviour and forbade him to have ice cream. In such a situation the father starts eating ice cream and little Billie, who would also like to eat ice-cream, does not want to ask his father to let him have it. The mother who does not know

anything about the punishment enters the room and realizes that the father is eating ice-cream while little Billie is watching his father ravenously. On the basis of her visual perception and her previous background knowledge that little Billie loves ice-cream, the mother takes the perspective about which she thinks that it is Billie's perspective and guided by which she addresses an indirect request to the father to give Billie ice-cream. The mother's perspective taking is guided by her empirical observation of the situation and her background knowledge about her son's habits and favourite sweets as well as her intention to help Billie. From this adopted perspective, the mother assumes that Billie has an intention to ask his father to give him ice-cream, but he does not dare to perform the request for some reason. Let us notice that both the mother's initial perspective and the perspective which she takes (believing that it is her son's perspective) include various intentions. For example, the mother can infer from the above mentioned pieces of information that Billie would like to eat ice-cream and since to eat ice-cream in this situation is only possible if Billie performs the communicative act of asking his father to give him ice-cream and because according to the mother's assumption Billie does not dare and/or does not want to ask for ice-cream, the mother herself performs the indirect request in (6) instead of Billie.

From this analysis it can be concluded that intentions are also perspectival, and it is reasonable to assume an intentional viewpoint within one's perspective similarly to assuming a temporal, spatial, and social viewpoints. To have intentions is only possible within a particular perspective, and to infer someone's intentions is only possible if we take her/his perspective. Assuming such a relationship between perspectives and intentions has several advantages. For example, it can be used for a simple, clear differentiation of the categories of particularized conversational implicatures and other inferences drawn by the addressees.¹ In the case of particularized conversational implicatures the speaker in her/his perspective has an intention to implicate a piece of information for the addressee in addition to what is said, and, taking the speaker's perspective, the addressee is able to recognize the speaker's intention to imply a piece of information as well as infer the implied piece of information. If the addressee cannot take the speaker's perspective, s/he will not be able to recognize the speaker's intention to implicate something and will not be able to infer the intended implicature. In contrast, in the case of other inferences drawn by the addressee, the addressee infers a piece of information not intended by the speaker, either from her/his own egocentric perspective or from a perspective which s/he takes, believing that it is the partner's perspective. Similarly to this latter case, in the modified Levinson's example the mother can make an inference which is not intended by her son, therefore, the indirect request performed by the mother cannot be considered as a conversational implicature. Grice (1975) emphasizes that the Cooperative Principle and its maxims guide not only conversations but also all kinds of human cooperative behaviour. The mother misunderstands Billie's behaviour and evaluates it as a piece of cooperative behaviour, namely, as a silent request to help him to get ice-cream, thus the mother's utterance *Can Billie have an ice-cream, Daddy?* is a verbal continuation of a cooperation not intended by Billie.

Another advantage of the consideration of perspectival nature of intentions can be detected in distinguishing between the various forms of successful and unsuccessful forms of language use.

¹ The categories of particularized conversational implicatures and other inferences drawn by the addressees sometimes are not differentiated in the literature and both of them are regarded as pragmatic inferences.

3.3 Speaker's and hearer's perspectives and intentions in successful forms of verbal communication, information transmission and manipulation

Epley and his colleagues (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich 2004: 760) emphasize that in successful social interactions the partners should understand and accept that others may not interpret the world exactly in the same way as they do. Different previous experience, representations about the world, expectations, attitudes, motivations, emotions, and perceptions can lead people to very different interpretations and evaluations of the same event (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich 2004, Maass 1999, Semin 2000). If partners do not recognize these differences, the social interaction can fail. Verbal communication is one of the most salient types of social interactions. It can be successful if the communicative partner can take into account their partners' perspective and alter their egocentric perspective to the necessary extent, if communicative partners can formulate a shared perspective. MacWhinney (2005: 198) also considers perspective taking and shifting fundamental for successful communication. Communicators attempt to maximize the extent to which their partners can share their perceptions and ideas, providing them with clear clues about which perspectives they should assume, and how they should move from one perspective to the next (MacWhinney 2005: 198).

In successful verbal communication the communicator should have informative and communicative intentions toward her/his partner which are included in the intentional viewpoint of her/his perspective. In order to start a communicative interaction with a partner, potential communicators, first, should attract potential partners' attention by indicating that they have an informative intention which they want to make mutually manifest. Second, potential communicators also attempt to make manifest the content of their informative intentions, a set of assumptions $\{I\}$. Attracting the partners' attention and making an informational content manifest to them can happen simultaneously. By one and the same utterance a person can achieve these two goals. Let us slightly modify the situation and conversation in (3). Consider the modified version of the conversation in (8).

- (8) Father: Kids, what do you want to eat for lunch today?
 Daughter: Fish soup would be OK for both of us, Daddy, as Mum said yesterday.
 Son: If we also have pancakes.

Let us imagine that the father is cleaning the living room, the mother is in the kitchen, and the children are playing in their own room. Suddenly, it comes to the father's mind that he forgot to ask the children what they wanted to eat for lunch and to buy things for lunch according to the children's response. The father intends, first, to attract his children's attention with his sequence of sounds uttered so loudly that the children would be able to hear it, second, to indicate to them that this sequence of sounds is addressed to them by using the vocative form *Kids*. The use of the vocative form *Kids* achieves two further aims. On the one hand, it expresses the father's social viewpoint toward the two young human beings in the children's room, and, on the other hand, it expresses the father's intention to start a communicative interaction, i.e. the father's communicative intention to make his informative intention mutually manifest. Because of the loudness of the father's utterance as well as influence of the vocatives *Kids*, the daughter turns her attention to the father and, at the same time, she realizes that the father wants to start a communicative interaction by asking an information requesting question which is also a communicative act by itself. From these non-linguistic and linguistic clues the daughter can easily infer that her father intends to start a communicative interaction. Answering the father's

question, the daughter accepts the invitation to communicate. The daughter alters her initial perspective which she had before the father had uttered his question and takes her father's perspective realizing the father's informative and communicative intentions and agreeing to communicate. The father's and daughter's intentional viewpoints regarding the interaction between them coincide, and, therefore, the communication is successful. It is worth noting that their social viewpoints also coincide, since the daughter takes her father's perspective in connection with their social, more specifically, family relations.

In informative language use the speaker has only an informative intention. In order to convey a set of assumptions $\{I\}$, the speaker also wants to attract the attention of a person to be informed. Therefore, s/he should speak so loudly that this person could hear her/his utterance. Since the speaker does not have an intention to make mutually manifest her/his informative intention, s/he cannot use a vocative form or perform an information requesting question (for a more detailed analysis of differences between informative and communicative forms of language use, cf. Németh T. 2008). While in communication the speaker attempts to recover her/his informative intention by developing a perspective in the communicative partner that s/he has informative and communicative intentions, in informative language use the speaker does not have an intention to recover her/his informative intention and wants to create a perspective in the person to be informed, which does not contain information about her/his informative intention. The speaker wants that the person s/he would like to inform about something only realize the information itself and processes it. To put it the other way round, in informative language use the speaker does not want the person to be informed to take her/his perspective completely, since the speaker's intentional viewpoint includes her/his informative intention, but according to the speaker's intention, the person to be informed should not take a perspective in which the speaker has an informative intention, i.e. the speaker's and hearer's perspectives should not coincide fully.

Two cases are possible with regard to the interpretation of such kind of the speaker's behaviour. First, the person to be informed about a set of assumptions $\{I\}$ takes a perspective according to which s/he believes that s/he has received the information conveyed by the speaker by chance, and, second, s/he realizes that the speaker had an informative intention toward her/him, so s/he is informed not accidentally.² For instance, the son in (8) can think that his sister has answered the father's question on behalf of both of them, which is indicated in the utterance by using the phrase *for both of us*. Therefore, he may communicate his utterance about his wish that he would like to eat pancakes as well only to his sister. At the same time, he may also have an informative intention toward his father, thus he may utter his wish so loudly that the father can also hear it. The father can take three different perspectives hearing his son's utterance. First, he can believe that he has heard his son's utterance only by chance. Second, he can assume that the son has an informative intention toward him as well, and third, he can think that his son is also answering his question, i.e. the son communicates with him having informative and communicative intentions. In the first case, the father does not believe that his son has an informative intention toward him. Therefore, the son's and the father's intentional viewpoints differ from each other. In the second case, the father's and the son's intentional viewpoints coincide with regard to the son's informative intention. In the third case, according to his intentional viewpoint, the father assumes more intentions for his

² This latter case is considered a covert or unintentional type of communication by Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995: 63-64). However, as has been argued in Section 2.1, this type of language use cannot be accounted for as communication because of the lack of communicative intention.

son than he really has, consequently, the father's and son's perspectives do not coincide. The son's informative language use can be successful in all three cases if the father is able to process the information intended by the son. For successful verbal information transmission without communicative intention, it is sufficient if the person to be informed processes the information in the way intended by the speaker. If the person in question recognizes the speaker's informative intention or s/he assumes informative and communicative intentions for the speaker, this does not decrease the success of information transmission. On the contrary, the supposition of informative and communicative intentions may increase the success of information transmission (Németh T. 2008). One may ask if the assumption of informative and communicative intentions increases the success of information transmission why speakers apply informative language use without communicative intention. The answer to this question is that the processing of an intended piece of information without an intention to make this intention mutually manifest sometimes can be more effective than processing of a piece of information with an intention to be mutually manifest. It can happen that taking the perspective according to which the speaker does not have an informative intention, the person to be informed thinks that s/he is not intended to be influenced in any way, therefore the processed information can be considered more reliable for her/him. If the father interprets his son's utterance accidentally, he cannot attribute any hidden intention to his son, e.g., he cannot think that his son wants him to ask the mother to make pancakes as well.

Now, let us imagine that the son in (8) addresses his utterance with informative and communicative intentions toward his sister, with informative intention toward his father, and with informative and manipulative intentions toward his mother. The son performs three kinds of language use by one and the same utterance. As we have seen above, toward his sister the son performs a verbal communicative act and toward the father an informative act. Toward the mother the son performs a manipulative act through information transmission. The son's intentional viewpoint includes all these three intentions and various combinations of them. In order to achieve successful forms of language use, the family members should take perspectives intended by the son. For successful communication the sister is intended to take a perspective according to which her brother has informative and communicative intentions, that is they should share a perspective regarding these two intentions. For successful information transmission without communicative intention toward the father, the son wants his father to take a perspective which does not contain a piece of information about his informative intention. For successful manipulation through information transmission, the son attempts to create in his mother a perspective which is similar to the one he wants his father to take, i.e. the mother should believe that she accidentally hears her son's utterance, and, therefore, as a good mother, she will happily be willing to make pancakes as well. However, while recognition of the son's informative intention does not decrease the success of information transmission, the recognition of the son's manipulative intention can yield unsuccessful manipulation. Therefore, in manipulative information transmission the son's and his mother's perspectives should not coincide, the mother's intentional viewpoint should not share the son's manipulative intention.

Let us change the situation in (8) again and imagine that the son also has a manipulative intention toward his sister, in addition to his informative and communicative intentions, he would like to influence his sister to get their mother to make pancakes as well, that is the son performs manipulation through verbal communication. Similarly to the manipulative information transmission, manipulative communication can be successful if the communicator's manipulative intention is not recognized by the partner. Consequently, in

successful manipulative communication the intentional viewpoints of the communicator and her/his partner should not share the communicator's manipulative intention.

To summarize: in successful communication the communicator and her/his partner should share a perspective regarding the communicator's informative and communicative intentions, in successful information transmission there is no need for the hearer's taking the speaker's perspective concerning the speaker's informative intention, in successful manipulative information transmission the speaker's and hearer's perspective must be different with regard to the intentional viewpoints, and finally, in manipulative communication the speaker and the hearer should share their intentional viewpoints to some extent, namely, the hearer should take the speaker's perspective including the speaker's informative and communicative intentions, but the speaker's manipulative intention should not be shared by the hearer.

4 Summary

In the present paper I have investigated the role of perspective and perspective taking in various forms of language use. After a theoretically based discussion of distinguishing between verbal communication, verbal information transmission without communicative intention, and verbal manipulation, I have examined conceptions of perspective. I have defined perspective in language use as a complex, initially egocentric mental position of a person grounded in her/his individual brain. This initial egocentric perspective of a language user includes pieces of information from her/his particular perceptions as well as previous mental states, background knowledge, emotions, attitudes, intentions, etc. In social forms of language use, language users can alter their egocentric perspectives and share their partners' perspectives. Therefore, in communicative, informative, and manipulative forms of language use both egocentric and social phenomena must be assumed. I have also argued that within the perspective it is useful to assume an intentional viewpoint as the speakers' intentions and hearers' recognition of the speakers' intentions are perspectival. I have systematically analysed by means of the modification of the examples, which can be considered a kind of thought experience, how speakers can realize their intentions through their perspectives and what perspectives speakers intend to create in their partners of verbal interactions in informative, communicative, and manipulative forms of language use as well as how partners in verbal interactions of these social forms of language use can infer the speakers' intentions evaluating and taking speakers' perspectives on the basis of indicators provided by speakers and according to their own perspectives. Relying on the results of cognitive linguistics and methods of philosophical pragmatics, the new kind of analyses presented in the paper has shown that by assumption of an intentional viewpoint within perspectives of language users, that is perspectivization of the intentions of the language users, results in a more adequate account of the social forms of language use. The success of informative, communicative and manipulative forms of language use seems to be partly predicted depending on the extent to which the speakers' and hearers' perspectives, which are linguistically and non-linguistically indicated by various clues, coincide or differ from each other.

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