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Regional Identities and Meso-mega Area Dynamics in Slavic Eurasia: Focused on Eastern Europe

The mega area of the northern half of Eurasia, the former Soviet Union and the East European regions, has changed its face dramatically since the collapse of the communist regimes. Four states in the area, USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and GDR, disappeared, and altogether 27 states came into existence. The number would be thirty or more, when including Transnistria (Pridniestr), Abkhazia, Kosovo, and so on, which are not yet recognized as independent states. Following these changes, post-communist regional cognitions are almost chaotic.[1] Research institutes have not yet created any common naming for the area and its regions.[2] Rather, they have changed the definitions from time to time; initially there was a trend to divide the area into regions to be analyzed separately,[3] and recently re-unification of the divided units with a new name, Eurasia, is the fashion. What are the connotations of Eurasia? The answers are again chaotic, because, for one thing, Eurasia greatly deviates from the common understanding, that is, Asia and Europe as the whole continent. Even if we understood it as an academic jargon – namely, Eurasia relates only to the post-communist countries – its coverage is quite different among users.

1 "… regional studies are challenged by a lack of precise definition as thematic strive to overcome geography. What are the components of a region or regional studies? … Who are we?" quoted from Maria Carlson: Old Battles, New Challenges. *Newsnet: News of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies*, Vol. 43, Nr. 5, 2003. 2.

2 The cover story of the first issue of *Europe-Asia Studies*, "From Soviet Studies to Europe-Asia Studies" reflects well the difficulty how to name the post-communist domains meaningfully; *Europe-Asia Studies,* Nr. 1, 1993. 3–6; George J. Damko and Matthew J. Sagars: Post-Soviet Geography. *Post-Soviet Geography,* Vol. 33, Nr. 1, 1992. 1–3.

3 Kimitaka Matsuzato: Chuikiken no gainen nitsuite [On the Concept of Meso-areas] http://src-home.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/research-e.html

A symbolic example is *Eurasian Geography and Economics,* an academic journal, whose former names were *Post-soviet Geography* till 2002 and *Soviet Geography* till 1992. This journal now "features … geographic and economic issues in the republics of the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and the socialist countries in Asia." The other end of the usage-scale, that is, the narrowest definition of Eurasia, may be the "Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre" at St Antony's College, the University of Oxford, formerly the Russian and East European Centre till July 2003. The center says in its circulation letter: "After covering Eastern Europe for more than a decade of post-communist transition, we decided that the region's 'migration' to Europe was so advanced that it should also migrate within the College and come under the European Studies Centre. We shall continue to concentrate on Russia and move to develop our research on Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The new name of the Centre was chosen to convey this geographical coverage, not in any way to signal 'Eurasianist' leanings!"

Compared with these flexible and 'geographical' ways of regional perceptions of the mega area, the 'disciplinary' naming of the area seems rather chronological and stiff. Specifically, the new nations and states in the area, though more than ten years have passed since the systemic changes happened, are still called 'transition' economies or 'post-communist' countries. Though this naming does not help us to perceive and describe the diversity within the area, it clearly suggests the common heritage of the area from the communist past. Indeed, for many cases we could not draw any closer pictures of the emerging political and economic institutions and the behaviors or value systems in the area without taking into consideration the communist legacies.[4] Besides, the peoples in the area still share an identity based on common experiences in the communist era. This is the reason why the peoples still use "we" when identifying themselves with the former communist camp as a whole even nowadays. We call this bond with the common past of the mega area as the *institutional identity*. So the institutional identity is, more or less,

[4] See, for example, Kimitaka Matsuzato: From Communist Boss Politics to Post-Communist Casiquismo: the Meso-elite and Meso-governments in Post-Communist Countries. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 34, 2001. 175–201, and his other related papers; James Toole: Straddling the East-West divide; Party organization and communist legacies in East Central Europe. *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol 55, Nr. 1, 2003; Osamu Ieda (ed.): *Transformation and Diversification of Rural Societies in Eastern Europe and Russia.* Sapporo, 2002; Osamu Ieda (ed.): *The New Structure of the Rural Economy in Post-Communist Countries.* Sapporo, 2001; Osamu Ieda (ed.): *The Emerging Local Governments in Eastern Europe and Russia, Historical and Post-Communist Developments.* Hiroshima, 2000.

based on reality. In this context, the terms, 'transition' and 'post-communist', are still useful. However, the 'disciplinary' naming is not sufficient for us, because the diversity within the mega area has developed more and more clearly. Thus we have to consider not only "the region's 'migration'" but also the regions' 'migration', or *emerging meso-areas* in our terminology. The 'disciplinary' naming can suggest only a set of possibilities in post-communist development; that is, market economy and parliamentary democracy. In reality, various regions or sub-regions came into existence in the mega area, such as Central Asia, Caucasia, South Eastern Europe, Central Eastern Europe, Russian Far East, Eastern and Western Siberia. So far, we have no systematic frames how to categorize and analyze these regions and Eurasia.[5] Instead, the borders of the former states and republics still function for grouping the regions, such as the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Baltic and CIS countries, or East Central Europe and the Balkans.

The purpose of this paper is to create concretely a new methodological terminology to analyze the emerging regions, or meso-areas; changing regions both in regional perceptions and in political and economic institutions. Our main object to be interpreted by the new terminology is the post-communist meso-areas emerging in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, or the *Slavic Eurasian Mega-area* in our geographical definition. The

[5] Katharine Verdery's "regionalization" likely suggests a trend of regions' migration. See Katharine Verdery: Post-Soviet Area Studies? *Newsnet: News of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies,* Vol. 43, Nr. 5, 2003. 7–8.

mega-area is a changing unit, whose regions have shared the Soviet type of political and economic institutions, and an identity as well in its active and passive senses. The mega-area is, though the communist regime collapsed, still a unit combining meso-areas on the basis of institutional identity, and it likely remains a unit, though it may be looser and looser in the future. At the same time, we aim to review the current regional divisions based on the state borders from a new perspective of meso-areas. We aim also to temper the new terminology so that the terminology of meso-and mega-areas would help us to understand better any areas and regions in the world which are changing their identities under regional or global integration.[6]

In this paper, firstly, we will define the key concept, meso-areas, by regional integration, institutional identity, self-identity, and external identity. Then, in the second half of the paper, we try to generalize the notions of meso-and mega-area. The notions were initially invented in order to understand systematically the changing and reorganized Slavic Eurasia, but, supposing that the notions could be useful beyond the area, we formulate the dynamics of meso-and mega-areas in a general setting. Finally, synthesizing the notions, we find that they could de-and re-construct the modern unilateral perspectives of the world regions.

MESO- AND MEGA-AREAS IN SLAVIC EURASIA

Institutional identity and regional dis- and re-integration

A meso-area is a changing part of a mega-area in its regional perceptions and institutions. This change happens when the mega-area diminishes its centripetal forces and/or is challenged by an external momentum, such as an economic-political integration by a neighboring region, a cultural influence, an economic expansion, or an impact of globalization. A meso-area is, therefore, a product of the relatively weakening mega-area. At the same time, it premises that the mega-area still sustains the centripetal force sufficiently enough to keep the meso-areas under its visible or invisible hands. In other words, meso-areas stand on the balance between the centripetal force of the Mega-area and the external momentum.

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6 See Mie Ooba: Kyokai-kokka to tiiki no jiku ron [Border States and Spatial Definition of Areas] *Leviathan,* Vol. 26, 2000. 99–131. This essay tries to conceptualize the changing identities of some countries (Japan and Australia) under the pressures of regional-global integration in the Asian-Pacific area.

The centripetal force on a meso-area is embodied by factors such as political and economic institutions, experiences, pattern of behaviors, and ecosystems. These are the *institutional identity of the meso-area,* which is shared by the other meso-areas in the same mega-area. We can call this identity as *Sein*. In contrast to this, a common external momentum functions as *Sollen* in a meso-area. For example, in the case of the relations between the East European meso-area and Western Europe, the EU norms, *Acquis Communautaire*, are *Sollen* for the candidate countries to accept and to implement in order to be members of the EU. The set of market economy and parliamentary democracy is also a norm, but is not a specific Sollen to EU membership. It is a general *Sollen* in the global integration.

The East European Meso-area, although mentioned often here and in the following as an example, is not regarded as typical. It is rather a unique case, where dis-and re-integration is carried very systematically and comprehensively. The reason why the region is taken for our examples is that it would clearly show us an intensive and condensed course of meso-area formation. The European integration, additionally, seems very social, compared to other dis-and re-integrations in Slavic Eurasia, namely, the East Asian integration toward the Siberia and Russian Far-East Meso-area is restricted to the economy, and as for Central Eurasia (Central Asia, Caucasia, and a part of the southern Russian Federation), the external momenta are individual and multiple, for example, Islamic, South Asian, and Chinese factors are mixed in this meso-area. Other meso-areas may be supposed according to the meso-area formulation presented later in this paper.

A meso-area is a field where the momenta of the two different dimensions, *Sein* and *Sollen* meet and interact with each other, and this meeting and interacting provides dynamism to the meso-area. Due to the dynamism, the meso-area's spatial borders are variable. For instance, again the East European Meso-area under the integration pressure of Western Europe is the case. The eight countries – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia – will have full membership of the EU in May 2004. Then the second candidate group consisting of Romania and Bulgaria may become member countries in the near or medium future, and potentially Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, and even Ukraine, Belarus[7] and Moldova can be candi-

[7] See Uladzimer Rouda: "The Reserves of the Policy of Soviet Populism in Modern Belarus" presented at the international symposium "Emerging Meso-areas in the Former Socialist Countries: Histories Revived or Improvised?" held from 28–31 January 2004 at

dates of EU membership in the distant future. Moreover, we have no definite reasons to eliminate possibilities for Caucasian countries to enter the EU in the more distant future, though Russia will less likely realize its membership of the EU. In any case, the essential point here is that the reach of EU integration pressure and the people's will for EU membership – a new regional self-identity as *Sollen* – is changeable and flexible. Actually the pressure and the self-identity are interactive. As a consequence, the East European Meso-area is elastic enough to change its borders, and thus the meso-area is not necessarily identical to the current candidate countries for EU membership. A meso-area is applicable for this kind of flexible unit that may vary its shape in accordance with the changing identities. *Sollen* is a will of human beings, without which no new regional identities could be evoked, and is reflected in self-and external regional identities. Therefore, meso-areas inseparably relate to cognition of the peoples in the concerned regions.

Regional self-cognition

As seen above, meso-areas are a regional notion to be defined substantially (that is, institutional identities) on the one hand, and also a perceptional notion to be identified by the peoples in the related regions, especially including the neighboring peoples (that is, *perceptional identities*). Therefore, essential for a meso-area is how the people recognize their own region firstly (*self-identity*), then, secondly, how its external or neighboring regions recognize it (*external identity*).[8] The peoples in Eastern Europe, for example, changed their regional self-perception from "Eastern Europe" to "Central Europe" at the beginning of the systemic changes.[9] Their "Central Europe" is not one that really existed in history, such as the Mitteleuropa of Nazi Ger-

SRC, Hokkaido University. This Belarusian author suggests EU as "the third way for a more suitable" alternative than the union with Russia.

8 Asian studies, especially Southeast Asian Studies in Japan have had many surveys and theoretical essays on regional identities from the perspective of cognition, including regional self-cognitions; for example, Toru Yano (ed.): *Tonan Azia gaku no shuho* [Methodology of Southeast Asian Studies] *Series of Southeast Asian Studies*, Nr. 1, Tokyo, 1990, including Toru Yano, "Chiikizo wo motomete: soto bunmei to uchi sekai [Quest for New Images of Areas: External Civilization and Internal World]" 1–30; T. Hamashita and N. Karashima (eds.): *Tiikishi toha nanika* [What Is Regional History]. Tokyo, 1997, including the editors, "'Chiiki no sekaishi' no shiten to houhou [Perspectives and Methodology for the 'World History of Regions']," and T. Hamashita: "Rekishi kenkyu to chiiki kenkyu [Historical Studies and Area Studies]." Nevertheless, few works have been done, relating the interactions among various perceptions on regional identities.

9 See Timothy G. Ash: Does Central Europe Exist? and other essays in *The Use of Adversity, Essays on the Fate of Central Europe.* New York, 1990. 179–213.

Triadic Dynamics of Regional Definition: Deviation, Interaction and Amalgamation Field (Meso-area) and cognition (Identity)



many in the Inter-war period or the Habsburg Empire before WWI. The post-communist Central Europe was, first of all, a statement that they rejected "Eastern Europe" as it had been inseparable from the socialist experience. Instead, the people wanted to be Europeans, or West Europeans. "Return to Europe" was their pronouncement at that time. However, the new self-cognition, 'Central', implied another clear self-understanding, that is, that they were not yet full members of Europe due to the institutional identity. Thus the Central European identity reflected their perceptional location, which was neither Eastern nor Western; precisely speaking, no more Eastern, but not yet Western.[10] 'Central Europe' is typically a meso-area self-identity, constructed by the relations between the past and current reality (institutional identities) and the future belonging *to be* realized (perceptional identities).

'Central European identity,' replacing the former identity of Eastern Europe in the initial stage of the post-communist era, was widely accepted among the peoples in Eastern Europe and in some parts of the former Soviet Union as well. However, its substantial uniformity became very suspicious in the following stages of post-communist development, because the region began to experience different courses inside. For instance, ways of nation-building, manners of response to the systemic changes, membership of

10 Gusztáv Molnár: The Geopolitics of EU-Enlargement. *Foreign Policy Review,* Nr. 1, 2002. 39–45.

European integration such as NATO and EU were different from each other's. A considerable change could happen in the political and economic institutions. As a result, Central European identity was challenged both internally and externally. Consequently, divided perceptions began to shape according to the institutional realities; for example, "Central East European Countries (CEECs)" related to those countries which have adjusted themselves in a good student manner for adaptation of the EU norms. Some other countries, however, which were regarded as problematic students in their Europeanization or EU-nization, were labeled as South East Europeans – a sophisticated name for the Balkans – or under-developed reformist countries – those CIS countries whose systemic transformation was going on but very slowly or stagnantly, such as Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova.[11] Central Europe, after all, became less useful as the common name for the regional identity of "No more Eastern but not yet Western".

The post-communist East European Meso-area identified itself as 'Central Europe' at the initial stage of the post-communist developments, then given various sorts of self-or external naming in accordance with the changing perceptions, has fluctuated its geographical coverage between the two ends: Western Europe, the Sollen, and Eastern Europe, the Sein. Floating perception is a basic feature for meso-area identities, but "No more Eastern but not yet Western" remains as the common regional identity for the East European Meso-area. Other meso-areas share a floating type of regional identity between their specific Sollen and the common Sein of the mega-area. With this common ambivalent consciousness, the peoples throughout the mega-area still identify themselves collectively as "we".

A self-identity of a meso-area, therefore, has no strict correlations with the institutional reality. Thus the East European Meso-area may cover any post-communist countries, which not only will have EU membership in

[11] It seems very difficult to name and categorize – eventually analyze – these countries commonly. "The outsiders" is given for the post-Soviet countries, which have "no immediate prospect of membership of the EU", and "for the foreseeable future they will constitute a borderland between full members of the European family and the rest of the Eurasian landmass." In S. White, I. McAllister, M. Light and J. Löwenhardt: A European or a Slavic Choice? Foreign Policy and Public Attitudes in Post-Soviet Europe. *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 54, Nr. 2, 2002. 181. The idea of "the outsiders" and "borderland" can be overlapped with the conceptualization of the changing regions, meso-areas. "Near abroad" can be also a close notion, in a sense, to a meso-area in its Russian political usage. See, for example, relating the Diaspora question, Andrei Edemsky and Paul Kolstoe: Russia's policy towards the Diaspora. In Paul Kolstoe (ed.): *Russian in the Former Soviet Republics.* Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1995. 259.

2004, but also may have it in the future, or only want to have it someday in the distant future. As a matter of fact, on the basis of the institutional identity, the difference between the divisions within the East European Meso-area is still in a phase of beginning, so the divisions within the Meso-area are relative. For example, some analysts consider that the CEECs are now consolidating their transition to EU membership, and South East European countries, on the contrary, still remain in a transition in which the nation-building can be an issue, and to be completed in time. However, the status law established in 2001 by Hungary, one of the CEECs, was scandalous enough to demonstrate that the process of nation-building or new nation-building was still a national and regional agenda for Hungary both politically and diplomatically. Moreover, the conflicts on the law between Hungary and its neighboring countries and between Hungary and the EU resulted in consolidation of the meso-area identity on both sides, the EU members and the candidate countries. The public statement of the Hungarian government below, released just after the negotiations with the EU over the question of public assistance by the law for private commercial companies, is a good example to the "No more Eastern but not yet Western" identity of the meso-area.

> "It was repeatedly required in the negotiation with the EU that we should respect the disciplines of fair competition. However, on this issue there were misunderstandings and controversies, and we might continue exchanges of opinions regarding the legal principles; namely, they should be concerned with the questions; for example, how indispensable the assistances to local industries were for the aim of preserving the national minority, or how contrary the assistances were against the fair competition. I will not explain this in details now. At any rate, we have accepted, *for peace,* the requirement to delete the related article of the draft, which clearly prescribed assistance to commercial companies."[12] (Italicized by the present author – O. I.)

This statement shows an ambivalent attitude, a floating identity, between the norms to be implemented for EU membership – here, fair competition in the market economy – and the reality or the institutional identity – preferential and anti-market assistance to the Hungarian minorities abroad. What is more essential is the connotation of *"for peace":* namely, it means eventual neglect against the EU norm, since the Hungarian government inserted an additional phrase into the final draft of the law, which is *de*

[12] The statement of Zsolt Németh – Secretary of State of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time – at the press conference on 13 June, 2001: www.kum.hu

facto a revival of the deleted phrase.[13] This ambivalent self-perception and behavior stimulated the EU to recognize Hungary as 'not yet European', that is, the EU's external identity toward the East European Meso-area; "No more Eastern but not yet Western". This regional identity will very likely survive EU membership of the East European candidate countries both internally and externally.

Regional identity and external cognition

We may give up drawing clear-cut boarders of meso-areas if introducing perceptional identities, that is, factors of Sollen or desire, into regional definition. However, spatial divisions of areas have never been objective. In fact, objective areas have never existed. They have been created according to external perceptions. Needless to say, for example, the postwar Eastern Europe and Western Europe, that is, the East-West division of Europe was constructed by the imperialist view of politics in the Cold War. Geographically or historically we have no categorical reasons to separate Greece, Turkey, Austria, the Baltic countries, Finland or other countries in the western part of the former USSR from the East or Central European region. Another case outside Slavic Eurasia is South East Asia. This area is well known for its colonialist naming, that is, the regional notion was created from the remaining parts other than the major Asian regions, which had been also made up by the imperialist divisions of the world. The world areas reflect directly the unilateral worldview of Orientalism. It is another problem that a colonialist unilateral cognition of areas has a crucial influence on the emerging regional self-identities; thus the East Europeans, for example, adjusted their identity to communist Eastern Europe, and then shared the concept of the communist camp in general.[14]

External regional identities are not necessarily coincident with the institutional identity of the meso-area or with the regional self-identity, either. The essential difference between the imperialist regional identity and the post-communist one is interactivity between the external and self perceptions in making the post-communist regional identity, and a working interactivity between the external and self-identities is fundamental for the formation of meso-areas. A regional identity is an interactive product of self-and external perceptions, mutually influencing each other's construc-

13 The second sentence of the 18th article of the Status Law.

14 Miklós Szabó: *Politikai kultúra Magyarországon*. Budapest: Medvetánc Könyvek, 1989. 225–251; Osamu Ieda: The Zigzag Way of Thought of a Hungarian Populist. *Japanese Slavic and East European Studies*, Nr. 18, 1998. 115–128.



tion of regional identity, and a regional identity is re-makable when any side of the perceptions begins to change with or without new developments in the institutional realities.

FORMULATION OF MESO- AND MEGA-AREA DYNAMICS

Meso-area dynamics

Taking the factors above into consideration, we can redefine the regions in a general setting, in contrast to the world areas reinforced by the unilateral perceptions in the 20th century. Our regional definition is based on *dynamics of the triadic identities;* that is, deviation, interaction, and amalgamation among self-, external, and institutional identities. We call this the *triadic dynamics of meso-area.*

Hypothetically we formulate the triadic dynamics as follows;

1) A regional cognition is stable when the institutional and self-regional identities correspond to each other. At this stage, an external identity or integration may exercise an influence on the other identities very restrictively. (No triadic dynamism, no meso-area)

2) A stable regional identity is based on a common value system between the self-and institutional identities in the region internally, but externally a common value may induce a triadic dynamism. In other words, a region eventually has no external identity when no value systems are shared by both of the peoples in the region and in its external world. Or, the opposite, a meaningful external cognition premises a common value system at any level with the residents in the region. (Stability of regional identities)

3) A region may have not single value systems; therefore it may have multiple identities. Thus, a region can have different regional identities at the same

time in accordance with their corresponding external identities. (Multiple identity)

4) A regional cognition is to be de-and re-constructed if some considerable change happens in any of the three identities, resulting in deviation among the triadic identities. (Initial triad)

5) A meso-area emerges when all of the triadic identities begin to change under a new internal or external momentum, and the meso-area exists as long as the triadic dynamics works among the changing identities. (High triad)

6) Meso-areas emerge differently depending on different self-and external identities within one mega-area, though the initial institutional identity is the same. (Various triad). Below we suggest a typology relating to the Slavic Eurasian Meso-areas.

a) Intensive (communal) integration: the East European type of triadic dynamism. A societal membership is essential in this triad, and the membership requires the meso-area to accept the political, economic, social, and cultural criteria. Therefore, the interaction in the triadic dynamics should be high, and this process may need a long duration to complete the implementation of the comprehensive criteria. The intensive integration may result in a new community of the regions. (Communal type)

b) Systemic integration: the Far Eastern and Siberian type of triadic dynamism. Economic relations are essential in this triad, and the interaction and amalgamation are high, though selectively. Namely, the integration is not inclusive over the other spheres of human and societal activities. This integration may bring about an economic system among the regions. The duration can be relatively short to make up the system due to the incomprehensive feature of the integration. (Systemic type)

c) Extensive and individual (network) integration: the Central Eurasian type of triadic dynamism. A network membership is essential in this triad, and the membership requires the meso-area to accept the political, economic, social, and/or cultural criteria, though not communally, but individually. Because of the individuality of integration, the interaction and amalgamation is not necessarily high, at least superficially, and the integration process is not clear, though the triadic dynamics can bring about an extensive formation of networks among the regions. The duration can be short to make up the networks due to the individual feature of the integration. (Network type)[15]

[15] Tomohiko Uyama: From Bulgharism through Marrism to Nationalist Myths: Discourses on the Tatar, the Chuvash and the Bashkir Ethnogenisis. *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, Nr. 19, 2002. 163–190.

These types of triad are inductive and hypothetic; therefore, they are not exclusive or comprehensive at all.

7) Multiple regional identities may not generate single triads (multiple triad)

8) Triadic dynamism does not necessarily result in a new region (final triad);

a) A meso-area may go back into the original mega-area due to greater deviation, insufficient interaction, minor amalgamation, and a strong institutional identity. (backlash triad)

b) A meso-area may be basically absorbed into the external integration due to sufficient interaction, minor amalgamation and strong external identity enough for disappearance of the specific regional identities of the meso-area (transitional triad).

c) A meso-area may remain as a meso-area for a considerable duration due to greater deviation and insufficient amalgamation (transformational triad). In this triad a new regional identity may engender among the various peoples in the meso-area.[16] (A meso-area identity)

d) A meso-area may grow into a new region through sufficient interaction and considerable amalgamation enough to create a unique regional identity (evolutional triad).

9) A mega-area can be identical with a single meso-area.

10) External momenta are generated by globalization and regional, economic, cultural, and other integration.

11) Requirements of external integration can be coincident with that of globalization, such as market economy, parliamentary democracy, World Trade Organization membership, and so on. In reality, however, the connotations of the requirements often deviate essentially from the original understandings, or their local implication and implementation is significantly different from each other's.

12) Globalization prevents triadic meso-areas from backlash, but it does not necessarily dismantle areas and regions. Rather it works to de-and re-construct areas and regions in accordance with the single value system throughout the world, resulting in not only a transitional but also a transformational or evolutional triad.

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16 For example, the Baltic peoples and the former East European peoples have had no significant common identity, and we may also talk about no mutual perceptions within the Baltic republics to be shared as a solid regional identity in the Soviet and earlier eras. However, a common status for EU membership, that is, the *candidate countries*, and the communist past (the institutional identity) create the common regional identities among the peoples in Baltic and East European countries. How consistent is the meso-area identity depends on the type of triadic dynamics.

MEGA-AREA DYNAMICS

A mega-area emerges when a meso-area is emerging in it. Therefore, a mega-area is a companion notion of meso-area. At the same time, a pair of meso-and mega-areas must be complemented by emergence of another mega-area, which has external momentum on the meso-area. We call the former mega-area "exit mega-area," and the latter "entry mega-area." In other words, an emerging meso-area is accompanied by a pair formation of mega-areas. These mega-areas work just as the plus-minus electrodes in the triadic dynamics of meso-areas, and their functions – that is, the institutional and external identities in the meso-area – can be convertible from each perspective of the mega-areas. From the viewpoint of the exit mega-area, namely, the institutional identity is less and less substantial or more and more reminiscent in the process from the initial to the high triad of the dynamics of meso-areas. This process, however, seems opposite from the perspective of the entry mega-area; that is, the institutional identity of the exit mega-area seems as an external identity for the entry mega-area, and the external identity for the exit mega-area functions as no other than the institutional identity for the entry mega-area. In this reversed perspective, the institutional identity of the entry mega-area becomes more and more substantial, or less and less normative along with the diminishing momentum of the exit mega-area. This reversibility is important all the more, when the exit and entry mega-areas may convert their positions on the way of the winding triadic dynamics. In brief, we understand the exit and entry mega-areas not as discrete categories but a transferable notion. The transferability may extend availability of the notion.

Taking into account these relations among the three elements – meso-area, exit mega-area, and entry mega-area –, we formulate the *triadic dynamics of mega-area* on the basis of the meso-area dynamics as follows;

1) No mega-area exists when no meso-areas emerged.

2) An emerging meso-area is accompanied by a pair of mega-areas; one is an exit mega-area, to which the meso-area has belonged, and the other is an entry mega-area, which exercises external momentum on the meso-area. These are the actors of the dynamism of the mega-area, and they correspond to the Triadic identities of meso-area. (Triadic Mega-area)

3) Triadic dynamics of the mega-area emerge differently depending on the triadic dynamics of the meso-area. (Various Triadic Mega-area)



4) A mega-area can be constructed entirely as a new domain. (Imagined triadic mega-area)

5) Multiple triadic dynamics can emerge in a meso-area when plural external integrations work on the meso-area at a time. (Concentrative Triadic Mega-area)

6) Multiple triadic dynamics can emerge in an entry mega-area when the entry mega-area exercises integration momenta not on single meso-areas. (Expansive triadic mega-area)

7) Multiple triadic dynamics can emerge in an exit mega-area when not single meso-areas emerge in the exit mega-area. (Lethal Triadic Mega-area)

8) Triadic dynamics of a mega-area terminates differently depending on the final triad of the meso-area (Final Triadic Mega-area);

a) Due to the backlash triad of the meso-area, the exit and the entry mega-areas superficially return to the original positions where the regions have been before, however, the triad may have caused and the potential triad may cause some changes in their regional identities, and these changes may induce a new triadic dynamism in the regions. (Backlash and Potential Triad of Mega-area Dynamics).

b) Due to the transitional triad of the meso-area, the domain of the entry and the exit mega-areas changes noticeably. Moreover, the identities, the less

Meso-Area Dynamics-III
Types of Regional Integration



visible features, of the regions have also changed in both of the meso-and mega-areas due to the interaction and amalgamation in the triadic dynamics. (Transitional Triad of Mega-area Dynamics)

c) A triadic mega-area remains for a considerable duration, due to the transformational triad of the meso-area. Under the duration the exit and entry mega-areas may change their own regional identities by the impact of the triadic dynamism in the meso-area. (Transformational Triad of Mega-area Dynamics)

d) Due to the evolutional triad of the meso-area, the exit mega-area diminishes its domain, and cannot help changing its regional identities, internally and externally. The entry mega-area, on the other hand, though remaining spatially as it has been, may have to review its regional self-identity because of the changing inter-regional relations due to the new region out of the triad. (Evolutional Triad of Mega-area Dynamics)

9) Globalization or the world systems are phenomena or effects of an expansive triad of mega-area dynamics. (Global Triadic Mega-area)

10) An exit mega-area may have experienced a triadic dynamics of mega-area as an entry one, and an entry mega-area, on the contrary, would experience a triadic dynamism as an exit one in the future. (Vicissitudinous Triadic Mega-area)

Meso-Area Dynamics-IV
Interactive De- and Re-construction of Meso-Areas



11) The positions of mega-areas, namely, exit and entry, are convertible in accordance with the process of the triadic dynamics of a Mega-area.

INFERENCE OF MESO-MEGA AREA DYNAMICS

Formulating the meso-and mega-area dynamics in the previous sections, we have a basis to infer its implications from the triadic relations as follows;

1) Parallels of integration in meso-and mega-areas: A meso-area is an objective to be integrated into a mega-area. In this respect, we may have a deduction on the correlation between the types of the triadic dynamics of the meso-area and the institutional identities of the entry mega-area. Namely, what generates the external momenta in the triadic dynamics of the meso-area is identical with none other than the patterns of integration in the entry mega-areas themselves. We may call it membership in the region. Regarding the Slavic Eurasian Meso-areas, the formulation of this parallel is as follows:[17]

[17] See the paradoxical developments of the modern state system in Western Europe; Takao Sasaki: "Kokusai sisutemu, kokusai shakai to chiiki sisutemu, chiiki shakai: Chuiki ken gainen wo megutte [System and Society; International Contra Regional: Reflections on the Concept "Meso-Area"]," presented at the SRC Forum of Regional Studies and meso-areas on 26 November 2003, Hokkaido University. The paper suggests that "international public goods" provide the basis to Europe for the societal integration beyond the solid modern state system, though the system was created in Europe. On the contrary, no other regions than Europe have developed "international public goods" sufficiently. The implication of this thesis is that the East Asian economic integration, for example, can develop to the communal type of regional integration with a great difficulty, and thus it rather remains a sub-system under the solid state system. This contrast between Europe and Asia can be an economic and political background of the meso-area typology.

a) The communal type of triadic dynamism in the East European Meso-area corresponds to the societal membership in the EU Mega-area which requires the members to accept the political, economic, social, and cultural criteria.

b) The systemic type of triadic dynamism in the Siberian and Far-Eastern Meso-area corresponds to the selective economic integration of the East Asian Mega-area which requires the members to accept the systemic economic relations in the regions.

c) The network type of triadic dynamism in the Central Eurasian Meso-area corresponds to the network membership of the South Eurasian Mega-area which requires the members to accept the political, economic, social, and/or cultural criteria, though not communally, but individually.

2) Reversibility of meso-and mega-areas: meso-and mega-areas are theoretical and relational categories, not primordial notions. A meso-area can develop into a mega-area, and an evolutional triad of meso-area may stimulate the region even to grow into a mega-area. This can happen through the way of the expansive triadic dynamism of mega-area. For instance, communist Russia had been a mega-area in the twentieth century, following the evolutional triadic dynamics of meso-area in the capitalist European and the imperialist Russian Mega-areas in the nineteenth century. Another case in contemporary Eurasia is South East Asia. The region was created through a concentrative triadic dynamics of mega-area, including the Chinese, European, Japanese and American Mega-areas, and now the region is emerging as a mega-area through the expansive triadic dynamism, involving the neighboring countries and regions (from the ASEAN to the enlarging ASEAN).

The East European Meso-area would develop into a unique region after a long winding process of transitional, transformational, and evolutional triadic dynamics due to the great cleavage symbolized by the difficulties to implement "the 31 chapters of Acquis Communautaire,"[18] and then the region would develop further to a mega-area, inducing surrounding regions on the basis of "No more Western, rather Central European or Eurasian" identities. Or, what seems more likely to happen is that, while the meso-area is de-and re-constructed in accordance with the EU norms, de-EU-nization of the EU is brought about by the eastward enlargement of the EU. Namely, the triadic dynamism of the EU Mega-area, preparing its expansion of the membership, has changed its internal basic features. For example, the rule in decision-making of the EU changed fundamentally from the parity system

[18] Csaba Tabajdi: The Re-formulation of the Central European Thought. *Foreign Policy Review*, Nr. 1, 2002. 22–28.

among the member countries to the efficiency and hegemony discipline.[19] If the mega-area enlarges further toward such regions as the south and east Mediterranean regions, the Black Sea region, the Middle East region, it might result in a totally new region with an identity of, for example, "Not only European, but also Eurasian – or No more European, but Eurasian".

3) Eurasian dynamism: Due to a range of meso-areas emerging in the Slavic Eurasian Mega-area since the collapse of the communist regime, today's Eurasian Continent consists of various mega-areas, linked and intermediated by the meso-areas. Therefore, any regions in the continent now interact cooperatively or competitively as the actors in the triadic dynamics of the meso-mega areas.

This multiple and comprehensive dynamism in the Eurasian continent necessitates collaborations among the regional studies, such as East Asian, South East Asian, South Asian, Islamic, Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, European, North American, Slavic Eurasian Studies, and so on, because, otherwise, regional studies could not draw any actual realities or persuasive interpretations on the regions, and rejuvenate the regional studies in accordance with the changing Eurasia and the world as well.

4) Interactive formation of the world: The triadic dynamics of meso-and mega-areas may interpret the inter-regional relations in contemporary international relations and in world history as well in a different way from the unilateralist ones, such as Orientalism, dependence theory, the world system of modern capitalism, the colonial division of world areas, and so on. The triadic dynamics, instead, introducing the dual perceptional identities as the crucial and interactive factors in the formation of regional identities, could be a new cognitive framework to understand the regions (meso-and mega-areas) in the context of bilateral or multilateral interdependency. In other words, the emergence of meso-areas is an agency to cause a chain of changes in regional identities not only of meso-areas but also of mega-areas. Thus even the centers and the suzerains, or, in our terminology, the entry mega-areas, also change their own regional identities in effect of the meso-area formation, since the triadic dynamism de-and re-constructs the regional identities of both meso-and mega-areas. Thus the modern European identity was, in our understanding, nothing but a counter-creature, when the European Mega-area constructed the Orient and the

[19] See the Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts; http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/search_treaties.html

world areas; in brief, not "modern Europe" created the world areas, but the world meso-areas invented "modern Europe".

In the changing contemporary world, the global power requires the regions to acclimatize themselves to the market economy and parliamentary democracy as the normative identities, thus inducing Triadic dynamics throughout the world. The global triadic dynamism, in turn, brings about global issues out of regional or local issues of the meso-and exit mega-areas, or vice-versa, for example, human security, cross-border migration, socio-regional divisions, and environmental problems,[20] and due to the concentration of these issues onto the entry mega-area in a natural effect of the triadic dynamics, the mega-area is more, or at least as much seriously threatened in its security over the lands and peoples as the meso-areas are threatened. This is the reality in the triadic dynamics with which the new identities are to be created regionally and globally as well. It is very likely that the new regional and global identities would be rather reluctant from "Free Movement of Good and Persons," though the initial momentum of the triadic dynamism was the introduction of the free market system throughout the world. According to our formulation of the possible finals in the triadic dynamics, namely, among backlash, transition, transformation, and evolution, the global triad seems to be headed to one other than the expected one, transitional. At any rate, the most important and significant actors in our dynamics are the perceptional cognitions in the emerging identities; namely, the wills of human beings, and their interactivity in the triadic dynamics. Briefly, not the global power creates the world regions, but the meso-areas are inventing the future of global power and global identities as well.

20 See the interactive functions of the self-and external cognitions for inventing the historical identities of the regions, for example, Go Kato: Minzoku shi to chiiki kenkyu, tasha heno manazashi [Ethnography and Area Studies: Looks Towards 'Others']. In T. Yano (ed.): *Chiiki kenkyu no shuho* [Methodology of Area Studies]. Tokyo, 1993. 104–106.

ÉVA KOVÁCS

Daring Theses on Identity

The concept of *identity* has cropped up in the past few decades, not only in philosophical, sociological and social psychological texts, strictly understood, but also in the fields of anthropology, history and political science. In fact, the concept has made appearances in political statements, TV talk shows, bank fliers and commercial home pages. We can infer, on these bases, not only the trivialization – at times banalization – of the concept, but also its inherent disorderliness.

A number of paths stand open to the social scientist to avoid this disorder. She/he can exchange the expression 'identity' for *representation*, *life history*, etc. or can hang on adjectives such as *political*, *national*, *ethnic*, *gender*, etc. to the concept, in order to better define the subject of study. The former, on the one hand, necessitates extraordinary determination and theoretical talent and, on the other – one swallow does not make a summer – is not sure to fundamentally alter the scientific and public discourse on identity. The latter, in turn, only masks, but does not solve, the theoretical problems hidden in the disarray. My paper seeks to place itself between the two extremes above. It accepts the disarray as the status quo and endeavors only to append explanations. It considers as its main task to identity of the context of particular uses of concepts, with special attention to ethnic identity as reflected by minority studies joined.

Identity (politics) and modernity

Almost all social science literature assumes that the question of identity is a specialty of the modern age.[1] The dissolution of pre-modern society has

[1] The statement above cannot be expounded on within the narrow framework of this paper. I don't even attempt to introduce the existing voluminous literature. I consider the following works authoritative of the virulent scientific discourse of the mid-eighties on the connection between identity and modernity. Habermas, Jürgen: *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. Zwölf Vorlesungen.* Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1985; Habermas, Jürgen: *Die Moderne – ein unvollendetes Projekt*. Leipzig: Jürgen Verlag, 1990; Bauman, Zygmunt: *Modernity and Ambiva-*

rendered the formation and recognition of identity problematic: modernity re-ordered not only forms of collective identity (reference is most often made to family and feudal links) but also fundamentally affected the formation of personal identity. Modernity – because it has radically changed previous relationships to space and time – has left us, individuals, with the challenge of establishing our personal and social selfhood over and over again. In other words, we must be capable of relating a coherent *life history* considered and accepted as authentic by our environment. Our mere 'ancestry' does not make who we are obvious – our personal life history must also support our identity.

This other identity arises not through the homogenous cultural systems of previous times, but out of sizable competing, cultural discourses that emphasize exactly the *incompleteness*, *fragmentation* and *contradiction* of collective and personal being – or the growing insecurity of identity. At the same time certain groups continue to call for categorical and fixed forms of identity. While in earlier times the primary goal of identity formation and perception consisted of self-expression and of the fulfillment of autonomy, the diversity of competing identity models make recognition the real challenge. Moreover, new social expectations have led to the institutionalization of identity creation and to the development of *identity politics*. While personal identity was diverted into political space, and private life into the public sphere – lesbian and gay identity politics, for example – the close interconnection between personal and social identity, and power relations became manifest.[2]

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lence. Cambridge: Polity, 1991; Giddens, Anthony: *Modernity and Self-Identity – Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Oxford/Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991; Bauman, Zygmunt: *Modernity and Ambivalence*. Cambridge: Polity, 1991; Hannerz, Ulf: *Cultural Complexity. Studies in the Social Organisation of Meaning*. New York: Columbia U. P., 1992; Beck, Ulrich – Giddens, Anthony – Lash, Scott: *Reflexive Modernisation – Politics, Tradition and Aestetics in the Modern Social Order.* Oxford/Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994; Lash, Scott – Friedman, Jonathan (eds.): *Modernity and Identity.* Oxford/Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992; Appadurai, Arjun: *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimension of Globalisation*. Minneapolis/London: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1996; Hall, Stuart – du Gay, Paul (eds.): *Questions of Cultural Identity.* London/Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage, 1996; Castells, Manuel: *The Power of Identity.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. 5–67; Sakai, Naoki: *Modernity and It's Critique: The Problem of Universalism and Particularism. South Atlantic Quarterly,* Vol. 87, Nr. 3, 1988. 475–504; Bauman, Zygmunt: From Pilgrim to Tourist – or a Short History of Identity. In Hall, Stuart and du Gay, Paul (eds.): *Questions of Cultural Identity.* London: Sage, 1994. 18–36.

2 On this, see Foucault's 1976 lecture. Foucault, Michel: In Verteidigung der Gesellschaft. Vorlesungen am Collège de France (1975–76). Vorlesung vom 17. März 1976. http://www.momo-berlin.de/Foucault_Vorlesung_17_03_76.html. As to the gender aspect, not to be discussed here, see Fehér, Ferenc and Heller, Ágnes: *Biopolitics*. Ashgate/Aldershot, 1994. http://www.euro.centre.org. Foucault, Michel: *Technologies of the Self.* Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.

Surely, not only social scientists, but also the competing cultural discourses and newly arisen identity politics are 'responsible' for the disorder generated around identity. Nonetheless, few empirical studies seem to have taken notice of these changes.[3] Sociology occasionally operates with a concept of identity that sees the latter as categorical and fixed – the aggregation of functions inherited by descent and acquired by socialization. Identity is seen as a compound of characteristics that may even be mapped graphically. Unfinished, fragmented and contradictory identities are grouped in the category of 'inexplicable,' assuming quantification even allows for their visualization. The constitutive nature of identity and its embedment in space and time – its historicity – cannot be evaluated in such a framework. Sociological snapshots may thereby – in a veiled or open manner – conserve an essentialist understanding of identity that is already seen as outmoded and is, in political terms, outright dangerous. This *reduction* is one of the factors causing the terminological confusion noted above.

Identity, Time, Narration

The chaos is only heightened by the disappearance of interpretations of difference (*alterity*) from discussions of *identity* – at least in the sphere of survey-based identity studies – despite the conclusions of classic social psychological, social historical and ethnological studies to the contrary. How could we show *what* we are, if we didn't experience our difference from and similarity to the Other? How could we be something without designating, over and over again, the boundary of this *something*? I am not speaking only of boundaries here, but of the *continuous* transformation of these boundaries – or the performative nature of identity.

Sociology – orienting itself by the requirements of the dominant cultural and political discourse and mistakenly alluding to its role as the science of social phenomena – seems to have forgotten a crucial feature of individual or collective identity, namely its basis in *individual experience*. In other words, social

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[3] It seems that today, even the ability of sociology to acknowledge the social changes taking place around it is questionable. See: Lepenies, Wolf: *Die drei Kulturen. Soziologie zwischen Literatur und Wissenschaft*. München, Wien: Hanser, 1985; Boudon, Raymond: European Sociology: The Identity Lost? In Nedelmann, B. – Sztompka, P. (eds.): *Sociology in Europe – In Search of Identity.* Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1993. 27–46; Wallerstein, Immanuel: The Heritage of Sociology, The Promise of Social Science. Presidential Address, XIVth World Congress of Sociology. Montreal, 26 July 1998. In *Current Sociology,* Vol. 47, Nr. 2, 1998. 1–37; Bauman, Zygmunt: Parvenu and Pariah: The Heroes and Victims of Modernity. In Beilharz, Peter (ed.): *The Bauman Reader.* La Trobe University/Blackwell, 1990.

systems, cultures,[4] etc. are unable to create and maintain identities unless the individuals constituting the former esteem these identities and assign them personal meaning. It is, for example, difficult to imagine a 'Hungarian collective identity' without individual regard. This means, on the one hand, that collective identities can emerge only *on the basis of the analogic transmission* of similarities (also) individually perceived.[5] On the other, it means that we are led back to the embedment of identity in *time*, specifically the phenomenological theory that perception, in time, is approachable only in a narrative manner.[6] To put matters more simply: individuals are always entangled in (*his*)*stories*.[7] This entanglement doesn't just help orientation in life, by means of cultural competences inherited through narration. Narration means much more than this: we get closer to ourselves with the help of our stories. And now we have arrived at the point where we can ask the question of what it means to be identical with ourselves.

Personal Identity

Personal identity is created from the tension between temporal continuity and its lack or insecurity.[8] One example of this peculiarity is the self-image we create of our bodies and ourselves, through the perception of our bodies. Our bodies have constant 'borders;' but within these borders – with the passage of time – change constantly, while our perception of them as ours remains unchanged. Our physical identity extends as far as our life span.

The 'accidents' that befall us – destabilizing our identity – cause deviation and, as 'events of fate'[9], create accordance, so long as our identity is re-

4 I use the word 'culture' in the sense of a 'creative culture.' Compare Greverus, Ina Maria: Culture: Creation – Captivity – Collage. A Plea for a Controversial Term. *Anthropological Journal on European Cultures*, Vol. 5, Nr. 1, 1996. 127–160.

5 Halbwachs and Ricoeur formulate similar assertions in the context of collective memory. Halbwachs, Maurice: *On Collective Memory.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992; Ricoeur, Paul: *Memory, History, Forgetting.* University of Chicago Press, 2004. See also Welzer, Harald: *Das kommunikative Gedächtnis*. München: Beck, 2002.

6 Ricoeur, Paul: Threefold mimesis. In Ricoeur, Paul: *Time and Narrative.* Vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 53.

7 Schnapp, Wilhelm: *In Geschichten verstrickt. Zum Sein von Mensch und Ding*. Hamburg: Richard Meiner V. 1953.

8 I follow Paul Ricoeur's train of thought in this portion of the paper. Ricoeur, Paul: *Oneself as Another.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

9 I cannot expound on the concept of 'event of fate' in this paper. Instead, I cite László Tengelyi, who explained the concept as follows: 'The concept of fate builds on the idea that life history, as the carrier of identity, is a closed whole; but the expression 'event of fate' denotes an occurrence as a result of which identity as the casing for life history shatters and opens up.' Tengelyi László: Élettörténet és önazonosság. [Life history and Iden-

stored. The continuity and instability of identity, the contradiction between its correspondence and confrontation, is regularly resolved by our determination *to seem who we are*. This inner determination compels us to continuously self-correct – to redefine our identity.[10]

Even in its simplest form, the question of identity can be posed in two ways: What am I? And, who am I? These questions point to the two essential dimensions of personal identity. The question 'what am I' is linked to the type of identity identified by Ricoeur as *identity of the same* (*idem*-identity or *memeté*), based on the correspondence of external features, traits and characteristics. The moral unity of these latter, the *character*, makes the discovery of similarities possible: character is in effect the 'what' of 'who.' This is what we can demonstrate with linguistic tools, since characteristics are specifiable and countable. Identity of the same is, on the one hand, a *numerical* correspondence – we say something is 'one and the same' – and, on the other, a relational one – 'I am like the Other' – in other words, a *qualitative* sameness allowing for substitution. In addition, our *idem*-identity is *continuous*, durable in time: in this manner we can speak of ourselves from birth until the moment of death as male or female, French and/or Hungarian. We can attribute to ourselves values, ideas, models and heroes, despite the fact that difference constantly threatens this sameness. Character is thus the aggregation of stable dispositions on the basis of which an individual can be identified.

Paradoxically, in contrast to 'what am I' we cannot answer the question 'who am I' with narrative tools: 'I am me' ('I am who I am,' etc.) we answer. *Identity of the self* (*ipse*-identity, *ipseité*) is in reality a feeling, nourished by inner experiences, that necessarily comprises the time-horizon strung between past incident and future expectation, while being unable, itself, to reveal this horizon.

> "The primary word *I-Thou* can be spoken only with the whole being. Concentration and fusion into the whole being can never take place through my agency, nor can it ever take place without me. I become through my relation to the *Thou*; and as I become the *I,* I say *Thou*. All real living is meeting."[11]

While I may feel that, through stories, allegories, metaphors and countless other linguistic tropes, I have clarified to the Other who I am, the Other only retains a sensation of what she would feel in my place. Naturally,

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tity.] In Tengelyi, László: *Élettörténet és sorsesemény* [Life History and the Event of Fate]. Budapest: Atlantisz, 1998. 43.

10 Ricoeur, Paul: The Self and Narrative Identity. In Ricoeur: *Oneself as Another,* 140–168.

11 Buber, Martin: *I and Thou*. 2. Edition, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1958. 24–25.

the 'place' of the I for the Other only emerges through the narration of the I, while the Other relies on her selfhood in the construction of what we deem: I in the Other's place. The moral conception of *ipse*-identity is accordingly not character, but *self-preservation* – the attempt to ensure that the Other can rely on me. Ricoeur formulated the moral problem hidden in personal identity as the following:

> "The term 'responsibility' unites both meanings: 'counting on' and 'being accounted for.' It unites them, adding to them the idea of a *response* to the question 'Where are you?' asked by another who needs me. This response is the following: 'Here I am!' a response that is a statement of self-constancy."[12]

Narrated identity creates a relationship between selfhood and sameness. But we do not have a need for narrative identity only in extreme cases. Our personal identity cannot do without a linguistic formulation of it.

"In narrativizing the aim of the true life, narrative identity gives it the recognizable features of characters loved or respected. Narrative identity makes the two ends of the chain link up with one another: the permanence in time of character and that of self-constancy."[13]

If this is so – and here it would not be futile to work out philosophical and literary theories with the help of the fresh results from cognitive psychology and life history studies – then what kind of conclusions can a social scientist (searching for the empirical) draw from the foregoing? What does one who studies 'identity' really study?

It can be ventured that, empirically, one gets closest to identity through (life history) narration. I don't imply thereby that through the study of life history identity itself becomes 'findable' or reconstuctable by means of scientific tools; since, as the history swings between *idem* and *ipse*, so we also hear-read only this history, namely with the help of another history (our scientific text) in which we interpret the original (itself no longer identity, merely a story narrating the I). Thus, the biographical method, in essence, interprets *narrative identity* – the tension between character and self-preservation and its narrative corrective mechanisms. This is the case even if some representatives of the approach have exchanged the word identity for life history.[14]

12 Ricoeur, ibid. 165.

13 Ricoeur, ibid. 166.

14 The literature on this topic could (also) fill a library. For this reason, I only refer to summaries of the growing influence of the biographical method in the social sciences. Chamberlayne, Prue – Bornat, Joanna – Wengraf, Tom (eds.): *The Turn to Biographical Methods in Social Science*. London: Routledge, 2000.

At first glance, it may seem that large, quantitative surveys move in the realm of *sameness*, insofar as they take as their foundation the correspondence of external features, traits and characteristics, established and acquired abilities, and fixed similarities – in other words, those permanent dispositions that make individuals and groups identifiable. Thus, we would need to conclude that these studies quantify the 'supports' of selfhood, abolishing the narration so troubling to quantitative understandings (due to the difficulty of measuring histories). But is this really the case? Does it make sense to study sameness – character and its specific features – when the individual or community is uprooted from the realm of narrative knowledge?[15] Can we attribute meaning to quantified features without taking account of the histories of these features? It is highly likely that this is not the case. Behind models of sameness lurk muted sounds – histories muttering softly.

Until this point, we have focused only on personal identity, or the individual perception of collective identities. Though I believe the alternative model of identity sketched above fundamentally questions the usage of the concept in everyday and scientific discourse, many may perceive only a nuance of difference magnified into philosophy and psychology. The identities discussed here are, after all, only feelings without any effect on social action, the stubborn empirical social scientist may respond. They are mere narratives without power, she may continue, which barely filter through the uproar of common talk. But let us not give up so easily: let us turn our inquisitive gaze from the personal to the collective, from emotion to action, from narrative to discourse. It is time to bring together the relational nature of identity with the concepts of social relationships and social action.

Ethnicity as social relationship

Identity – whether individual or collective – on the one hand assumes personal meaning and, on the other, manifests itself only in interpersonal *webs of reference*. Our sameness becomes visible, perceivable and thereby examinable in social actions (understood as any external or internal hu-

[15] Other than Ricoeur, see Lyotard, Jean-François: *The Postmodern Condition.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984; Habermas, Jürgen: Die Moderne – ein unvollendetes Projekt. In: Welsch, W. (ed.): *Wege aus der Moderne. Schlüsseltexte der Postmoderne-Diskussion.* Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994. 177–192; Rorty, Richard: Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity. *Praxis International*, Vol. 4, Nr. 1, 1984. 32–44.

man behavior or activity, its omission or countenance) which, according to the intended understanding of the actor, relate to the behavior of others and orient themselves according to these latter.[16] External interaction, however, becomes *internalized*, again with time, into familiarity, craft and tradition. The next question to be put to quantitative studies of identity would thus run as follows: Does it make sense to study identity if the individual or community examined is torn from the realm of social actions and thereby that of custom?

But let us go further, since social actions only appear peripherally in studies of social identity (though much more in conflict-oriented media.) The concept of social relationship brings us closer to group identity.

"The term 'social relationship' will be used to denote the behavior of a plurality of actors insofar as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms. The social relationship thus consists entirely and exclusively in the existence of a pronality that there will be a meaningful course of social action – irrespective, for the time being, of the basis for this probability. Thus, as a defining criterion, it is essential that there should be at least a minimum of mutual orientation of the action of each to that of the others… Hence, the definition does not specify whether the relation of the actors is co-operative or the opposite."[17]

Collective identities are thus social linkages that merely create the *possibility* that a national or ethnic community with a sense of group will emerge.[18]

16 Hereafter, – accepting the charge of being old-fashioned – I follow Max Weber. In other words, I use the 'weapon' of empirical sociology in order to critique it. Weber, Max: *Economy and Society.* Vol. 1. (ed. By Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich) Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1978.

17 Weber, ibid. 26–27.

18 Weber discusses the links of ethnic communities in a separate chapter. (Ibid. 385–398.) He refines the concept above in the following manner: "The belief in group affinity, regardless of whether it has any objective foundation, can have important consequences especially for the formation of political community. We shall call 'ethnic groups' those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership (*Gemeinsamkeit*) differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action, like the latter. In our sense, ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity. This belief tends to persist even after the disintegration of the political community, unless drastic differences in the custom, physical type, or above all, language exist among its members. This artificial origin of

Weberian terminology questions all essentialist understandings (grown increasingly popular in recent years) that accept collective identity-formations as given and fixed; at the same time romantic notions that consider solidarity the main organizational principle of social groups are done away with. Ethnic, national, etc. social relationships are only presumed forms of belonging that create the *probability* that certain social acts will take place. These relationships must be created anew from act to act, while even their intended meaning may change – to the point that they disintegrate and break off.

Social relationships conceal alterity and identity. The equivalent of alterity in Weberian terminology is 'struggle' (the singling out and displacement of difference); that of alterity is 'community' and 'association.'

> "A social relationship will be called 'communal' (*Vergemeinschaftung*) if and so far as the orientation of social action – whether in the individual case, on the average, or in the pure type – is based on a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong together."[19]

It is an important condition here that social relationships are 'very heterogeneous states of affair,' since every single participant endows them with a different meaning. Thus, for example, there may be those who perceive social relationships aimed at national or ethnic identity as a community, and those who view them as an association. The second group does not take part in term because of feelings of subjective belonging, but on the basis of the equalization or connection of interest. Common characteristics, situations or forms of behavior are not sufficient to create a community. A uniform answer to possible exclusion is also, in itself, insufficient for this purpose. Community comes about with a *collective* answer: the orientation of individuals toward each other (not the environment). Common language – one of the cornerstones of identity studies – is only a *tool* of understanding according to the Weberian approach, not a primary content of community. Only the *conscious contrast* that emerges between members of a linguistic group and outsiders creates a community, of which language is one – also conscious – foundation.[20]

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the belief in common ethnicity follows the previously described pattern of rational association turning into personal relationships." Weber, ibid. 389.

19 Weber, ibid. 40.

20 Weber, ibid. 42–43.

It is foreseeable that this approach will be inadequate to bolster empirical sociological efforts that unilaterally and pre-emptively construe collective groups.[21] But even if we are more understanding and permissive of quantitative social scientific approaches to the measurement (or appraisal) of collective identity, the classification of community feeling by the Weberian definition as a thing within the realm of 'beliefs in belonging' looms large. Does this mean, ad absurdum, that the constant identity surveys that form the basis of political, social welfare, etc. programs and that, in part, require common discussion of community are really only the summaries and typologies of beliefs and opinions? The next question can hence be formulated as follows: which are the communities – assuming they even exist – whose members' social action is really guided by 'subjective belief in belonging'?

National and ethnic landscape

It would be only right to construct my argument in this chapter on the basis of theories of nation and nationality, as I did in the context of personal identity in chapter III and collective identity in chapter IV. However, such an approach would, I feel, burst the bounds of this study. I hope it will therefore suffice to state that scientific and common discourse in these areas is as contradictory as on the subject of identity[22] and that some theorists' conceptions are not far removed from the Ricoeurian model presented above.[23] My argument will thus continue

21 A number of anthropologists have launched serious attacks against such reduction. Brubaker, Rogers: *Ethnicity without groups.* Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. 2004; Calhoun, Craig: Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. In Calhoun, Craig (ed.): *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity.* Blackwell: Oxford 1994. 9–36.

22 I only refer to the milestones among the basic works on nation and nationalism. Anderson, Benedict: *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* London: Verso, 1983; Gellner, Ernest: *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983; Smith, Anthony D.: *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986; Hobsbawm, Eric J.: *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge University Press, 1990; Smith, Anthony D.: *National Identity.* London: Penguin, 1991.

23 Anthony Smith, for example, states the following about national identity: "Finally, a sense of national identity provides a powerful means of defining and locating individual selves in the world, through the prism of the collective personality and its distinctive culture. It is through a shared, unique culture that we are enabled to know 'who we are' in the contemporary world. By rediscovering that culture we 'rediscover' ourselves, the 'authentic self', or so it has appeared to many divided and disoriented individuals who have had to contend with the vast changes and uncertainties of the modern works." Smith, ibid. 17. Smith naturally does not go so far as to inspect national identities as optional and situational phenomena and refers, in a number of places, to the 'discovery' of identity, rather than its construction.

in the context of communities; while the nation will loom only at the foggy horizon of my study.[24]

The post-structuralist and post-colonial theories of the eighties and nineties[25] attempted to rethink the concepts of community, communality and ethnicity. These approaches generally rested on the assumption that modern capitalism and liberalism had created exclusive democracies from which wide social layers and groups were simply shut out.[26] Poststructuralist critique ultimately put emphasis on locality, rather than community and communality. However, the theory of the complex of locality has not been worked out to this day. The most attractive attempt is perhaps that of Appadurai, who emphasized not only the complexity, symbolism and connotations of locality, but also sketched a model of the fabrication of locality through the separation of the concepts of locality and neighborhood.

Appadurai works with concepts that protect us from the notion that:

> "group identities necessarily imply that cultures need to be seen as spatially bounded, historically unselfconscious, or ethnically homogeneous forms."[27]

Ethnic landscape (ethnoscape), though an important characteristic of social life, is not a given, but must constantly be created anew – this (as social relationship) gives the true social form, *neighborhood* (community), its context and emotional framework. Neighborhood, in turn, construes and forms the foregoing context. With this approach, Appadurai not only deprives group identity of the requirement of ethnic homogeneity, but also radically breaks with earlier theories, as the relationship between ethnicity and neighborhood shows. The theory also crosses the Weberian conception of ethnic community and depicts local ethnos as an ethnically heterogeneous relationship. Through the introduction of *neighborhood* it furthermore directs attention to

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24 In this context, I consider Peter Burke's study authoritative on the link between identity and nation. Burke, Peter: We, the people: popular culture and popular identity in modern Europe. In Lash-Friedman, ibid. 293–308.

25 Compare Bhabha, Homi K.: DissemiNation. Time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation. In Bhabha, Homi K. (ed.): *Nation and Narration*. London/New York: Routledge, 1990. 301–327; Featherstone, Mike – Lash, Scott – Robertson, Ronald: *Global Modernities*. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage, 1995; Chambers, Iain and Curti, Lidia: *The Post-Colonial Question*. London/New York: Routledge, 1996; Cvetkovich, Ann and Kellner, Douglas: *Articulating the Global and the Local*. Boulder/Colorado: Westwiew Press, 1997; Featherstone, Mike – Lash, Scott: *Spaces of Culture*. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage, 1999; Tomlinson, John: *Globalisation and Culture*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999.

26 I will not go into the communitarian discourse that emerged from this approach here.

27 Appadurai, Arjun: The Production of Locality. In Appadurai, ibid. 183.

communality, one of the loosest forms of grouping characterized by social action and guided by feelings of subjective belonging – seeing as one of the basic principles of neighborhood is exactly that its members maintain distance despite (or perhaps because of) physical proximity.[28] Neighborhoods rarely – generally in response to the fact or perception of external threat – appear together and assume distinct form, and again fall apart, loosen ties or narrow to dormant social relationships once danger has passed. The boundaries of neighborhood are fixed loosely and appear, paradoxically, only when they have ceased to exist and have transformed into some sort of 'closed association.' The dialectics of distance maintenance and interdependence, in the first place, the low intensity and frequency of community action, in the second, and the malleable aggregation and open circle of participants, in the third, dovetails with the concrete group-formations of post-modern societies.

Ethnoscapes are fragile and sensitive – while large scale social formations (including discourses) are most threatening to their existence. Appadurai considers modern nation states[29] the most hostile of these formations.

> "From the point of view of modern nationalism, neighborhoods exist principally to incubate and reproduce compliant national citizens – and not for the production of local subjects. Locality for the modern nation-state is either a site of nationally appropriated nostalgias, celebrations, and commemorations or a necessary condition of the production of nationals. Neighborhoods as social formations represent anxieties for the nation-state, as they usually contain large or residual spaces where the techniques of nationhood (birth control, linguistic uniformity, economic discipline, communications efficiency, and political loyalty) are likely to be either weak or contested. At the same time, neighborhoods are the source of political workers and party officials, teachers and soldiers, television technicians and productive farmers. Neighborhoods are not dispensable, even if they are potentially treacherous. For the project of the nation-state, neighborhoods represent a perennial source of entropy and slippage. They need to be policed almost as thoroughly as borders."[30]

It thus seems that one of the wellsprings of group identity formation today is not so much perceived similarity but rather resistance to the collective

28 Weber, ibid. 360–362.

29 Manuel Castells' observations about the distinction between 'nation state' and 'nationalism' are worth considering. Manuel Castells, ibid. 5–67.

30 Appadurai, ibid. 190–191.

identifiers attributed to us. Moreover, locality comes about with the help of familiarities necessary to the formation and maintenance of ethnic landscape. In this manner, however, it is not the feeling of collective belonging – to return to my earlier argument: not the recognition of sameness, and thereby identity support – that is at stake, 'merely' the assurance of the self-validating and self-acknowledging power of associations in the face of oppressive social formations. In other words, if we speak of ethnic landscape as one of the dominant spaces of identity formation we are no longer moving in the dimension of collective identity, but rather in that of institutions. Appadurai's observations do not refer to the Weberian community – though he does speak of neighborhoods –, nor to the transformation of the community's consciousness, nor to the *identity politics and discourses* formed for its acceptance.

At the end of my study, the following, seemingly daring, conclusions offer themselves.

1. Personal identity is a presumably unattainable phenomenon for empirical studies, since only its narrative level, reported similarity, is available for scientific understanding. The quantification of character – or sameness – threatens to bring about an approach whereby situational manifestations are viewed as permanent; and temporary groupings are perceived as solid communities. The haphazardness and incompleteness of character-combinations, moreover, forecasts that in the new millennium it is difference that will be *normal*, not life-long similarity. These social changes urge the elaboration of a sociology of *alterity*, rather than identity.

2. It appears that there is no such thing as ethnic community (at least not in the habitual understanding) – or if there is, not in a relevant sense. This statement is perhaps not so absurd if we take seriously that order, ethnicity, nation, etc. are all historical categories. Possibly, ethnicity is finished in this day and age. From philosophy through the history of ideas to cultural anthropology, ethnicity is being replaced, bit-by-bit, with the concepts of common narratives, social spaces, ethnic landscapes and groupings. The approach to these concepts is limited, however. The silent human groups deprived of their spaces cannot be seen in this new frame yet.[31]

3. Varied loose communities are imagined, configured and embodied, from time to time, in landscapes, spaces, narratives and groupings; generally

[31] Colonial studies drew attention to the degree to which this is the case. See Spivak, Gayarti C: Can the Subaltern Speak? *Wedge* Nr. 7–8, 1985. 120–130; Chambers, Iain: Signs of silence, lines of listening. In Chambers – Curti, ibid. 47–64.

as a consequence of resistance to a (feeling of) threat. In other words, there are politics of identities – or at least these are most visible – that fight for the right to and recognition of the existence of experiences common to the group, but particular in the context of a larger unit.[32] It seems that the fixation, inference and enumeration of collective identities, or homogenization, is not so much an efficient tool of science (and thereby understanding) as of power (and thereby control). Science can finally return to the quantitative *and* qualitative analysis of social acts and power relations.

Transleted by Enikő Horváth

[32] Similar observations guide Clifford Geertz. See Geertz, Clifford: "Primordial Loyalties and Standing Entities. Anthropological Reflections on the Politics of Identity." Delivered at Collegium Budapest. Budapest, 13. December 1993. http://www.colbud.hu/main/PubArchive/PL/PL07-Geertz.pdf

ENIKŐ HORVÁTH

All Things European: Citizenship and Identity in Search of Meaning

The pomp and circumstance surrounding the signing of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe [Constitutional Treaty][1] was the finale of years of deliberation on the 'future of the Union.'[2] At the ceremony, references to '*fraternité européenne*,' '*solidarité européenne*'[3] and the 'values' of Europe[4] abounded. Certainly, the moment was a historical one, deserving praise. But what about the assumptions of the existence of a fraternal (sisterly?) 'us,' the Europeans? Our existence is implied throughout the Treaty as the basis for the latter's very existence. In other words, there is supposedly *something* that joins the states of and peoples in the European Union [EU or Union] in a common enterprise – at the very least, the values and objectives listed in the Constitutional Treaty. Rec. 4, for example, declares, 'thus 'United in diversity,' Europe offers them [us] the best chance of pursuing […] the great venture which makes of it a special area of human hope.'

Granted, the passage just cited raises more questions than it answers. Since when does the EU equal Europe? Is the former the basis for the unity referred to? Or is there a deeper unity beyond the institutional? These are questions that have been raised repeatedly since the inception of what is now the Union. CT art. 1–1(1), in fact, gives one answer: the Constitutional Treaty reflects the 'the will of the citizens […] of Europe.' Thus, European citizenship joins us. The information booklet for the public on the 'Constitution for Europe' gives another answer. It describes EU 'symbols' as 'important, since they enable Europeans to identify more with Europe' – the flag, in

1 OJ 2004 C310. The Constitutional Treaty was signed on October 29, 2004. As of January 2005, only 2 of the 25 member states have ratified it.
2 The Future of the European Union – Laeken Declaration (2001).
3 José Manuel Barroso, Speech 04/478 (October 29, 2004).
4 Romano Prodi, Speech 04/479 (October 29, 2004).

particular, is the symbol of 'Europe's unity and identity.'[5] So, we may have a European identity uniting us.

But what constitutes European citizenship? And European identity? [6] What kind of status and identity are they anyway? And why are they necessary? These are some of the questions to be examined here, in part by looking at the interaction of the two big ideas – both trotted out at regular intervals as tools of legitimization or explanation. After a historical overview, the present state of each will be presented (with due knowledge that European citizenship is easier to describe than an identity.)[7] Finally, some considerations for the future will be introduced.

The European Community, as an essentially economy-focused entity, initially paid no attention to identity or culture. Besides a mention of possible 'ever closer union among the peoples of Europe'[8] no thought was given to cultural interaction, let alone identity-issues. By the early 1970's, however, as integration spread beyond the economic sector, interest in culture as a sphere of Community interest had emerged. Parallel to the growth of interest in commercial cultural policy, it was recognized that, while '*[e]in Bürgerbewustsein […] Voraussetzung [war], um eine Europäische Gemeinschaft zu bilden*.', '*[ein] Defizit an europäischer Identität der Bürger Europas*'[9] was, instead, characteristic. Thus, a European identity was necessary to further integration.[10] That this question should arise increasingly insistently in the context of quickened integration should come as no surprise, since it goes to the heart of a conception of the Union, for two reasons. One, because if we consider Europeanization, or the increasing growth and depth of the EU, as an ongoing process rather than a concrete entity, one's concept of 'Europe' will

5 A Constitution for Europe 11 (2004).

6 Though one would do well to distinguish between types of European identity when assessing the effects of European integration, few scholars make this distinction. See Franz C. Mayer and Jan Palmowski: European Identities and the EU – The Ties that the Peoples of Europe, Vol. 42, Nr. 3, *JCMS,* 573, 575 (2004).

7 'Identity' serves here as shorthand for social identity, unless otherwise specified, understood according to the approach of social identity theory. See James E. Cameron: A Three-Factor Model of Social Identity. *Self and Identity,* Vol. 3, 2004.239 for an overview. 'Cultural identity,' a subset thereof, is used after Anthony D. Smith: National Identity and the Idea of European Unity. *International Affairs,* Vol. 68, 1992: 55, 58 – national identity is accordingly a kind of cultural identity.

8 Treaty of Rome, Preamble (1957).

9 Olaf Schwencke: Das Europa der Kulturen – Kulturpolitik in Europa, 162 (2001).

10 Despite this recognition, the first mention of a 'European identity' in a Community document, in the Preamble of the Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity (1973), was in the context of external relations.

determine the path of development. This path is of some concern to all actors involved, from the member-states to the Commission. Two, because of the recognition of a need for legitimacy for the project – on the model of nation-states, a shared collective identity (a 'European' one) would seem to be a good means to the end envisaged.

Such internal identity concerns appeared for the first time in a Community instrument only in 1983, as part of the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration. A '*coopération plus étroite en matière culturelle, pour affirmer la conscience d'un héritage culturel commun en tant qu'élément de l'identité européenne*'[11] is a stated objective of the Declaration. One of these committees consequently set up to examine aspects of further integration dealt with the concept of a common European identity, as well as how such an identity could be developed. The resulting Adonnino Report[12] makes specific recommendations with regard to rights that are now considered fundamental to European citizenship – such as freedom of movement, right of establishment, right of residence –; as well as to citizens' participation. It also recommends action in the spheres of education and commercial culture 'which is essential to European identity and the Community's image in the minds of its people.'[13] Thus, by the mid-80's, the concept of European identity had been linked to citizenship, as well as to a wider Community role in cultural policy.[14]

A concern with the European citizen could, in fact, already been seen in the 1975 Tindemans Report.[15] There, two specific courses of action were suggested in the sphere of citizenship: one, an increase in and protection of fundamental rights and two, external signs of solidarity.[16] The second path is the one further developed by the Adonnino report ten years later through its suggestions on European identity. The big breakthrough, however, came in 1992, with the inclusion of TEC[17] arts. 17 (on citizenship) and 151 (on cul-

11 Stuttgart Solemn Declaration § 1.4.3 (1983). *EC Bulletin* 1983/6 (French).

12 Also referred to by the title 'A People's Europe.' *EC Bulletin*, Suppl. 7/85.

13 Id., at 21.

14 This wider role can be seen in some of the Report's suggestions: a flag, an anthem, money, stamps ('which commemorate particularly important events in Community history'), 'Europe Day,' a European passport, school materials and institutions 'appropriate' for presenting 'European achievements, and the common heritage' and 'the originality of European civilization in all its wealth and diversity.'

15 Also referred to by the title 'European Union.' *EC Bulletin Suppl.* 1/76.

16 Id., at 26.

17 (Consolidated) Treaty Establishing the European Community [TEC]. Article references are to the numbering system in effect since the Amsterdam Treaty.

ture) through the Maastricht Treaty.[18] This breakthrough, however, also brought a clear decision to disconnect cultural identity and citizenship – the fact of two separate articles shows as much. The determination seems to have been but momentary however, and is present only in the text of the Treaty itself, since the link of culture and citizenship seems to have become more central again in recent years.

European Citizenship, or the Question of Instrumentality

The concept of European citizenship, though present in Community discourse since 1969,[19] assumed a legal character only through the introduction, through Maastricht, of TEC arts. 17–22 (CT art. I-10). Three elements in particular were considered important in creating European citizenship: freedom of movement, political rights and 'identification with Europe.'[20] The first two of these aims are, in fact, reflected in the TEC articles: freedom of movement is guaranteed in art. 18(1); the right to vote in municipal and European Parliament elections in arts. 19(1), 190(4) and 19(2) respectively; the right to information regarding Union institutions in one of the official languages of the Union in art. 21 and a related right to access to documents in art. 255; the right to petition an Ombudsman or the European Parliament in arts. 21, 194 and 195. The right to diplomatic protection by any member-state in countries without representation by one's own state is included in art. 20.[21] However, the rights of Union citizens reach farther than those enumerated in these articles. As per art. 17(2), European citizens enjoy all rights 'conferred by the Treaty' – i.e. all rights through secondary law issued on the basis of the Treaty, or all those available under Union law, including those found in the (soon to be legally binding) European Charter,[22] as well as 'fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States' (TEU art. 6(2)).

Commentary on all elements of European citizenship, from the idea to its content and significance has covered a wide range, but can generally be

18 Treaty on European Union [TEU].

19 Third General Report on the Activities of the European Union 527 et seq. (1969).

20 Stefan Kadelbach: Union Citizenship 9, *Jean Monnet Working Papers,* 9/03 (2003). Available at: http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/030901–04.pdf. See also the Tindemans Report already discussed, supra note 15.

21 In light of the requirements set out in CT art. III-127 there is hope that this right will soon become a meaningful one.

22 But see Case T-54/99 *Maxmobil v. Commission* [2002] ECR II-313, where the Court of First Instance already referred to the Charter as a source of fundamental rights (para. 48).

grouped into two approaches: the first focuses on the rights and duties that accompany it; the second on its identity function. In particular, the former has assessed European citizenship in the context of fundamental rights; and found it a pale imitation of the some pre-existing notion of citizenship, one based, often unconsciously, on that of nation-states, as either a positive or negative example. In other words, an increased scope of rights to an expanded group of persons is urged, as well as the complete de-linkage of European citizenship from member-state nationality.[23] These assessments are, however, problematic. For one thing, even the assumption of European citizenship as a prerequisite for fundamental rights is precarious. A European citizen is an individual who holds the nationality of a member-state (TEC art. 17(1)). But, as Kadelbach discusses, 'holders of fundamental freedoms are all those upon whom the Community legal order has conferred such rights.'[24] For example, the right to free movement may be extended to nationals of non member-states[25] and denied European citizens;[26] the right to petition the European Parliament or the Ombudsman, for example, extends to all legal residents.[27] In the context of human rights more generally, instruments such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ECHR extend rights to all individuals under the jurisdiction of the given state (except where stated otherwise). Thus, whatever human rights (as distinct from some citizenship rights) are afforded European citizens are extended to third-country nationals, both through the Community framework[28] and through regional and international instruments.[29] Also, the Amsterdam Treaty has added a number of rights based on criteria other than European

23 See, e.g., Síofra O'Leary: European Union Citizenship: the Options for Reform 89 et seq. (1996); Jean Denis Mouton: La Citoyenneté de l'Union: Passé, Présent et Avenir 18 et seq. (1996); Helen Staples: The Legal Status of Third Country Nationals Resident in the EU 335 et seq. (1999).

24 Kadelbach, supra note 20, at 7.

25 See arts. 28, 31 and 36 of the EEA Treaty, OJ 1994 L1 for conditions applicable to EFTA member-states; and Case C-262/96 *Sema Sürül v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit* ECR [1999] ECR I-2685 for a discussion of the conditions that apply to Turkish nationals.

26 See below.

27 Curiously, a number of rights not exclusive to European citizens (right to good administration in art. II-101, right to access documents in art. II-102, right to petition the Ombudsman in art. II-103 and right to petition the European Parliament in art. II-104) have been kept under the heading of 'Citizens' Rights' in CT Part II, Title V; moreover, they are mixed in among rights truly limited to European citizens.

28 E.g. Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (OJ 2000 L180); Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L303).

29 E.g. the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR.

citizenship (see arts. 141, 153, 255, 286). Given that member-state nationality,[30] on the one hand, and human rights instruments, on the other, remain the main avenues of guaranteeing rights, the call for an extension of European citizenship in either of these directions[31] is an outcome of somewhat limited thinking – one based on existing realities, not on possibilities of development.

In light of the proliferation of legal statuses in Europe – e.g. (member-state) national, dual-national, European citizen, third-country national, resident, permanent resident – traditional notions of citizenship, based on the model of the nation-state, are not the standard against which to measure provisions on European citizenship.[32] The authors asserting that European citizenship does not go far enough seem to forget that the EU is not a nation-state, but an entity near the confluence of international, regional and national law. In terms of international law on nationality, the fact that member-states must provide diplomatic protection to each others' nationals is already an anomaly – despite the lack of guarantees for this right to individuals.[33] That they must mutually recognize decisions on the grant or removal of nationality[34] and that Community law may interfere in such matters[35] is even more unusual, since nationality has until recently served to determine membership in the political community of the modern welfare state. States have accordingly reserved to themselves the right to inspect grants of this status/legal relationship.[36] As such, nationality has not only been an important function of sovereignty, but also a sign of the national identity politics of the state.

30 'Nationality' is used here to define the bond between an individual and a state for purposes of international law; 'citizenship' determines the domestic content of that bond.

31 See e.g. Álvaro Castro Oliveira: The Position of Resident Third-Country Nationals. In Massimo La Torre (ed.): *European Citizenship: an Institutional Challenge*. 1998. 185, 196. Compare CT art. III-265(2), which foresees a right to travel for third-country nationals, independent of European citizenship.

32 See (Third) Report from the Commission on Citizenship of the Union, COM (2001) 506 final, at 7.

33 See Kadelbach, supra note 20, at 28 et seq.

34 See Case 369/90 *Mario Vicente Micheletti and others v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria* [1992] ECR I-4239; and *Chen and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2004] ECR not yet reported. See also TEU Declaration No. 2 on Nationality of a Member State (1992). The extension of the nationality of the Federal Republic of Germany to former East-German nationals is a concrete example.

35 See Case C-192/99 *The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Manjit Kaur* [2001] ECR I-1237, para. 19.

36 See *Liechtenstein v. Guatemala* (Judgment, Second Phase), 1955 ICJ Rep. 4, 23 (1955).

In fact, considering that most citizenship rights are traditionally and in accordance with international law restricted to nationals,[37] the development of European citizenship has been spirited – and atypical of international practice. For example, the political community – circumscribed by state borders – is no longer linked to the territory in which rights may be exercised. Instead, the territory of rights spreads far beyond the territory of the community. Thus, member-state nationals enjoy a number of citizenship rights (free movement and residence, non-discrimination, etc.) throughout the Union that used to be limited to the territory of the state only. As a corollary, it is not only nationals who enjoy certain rights in the territory of the member-state, but a much larger group, extending, through the Long-Term Residence Directive[38] to third-country nationals legally resident in a member-state.[39] The citizenship-nationality link that formed the basis of the nation-state has thus been broken. Because of this development – and in a nod of good-bye to sovereignty – it is not the members of the given political community (the member-state nationals) that determine the content of the scope of applicable rights, but a supra-state entity, namely the EU.

The fact of citizenship rights, as such, with an extended geographical reach beyond the state is thus distinctly new. Moreover, despite early pessimism,[40] the effects of European citizenship have not been so insignificant. For one thing, in *Martínez Sala*[41] the Court determined that 'a national of a Member State lawfully residing in the territory of another Member State […] comes within the scope *ratione personae* of the provisions of the Treaty on European citizenship' (para. 61). In other words, the mere (legal) presence of

37 There is likely an 'international minimum standard' of non-discriminatory treatment that must be afforded to non-nationals, subsumed into the general body of international human rights law. Richard B. Lillich: The Human Rights of Aliens. *Contemporary International Law*, 49–56 (1984). However, the 'sartorial tastes of the State involved' still determine the extent of non-national protection. Id., at 122. Accordingly, some European states have extended social and local voting rights to non-nationals, others haven't.

38 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents (OJ 2003 L16).

39 A whole thread of literature on European citizenship focuses on its possible development as a means of granting citizenship rights through member-state residence, not nationality. See Norbert Reich: Union Citizenship – Metaphor or Source of Rights? Vol. 7, Nr. 1, 2001. 4, 15. *European Law Journal,* 4, 15 et seq. (2001).

40 See, inter alia, Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira: European Citizenship: Its Meaning, Its Potential. In Renaud Dehousse (ed.): *Europe After Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union?* 126, 147 (1995); Catherine Barnard, Article 13: Through the Looking Glass of Union Citizenship. In David O'Keeffe and Patrick Twomey (eds.): *Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty.* 1999. 375.

41 Case C-85/96 *Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern* [1998] ECR I-2691.

a European citizen in another member state is enough for Community law to apply: the scope of national legislation in which Community law principles may enter has been expanded significantly.[42] With regard to rights, it is worth considering that there are no other regions in the world where the right to free movement beyond and between state borders or the right to equal treatment with nationals of other states exists.[43] In a number of decisions, moreover, the ECJ has given both principles wide interpretations.[44] In the recent *Chen* case, the Court determined that the (third-country national) mother of a minor child holding the nationality of Ireland – born in the member state exactly so both could reside in the UK – had a right to residence in the UK, on the basis of the child's right to free movement and to residence under TEC art. 18, in conjunction with Council Directive 90/364.[45] The case is noteworthy not only because of the extended chain of entitlements, but also because the child's right residence in the UK is clearly based only on its European citizenship (see paras. 26–27).

With regard to equal treatment, in *Bickel and Franz*[46], for example, the Court determined that the right of minority individuals in a given state to use their language in criminal proceedings must be extended to non-nationals speaking the same language, on the basis of the principles of free movement and non-discrimination. The opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in that case makes the basis of the decision clear: '[t]he notion of citizenship of the Union implies a commonality of rights and obligations uniting Union citizens by

42 See also Case C-413/99 *Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2001] ECR I-7091 ('since […] Union citizenship has been introduced into the EC Treaty […] Article 18(1) EC has conferred a right, for every citizen, to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States,' para. 81).

43 But see discussion of possible exceptions below. (The relevant directives repealed by Directive 2004/38/EC, discussed below, also included a whole litany of limitations and conditions.)

44 In the context of freedom of movement, see Case C-348/96 *Criminal Proceedings against Donatella Calfa* [2000] ECR I-11; Case C-413/99 *Baumbast*, supra note 42. See also the Advocate General's opinion in Case C-224/02, *Heikki Antero Pusa v. Osuuspankkien Keskinäinen Vakuutusyhtiö* (not yet reported), para. 22 ('subject to the limits set out in Article 18 itself, no unjustified burden may be imposed on any citizen of the European Union seeking to exercise the right to freedom of movement or residence.') But see Case C-378/97 *Criminal Proceedings against Wijsenbeek* [1999] ECR I-6207. In the context of the principle of non-discrimination, see Case C-281/98 *Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA* [2000] ECR I-4139 (extending the prohibition to private actors).

45 Case C-200/02 *Chen and Others*, supra note 34.

46 Case C-274/96 *Criminal Proceedings against Bickel and Franz* [1998] ECR I-7637.

a common bond transcending Member State nationality' (para. 23).[47] This reasoning has, moreover, been extended to the realm of social rights. Specifically, in the *Grzelczyk* case[48] the Court determined that a member-state could not refuse student benefits to a student who is a national of another member-state solely on this basis, since such action constitutes discrimination under art. 12. The decision is interesting also because the Court specifically states (in paras. 34–36) that the introduction of European citizenship makes this outcome possible. In other words, a conscious choice was made here to expand the scope of European citizenship.[49]

Moreover, the possibility that nationality will give way 'to the residence principle in relation to Union citizens' is certainly present.[50] In a significant step in this direction, Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States,[51] first suggested by the Commission's Third Report on Citizenship of the Union, clarifies and adds to the rights of European citizens with regard to residence in another member state. As rec. 1 states, 'citizenship of the Union confers on every citizen of the Union the primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.' Yet, his right – encompassed by one of the fundamental freedoms – has been attached to a number of limitations, financial, administrative and legal, and differentiated by categories, such as 'worker' or 'student.'[52] Under the terms of this instrument, however, European citizens – as such – have the clear right to exit their member state (art. 4) and enter another (art. 5) with valid

47 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs [1998] ECR I-7637. The Advocate General also distinguishes the case from Case 137/84 *Ministère Public v. Robert Heinrich Maria Mutsch* [1985] ECR 2681, where the right to use a given language in court proceedings emanated from a specific Regulation.

48 Case 184/99 *Rudy Grzelczyk v. le Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve* [2001] ECR 6193.

49 See also discussion of case law on citizenship in Catherine Jacqueson: Union Citizenship and the Court of Justice: Something New Under the Sun? *European Law Review*, Vol. 27, Nr. 3, 2002. 260, 268. A comparison with Advocate General Alber's opinion in the case at issue, where he attempts to subsume Mr. Grzelczyk into the category of 'workers' and relies only hesitantly on art. 17 rights shows the more traditional route the Court could have taken.

50 Kadelbach, supra note 20, at 33.

51 OJ 2004 L229.

52 Family members (as per art. 2(2)), whether European citizens or not, also enjoy the rights enumerated. In fact, the right of family members, once acquired indirectly through the European citizen, are in many cases retained even after the family ties have been broken (see art. 12). (The status of family members has been the subject of a number of ECJ decisions, most notably Case C-413/99 *Baumbast*, supra note 42.)

identity cards only. The right, while not new, is now clearly granted European citizens in a piece of legislation. Alas, it is still not absolute, since possible restrictions on the grounds of public- policy, security and health remain (see art. 27–29); still, the potential scope of such restrictions have been considerably curtailed, while a number of procedural safeguards (including redress procedures) have been added (see arts. 30–33).

As per arts. 6 and 7 moreover, individuals have the right to residence in other member states: without any conditions for a period of three months and on the basis of strictly limited conditions (and administrative formalities, as per art. 8) for periods extending beyond three months. Individuals are, furthermore, entitled to permanent residence in any member state in which they have legally resided for 'a continuous period of five years' (art. 16(1), but see shorter period, as per art. 17). As the Preamble states, this right 'would strengthen the feeling of Union citizenship and is a key element in promoting social cohesion' (rec. 17). In other words, permanent residence is a means to the end of identification with European citizenship (and hence, the development of solidarity among European citizens.) Respect for 'integration' into host member-state society (see Preamble recs. 23 and 24) as the basis for protection against expulsion, in turn, reflects a concern with identification with another member-state. As per art. 28(1), any expulsion decision must take into account not just length of residence, state of health, economic and family ties, but also 'social and cultural integration into the host Member State and the extent of his/her links with the country of origin.' It seems that the possibility of attachment by European citizens to more than one member-state (culture and society) is acknowledged.

And what about obligations? Strictly speaking, we still cannot speak of the direct ones – but there are counterparts to obligations, suggesting that European citizenship may soon come with duties. One example of such a counterpart is that, as a consequence of the European arrest warrant introduced in 2002,[53] the principle of international law whereby states may refuse the extradition of their own nationals (enshrined in a number of Constitutions, e.g. art. 16(2) of the German *Grundgesetz*) – in light of the personal jurisdiction of states over their nationals – has been invalidated in the context of the Union. Thus, European citizens must now be surrendered to another member-state, upon request, with only few exceptions. Though a number of conventions relating to extradition had been in place among member-

[53] Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L190).

states,[54] the new practice (as of January 1, 2004), based on the principle of 'mutual recognition' (see Framework Decision art. 1(1)), has limited the grounds for refusal of surrender to the grounds listed in arts. 3 and 4. All grounds are of an administrative and judicial nature; and are independent of traditional sovereignty concerns. Only Preamble rec. 12 makes any reference to the application of the 'constitutional rules' of member-states, but curtails these to a very limited area. That said, courts are thus far proving quite creative in finding reasons to refuse surrender.[55]

The Constitutional Treaty, in turn, refers to citizenship and citizens in almost mantra-like fashion (e.g., arts. I-1, I-3(2), I-10, I-45-I-47, all of Title V of Part II and all of Title II of Part III.) No surprise, perhaps, considering it is presented (like all constitutions) as a document in the name of the people of the respective political entity. (That in the case of the EU the document also expresses the will of the member states does not mean diminished importance in this respect.) The newly central place of the citizen can be glimpsed most clearly in the articles declaring the Union a 'representative' and 'participatory' democracy (arts. I-46 and I-47, respectively). Though the process of citizenship – or an activist conception thereof, in addition to the identity-linked function discussed below – was of central concern from the introduction of the citizen into European law, there is a change of focus here. TEC art. 191 had opened up the possibility of a European politico-legal space – and the eventual emergence of a European *demos* – through its reference to 'political parties at European level.' The activist concern referred to above was present in the language declaring that such parties contribute to 'expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union' while an identity function was present in their role in 'forming a European awareness.' Still, not much happened until the Nice Treaty (2001), when a paragraph was added allowing for the drafting of regulations governing such parties. The requisite regulation was quickly adopted,[56] but has not resulted in significant development – parties 'continue to suffer from a series of 'deficit-gaps' which make it abun-

54 In particular, European Convention on Extradition (1957) and Protocols; Convention of 10 March 1995 on simplified extradition procedure between the Member States of the European Union (OJ C78); Convention of 27 September 1996 relating to extradition between the Member States of the European Union (OJ C313).

55 See, i.e., Le tribunal de Pau émet une interprétation restrictive du mandat d'arrẹt européen. *Le Monde*, June 2, 2004.

56 Regulation 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding (OJ 2003 L297).

dantly clear that formal-legal developments […] need to be paralleled by forms of structural and psycho-emotional linkage with European citizens.'[57]

The Constitutional Treaty attempts to make a few of these changes, however small. One, the stress on the Union as not only representative, but also participatory in character announces a more direct link between itself and individuals. The best example for this is the only new citizenship right introduced, under art. I-47(4): the right to initiate Commission law-preparation, through the procedure of a 'citizens' initiative.' The other paragraphs of that article suggest a generally more inclusive approach, with references to 'dialogue' with 'civil society' and 'representative associations' – though these do not have the legal underpinning of European laws the citizens' initiative does. Another change is the repeated emphasis in art. I-46 on the ways in which the Union is 'representative' and 'accountable,' as well as the newly added 'right to participate' listed in paragraph three.[58] Thus, political parties are now only one means of representation, not the means to 'integration' – in fact, they are now a means to 'European political awareness,' not 'European awareness,' generally speaking. One can, of course, read these modifications as a downgrading of the role of the political parties introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. In light of the stellar symbolic rise of the European citizen – now one of the two pillars of the European constitutional enterprise – however, they are better read as normalization. In other words, European political parties are (hoped to be) no longer the anomalies they were upon their introduction.

Despite the symbolic role of the European citizen in the Constitutional Treaty, her rights and obligations have seen no significant change. Still, further development has come in indirect guise, and somewhat surprisingly, through the domestic law of member-states. Germany, for example, now allows nationals of other member-states to keep their original nationality at naturalization, on the condition of reciprocity, while third-country nationals must give theirs up (special circumstances notwithstanding), as per AusIG §87(2).[59] In Italy (as well as a number of other member-states) European citizens have access to Italian nationality after a shorter period of residence (four years) than third-country nationals (ten years), as per Legge 5 febbraio 1992,

57 Stephen Day and Jo Shaw: Transnational Political Parties. In Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione and Jo Shaw (eds.): *Making European Citizens: Strategies for Civic Inclusion*. 2005, forthcoming.

58 Compare art. II-72, which includes no such right. In fact, the placement of the right in Part III and its omission among the 'fundamental rights' is striking. (The active and passive voting rights included in arts. II-99 and II-100 cover slightly more limited ground.)

59 See also StAG §§ 4(3) and 29, in conjunction with AusIG § 87.

no. 91, art. 9(1)(d).[60] The legal effects can spread beyond laws of nationality, however. In Hungary, for example, the proposed Minority Rights Act submitted to Parliament in March 2004 (amending and revising the 1993 Act),[61] extends personal application to European citizens, among others (§28).[62] It is indeed the case that 'EU nationalities are less exclusive in relation to each other than they are to outside nationalities'[63] – on the basis of both European and domestic law.

As for the realm of possibilities, Nic Shuibhne, for example, argues in the context of extended language rights that '[t]o fulfill the idea of citizenship in real terms, the expansion of associated rights must reflect the integrity of various identity-forming characteristics.'[64] The way is thus open for the ECJ to interpret European citizenship as a 'whole' concept, its rights capable of reflecting and protecting existing identities. The Court has, in fact, delivered a number of decisions protecting some element of individual identity, albeit always indirectly. In the *Garcia Avello* case,[65] for example, the Court determined that a member-state could not refuse an application to change the surnames of resident dual member-state nationals 'in the case where the purpose of that application is to enable those children to bear the surname to which they are entitled according to the law and tradition of the second Member State.' The reasoning of the Court was based on a reaffirmation that 'citizenship of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States' (para. 22); through this status, nationals of the member-states in the same situation may, within the scope *ratione materiae* of the EC Treaty, enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality (para. 23).[66]

On this basis, the Court could have found that the principle of non-discrimination required dual-nationals to be treated in accordance with the law of

60 The common practice in Italy of sub-dividing foreigners into *comunitari* and *extracomunitari* (generally on the basis of skin color and/or accent, rather than nationality) is a less obvious example of indirect effects.

61 1993. évi LXXVII. törvény a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségek jogairól. *Magyar Közlöny,* 1993/5273.

62 T/9126 számú törvényjavaslat a kisebbségi önkormányzati képviselők választásáról, valamint a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségekre vonatkozó egyes törvények módosításáról.

63 Mayer and Palmowksi, supra note 6, at 591.

64 Niamh Nic Shuibhne: EC Law and Minority Language Policy: Culture, Citizenship and Fundamental Rights Nr. 45, 2002.

65 Case C-148/02 *Carlos Garcia Avello v. État Belge* [2003] not yet reported.

66 See also Case 388/01 *Commission v. Italy (Museum Entry)* [2003] ECR 721 (advantageous entry rates for province/town residents only is discriminatory to nationals of other member-states.) (The Court's reliance on the free movement principle, not European citizenship, to bring the matter within the scope of Community law is also noteworthy.)

the state in which they reside, instead of determining that the law of another member-state could be imported into the state of residence. However, the Court decided that the situation of a dual-national was different from that of a national, due to possible administrative difficulties (paras. 36–37). The final result, then, is a boost for individual cultural identity, on the basis of bureaucracy.[67] But what if the Court had gone a different route? What if, as Advocate General Jacobs argued back in 1993,[68] the Court had decided that an inability to use one's name, in accordance with one's own tradition, in another member state constituted a loss of 'dignity, moral integrity and sense of personal identity'[69] and that such treatment, in itself, constituted discrimination when compared to the nationals of the given member-state, whose names were respected? Or, that such treatment could be a hindrance to freedom of movement, since individuals presumably do not enjoy their personal identity being tampered with, and may consider such a possibility when deciding whether to exercise this particular freedom?

In this connection, the inadequacies of rights protection at the Community level come to the fore. Despite the ECJ's announcement of a role for human rights in Community jurisprudence as far back as 1974,[70] it took 26 more years for a Charter of Fundamental Rights to be drawn up. Though the inclusion of this Charter in the Constitutional Treaty, in Part II, gives the former binding legal force and thereby places fundamental rights squarely at the heart of Community jurisprudence – and despite the foreseeable Union accession to the ECHR (see CT art. I-7, in conjunction with ECJ Opinion 2/94),[71] problems remain, particularly in the area of cultural rights and in the closely related question of minority rights.[72] Both topics are too complex

67 See also Case 168/91 *Christos Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig Standesamt* [1993] ECR 1191 (finding that the individual was entitled to a given transliteration of his name, on the basis of the 'inconvenience' diverse spellings may cause and the effect they may have on freedom of establishment.)

68 See also the ECtHR decision *Burghartz v. Switzerland* (Judgment of 22 February 1994), Series A No 280-B 28, para. 24; and ICCPR art. 24(2).

69 Para. 39 of Advocate General Jacobs' opinion in Case 168/91, supra note 67.

70 Case 4/73 *Nold v. Commission* [1974] ECR 491 (identifying 'international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories' and the common constitutional traditions of member-states – whatever these may be – as the source of fundamental rights principles; para. 13).

71 Opinion 2/94 *European Convention* [1996] I-1759.

72 See Gaetano Pentassuglia: The EU and the Protection of Minorities: The Case of Eastern Europe, *European Law Journal,* Vol. 12, Nr. 3, 2001. 3. for an early evaluation, as well as the contributions in Gabriel N. Toggenburg (ed.): *Minority Protection and the Enlarged European Union: The Way Forward.* 2004, for a thorough examination.

fully to present here, so only a few words will do for our purposes. In the context of the former, Community (or, for that matter ECHR) law has little relevance – there is no such right – despite the abundance of general references to 'Union […] respect' for 'cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.'[73] As for minority rights, a reference to respect for 'the rights of persons belonging to minorities' did, finally, find a place among the values of the Union (CT art. I-2), but is not truly followed up on later in the treaty.[74] One could perhaps forgive the Union for not addressing these matters for reasons of competence and political prudence if it weren't for the constant pre-occupation with and instrumentalization of all kinds of identity: for an entity that increasingly affects the cultural policies of its member-states and urges increased cross-cultural interaction – while considering 'diversity' a value and an objective – a disregard for such questions is out of place.

In fact, the Commission and Parliament have been active in the areas of both cultural and minority rights, without much result.[75] During the preparation of the text on Union citizenship in 1992, for example, the Commission proposed an article stating that '[e]very Union citizen shall have the right to cultural expression and the obligation to respect cultural expression in others.'[76] The necessity of such an article was explained by the principle of the dignity and diversity of individuals and was regarded as a corollary of Community competence in cultural matters. In other words, the Commission tried to link a right to cultural expression both to European citizenship and to the Community's newly-gained cultural functions.

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73 CT art. II-82. See also arts. I-3(3) and III-280. There are, however, references to language rights in Community law. See Case 137/84 *Mutsch*, supra note 47; TEC art. 21.

74 E.g. bases of discrimination to be combated by European measures (art. III-124) do not include language and membership in a national minority, among others, though these are prohibited grounds of discrimination under art. II-81. Or, while regions have a constitutionally protected place in the EU system (art. I-5(1)), as well as a place in its structure through the Committee for the Regions, minorities have no such protection. A proposal for a Committee of National and Ethnic Minorities was distinctly rejected during the Convention process. See CONV 580/03 (Contribution of József Szájer, February 26, 2003).

75 See also: Call for proposals for European Commission backing involving actions in favour of promoting and safeguarding regional or minority languages and cultures, OJ 1995 C322; Support from the European Commission for measures to promote and safeguard regional and minority languages and cultures, OJ 2000 C266. See also Parliament Resolution on Linguistic and Cultural Minorities in the European Community, OJ 1994 C61.

76 *EC Bulletin Suppl.* 2/91, 85, 86.

Identity Conundrums

We are thus back to the question of identity and citizenship. As discussed, the last aim of the European citizenship project in 1992 was an 'identification with Europe': the symbolic aspect of citizenship already identified by the Tindemans Report. Though there is no reference to this aim in the actual articles of any treaty – is it any wonder? – the concern is certainly behind many Community acts.[77] As Prodi stated a few years ago:

> "We have created a customs union […] built an economic and monetary union […] laid the foundations of a political union […]. [W]e need now […] a union of hearts and minds, underpinned by a strong shared sentiment of a common destiny – a sense of common European citizenship. We come from different countries […] speak different languages […] have different historical and cultural traditions. And we must preserve them. But we are seeking a shared identity – a new European soul."[78]

This statement fits well with the view, expressed in art. 17(2), that European citizenship is a process rather than a thing ready-made.[79] Whatever its contents then, European citizenship is a concept oriented toward a sometime, future conception of 'common destiny.' This has been reiterated in the Constitutional Treaty also (Preamble, rec. 3.) But a sense of common destiny is an element of collective identity. How can it also be the basis for it? The underlying reasoning is thus a tad circular: 'while identification with a „European" consciousness can be said to derive from some sort of shared loyalty, this affinity is equally necessary for its continued fabrication.'[80] This is something the Commission seems to have recognized. In a 2004 Communication on cultural and educational policies – which suspiciously abounds with references to European citizenship[81] – a strengthened sense of 'shared European cultural val-

77 See Síofra O'Leary: *The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship*, 1996, chap. 1 for a survey of considerations taken into account during the preparation of the citizenship articles. See also the link drawn between culture and citizenship in the context of the Kaléidoscope programme, Decision No. 716/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 March 1996 establishing a programme to support artistic and cultural activities having a European dimension (OJ 1996 L99).

78 Romano Prodi, addressing the European Parliament (September 14, 1999.) *EU Bulletin*, 9/1999 § 2.2.1.

79 See also Making Citizenship Work: Fostering European Culture and Diversity Through Programmes for Youth, Culture, Audiovisual and Civic Participation, Communication from the Commission, COM(2004)154 final, 2.

80 Nic Shuibhne, supra note 64, at 130.

81 Communication 154, supra note 79, at 2–7.

ues'[82] is the hoped-for basis for a '*developing* European identity,'[83] which could, in turn, provide a deeper basis for citizenship than exists at present. Thus, it is hoped that a discovery of existing commonalties, coupled with a sense of participation in the European project will be enough to make European citizenship matter. The claimed representative and participatory nature of the Union is, in turn, to help the formation of '*political* awareness,' in part through political parties at the European level – which could affect the European identity that informs citizenship. Seemingly a two-pronged attack on perceived indifference to the European project, then – but what if the cycle never takes off?

Unsurprisingly, the symbolic element of European citizenship has also captured the imagination of many commentators who also seem to agree that law can be a means to creating identification, and constitutes the second main line of commentary.[84] Again, the example of the nation-state is not far in the background here;[85] though the authors in question generally assume they are going past the national, since they rely on core values rather than a common culture as the basis for the collective identity to be developed.[86] An 'overlapping consensus that results in a political conception of justice, shared through a political community'[87] does not, however, create a shared identity. For one thing, there is not yet a European political community – despite elections to the European parliament, European political parties and European citizenship, few EU citizens see themselves as joined in a shared political space;[88]

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82 Id., at 9.

83 Id., at 5. (Emphasis in original.)

84 See Jürgen Habermas: Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe. In Ronald Beiner (ed.): *Theorizing Citizenship*, 1995. 255; Neil MacCormick: Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the "European Commonwealth" *Law and Philosophy*, Vol. 16, 1997. 333, 342. See also Carlo Gamberale: European Citizenship and Political Identity, *Space and Polity*, Vol. 1, Nr. 37, 1997. Percy B. Lehning: European Citizenship: Towards a European Identity? *Law and Philosophy*, Vol. 20, 2001. 239.

85 Or, in some cases, it is clearly stated: 'the concept of liberal democratic citizenship developed for a nation-state, should be extended.' Lehning, id., at 257.

86 E.g. Habermas, supra note 84; Deirdre Curtin: *Postnational Democracy: The European Union in Search of a Political Philosophy*, 1997.

87 See Lehning, supra note 84, at 250.

88 In other words, there is not yet a European *demos*. See Ulrich K. Preuß: Prospects of a Constitution for Europe, *Constellations*, Vol. 3, 1995. 209, 214. Lehning, supra note 84, at 275; J.H.H. Weiler: The Constitution of Europe 346–347 (1999); see also *Brunner and Others v. the European Union Treaty (Maastricht)*, Bundesverfassungsgericht (2 October 1993) 1 CMLR 57 (1994). The reference in CT art. I-46 to the 'formation of European political awareness' is perhaps a sign that even Brussels recognizes its present nonexistence.

the member-state remains the container instead.[89] (A feeling of shared political conceptions is likely just as far away, as the acrimonious debate over the place of 'Christianity' in the Preamble of the Constitutional Treaty showed.) Moreover, even if such a political community existed, no institutional identity can, at present, compete with cultural or regional identities: the former does not inspire the emotive connection of the latter. The ability of cultural identity to order individuals' perception of reality through values, beliefs and traditions just doesn't extend in the case of a political identity through a wide-enough area to be able to encompass all that the former does – my identity as a citizen may thus be important when voting in elections, but irrelevant when deciding which book to buy, what to eat or how to act at a wedding. In case of conflict between various levels of such a 'concentric circles'[90] approach then, it is not clear that the Community would win out over the member-state. Even if it could, why would the attachment to this particular family of values be stronger than to another? In other words, why the EU and not Greenpeace?

Finally – moving from the realm of theory to that of reality – such a social contract-based polity is no longer possible: the founding documents of the Community (and the Union) have not been voted on by the majority of European citizens. Even the Constitutional Convention was far from a participatory process, or one that created any (real) public discussion. Query whether the referendums announced in a number of member-states will replace the missing discussion. Even if they will, however, it will be a matter of *post factum* consideration – the terms have been set, after all. A continuous top-down determination of what shared political and social values are to be simply does not (necessarily) resonate with individuals, however. In that sense, the Constitutional Treaty is a sign of more of the same, despite the changes of arts. I-46 and 47 – there is not even the possibility of Habermasian constitutional patriotism, unless one can identify with the process of late night bargaining that has emerged as an essentially European procedure. This is especially true if touted values seem to be guided (and even trumped) by pseudo-economic considerations: for the nationals of the new member-states, for example, the Community's proclamation of the principles of

89 See, e.g. Chris Rumford: European Civil Society or Transnational Social Space?, *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 6, Nr. 1, 2003. 25, 33. arguing that European civil society is only one 'in-the-making'.

90 Joseph Weiler: European Citizenship: Identity and Differentity. In La Torre, 1, supra note 31, at 17.

equality and dignity mean very little in light of the old member states' free movement policies, however temporary.

For these reasons, Prodi's reliance only on 'the core values we all share: peace and stability; freedom and democracy; tolerance and respect for human rights; and solidarity and social justice'[91] as the basis for the 'soul' the Community is searching for is likely not sufficient. In fact, any attempt at manufacturing one shared feeling of belonging, to a single European entity, on any basis, is likely to fail when faced with the 'axiomatically integrated' identities of most individuals today.[92] Simply put, if a monolithic collective (especially national) identity was difficult to create in the 19th century, the technologies that have emerged since that time would make such a project near-impossible today. A shared consciousness between different nationalities, peoples and groups could emerge, instead, from geographical proximity, collective history and experiences, common values and ambitions. As such, identification with the European project may be promoted, given a stable economic basis, through cooperation, solidarity, education, cultural and social ties – something the Commission seems to have grasped since 1992. In this sense, the Community is not only re-interpreting the function of nationality through the extension of citizenship rights beyond the nation-state community, but also transforming the role of a political entity in creating and guiding collective identity: traditional national identity creating policies can no longer be the model.

One manner in which European citizenship has, perhaps, fulfilled the hope for identification envisaged is that outlined by Mayer and Palmowski. Namely, it allows European citizens to live in any other member state, as equals with the nationals of those states. As such, European citizenship – the 'fundamental status of nationals of members states'[93] – goes a long way in giving concrete form to the myriad ways in which integration has affected the lives of individuals. In other words, Franz or Antonella can now say it is because they are European citizens that they can take an Easyjet or SkyEurope flight to Budapest to look for a job, or just sit around coffee houses, rather than because Directive XXXX/ZZ/EC says so. European citizenship is, as the authors above state, the '*sine qua non* for a meaningful European iden-

91 *Enlargement Weekly*, February 11, 2002.
92 Yasemin Soysal: Changing Boundaries of Participation in European Public Spheres. In Klaus Eder and Bernhard Giesen (eds.): *European Citizenship,* 159, 169, 2001.
93 Rec. 3 of Directive 2004/38/EC, discussed in text.

tity.'[94] Whether identification as a European citizen will result in a sense of European identity is another question, however.

In fact, some sense of a European identity does seem to have emerged among individuals. Eurobarometer surveys, for example, regularly ask respondents about Europeanness: as of spring 2003, 57% of those asked in the old member-states felt to some degree European (3% felt exclusively European, 7% first European then their own nationality, 47% first their nationality then European).[95] In the new member-states, the run down was almost the same: 58% felt European to some degree (3% felt exclusively European, 8% felt European first then their own nationality, 47% first their own nationality then European).[96] In a more in-depth study, on the basis of surveys in ten cities (in six states), attitudes toward European identity were seen as compatible with national and regional identities and were 'associated to state-related identity.'[97] In other words, 'nation and Europe serve as complementing rather than competing sources'[98] for collective identity. The multi-level identity referred to by Prodi, and recognized by an increasing number of theorists as the way forward, may thus be in the making.[99] As for the quality of this European identity, a series of studies have shown that both civic and cultural aspects are present in its composition – and that there are significant differences by member-state, region, level of education and gender.[100] Furthermore, the official symbolism constructed by the Commission has had some effect, as individuals tend to associate the European flag, anthem and pass-

94 Mayer and Palmowski, supra note 6, 592.

95 Standard Eurobarometer 60 (Autumn 2003, Full Report) 27. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm /public_opinion/

96 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (Autumn 2003, Full Report) 71–72. Available at id.

97 María Ros et al.: Who Do You Think You Are? Regional, National and European Identities in Interaction, Research Briefing Two 4 (July 2004). Available at: http://www.sociology-ed.ac.uk/youth/docs/Briefing%202.pdf. (Last visited January 20, 2005).

98 Daniel Fuss: The Meaning of Nationality and European Identity Among Youths from Different Nations 13. Paper for the Workshop 'Political Cultures and European Integration' (European Consortium for Political Research, 2003).

99 See, e.g. Rainer Bauböck: Citizenship and National Identities in the European Union, Jean Monnet Working Papers 4/97. Available at: http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97–04–.html; David O'Keeffe and Antonio Bavasso: Fundamental Rights and the European Citizen. In La Torre 251, supra note 31, at 264–265; Preuß, supra note 88.

100 Michael Bruter: On What Citizens Mean by Feeling 'European': Perceptions of News, Symbols and Borderless-ness. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* Vol. 30, Nr. 1, 2004. 21, 36. See also the survey quoted above, where association with Europe emerged through: an automatic mechanism ('the country is in Europe,' nationals 'have EU passport'), identification based on pride ('in a common European culture' or 'shared political attitudes') and/or personal experience (travel, family, etc.) Ros et al., supra note 97, 3.

port, as well as the Euro with 'values of peace, harmony, co-operation', at the same time as perceiving the European project as 'non-national.'[101] Also worth noting, in light of persistent fears of a 'Fortress Europe,' is that European-ness tends to be seen through the lens of the disappearance of borders (both literal and symbolic) within Europe and their increased salience toward the rest of the world.[102]

Final Considerations

So far so good – European citizenship has extended the reach of a number of citizenship rights beyond the nation-state, while the concept of a European identity, in whatever form, is an effort at supporting the development of a collective identity for an emerging political community. Moreover, the identity being developed is not the homogenous one of the nation-state, but one that relies on cultural diversity. Still, there seems to have been a recognition – albeit unsaid – that the extension of ever-more rights to an ever-larger group of people is not enough to engender the loyalty hoped for. As Weiler notes, 'citizenship is as much a state of consciousness and self-understanding and only in smallish part is translatable to positive law.'[103] In fact, rights and identity may, in the case of European citizenship, be at odds. In other words, if the (increasing) rights of European citizenship are extended to an ever larger group and are thereby rendered less and less exclusive, the border between 'ins' and 'outs' – a boundary necessary in some form or another to any concept of citizenship – becomes increasingly blurry. European citizenship then becomes a framework for certain rights in the spirit of international human rights and loses its link to a given political (or social, cultural) community. This may be a positive outcome from the view of rights: but one needs to recognize that their basis in a European citizenship that individuals identify with may be lost.

In fact, as already discussed, the Commission has come to see some developing European cultural identity as a prerequisite for a European citizenship that means more to individuals than it does presently. However, the instrumental development of a European culture that would 'challenge or even displace'[104] national identities – something the Commission aimed for a time – has been abandoned. Still, 'culture building' as a 'political objective' has not gone away in Com-

101 Bruter, id., at 30.
102 Id., at 33.
103 Weiler, supra note 90, at 4.
104 Cris Shore: *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*. 2000. 21.

munity discourse.[105] Attempts at using the banner of culture to 'galvanize and mould public opinion'[106] in times of increased skepticism about the European project continue, since 'as political leaders recognize, the credibility of the European Union hinges on the development of a more tangible and coherent sense of shared identity among the peoples of Europe whose interests the Union aims to serve.'[107] The methods have changed, however, to the diversity-embracing, bottom-up formula we increasingly find post-Maastricht. The character of this bottom-up identity, emerging through increased interaction among individuals and groups and relying, in its very existence, on diversity is something wholly new; as is the laid-back role of the entity that aims to harness this collective cultural identity.

It is easy to imagine the ideal outcome of this new approach. As Smith discusses, a number of shared legal and political traditions/experiences, as well as cultural and religious heritages exist across Europe. 'Not all Europeans share in all of them […] But at one time or another all Europe's communities have participated in at least *some* […] to some degree.'[108] Such traditions are exactly what the Commission likely hopes individuals will discover. Along with the more rational shared constitutional values that Prodi mentioned, we could easily be looking at the basis for a European identity that respected existing cultural (including national) identities, while leaving open the possibility of emerging new ones.[109] In this sense, cultural identity would be regarded as the process it really is. At the same time, assuming certain other supra-national rights were added – consumer or environmental rights, for example, extended to all individuals[110] – a stronger civic basis for identification with the Union may emerge than exists presently. Perfect, no? Sure, if one is trying to re-create a more tolerant form of the national identity that came with the pairing of nationality and citizenship. But the EU is not a nation-state; and we are not in 1830.

An acceptance that citizenship – and accordingly European citizenship – can be multi-layered, and unhinged from the nation-state would serve com-

105 Id., at 15–26.
106 Id., at 222.
107 Id.
108 Smith, supra note 7, at 70. These include humanism, romanticism and classicism in the arts; empiricism and rationalism in philosophy and the sciences; democracy, fascism and communism in politics; as well as Roman law and Judeo-Christian ethics. (There seems to be no assumption that some of these could serve as much to divide as to unite.)
109 See also Bauböck, supra note 99, at 5.4.
110 E.g. compare the language in CT art. II-97 with §18 of the Hungarian Constitution.

mentators as well as politicians well. Calls for (or accusations of) an 'overarching' European identity, somehow serving to cover other collective identities, [111] assume that the former will be like national identities – necessarily linked to a political community, partaking of the same characteristics and covering the same ground.[112] In a similar vein, a European identity based on diversity is not 'intellectual gymnastics,'[113] but a recognition that no other basis for a European identity can exist.

As Waldron has discussed, cultures merge into each other – there is no clear boundary.[114] This is as true in temporal terms as in geographic ones. Thus, it is not some 'past' set in stone that provides the basis for any collective identity, but rather interpretations of it, as they function for the present and future.[115] How individuals view their heritages today is what determines how they feel about a given cultural identity, not the elements of the common culture. Thus, individuals may well decide that only some of the elements of the 'European experience' or perhaps none at all matter to them; or, that they have a great deal in common with neighboring countries and very little with those farthest from them. The 'European experience' is unlikely to be unified, but instead one influenced by existing identities and interpretations of the past. Accordingly, what or who is European for one may not be for another. This means that it is not only those with a 'European background',[116] what ever that is, that may or may not develop a sense of European identity. But it also means that some groups will have a more inclusive view of the European than others.

Cross-cutting identities, along with the multi-level identification discussed by the theorists of cosmopolitan citizenship will thus be an element of any European identity. However, it is more likely that national, European, as well as a multitude of cultural and other identities will (continue to) co-exist – and at times clash – than that one homogenous and over-arching iden-

111 Shore, supra note 104, at 225. See also Soledad García and Helen Wallace: *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy.* 1993. 172.

112 See, e.g. Barber, who argues that '[t]he boundaries of Europe and its relationship with its putative citizens is shaped by the past' and that, accordingly, the Community is involved in an 'attempt to stimulate nationalist sentiment at a European level.' N.W. Barber: Citizenship, Nationalism and the European Union, *European Law Review*, Vol. 27, Nr. 3, 2002. 241, 256–257.

113 Shore, supra note 104, at 126.

114 Jeremy Waldron: Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, *University of Michigan Journal of Lw Reform,* Vol. 25, 1992. 751, 777–778.

115 See Vikings? Such Friendly Folk, Say Textbooks, *The Observer* (April 13, 2003) for what can go wrong when new interpretations are introduced.

116 Barber, supra note 112, at 258.

tity will encompass others. In fact, some dimensions of national and regional self-understanding will likely become more 'European', others less: the disappearance of national currency has not, for example, made member-states less national, but has certainly given a more European dimension to their economies. In other words, not only is any European identity unlikely to be homogenous geographically, it is also likely to vary in intensity depending on which element of cultural identity one examines. For these reasons, any emerging European identity will be less exclusive than traditional cultural identities, or the homogenous European identity the Commission flirted with for a period; and it is unlikely to be similar to existing national identities.

In fact, European identity may not even serve the legitimating function the Commission hopes for. In this context, Bruter's distinction between the 'cultural' and 'civic' nature of European political identity – the former expressing belonging to a particular group, the latter identification with a political structure (the EU) – is crucial.[117] For the citizens of the new member-states, for example, Union membership did not mean a sudden discovery of being European (because they were now European citizens); instead, it was an institutional confirmation of something many had felt all along. In fact, those asked generally express much stronger attachment to the idea of 'Europe' than to the EU, as institution.[118] And, even if theorists are unsure of the existence of a European identity, member-states have certainly determined that there is some commonality. No member state has attempted, for example, to assimilate the nationals of other member-states. Certainly, there are enough non-national European citizens residing in certain regions of certain member states to have a potential effect on identities. Unsaid though it remains, there seems to be a presumption that other European citizens are enough like 'us' not to be a threat to 'our' national or regional identity. (The contrast with the integration requirements for third-country nationals only confirms this point.) But who is to say that a bottom-up European identity will mesh with the one the Community could utilize to gain legitimacy for certain policies? Individuals may develop a European identity and still determine that Brussels should not govern certain matters. For example, one can feel European without agreeing that other European citizens should have

117 Bruter, supra note 100, at 22.

118 In 2003 only 44% of respondents had a 'very' (8%) or 'fairly' (36%) postive image of the European Union. (32% were neutral, while 19% had a 'very' or 'fairly' negative one. Eurobarometer 60, supra note 95, at 35. At the same time, 58% of respondents felt an attachment to 'Europe'. But see Bruter, supra note 100, at 37.

equal placement on organ donation lists as co-nationals – indeed the case under Community law.

The danger then, from the Community's (soon Union's) point of view at least, is that, along with the reconfiguration of citizenship rights and the citizenship-nationality link that has occurred, the rights-identity duality of citizenship will also come undone, leaving the EU in a vacuum between two non-existent pillars. On the other hand, a return to the pre-Maastricht attempt to emulate nation-building from an earlier time[119] is also not an answer. Forcing on individuals the idea that there are commonalties to be discovered and that these latter are justification enough for given policies – a kind of cultural consciousness-spreading exercise – is unlikely to have positive results.[120] The Community thus walks a fine line between instrumentalizing culture and identity for its own purposes and supporting them in the hopes that individuals will find meaningful commonalties.[121]

No political entity, however, can function without legitimacy in the eyes of the individuals that belong to it; so that European citizenship needs to develop in both the area of rights and that of identity. An emerging European identity – the multi-layered, fluctuating one already described – may help make European citizenship 'matter', but cannot substitute for missing political allegiance.

119 According to certain theorists, this period continues. See Shore, supra note 104.

120 For plans along these lines, see A People's Europe: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, COM (1988) 331 final.

121 The language of Communication 154, supra note 79, offers hints of both approaches.

ALPÁR LOSONCZ

The Paradoxes of a Regional Construction

One of the issues that repeatedly arose in the Serbian public sphere is connected to the region Vojvodina (Vajdaság or Délvidék for Hungarians). There is widespread suspicion that the country's territorial integrity may suffer changes, irreversibly damaging its national essence. From the time of its constitution as part of Serbia, the political and cultural debate over Vojvodina's place on the discursive raised new issues. This situation continually generates intense conflicts focusing on questions of regional loyalty and national identity among intellectuals and politicians. Serbia is an unfinished nation-state, and issues related to the territorial frame of a nation-state appear whenever structural transformation becomes evident.

Many intellectuals and politicians engaged in regional identification point out that Vojvodina may more easily integrate into a European framework. By emphasizing that Vojvodina belonged to earlier Central Europe, regionalists intend to construct and endorse the distinctiveness (its codes of tradition in which ethnical pluralism has played a crucial role) of this region. Regionalists frequently argue that the uncertain position of Vojvodina's is the result of centralist coercion.

It should not be forgotten that re-actualizing Vojvodina as a regional and multiethnic locus where different cultural, social, and political items are exchanged remains a possibility. In order to properly depict the unique character of Vojvodina, wide-ranging, everyday and economic relations between members of different ethnic groups should be mentioned. Comprehensive communication and well-coordinated realization of common interests illustrate habitual behavioral pattern-making it necessary to observe both elements of micro-history and the impact of accumulated social capital that underlay Vojvodina's political history. Such underlying elements in the tradi-

tion of customary interactions highlight the complexity of Vojvodina as a historically specific region.

Obviously, micro-history cannot be identified with political articulation, and the correlation of the two ought to be dealt with separately. In this article I argue on the one hand, that due to traces of ethnic and religious heterogeneity, and a different conception of historical experiences, great efforts, if not, assimilation-processes are required to internalize and accept Vojvodina as part of Serbia. On the other hand, I take into account that after 1918, despite symbolic boundaries, the new constellation of power managed to subordinate and assimilate a tremendous part of the regional codes. Consequently, Vojvodina with its conflation of points of reference, embodies the contradiction between nation-building and regional identification arising from its tradition, or rather between the homogenizing nation-state and regional heterogeneity.

The history of Vojvodina bears the hallmark of the political, demographic and cultural dynamics of the victorious Habsburg Monarchy, which also incorporated 'historic Hungary'. Following the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburgs moved quickly to populate its vast territories.[1] Although the populating processes were sometimes officially directed, at other times, some had an air of spontaneity. Nevertheless, the Habsburg's intention clearly encouraged ethnic diversity, which brought about certain alterations of the religious map. The Habsburgs endorsed anti-Reformation and hence, a large number of people were drawn to Catholicism. The previous movement towards Reformation had been carried out collectively within language-national groups, thus creating religious confessions rooted inside particular national boundaries. These religious dynamics contributed significantly to the miscellany of Vojvodina.

The Habsburg policy comprised both the tendencies of proto-modernization and the interests of preserving the Empire with its constellation of diverse entities. The enlightened absolutism of the Habsburg Empire and Germanization (i.e. supra-national bureaucracy coupled with multi-ethnic conscription) were inevitably confronted by rising nationalism over modernization tendencies. The end of the 18th century and the entire 19th century were marked by frequent conflicts between the multi-ethnic Empire and the dynamics of nationalism. The very paradox of the dynamics of nationalism within the proto-modernization of the Habsburg Empire carried the seed of

[1] Throughout the article I follow certain ideas developed in A. Losoncz: Vojvodina as a realm of regional tendencies. In D. Vujadinovic, L. Veljak, Vl. Goati, V. Pavicevic (eds.): *Between Authoritarianism and Democracy*. Beograd/Podgorica/Zagreb, 2003. 351–371.

future violent conflicts, and of the modalities of political shifts. This presented a paradox since the further proto-modernization advanced, the greater the intensity of the intentions for national emancipation and revival became, which had far-reaching but disputable consequences for multi-national constructs.

Examining other characteristics, it should be pointed out that certain forms of administrative regionalism had previously existed in the area of present-day Vojvodina. However, Vojvodina as a separate entity is a product of 19th century political decisions and represents an expression of a certain historic blueprint. In light of the Hungarian struggle for emancipation from the Habsburgs, and upon the Emperor's order, certain forms of decentralization were constituted. Yet, the Serbs were unsatisfied with the outcomes of decentralization, as the degree of autonomy was very small. For instance, the German was the language of administration, which was far from their expectations. The disappointment over the achieved degree of autonomy was followed by a settlement of differences between Hungarian and Monarchy political leadership. In 1860, the Imperial Decree abolished these forms of decentralization, and the Monarchy reinstated the system of districts.

In the 19th Century milieu, the attitude towards the national-minority issue had a specific connotation owing to the attitude of the Hungarian political elite towards the aspirations and demands of their national minorities. Namely, the Hungarians enjoyed a special status in the Monarchy, which incited national demands from other ethnic groups (especially Serbs). The Hungarian political elite's actions were in keeping with the codes of liberal nationalism of the 19th Century. Their opinion was that modern society had mechanisms for attaching national identity in economic, political and governing spheres. The problem that had been raised, however, cast doubt on the feasibility of a nation-state as a milieu for the development of integration potentials in a genuinely multi-national context. Attempts to find a solution, and the rigidity with which the problem was tackled, all but pointed to the difficulties of liberal nationalism in resolving the national-minority integration issue.

At the end of World War I, and in the context of the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy (with favorable historical circumstances), the region of the present-day Vojvodina affiliated itself with the emerging Yugoslavia, the *co-national* aspirations of Vojvodina Serbs playing the decisive role.[2] Hence

[2] The recent elections in Vojvodina demonstrate the great influence of a nationalist party that has been playing a crucial rule during the last decade (Serb Radical Party). It is indica-

the population of this region became a part of the multi-national pattern of Yugoslavia, which was equally burdened with conflicts related to the distribution of political and economic powers, and considerable features of hierarchy and non-democratic structures. Other ethnic groups especially with regard to national identity perceived affiliation with Yugoslavia differently. With such a model of political unity, the centralizing impact of the state became predominant. Concurrently, roles changed: minority groups became the majority and the majority ethnic groups became minorities trying to reinforce their minority rights along the windy paths of political negotiation and through bureaucratically complex communication with the League of Nations. Despite the fact that Vojvodina represents a separate cultural memory, it is related to national referential points, the myth of common memories, shared destiny, and symbols of ethnic heritages. Moreover, as we now know, it is from these elements that modern national identities are reconstituted in each generation, as the nation becomes more inclusive. This is a fact that is often oversimplified by affirming a detached cultural memory for societal actors in Vojvodina. The integrationists, or the supporters of a homogeneous nation-state, construct Vojvodina as the returned, undeteriorated, pure and eternal national essence. Nevertheless, regionalists neglect the tensions that arose from the contradiction between national and regional cultural memories, and likewise ignore the homogenizing effects of the endorsed national form.

Between the two world wars, 'Vojvodina', as a political program, was present on the political scene, but it was actually no more than a point of reference for the political orientation of the majority group (the Serbs). Referring to Vojvodina brought about the regional agents' dissatisfaction with the economic and political positions of the region and with the absence of a far-reaching decentralization within the new Yugoslavia. 'Vojvodina', after World War I, however, could not contain the inclusive political process broadly comprising minority demands and, ultimately, a political co-existence based upon equal relations between various groups.[3] It is of little relevance here to make a through

tive, that as a ruling party at local levels, it announced its intent to rewrite the memory of the majority. For example, up to now representation of Novi Sad (the capital of Vojvodina) was connected to the constitutive act confirmed by a Habsburg empress. From now on, the main symbolic referential point should be the entering of the Serb Royal Army in Novi Sad at 1918.

3 About the political state of affairs between the Wars, see R. Končar: *Opozicione partije i autonomija Vojvodine 1929 – 1941.* [Oppositional parties and the Autonomy of Vojvodina 1929–1941] Novi Sad, 1995.

analysis of relations between the majority (Serbs) and various minorities (Germans, Hungarians, Slovaks, Ruthenians, etc.), but it is important to note that regional tendencies were burdened with an unquestioned acceptance of *exclusionist patterns of nation-building*.

After World War II, Vojvodina was subordinated to the Communist rule and later gained a regional outline within the Yugoslav State structure. Vojvodina has remained multi-ethnic despite numerous challenges and events. Vojvodina emerged from World War II with painful scars and serious losses. No doubt, the events of World War II were marked by violence and inter-ethnic hatred and are still a source of conflict-inducing memories. Yugoslavia was one among a few states with a federal structure and a considerable degree of decentralization that remained within the Communist ideological frames; i.e. regionalization was carried out in compliance with the standards for preserving Party-power. This meant that the region was understood as an organic part of the ideological structure and therefore, necessary to integrate into the territorial distribution of power. All Vojvodinan elements – historical and territorial codes – had to be fitted into the ideological construct of Yugoslav reality. Obviously, territorial differentiation was a network of channels for the division of power in the Communist creation of reality. The classical principles of a federation, like subsidiary, or power control, had to be rewritten according to the altered imperatives of political action as the word 'control' could not be used and was replaced by 'the territorial distribution of power'.

In 1974, the Constitution of Yugoslavia was adopted, strengthening the decentralization of the country. It immediately brought about criticism by the Serbian political elite, especially as Vojvodina had a dual constitutional status, being part of Serbia and Yugoslavia at the same time. Broad disputes over the adoption of the Constitution revealed the discontent of Serbian political elite with the quasi-statehood of Vojvodina, who concluded that the status of Vojvodina was dubious in a number of ways from the standpoint of Serbian national interests. The broad political context demonstrated the paradoxical meanings of nationalism: official ideological rhetoric strongly excluded nationalism from the public sphere, but made it stronger underground.[4]

[4] At this point I agree with D. Jovic: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, A Critical Review of Explanatory Approaches. *European Journal of Social Theory,* Vol. 4, Nr. 1, 2001. 5. An assessment on Russia, *mutatis mutandis*, could be applied to the case of Yugoslavia too: "far from suppressing nationhood, the communist regime institutionalized it". See Rogers Brubaker: *Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National question in the New Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 17.

During the 1980s, ethnocentric discourse gradually won public support in Serbia and, finally, gained 'street', populist forms. In 1987, the rising ethnocentric populism was affirmed in the ousting of the Vojvodina political elite who suffered from a national identity deficit on the one hand, and the discontentment caused by its repressive internal policy among even of those who were not committed to ethnocentrism on the other. The defeat of the isolated and lonely Vojvodina political elite did not only mean reshaping maneuver space in Yugoslavia, but it also represented a symbolic departure from 'the sins of the past' – a demarcation line to the past which implied 'weakening and blackmailing of Serbia'.

When Milošević's regime took over power, it cancelled elements of autonomy in Vojvodina, which had been derived from the Communist perception of Yugoslav reality. This period was loaded with elements of armed *ethno-anarchy*. Ethnocentrism targeted institutions perceived as limiting the strength and affirmation of ethnic essence. This can explain the collapse, the destruction of institutions, and the instrumentalization of the state. Furthermore, it was necessary to convert segments of everyday reality into signs of ethnocentric practice, which entailed discursive strategies concerning the rediscovered unity of blood and territory. Such a constellation opened the door to *myth-political* discourses. It was not a question of a return to the past, or to history, but rather of an integration of history and historicity into myth-political media. Moreover, discourse of the ruling ideology suggested that focusing on the issue of Vojvodina autonomy was contrary to the unification of the national interests in Serbia, i.e. that any regionalization could damage the unified Serbia. The correlation between the concepts of nation and centralism was re-affirmed a number of times. Admittedly, during the 1990s, the national discourse was modified, but the inner structure of Serbia remained unchanged.

With the overthrow of Milošević's regime deliberations on regionalism entered a new, post-Milošević stage. The political actors keen on the autonomy of Vojvodina systematically indicated their dissatisfaction with what had been achieved and, pointed out the uninterrupted centralism, thus bringing the autonomy issue into the focus of political discourse. Having become a topic of current political conflicts, the state of affairs in Vojvodina shook the very foundations of Serbia, which continues to try to re-associate with European tendencies. Although more or less all of the politically relevant actors admit that some changes are inevitable, the range of such changes is still unclear. For instance, regionalization concepts based upon the assumption that

Serbia should remain a unitary state, with certain asymmetric features reflecting the particularities of its regions, have existed in Serbia for some time.[5] Regional actors understand this as an alibi-concept – an intention to preserve centralist features in changed circumstances.

Finally, it should be taken into account that the structure of inter-ethnic relations has changed. Indeed, if we examine earlier periods, the genesis of 'a multi-ethnic community free of domination of any one particular group' can be seen.[6] Even a superficial look at the statistic data for the 20th century, however, reveals the changes that have brought about the development of the majority and minorities, amongst whom the biggest is Hungarian, then Croatian, Slovak and Romanian. Demographic processes, assimilation trends, modernization's influence, as well as populating policies, have changed proportional relations between ethnic groups and their opportunities to make use of the resources. The statistics also reveal that the minority population has considerably shrunk, which points towards certain political influences that, along with 'natural' assimilation tendencies, have instigated change in the ethnic pattern (namely, the percentage of minority population decrease ranges from 7% to 17% in a ten-year period). It is evident that reflections on regionalism in Vojvodina cannot be immersed in an abstract equality discourse, but should rather enjoy an asymmetry created by the relations between the majority and the minorities.

Let us turn from with the historical analysis and ask, "How can we establish *normative standpoints* for regional identity"? Identification commonly implies a process of bringing into consciousness an *unconscious* image of oneself. In the identity analysis, it is always advisable to examine the route between unconscious images and the process of bringing them into consciousness.[7] Regional identification should denote *collectively* created images of oneself upon which a certain community perceives and explains itself. The existence of regional identity implies that the political and economic organization of a region is considered a collective enterprise of all the inhabitants of the region. This means that the root of regional identity comprises a certain collective structure and allegiance which are to be understood as touchstones for the inhabitants of that region. The members of the region do not perceive themselves as ran-

5 This is a concept elaborated by M. Jovičić: *Regionalna država.* [Regional state] Beograd, 1996.

6 See Charles Ingrao: Istorijski preduslovi regionalizacije: Vojvodina, nasleđe Austrijske Monarhije i njene južne strategije [Historical preconditions of regionalisation: Vojvodina, or the heritage of Austrian Monarchy and her strategy for South] In N. Ćuk Skenderović (ed.): *Ogledi o regionalizaciji.* [On regionalisation] Subotica, 2001. 191.

7 O. Marquard – K. Stierie (eds.): *Identität*, in Poetic und Hermeneutik XVIII, München, 1979.

domly gathered individuals as they exercise a higher level of obligation towards each other than towards other citizens of the state. They single themselves out from the state macro-region and confirm their particularity through common actions. Hence, regional identity is viable only if there is a habitual inclination towards understanding between the members of the region. Collective identification cannot be realized without substantial elements of trust. Any group inhabiting the given region has to be confident that its voice will be heard and that its aspirations will be taken into account. In other words, regional identity creation is always closely followed by the creation of a framework for litigation and deliberation between the protagonists of the region.[8]

Referring to the region implies that all members of the region, upon certain recognized values, commonly join a broader community. Hence, when a region exists, its members perceive themselves as citizens of the state, but communicate such a perception through regional membership. When there is a region, then all its members identify themselves with certain features and outcomes of the given region. A steady-patterned identity cannot solely be formed on the contradistinctions to the exterior. Dichotomies cannot define all the components of identity. In other words, regional identity has to be established upon its own value patterns, i.e. upon its own pre-established values.

Decentralization implies such processes as when policy design and executive-power practices are transferred onto sub-state levels. It is possible, of course, that a number of different functions are transferred onto sub-levels, i.e. that the decentralized institutions hold a variety of responsibilities and a number of different modalities of power.

At the same time, an analysis of the history of Yugoslavia, calls for a word of warning: *territorial decentralization may not be identified with a regional, "unfettered" form of litigation*. Decentralization may be wielded as an institutional framework for power distribution among power-holders, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia; the country utilized some forms of territorial decentralization, but only in order to attain a certain type of power. 1980s Kosovo exemplifies such a situation. Namely, the territorial decentralization of Kosovo during that period demonstrated that it is possible to carry out the process in such a way that neither the members of the ethnic majority, nor those of the minority, could identify with it. The members of the region, de-

8 About 'unfettered consensus' see Charles Taylor: Invoking Civil Society, Chicago: Center for Psychosocial Studies. 1990, or reprinted in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds.) *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. 66–77. Consensus here is not teleologically placed.

spite being territorially intertwined, did not comprehend their belonging as a basis for the realization of democratic initiatives. This and other instances have proven that decentralization can be a *mechanism of power* inconsistent with pluralism and aimed at a coercive unification of society. Therefore, territorial decentralization became an instrument for facilitating the participation of the political and cultural elite in the re-distribution of wealth.

With regard to regionalism, it seems important to emphasize the difference between:

1) decentralization as a basis for certain autonomous actions of regional/local governance, i.e. decentralization as a basis for the autonomy of a certain territorial entity, and

2) regionalism as a basis for democratic litigation between different actors in order to achieve mutual recognition.

The earlier remark on the difference between the majority and minority should not be forgotten. In accordance with this, r*egional communication related to Vojvodina is a history of singular solutions to the dialectic of inequality and equality, a series of locally situated inscriptions of equality into the realm of inequality.* Minorities disrupt the organizational principle of society based on the bias of an exclusive nation-state, and make themselves visible as social partners; they make their voices heard. Minority communities holding firm on the notion that all groups are equal disrupted national hierarchy.

That common political identity in a plural society has to be negotiated, is empirical knowledge. Such litigation should rather be understood as a *process* than a completed situation. They are negotiations on political standards rather than a mere territorial decentralization. As a final point, the aforementioned litigation ought to extend to various spheres, from everyday life outwards. The normative projection offered here revives Tocqueville's idea of various forms of *self-government*, which enable the affirmation of cultural identities. Not one, single instance of Vojvodina's past corresponds to this idea. Cultural identities and ethnic-minority patterns in Vojvodina could gain their full meaning only through a network of various forms of self-government, institutions and civil associations.

Possible aspects of regional legitimization can be enumerated as follows:

1. *Tradition as a source of legitimization.* Tradition appears to be a possible basis for legitimization not only because various actors in Vojvodina refer to it as such, but also because it may indeed be a substantial source of legitimate outcomes. However, it is unclear whether tradition in Vojvodina includes the con-

notations that can serve as the basis for the construction of the regional collective identity. Namely, the tradition seems to be void of the meanings over which consensus in the aforementioned sense could be expected.

This is explicitly illustrated by the fact that various attempts connect it with certain historical situations. It is obvious that evoking 19th century (1848 to be precise), or evoking 1918 and 1945, do not meet the aforementioned criteria. These historical situations are susceptible to various, often-contradictory interpretations and cannot be referential for regional identity. It should be born in mind that some crucial decisions were closely connected to the fulfillment of a particular national concept (1918), and that the event did not include a large part of the population in the decision-making process. A closer look at more recent history reveals similar difficulties. Vojvodina was granted quasi-state prerogatives by the 1974 Constitution, thus becoming incorporated into the Communist way of unification of the society. It is not difficult to conclude that the outcomes of this period were such that the multicultural configuration suffered a negative transformation. The integration of minorities into the 'ruling cohesion' resulted in assimilation policies and the re-tailoring of the ethnic map.

Such a gloomy diagnosis does not mean that, over the decades, everyday routine forms of cohabitation in Vojvodina have not developed various kinds of tolerance (this was argued previously in connection with the micro-history). On the contrary, tolerance has been the load-bearing pillar of practical concerns over various modalities of cohabitation. The disruption of explicit or implicit hierarchy in society, however, has shown that individual and collective tolerance is rather ineffective when an institutional confirmation of pluralistic cultures is attempted. This diagnosis focuses on the fact that historical situations that can be invoked are too controversial and that they imply exclusion of a considerable part of the population from deciding their own destiny. This is a model of 'ascribed', imposed consensus. Hence, it follows that revitalizing tradition contains insurmountable weaknesses as a possible source of legitimating in Vojvodina.

2. *Vojvodina as a Framework of Supra-national Tendencies* There are arguments which claim that regionalism should be made accessible both for reining national aspirations of the majority, and for minorities' orientations burdened with invidious ethnicization. Such arguments are prerequisites of the attitude that perceives Vojvodina as an attained equilibrium between national and democratic aspirations. They result from a critical attitude to-

wards the boost of ethno-nationalism in Serbia during the 1990s, and link the tradition of resistance to crude particularization.

a) In order to examine similar situations, knowledge of ethnically composed, regional aspirations should be assumed. Regionalism often combines divergent claims, and cannot be understood as a framework which *eo ipso* generates supra-national orientations.

b) Besides the aforementioned, the fact that Vojvodina consists of the majority and a number of minorities amongst whom advantages and disadvantages of membership are not equally distributed should also be taken into account. Structural inequality between various groups repeatedly requires alteration in the practice of forming collective identity upon rigid, abstractly stipulated features. Litigation between majority and minorities occur as reiterations of previous inscriptions of equality. Supra-national features of collective identity are undoubtedly rooted in certain domains – economic, for instance. However, a rigid formation of collective identity based upon such domains has a devastating influence on the exploitation of cultural resources, which are relevant for the development of a particular cultural identity. If the creation of regional collective identity is based upon a rigid, abstract attitude, it produces a pattern, which provides structural domination of the majority. It is a well-known fact that democratic procedures void of corrective mechanisms systematically produce disadvantages for minority groups.

With regard to Vojvodina, the aforementioned statement ought to be especially clear as regional identity can be caught in the net of majority democracy unless it opens itself to institutional affirmation of minority identities. We are quite accustomed to actions that represent regional demands before a broader community, i.e. which design the presentation of regionalism. Actually, they design the presentation from a *collective* identity standpoint. The actors of such a presentation, however, are not open to the creation of minority identities within the regional identity, i.e. they are against the fragmentation of the regional space according to minority identities. When they criticize minority demands as 'too ethnic', they invoke individual freedom as contrasted to collective identities. De *facto*, they prioritize a certain type of collective identity (regional) over other types of collective identity. Otherwise, such regional identity becomes prey to the majority democracy, the outcome of which is a *neutralization of plurality.*

3. *Territorial Autonomy as a basis for Legitimating* This puts forth, as in the previous assertions, that there is a profound difference between decentralization and

the development of regional identity, and that life together based on litigation, temporarily posed consensus, cannot be identified with territorial autonomy. The possibility of democratization that is not connected with a territorial entity of the regional kind is another empirical reason to support such assertions.

The strategy of establishing territorial autonomy can also imply the traditional correlation between the state and the territory. Namely, it is customary to conceive of a state or parts of a state, as entities with a certain territory, and vice versa, territories and parts of territories are seen as inclusive components of a state. *However*, certain tendencies and reflections encourage a profound correction to this view. The contemporary practice includes both territorial and de-territorialized forms of democracy and therefore, it cannot be inferred that territorial autonomy necessarily ensures democratization.[9]

4. *Vojvodina as a Euro-region.* The idea of Vojvodina as a Euro-region is grounded on a) a critical reaction against anti-European tendencies in Serbia and consequently, on the demand to associate with European structures, b) on the increase in significance of Euro-regions on this continent in the 1980s and 1990s. Primarily, Euro-region is understood as a type of co-operation that goes beyond borders and integrates representatives of local and regional governance and other social actors. Besides the obvious common economic interests, regionalisms in Europe are also established in order to stimulate an extended co-operation aimed at re-strengthening mutual trust – a capacity frequently lacked in Central and Eastern Europe. In other words, regional networking and learning how to co-operate serve as a means of establishing associations along existing borders, surmounting the accumulated problems of the past.[10]

Intensifying Euro-regionalism, however, would not cancel the need for the framing of *ethnic differentiation* in Vojvodina. There is a link between memory, history, and democracy. Moreover, intensifying Euro-regionalism may also mean the creation of sub-regions in Vojvodina, i.e. the formation of border sub-territories that co-operate with similar border sub-territories in other countries. This would mean a formation of certain regions within Vojvodina and, in a way, a division of its territory along newly established sub-regional lines. As a final point, such a tendency would be in complete accordance with European standards. Democracy may also develop as a net-

9 B. S. Frey: Flexible citizenship for a global society. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics*, Vol. 2, Nr. 1, 2003. 93–114.

10 As it is known, the DMT Euro-region, which includes Vojvodina as well, was established in 1997. As the subsequent events were highly unfavourable for the realisation of a broader network, the DMT potentials have remained unexploited.

work of associations and as a fragmented system of sub-regional tendencies. Sub-regions may become representative manifestations of democracy in the same way, as localities may be the promoters of the 'spirit of freedom'. Therefore, it can be inferred that Vojvodina should not be automatically treated as an area of territorial autonomy, but possibly as a framework of various civil and sub-regional tendencies.

5. *Vojvodina as an Economic Entity* At first glance it might seem surprising to link remarks on nationalism with economy. Nevertheless, the argument insists that successful implementation of reforms in post-Milosevic era requires a strengthening of the nation as a collective. Taking into consideration the significant social discontent that built up after the political changes in Serbia, it is clear that references to nationalism as the cement of "reforms" have a *seductive* meaning in the discursive sphere. Especially relevant here is the ambition to affirm "liberal" nationalism in the *discursive conflicts of certain elite*. It is thus stressed that strengthening national loyalty, i.e. of a nationally mediated community, can provide a starting point for market-based reforms. This is partially because liberal nationalism may meet the interests of the new economic and cultural elite. The distribution of cultural, economic resources can strongly correspond to the interests of those economic and cultural elite.

Liberal nationalists express the hope that the expansion of the codes of market might *deactivate* regional aspirations. That is, supporters of integration believe that a sense of distinctness has lived out its days and could not survive after economic liberalization. Because the market is liberated to grow and operate freely according to its own principles, constructions of regional identity (integrationists believe that these constructions always reflected top-down arrangements) would disappear.

Liberal nationalists acknowledge regional differences and do not negate the significance of handling regional disparities in various fields. However, the role of the economy in identity patterns necessitates a clarification of the social-economic system in which the economic interests would be articulated. It is certain that social dynamics in Serbia will bring about an expansion of market standards and bear out the codes of economic liberalization. The liberated market facilitates the development of economic freedom and the expression of economic will but also intensifies the struggle of interests. Social theoreticians frequently discuss elimination processes and the outcomes of the growing importance of market standards. The advance of market standards carries a 'de-contextualization' and reshapes social relations 'within un-

specified expansion of time and space'. This means that market expansion nullifies traditional identities, amongst which it may undermine local and regional identities, as well.

This interpretation of the relation between market and identification, if applied to Vojvodina, will demonstrate that ongoing economic liberalization will almost certainly lead to disintegration of the hitherto fragile types of regional identity. It is highly probable that market logic will produce the same contradictory effects as in the previously mentioned situations, and strengthen the confusion in relation to regional identity. The regionalists do not have an adequate answer to these questions.

Conclusions

In this article I examined the phenomenological and normative dimensions of Vojvodina and considered the perpetual confusion in relation to regional identity. My goal was to demonstrate the antinomical character of regional self-understanding, and to articulate the discursive position that critiques both the regionalists and integrationists. Integrationists praise the pristine unity of the nation. The discursive construction of regionalists reifies regional identity and neglects: a) the tensions between the nationalizing and regionalizing processes, b) the claims of national minorities which are described as the continual inscription of equality into structural inequality between majority and minority. However, such treatment typically fails to grasp the varied forms in which this process occurs and the different understandings that motivate key actors in their approach to regionalization. They ignore the extent to which regionalization is the complex of many different forces and processes – processes occurring on various spatial and temporal scales and originating in widely dispersed places and/or networks of places. They neglect the extent to which regionalization involves complex, causal hierarchies rather than a unilinear, bottom-up or top-down movement, as well as the extent to which regionalization is always a contingent product of tendencies and counter-tendencies. One should not commit the error of essentializing regional identities.

Various starting-points for the development of regional identity in Vojvodina have been discussed in this paper. They are based on the notion that identification is a complex idea, the content of which can be fully understood only if its various dimensions are examined. Therefore, the subjects of collective regional identity must be sensitive to particular identities within the region. In addition, institutionalization of cultural differences enables the creation of a regional identity from *within*; they reach beyond the territo-

rial decentralization standards.[11] This does not call into question the validity of territorial decentralization, but it does not seem sufficient to cover the plurality of cultural patterns in Vojvodina.

[11] A. A. Caglar: Hyphenated Identities and the Limits of Culture. In T. Modood and P. Webner (eds.): *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism Identity and Community*. London-New York, 1997. 169.

BALÁZS MAJTÉNYI

Where Are They Headed?
The Situation of the Roma Minority in Hungarian and International Law[*]

At present, the Roma[1] live primarily in Europe. An estimated 8 and 10 million Roma live in Europe, with approximately 70% in Central and Eastern Europe. Statistics on the Roma are rather difficult to gather, and often unreliable for a number of reasons including that due to fears of prejudice and discrimination, Roma do not declare themselves as such. Reading the Regular Reports of the European Commission on the Candidate Countries, for example, it seems that the Commission tries to fix the size of Roma Communities by firing at random with statistical data. In its 1999 Regular Report, the Commission estimated the number of Romanian Roma to be between 1.1–1.5 million, but reported between 1.8 and 2.5 million in its 2002 Report.

International documents regard the Roma as a "transnational people". Many claim they originate from the North – West of India, from whence they traveled several centuries ago. Regardless of their alleged ancestral origins, the majority believe Roma usually resemble each other physically, and therefore, are bound together by the fact that the non-Roma population regards and calls them gypsies.

Numerous questions concerning Roma in Europe have remained unanswered and it is still doubtful whether they will assimilate into majority society or demand special rights as a national or ethnic minority. I presume the answer will vary country-by-country and by the attitudes and interests of different groups of Roma within one country. Despite this assumption, one

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1 The term "Roma" used in this paper always refers to the "Gypsy", "Sinti" and "Traveller" categories.

European Parliament resolution states, „the conditions of life of the Roma people are a problem which can only be tackled at the international level.[2]" Aside from social integration a much gloomier alternative exists, to permanently remain a disintegrated segment of European society.

If a national legal system offers special minority rights and the free choice of identity, theoretically, the Roma will be granted two possibilities: assimilation or special minority rights. Obviously, the state's solution and the legal and financial means available to support that decision, makes some difference. The state may provide special minority rights, or it may support various forms of affirmative action promoting the assimilation process, like the quota system in the USA.

To achieve both forms of social integration, states must guarantee the equal enjoyment of human rights. In an era of universal human rights protection, however, this might seem like a minimalist objective.[3] Nevertheless, such a minimalist approach must be addressed as the Roma continue to "suffer systematic racial discrimination in virtually all spheres of public life: education, employment, housing, access to public space, and access to citizenship."[4] Unfortunately, human rights abuses suffered by the Roma are not limited to the infringement of various forms of positive distinction, but encompass the whole of known human rights violations.

If a state decides to offer special minority rights, it may include autonomy in its conception. "A well thought-out plan of autonomy, agreed to by civil society may, where appropriate, be understood to offer better protection of the rights of both majority and minority; especially the Roma."[5] (Although a catalogue of the special rights of minorities would be difficult to compile, at the top of this imaginative hierarchy of rights we would find the autonomy of minorities, which "constitutes the maximum legal status a minority may achieve within a state.")[6]

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2 Minutes of 13/07/1995 – Final Edition B4–0974/95 Resolution on discrimination against the Roma

3 "If they have not yet done so, all the rights that are enjoyed by the rest of the population." Resolution 6 (XXX) of 31 August 1977, the Sub Commission.

4 Report by Mr. Glélé-Ahnhanzo, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/26.

5 The human rights problems and protections of the Roma. Working paper prepared by Mr. Y.K.J. Yeung Sik Yuen pursuant to Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights decision 1999/109. 46.

6 Georg Brunner – Herbert Küpper: European Options of Autonomy: A Typology of Autonomy Models of Minority Self Governance. In Kinga Gál (ed.): *Minority Governance*

The question of ensuring Roma participation in decision-making and both the public and political life of the countries is very important. Hungarian legislation made an attempt towards the latter when it introduced the Minority Act[7] ensuring autonomy for the Roma minority in Hungary. (Due to territorial distribution of minorities in Hungary the principle of territorial autonomy alone would not have been applicable. Instead, the Act was formulated to combine the principles of personal and local autonomy.) The act proved futile due to the defects of its text.

The Situation of the Roma and the Minority Act in Hungary

Today the Roma constitute the largest minority in Hungary. In the 2001 census, 190,000 individuals declared Gypsy ethnicity. Sociologists, however, estimate the size of the country's Gypsy population to be about 600,000 persons. The Hungarian Roma belong to three linguistic groups: the Romungro, who speak Hungarian and who call themselves "musician Gypsies", the bilingual (Hungarian and Gypsy) Vlach Gypsies, who call themselves "Roma" or "Rom"; and the Hungarian-Romanian, bilingual Romanian Gypsies, who call themselves "Boyash".[8]

The Act included Roma on the list of national and ethnic minorities, perhaps in protest of the official Roma policy of the previous era.[9] The Hungarian Minority Act was adopted by Parliament on July 7, 1993, with an overwhelming majority of 96.5%.[10] In 1961, during the socialist times, the Political Committee of MSZMP KB- Hungarian Socialist Working People's Party, Central Committee, insisted that the Roma were not a national minority, and through social-political measures which improved their situation, aimed to assimilate the Roma. Though some results did come of these measures, they quickly disintegrated after the political transition. The concept of autonomy espoused by the Act addresses individual, Hungarian citizens belonging to

in Europe. Budapest: European Centre for Minority Issues – Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, 2002. 17.

7 Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities

8 See in this connection István Kemény: Linguistics Groups and Usage among the Hungarian Gypsies/Roma. In Kállai Ernő (ed.): *The Gypsies/the Roma in Hungarian Society.* Budapest: Teleki László Foundation, 2002.

9 Georg Brunner: Die rechtliche Lage der Minderheiten in Mittel- Ost- und Südosteuropa. *Osteuropa Recht,* Vol. 40, 1994, 162.

10 The Act can be considered an "omnibus law": several other statutes contain regulations relating to the situation of minorities.

one of the minorities listed,[11] and encourages them to establish corporate entities in public and civil law in villages, towns and districts throughout Hungary.

Debates persist in professional circles and in academia concerning the scope of the Minority Act: was it a good idea to include the Roma among the list of minorities, or would it have been better to pursue assimilation as a more prosperous alternative in regards to social integration? A study by István Kemény and Béla Janky draws a parallel between the Romungro and the Jews in Hungary, emphasizing that both groups speak Hungarian as their first language, and the majority of both groups professed Hungarian ethnicity in the 2001 census.[12] (During the drafting of the Minority Act, Jews rejected the government's offer to include "Jew" among the list of ethnic and national minorities.) The ancestors of Hungarian Jews who entered Hungary around the 18th and 19th Century did not speak Hungarian as their mother tongue. Now, Hungarian Jews speak Hungarian and a great majority claimed Hungarian ethnicity in the 2001 census. The ancestors of the Romungros entered Hungary around the 16th to 18th centuries. They now speak Hungarian as their mother tongue and a large proportion, perhaps the majority, declared Hungarian ethnicity in the 2001 census. Yet, as a result of segregation and exclusion, the number of those declaring themselves to be of the Roma minority has increased. Vlach and Romanian Gypsies, however, appear to be on the road to assimilation. Regardless, researchers and Roma politicians frequently express their doubts over the inclusion of the Roma in the legislation. At the same time, they admit that dissolving the Roma minority self-governments created on the basis of the Minority act would be absurd, if not impossible.

The decision to include Roma among the list continues to be questioned mainly because of the deficiencies of the act. For example, the Hungarian minority electoral system allows any voter to vote for the minority candidate in his/her electoral district. Yet, due to historical experience, (in Central and Eastern Europe in the past, data on ethnicity were frequently misused to persecute and discriminate against minorities) Hungarian legislators rejected registering voters on the basis of ethnic affiliation when adopting the law. As

11 The recognised minorities in Hungary are as follows: Bulgarian, Gypsy, Greek, Croatian, Polish, German, Armenian, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian.

12 Kemény, István – Janky Béla: A 2003. évi cigány felmérésről [On the 2003 Survey on the Roma]. In Kállai, Ernő (ed.): A *magyarországi cigány népesség helyzete a 21. század elején*. [The Situation of the Hungarian Roma in the Beginning of the 21st Century] Budapest: MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2003. 7–26.

a result, majority voters voting for minority candidates may be influenced by prejudice and temporary caprice. In fact, the legislation specifies that minority self-government elections and local self-government elections should be held on the same day. And, although no precise data on minorities are currently available, we can safely say that a great number of non-minority voters voted for minority candidates in these elections. Thus, the basic right of minorities is infringed upon whenever it happens that the majority decides who will represent the minority. This clearly goes against the system of minority self-government.

On International Legislation

Along with equal enjoyment of human rights, both government solutions require a form of positive distinction for the Roma. Minorities need positive distinction to combat the disadvantages of being in a minority situation. Positive measures taken to eliminate disadvantage fit the Aristotelian concept of 'equality as justice', which is based on the idea that in the same situation, everyone should be treated in the same way. In this view, one acts justly by treating similar cases similarly and different cases differently.[13]

Of the two possibilities mentioned above, the international documents seem to have committed themselves to guaranteeing special minority rights, and thereby strengthening the concept of Roma nation. This approach is most obviously present in the documents of the Council of Europe (CoE). In one of its recommendations, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE stated: "The majority population must accept Roma into society without assimilating them, and support Roma as a disadvantaged social group."[14] Or, "Roma must be treated as an ethnic or national minority group in every member state, and their minority rights must be guaranteed."[15] Member states are usually recommended to guarantee the Roma implementation of provisions included in three – to some extent normative – international minority documents: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 27), the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.

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13 See in this regard Kymlicka, Will: *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. Ch. 6., 107–130. Sajó, András: *Jogosultságok*. [Rights] Budapest: MTA JTI-Seneca, 1996. Chapter VI.: Nemzetérzület és alkotmányos jogok. [National feelings and constitutional rights] 177–202.

14 Recommendation 1557 (2002) The legal situation of Roma in Europe 9. point

15 Recommendation 1557 (2002) The legal situation of Roma in Europe 6. point

As regards the European Union's treatment of minorities, one must note that the Commission addresses the Roma question in its Regular Reports not in the general framework of political and civil rights, and/or economic, social and cultural rights, but in a separate chapter for the protection of minorities and minority rights. EU devotion to minorities might seem strange when Western European states like France do not even recognize the existence of national minorities. This approach, however, is supported by international organizations who, when dealing with the Roma issue, often limit their attention to Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, this is not an unusual practice in the field of minority protection; provisions for minorities accepted by the League of Nations in the pre-WWII period only covered Central and Eastern Europe, and today, the High Commissioner on National Minorities only exerts its activities in this region. Therefore, it's not unique that the EU only demanded in candidate countries the guarantee of special rights for minorities.

On the Security Based Approach

The minority question is, being treated both in the framework of human rights protection and as a security question in the East and the West, and this attitude unambiguously presents itself on the international stage as well. International organizations treat the international protection of minorities as a part of international human rights protection,[16] but they sometimes regard it as a security policy issue.[17] Present in the documents of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), we may also encounter this

16 One can read, for instance, in Article 1 of the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities the following: "The protection of national minorities and of rights and freedoms of persons belonging to those minorities forms an integral part of the international protection of human rights, and such falls within the scope of international co-operation." In connection to the human rights approach, see in detail Felföldi Enikő: The Characterics of Cultural Minority Rights in International Law – With Special Reference to the Hungarian Status Law. In Zoltán Kántor – Balázs Majtényi – Osamu Ieda – Balázs Vizi – Iván Halász: *The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection*. Slavic Eurasian Studies No. 4, Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2004. 431–460.

17 In connection to this, see in detail: Fernand De Varrenes: Minority Rights and the Prevention of Ethnic Conflicts. UN Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Working Group on Minorities, Sixth session, 10 May 2000. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2000/CRP.3; Ted Gurr - Barbara Harff: *Minorities at Risk: a Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts.* Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace. 1995; Ted Gurr: *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century.* Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace 2000.

outlook in several resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE and in the regular reports on former accession countries made by the European Commission as well. The relationship between the security policy approach and the current idea on human rights creates some tension as it could lead to a utilitarian concept of human rights presently rejected by the current theory of human rights. It could result in the legalization and institutionalization of a dangerous viewpoint from which one could diverge from the general protection of human rights in two ways. On the one hand, the human rights of persons endangering peace and security are restricted in certain cases, as in the Iraqi jail of Abu Graib, or in Guantanamo. On the other hand, granting special minority rights might appease security menaces in the interest of greater social usefulness. On the contrary, according to current legal theory, the threat of individuals, or groups of individuals, to security may not lead to any infringement of general human rights, or to the provision of special rights. As human rights are based on the fact that a human is a moral creature and that every man is equally valuable, only in very exceptional cases can we accept measures restricting human rights for the public good. If we resign ourselves to utilitarianism, these individuals or groups of individuals might become a tool of lofty community objectives.

The security policy approach is reflected in the limited mandate of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,[18] and in its documents addressing the Roma issue. It also seems justified by the fact that the European Union was particularly interested in the fate of the Roma minority during the accession process. While the Regular Monitoring Reports dealt with Roma living in accession countries in great detail, the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, which were accepted at the end of the accession process, gave limited space to the Roma question.

Furthermore, several statements contained within international documents can be interpreted only in light of the security approach. For example, one can find among the European Parliament Resolutions: "recognizing that there is widespread discrimination against the Roma in practically every country where they are settled, but that their numbers in Central and Eastern Europe make the problem particularly acute." Or in the Report of the OSCE High Commissioner on

[18] The office of the High Commissioner was established to identify and seek early resolution of ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, stability or friendly relations between participating States. In relation to this, see CSCE Helsinki Document 1992. The Challenges of Change II. See in detail: Walter Kemp: *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001.

National Minorities one can read the following concerning positive distinction: "Policies should be also considered and instituted in such a way that intra-community tensions are not exacerbated by (the appearance of) unfairly favorable treatment for one group over others."[19]

Deficiencies of the International Documents

International organizations also lack consistency. This can be seen especially in the case of the Regular Reports of the European Commission, which in one year address a question in a separate chapter, and in the next year, drop the issue entirely, only to take it up again later. The Regular Report of 2000 on Poland, for example, mentions "some acts of discrimination by public authorities and violence against Roma do take place."[20] In reports for the following years, however, no mention is made about discrimination by public authorities, from which one might deduce that the problem was meanwhile satisfactorily solved. Or, the Bulgarian Report mentions, for example, that "police protection is inadequate,"[21] and later says nothing about the matter.

In some cases one might even note a confusion of concepts. For instance, minority education related to the Roma is often confused with, or dealt together with, the segregation of Roma at school.[22] Consequently, international documents often do not separate theoretically negative discrimination and positive distinction. Thus, it's not by accident that a recommendation of the Committee of Ministers – while supporting and promoting minority education for Roma children – draws attention to the danger of this "lead[ing] to the establishment of separate curricula, which might lead to the setting up of separate classes."[23]

Now and then we can even find prejudiced views in these documents. *The Human Rights Problems and Protections of the Roma*, UN working paper, speaks of the building of the notorious wall in the Czech town of Usti nad Labem, (the wall separated the Roma and non-Roma population). The paper mentions the following:

19 Report of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Session 3 ("Roma and Sinti") of the Human Dimension Section of the OSCE review Conference, Vienna, 22 September 1999.

20 Poland 2002 Report (Minority rights and the protection of minorities)

21 Bulgaria 1999 Report (Minority rights and the protection of minorities)

22 The practice of systematically routing Roma students to "special schools" for the mentally disabled is the most widespread form of segregation in certain countries.

23 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Education of Roma/Gypsy Children in Europe Recommendation No. R (2000) 4.

"Whilst it cannot be denied that the municipal authorities of that town might have had some genuine cause for concern or could have taken reasonable action to eliminate the noise and visual pollution coming from the two blocks of flats which were source of inconvenience to the non-Roma neighborhood, the proposal to build a wall to separate and segregate the two communities was most disquieting since it amounted to an affront to human dignity and was a clear breach of the principle of equality of individuals before the law."[24]

This document also stated: "Roma children are usually breastfed till they are 6 or 7 years old and thus have barely been exposed to mainstream influence, including language, when they start their schooling."[25] This is the sole instrument adopted at the universal level that focuses exclusively on the situation of the Roma.

Documents adopted by international organizations concerning the Roma are frequently incoherent, making it difficult to deduce any common regulatory elements from them. At most, one can claim that in general, these documents are characterized by a security policy approach and regularly recommend the prohibition of discrimination. Furthermore, while perhaps overly committed to the concept of the Roma-nation, they fail to take into consideration the possibility of alternative forms of positive distinction.

Index of International Documents

UN

- Report by Mr. Glélé-Ahnhanzo, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/26
- Discrimination against Roma: 16/08/2000.
  /International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, CERD General Recommendation 27 (General Comments) (Fifty-seventh session, 2000)/
- The Human Rights Problems and Protections of the Roma. E/CN.4 Sub.2/2000/28, 23 June 2000
  Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fifty-second session.

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24 The Human Rights Problems and Protections of the Roma E/CN.4 Sub.2/2000/28, 23 June 2000, Paragraph. 24.

25 Ibid. II: Human Rights Problems of the Roma B Socio-economic Problems 2 Education 25.

– The Human Rights Problems and Protections of the Roma Sub-Commission on Human Rights Decision 2000/109

OSCE (CSCE)

– Roma (Gypsies) in the CSCE Region, Report of the High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993.
– Report of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Session 3 ("Roma and Sinti") of the Human Dimension Section of the OSCE review Conference, Vienna 22 September 1999.
– Report on the Situation of the Roma and Sinti in the OSCE area. The Hague, March 2000.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

– Recommendation 563 (1969) on the Situation of Gypsies and Other Travelers in Europe (Consultative Assembly)
– Recommendation 1203 (1993) on Gypsies in Europe (Parliamentary Assembly)
– ECRI General Policy Recommendation N: 3 CRI (98) 29 rev
– Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Education of Roma/Gypsy Children in Europe Recommendation No. R (2000) 4 (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 3 February 2000 at the 696th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies)
– Recommendation Rec(2001)17 on Improving the Economic and Employment Situation of Roma/Gypsies and Travelers in Europe
– Recommendation 1557 (2002) The Legal Situation of Roma in Europe

EUROPEAN UNION

European Commission

– AGENDA 2000
– Regular Reports 1998
– Regular Reports 1999
– Regular Reports 2000
– Regular Reports 2001
– Regular Reports 2002
– Regular Reports 2003

– Comprehensive Monitoring Reports
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia)

The European Parliament

– Minutes of 13/07/1995 – Final Edition B4–0974/95 Resolution on Discrimination Against the Roma
– Resolution on Abuses Against Roma and Other Minorities in the New Kosovo, Minutes of 07/10/1999 – Final Edition Human rights: Situation of the Roma people in Kosovo B5–0147, 0151, 0166 and 0174/1999
– Resolution on the Situation of Women from Minority Groups in the European Union (P5_TA-PROV(2004)0153, A5–0102/2004)

PETER VAN DER PARRE

Minorities and Nation Building Strategies: Central European Lessons for the Netherlands*

In November 2004, the Netherlands faced a severe crisis in the relationship between the autochtonous Dutch population and Muslim minorities. A cell of fundamentalist Muslims assassinated Theo van Gogh; a filmmaker well known for his public appearances in which he would use insulting language regarding the Muslim population in the Netherlands. For two weeks after the assassination, the Netherlands was shocked by attempts to burn Mosques, Islamic schools, and churches and the violent resistance against arrest of two members of the terrorist cell in The Hague.

These incidents are not isolated. People visiting the Netherlands will recognize that this country has become a rather colorful nation with many minorities living together with the Dutch. The Dutch are proud of their history of being a free haven for many flows of refugees. All of these flows have more or less been assimilated into the Dutch society. Only recently at the end of the 1990's the government of the Netherlands formally recognized the fact that the country had changed over the past decades from an emigrant nation into an immigrant one. Since 1948 the Netherlands has faced a lot of newcomers as both refugees and immigrants from its former colonies Indonesia,

* This article is the result of a two-month study in three Central European countries: Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. From September until October 2004 the author was a visiting-fellow at the Teleki László Institute, Centre for Central European Studies in Budapest. This research project is part of the Master of Public Administration program executed by the Netherlands School of Public Administration, for which the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations selected him. The content of this article does not represent the Dutch policy towards minorities but his personal point of view. The author would like to thank Irina Culic, Gábor Czoch, Jaco Dagevos, Han Entzinger, Zoltán Kántor, Peter Mascini, Steven Ralston, Paul Scheffer, Florian Sterk, Susanne Westdorp, Hans Wilmink, Anton Zyderveld and Bianca Zylfiu for their comments and suggestions on a previous draft of this article. e-mail: p.vd.parre@freeler.nl

Surinam and the Dutch Antilles. In the late 1960's many people were hired as temporary workers from the Mediterranean. After some decades many Moroccans and Turks decided to stay and to bring their families to the Netherlands. However, in 75% of the cases their offspring still marry with men and women from the countries of origin and settle together in the Netherlands. Over the years the Dutch approach to deal with newcomers is one of assimilation with a strong focus on socioeconomic integration. Socioeconomic equality and equal opportunity of socioeconomic changes are the normative starting points. Meanwhile, on a socio-cultural level, there are many aspects that can be qualified as culturally liberal, even a more or less laissez faire approach to multiculturalism. In the last couple of years this has dramatically changed into an assimilation approach as well.

At present an important policy issue in the Netherlands is to look for ways to deal with the multicultural challenge the country is confronted with. The Dutch are used to learning from the experiences of the United States. But geographically closer to the Netherlands, the Central and East European Countries have a long tradition in dealing with this question too. These countries are strongly aware of their multicultural history. In the last thousand years Central and East Europe faced many migration flows and many migrant settlements kept their religion, culture and language over several hundreds of years. As a result of the peace treaties after the First World War and the border shifts thereafter, all the Central and East European Countries have many minority groups. Many of these minority groups have kin-states in neighboring countries. For many years cultural homogenization was clearly the aim of the applied strategies of assimilation in all these different countries and there even were several periods of "ethnic cleansing". After 1989 many of the new post-communist states recognized that National minorities are a part of the population with whom the majority share a common history in their constitution and laws. Nevertheless, this common history is still interpreted in a manner of nationalist myths of ethnic victimization with the neighboring states as oppressor by every Nation state, and likewise in a popularized manner by its national ethnic group. These myths coexist in a fragile combination with the idea of peaceful coexistence of the different ethnic groups at the local level. This history may offer experiences from which Dutch policy makers can learn.

I will start with a brief description of the main theoretical approaches. Here, an important question to be answered is whether a comparison between recent immigrant groups and historical minority groups can be made.

After answering this question affirmatively, I will give a rough sketch of the actual and historical situation in four countries: Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and the Netherlands. Through this rough sketch I examine some general patterns in minority-majority interaction. After drawing conclusions, I will sum up some lessons Dutch policy makers might learn from the Central and East European experiences regarding the question of dealing with minorities in the Netherlands.

Theories on dealing with minorities

According to the World Directory of Minorities minorities are defined as: *"non-dominant groups, not always numerically inferior to majorities, whose members possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics that differ from the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language"*[1]. From this definition it is clear that before all other things the question of dealing with minorities is a question of dealing with the consequences of collapsing cultures. Surveying the literature, two different approaches towards the question whether a comparison can be made between recent immigrant groups and historical minority groups can be found. The multiculturalism point of view defines all minorities as being equal, which would allow comparison. However, its relativistic approach towards cultures denies the sense of making a comparison for the purpose of learning from different situations[2]. The nation-building point of view, on the other hand, makes a strong division between newcomers and historic minorities. In doing so a comparison between these different minority groups is in fact not allowed. After taking a deeper look at both normative approaches, I will argue that a more empirical approach focusing on the processes of majority-minority interaction and mutual cultural change is necessary and meanwhile allows the comparison of different kind of minority groups.

According to Dimitras[3] Citizens, non-citizen residents and even non-permanent residents of states are qualified for protection under the norms that can be found in the United Nations "International Covenant on Rights of minorities" of 1994 and the Council of Europe's "Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities" of 1998. Article 27 of the

1 Minority Rights Group International: *World Directory of Minorities.* London: MRG, 1997. XV.
2 Culic, Irina, István Horváth, Cristian Stan (eds.): *Refelections on Differences: focus on Romania.* Cluj-Napoca: Limes Publishing House, 1999.
3 Dimitras, Panayote Elias: *Recognition of Minorities in Europe: Protecting Rights and Dignity.* MRG Briefing, London: Minority Rights Group International, 2004. 1.

"International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights" spelled out that the protection of minorities' civil and political rights cannot be limited to invoking general equality before the law, equal protection by the law, and non-discrimination. All existing minorities need to be acknowledged by states, and states are urged to ensure the survival and development of the identity of all minorities. The existence of minorities does not depend on decisions by the state, but is to be established on self-identification by the individual concerned, if no justification exists to the contrary.

Opposed to this view we find authors who share the opinion that the question of dealing with National minorities is really different from the question of dealing with new-coming minorities. As Kymlicka points out, National minorities become minorities outside their free will, while immigrants become so within their free will.[4] National minorities are a by-product of nation-building processes inside states. It is not a question if states engage in nation building or not, as all states do, but the extent to which nation building is liberal or illiberal. Nation building is not an ethno-culturally neutral process in the sense that there is a sharp divorce between the state and ethnicity, and the state acts neutrally towards the language, the history, the literature and the calendar of the different ethnic groups inside its territory. Moreover, liberal-democratic states are not ethno-culturally neutral. On the contrary, by traveling from one liberal-democratic state to another in Western Europe it becomes clear that the culture of a specific dominant group is diffused within that particular society in every different state. Kymlicka defines a societal culture as "*a territorially-concentrated culture, centered on a shared language, that is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both public and private life (schooling, media, law, economy, government, the requirements of immigration and naturalization, the drawing of internal and external boundaries, and so on).*"[5] The combinational aspects of language and social institutions makes a societal culture something different from common religious beliefs, family customs or personal lifestyle. To realize societal cultures states selectively suppress ethno-cultural diversity. This attempt at diffusing a single societal culture throughout the whole territory of a state is defined by Kymlicka as the nation-building process[6]. In this process a number of tools are used:

4 Kymlicka, Will: Nation-building and minority rights: comparing West and East. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2000. 188.
5 Kymlicka, 185.
6 Kymlicka, 186.

1. official language policy; 2. attempts to create a uniform system of national education; 3. migration and naturalization policies (i.e., favoring co-ethnics in admissions decisions; requiring migrants to adopt a common national identity as a condition of naturalization); and 4. the redrawing of administrative districts to dilute the weight of minorities in each of them.[7]

Confronted with this diffusion of a particular societal culture, socio-cultural minorities will react in different ways. In brief there are three major categories of reaction: 1. assimilation; 2. challenge; or 3. migration.

Assimilation

After a certain period of time, minorities assimilate to a certain degree by learning the official language, the history and the political institution of the state they are living in. Most minorities are too small and territorially too dispersed to engage in competing nation-building processes. Moreover, they accept the assumption that their lives will change, and even more so that the lives of their children will change, and that they will be bound up with participation in mainstream institutions. Thus, they integrate into the political system, just as they integrate socio-economically.[8] This is more likely to happen when the cultural differences between the minority and the majority are relatively small and when the minority does not believe they lose something highly valued by assimilating. In the point of view of Kymlicka, assimilation generally is the applied strategy of immigrants.

Challenge

According to Kymlicka those ethno-cultural minorities who are rather strong in challenging the diffusion of a societal culture are National minorities.[9] National minorities are ethno-cultural groups that formed complete and functioning societies in their historic homelands prior to being incorporated into a larger state. Like the majority group they seek control over the language and curriculum of schooling, government employment, the way of dealing with public authorities, the requirements of immigration and naturalization in their region, and the drawing of the internal boundaries of their region. At the extreme, this can lead to secession, but normally, as in the case of Belgium and Canada, it involves some form of regional autonomy. Kymlicka interprets this as a trend in which Nation states more and more will shift into multi-nation

7 Kymlicka, 195–6.
8 Kymlicka, 191.
9 Kymlicka, 187–95.

states. And what is more important, empirical evidence exists that arrangements of self-government diminish the likelihood of violent conflict, while on the other hand refusing or rescinding these rights serve to act as a stimulus to escalate the level of conflict.[10]

Migration

Protestant groups like the Mennonites are a good example of minorities that feel forced to choose several times in history for the option of migration instead of the choice for assimilation as their numbers were too small to challenge the oppressing culture of a majority. In the beginning of the 16th century growing discontent with the Catholic Church led to the foundation of a number of new religious movements. The Mennonites are one of those and are named after one of their leaders Menno Simons from the small village of Wytmarsum in Friesland. He and his disciples first found refuge in the town of Groningen, which was soon followed by forced emigration eastwards to Eastern Friesland. From there they moved on to Western Prussia, into the Weichsel delta near Danzig (Gdansk). Until the first Polish Partition in 1772 the Mennonites were allowed to live according to their own principles. When, as a result of this Partition, the area around Danzig became a part of the state of Prussia, the situation deteriorated significantly. Their refusal to bear arms brought the Mennonites into serious conflict with the authorities, and once again emigration seemed the only alternative. In 1789, a first group of settlers set off for the southern parts of Russia. Catherine the Great, who needed farmers for the parts of Southern Russia, invited them. Since 1986 many of the Mennonites are leaving the former Soviet Union for Mennonites settlements in Canada and the United States.[11] The example of the Mennonites is no exception, as the Amish in the United States, the Huguenots in Western Europe and the Chinese settlements in Indonesia illustrate. When groups are large enough, territorially concentrated and strongly believe they will lose something highly valued by assimilating into a majority culture, they will try to migrate to a territory where they are allowed to have their own nation-building process.

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10 Kymlicka, 188.

11 Graaf, Tjeerd de: *The staus of an ethnic minority group in the former Soviet Union: The Mennonites and their relation with the Netherlands, Germany and Russia.* Paper presented at the conference "The Status-law syndrome: Post-Communist Nation-Building or Post-Modern Citinzenship?" October 14–16, Budapest, 2004.

The option of migration and the successful examples of minority groups who did so, make it clear in my opinion that not all immigrant groups may be assumed to be willing to assimilate. So the distinction between national minorities and immigrants is not an exclusive one, but an empirical one depending on the orientations of the minority group itself rather than whether it is a national minority or an immigrant minority. Orientations and cultures are not frozen but develop in interaction. The relative success of assimilation of a first generation is also of influence on the nation-building efforts of the next generation. For the children of a first generation of migrants to be born in their homeland is as much a matter of fact that is outside their free will as for the offspring of the National minorities. Both must live in multicultural surroundings: the culture of their parents and the culture of the majority society in which they somehow are being acculturated. The more successful the first generation is at assimilating, the smaller the chances are that the next generation will start its own nation-building project.

Both normative approaches, i.e. multiculturalism and nation building, share the same kind of shortcoming: a lack of attention towards the interaction between majorities and minorities. This interaction is at the very heart of the collapse of cultures. And in this interaction both cultures develop and change. The processes of majority-minority interaction and cultural change are worth comparing so we can learn from them in different empirical situations.

To analyze the complexity of majority-minority interaction one needs a multi-level approach. A helpful starting point is the theoretical framework of the Triadic Nexus of Rogers Brubaker.[12] The Triadic Nexus offers an analytical framework to analyze the nation-building project of a majority inside the political scene of the homeland, taking into account the international relations between neighboring governments, and the interaction of kin-state governments with their exterior kin-minorities. Zoltán Kántor made this model more dynamic by adding the nationalizing project of minorities to this framework.[13] As this model still focuses on the political elites – those who are involved in politics, both in government and opposition – I feel the need to enlarge this framework to a quadratic nexus by introducing the street-level interaction of minorities and majorities into this scheme.

12 Brubaker, Rogers: *Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

13 Kántor, Zoltán: *Institutionalizing Nationalism. (manuscript)* Budapest: Teleki László Institute, 2004. Kántor, Zoltán: Status Law and 'nation policy': Theoretical aspects. *Foreign Policy Review,* Vol. 2, Nr. 2, 2003.

As elites do not always have a proper feel for what is going on at the street level, they need the support of the street level to implement their strategies. The need for this support is most clear during elections. So, in short, my analytical framework, which is necessary to give a rough sketch of the mechanisms behind the interaction between majorities and minorities, can be summarized as a multi-level approach focusing on the interaction between minorities and their majority peers. It is inside the context of a national political scene; influenced by the kin-politics of a kin-state towards its exterior living kin-minority; and influenced by the international relations between governments in the framework of an international community with its developing standards of international law. To analyze the interplay of the different relationships, four different levels of interactions are considered throughout this article:

1. The interactions between minorities and their majority peers.
2. The interactions of minorities inside the political scene of the home state.
3. The interactions of kin-state governments with the extraterritorial living kin-minorities.
4. The international relations between governments within the framework of an international community with its developing standards of international law.

From the Central and East European countries I chose to compare Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. This is because of the large Hungarian minority in both Romania and Slovakia, which is politically significant in both countries. Simultaneously, both countries have a much smaller and more assimilated kin-minority in Hungary. Between 1920 and 2004 the number of Hungarians in the neighboring countries decreased from 3.5 million to 2.5 million. According to Bárdi: "*Population loss, which can be interpreted within the framework of parallel nation building endeavors of Hungary and its neighbors, can be attributed to migration to the mother country, assimilation, the Holocaust, as well as a decrease of natural population growth*".[14] Below, I will briefly describe the situation of dealing with the question of minorities in Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and the Netherlands.

[14] Bárdi, Nándor: Hungary and the Hungarians Living Abroad: a Historical Outline. *Regio: Minorities Politics, Society,* 2003. 121 – 138. www.regiofolyoirat.hu See also the longer version of the study in Zoltán Kántor, Balázs Majtényi, Osamu Ieda, Balázs, and Iván Halász (eds.): *The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection*. Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2004.

Hungary

Due to its multicultural history as part of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, many but mostly rather small groups of minorities live in Hungary. The Hungarians themselves form the absolute majority as there are 9.7 million Hungarians out of the total population of 10.1 million. The official language is Hungarian. Since the political changes in 1990, Hungary has established internal legal and institutional frameworks for the protection of minorities.[15]

The Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities offers the members of minority groups recognized by this act a combination of both territorial and personal autonomy.[16] Newcomers, like the growing Chinese population, are excluded from this Act. Majtényi points out that the requirement of one hundred years of residence is disputable and even unnecessary, as even the members of National and Ethnic minorities recognized by the Act arrived in the country in several waves of immigration less than one hundred years ago.[17] Finally, Majtényi questioned whether a minority like the Chinese can "grow old enough" to gain legal recognition of its minority status. At this very moment over a thousand local and thirteen national self-governments exist. The main tasks and responsibilities of self-governments lie in guaranteeing autonomy in education and culture.[18]

The relationship of Hungary with the neighboring governments and the Hungarian minorities abroad

Since 1990 Hungarian governments publicly declare a responsibility towards the Hungarians abroad. In 1990, Prime Minister József Antall declared himself the prime minister 'in spirit' of the 15 million Hungarians. This example was adopted by his successors. Even parties that are less overtly nationalistic realize that they can not appear to neglect Hungarians abroad, or ignore those at home who seek to support them. In the amended Constitution of Hungary (1989), Article 6 (3) states: "*The Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living outside of its borders and shall*

15 Mercator Education, www.mercator-education.org, 2004.

16 Hungarian Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, Article 61 (1) qualify Bulgarian, Gypsy, Greek, Croatian, Polish, German, Armenian, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovakian, Slovenian an Ukrainian ethnic groups as ethnic groups native to Hungary. At the moment this law was still in draft the Jewish population applied for being taken out from the Act. See Majtényi, Balázs: Minority Rights in Hungary and the Situation of the Roma. *Acta Juridica Hungarica*, Vol. 45, Nos 1–2, 2004.

17 Majtényi, idem, 138–9.

18 Klinge, S.: *Hungary files National Minorities Convention Report.* Brussels: Eurolang EBLUL, 2004.

promote and foster their relations with Hungary." On the basis of this constitutional foundation Hungary established a Government Office for Hungarians Abroad in 1992, it created a Hungarian Standing Conference in 1999, which is meant to be a political bond between Hungary and Hungarians abroad, and finally on June 10th 2001 Hungary unilaterally adopted an Act on Hungarians Living in Neighboring States.[19] This Act is generally referred to as the Hungarian Status Law. The aim of this Act is "*to comply with its responsibility for Hungarians living abroad and to promote the preservation and development of their manifold relations with Hungary, as well as to ensure that Hungarians living in neighboring countries form part of the Hungarian nation as a whole to promote and preserve their well-being and awareness of national identity within their home country.*"

In recent years, similar acts were adopted in Austria (1979), Italy (1991), Slovenia (1996), Slovakia (1997), Greece (1998), Russia (1999), and in Bulgaria (2000).[20] Moreover, in response to the Hungarian Status Law, Romania is actually framing one. Nevertheless, the governments of both Slovakia and Romania considered the Hungarian Status Law as a form of unilateral interference in their internal affairs, insinuating that they were not doing a proper job of protecting and promoting the rights and interests of Hungarian minorities under their jurisdiction. However, at the very moment the Hungarian Status Law was adopted this situation was improving in both countries thanks to the important political role of the Minority Parties representing the Hungarians in both countries. The inter-ethnic relations in both Romania and Slovakia were no longer a hot issue in either country. And, moreover, significant improvements were being made in terms of the protection and promotion of national minorities, and the Hungarian minority in particular. Also, the bilateral relations between Hungary and Romania and Slovakia were much better than in past decades.

Nigel Swain explains why the Hungarian Status law could increase tensions between Hungary, Romania and Slovakia that much in what he calls the co-existing of myths of national victim-hood in Central and East Europe. Swain:[21]

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19 Hungarian Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (amended on June 23, 2003)

20 Venice Commission (officially: European Commission for Democracy through Law), *Report on the Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by their Kin-State*, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 48th Plenary Meeting, 19–20 October, 2001, Venice

21 Swain, Nigel: *The innocence of article eighteen, paragraph two, subsection e.* Paper presented at the conference "The Status-law syndrome: Post-Communist Nation-Building or Post-Modern Citinzenship?" October 14–16, Budapest, 2004.

> "*How could Hungarian politicians genuinely believe that they were doing something unproblematic when they passed the bill? The obverse of the question was where did all the controversy come from on the other sides, given that in reality there were precedents for most of its provisions? The answer to both questions (…) is the persistence of nationalist myths of national victim-hood that dehumanize the ethnic other and make negotiation and reasoned discussion impossible. Victims do not see any need to consult with their oppressors. Victims seek redress on their own terms. Only politicians who viewed events through the prism of a myth of national victim-hood could innocently and unreflectingly have proposed measures such as Article 18 of the Status Law, which resulted in extreme intervention into the domestic policies of neighboring states. Only politicians informed by similar myths from the other side could have reacted so hysterically to the proposals. While myths of national victim-hood persist and the nations of Eastern Europe see themselves as victims and their neighbors as oppressors, incidents such as the status law and the scandal it provoked will be repeated.*"

The relationship between the Romanian and the Hungarian governments worsened after Hungary adopted the Status Law. The Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Nastase even edited a whole book on this legislation.[22] In his book he carefully explains that the Status Law is based on an ethnical conception of the human race that is closely related to racism and opposed to the universalistic concept of citizenship. Furthermore, the impact of the law regarding citizens from another country is extraterritorial and seen as interference in the territorial autonomy of the affected countries. Finally, besides all this, the Status Law is by its very nature an act of discrimination to people who can not benefit from it because of the fact they belong to another ethnic group. Here again the extraterritorial nature creates two categories of citizens in the affected states that would deteriorate the relationship between the minority and the majority in that country. Regardless of the critique on the Hungarian Status Law, Năstase's government feels a responsibility for the fate of the Romanians living abroad. Ethnic Romanians of the Republic of Moldova are offered the Romanian citizenship regardless of whether they stay in Moldova or immigrate to Romania.[23] In an address to representatives of the Romanian Diaspora on 9 August 2003, Prime Minister Nastase announced that Romania is enacting similar legislation like the Hungarian Status Law, to enhance the relationship between Romania and the Romanians

22 Năstase, Adrian et al.: *Protecting Minorities in the Future Europe: Between Political Interest and International Law*. Bucharest: Monitorul Oficial, 2002.

23 Iordachi, Constantin: Citizenship and National Identity in Romania: A Historical Overview. *Regio: Minorities, Politics, Society*, 2002. 34.

living abroad.[24] This is clearly the application of double standards, which can only be explained in the process of nation-building nationalism[25] and that is affected by the myth of national victim-hood regarding the historical oppressor.

After a year of negotiations, the Romanian and the Hungarian governments agreed on a bilateral treaty in which the application of the Status Law to Hungarians living in Romania is arranged. At least one third of the Hungarians in Romania have applied for the Status Law certificate through which one can benefit from the Status Law. Elderly Hungarians living abroad in particular cherish the symbolic attachment to Hungary. The negotiations between Bratislava and Budapest about a bilateral treaty to implement the Status Law inside Slovakia even took two years. Unlike Bucharest, Bratislava didn't agree on the individual benefit that the Status Law could offer. Finally, Bratislava and Budapest agreed upon the establishment of a joined Slovakian and Hungarian foundation, which handle the applications with regard to the Status Law and which will take care of the fact that the whole community is affected by the benefits the Status Law offers and not only some ethnic individuals or ethnic families. The way this joined foundation operates is comparable to the way Germany supports communities abroad to stimulate the German language and German culture. National and local governments have to be aware of the risks of ethnic closure and social exclusion that might happen between communities with different languages and cultures. To avoid this both communities have to be stimulated to invest in their mutual interaction. For this reason the Slovakian implementation of the Hungarian Status Law seems positive.

The interactions of neighboring kin-state governments with their kin-minorities in Hungary

Both the Romanian and the Slovakian minority groups in Hungary are rather small, and economically and culturally well integrated in Hungarian society. Both the Romanian and the Slovakian Constitution pay special attention to the kin-minorities in their neighboring countries. Neither Romania, nor Slovakia seems to be much involved with their small kin-minorities in

[24] Kemp, Walter: *The Triadic Nexus: Lessons Learned from the Status Law* Paper presented at the conference "The Status Law Syndrome: Post-Communist Nation-Building or Post-Modern Citizenship?" October 14–16, Budapest, 2004.

[25] Kántor, Zoltán: *The Uses (and misuses) of the Concept of Nation in the ECE 'Status Laws'.* Paper presented at the conference "The Status Law Syndrome: Post-Communist Nation-Building or Post-Modern Citizenship?" October 14–16, Budapest, 2004.

Hungary. Nevertheless, Hungary was able to make agreements with the neighboring countries concerning these minorities. The minority language communities in Hungary are able to make use of learning materials of their kin-states. Teachers are also educated in the kin-state. Hungary hopes that it can stimulate the neighboring countries to treat their Hungarian minorities in a proper way as well by means of this policy. According to the 2001 report by the Committee of Experts[26] on the implementation of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, Hungary *"has undertaken an ambitious effort in drafting a form of a model legislation on the protection of minorities"*.

Romania

According to the population census of 2002, Romania has 21.681 million inhabitants of whom 90% define themselves as Romanians. The official language is Romanian. The number of languages listed for Romania is 15.[27] For much of its history, Romania was part of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy (Transylvania) and of the Ottoman Empire as well. Over the past decade Romania has lost around 1.2 million of its population. Compared with the census of 1992 1 million of the ethnic Romanians and 200,000 of the ethnic Hungarians have left. This is mainly due to emigration. Nearly everyone interviewed spoke of relatives in foreign countries and many of them are mentally prepared to emigrate to find a better future for themselves but also to help their relatives to survive.

In March 1990, Romania witnessed a severe nationalist clash of ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Romanians in the Transylvanian city of Târgu-Mureș. After 15 hours of fighting there were 6 deaths and over 100 wounded. Out of Romania's largest cities, Târgu-Mureș (300.000 inhabitants) is the only one with a nearly 50/50 distribution of both ethnic groups. On the basis of interviews with eyewitnesses and participants in this clash, Călin Goina[28] describes the process of action, interaction and reaction that facilitated the widespread use and intensification of ethnic framing.

In the instable situation in the aftermath of the revolution of December 1989 ethnic affiliation became for a while one of the main criteria in the public arena. Before 1989 bureaucratic appointment operated according to tacit princi-

26 Council of Europe, *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages Application of the Charter in Hungary: Report of the Committee of Experts on the Charter and recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the application of the Charter by Hungary.* Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2001. 10.

27 Mercator Education, www.mercator-education.org, 2004.

28 Goina, Călin: *The Ethnicization of Politics: the case of Târgu-Mureș.* (manuscript) 1999.

ples of ethnic representation. In the aftermath of December 1989 the distribution of positions became an explicit and highly contested element in the struggle for political and symbolical control of this city. The homogenizing elements of the Ceausescu way of nation building stimulated the Hungarians in Transylvania, in the context of the political democratization process, to articulate minority's rights to realize autonomous and separate institutions of the Hungarian language to ensure the survival and development of their culture. In doing so they developed organizations that were seen by their Romanian peers as a sort of 'Hungarian-only' organizations. So the issue of minority's rights was soon interpreted as a claim of ownership over the city. This was reason enough for some Romanians to create 'Romanians-only' organizations, which had as sole reason of existence the desire to counter-act and oppose the Hungarian initiatives. This ownership struggle erupted when the issue of school separation was raised. Local media switched during this process from mere presentation of the events to partisan presentation and ended up in making open appeals to violence. At this moment ethnic demonstrations and counter-demonstrations reached a mass dimension. Finally, after the clash it took a long time to re-build trust and shattered friendships between Hungarians and Romanians in Târgu-Mureș.

This clash is an important part of the collective memory in Romania and for a lesser part in Hungary. Many people interviewed referred in to it one way or the other and often spontaneously to this event. Everybody was reassuring that such a clash is not possible any more in Romania. And the very fact that this riot stayed isolated even in 1990 is a reason to have faith in this claim. It was found that Hungarians have no problems in speaking Hungarian in public and are treated as equals by their Romanian peers. Respondents assured me that the criterion of professional merit and credibility is gaining more and more weight for people to vote for a politician regardless of his or her ethnic affiliation. Still, the interaction between Hungarians and Romanians is somewhat restrained. This is easily explained by the fact that the Hungarian language is an unintended but real factor in ethnic closure.[29] Another factor of social closure is the difference in religion: Romanians are in general Orthodox, while the Hungarians are Protestants and also Catholics. Economically, the Hungarians and the Romanians are very much alike.

[29] see also Goina, 1999; Fox, Jon E.: Missing the Mark: Nationalist Politics and University Students in Transylvania, Draft, Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj, 2000; and Lazăr, Marius: Switching Antagonist Roles: Conflicting Identities and Majority/Minority Reactions. A Case Study on the Region of Szeklerland-Transylvania, NEXUS Research Project paper, Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj, 2001.

Instead of the one sided focus on the preservation of the Hungarian language and culture among the ethnic Hungarians in Romanian, it would be better for both the Hungarian and the Romanian government to promote the Hungarian language and culture in general to Romanian-Hungarians and Romanians alike. Quite a few Romanians seem interested in the language and the culture of their fellow Hungarian citizens and in the opportunities this will offer to find jobs in Hungary as well. Only the enforcement of mutual interaction will make the myths of victim-hood disappear over time. At street level these myths are still alive at present. Nevertheless, social research data already shows a strong improvement in the inter-ethnic coexistence of Hungarians and Romanians.[30] For many people interviewed the most important factor for this improvement is the participation of the Romanian-Hungarians in Romania's political scene.[31]

The interactions of national minorities inside the political scene of Romania

Minorities in Romania have a seat in the Parliament and in the Senate by right of their constitution. In their nation-building project, the Hungarian minority in Romania succeeded to augment this representation. By overcoming ideological differences they established a federation of civic organizations and different political parties: the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR). The DAHR finds its raison d'ętre in the nation-building process that unites the Hungarian minority in Romania. An important stimulus is the continuing confrontation of the Hungarian minority with the homogenizing tendencies of the nation-building process of the Romanian state, which causes sentiments as lack of protection of the Hungarian minority rights and lack of protection of the Hungarian language. United this federation participated in the Romanian elections in 1996, 2000 and 2004. Up till now the DAHR gained between 6.6% and 6.9% of the votes, enough to pass the 5% threshold, but also close to the maximum votes they can mobilize as an ethnic party with a population of approximately 6.6% of the total population.[32] In the Romanian political scene, the DAHR became a significant political factor. In December 1996 it was invited to join the coalition. Inside and outside Romania this was seen as an unprecedented and outstanding event.

30 Research Center for Interethnic Relations, *Ethnobarometer: Interethnic Relations in Romania*, Cluj: Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj, 2000.

31 See also Kántor, Zoltán and Nándor Bárdi: The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) in the Government of Romania from 1996 to 2000. *Regio: Minorities, Politics, Society*, 2002. 205.

32 Kántor and Bárdi, 195.

After the elections of 2000 and in order to isolate the extreme nationalistic Greater Romania Party, which ranked second in the elections, Prime Minister Adrian Nastase of the Socialist Party (PSD) signed several collaboration protocols, three of them with the DAHR, the party of the Roma (PR) and the German Democratic Forum of Romania (FDGR).[33]

By the unilateral adoption of the Status Law by the Hungarian Parliament, the DAHR found itself in a bind. Although the DAHR is a supporter of trans-border affirmative action by Hungary, the unilateral nature of this action challenged their good relations with the governing party. Moreover, after successfully raising and addressing the issue for minority rights on the basis of citizenship and equal opportunity and meanwhile criticizing the Romanian majority for its nationalizing strategies, the nationalistic parties in Romania accused the DAHR of pushing an exclusively ethnic agenda, strengthening bonds with Budapest, advocating discrimination based on ethnicity, and demonstrating disloyalty to the state in which they are citizens.[34]

The internal challenge for the leaders of the DAHR is to prove its effectiveness in cooperating with the governing parties instead of opposing the government in a more radical way. In the mean time, the more nationalistic parties inside Hungary have become explicit supporters of the more radical opposition inside the DAHR. The debate about the Status Law strengthens the already existing divide within the Romanian-Hungarian community. In 2004 some organizations of the DAHR left the federation, because they disagreed with the mainstream inside the DAHR concerning the way to achieve territorial autonomy for the Hungarian minority. As the claim for territorial autonomy for minorities is unacceptable for the Romanian-majority political elite, the mainstream inside the DAHR does not want to jeopardize its favorable central position inside the Romanian political scene by making strong claims for territorial autonomy. After the elections in November 2004, it became clear that the DAHR could maintain its position in the Romanian Parliament and it even became a member of the government coalition again.

Because of the ongoing migration of Hungarians from Romania to Hungary and because of the departure of some of its internal opposition to competing parties, the DAHR has reason to fear for its continuation in the near future. This could be a significant loss for both the Hungarian minority in Romania as well as for Romanian society as a whole, because thanks to the

33 Niculescu, Toni: *National Minorities' Share of Power in Romania*. Bucharest, manuscript, 2003.
34 Kemp, idem

crucial position of the DAHR in the centre of the Romanian political scene it was able to make considerable progress on core Hungarian minority issues, of which other minorities profited as well[35]. As a result, inter-ethnical relations improved, but they still need continuous investments for improvement. Niculescu: "*Diversity integration, minority inclusiveness and participation were subject to political negotiation, pending on the electoral outcomes, according to short-term political agreements. Real progress can occur under severe monitoring of the West. For example, centre-periphery tensions would significantly decrease once EU regulations and principles regarding regional development and subsidiary will be in place. Yet, as there is no acquis on minority rights, once the candidate states have concluded accession negotiations there remains no room for monitoring in this sense. This is especially worrisome given that minority rights standards in some of the EU member states themselves do not meet the criteria on minority protection, as laid down by the Copenhagen European Council.*"[36]

Slovakia

The Republic of Slovakia has 5.4 million inhabitants, with a majority of Slovakians (4.3 million). Slovakia is a very young state as it officially separated from the Czech Republic on January 1st ,1993. The official language is Slovak. The major minorities are Hungarians, Roma, Ukrainian and Czech. Slovakia has a multicultural history and it was part of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy. 597,400 people define themselves as Slovakian-Hungarians, which is 11.2% of the total population. Approximately approximately 560 to 600 thousand people in Slovakia speak Hungarian.[37] In general Slovakians are Catholics, while many of the Slovakian-Hungarians are Protestants. Economically the Hungarians are more or less equal to the Slovakians. Between 1991 and 2000 around 46,000 Slovakian-Hungarians assimilated in Slovakia.[38] The Hungarians mostly live in the southern parts of Slovakia now, near to the Hungarian border. From 1945 to 1948 the Hungarians lost their citizenship and many were deported under the Benes Decrees. In October, 2004, the Hungarian Museum in the Slovakian city of Komarno offered an exposition on this subject. During the negotiations for the present coalition government in 2002, which the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) is part of too, this subject and the demand for territorial autonomy was explicitly banned from the agenda.

35 Romanian Acts: http://www.minelres.lv/NationalLegislation/Romania/romania.htm
36 Niculescu, idem
37 Mercator Education, www.mercator-education.org, 2004
38 Bárdi, Nándor: Hungary and the Hungarians Living Abroad, 121–38.

In 1995 Slovakia ratified the European Framework Convention of National Minorities. Under the successive governments of Mikulas Dzurinda, Slovakia took steps to make up for the poor record of national minority protection under the Meciar regime.[39] At present Slovakian-Hungarians speak their mother tongue freely in public. Only ten years ago this was something completely different. Speaking Hungarian in public was an open invitation to be told in insulting language that in Slovakia one has to speak Slovakian. All the young and middle-aged Slovakian-Hungarians are bilingual. During their studies the Hungarians like the Slovakians are confronted with much pressure to learn the Slovakian language as well as possible. As in Romania, Hungarians are easily recognized by their Hungarian accent. In Slovakian Cabaret this accent is used in the same funny way like the British make use of the French accent. However, Hungarians make the same use of the Slavic accent.

Like in Romania, the participation of Slovakian-Hungarians in the national government and at a local level, but also the presence of Slovakian-Hungarian athletes in the mass media has very much improved the general opinion about the Hungarian minority and the way it is treated in public. The Slovakian government is aware of the dangers of ethnic closure and enclosure, and it has stimulated interaction effectively.

The interactions of national minorities inside the political scene of Slovakia

The Slovakian-Hungarians followed the historical precedent of the DAHR joining the Romanian coalition in 1996 in 1998. The SMK is an association of three different parties with a slightly different nature: Christen Democratic, Liberal and Social-liberal. The first Dzurinda government abolished a controversial law on local elections, reintroduced school certificates in both the State and minority languages, and committed itself to introducing a new law on minority languages. At the end of this period, the SMK became more and more dissatisfied, due to the fact that the law on minority languages, adopted in July 1999, was too weak. The public administration reform did not take into account a redrawing of the two south-western regions with both a high concentration of ethnic Hungarians in the south of them, so

[39] Slovak Republic, Constitution of September 1st, 1992 and Amended: No. 244/1998 Coll., No. Amended: 9/1999 Coll., No. Amended: 90/2001 Coll.

Slovak Republic, Act on the state language of the Slovak Republic, 270/1995 Coll., and Amended: No. 260/1997 Coll., No. 5/1999 Coll., No. 184/1999 Coll.

Slovak Republic, Act on the use of languages of national minorities, 184/1999 Coll.

there was no progress on increasing opportunities for Hungarian-language teacher training, and finally, no perspective for a state-funded Hungarian University. The relations between the SMK and its coalition partners therefore became tense. However, in general, the parties appear to be able to resolve their differences within the coalition through the normal give and take of political compromise.[40]

After the elections in the autumn of 2002, Dzurinda was surprisingly re-elected. As second strongest party in the coalition, the bargaining position of the SMK was further strengthened. Since 2002 Slovakia has faced an enormous number of institutional changes. The law on minority languages was amended. October 2004 the coalition agreed on a high level of decentralization of the national government authority accompanied by a decentralized redistribution of the national budget and the right of a package of potentially applied local taxations. On the first of September 2004, the Comenius University of Komarno opened its doors as a mutually-funded Slovakian and Hungarian University.

It would seem that the SMK smartly integrates its nation-building project as a federation of the Hungarian minority into the ambitious program of institutional changes that the Dzurinda government is engaged in. Finally, respondents noted that the criterion of professional merit and credibility is gaining more and more weight for people to vote for a politician regardless of his or her ethnic affiliation. For this reason SMK is winning more seats in Parliament, and also rising numbers of local representatives - more than can be explained on the basis of ethnic solidarity.

The interactions of the Hungarian governments with the Hungarians in Slovakia

The SMK is very comparable with the DAHR as a party that has its raison d'ętre in the nation-building process that unites the Hungarian minority. The fact that an apology for the cruelties happened under the Benes Decrees between 1945 and 1948 has still not been made, the taboo on territorial autonomy, and the discontent in the Slovakian mass media when a Slovakian-Hungarian member of the European Parliament addressed the European Parliament in his mother tongue, repeatedly confronts the Hungarian minority with the homogenizing tendencies of the nation-building process of the Slovakian state. By contrast, this stimulates its own nation-building project

40 Kemp, idem

as a minority. The Hungarian Status Law challenged its credibility inside the government coalition and nationalist politicians used the situation to blame the SMK of ethnic discrimination.

Like Romanian-Hungarians, Slovakian-Hungarians are foreigners in Hungary. Although they speak Hungarian, their accent and dialect make it clear where they come from. Being treated as a foreigner in Hungary is a point mentioned by respondents. It seems to be more hurtful than being confronted with the nationalistic tendencies of Slovakians, since they are expected to act that way.

The Netherlands

In 2004 the Netherlands had 16.2 million inhabitants.[41] On the basis of self-identification, the following minorities are found: among the Dutch around 350,000 have Frisian as their mother tongue and around 600,000 are able to speak this language[42], of the 341,000 Turkish 8% defines themselves as Kurd, of the 295,000 Moroccans 34% defines themselves as Berber, of the 321,000 Surinamese 38% defines themselves as Hindustani, 37% Creole, 7% Javanese, and of the 129,000 Dutch Antilles 45% defines themselves as Curacao and 11% as Arubans[43]. The Netherlands signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, but until now it has not ratified it.

As there is a strong link identified between a minority status and a weak socio-economic position, most Dutch policy efforts and social research projects are focused on the social and economic situation of the identified minority groups. Education as a strong indicator for success on the labor market is also of key interest. Children of minority groups have education in the mother tongue next to education in Dutch in the major cities with large concentrations of minorities. Despite its success[44] providing education in the mother tongue, besides the Frisian language, is being replaced by additional education in the Dutch language as an answer to the continuously weak re-

41 CBS (Dutch Bureau of Statistics), WWW.CBS.NL/STATLINE, 2004

42 Mercator Education, www.mercator-education.org, 2004

43 Dagevos, Jaco, Gijsberts Mérove and Carlo van Praag (eds): *Rapportage Minderheden 2003: onderwijs, arbeid en social-culturele integratie* [Report on Minorities 2003: Education, Labour and Social and Cultural integration] Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2004. 17.

44 See for example: Tesser, Paul and Jaco Dagevos: Voorbij de etnische onderklasse? De integratie van etnische minderheden in het onderwijs en op de arbeidsmarkt [Departing the ethnical underclass? The integration of ethnic minorities in education and on the labour market] In F. Becker, W van Hennekeler, M. Sie Dhian Ho, B. Tromp (eds.): *Transnationaal Nederland.* Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 2002.

sults in this part of the educational curriculum. On national television as well on several regional and local TV stations, minority groups have separate time to broadcast in their own language. They can apply for national, regional and local subsidies to maintain these programmes, but often these are also (partially) privately funded. In general these programmes are subtitled in Dutch as well. Normally, the Dutch majority population does not often view these programmes. However, when some conflicting opinions on for example homosexuality, equal rights for woman, or the Iraq-conflict are broadcast, that particular programme gains considerable attention in both the local and national media. Discussions about slashing subsidies for these programmes usually flare up and soon after disappear.

Freedom of religion and freedom of education are heritages from the past, anchored in Dutch Constitutional law and still strongly defended by the religion-based parties, but also defended by the Liberal and Social Democratic parties. In this culturally liberal climate, the newcomers have the right to have their own places for their religion and their private schools as well. The most visible are the Mosques and the Islamic University in Rotterdam, which is dedicated to Koran education. In the larger cities several Mosques have been built, while the Islam has a fast-growing religious population split up into several enumerations like the Protestant Church. At the moment the different denominations of the Islam in the Netherlands have around 1 million believers, and it is forecast that in a period of twenty years this number will double.[45]

Despite this culturally liberal tradition, the politically correct interpretation of multiculturalism has created a divide between a part of the Dutch majority and its political elite in the past decades. To overcome this divide, the more rightwing parties are promoting cultural assimilation to improve the socio-economic integration of the immigrants, rather than investing in the augmentation of quantity and quality of interactions between members of the majority with members of the minorities. When we take a look at some of the social-scientific research results, it is clear that the Netherlands must take action.

Surinamese and Dutch Antilleans state they have a lot of contact with the Dutch majorities; while Turkish and Moroccans report much less contact, although this is slightly improving over generations and with a higher level of education.[46] In general Moroccans and Turkish have little sympathy for modern values. Instead they feel a strong attachment to their religion. In both respects

45 Dagevos, idem, 2004. 17.
46 Dagevos, idem, 2004. 321.

they differ from the Dutch majority and from the Surinamese and Dutch Antilleans as well.[47] Turkish and Moroccans more often use their own languages than they use Dutch, although the second generation reports a significantly higher use of Dutch.[48] It is not surprising that Turkish and Moroccans identify more with their own group than with the Dutch majority.[49] The attitude of the majority members towards the different minority groups is different. Turkish and Moroccans are more or less liked by 27% of the respondents, but more ore less disliked by 34%. Members of the Dutch majority feel comfortable in interaction with Surinamese (55%), Turkish (40%) and Moroccans (28%), and not comfortable in interaction with Surinamese (15%), Turkish (28%), and Moroccans (38%).[50] By contrast, the members of the minority groups feel themselves comfortable in interaction with members of the majority: Surinamese (96%), Turkish (81%) and Moroccans (86%), and not comfortable in interaction with the majority: Surinamese (4%), Turkish (21%), and Moroccans (14%).[51] These empirical data shows that the assimilation of the Moroccans and the Turkish in the Netherlands is rather unsuccessful.

The assimilation policy of the past few years has made especially the Turkish and Moroccans report a decrease in experienced tolerance. As the theory on nation-building predicts, pressure of the majority on assimilation will lead to assimilation, challenge and migration. Newspapers report tendencies of assimilation and of migration as well. Highly educated Turkish are thinking of remigration to their mother country as they no longer feel welcomed by the Dutch and do not see a way to rid themselves of the social control of their Turkish peers who are much less modernized than Turkish people in the major towns of Turkey.[52] On the other hand, there are several international Muslim foundations that support Mosques and Koran schools in the Netherlands. Some of these foundations are listed as fundamentalist and as supporters of international Muslim terrorism. Empirical research is required to find out if fundamentalist Muslim foundations are developing a kind of nation-building strategy by organizing resistance towards governments in the Muslim world on the one hand and meanwhile executing Mus-

47 Dagevos, idem, 2004. 328.
48 Dagevos, idem, 2004. 331.
49 Dagevos, idem, 2004. 332.
50 Dagevos, idem, 2004. 366.
51 Dagevos, idem, 2004. 381.
52 Santing, Froukje: Modern Turkije lokt remiganten: Hoogopgeleide Turken keren intolerant Nederland de rug toe [Modern Turkey attracts remigrants: Higher educated Turkish wants to leave the intolerant Netherlands] *NRC Handelsblad*, January 7, 2005.

lim terrorism in Western countries. The belief of a collective victim-hood of Muslims worldwide plays an important role in this process.

The interactions of minorities inside the political scene of the Netherlands

The participation of members of minorities as members of the different political parties in the Netherlands is generally regarded as a result of their integration into the Dutch society. Until now, there have been no signs of minority-based political parties in the Netherlands. Because of this situation the question of dealing with minorities has been formulated in individual terms of equality in changes of opportunities, equal access to education, and non-discrimination. To realize equality of opportunities and access to education, affirmative action is applied in many policy measurements. However, this individual approach will soon be challenged, as it has been announced that a Muslim democratic party is to be founded in May 2005 to run in the local elections in the major cities in 2006.

The interactions of kin-state governments with minorities in the Netherlands and with the Dutch government

In recent history, when the governments of Morocco, Suriname and Turkey were classified as more or less dictatorial or rather authoritarian, both the different minorities and the Dutch authorities were anxiously aware of activities of spying and intimidation. As the governments of the main minority groups became of a more and more democratic signature this fear has faded away. Actually there are serious concerns regarding the recruitment practices of Islamist fundamental groups in and around some of the Arab-funded Mosques.

Both the governments of the Netherlands and the kin-states act upon the assumption that migrants will assimilate into the country of arrival. For some reason, the Moroccan government is an exception to this rule as it continues to see the Moroccans in the Netherlands as its citizens. Especially regarding the family law this is complicated: getting divorced is very complicated and the Dutch law unlike the Moroccan law does not accept that a man can be married to more than one woman. However, no significant action has been undertaken by the Turkish or Moroccan governments to strengthen the relations with their kin-minorities in the Netherlands, or to encourage the use of their mother tongue or enhance their cultural heritage.

West-European policy advisers advised the governments of the Central and East European states to adopt special minority rights, to improve both international security and to integrate minorities into society. Preserving the

language and the cultural identity of minorities is so valued that it is also an integral part of the Copenhagen criteria to obtain the EU-membership.[53] It is an application of double standards if the EU founding states does not apply the same criteria. For the Netherlands it is important to realize that states should protect and promote minorities within their sovereign jurisdiction. The necessary steps should be taken in awareness of the challenges of being a multi-nation society. In recognizing that it is a multi-nation society, the Netherlands have to actively guarantee the equality of opportunities, protection of minority rights, propagation of mother tongue languages, and to ensure the effective participation of minorities in public life. In fact these subjects are on the agenda of the Dutch policy makers. The socio-economic dimension of integration has enjoyed considerable attention. However, the socio-cultural dimension needs more attention in a mutual sense: both the majority and the minorities have to invest in their mutual perceptions and mutual conceptualization.

Conclusions

Confronted with the nation-building program of a majority, minorities react in three different ways: assimilation; challenge; or migration. The Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia react in all three ways. Over the decades their number has decreased due to both assimilation and migration. Still their number is large enough and they live geographically concentrated enough and have a strong sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture and language that they challenge the nation-building programs of the Romanians and the Slovakians by their own Romanian-Hungarian and Slovakian-Hungarian nation-building programs. Their challenge was successful since the Hungarians overcame their internal differences and became part of the national political scenes in Bucharest and Bratislava. As the historical materials show there is a thin line between tolerance and violence in both Romania and Slovakia between the majority and the Hungarian minority. The Hungarian language acts as an unintended but effective mechanism for social closure and enclosure. Differences in religion may

[53] See also: Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages Application of the Charter in Hungary: Report of the Committee of Experts on the Charter and recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the application of the Charter by Hungary, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2001. Council of Europe, Second report of the Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities, submitted by Hungary, Council of Europe (ACFC/SR/II (2004: 003), Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2004.

strengthen this tendency, while being equal economically does not affect this. Indifference between these social groups easily develops into distrust fed by the myths of national victim-hood. Being active on both the national and local political scene offers the Hungarian minority an unintended means to prove their loyalty to their home states and to their commitment to their dignity as a minority and their minority rights as well. The case of the Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia proves that mutual interaction offers the only way out to social closure and enclosure.

The difference between national minorities and immigrants is an empirical one, depending on the orientation of the minority group in question. If the project of assimilation fails within the first generation of migrants, it is still possible for the second generation to develop its own nation-building program to challenge the societal culture of the majority. The children of a first generation of migrants being born in their homeland is as much a matter of fact outside their free will as for the offspring of the national minorities. Both face a life in multicultural surroundings: the culture of their parents and the culture of the majority society in which they somehow are being acculturated.

Dutch policy makers have to realize that any immigrant group of a significant number of people, who are active participants in a religion or life philosophy will mostly adhere to this practice and to the language that is accompanied by this practice as long as this language is not altered for the use of Dutch. As the experiences of the Central and East European countries teach us, oppression of collective identities can lead to assimilation, migration and the challenging of the majority, including the use of violence as well. It is important to understand the mechanism of nation building: the stronger the repression of the minority's sense of its distinct identity, the more the result is a strengthening rather than a weakening of this awareness.

At present, both the Dutch government as well as the kin-state governments are still acting more or less on the assumption that the immigrants will assimilate. It is debatable whether this assumption will prove to be correct for the children of the numerous and rather concentrated immigrant groups of a Turkish and Moroccan origin. The appeal of the fundamentalist Islam to young Dutch Muslims may be interpreted as a sign that this group is challenging the Dutch nation-building project with its own nation-building program. Myths of victim-hood play an important role in this process.

CONSTANTIN IORDACHI

"Entangled Histories:" Re-thinking the History of Central and Southeastern Europe from a Relational Perspective*

The collapse of the communist system in Central and Southeastern Europe has inaugurated sweeping economic and socio-political changes, marked by the conversion of state-economies into market economies, political liberalization and democratization, and integration into European and Euro-Atlantic security and political organizations. These changes have also affected the pattern of inter-state relations in these regions. Due to the strengthening of their political collaboration, countries in Central and Southeastern Europe are today linked by a dense network of inter-governmental agreements, which have worked for changing the nature of inter-state relations, by fostering co-operation rather than conflict.

An important part of the process of political transformation has been the recuperation of the historical memory, especially of those aspects censored under the communist regimes. This recuperation has taken place in the name of the "national identity" that had been suppressed for decades by the military and political hegemony of the Soviet Union. Starting in late 1980's, one can identify a rising tide of a "new nationalism" in Central and Southeastern Europe, stimulated by novel factors such as: "demographic changes," "the media revolution," "the bankruptcy of supra-national authority," and

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the "environmental threat."[1] The process of national "revival" culminated during the 1989 revolutions, which were as much national as they were political. The upsurge of 1989 was seen by many scholars "as the victory of national identity against Marxism,[2] "the finest hour of East European nationalism,"[3] or the "Springtime of Nations."[4] At official level, the tendency of returning to the "national history" has been expressed by the restoration of traditional state symbols and monuments of national heroes, the establishment of new national holidays, rituals of remembrance and commemoration, and the re-writing of history textbooks.

As a result of this twofold development, one can identify an underlying tension between the "re-nationalization" of history in Central and Southeast Europe and the process of European integration. As Mary Fulbrook pertinently points out, the process of European integration calls for "the development of more adequate historical perspectives."[5] At the same time, the nation-state perspective continues to frame historical studies. This contradiction raises the challenging methodological question: Does "European history, far from being the sum of individual national histories, in fact constitute an alternative framework within which different kind of constituent parts may be identified and interpreted?"[6]

This article argues for the need to re-conceptualize the history of Central and Southeastern Europe by employing a relational and transnational approach, as part of a more general effort to re-write continental history from an integrated perspective. Central and Southeastern Europe countries share a common historical past that goes far back in time to enduring medieval and early modern imperial legacies, such as the Byzantine, the Hungarian, the Habsburg, and the Ottoman. After 1945, they experienced similar strategies of communist modernization, and a forceful integration into a common mili-

1 See Raymond Pearson: The Making of '89: Nationalism and the Dissolution of Communist Eastern Europe. *Nations and Nationalism,* Nr. 1, 1995. 69-79, here 69-70.

2 Anthony Smith: *The Ethnic Origins of Nations.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.

3 Misha Glenny: *The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy*. New York: Penguin, 1990. 294.

4 Zbigniew Brzezinski: Post Communist Nationalism. *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 68, Nr. 5, Winter, 1989–1990. 2–3. For the link between ethnicity, nationhood and the 1989 socio-political change in the former Communist block, see also George Schöpflin: The Politics of Nationhood. *International Review of Sociology,* Vol. 6, Nr. 2, 1996. 219–231.

5 Mary Fulbrook: Introduction: States, nations, and the development of Europe. In Mary Fulbrook (ed.): *National Histories and European History*. London: UCL Press, 1993. 3.

6 Fulbrook, Introduction In *National histories,* 3. For similar challenges in social sciences disciplines, see Peter Wagner et al. (ed.): *Social Sciences and Modern States: National Experiences and Theoretical Crossroads.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

tary and economic block. Post-communist countries in these regions are now facing similar socio-political challenges. Despite these similarities, historians in the regions seem "absorbed" by their own national histories, and have relatively limited knowledge of—or openness toward—the historical experience of their neighbors. The process of regional integration and the European Union's Eastern enlargement calls for an incorporation of the Central and Southeast European Studies into the framework of European studies (thus breaking with the tradition of *Russian and East European Studies*, which is a legacy of the bipolar Cold War division of Europe). Historians in Central and Southeastern Europe are now challenged to place a greater emphasis on the "shared" and "entangled" history of the peoples in these regions, to assess international influences and transfers, and to account for the process of European integration and its impact on the development of their regions.[7] They need to transcend the prevailing narrow national-based historiographic perspective and to redirect their research focus toward new areas of inquiry, such as physical and geographical mobility, transnational circulation of ideas, migration and the environment.

A recent theoretical and methodological tool for approaching regional history is provided by the paradigm of *histoire croisée*, which—although stemming from the tradition of comparative history—attempts to critically re-evaluate it and to shift the analytical emphasis on multiple levels of connectedness, examined through interdisciplinary lenses. While sharing numerous common features with other paradigms of relational history such as "shared" or "connected history,"[8] *histoire croisée* also urges researchers to take into account their own ideological position and involvement in the process of knowledge, and to reflect on the plurality of viewpoints, differences of languages, terminologies, categorizations, conceptualizations.[9] Although having at its core the French and German scholarship and historical experi-

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7 On the new potential agenda of the transnational history, see Michael McGerr: The Price of the 'New Transnational History'. *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 96, Nr. 4, October, 1991. 1062–1063.

8 See Robert W. Strayer (ed.): *The Making of the Modern World. Connected Histories, Divergent Paths. 1500 to the Present.* New York: St. Matin Press, 1989; Sebastian Conrad, Shalini, Franderia (eds.): *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften.* Frankfurt: Campus, 2002.

9 For the theoretical framework of *histoire croisée*, see Michael Werner, Bénédicte Zimmermann: Penser l'histoire croisée: entre empirie et réflecivité. In Michael Werner – Bénédicte Zimmermann (eds.): De *la comparaison à l'histoire croisée.* Paris: Seuil, 2004. 15–52, here 16. See also Michael Werner, Bénédicte Zimmermann: Penser l'histoire croisée: entre empirie et réflecivité. *Annales,* Vol. 58, Nr. 1, 2003. 7–36.

ences,[10] the new "*paradigm de croisement*" also tries to bridge different historiographic traditions and to offer a "universally-valid" model of analysis, mediating between comparatists and historians studying the question of "transfers."[11]

In order to underscore the importance of relational approaches to the regional history of Central and Southeastern Europe, the current article explores recent historiographic debates pertaining to the overlapping history of Romania and Hungary. The article comprises three main parts. The first part exemplifies the arduous and protracted process of reforming history writing in Central and Southeastern Europe with the case of historiography in Romania. Special attention is paid to the recent public debates on alternative history textbooks. Part two looks at the intrinsic interdependence between the writing of history and the process of regional political reconciliation, by using the case study of the Romanian-Hungarian relations. The conclusions evaluate the potential impact the incorporation of the historical experience of Central and Southeastern Europe on building a new integrated perspective on European history.

Romanian Historiography: Legacy, Prospects, and Challenges

The evolution of the Romanian historiography is a relevant example of the challenges faced by historians in the post-communist Central and Southeastern Europe.[12] Historiography has a long and well-established tradition in

10 See the first application of the new method of *histoire croisée* in Bénédicte Zimmermann, Claude Didry, Michael Werner: *Histoire croisée de la France et de l'Allemagne.* Paris: Éd. de la MSH, 1999.

11 For the history of "transfers" see mainly Johannes Paulmann: Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer. Zwei Forschungsansäntze zur eurpäischen Geschichte des 18. bis 20 Jahrhunderts. *Historische Zeitschrift*, Nr. 3, 1998. 649–685; Hartmut Kaelbe: *Der historische Vergleich. Eine Einführung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert.* Frankfurt: Campus, 1999.

12 For general works on the history of Romanian historiography, see Pompiliu Teodor: *Die Entwicklung des historischen Denkens in der rumänischen Geschichtsschreibung*. Translated by Franz Killyen. Cluj: Dacia, 1972; and Frederick Kellogg: A *History of Romanian Historical Writing.* Bakersfield, Calf: Charles Slaches Jr., 1990. For general overviews of the post-1989 state of Romanian historiography, see Alexandru Zub: *Discurs istoric şi tranziţie* [Historical Discourse and Transition] Iaşi: Institutul European, 1998; Dennis Deletant: Rewriting the Past: Trends in Contemporary Romanian Historiography. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol 14, Nr. 1, 1991. 64–86; Keith Hitchins: Historiography of the countries of Eastern Europe: Romania. *American Historical Review,* Vol. 97, Nr. 4, 1992. 1064–1083; Catherine Durandin: Roumanie, retour á l'histoire et revisions. *Rélations Internationales,* Vol. 67, 1991. 295–298; Paul E. Michelson: Reshaping Romanian Historiography: Some Actonian Perspectives. *Romanian Civilization*, Nr. 1, 1994. 3–23; Andrei Pippidi: Une histoire en reconstruction. In Antoine Marès (ed.): *Histoire et pouvoir en Europe médiane.* Paris: l'Harmattan, 1996. 239–262; Bogdan Murgescu: A *fi Istoric în anul 2000.* Bucureşti: All Educational, 2000; Constantin

modern Romanian culture. We can identify several stages in its pre-1945 development, from the pre-Romantic school embodied mostly by Mihail Kogălniceanu and Nicolae Bălcescu, the Romantic school of A. Tocilescu, V.A. Urechia, and A. D. Xenopol, the "critical school" at the turn of the century personified by Nicolae Iorga and Dimitrie Onciul, and the "New Historical School" of the interwar period represented by prominent historians such as Constantin C. Giurescu and Gheorghe Brătianu. These schools greatly differed in the theoretical models they emulated and the historical methodology they utilized, but shared the main tenants of Romantic historiography, marked in the Romanian context by an ethnocentrist vision of national history stressing the ideas of nationality and fatherland, and the *risorgimento* ideal striving for the political unity of all ethnic Romanians living in various historical provinces.[13]

By and large, under Communism, Romanian historiography followed the dynamics of the complex relationship between the communism ideology and nationalism.[14] The first period of Communist rule (1948–1958) was characterized by the destruction of the "bourgeois nationalist" legacy and the diminution of Romania's national sovereignty under a virtual Soviet occupation.[15] The process is described by Kennet Jowitt as a "breakthrough," "the decisive alternation or destruction of values, structures, and behaviors which

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Iordachi: Social History in Romanian Historiography: Legacy, Prospects, and Challenges. *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, Nr. 1, 2003. 233–248; Constantin Iordachi – Trencsényi Balázs: A megújulás esélyei: a román történetírás tíz éve (1989–1999) [Chances of Renewal: History Writing in Romania, 1989–1999] *Replika*, Nr. 40–41, November, 2000. 165–194; Constantin Iordachi – Trencsényi Balázs: In Search of a Usable Past: The Question of National Identity in Romanian Studies, 1990–2000. *East European Politics and Society*, Vol. 17, Nr. 3, Summer, 2003. 415–454.

13 On the continuities and discontinuities between the Romantic school of Tocilescu, Urechia, Xenopol, and the "critical school" at the turn of the century see Lucian Nastasă: *Generație și schimbare în istoriografia română – Sfîrșitul secolului XIX și începutul secolului XX.* [Generation and Change in Romanian Historiography. The end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century] Cluj: Presa Universitară Clujană, 1999.

14 For the historiographical policies of the Romanian Communist Party, see Vlad Georgescu: *Politică și istorie. Cazul comuniștilor români, 1944–1977* [Politics and History: The Case of Romanian Communits]. München: Jon Dumitru Verlag, 1983. Second Edition: București: Humanitas, 1991; and Șerban Papacostea: Captive Clio: Romanian Historiography Under Communist Rule. *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 26, 1996. 181–209. For the most comprehensive treatment of Romanian historiography under communism, see Lucian Boia: *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească.* București: Humanitas, 1997. Translated into English as *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness.* Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2001.

15 Stephen Fischer-Galați: *The New Rumania. From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic.* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1969.

are perceived by a new elite as compromising or contributing to the actual or potential existence of alternative centers of power",[16] and by Michael Shafir as a "primitive accumulation of legitimacy."[17]

In its attempt to establish and consolidate its control over society, the Romanian communist regime led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1948–1965) alternated periods of harsh repression (1948–1953 and 1958–1961) with period of economic growth and political relaxation (1954–1957 and 1961–1965). During the first period of repression (1948–1953), Communist elites championed proletarian internationalism, and purged the previous "bourgeois-nationalist" historiographical schools, irrespective of the sharp theoretical and political divisions among them. The transformation of history research in this first period of Communist take-over was coordinated by Mihail Roller, a vice-president of the Academy, also responsible for history research within the ideological section of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers Party. Roller initiated and edited the first Marxist synthesis on the history of Romania, a secondary school textbook entitled *Istoria României: manual unic pentru clasa a VIII-a secundară*, first published in 1947.[18] The textbook was instrumental in disseminating a new officially-endorsed vision of history.

The timid de-Stalinization that took place in mid-1950s was accompanied by a gradual relaxation of the political control over culture, and most of the surviving prominent pre-1945 historians could return to institutional positions. In addition, the growing tendency of cultural and political autarchy of the regime generated an innovative synthesis between Marxist ideology and the nationalist tradition of interwar historiography. This was best embodied by the work of Andrei I. Oțetea, a historian from Iași who gained his Ph.D. in Paris (1926). As the director of the Institute of History in the 1960's, Oțetea supported a moderate nationalism turn of the Romanian historiography, but he also stimulated the study of socio-economic history, especially in the early modern period.[19]

16 Kenneth Jowitt: *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development. The Case of Romania, 1944–1965.* Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971. 7.

17 Michael Shafir: *Romania, Politics, Economy and Society.* Boulder Co: Rymme Rienner, 1985. 56.

18 Mihail Roller, coordinator: Gheorghe I. Georgescu, Dumitru Tudor, and Vasile Maciu, *Istoria României: manual unic pentru clasa a VIII-a secundară* [History of Romania. Unique Textbook for the VIIIth Grade] București: Editura de Stat, 1947. Republished as *Ministerul Învățământului Public. Istoria R. P. R. – manual pentru învățământul mediu* [The Ministry of the Public Education. History of the Romanian Popular Republic: Textbook for Gymnasium] București: Editura de Stat Didactică și Pedagogică, 1952.

19 See Petre Constantinescu-Iași, Andrei Otetea, Emil Condurachi, Constantin Daicoviciu, et al.: *Istoria Romîniei.* (4 Parts). București: Editura Academiei R. P. Romîne, 1960–1964; Andrei

The deviation from the Soviet foreign policy that took place in the period 1958–1964 is generally regarded as the turning point in the development of the Romanian Communist regime. The outbreak of the diplomatic conflict with the Soviet Union had deep internal and external consequences. During the conflict, Romanian leaders de-emphasized Marxism in favor of a policy of national modernization, focusing on the creation of industry, especially heavy industry that allowed economic autarchy and a maximal central control over resources.[20] This policy led to the establishment of a *national-communist* regime, based on three main sources: the redefinition of the relationship between local Romanian elites and Moscow; the pursuing of an independent program of industrial development in view of the "national interest;" and a return to certain elements of the Romanian nationalist tradition of the interwar period.[21]

The policy of political separation from the URSS was continued and even amplified during the rule of Nicolae Ceaușescu (1965–1989). Domestically, the Romanian Communist regime underwent considerable changes under Ceaușescu's long rule. The first years witnessed a relative political liberalization, coupled with a rapid economic development. This liberal tendency persuaded numerous members of the intelligentsia who were educated in the cultural tradition of the interwar period to participate to a program of "restoring" the national culture and re-linking it with a "Western" system of references. As a result, important cultural figures reappeared on the cultural scene, while numerous emblematic historical works of the 1930s were republished.

At the beginning of the '70s, the Romanian communist regime was at a crossroads of two main options: continued modernization and liberalization, or an increasing political control over society. The solutions chose by the Romanian leader was to foster a cultural revolution following the Chinese model (1971), which resulted, into a total control of the Romanian Communist Party over intellectual life. Politically, the regime moved to an in-

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Oțetea: *Istoria poporului român.* București: Editura Științifică, 1970; Andrei Oțetea (ed.): Ion Popescu-Puțuri, Ion Nestor, et al.: *The History of the Romanian People.* New York: Twayne Publisher, 1974.

20 On this aspect, see mainly Katherine Verdery: *National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, especially Chapter Two.

21 See Stelian Tănase: *Elite și societate. Guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej, 1948–1965.* București: Humanitas, 1998; see also Stelian Tănase: *Anatomia mistificării: 1944–1989.* București: Humanitas, 1997.

creasingly personalized power, while the cult of Ceaușescu's leadership reached unprecedented heights.[22] The conservative attitude of the Romanian communist regime radicalized in the 1980's, when Romania experienced a generalized economic and socio-political crisis. The main characteristics of the nationalist-communist propaganda in the '80s were xenophobia, autarchy, isolationism, anti-Occidentalism, anti-intellectualism and protochronism.[23] In this way, as the political scientist Michael Shafir pointed out, "discontent and political dissent, instead of being channeled into the system, as inputs, were successfully deflected by the leadership towards external (Soviet and Hungarian) targets as outputs."[24] In order to explain this peculiar evolution of the Romanian communist regime in its last decade, Vladimir Tismăneanu coined the concept of "national Stalinism," a term that refers to regimes that instrumentalize a nationalist ideological framework, while opposing any significant political change.[25]

History played a crucial role in the nationalist cultural offensive of the '80s.[26] The regime sponsored a huge production of officially inspired historical works, strengthened its control of all research and educational institutions, and used prominent historians to express its political view on various internal and external events, since the rules of the game in the socialist camp did not allow for open diplomatic conflicts among socialist countries. Moreover, the official propaganda of the regime recuperated and abused traditional themes of the Romanian historiography, such as the continuity of the Romanian people in the same territory, the emphasis on "autochthonous traditions" and ethno-centrist myths.[27]

Romanian historiography under Communism was certainly not entirely monolithic. Among the few and largely isolated attempts to incorporate the Western theoretical and methodological gains, we can mention the studies on historiography authored by Alexandru Zub at the Institute of History and Ar-

22 For a comprehensive presentation of the cult of personality under Ceaușescu's Romania, see Anneli Ute Gabanyi: *The Ceaușescu Cult.* București: The Romanian Cultural Foundation, 2000.

23 Vladimir Tismăneanu – Dan Pavel: Romania's Mystical Revolutionaries: The Generation of Angst and Adventure Revised. *East European Politics and Society,* Vol. 8, Nr. 3, 1994. 404. For the most authoritative analysis of protochronism, see Katherine Verdery: *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu's Romania.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 167–214.

24 Shafir, *Romania*, 51.

25 Vladimir Tismăneanu: *Fantoma lui Gheorghiu-Dej.* București: Univers, 1995. 77.

26 For a seminar analysis of cultural politics under the Ceausescu regime, with a special focus on historiography, see Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism*

27 Tismăneanu – Pavel: Romania's Mystical Revolutionaries, 404.

cheology "A. D. Xenopol" in Iași, the research on the history of mentalities stimulated by Alexandru Duțu at the Institute of South-East European Studies in Bucharest, the studies on the history of the imaginary conducted by Lucian Boia at the University of Bucharest, or the work on social and intellectual history conducted by Pompiliu Teodor at the Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj.[28] By and large, however, the historiographical discourse in the public sphere was monopolized by the official propaganda, historians who did not join the nationalist camp being marginalized as eccentric figures.

The political change that occurred in December 1989 liberalized the historical discourse and opened the door to competing ideological visions of Romanian history. In spite of the optimistic expectations, however, the fall of the Communist regime pushed Romanian historiography into the gray zone of "post-totalitarian spasms."[29] With the demise of Marxism as a dominant ideological model, Romanian historiography lacked authoritative theoretical and methodological paradigms. There were no alternative historical schools or dissident canons available. After decades of theoretical isolation and brutal political interference, and without available models at hand, Romanian historiography turned yet again towards its own pre-Marxist traditions, such as the "critical school" of the turn of the century, or the "new historical school' of the interwar period. The uncritical reliance on tradition reproduced numerous traditional drawbacks of history-writing in Romania, such as the absence of deep theoretical debates and of interdisciplinary dialogue, a primordialist perception of ethnicity, and a close relationship between historiography and the political power.

In this context, national ideology continued to serve as a "block culture" for historiographic production. Unlike the previous period, after 1989 the hegemonic discourse over national identity broke into a multitude of divergent and even contradictory narratives, ranging from "ethno-cultural" to "civic nationalist" and liberal perspectives. The institutional infrastructure of historical research has also undergone a profound transformation. New research institutes and journals have been established, with the aim of promoting a higher professional standard. It is undeniable that the writing and teaching of history in post-communist Romania has undergone considerable progress in the last

28 See Alexandru Zub: *Mihail Kogălniceanu. Biobibliografie.* București: Editura Enciclopedică Română, Editura militară, 1971; Alexandru Dutu, especially his *Literatura comparată și istoria mentalităților* [Comparative literature and the history of mentalities] București: Univers, 1981; and Lucian Boia: *Jocul cu trecutul: istoria între adevăr și ficțiune.* București: Humanitas, 1998.

29 Catherine Durandin, Roumanie, retour á l'histoire et révisions, 295.

decade and a half, mostly in university centers and non-governmental research institutes. Overall, the body of practitioners has become nevertheless very heterogeneous, with dissidents, former collaborators, and an emerging post-1989 generation of historians competing to carve out a space in the public sphere for their respective discourses.

As a result, after more than a decade of liberty, Romanian historiography remains a heterogeneous combination of several "strata": a significant proportion of the professional body is still rooted in national romanticism; a dominant corpus of historians adhere to the precepts of the "critical school" existing at the turn of the century; a minority of circa 10%, work in the spirit of the French *Annales* school; and several isolated figures are trying to be open to the historiographical evolution of the post-*Annales* period.[30] Overall, the image of the Romanian historiography depicted by most Romanian scholars is that of a still dominant nationalist "canon" facing a sustained attack by an alternative liberal discourse.[31] Although it managed to win significant "battles," the "reformist" camp is far from being able to dominate the public discourse. Reinforced by the acute polarization of the political life, the institutional confrontation between the nationalist canon and reforming historians has been quite harsh, giving only recent signs of accommodation.

Reforming the Post-Communist Historiography: The Debate over Alternative History Textbooks

An important *barometer* of the political problems involved in reforming the post-communist Romanian historiography was the tense public debate over alternative history textbooks that took place in October-November 1999. After decades of central monopoly, on 24 July 1998 the Ministry of National Education (MNE) decided to finally liberalize the textbook market, by allowing secondary schools to choose freely among officially-approved alternative history textbooks.[32] The aim of the reform was to upgrade the Romanian educational system to the European standard, by applying the Council of Europe's Recommendation 1283.[33]

30 Murgescu, A *fi Istoric în anul 2000*, 46.

31 Antohi, Sorin: Ieşirea din metatext: istorie şi teorie în Romania postcomunistă. [Going out of the Metatext: History and Theory in Post-Communist Romania] *Sfera Politicii*, Nr. 39, 1996. 19.

32 For an overview of the main features of the Romanian national curricula before and shortly after the 1989 revolution, see Robert D. Reisz: Curricular Patterns before and after the Romanian Revolution. *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 29, Nr. 3, 1994. 281–291.

33 The Recommendation asserted that "the subject matter of history teaching should be very open. It should include all aspects of societies (social and cultural history as well as

This significant reform was followed by an open competition for the writing of new history textbooks on the basis of a revised national curriculum put forward by the MNE. At the end of this process, five different history textbooks offered by working teams located in various university centers in Romania reached the approval of the MNE and were published for being used starting in the 1999/2000 academic year.

Among the five new history textbooks for the twelfth grade, the one written by a group of young historians from the Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj captured the attention of the media for many weeks.[34] In line with the recommendation of the MNE, the textbook stated the vital need to rethink Romanian history from a European relational perspective. In an introduction, suggestively entitled "The Romanians and Europe," the authors stated unequivocally "The history of the Romanians cannot be severed from that of Europe," since it encompasses, in a nutshell, "all the fundamental elements of the European civilization."[35] Once they emancipated themselves from the long domination of multinational empires, the Romanians opted firmly for synchronization with the European space and, today, for "integration into its structures."[36] Moreover, the authors pointed out that integration into Europe does not presuppose a renunciation of the country's national identity, since Europe "represents a unity in diversity," within which "each inhabitant of the continent who has a European identity, also has – at the same time – a national identity."[37]

The authors also opted for a relational approach to history, by arguing that "there is no a separated history of the Romanians only, or of the Americans

political). The role of women should be given proper recognition. Local and national (but not nationalist) history should be taught as well as the history of minorities. Controversial, sensitive and tragic events should be balanced by positive mutual influences; the history of the whole of Europe, that of the main political and economic events, and the philosophical and cultural movements which have formed the European identity must be included in syllabuses." It also read that "Particular attention should be given to the problems in central and eastern Europe which has suffered from the manipulation of history up to recent times and continues in certain cases to be subject to political censorship." See the text of the "Recommendation 1283 of the Council of Europe on history and the learning of history in Europe" adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 22 January 1996, available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta96/erec1283.htm, retrieved on 20 September 2003.

34 Sorin Mitu (coord.), Virgil Țărau, Liviu Tărău, Ovidiu Pecican, Lucia Copoeru: *Istoria românilor. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a* [History of Romanians. Manual for the Twelfth Grade] București: Sigma, 1999.

35 *Istoria românilor, 5.*

36 *Istoria românilor, 5.*

37 *Istoria românilor, 5.*

only, since close ties have always existed among all peoples and the fate of one cannot be understood without the fate of the others."[38] They also argued that, since "the history of Romanians is tightly linked to the history of ethnic minorities who are living together with them," their shared history should be integrated under a common heading that of the *History of Romania,* instead of the *History of the Romanians* understood from an ethnic perspective.[39]

The treatment of the national history put forward in the new textbook clashed with the conventional interpretation in the previous history textbooks on major points. In order to better understand their divergences, I briefly allude to the debates between the "primordialist" and the "modernist" or "instrumentalist" schools in the study of nationalism. Primordialists believe that nations are unitary and homogeneous entities, which have generally appeared in the early Middle Ages and whose features are given once and for ever. Modernists assert that nations are intellectual and socio-political constructions, forged by national movements in the early modern period, through mechanisms described as "the invention of tradition."[40] More recently, various authors bridge the two perspectives, by highlighting the necessary ethnic prerequisites for constructing modern nations; they also point out the hybrid character of modern national identities and cultures.[41]

38 *Istoria românilor, 5.*

39 *Istoria românilor, 5.*

40 The primordialist view is represented by such authors as Anthony Smith: *The Ethnic Origins of Nations.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. The modernist view is represented by Benedict Anderson: *Imagined Communities*: *Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* London: Verso, 1983; Ernest Gellner: *Nations and Nationalism.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983; Eric Hobsbawm: *Nations and Nationalism since 1780.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Eric Hobsbawn – Trevor Ranger (eds.): *The Invention of Tradition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. For general overviews of theories of nationalism, see Umut Özkirimli: *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000; Louis L. Snyder: *Encyclopedia of Nationalism.* Chicago: St. James Press, 1990; and Alexander J. Motyl, (ed.): *Encyclopedia of Nationalism.* San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2000.

41 On the concept of hybridity and its relevance for understanding the composite nature of modern national identities and cultures, see Homi Bhabha: DissemiNation: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation. In Homi Bhabha (ed.): *Nation and Narration.* London: Routledge, 1990. 291–322. Bhabha points out that "[T]he nation, as a form of cultural *elaboration* (in the Gramscian sense), is an agency of *ambivalent* narration that holds culture as its most productive position." See Homi Bhabha quoted in Anna Trindafyllidou: Hybridity Theory of Nationalism (Homi Bhabha on Nationalism). In Louis L. Snyder (ed.): *The Encyclopedia of Nationalism.* Chicago: St. James Press, 1990. 131–134, here 132. On the concept of culture and its relation to nationalism, see Peter Burke, "Culture" in *History and Social Theory.* Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. 118–126; Ernest Gellner, "Definitions," "The age of universal high culture," and "What is a Nation?" in *Nations and Nationalism*, 1–7,

While the primordialist view has traditionally shaped the interpretation of history in Romania, the authors of the new textbook took a modernist stance and discussed the modern "invention" of the Romanian nation, mostly through the contribution of Greek-Catholic Transylvanian-Romanian intellectuals during the eighteenth century.[42] On this basis, they offered an alternative view on the process of nation- and state-building in Romania. This process has been particularly complex. Greater Romania (1918–1940) was an aggregate of different historical provinces: the former Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (unified in 1859 to constitute the Old Kingdom of Romania), the former Ottoman province of Dobrudja (annexed in 1878), the former Russian province (1812–1918) of Bessarabia, the former Austrian province (1775–1918) of Bukovina, and territories that were part of the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Monarchy, such as Transylvania, the Banat, Maramureș, and the Partium. As in other states in Central and Southeastern Europe, such as Greece and Serbia before World War I, or Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the interwar period, the union of heterogeneous provinces occasioned an arduous process of elite bargaining, administrative unification, and a thrust for cultural homogenization. In order to defend the Romanians' legitimate right to independent statehood into a unified state, Romanian historians have generally written their work from the perspective of the nation-building center, and presupposed a historical teleology, which necessarily led to the creation of Greater Romania.[43] The new textbook deviated from this view. It devoted only limited attention to the fight for "political union" of Romanians from all historical provinces that constituted Greater Romania in 1918; instead, it focused on the regional history of various provinces.

The alternative view on the history of Romania proposed by the new textbook stirred an incendiary political debate. The textbook was denounced in the Romanian parliament as a threat to Romanian national identity. In the Senate, Sergiu Nicolaescu, a well-known Romanian film-director who

35–38, 53–62; and Eric Hobsbawm: "The Nation as Novelty: From Revolution to Liberalism" In *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. 16–44.

42 For a relevant example, see the chapter "Ethno-genesis: How do Romanians *imagine* their origins", my emphasis.

43 For a notable exception, see Irina Livezeanu: *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995; Cornell University Press, 2001, focusing on the process of cultural homogenization in Greater Romania, regarding mostly the expansion of the education system and the social and ideological roots of the fascist organization the Iron Guard.

played a central role in the ideological propaganda of the Ceaușescu regime, at the time an independent senator and a vice-president of the Committee of Culture, Arts and Mass Media, opened the attack. In a parliamentary intervention on 5 October 1999, Nicolaescu went as far as to propose that the new textbook "should be burned out in a public square." The attack continued in the Chamber of Deputies, carried out by Petru Bejinariu, a deputy of the opposition Party of Social Democracy in Romania (starting in 2000 the ruling party under the name of the Romanian Social-Democratic Party). Their appeal triggered an immense public scandal which remained in the focus of the media for several weeks, by way of daily editorials in leading newspapers and cultural weeklies such as *Evenimentul Zilei*, *Cotidianul*, *Adevărul*, *Jurnalul Național*, *România Liberă*, *Revista "22", Dilema*, and *România Literară,* talk-shows on popular TV channels, and contradictory public statements of politicians, state dignitaries, and historians. During the harsh public debates, nationalist politicians as „traitors of the nation" stigmatized reformist historians. Prominent journalists, conservative historians, and a strong segment of the public opinion joined their campaign.

Criticism of the textbook can be grouped into four categories, each employing a different version of the conspiracy theory. The first concerned the authors' interpretation of the events that brought the collapse of the Communist regime in December 1989. The officially-endorsed version is that the regime was toppled by a spontaneous and unorganized popular revolt.[44] The National Salvation Front (NSF), a heterogeneous political body constituted during the revolutionary events, subsequently took power. In the following

[44] The Romanian revolution has remained an issue of deep controversy among scholars and politicians. For an attempt to reconstruct the events, see Nestor Ratesh: *Romania: the Entangled Revolution.* New York: Praeger, 1991. For the arguments pro and against characterizing the 1989 popular uprising as a revolution or as a coup d'état, see Peter Siani-Davies: Romanian revolution or coup d'état? *Communist & Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 29, Nr. 4, 1996. 453–466. For arguments supporting a "theory of evolution" to explain the events, see Steven D. Roper: The Romanian revolution from a theoretical perspective. *Communist & Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 27, Nr. 4, 1994. 401–411. Finally, for the process of myth-making associated with the revolutionary events in political memoirs on the Romanian revolution, see Dennis Deletant's review essay, "Myth-making and the Romanian revolution." *Slavonic & East European Review*, Vol. 72, Nr. 3, 1994. 483–492. For the impact of the revolution on the Romanian politics and society, and a comparison with revolutionary changes in other East European countries, see Vladimir Tismăneanu: *Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel.* New York: Free Press, 1992; Vladimir Tismăneanu (ed.): *The Revolutions of 1989.* London: Routledge, 1999**;** and Sorin Antohi – Vladimir Tismăneanu (eds.): *Between Past and Future: The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Aftermath*. Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2000.

months, NSF reorganized itself as a political party, and won political power in two consecutive national elections (1990–1992 and 1992–1996, the second time reformed under the name of Party of Social Democracy in Romania). The leading politicians involved in the events promoted this version, most importantly Ion Iliescu, the leader of the NSF and the first elected president of Romania (1990–1992, 1992–1996, and again 2000–2004).

In order to undermine the political legitimacy of Iliescu and of the ruling NSF/PDSR, the political opposition, grouped in 1992–2000 under a coalition entitled the Democratic Convention, put forward an alternative view of the events, arguing that the popular revolt was in fact manipulated by a conspiracy of communist apparatchiks belonging to the second echelon of the party, who subsequently took power with foreign aid in order to deflect the process of revolutionary change. The history textbook favored the second view, arguing that the Communist regime in Romania collapsed under pressure from a popular revolt, speculated by a political conspiracy of Communist leaders inspired by foreign powers and supported by a military diversion. Since the revolution was central to the political legitimacy of the PDSR, Ion Iliescu, at the time the leader of the party, reacted virulently against the interpretation put forward in the textbook, blaming the ruling Democratic Convention (1996–2000) for this attempt "to falsify history:" In his own words:

> "All the attempts to dispute and to denigrate the Romanian Revolution, all the fabrications on 'coup d'état' or on the 'seizing' of the revolution represent the expression of a political diversion conducted by a series of frustrated and inhibited forces and people, mere spectators of the revolutionary events, wishing to create their own legitimacy, based on forgery and slandering. […]The fact that such nonsense and defrauding of the Romanian Revolution are consciously introduced in some of the history manuals, which have received the seal of approval of the Ministry of Education, is unforgivable and straight-out harming. Thus, history manuals, by encouraging the lack of respect towards the historical truth, are transformed into a perverse means aimed against the national interests and identity of Romania."[45]

Conservative historians attached to the PDSR and former members of the Communist establishment, who defended a „canonical" vision of Romanian history, soon endorsed Iliescu's harsh criticism of the textbook.

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45 Ion Iliescu, President of the Social Democracy Party of Romania, Political Report Given by the National Council of the Social Democracy Party of Romania, "Pulling Romania from crisis, achieving economic and social rebirth" Bucharest, 9 October 1999.

The second type of criticism was put forward by Adrian Năstase, former Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992–1996) and at the time a vice-president of the PSDR (in the period 2000–2004, Năstase was Prime Minister of Romania). While agreeing with Ion Iliescu's arguments, Năstase wrote his own version of the conspiracy theory. In a detailed analysis of the historical information in the textbook, Năstase tried to demonstrate that it reflected an anti-Romanian and pro-Hungarian attitude. In his view, the textbook gave up on all the major points of the Romanian-Hungarian historiographical polemics (see below), a sure proof that the authors were financially and ideologically motivated by Budapest.[46] It is worth noting that, although Năstase is not trained in history but in law and sociology (Ph.D.), he did not refrain from making extensive value-judgments on the textbook, offering his own vision of historical events, and telling historians how national history should properly be interpreted.

A third type of criticism came from leading Romanian journalists, the most vehement and influential being Cristian Tudor Popescu, the editor-in-chief of the independent daily *Adevărul* (The Truth). Popescu put forward a third theory of conspiracy, this time attacking the European and multi-cultural orientation of the textbook. He argued that the textbook "is the fruit of the ideology of political correctness, of multi-culturalism, and of ways of controlling the majority by inciting the minorities against it. This ideology accompanies the American imperial ideology."[47]

Popescu accused the Romanian office of *The Project on Ethnic Relations* (PER), an American NGO located in Princeton, New Jersey, for being responsible for the dissemination of this ideology. In October 1998, in order to support the initiative of the MNE to reform the history textbooks, PER organized a seminar entitled "History Textbooks – Source of Knowledge or Generator of Stereotypes," bringing together historians and state officials from the MNE.[48]

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46 See Adrian Năstase "Această lucrare este anti-națională, dezvoltând toate tezele istoriografiei maghiare" (This work is anti-national, developing all the thesis of the Hungarian historiography), *Timpul*, 26 October – 1 November 1999. 8–9. For a detailed analysis of Năstase's view on the textbook in particular, and of the public debates over the textbook, in general, see Răzvan Părăianu: National Prejudices, Mass Media, and History Textbook: The Mitu Controversy. In Trencsényi Balázs, Dragoș Petrescu, Cristina Petrescu, Constantin Iordachi and Zoltán Kántor (eds.): *Nationalism and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies.* Budapest: Regio Books; Iași: Polirom, 2001. 93–117.

47 See Cristian Tudor Popescu: Manualul de Istorie Antinațională—crimă cu premeditare a Ministerului Educației Naționale. *Adevărul*, 8 October, 1999.

48 On Popescu's accusations against PER, and for a report on the Brașov Seminar, and – more generally – on the political connotations of the textbook controversy, see Dan Pavel,

Popescu judged the seminar to be a proof of the existence of a foreign conspiracy to replace "the old patriotic and mobilizing history, aimed at generating national loyalty," with "a European-type history, based on the understanding of political institutions, state, ideologies, and the role of ethnic and religious minorities."[49] He therefore initiated a sustained journalistic campaign meant to discredit the textbook in the eyes of the public.

This choir of criticism ultimately degenerated into an overt attack against the agenda of reforming the national educational system promoted by Andrei Marga, the Minister of National Education and the rector of the Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj. On 15 October 1999, facing harsh criticism within the *Parliamentary Commission for Education, Science, Youth and Sport* of the Chamber of Deputies, from the part of numerous opposition deputies, who accused the textbook of being "anti-Romanian," the Minister Marga reiterating the need to reform the national curricula.[50] He pointed out that it is a unique situation in Europe when a history textbook was debated in the parliament, and pointed out that the content of the textbook was not presented accurately in the media. Marga restated his conviction that the alternative textbooks were an important step in reforming the educational system, and that Romania must adopt European standards. He also pleaded for an "enlightened patriotism" and defended the professional autonomy of historians, who have a legitimate right to writing their views free of political interference.

Marga's arguments did not convince opposition parties. On 5 November 1999, 55 deputies filed a parliamentary motion asking for the withdrawal of the textbook from the market. Although the group won allies among politicians across the political spectrum, the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the Parliament, ultimately rejected the motion. In the weeks that followed, the debate slowly faded away. With the discovery that the alternative textbooks' publication was in fact initiated by the former administration and was supported by a grant from the World Bank negotiated and signed by the former PDSR government and not by the Democratic Convention, the polit-

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the director of the Romanian office of the PER: Rewriting History in Romania. *East European Politics and Society*, Vol. 15, Nr. 1, 2001. 179–189. For the website of the PER, see http://www.per-usa.org/romania.htm.

49 Popescu, "Manualul de Istorie Antinațională." Pavel points out that the second part of the sentence was a quotation from the program of the seminar organized by PER. See Pavel, "Rewriting History in Romania," 181.

50 On Marga's position, see *Parlamentul României, Camera Deputaților. Comisia pentru Învățământ, Știință, Tineret și Sport*, No. 487/XVII/9, Bucharest, 15 October 1999. 2–3.

ical connotations of the scandal fell into the background, and the media laid more emphasis on the financial aspects of the textbook controversy.[51]

Despite strong criticism, at the end of the day reformist historians have apparently won their case. Minister Marga refused to withdraw the authorization for the textbook, which continues to be used in secondary school classrooms, although in a slightly revised version published in 2000. Beyond immediate partisan political interests or financial implications, the textbook controversy was nevertheless a clear indication of the precarious position of the new reformist school, under joint crossfire from nationalist politicians, conservative historians, the mass media, and a larger nationalist consensus in public opinion. It was remarkable that the general public took an active part in the debate, a proof of the importance of history for constructing identity in the public sphere. But beyond this active public participation, it was puzzling to note the vehemence of the public opinion was in condemning reformist historians. It was also particularly striking that leading journalists joined politicians in stigmatizing the reformist historians. The debate pointed out to the fact that historians have lost the "monopoly" over historical writing in Romania, and they contribute to a modest degree to the formation of the public opinion.

Most importantly, the debate temporarily inhibited the process of reforming Romanian historiography. In the light of the incendiary public scandal stirred by the reformist textbook, numerous historians—even those from the younger generation—concluded that the general public was not yet ready for a radical reform of the Romanian historiography. Bogdan Murgescu, a Professor of History at the University of Bucharest, argued such a view. In a brochure entitled A *fi istoric in 2000* [Being a historian in the year 2000], Murgescu summarized the specific challenges and privations faced by historians in post-1989 Romania, and tried to suggest ways of professional rehabilitation of the social status of historians, and of history as a discipline. He pointed out that in countries such as Germany or Ireland, a radical reform of the historiography could only occur when it was accompanied by political democratization, economic prosperity and integration into European institutions, and concluded that in Romania "conditions are not yet ripen for a substantive renewal of the historical consciousness."[52] He advocated a strategy of gradual reform of the historiographical discourse, taking account of public expectation, and an avoidance of "terrible statements that

51 See Pavel, Rewriting History in Romania, 188.
52 Murgescu, A *fi Istoric în anul 2000*, 113.

shock the public and offer arguments to enemies of the historiographical renewal, thus proving more harmful than useful."[53] The stagnation that generally characterized economic and political reforms in post-communist Romania thus endangered the reform of the historiography, as well.

Political Reconciliation vs. Historiography: The Romanian-Hungarian Conflict

The lack of thorough reforms in historiography hampered the general process of political reconciliation in Central Europe, a situation best exemplified by the diplomatic conflict between Romania and Hungary. The inter-state relationship between Romania and Hungary was one of the most disputed in Central Europe in the twentieth century. In analyzing the Romanian-Hungarian historical conflict, many scholars stressed the different historical experience of the two peoples.[54] In the process of nation- and state-building from the nineteenth century, the Transylvanian Hungarians participated as part of the Hungarian nation, whereas the Romanians from Transylvania participated, through their cultural movements, in the process of building the modern Romanian nation. As a result, the two peoples have had different political interests and cultural orientations, a situation that generated conflicting national mythologies in the long term.

The main ground of confrontation between Romanians and Hungarians has been the inter-ethnic and multicultural space of Transylvania, a province conceived as having made a crucial contribution to the survival of both nations. The Romanian historian Pompiliu Teodor suggestively highlighted Transylvania's importance for the national development of Romanians, Hungarians, and other ethnic groups living in the province:

> "Through its past and present, Transylvania occupies a well-defined role in the Romanian, Hungarian, and German historical life, and in the history of Central and Eastern Europe as a historically individualized entity. For Romanians, Transylvania represents the cradle of the national movement in the 18th century, for Hungarians, Transylvania was the locus of development of the national awakening in the 17th and

53 Murgescu, A *fi Istoric în anul 2000,* 113.

54 See László Péter (ed.): *Historians and the History of Transylvania.* Boulder, Co., East European Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 1992; Stephen Borsody (ed.): *The Hungarians: A Divided Nations.* New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988; and John F. Cadzow, Andrew Ludanyi, Laris J. Elteto (eds.): *Transylvania: The Roots of Ethnic Conflict.* Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1983.

the 18th centuries, and for Germans, it is the country where they could establish a historical, linguistic, cultural and constitutional community."[55]

The Hungarian national ideology regards Transylvania as a core province of historical Hungary, in which the Hungarian political elite and national culture could survive and perpetuate during difficult periods, such as the seventeenth and the eighteenth century.[56] In a similar vein, the Romanian national ideology defines Transylvania as the core of the Romanian lands, the "cradle" of the Romanian civilization, and the demographic reservoir of the Romanian nation.[57] This "mythical" approach to the history of Transylvania coupled with conjectural political interests, generating many diplomatic and even military crises between Romania and Hungary over Transylvania (1916–1918, 1919–1920, 1940, 1944–1945).

The Romanian-Hungarian inter-state conflict continued and even amplified during the Communist period, when the growing concern for Hungarian minorities abroad that developed in Hungary starting in 1970's interacted with the nationalizing policies conducted by the Romanian Communist regime under Nicolae Ceaușescu, putting the official and public political discourses in the two countries on the way to collision. The peak of this controversy occurred in the late 1980's, when the Romanian-Hungarian legal and political debates over the status of the Hungarian national minority in Romania dominated the agenda of numerous international reunions, such as the CSCE meetings, being therefore regarded by numerous analysts as "one of the most dangerous interstate problems in Europe."[58]

55 Pompiliu Teodor: Transilvania: spre un nou discurs istoriografic. [Transylvania: toward a new historiographical approach] *Xenopoliana*, Vol. 1, Nr 1–4, 1993. 59–63.

56 For a hierarchical division among core, semi-peripheral and peripheral territories in the national ideology of Serbs, Romanians, and Hungarians, see George W. White: *Nationalism and Territory. Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe.* Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. A comparative reading of the chapters on Romania and Hungary reveals the conflicting overlapping between the national ideologies of the two peoples. For the symbolic place of Transylvania in the Hungarian national ideology, see also László Kürti: *The Remote Borderland: Transylvania in the Hungarian Imagination.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.

57 See Ștefan Pascu: *Transilvania: Inimă a pământului românesc și leagăn al poporului român* [Transylvania: Heart of the Romanian Land and Cradle of the Romanian People] Cluj: Editura Vatra Românească, 1990; David Prodan: *Transilvania și iar Transilvania: Considerații istorice.* București: Editura Enciclopedică, 1992. Translated into English as *Transylvania and Again Transylvania: A Historical Exposé.* Cluj: Fundația Culturală Română, 1992; Titus Podea: *Transilvania.* București: Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1993.

58 Alpo M. Rusi: *After the Cold War. Europe's New Political Architecture.* London: MacMillan and the Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1991. 66.

Despite optimistic expectations, the fall of communism did not foster a spectacular improvement of the Romanian-Hungarian relations. The link between the Hungarian minority in Romania and their "mother country" remained a very sensitive issue for the Romanian politicians and public opinion. In 1990, the Hungarian state's obligation to protect the interests of ethnic Hungarians abroad was introduced in an amendment to article six of the Hungarian Constitution. In order to provide an institutionalized framework for permanent political consultations with representatives of the Hungarian national minorities in neighboring countries, the Hungarian Government set up a special monitoring commission entitled "The Secretariat for Hungarians Abroad at the Office of the Prime Minister," reorganized in 1992 as the Governmental Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad (*Határon Túli Magyarok Hivatala*), and functioning under the supervision of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.[59] Romania, however, contested Hungary's right to grant political protection to its ethnic minorities abroad, denouncing it as a "self-appointed right."

Moreover, as Romania initiated the first phase of its transition to a democratic political system, the status of ethnic Hungarians became a main area of internal political debate.[60] The most pressing issues concerned the restoration of educational and language entitlements for ethnic Hungarians, which had been suspended during the last years of the communist regime, and their unrestricted access to state institutions. Hungarian civic groups also advocated various forms of collective and territorial autonomy for the Hungarian community, a demand largely opposed by Romanian public opinion. Bilateral misperceptions, coupled with political manipulations of ethnic nationalism by leading figures of the NSF led to a violent clash between ethnic

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59 See Government Decree No. 90/1992, "On the Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad" available at http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/CD0972C6–5D3D-40C7–97B6–98DCD09FE037/0/HTMHa.htm, retrieved on 15 September 2003. For the website of the Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad, see http://www.htmh.hu.

60 For authoritative analyses of the post-1989 inter-ethnic relations between Romanians and Hungarians, see Enikő Magyari-Vincze: *Antropologia politicii identitare naționaliste.* [The Anthropology of the Nationalist Identity-Politics] Cluj: EFES, 1997; and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi: *Transilvania subiectivă* [Subjective Transylvania] București: Humanitas, 1999. For debates on federalism and devolution in post-1989 Romania, with direct reference to Transylvania, see Gustav Molnár – Gabriel Andreescu (eds.): *Problema transilvană* [The Transylvanian Problem] București: Polirom, 1999. For the process of political reconciliation between the two countries, see Constantin Iordachi: The Romanian-Hungarian Reconciliation Process, 1994–2001: from Conflict to Co-operation. *PolSci. Romanian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 1, Nr. 3–4, 2001. 88–134.

Romanians and Hungarians in March 1990 in Târgu Mureș, a multi-ethnic Transylvanian city.

The controversy acquired new domestic connotations with the creation, in December 1989, of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (the DAHR), as the main political representative of the interests of ethnic Hungarians. The DAHR defines Romania's ethnic Hungarians as an integral part of the Hungarian nation, and defines them as a "co-nation," or a "state building nation" in Romania.[61] At international level, the DAHR demands to be considered as the official representative of the Hungarian community in Romania, and to be part of every bilateral agreement between Romania and Hungary over the status of the Hungarian minority. This request was considered legitimate by Hungary, but contested by Romania, which refused to recognize the DAHR as a negotiating partner at inter-state level, pointing out that the issues between Hungary and Romania should be solved only between the two governments.

The Romanian-Hungarian Reconciliation: Genuine Agreement or a Foreign "Dictate"?

Taking into account the effects of geographical proximity and geopolitics on relations between neighboring states, their power relations, and the interdependence of both state-rivalries and common interests, Romania and Hungary can be regarded as making up a "security complex," defined by Barry Buzan as "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another."[62]

Given this conflicting historical legacy, the spectacular improvement in the Romanian-Hungarian relations starting in September 1996 has been generally perceived as "a divine surprise," "a model for Europe and for the whole world,"[63] and an example able to "put an end to a millennium of conflicts and tragedy in Central Europe."[64] Romania and Hungary have avoided a military

61 See the Program of the DAHR, available on-line on its official web-site at the address http://www.rmdsz.ro

62 Barry Buzan: *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991. 205.

63 Bill Clinton: *Letter to Romanian President Emil Constantinescu*.

64 Alfred Moses and Donald Blinken, the American ambassadors from Bucharest and, respectively, Budapest, "The New Treaty between Romania and Hungary Remove an Obstacle from their Way of Western Integration," *The Washington Post*, 19 September 1996.

confrontation that seemed a grim possibility in late 1980's, have ameliorated their tense diplomatic relations, and, more significantly, have managed to develop a close political collaboration. The two countries are more and more bound together by a network of formal and informal contacts, which have worked for changing the nature of their inter-state relations. Political elites in the two countries have made clear their intention to foster a long-lasting and constructive relationship toward their integration into NATO and the European Union, a process that "is not a competition, but an approach resting on collaboration."[65] This does not mean that conflicts are excluded in the future period, but it is more probably that they will take the form of legal controversies, and will be solved by a process of political bargaining.

How can we account for the Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation? According to Buzan, four structural options are available in order to account for the changes suffered by a security complex, namely "external transformation," "internal transformation," "maintenance of the statue-quo," and "the overlay of the complex by an outside power." [66] Most of the explanations employed to account for the process of the Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation assessed the bilateral treaty as "a new Dayton," due to "'the extraordinary American pressure" [67] and the whole Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation as "a first forced step" which came "as a result of five years of negotiations and intense international pressure."[68] One can distinguish between a) 'conjectural' and b) "structural" argumentation of this thesis. In spite of their differences, both positions attribute to the international community a decisive role in the outcome of the negotiation. Their common view is that the Romanian-Hungarian security complex was "overlaid" by an external interference that was so powerful as to suppress the bilateral conflict.

In contrast to these views, this article argues that the major change in the Romanian-Hungarian relationship was brought by an internal political transformation suffered by the components the security system. Romanian and Hungarian decision-makers have employed new, more compatible definitions of national security, and this accounts for the reconciliation reached. While the international community played an important role in the process

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65 Dinu, Marcel Romanian Deputy Foreign Ministry, in Simona-Mirela Miculescu, "Romania-Hungary Basic Treaty Ready For Official Signature," 08/21/96, at http://www.embassy.org/press/romania/00000097.html, 23 July 1996.

66 Cf. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*

67 See Cristoiu, Ion: Un imperativ național: semnarea cît mai grabnică a tratatului româno-maghiar. *Evenimentul Zilei*, 19 August 1997.

68 "Romania and Hungary Reconcile," *Libération*, 18 September 1996.

of reconciliation, it did so not through a direct intervention and political pressure "a la Dayton," but by devising a structural framework in which the negotiations took place, consisting of a standard for minority rights, a mechanism for implementing and monitoring these rights, a framework for confidence building measures, and a framework for bilateral Romanian-Hungarian negotiations, including the possibility of an external mediation.

At international level, the Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation was occasioned by the "Balladour plan," an initiative which aimed at stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe by backing the conclusion of bilateral treaties between states experiencing bilateral tensions related to minority or ethnic issues. Following the inaugural Conference for a Pact on Stability in Europe, held in May 1994, nine states aspiring for the EU membership in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), were expected, within a grace period of one year, to conclude bilateral or regional treaties regulating their inter-state relations with the neighboring countries, including issues questions pertaining to frontiers and minorities.

Following Balladour's initiative, Romania and Hungary resumed negotiations toward a bilateral treaty that had been pending for a long period. The first political breakthrough in the relations between Romania and Hungary took place in November 1994: the new Hungarian government led by Gyula Horn set as its major foreign policy task the reconciliation with its neighbors, mostly with Romania and Slovakia. The second major political breakthrough took place in August 1995 when President Iliescu proposed a detailed plan of a historical reconciliation between the two countries. The third breakthrough in the bilateral reconciliation process was the signing of "The Treaty of Understanding, Co-operation and Good Neighborliness," on 16 September 1996, which included the provision that both countries will support their efforts for NATO and European Integration.[69] A „Joint Romanian-Hungarian Political Statement" and an Agreement of Reconciliation and Partnership also accompanied the treaty.

While the mediation of the international community was an important stimulus behind the reconciliation, it is important to note that Romania and Hungary managed to shape the content of their bilateral treaty. Far from being a dictate, the mediation of the international community can thus be regarded as a proof of the interactive way in which states can use and shape in-

[69] *Romania and Minorities. Collection of Documents.* Târgu Mureș: Pro Europa, 1997. 162.

ternational institutions, as well as of the way in which institutions can influence the behavior of states.

In the next years, the diplomatic collaboration between the two countries has continued to improve, transforming itself into a "partnership for the whole region."[70] Romania and Hungary have developed an active regional partnership, having bilateral agreements in almost all fields of activity, exceeding the relations they have with the other neighbors. Implemented in January 1997, the Mixed Intergovernmental Commission for Collaboration and Active Partnership between Romanian and Hungary set up a permanent framework of dialogue and collaboration, Having as model the French-German reconciliation, this comprehensive framework of collaboration instituted a permanent dialogue between Romania and Hungary.

Despite these major successes, in order to prove durable, the process of political reconciliation between Romania and Hungary needs to be accompanied by a cultural reconciliation between the two countries. The following section points out to the powerful impact of symbolic politics on the bilateral relations between Romania and Hungary.

Political Reconciliation vs. Conflicting Historical Memory: The Statue of Liberty from Arad

The territorial conflict between Romanians and Hungarians over Transylvania has been greatly exacerbated by an accompanying historiographical dispute over all the important moments in the history of the province, such as the question of the "chronological pre-eminence" of Romanians or Hungarians in Transylvania, the place of Transylvania within the medieval Kingdom of Hungary, the legal status of Romanians under the dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy, or that of the Hungarians in Romania.[71]

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70 Adrian Severin, Romanian Foreign Ministry, quoted in *Evenimentul Zilei*, 15 January 1996.

71 See Dennis Deletant: Ethnos and Mythos in the History of Transylvania: the Case of the Chronicler Anonymus, and Martyn Rady: Voievode and Regnum: Transylvania's Place in the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary. In László Péter (ed.): *Historians and the History of Transylvania*, 67–87, and 88–103; and Sándor Biró (ed.): *The Nationalities Problem in Transylvania, 1867–1940. A Social History of the Romanian Minority under Hungarian rule, 1867–1918 and of the Hungarian Minority under Romanian Rule, 1918–1940.* Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1988. The main Romanian-Hungarian historiographical controversy surrounded the publication of Béla Köpeczi (ed.): *Erdély Története* [History of Transylvania] 3 Vols. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1985, a work considered by the Romanian side as having irredentist overtones. A shorter version of the book was translated in German and French, while the full edition was translated in English: Béla Köpeczi (ed.): *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens* Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990. Translation of: *Erdély rövid története*; Béla Köpeczi (ed.): *Histoire de la Transylvanie*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó,

Although in modern times Romanian and Hungarian historians have debated the overlapping history of their countries with considerable passion, these polemics have not always led Romanians and Hungarians scholars to an understanding of each other's history and culture. Instead of initiating fruitful scholarly debates over the common aspects of their history, Romanian and Hungarian historians have too often perpetuated their competing national "cannons," veritable "self-fulfilling mythologies" of their historical writing. As a result, ethnic stereotypes and hostile perspectives have survived unchanged in history textbooks and in historiographical works, undermining the process of political reconciliation.[72]

The historiographical narratives of the 1848 revolution best illustrate this conflicting and ethnocentric approach. The revolution was a pan-European event, national movements in various European countries being animated by liberal principles and having as a common goal the fight against absolutism. Both Romanians and Hungarians fought in the revolution, as the most advanced bastions against absolutism in East-Central Europe. Despite the transnational character of the revolution, national historiographies in Romania, Hungary, and more generally in Central Europe, have generally (although not exclusively) taken a narrow, nation-based perspective, considering national rivalries and conflicts as the main features of the revolution, and asserting that only their own national and territorial claims were just and legitimate.

In Hungary, the 1848–1849 revolution is regarded as a central event in the crystallization of the Hungarian national consciousness, giving birth to the modern Hungarian nation. Its commemoration has been a central political act for the Hungarian political elites, and has always enjoyed a large popu-

1992; Béla Köpeczi (ed.): *History of Transylvania,* 3 Vols. Boulder, Colo. New York: Social Science Monographs, 2002. For the Romanian reaction, see Florin Constantiniu, Ștefan Pascu, Mircea Mușat: A Conscious Forgery of History under the Aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. In László Péter (ed.): *Historians and the History of Transylvania*

72 For historical works on the Romanian-Hungarian relations published after 1989, see Constantin Iordachi, Bárdi Nándor: The History of the Romanian-Hungarian Inter-Ethnic, Cultural and Political Relations. Selected Bibliography, 1990–2000. In *Nationalism and Contested Identities*, 315–375. For a comprehensive overview of the image of Hungary in the post-1989 Romanian historiography and its relationship to the Romanian-Hungarian political reconciliation, including an extensive bibliography, see Constantin Iordachi, Marius Turda: Politikai megbékélés versus történeti diskurzus: az 1989–1999 közötti román történetírás Magyarország-percepciója [Political Reconciliation versus Historical Discourse: The Image of Hungarians in Romanian Historiography, 1989–1999] *Regio,* Nr. 2, 2000. 129–159.

lar participation.[73] The two main aspects of the revolution are regarded as\being the fight against the Habsburg oppression in order to achieve the self-determination of historical Hungary, and the decision regarding political union between Hungary and the autonomous multi-ethnic principality of Transylvania. Hungarian historiography devotes less attention to the relationship between the Hungarian national movement and the fight for self-determination of the Serbs, Slovaks, Croats, and Transylvanian Romanians, the "non-historical peoples" living within the symbolic borders of the historical state of medieval Hungary that the Hungarian revolutionaries fought to revive. During the 1848–1849 revolution, Hungarian leaders believed that the rights of all peoples living within the historical Hungary would be secured by liberal legal reforms guaranteeing individual rights and the abolition of feudal privileges.

At the time of the 1848 revolution, Romanians were divided among three historical provinces. The principalities of Moldova and Wallachia had internal autonomy under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire and the diplomatic "protection" of Russia. The national movements in these two provinces fought to abolish feudal privileges and to consolidate their internal autonomy. While in Moldova the revolutionary movement was defeated in an incipient phase, revolutionaries in Wallachia succeeded in gaining and exercising political power for three months (June-September), until their regime collapsed under the joint attack of the Ottoman and Russian armies.

In Transylvania, most Romanians and Hungarians fought on different sides. A majority of the Romanian leaders contested the union of Transylvania with Hungary, and fought for the national self-determination of their ethnic group, in alliance with the Habsburg army. The attitude toward the Hungarian revolution differed, therefore, in the various historical provinces. Romanian revolutionaries in Wallachia admired Hungarian liberals for their military force and political cohesion, and

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73 The historiography on the 1848 revolution in Hungary is immense. I mention here, selectively, only general works in English. On the revolutionary events in the Habsburg Empire, see Robin Okey: *"1848–1849"* in *The Habsburg Monarchy: From Enlightenment to Eclipse.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001. 127–156. On the Hungarian revolution, see mainly András Gerő: Politics and National Minorities, 1848–9. In *Modern Hungarian Society in the Making: The Unfinished Experience*. Translated by James Patterson and Enikő Koncz. Budapest: CEU Press, 1995. 92–105; György Spira: *The Nationality Issue in the Hungary of 1848–49.* Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1992; Kosáry Domokos: *The Hungarian Revolution of 1848 in the Context of European History.* Budapest: Collegium Budapest, 2000; István Deák: *Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848–1849.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.

sought to forge a political alliance with them against imperial absolutism. To this end, the Wallachia Nicolae Bălcescu mediated a late reconciliation between the Hungarian leader Lajos Kossuth and the Transylvanian-Romanian leader Avram Iancu. In Transylvania, only a minority of Romanians opted for an alliance with the Hungarian revolutionaries against Habsburg absolutism, Bălcescu's mediation coming too late to change the military balance on the field.

In Romania, the 1848 revolution is celebrated as a major historical event, but it is not regarded as the founding act of the Romanian nation. The Romanian national holiday celebrates the union of Transylvania with Romania on the 1st of December 1918. Moreover, the commemoration of the revolution had two main components: the Wallachian, insisting on the fight for the abolition of feudal privileges and for political emancipation, and the Transylvanian, underlying the fight for national self-determination, and taking strong anti-Hungarian overtones. The commemoration of the revolution in Transylvania stresses Romanian military action against the Hungarian revolutionary army, and glorifies the mythical figure of Avram Iancu, the leader of the rebellious army. Nationalist historians lay all the blame for atrocities against the Romanian population on the Hungarian army, holding it responsible for the death of up to 40,000 people.[74]

The recent diplomatic tension between Romania and Hungary over the rehabilitation of the "Statue of Liberty" in Arad illustrates the importance of historical memory of the 1848 revolution in the process of reconciliation between the two peoples. The Statue of Liberty was unveiled in September 1890, under the Austro-Hungarian Dualism, in the "Szabadság tér" (Freedom Square) of Arad, in the historical Banat. It was erected in order to commemorate the execution, on 6 October 1849, of thirteen generals who fought in the Hungarian revolutionary army by the Habsburg imperial army, following Hungary's defeat in the War of Independence waged against the Habsburgs. Designed by Adolf Huszár and finished by György Zala, the stat-

74 For this claim, see the massive work of Anton Dragoescu (coord.), Liviu Maior, Gelu Neamțu and Serban Polverejan: *Istoria României. Transilvania* [History of Romania. Transylvania]. 2 Vols. Cluj: Geroge Barițiu, 1997, 1999, sponsored by the former nationalist mayor of Cluj, Gheorghe Funar. For similar works, see Ioan Chindriș, Gelu Neamțu: *Procese politice antiromanesti care au zguduit Transilvania in toamna anului 1848* [Anti-Romanian political trials that shook Transylvania in the autumn of 1848]. București: Viitorul Românesc, 1995; and Ioan N. Ciolan, Valentin Borda, Ioan Lacatușu: *Transilvania prigonită de unguri* [Transylvania oppressed by the Hungarians] Târgu Mureș: Casa de Editură "Petru Maior" 1997.

uary group is an allegory of liberty, having in the center a symbolic representation of "Liberty," holding a wreath in her right hand and a sword in the left. On the lower level, there are four allegorical statues, while in front there is the "waking liberty," symbolizing "Hungaria." The two side figures symbolize the "battle ready" and "sacrifice-ready," while the back figure represents the dying fighter (see below).

Due to radical territorial changes, the presence of the statue was discontinued after 34 years. Following World War One, under the Treaty of Trianon (1920), the Banat, together with Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia, joined Romania, as part of the radical post-World War I geo-political reorganization. This territorial change was contested by Hungary, so that in 1924 the Romanian government, led by the Liberal Ion I. C. Brătianu, decided to remove the Statue of Liberty, arguing that it was as a symbol of Hungarian irredentism. Subsequently, the Freedom Square was renamed "Avram Iancu," in honor of the Transylvanian Romanian leader who fought for national self-determination during the 1848–1849 revolution.

In 1999, in a gesture of political reconciliation, the Romanian government promised to rehabilitate the statue and to place it at the center of a "Park of Romanian-Hungarian Reconciliation" to be inaugurated on 6 October, at the hundred-fiftieth commemoration of the execution of the thirteenth generals (1849–1999). This decision was welcomed by Hungary, but met with stiff resistance in Romania, from the part of ultra-nationalist Greater Romanian Party, led by Corneliu Vadim-Tudor, and from the center-left political opposition, led by Ion Iliescu and Adrian Năstase.

The different significance and patterns of commemoration of the 1848 revolution in Romania and Hungary gave a window of opportunity for these nationalist politicians to manipulate the Romanian-Hungarian conflicting historical legacy in order to oppose the rehabilitation of the Statue of Arad. While in Hungary the Statue of Liberty is seen as a symbol of the fight against absolutism, in Romania the statue was presented by the media and by nationalist politicians as an irredentist symbol of the "Millenarian Hungary," with an implicit anti-Romanian message. Facing a choir of vehement protests, and in the eve of national elections planned for November 2000, the Romanian government abandoned its promise to rehabilitate the statue. Prime Minister Radu Vasile cancelled his participation to the commemoration in Arad in October 1999, delegating instead the Ministry of Justice, Virgil Stoica. Due to the absence of his official counterpart, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán shortened his trip to Romania, which took place on 5th of October. In-

The Statue of Liberty, Arad (1900): A symbol of historical reconciliation or a reminder of national rivalries?

stead of being erected in its original location, or alternatively in a new "Park of Reconciliation," the monument was entrusted to the care of the Catholic Diocese in Arad. At the execution site, an obelisk commemorated the memory of the thirteen generals.[75]

The rehabilitation of the Statue of Liberty has remained a contentious issue on the Romanian-Hungarian agenda since 1999, stretching the bilateral relations between the two countries. Invoking the resistance of the public opinion, Romanian authorities delayed the rehabilitation, arguing that its symbolism divides Romanians and Hungarians, instead of uniting them. Their position triggered criticism from Hungarian diplomats, who repeatedly asked the Romanian part to keep its promise. Ultimately, after harsh negotiations between the Romanian President Ion Iliescu and the Hungarian President Ferenc Mádl in October 2003, the Romanian government has confirmed yet again that it will re-erect the Statue of Liberty in a "Park of Reconciliation," but no deadline has been set for this action. On its part, Hungary made several compensatory gestures toward Romania, by agreeing to revive

75 For an thorough analysis of official commemorations of the 1848 revolution in Central Europe, see Rogers W. Brubaker, Margit Feischmidt: 1848 in 1998: The Politics of Commemoration in Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* Vol. 44, Nr. 4, 2002. 700–744. The article focuses on talks, practices and celebrations occasioned by the 150th anniversary of the revolutions of 1848 in the three countries.

and co-finance the Gozsdu Foundation, established at the end of the 19th century to assist the cultural emancipation of Romanians within Austria-Hungary, but nationalized by the Hungarian communists. This political outcome has failed to satisfy ethnic Hungarians in Romania. The leaders of the DAHR felt "deeply offended" by the attitude of the Romanian authorities in denying them the legitimate right to erect statues in their historic homeland.

Following this bilateral agreement, in 2004 the Statue of Liberty has been finally displayed in a public square in Arad. Contrary to the somber prophecies of nationalist politicians, this event passed uncontested by Romanian city-dwellers, the statue soon becoming an integral part of Arad's urban landscape. In retrospect, the tolerant attitude of the public opinion exposes the political manipulation of the issue by certain politicians interested in escalating inter-ethnic tensions for transient political gains. The controversy surrounding the rehabilitation of the Statue of Liberty also highlights the problems raised by the failure to fulfill bilateral commitments in a political partnership. It points out to the need to deepen the Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation from a political agreement reached between political elites in the two countries to the level of public opinion and scholarly communities.

More recently, numerous works of political science, sociology, and anthropology have contributed to deepening the political reconciliation between Romania and Hungary. They have deconstructed nationalist ideologies, exposed intolerant attitudes at the level of Romanian and Hungarian communities, analyzed the political identities of Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania and the image of the other in the media, and proposed practical solution for a societal reconciliation.[76] Although to a more limited

[76] For a synthesis of Romanian history published in Hungarian, see Zoltán Szász: A *románok története* [History of the Romanians] Budapest: Beremányi, 1993. For attempts of relational history, see Liviu Maior: *1848–1849. Românii și Ungurii în revoluție.* București: Editura Enciclopedica, 1998; Lucian Nastasă (ed.): *Studii Istorice Româno-Ungare.* Iași: Fundația Academică "A. D. Xenopol", 1999; and the collective volume written by a new generation of Romanian and Hungarian historians, Trencsényi Balázs, et. al, (eds.): *Nationalism and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies*. For works on the "image of the other," see selectively, the following works: Ildiko Melinda Mitu, Sorin Mitu: Românii văzuți de maghiari—geneza unei imagini etnice moderne [Romanians seen by the Hungarian—the genesis of a modern ethnic image] In Nicolae Bocșan, Valeriu Leu (eds.): *Identitate și alteritate: Studii de imagologie* [Identity and alterity: Studies of imagology] Reșița: Editura Banatica, 1996. 52–63; Borsi-Kálmán, Béla: Les Roumains aux yeux Hongrois. Stéréotypes et lieux communs "hongrois" sur les "Roumains": Bétises, généralitiés, sémi-vérités par rapports á la conscience et la stratégie nationale. In Alexandru Zub, Gabriel Bădărău, Leonid Boicu, Lucian Nastasă (eds.): *Istoria ca lectură a lumii: Profesorului Alexandru Zub la împlinirea vîrstei de 60 de ani* [History as a reading of the

extent, historiography has also participated only to a limited extent in this process of reconciliation. In the past years, a new generation of historians in Romania and Hungary have exposed the limitation of the nationalist canon of history-writing and have proposed a pluralist view, focusing on the interaction of all ethnic groups living in Transylvania, and favoring common elements of their shared history. They have approached the problematic of nation- and state-building with the specific tools and methods of social history, by concentrating on the study of local history and regional patterns of elite formation, the history of multiculturalism, and the image of the "other."[77] These works do not propose an artificial reinterpretation of common historical events, as official attempts of reconciliation did during the communist periods, but search for a common methodological and theoretical ground on which to conceptualize the history of the region.

The benefits of this new orientation are perceivable in the attitude of the public opinion, as well. Romanians and Hungarians do not have a preponderantly negative opinion of each-other anymore, as surveys conducted in 1980's had indicated. Nationalist politicians advocating the existence of a Hungarian danger to Romania's security seem to have almost completely lost their capacity of manipulating or mobilizing parts of the electorate. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, which took part in three consecutive ruling coalitions, is perceived nowadays as a factor of stability and not instability. Recent gains in historiography and the tolerant attitude of the public opinion can serve as a basis of a Romanian-Hungarian unified his-

world: To Professor Alexandru Zub for his 60's anniversary] Iași: Fundația Academică "A.D. Xenopol", 1994. 453–482; Dan Horia Mazilu: *Noi despre ceilalți: Fals tratat de imagologie.* [We about the others: False treaty of imagology] Iași: Polirom, 1999.

77 Among these works, see Sorin Mitu: *Geneza identității naționale la românii ardeleni.* București: Humanitas, 1997. Translated into English as *National Identity of Romanians in Transylvania.* Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001; Florin Gogâlțan, Sorin Mitu (eds.): *Studii de istorie a Transilvaniei. Specific regional și deschidere europeană* [Studies on the history of Transylvania: Regional Character and European Openness] Cluj: Asociația istoricilor din Transilvania și Banat, 1994; Florin Gogîlțan, Sorin Mitu: *Viața privată, mentalități colective și imaginar social în Transilvania* [Private life, collective mentalities, and social imaginary in Transylvania] Cluj: Asociația istoricilor din Transilvania și Banat, 1995–1996; Victor Neumann: *Tentația lui Homo-Europaeus. Geneza spiritului modern în Europa centrala și de sud-est* [The Temptation of Homo-Europaeus: The Genesis of the Modern Spirit in Central and Southeastern Europe] București: Editura Științifică, 1991; and Valeriu Leu: *Modernizare și imobilism. Sate și oameni din Banat la începutul veacului XX în documente memorialistice* [Modernization and Immobilism: Villages and People of the Banat at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century in Memorial Documents] Reșița: Banatica, 1998.

tory textbook, which to be taught in secondary schools in Romania and Hungary, following the example of the French-German historical reconciliation.

Conclusions

The radical socio-political changes that have occurred in Central and Southeastern Europe after 1989 have affected the status of history as a discipline and the societal status of historians.[78] National historiographies have been challenged to overcome "parochialism," to internalize the theoretical and methodological achievements that marked the development of Western social sciences, and to open up to comparative regional and global perspectives. This process has been nevertheless hindered by numerous factors.

First, the institutionalization of the study of history as a profession in the modern period has been traditionally closely linked with the rise of nationalism and with the development and consolidation of nation-states. The connection between the writing of history and the institutional infrastructure of the nation-state has been even stronger in Central and Southeastern Europe, where historiography played an important role in the process of nation- and state-building. Local historians have therefore focused almost unilaterally on the "validity" of their country's historical rights to self-determination and territorial statehood, often ignoring wider regional processes.[79]

Second, history served as a tool of political legitimization for political elites, providing the cement for forging paradigms of collective identity. This feature conferred an important political influence to historians, giving birth to a type of "historian-politician" best epitomized by František Palacky and J. Rački in the Czech lands, Slobodan Jovanovič in Serbia, Mihály Horváth in Hungary, and Nicolae Bălcescu, Mihail Kogălniceanu, and Nicolae Iorga in Romania, the latter being celebrated as "the historian-politician 'par excellence.'"[80] The strong link between politics and the writing of history was preserved and even consolidated during the communism regime, the official propaganda being based on

78 See Lucian Boia, Marie-Karine Schaub, Alexandru Duțu: *Le métier d'historien dans l'est de l'Europe: enjeux des discours historiques depuis la chute du mur.* Paris: Association "Histoire au présent," 1994.

79 For the role played by historiography in the process of nation-state building in East-Central Europe, see R. W. Seton-Watson: *The Historian as a Political Force in Central Europe.* London: University of London, 1922.

80 Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera: *Nicolae Iorga. A Biography.* Iași: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1998. 26. On the political activity and socio-political thought of Iorga, see also William Oldson: *The Historical and Nationalistic Thought of Nicolae Iorga.* Boulder Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1973; and Constantin Iordachi: Nicolae Iorga and the Paradigm of Cultural Nationalism. *Balkanistica*, Vol. 13, Nr. 1, 2000. 167–174.

a new vision of national history, which gradually suppressed in importance the ideological discourse on proletarian internationalism.

Third, one can identify a rising tide of "nationalism" in the late 1980s. Despite policies intended to weaken or subvert national identities and loyalties, the communist regime was in fact "conflictogenic," or conflict producing, and reinforced rather than suppressed ethnicity.[81] Faced with economic grievances, people tended to channel economic grievances against "outside" or "internal enemies," further aggravating inter-ethnic conflicts. The crisis in the inter-ethnic relations in the last stage of the communist rule was thus yet another manifestation of the broader socio-economic and political crisis facing communist societies.

Due to this combination of factors, national historiographies in Central and Southeastern Europe have been generally characterized by modest regional scholarly interaction. Surely, there have occurred during the time numerous and passionate polemics among historians in the region, but they have been too often politically driven and have concentrated on the question of historical rights. As a result, the inter-regional dialogue on historical studies has been rather limited, often lacking a genuine openness to cultural differences. Nowadays, the collapse of communism and the process of European integration provide a unique opportunity for historians in East-Central Europe to combine the heritage of their national scholarly institutions and patterns of research with an emerging European historiographical discourse. They are challenged to expose inter-ethnic stereotypes and to relate to a broader historical discourse that transcends national lines of reference, by integrating new regional, continental and global perspectives.

A transnational and relational re-conceptualization of the history of Central and Southeastern Europe would have a refreshing impact on the writing of European history, as well. Currently, European history-writing is in a process of transformation, moving away from its concentration on the historical experience of Western Europe and toward considering the history of peripheral areas and the status of various types of excluded minorities. Countries in Central and Southeastern Europe can actively contribute to enhancing the plurality of historical and cultural experiences defying "Europeanness" and European values. They can expose the tendency of essentializing the experience of European historical regions such as "the West" or "the Balkans," by

81 Gail Lapidus: Gorbachev and the 'National Question'. In Edward A. Hawett and Victor H. Winston (eds.): *Milestones in Glasnost and Perestroika. Politics and People.* Washington, DC: The Brooking Institution, 1991. 197.

promoting a more integrative perspective.[82] On the long run, the fruitful cross-fertilization between Western scholarship and historians in Central and Southeastern Europe might lead to the re-thematization of the European history.

82 For a discussion of the implications of the transnational history on national ideologies and the profound changes it entails, see Michael McGerr: The Prince of the 'New Transnational History.' *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 96, Nr. 4, 1991. 1056–1067. The author argues that in the American context, transnational history means to relativize American "exceptionalism" and American "distinctiveness," and to de-emphasize comparative history and the "practice of nation-centered history writing." See also Laurence Veysey: The Autonomy of American History Reconsidered. *American Quarterly*, Vol. 31, Nr. 4, 1979. 455–477.

JÓZSEF D. LŐRINCZ

Ambivalent Discourse in Eastern Europe

Despite the general consensus that transition in Eastern Europe has reached its completion, it seems more difficult to prove on the level of everyday life. In the context of East European transitions, some of the major questions refer to the way this process, the events, and the decisions become interpreted in everyday life; do the values of the new political/economic system become internalized? What is the legitimacy of the political, economic, and social ideals of short-term plans proposed by the elite? Internalization and legitimacy depend only partly – and not always – on the activity of opinion leaders. Both before and after 1989 they attempted to adapt "Western" models to local conditions – an attitude and a practice difficult to adopt in everyday life. Here, improvisation rather than adherence to a model or ideology drove everyday activity and discourse, often without a larger perspective and frequently leading to disappointments. Specific, historically, developed conditions coupled with the constraints of everyday life led either to success or, on the contrary, to obstruction of opinion leaders.

Internalization presupposes polarization, oppositions that in everyday life must be dissolved by individuals or groups. Good and bad (evil), merit and need, private enterprise and public fairness, ideals and pragmatism, etc., are choices everybody has to make. In everyday life one either suspends the tension between dichotomous or dichotomously understood values, or develops frames of interpretation that make cohabitation with their contradictions possible. More specifically, in modernizing Eastern Europe the polarization between "us" and "them" or between the private and the public sphere took certain local, specific variations. For example, both before and after 1989 the tension between the "official" and the "non-official" spheres, or between "our" and "their" ethnic (national) group was – and continues to be – of major importance, even if the meanings of these terms changed over time.

The point remains that the importance of such terms comes not from some "national" or "worldwide" politics, but from everyday life, determining the behavior of common people, their worldview, their social orientation, and their identity.

The pragmatic dissolution of conflicts usually requires the individual or community to transform a system of values and norms formally perceived as valid and coherent. This usually involves considerable effort, and some discomfort, as such changes endanger the real or assumed coherence of our worldview and ourselves. This thus raises the question, what happens, if – for a variety of reasons –the choice, or the reconciliation of the various polarities is hindered over a long period of time[1] by the lack of legitimate institutional forms that could promote such an option, or a compromise. How does such a situation impact the values of everyday life and the conduct of individuals? Do individuals then try to dissolve the tension of conflicts? And if so how?

As a first approach, Katherine Verdery's theory on the split identity of East European subject's, which led, according to her, to the incoherence of values and norms of behavior, will be discussed. It will be shown that in this region, in everyday life, such a polarized identity does not always result in chaos, or in moral double standards, but rather in a coherent, pragmatic lifestyle validated by the everyday social milieu. Some examples of trespassing between official, dominant and "opposition" discourse, a practice developed in state socialism, will be given. These will be treated on the one hand as forms of silence and struggle with silence, and on the other hand as "pedagogical" exercises.

Her thesis will be demonstrated through an analysis of the (quasi-) opposition discourse developed in Transylvanian Hungarian circles. Three examples will be given: poems allegedly written for children by Sándor Kányádi before 1989, the activity of the Party Committee for Supervising Performances (based on the minutes of this body), and an artistic performance "in honor" of the Romanian Communist Party's 60th anniversary. The conclusion will try to connect the problem of ambivalent discourse to that of parrhesia.

According to one of the most interesting interpretation, the roots of the ethnic conflicts that erupted in Eastern Europe after 1989 can be traced back to the bipolar personality structure characteristic of communism. According

[1] For the problem of enduring transition, see Árpád Szakolczai: *Reflexive Historical Sociology.* London: Routledge, 2000.

to Katherine Verdery[2], communism dichotomized the moral, political and social world by constructing a totally antagonistic enemy for itself (the enemy of the state, of the people, of the regime, etc.). Even if everyone did not accept this worldview, this dichotomization became the mechanism by which the subjects' identities were formed and reproduced. Quite apart from the expectations of the regime, however, the "others" from whom they differentiated themselves in everyday life were not the "capitalists", "the West", or the "internal enemies", but the official elite itself, (official rhetoric, culture, etc.). And thus, the "us" developed exactly in opposition with the official "them". Values were turned upside down in the private sphere. And, in the public sphere, positive values became evil. In this situation, the self could not be affirmed openly, and thus, the identity of East European subjects was characterized by a certain duplicity: a "public self" that presented itself according to the requirements formulated by those in power, and a "real self", secluded into private life. But the real self, developed in opposition with the public self, relied for coherence on the official self. Bi-polarity became constitutive of a social person. The end of the regime provoked a crisis of self-conception, n the disappearance of the "them" against whom the self had been constituted. Nevertheless, Verdery claims that the bipolar mechanism of identity-construction continues to function as part of the social person even after 1989 and the creation of new dichotomies have been created. The real self needed a "them" in order to maintain itself. The new "other", according to Verdery, found its form in the stranger, especially ethnic groups. This lies at the heart of post-1989 nationalism.

Bi-polarity certainly explains nationalism, the ongoing creation of borders, and many other more or less intolerantly self-constituting practices. But this statement needs qualification in two respects.[3] On the one hand, the private/public dichotomy was not so polarized. For Verdery the two spheres are sealed off from each other, resulting only in antagonism. Such a position, labeled "liberal" by Benn and Gaus,[4] can be criticized from several standpoints.

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2 See Verdery, Katherine: Comment: Hobsbawm in the East. *Anthropology Today*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1992, and Verdery, Katherine: *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1996, Chapter 4: *Nationalism and National Sentiment in Postsocialist Romania*, 92-97.

3 The following argument does not deal with another major problem raised by this analysis; namely that certain conflicts have a historical aspect – they took shape long before state socialism.

4 Benn and Gaus Introduction. In Benn, S. I. – Gaus, Gerald F. (eds.): *Public and Private in Social Life.* London: Croom Helm, 1983.

First, from a somewhat historical relativist point of view, it can be shown that the boundaries between public and private change throughout time. Second, public and private can interpenetrate (or become identical). Third, some cultures do not have such spheres, or if they do, they have significantly different meanings. Moreover, as the variety of viewpoints suggests, distinctions used in academic disciplines are equivocal themselves.[5]

Two observations need to be made concerning this case. On the one hand, that the two spheres existed in this region and were recognized in everyday life as more or less separate entities does not need debating. Interpenetration (as if the Communists penetrated and governed every part of the private world) is not the point, but rather the fact those values of the private sphere frequently appeared in the public one, and vice versa. One's frame of reference could interpret situations in the other, hence, creating ambiguity and ambivalence. On the other hand, further investigations should take into consideration that the borders between the two have changed a great deal after 1989.[6]

Without a proper description of how the public sphere worked, and its relationship to the private, one is stuck in a Manichean world with little resemblance to the real one. It is impossible to present here an overarching picture of the (Romanian or Transylvanian) public and private sphere and the relation between the two. Nor does it seem possible, in such a limited space, to describe how "time" solved the problems caused by polarization. The question up for examination deals only with their problematic nature and how this complex connection found resolution, as dichotomy in their moral world never reached perfection. It seems that rationalizing every action and situation according to a strict bipolar value system just was not possible. Everyday actions and situations were much more inconsistent. In many cases,

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5 This topic cannot be discussed in detail here. On the problematic relationship between the public and the private sphere and how categories change in time, see for example Benn – Gauss, idem; Maier, Charles S. (ed.): *Changing Boundaries of the Political: Essays on the Evolving Balance between the State and Society, Public and Private in Europe.* Cambridge University Press, 1987; Coontz, Stephanie: *The Social Origins of Private Life: A History of American Families 1600-1900.* London and New York: Verso, 1988; Castiglione, Dario – Sharpe, Leslie (eds.): *Shifting the Boundaries: Transformation of the Languages of Public and Private in the Eighteenth Century.* University of Exeter Press, 1995; Weintraub, Jeff – Kumar, Krishan (eds.): *Public and private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997.

6 See on this issue Biró A. Zoltán – Gagyi József: Román-magyar interetnikus kapcsolatok Csíkszeredában (az előzmények és a mai helyzet) [Hungarian-Romanian interethnic relationshps in Csíkszereda/Miercurea Ciuc]. *Antropológiai Műhely*, Vol 1, Nr. 1, 1993.

rationalization evaded bipolar evaluations, or played them off each other. Indeed, many issues were rationalized away. Strangely enough, this logical inconsistency helped people (in their own point of view) develop a *valid and consistent* personality which strove to correlate the private and the public into a more or less unitary whole (in spite of logical inconsistencies); a personality *both morally, and pragmatically* acceptable that made sense to themselves. Consequently, the development and reproduction of an acceptable personality demanded resolution of the tension between the public and private.

"That values and/or frames of interpretation became extremely context-bound presented the most important consequence of this mechanism. As a result, from the point of view of the external observer the behavior and mentality of "East Europeans" appears incoherent, hard to understand, or simply outside common morality in many cases. This conclusion coincides with a major point in Verdery's argument; one she considers represents an outcome of the "socialist identity structure":

> "Self-actualization in socialist Romania seems to me [...] to have been much more situationally determined than North Americans find acceptable, such that people could say one thing in one context and another in another context and not be judged deceitful or forgetful or mad."[7]

Although we note the same phenomenon, our conclusions diverge. Verdery sees this as a sign of a divided self. In the following, however, I will argue that often (but not always!) efforts are made in everyday life to reunite these "selves" to create an acceptable whole even if the results, from an external point of view, seem unsuccessfully. From the external point of view, they fail to create a coherent, consistent value system, behavior and mentality.

The array of events, actions, and situations of everyday life withstood rationalization according to a bipolar, coherent system of values. Roles and frames of interpretation retained some flexibility. Ambivalence could mean, for example, the procedures of distancing oneself from the official role. The roles of "us" and "them", for example- the "bureaucrat" and the petitioner, actually offered remarkable space for free maneuvers. Minimal gestures, winks, or one or two seemingly negligent, "unorthodox" expressions helped one exhibit a different image of one's self. Or, take for example, the Hungarian party official who helped a co-national acquire a flat. Rather than considering this an official procedure in which he/she took part as an anonymous

7 Verdery, 1996. 96.

bureaucrat, this often occurred as a personal act, implying help offered on the basis of national solidarity (a Romanian applicants often bribed such officials for similar purposes. In this case, the gesture could be rationalized either as a necessity imposed from above, or as understanding toward a person in a difficult situation, thus making nationality irrelevant, and/or making one feel more "objective", "tolerant", "humane".). Such acts became very important constitutive elements of one's self-image and offered important narratives/stories repeatedly told in private circles.

In this case, role distancing took place not only within the institution itself, but outside as well.[8] In many situations, people attempted to convey their role within the institution; a role caught up in the meanings of another system of values. In such a case, he/she not only acted as an apparatchik, but as a Hungarian, or simply a "decent human being" ("rendes ember"). The array of frames making the two compatible should be stressed. And thus, such a system of double (or even multiple) standards evaluating actions did not – and does not- involve cognitive dissonance. Just as devoted Christians can be thieves, it did not complicate one's life, but simplified it, helped constitute an identity acceptable for oneself. The frames of interpretation did not tend to seek accordance with general values and norms. On the contrary, the situation, action, or person justified the interpretation frame. One should take into consideration that in everyday life people most often came into contact with bureaucrats of a low, or a middle rank. The relationship usually involved making an application, understood as a bargain. Bureaucrat often refused by referring to the harshness of rules, thus transmitting a personal responsibility to the rules, the laws, to higher officials, or even to the regime. Thus, evaluations were mixed: one could be a "Hungarian and a Communist pig" (in the case of a refusal), or "a Communist, but still a decent person, a good Hungarian" (in the case of a successful bargain). Both were common expressions.

The following aims to present some elements of trespassing between official and unofficial, permitted and forbidden speech developed during state socialism.

8 On this see Goffman, Erving: *Role Distance.* In *Encounters.* New York, 1961

Ambivalent discourse: official, dominant, oppositional
The silence of the intellectuals and the silence of power

Peter Burke, in his essays on the social history of silence, considers knowing when and how to keep silent as relevant as when to and what to say.[9] The issue at hand, however, is neither silence as a rhetorical device – as it has been used in literary or argumentative works[10] – nor silence resulting from a personal decision, but institutionally defined silence. Its meaning may vary according to place, time, or speaker, but most importantly from the point of view of our problem, such public silence proves more important than silence in private life.

The silence and/or inactivity of intellectuals before 1989 were often as visible as their public activity. It was salient, and it was frequently discussed in private circles. The activity of the intellectuals, their "life in a calling" under an official aegis, was coupled with inactivity, silence concerning the regime-a silence as obvious as the public side of their activity. It was obvious because it was expected and often as talked about as their actions. Expression and silence were both notoriously part of the pre-1989 social world. And, both were linked not only to their "mission", but also to "pragmatism".

Actually, one has to differentiate among at least three types of "silence" in pre-1989 Eastern Europe. The first took for granted public space, the unspoken common background of knowledge that is the basis of any communication.[11] Moreover, in Eastern Europe this also made the transmission of certain information circumventing censorship possible. Although the cultural bureaucrats did their best, this was rather difficult to control. The second was a voluntary silence, the reasons for which do not require further development here. The third type consisted of an involuntary silence, which could not be broken even in the most hidden spheres of private life because of the lack of intellectual, conceptual means; the tools necessary for a properly argued account of society.

It is a common mistake – probably linked to theories of totalitarianism – that the *motivation* of the rhetoric of Eastern European power in the 1970's and 1980's equals that of the 1950's. The two phases were totally different. In

9 Burke, Peter: Notes for a Social History of Silence in Early Modern Europe. In Burke: *The Art of Conversation*. Polity Press, 1993.

10 In ancient rhetoric, the issue was discussed referring to Cicero ("reticent"), or Celsus („obticentia"). Quintilian called it aposiopesis. See *Institutio oratorica*, IX. 2, 54–57.

11 Berger, Peter L. – Luckmann, Thomas: *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge.* London: Penguin Books, 1966; Burke, idem.

the first period of Communist rule, a portion of the political elite hoped to slowly convince the population their cause was just and best suited for everybody. But in its last 15-20 years (more or less), the apparatus lost confidence in the just character (and the viability) of its ideological program. Consequently, the function of rhetoric radically changed: no longer sought to convince, to "enlighten", to explain, or to mobilize.[12] The very fact that it could say whatever it wanted, without being obliged to pay attention to the possibility of being refuted (by "reality", or by a generally hostile public opinion) demonstrated the strength of their position, and that (almost) nobody had the courage to disprove it. Those resorting to this type of discourse knew very well that nobody believed them. And *this* was a major characteristic of their power: they could say anything, without anybody believing it, and also without anybody having the power to challenge it. They had the unique luxury of not caring what people thought or believed. The spoken word was not manipulation, but a rubber truncheon waved at everyone- a gesture.

Talk about "reality" (i. e. what was seen, experienced as reality in everyday life) was prohibited, not only for the subjects, but also for those in power as well. But the type of discourse that had no connection with reality was not typical only of the "official" elite. The "opposition" was also free of the obligation to demonstrate or to mediate ideals toward the world of *practicalities*: the *gesture* was important, not the ideas, arguments, or concrete proposals. That nearly all widely spread pre-1989 opposition topics disappeared from the public sphere following the period of triumph demonstrates this.

Tricks used to avoid silence

Totalitarian society seems to be the ideal terrain where the Gramscian concept of hegemony, respectively the division between dominant and popular culture can be successfully used. Yet, the distinction polarizing dominant and popular cultural spheres is not valid in the context of this argument.

First of all, power, in general and in particular, during the "socialist" period – never *created* culture, it only proposed, or tried to enforce a cultural *model*. Accordingly, before 1989, power did not produce "socialist culture".

12 See Tismăneanu, Vladimir: *Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel.* New York, Toronto: The Free Press, 1992. And Bauman, Zygmunt: *Dismantling a Patronage State.* In Frentzel-Zagórska, Janina (ed.): *From a One-Party State to Democracy: Transition in Eastern Europe.* Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1993. The latter claims that Communism collapsed because ruling elite lost belief in their order, and that society felt and observed this. One may add as a conclusion that this can explain the slackening of the zeal of the apparatus toward "converting" the population.

The question is how the elite reacted to the demands of the power. On the whole, one can say the reactions were mixed. The elite accepted it, adapted it, gave it form, mediated it, and reproduced it: but only partially. The intellectual (humanistic elite) who gave form to certain ideas, plans, and values formulated by the power elite created socialist culture. The public sphere, however, was not completely molded by the official ideal even in the darkest years. A thorough interpretation, one according to the official model, of social reality (including the private sphere) was never achieved in the public sphere.[13] If one considers topics from the point of view of permission, three variants can be distinguished. Aside from elements that were usually neutral (love[14], nature, etc.), there were others that in certain periods, for specific reasons were more or less tolerated. And there was a third category of topics, and ideas that were completely forbidden. Often, the boundary between these realms was arbitrary, usually not fixed, and liable to change, for reasons not of interest here.[15] The discourse and the issues in the intermediate, and "tolerated" category, are more important because they can help one distinguish between dominant and official culture. The latter represents the model proposed by the power and its eventual "perfect" presentations and adaptations. The former tries to raise and circulate issues if not encouraged at least tolerated.[16] This category includes discourse that tries to present forbidden issues by encrypting the text, and demanding the public to read between the lines.

This type of ambivalent discourse – probably used in most regimes without freedom of speech for authors with unorthodox views –offers one of the major differences between official and dominant culture.[17] The most com-

13 A similar view can be found in Zygmunt Bauman. According to him, there were two axes on which intellectual life in communist regimes was plotted. On the one hand, there was a systemic and social integration, which drew intellectuals "into direct engagement and competition with political power". On the other hand, there was a regimentation of intellectual practices, and pressures to "assimilate centres of intellectual authority within the structure of officialdom." Bauman, Zygmunt: Love in Adversity: On the State and the Intellectuals, and the State of the Intellectuals. *Thesis Eleven*, Nr. 31, 1992. 162. For the current, generally accepted view stressing on the regimentation, manipulation of society under socialism, see Tismăneanu, idem, for example on p. 283.

14 That is, putting aside unpalatable love stories between tractor drivers and milkmaids.

15 Periods of "liberalisation" were usually linked to the change of the secretary general of the party. "Freedom" certainly had a cost, for example, relaxing the analysis of certain domains of the past (e. g. the fifties), dissolved energies for other periods (like the present).

16 There was a differentiation among people as well. Some were allowed to write on "hot" issues, while others were not; being "courageous" meant more than to have "courage".

17 Another pair of the opposition, dominant vs. popular, is problematic as well. If popular is everything outside dominant, could one call Havel a "popular author" because he was not "dominant" before 1989?

mon techniques of ambivalent discourse include: presenting the issue as a tolerated one, presenting the opinion of the ideological "opponent" accurately, objectively, or maybe even sympathetically, but then "refuting" it, as an "inimical" view, brutally inserting orthodox passages into a non-orthodox work[18], and perfecting self-encryption where the piece is a unitary whole[19].

Sándor Tóth presented a whole range of tricks used in order to avoid censorship in his work on Gábor Gaál, a Hungarian leftist philosopher from Transylvania. While the official ideologists and the censorship wanted to monopolize and distort his message and his personality, his disciples and friends did their best to prevent them. During the fifties- especially after 1953, Tóth claims, it was common to introduce references to the "Soviet example", as the Romanian party apparatus did not want to de-Stalinize.[20] Another possibility when proposing the publication of a book was to hail it as a work putting in practice Zhdanov's criteria of "good literature", although the real goal aimed to publish a good book that most likely had nothing in common with such criteria.[21] Usually, papers and reviews had to introduce texts showing their loyalty to the party and its program. It was possible, however, to make these texts distinct by printing them separately at the beginning on different paper, with different characters, and even with a distinct pagination leading readers to understand that these texts were not addressed to them, but offered a necessary tribute to the censorship. It happened that such texts were not even included into the summary.[22] Especially when editing texts from the inter-war period (or earlier), one faced certain taboo topics, or expressions. In such cases one could simply delete the expression, and hope that the rest of the text could be saved.[23] The other alternative put all such texts and expressions into the endnotes as they were not seriously checked.[24]

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19 Mikhail M. Bakhtin's works written together with Valentin N. Voloshinov or Pavel N. Medvedev offer some famous examples. See for example *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. Mikhail Sholohov's *Quiet Flows the Don* is a work written in the same vein.

19 For this, see some of György Bretter's works.

20 Tóth Sándor: *Dicsőséges kudarcaink a diktatúra korszakából. Gaál Gábor sorsa és utóélete Romániában 1946-1986* [Our glorious failures during the dictatorship: The fate and after-life of Gábor Gaál in Romania between 1946-1986] Budapest: Balassi, 1997. 66, 72.

21 Tóth, idem, 57.

22 Tóth, idem, 76. A similar technique was the usage of the so-called "locomotive" in reviews and newspapers: texts which could prove problematic were preceded by citations from the works of Ceaușescu; the tougher the text, the longer the "locomotive". Often there was no connection between the two, but the engine managed to pull the carriages after it.

23 Tóth, idem, 86.

24 Tóth, idem, 164-165.

Aside from this arsenal of tricks, a book could also display some of the counter-methods deployed by the power in manipulating the work and opinions of personalities (mostly classics) that, for some reason or other were considered important for the regime. The most important methods included drastic, false reinterpretation of opinions by publishing so-called "selected" works that presented a biased image, by omitting major texts or leaving out certain phrases, and paragraphs.[25]

A special case: critique aiming at education

As these examples show, an investigation of structural silence is not so methodologically easy. Scholars have focused their study of the restriction of free speech within regimes on official discourse, although – on the basis of the hypothesis proposed – such analysis proves less fruitful than it may seem. On the one hand, they argue the debatable view that political events equal visible, so-called "major" events, leaders, politicians, etc., and on the other hand, they remain in an epistemological double standard. Leo Strauss has shown that according to mainstream philological rules in certain periods, one should not read between the lines, but confine him/herself to the explicit text.[26] It should be added that such respect is deliberately not granted to the dominant political rhetoric that is often expected to hide as much as it shows. As a result, the author's wish is not respected in either case: the unorthodox would like to convey his/her message, but the interpreters do not find the methodological arguments to his/her wishes; the orthodox rhetoric would like the interpreters to take the message *prima facie*, but they have good reasons for not doing so. Obviously, this difference boils down to the fact that there can be no general standards for deciding whether a philosopher's work, for example, is encrypted. Lessing's view that all philosophers of antiquity offered an exoteric and an esoteric teaching, found in the same work, lost its appeal.[27] Nowadays, this presupposition – once a philological standard – is marginal.

25 Tóth, idem, 123, 140-155.

26 See Leo Strauss. I consulted the Hungarian edition: Strauss, Leo: Az *üldöztetés és az írás művészete.* Budapest: Atlantisz, 1994.

27 See Strauss, idem, 33-37. The distinction seems to originate in 17th century freemason teachings. It was presented in the so-called "double doctrine", according to which a religion might comprise an outer shell (the creed for the vulgar), and an esoteric inner truth (known only to the initiated). This approach, they thought, could help them in deciphering ancient wisdom. See Kidd, Colin (1998): "Men in Aprons", book review of Piatigorsky, Alexander: Who's Afraid of Freemasons? The Phenomenon of Freemasonry. *London Review of Books*, May 7, 1997.

And nevertheless, continues Strauss, there are periods in which one knows that texts were written and read with a general, common background and clues in mind. This is not the case in the modern period due to a fundamental change in the social role of men of letters that took place around the middle of the 17th century.[28] Before then, the gap between "wise men" and the "masses" was considered a basic element of human nature, and one that could not be bridged with education. Consequently, wisdom could be handed over only to disciples. The moderns, in considering the possibilities of education, seem to have had a more optimistic view of human nature. Publication thus did not only mean a simple presentation of one's views to readers, but education aiming at the elimination of persecution. Writing and publishing with an educational purpose was seen as a contribution to the enfranchisement of people.[29] Reinhart Koselleck gives a thorough description of this type of critique, its context, and results.[30]

He hypothesizes[31] that the structure of Absolutism, rooted in the dichotomy of sovereign and subject, (between public and private morality), prevented the Enlightenment and the emancipation movement from seeing itself as a political phenomenon. Consequently, the Enlightenment became Utopian and even hypocritical because it saw itself excluded from sharing in political power. It also succumbed to Utopian contradictions that could not be resolved in practice, and prepared the way for the Terror and for dictatorship. He refines the argument by stating that it was only in certain countries (Central Europe, Germany, Spain, France, and Italy) that a type of Absolutism appeared which created a special type of Enlightenment. This, while trying to evade censorship and other chicaneries, was directed against the Absolutist claims of the sovereign ruler. Only inventing "ways of camouflage and mystification as well as other indirectly operative modes of behavior could

28 Strauss, ibidem, 40-42. Strauss uses the term "philosopher", but enlarging the category does not seem to contradict his intentions.

29 Sándor Tőth's book on Gábor Gaál shows us another reason for reading a text as if it were encrypted; respect for a certain person, and understanding for her/his fear. It is shown that after 1948 Gaál wrote nearly under constant menace. In Tőth's view, the texts produced under such circumstances do not reflect one's own ideas. If one is interested in what the author really wanted to communicate, then one should not look for the dogmatic views, but to the small, hidden elements showing his unique, individual character by presupposing that the text was encrypted and that there were secret ideas therein. See Tőth, idem, 56.

30 Koselleck, Reinhart: *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*, Oxford, New York, Hamburg: Berg Publishers Ltd., 1988.

31 Koselleck, idem, 1-2.

do all of which". Rousseau described this indirect method of political critique in the following manner:

Il tourne męme avec assez d'adresse en objections contre son propre système, les défauts ŕ relever dans celui du Régent; et sous le nom de réponses ŕ ses objections, il montroit sans danger et ses défauts et leur remèdes.[32]

This had two consequences, of which only one was foreseen. On the one hand, it obliged the Absolutist State to respond to these new pressures and try to legitimate itself. This was only partly successful as critical arguments remained outside the cabinets where actual political decisions were made. As compensation, a progressive philosophy of history was elaborated "which promised victory to the intellectual elite, but one gained without struggle and civil war." The unforeseen consequence took form in the camouflage and mystification pervading the ideas of the Enlightenment.

The Absolutist State did morally emancipate individuals, but denied them public responsibility by restricting them to the private sphere. This inevitably led to conflict with a State that subordinated morality to politics. And consequently, the State had to stand an endless moral trial. After the dissolution of *ständische* societies, pressure to justify politics and morals without being able to reconcile the two remains the legacy of the Enlightenment.[33]

What connection linked the critique of the Absolutist State with this crisis?[34] The major problem was caused by the fact that while Enlightenment did conjure the crisis, it did not realize the political significance of its action. The reason for this lies exactly in the type of "mystificatory" critique practiced in which Utopian images of the future "caused the day's events to pale". Consequently, the critique provoked a crisis of which it did not know.[35]

The last element of Enlightenment critique is the importance it renders to the planning of history that becomes as important as mastering nature. This misconception is furthered by the Absolutist State, which makes the alienation of morality from politics inevitable. But in the planning of history, moral man, "a stranger to reality", considers the political domain as something that can only stand in his way, and which should be eliminated. Thus, politics is dissolved in Utopian constructs of the future.

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32 Rousseau: *Oeuvres Complètes*, tome 93, p. 100ff. See Koselleck, idem, 68.
33 Koselleck, idem, 2-4.
34 Koselleck, idem, 9-12.
35 One can add that the whole situation also led to a mental-structural inability to cope with practical responsibilities.

Consequently, one can say that the major elements of Enlightenment critique and the Absolutist State's crisis encompasses the divorce of morality from politic, the individual's lack of power in the public sphere, both of which led to a philosophy of history that contained the moral, Utopian critique of both State and politics, the importance of technocratic thinking which proposed an end to politics, and a change of individuals into "useful collaborators" of the new social order.[36] One can add to these elements, a peculiar interest in *creating* a public suited for their utopian educational ideals.

This is not important in itself. The challenges the Enlightenment faced produced mentalities, attitudes, and behavioral patterns that survived the special circumstances of their appearance. The Enlightenment is not just our past, but also a "present that has passed".[37] This approach offers the opportunity to find in Enlightenment not analogies, but elements of our present.

Hungarian ambivalent discourse in Romania

Ambivalent discourse was also used at large in the Hungarian- language public sphere of the previous regime, even if explicit utopias were not formulated. They are deducible from the critiques. The most common trick employed certain keywords and symbols to raise issues that by analogy could incite certain reactions in the reader. Usually, they did not have to be explicated as they were based on the common knowledge of the author and his/her presupposed public, concerning the problems of democracy, freedom, of the minority question, and their presupposed connections. This relationship was never (and could never be) seriously developed or explicated in the public sphere, and caused several problems after 1989.

The greatest representative of this type of discourse was without doubt the philosopher, György Bretter. For some time, he was followed by a group of his students. But, by the second half of the 1980's, for some reason or other, high quality encoded texts became increasingly rare.

Three examples of pre-1989 ambivalent discourse will be presented in the following, taken from very different areas, expressed in very dissimilar situations, and with very diverse messages and implied publics. Since the development of a public creates the major problem in the case of utopias aiming at education, the analyses will put a particular stress on the question whether and how the public was conceived.

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36 This is shown by Koselleck in his description of the role of the free mason lodges (see p. 91).
37 Koselleck, idem, 7.

1. Kányádi, or the lack of a public

The first example proves peculiar not because of the depth of the analysis, or the virtuosity of encoding, but because of its publication venue: *Napsugár*[38], the "Children's Review of the Young Pioneers' National Council". From 1987, the well-known poet Sándor Kányádi published his "children's" poems and stories in *Napsugár*. One such poem, entitled *Don't Be Afraid*[39], says approximately the following:[40] winter (i. e. Ceaușescu's rule) is coming to an end, the sun warms up, and there is hope on the tips of the branches. There is still ice, but it slowly cracks.

This still looks like a poem for children. But some appear quite odd in a journal for children under 10. *Autumn Encouragement*[41] can be read as lamenting a minority on the verge of extinction due to a harsh regime and emigration:[42]

We hear the last chimes of the bell on the mountain, there is no more reason for us to stay here. The forest is crying, all the animals run away, everything is frozen. But some animals and plants encourage us that we are not lost yet. In spring we will find our place here again.

This example sheds light on another crucial issue. Namely, that in the few years before 1989, many authors put an ever stronger stress on the "oppositional" gesture. The number of those who emigrated or turned silent increased. There was also a public feeling and/or idea that the Hungarian intelligentsia in Romania "betrayed the Hungarians".[43] Those who decided to remain in Romania and go on writing had two choices: encrypt, or edit samizdats. As it has been argued, such choices were made in opposition to the gestures of the power, as it was increasingly difficult to write about the surrounding reality, while at the same time, the intelligentsia also resorted to gestures. This had an important impact on the latter's relationship with the public. As Kányádi's example shows, one could be ready to give up even the hope of having, creating one's public. Ambivalent discourse in the form of en-

38 "Sunray"

39 Ne félj. *Napsugár*, Vol. XXXI, Nr. 2, 1987. 9.

40 From the point of view of literary criticism such a plain rendering of a poem is probably unorthodox, but for the purpose of the present analysis it is enough, and *this is how these poems were read*. Literary virtues – if any – came second.

41 Őszi biztató. *Napsugár*, Vol. XXXI, No. 11, 1987. 9.

42 Emigration, primarily to Hungary, became a widespread option in the 1980's, especially in intellectual circles.

43 The idea was first spread by a few intellectual circles in Hungary. See Szilágyi N. Sándor: Levél egy kivándorolni készülő értelmiségihez. [A letter to an intellectual on his way to emigrate] In Cseke Péter (ed.): *Lehet – nem lehet? Kisebbségi létértelmezések (1937–1987)* [Is it possible? – is it not? Interpretations of the minority situation (1937-1987)] Mentor, 1995. 155-163.

crypted critical text in a journal intended for primary school pupils does not make much sense.

The same conclusion can be drawn from the activity of the first samizdat journal published in Romania.[44] Its first six issues hardly circulated. They were produced in five copies. The editors showed them to three or four people in Romania, but nobody knows how many readers this meant. More copies were made from issue seven. Yet, it gained its greatest audience through Radio Free Europe[45], and found its place in private circles thereafter. Again, this shows that its publication was not more than a (important!) gesture toward themselves, the Democratic Opposition in Hungary, (which helped them, and was considered to be an important part of the public), and even the world. But for the local reading public, its creation does not seem to have been a serious issue or goal. Whatever the case, this approach offers an explanation of the ignorant and patronizing contemporary attitude toward "(civil) society" taken by the intelligentsia.

This samizdat was intended to be the heroic act of some young people, destined to show that "we" do not lag behind other, more brave people in Eastern Europe, that there are intellectual and moral efforts at demolishing the regime, that its endeavor to hermetically seal off Transylvanian Hungarians from all the world is not successful, and that intelligent, meaningful opposition is possible even here. Furthermore it aimed to show that solidarity, idealism, heroism, and trust persisted, and that "we" can still say something to the world. Personal experience qualifies this perception of how people understood the editors' attempts. But the Securitate's operations for finding these people were large-scale terrorizing practically the whole of Hungarian intelligentsia in Romania. In the population at large, their efforts resulted not in trust, solidarity, heroism, confidence, the sense of a meaningful existence in Romania, etc., but just the opposite: fear, hysterical secretiveness, lack of trust, a mania of seeing

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44 Of the two samizdat journals in Romania, the most successful, *Ellenpontok* (Counterpoints), managed to have nine issues published between January 1981 and January 1983. It was edited by a group of young intellectuals, who, with one exception, all emigrated after being caught by the Securitate. The other journal, *Kiáltó Szó* (meaning approximately "loud word") – had only two issues, and was edited by Sándor Balázs. It seems that in spite of some attempts, there were no Romanian samizdats.

45 It seems *Ellenpontok* managed to raise a smaller dispute between the Hungarian and the Romanian department of Radio Free Europe. According to its internal regulations, each national section had to be concerned with its own country. One of the editors of *Ellenpontok* complained that due to this system nobody spoke of the Hungarian minority in Romania. As a result, the Hungarian samizdat, and generally the issue of the Hungarian minority was raised by both the Hungarian and the Romanian department.

collaborators of the Securitate in everybody, and a general feeling that one had to emigrate because life in this country was meaningless. Although *Ellenpontok* was seen as a sort of victory, the general mood among (especially young) intellectual circles reached the bottom of despair, instead of the heights of confidence. Actually, the editors themselves disbanded. And, although most of them now live abroad, there is quite a lasting tension and resentment among them even today.

2. The party committee for supervising performances, or, power as a public

On March 3, 1983, the County Commission for Supervising Theatrical and Musical Performances was established. Its twenty members included the propaganda secretary of the county, other party officials and propagandists, actors, journalists, teachers and workers. Its goal was to see, discuss and criticize all the performances presented in the county. This included even the approval and supervision of small bands playing at weddings, in discos, bars, etc. Directors, actors and musicians were forced to "consider" their critical remarks. Every opening night and first performance required its prior consent.

Ambivalent discourse can be seen in the way actors, directors, and/or authors responded to criticisms. And the very first "supervised" play proves and especially enlightening example.

The commission began its career with scandal. On the day of its establishment, the commission reviewed the final rehearsal of András Sütő's play, *Pompás Gedeon*[46]. The criticisms of the committee referred on the one hand to religious elements found in the play. They advised interrupting fragments of religious music with jazz, to disrupt their continuity. The number of angels had to be drastically decreased, and the atheism of the youth had to be more militantly exposed. Scenes taking place in heaven should not have any educational potential, and thus the number of religious texts had to be limited (although the play uses them satirically).

The main criticism, however, referred to national topics. A line of a Hungarian nationalist song sung by the antagonist, Gedeon – "Where are you,

[46] It can be approximately translated as *Gedeon the Pompous*. The author at that time was already considered a living classic of Hungarian literature. The play, an early one written in the fifties, criticized "kulaks". It was probably chosen because thirty years later, nobody took a play about collectivisation seriously and thus the message could not be distorted by the propagandistic atmosphere of the fifties. It made indirect criticism possible since, if taken literally, some parts of the text were naive and inoffensive. In the context of the 1980's they could also be seen as hidden criticisms of the regime or of its rhetoric. Or, in certain cases, as will be seen later, acts of bravado.

Székelys" – had to be omitted. As the party secretary for propaganda said it might remind the public of the next verse, "I gave you in custody a homeland (i. e. Transylvania) to take care of". References to "happy Austria" or Franz Josef also had to be eliminated. Both the director and the author of the play tried to explain that these elements shed a negative light on the negative characters, by criticizing their approach to collectivization and their nationalism. From his own point of view, however, the party secretary probably made a valid point. He did not say so, but it was obvious in the 1980's that national values could maintain their expressive force even when expressed by negative characters, truly not seen as such anyway as few people found kulaks despicable. And they were by far not really negative, since hardly anybody thought that kulaks were despicable people

The public sought criticism, not the coherence of the play. They sought elements to interpret out of the context and the logic of the play according to their free will. Such possibilities had to be restricted as much as possible. If the propaganda secretary thought that the interpretation of the author might contain a trick, he eschewed it.

Over the seven years of the commission's existence, however, the most important conflict erupted within the commission itself. Criticisms could be directed against anything, not just ideological problems; the scenery, the clothing (no red boots please, "this can be interpreted"), the actors' performance, and the play itself. This often brought about hilarious results. In the case of classics like Shakespeare, or Gogol, "interpretable" parts of the text had to be cut. Permission to present *Antigone* by Sophocles was granted by saying that "the play is good, and it has already been presented many times". When commenting on the performance of Gogol's *Diary of a Madman*, one of the members of the commission stressed the clarity of the actor's dislike of the Czarist regime. It would have been very unpleasant to mention the possibility that the actor saw the Czarist regime as an analogy to Ceaușescu's. (Actually, in the end the commission was "wise" enough to prohibit the performance.)

At a certain point, some members of the commission tried to impose the idea that their duty was only an ideological supervision of the performance, abstaining from artistic criticisms, due to their lack of qualification, not an actor or director could be found among them. This would have meant on the one hand, in the case of classics, ideological criticism was irrelevant, and on the other hand that artistic activity was less restricted (allowing room for "tricks"). Hard-liners in the National Council for Socialist Culture and Edu-

cation reacted promptly and issued a document stipulating that the commission had the obligation to criticize and give advice from all possible points of view, including artistic ones. Continually, internal opponents argued that they had no right to appreciate the artistic achievement of the actors and/or the director. They lost the debate; they could not offer counter-arguments to the problem of "interpretability". And so, elements that "could be interpreted" disappeared from performances. Whenever in doubt, they posed the questions "what would the spectators understand from the play?" "How would they interpret it?"

As time passed, the elements that "could be interpreted" grew in number and diversity. Colors (red), tones (dark or light), atmosphere (happy or sad), size, could become a problem. Slowly, a silent and fierce competition developed between the – voluntary or involuntary – critical allusions of the artists and the vigilance of the commission. Practically all of the elements of a performance could become "dubious". And this is how aspirations for total control actually brought about limitless possibilities for roundabout critique.

3. Baász, or the real public

From the end of the seventies, until around the middle of the eighties, Sepsiszentgyörgy[47] was considered to be an unpleasant town during official holidays. From 1978 when a couple of school children put anti-Communist and nationalist posters in the streets on May Day, or on the 23rd of August (Romania's national holiday before 1989), one could find Hungarian nationalist posters or handbills in the streets. This offered a good occasion for the police (secret or not) to take to the streets in large numbers. The town kept quiet thinking that the Securitate distributed the handbills as provocation.

In 1981, on the 60th anniversary of the Romanian Communist Party, an exhibition of the county's artists was organized. For this occasion, the graphic artist Imre Baász conceived a complex work consisting of two parts. One was an installation: six shirts stained with blood hanging on a rack, and on the floor around them, and on the wall, there were handbills of two types. One set consisted of copies and originals of old leaflets from the inter-war period, calling the public to fight against the government, for Communism, etc. The other set contained handbills announcing the opening of the exhibition. Baász had taken a special trip to the museum of the party's history in Bucharest, where he carefully examined, handbills of illegal Communist activists in the inter-war period.[48] Al-

47 A small town in South-Eastern Transylvania. In Romanian Sfântu Gheorghe.
48 In Romania, the Communist Party was banned between 1924-1945.

though the graphic structure differed in the second set they retained a phrase from the inter-war handbills: "read and pass it further".

The other part of the project was a performance.[49] After midnight, on the eve of the anniversary, Baász and three other friends went about town posting handbills advertising the exhibition opening.[50] Eventually, a frightened policeman who immediately requested a patrol, and reported to headquarters that he had found people hanging manifestos in the street caught them. The patrol, the chiefs of the county police, and the secret police appeared.[51] Baász and his friends were taken to the station and interrogated. To their complete bewilderment the police found that the posters had no particular subversive message, and gave them their official approval. The county's party secretary was woken up around three a.m. and confirmed that the invitations had to be made public. Baász and his friends were released.

Baász immediately went home and called his wife (who was away), told the whole story, and confessed that he feared that his joke would not get away unpunished. He might even go to jail. No such thing happened. On the contrary, the next day the police called Baász to the station, where he was presented a formal apology.

In those days, Baász used to say, "it is not the existence of the work of art, but the method that became of primary importance".[52] As previously mentioned, for him the two pieces – the installation and the performance – formed a unitary whole. The invitations functioned like the inter-war handbills: they were both part of the installation. The inter-war handbills were also stuck on the walls at night. The formal resemblance with the inter-war leaflets and the night actions lead to a mixing of periods of time, frames of reference, enemies, goals, values, etc., into a new unitary whole.[53] The six white shirts should symbolize moral cleanliness, stained with the blood of nameless victims. In those

49 The whole performance was described to me by several people, among them Baász himself. There were no differences among the various versions.

50 There are photos of this moment of the performance.

51 One should not forget that it was on the eve of an extremely important anniversary, and especially in that period, the heads of these two institutions were directly responsible for what happened.

52 Chikán Bálint: *Baász*. Szabad Tér Kiadó. 36. (no publication year mentioned)

53 While this type of game with the form was original, recourse to a symbol of power in order to "fight" it was not unique. See for example the case of Shostakovich, who said that the "Leningrad" symphony was not referring to the town under siege during the war, but to the destruction of old Leningrad and its people by Stalin. See his memoirs: Shostakovich, Dmitry: Sosztakovics, Dmitrij (1997): *Testamentum. Dmitrij Sosztakovics emlékei Szolomon Volkov szerkesztésében* [Testament: The memoirs of Shosztakovich] Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó, 1997.

times, however, a white shirt took part in a different context: the suit (usually dark), and necktie. These were already symbols of the "integrated" person, namely the party officials and the secret police (somewhat like the leather coat in the fifties). The whole image also suggests officialdom stained with blood, in a context in which past and present struggle against one another, leading to the rise of martyrdom against injustice.

Conclusions: ambivalent discourse and parrhesia

In conclusion, one can say that abstract, coherent moral rules canonized in different – theological, philosophical, etc. – systems became transformed in everyday life into a soft, malleable set of norms, which may be used according to circumstances. The situations, the actions, and the actors may take on different meanings according to the context of the action or of the preceding or ensuing discussion. This allows one to avoid the self-critical moral introspection that would make certain actions problematic, in favor of an acceptable personality that can be represented in both private and public interactions.

Ambivalent discourse – most likely considered reprehensible by moralists – played, and continues to play an important role in two major spheres of everyday life. On the one hand, it creates and reproduces an acceptable and pragmatic image of oneself and the world. Ambivalent discourse has become constitutive of an acceptable, although "motley" personality, which becomes coherent not through abstract rationalizations, but in practical validity. On the other hand, it can seriously contribute to the management of everyday conflicts (including inter-ethnic conflict), as ambivalent discourse "liberates" us from the exigencies of sincerity, and of plain speech. In exchange, it offers a plurality of values, norms, and interpretations that can be chosen according to the context of action and the re-telling of that action as well. This is how a personality develops that, from the point of view of everyday life, is both morally, and pragmatically coherent, acceptable, and meaningful. Coherence is achieved not by separating the public and private sphere, but by constantly reconciling them.

Ambivalent discourse makes it extremely difficult for a public elite aspiring to the level of opinion leader to create abstract communities resting on common, coherent values absorbed by the public, especially when the correctness of long or short term social, political projects are at hand. One such project is nation building. Another such project, one prominent in Eastern Europe (but not only) is "transition". In the case of the latter one faces a strange sit-

uation: in many respects, the goals, values, and norms of regime change, while legitimate for common people, are not valid in everyday life.[54]

The problem of ambivalent discourse is not specific to contemporary Eastern Europe. From a moral point of view, the situation is similar to the conflict between sincerity and strategic games presented by Norbert Elias.[55] He treats the antithesis between 'superficiality' and 'depth', 'falsity' and 'honesty', 'outward politeness' and 'true virtue', all connected to the German antithesis between Zivilization and Kultur, in the context of French versus German, of aristocratic, respectively middle class mentality, and national consciousness. In a discussion between Goethe and Eckermann analyzed by Elias, the latter, an adherent of middle-class values, argues in favor of a frank expression of personal values. Interaction is defined by personal likes and dislikes, and by the similarity of the interlocutors' inner nature. Goethe, on the other hand, puts forward a typically aristocratic argument, based on reason, itself a result of a process of civilization, opposed to anything like "nature". The tendency to take our nature as a guide is not sociable. Natural tendencies are opposed to education. One should not expect people to harmonize with them. Instead, one should converse with everyone, since 'with opposed natures one must take a grip on oneself if one is to get on with them.'

Such conflicting values can arise in any situation where differences in social standing, culture, and mentality are part of interaction. Should one give way to 'natural tendencies', including frankness and honesty, thus selecting partners according to inner resemblance, like Eckermann? Or, should one behave in a 'civilized' manner, like Goethe, conversing with everyone without expecting others to have ideas or values similar to ours.

Even more generally, one could tackle the problem by raising a question like Michel Foucault's, "what conditions raise the possibility of telling the truth?"[56] According to Foucault's presentation, in Ancient Greece telling the truth was distinguished from a series of other types of discourses. First of all, it was in no way connected to (self) doubt, a topic that appeared much later. In-

54 On the difference between legitimacy and validity, see Weber, Max: *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology.* (ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich), Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. Vols. 1–2, 1968. 31–32.

55 Elias, Norbert: *The Civilizing Process*. Volume I: *The Development of Manners: Changes in the code of conduct and feeling in early modern times*. Oxford: Blackwell; New York: Urizen Books, 1978. 29–34.

56 See Foucault, Michel: *Discourse and Truth: the Problematization of Parrhesia* (six lectures given by Michel Foucault at the University of California at Berkeley, Oct-Nov.1983), downloaded from http://foucault.info/downloads/discourseandtruth.pdf November 23, 2004.

stead, it was associated with certain moral qualities. Knowing and speaking the truth was an *ethical*, not an *epistemological* problem. Courage proved moral qualities and involved a risk taken consciously. Parrhesiastic courage was a duty, not the result of some external coercion. The aim was not to demonstrate the truth, but to be critical towards oneself and the external other.

Speaking the truth also involved certain social requirements. First, the parrhesiastic game required that both the truth-teller and the target of criticism were free citizens. People outside the realm of freedom could not take part in this moral game. The second condition involved courage, duty and risk; saying the truth implied a social position of inferiority. And last but not least, the parrhesiastic exercise brought about a valid result when the criticized person(s) entered the game, presented themselves as standing on the same moral platform, and accepted the criticisms wholeheartedly. Parrhesia was not a monologue (as in the case of rhetoric), but part of a dialogue.[57] In this respect, Athenian democracy made open criticism difficult, even impossible, and rendered it incapable of entering the parrhesiastic game.

What can be said about Eastern European parrhesia? As little research exists in this field, one may only hypothesize using the ancient Greek as a comparative guide:

a) in everyday speech, speaking the "truth" – as in the Greek case – is not reflexive, and shows hardly any (self) doubt. Thus, the problem is not adequacy with reality. And, consequently, Verdery's problem seems to miss the point.

b) "telling the truth" is considered a moral act, but one can often be moral by *not* telling the truth, or only half of it. Consequently: 1. telling the truth is not always reflective of "courage", and "courage" is not always linked to personal agency- the social context may make it impossible to be "courageous"; 2. telling the truth in Eastern Europe is not necessarily connected to criticism; 3. telling the truth is not connected to duty. The stress is not on courage, criticism, duty, or responsibility, but on "pragmatism"– on being a trickster who outwits the "partner".

c) while in ancient Greece telling the truth was connected to social standing, in Eastern Europe it was (and is) more complicated. Even in a position of superi-

57 The distinction between dialogue and monologue shows strong resemblances with Mikhail Bakhtin's views. See Bakhtin, Mikhail M.: *Beszédelméleti jegyzetek. In A beszéd és a valóság. Filozófiai és beszédelméleti írások* [Notes on the Theory of Speech, in Speech and Truth: Writings on Philosophy and the Theory of Speech. The Russian title: *Iz zapisey 1970-71 godov.*]. Budapest: Gondolat, 1986. 515-547; Bakhtin, Mikhail M.: *Dosztojevszkij poétikájának problémái* [The dialogue in Dostoyevsky's work. The Russian title: *Problemi poetiki Dostoyevskogo*] Budapest: Gond-Cura – Osiris, 2001.

ority one can be (partly) critical, a truth-teller. Role distancing made it for one to distance themselves from the regime they were supposed to represent.

d) parrhesia is a question of dialogue. However, the rules of the game are much more complicated, involving an ambivalent character. On the one hand, dialogue can lead to avoiding open criticism and/or responsibility. On the other hand, it *may* also provide the means by which the partner is forced to enter the parrhesiatic game.

ATTILA HUNYADI

Economic Nationalism in Transylvania[1]

While state-level economic nationalism is well known in historiography, the economic component of regional national movements received less attention.[2] This paper presents the main features of the economic nationalism promoted by the national entities from Transylvania via their cooperative movements. After a short chronological presentation, I will focus on features common or mutually adopted by Saxons, Romanians and Hungarians from Transylvania before World War I. This comparative presentation was inspired by the synchronic and diachronic opinions of different ethnic cooperative leaders who regarded each other's economic programs and strategies as paradigms.[3]

1 The author would like to thank the *Habsburg-kori Kutatások Közalapítvány* [Public Foundation for Habsburg Studies] and the Habsburg Történeti Intézet [Institute for Habsburg History] for the scholarship granted in 2003 and the seminars that contributed to enlarge his research on nationality cooperative movements from Austria-Hungary.

2 Nakano, Takeshi: Theorising economic nationalism. *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 10, Nr. 3, 2004. 211–229. Helleiner, Eric: Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism? Lessons from the 19th century. *International Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 46, Nr. 3, 2002. 307–329.

3 Gyárfás Elemér: Az erdélyi románok hitelszervezetei. [The credit institutes of Transylvanian Romanians] *Magyar Kisebbség,* 1924. 71–79. Jakabffy Elemér: A román példa. [The Romanian example] *Magyar Kisebbség,* 1922. 6–20. Before proceeding to the presentation of my own researches, I would like to mention those historians who contributed to the research of the history of national movements, political and economic modernization of Transylvanian nationalities. Ábrahám Barna published recently a book on Romanian embourgeoisement: Ábrahám Barna: Az erdélyi románság polgárosodása. [The embourgeoisement of Transylvanian Romanians in the second half of the 19th century]. Csíkszereda: Pro-Print, 2004. Egry Gábor published several articles on the Saxons from Transylvania. Egry Gábor: Tradíció és alkalmazkodás: az erdélyi szászok politikai kultúrája a dualizmus idején [Tradition and adjustment: The Political Culture of the Transylvanian Saxons during the years of Dualism]. *Múltunk,* Nr. 2, 2003. 112–158. Vasile Dobrescu, Mihai Drecin, Lucian Dronca published monographs on Romanian rural elite and financial institutes. Dobrescu, Vasile: *Sistemul de credit românesc din Transilvania 1872–1918* [The Romanian Credit System from Transylvania]. Târgu-Mureș, 1999. Francois Bocholier

Terminology

I will use the term 'policy' in order to denote countrywide, government-led policies. I reserve the term 'economic program' for actions led by peripheral national entities ('nationalities' and national minorities), based on articulated intellectual-political manifestos (programs, articles, statutes) intended to be put in practice for the benefit of the national entity. The aim-group of economic programs included only an ethnic national entity represented as a 'community'.[4] The national movements from Austria-Hungary had a strong economic component. Influenced by the national economic school of Friedrich List, national elites intended to delimit the area of a 'Nationalökonomie' as an entity different from that of the ('multinational') state.[5] While the state had clear, objective, definitional criteria (borders, tariffs and customs, authorities), peripheral, national entities had none. Instead they had to (re)construct a 'national community' with a 'national economy', on a 'national territory'.[6] Economic nationalism started to play an important role in the process of nation building combined with political modernization. As Albin Braf, professor at Prague University in 1904, formulated, those nations that had already passed through the phase of cultural revival and political institutionalization were entering into the phase of constituting their own national economies.[7] Thus, this process can be analyzed on the basis of Hroch's and Smith's typology.[8] According to them, the attributes of

researches the Transylvanian Romanian and Hungarian elites. Francois Bocholier: Az erdélyi elit a regionális identitástudat és a nemzeti érzelmek erősödése között. [The Transylvanian elite between regional sense of identity and consolidation of national feelings] *Pro Minoritate,* Nr. 1, 2004. 37–57. Szász Zoltán and Bárdi Nándor presented the inter-ethnic relationship between Hungarians and Romanians, government and nationalities, as well as their 'switch of roles'. Szász, Zoltán: Vom Staatsvolk zur Minderheit. Die Ungarn in Siebenbürgen während der Zwischenkriegzeit. *Minderheit und Nationalstaat. Siebenbürgen seit dem ersten Weltkrieg.* Wien: Böhlau, 1995. 87–97. Bárdi Nándor: Az erdélyi magyar érdekek megjelenítése az 1910-es években. [The representation of Transylvanian Hungarian interests] *Magyar Kisebbség*, No. 2–3, 2003. 93–105. The studies of Romsics Ignác, Szarka László, Joachim von Puttkammer are also essential in the historiography of the nationality problem in Austria-Hungary.

4 Hroch, Miroslav: *Social Conditions of national Revival in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*. Cambridge, 1985.

5 List, Friedrich: *The National System of Political Economy.* London, 1904.

6 Balawyder, Aloysius (ed.): *Cooperative Movements in Eastern Europe*. Nova Scotia: St. Francis Xavier Univ. 1980.

7 Albrecht, Catherine: The Rhetoric of Economic Nationalism in the Bohemian Boycott Campaigns of the Late Habsburg Monarchy. *Austrian History Yearbook*. Vol. 32, 2001. 47–67.

8 Smith, Anthony D.: *Nationalism. Theory, Ideology, History*. Polity, Blackwell, 2001.

a nation include a 'single economy' and national intelligentsia played a role in constructing the idea of a national economy. The Transylvanian national entities, too, made efforts to attain the goals of their formulated national programs: national autonomy and a proper national economy. Cooperatives functioned as diffusion channels of national emancipation and economic modernization, and enhanced the communication of the national elite with the masses. The elite institutionalized the solidarity of national organizations and made use of their links with their external homelands and international forums both on political and economic-financial terrain.

The role of cooperatives in national economies

The impulse for autonomous national economies had its roots in political emancipation programs and strategies of non-dominant national entities. Politics, the electoral system, and administrative political self-government were the terrain where nationalities felt negative discrimination and frustrations. On the contrary, economic policy driven by 'laissez-faire liberalism' and state 'non-interventionism' proved to be a favorable playing field for economic competition and permitted self-organization of 'non-dominant nations'.[9] According to the provisions of the Nationalities Act adopted in 1868, all nationalities had the right to establish state-controlled associations, and raise funds and invest them to promote their own schools, language, art, science, literature, economic life, industry and commerce.[10]

Economic programs were to materialize via proper, institutional-organizational systems claiming to have a national character. In Western Europe, in the cadres of a more industrialized and urban milieu, associations and cooperatives institutionalized mainly along ideological cleavages.[11] In East-Central Europe, in the context of multinational states, the main cleavages were ethno-national, determining the national character of institutionalization.[12] Cooperatives played the most important role in implementing economic pro-

9 Good, David F.: The state and economic development in Central and Eastern Europe. In Teichova, Alice – Matis, Herbert (ed.): *Nation, State and the Economy in History.* Cambridge University Press, 2003. 159–179.

10 Niederhauser Emil: Peoples and Nations in the Habsburg Monarchy. In Glatz, Ferenc (ed.): *Hungarians and their neighbors*. New York: Columbia Press, 1995. 10.

11 Fairbairn, Brett: Social Bases of Co-operation: Historical Examples and Contemporary Questions. In Fulton, M.E. (ed.): *Co-operative Organizations and Canadian Society: Popular Institutions and the Dilemmas of Change* University of Toronto Press, 1990. 63–76.

12 Gyáni, Gábor: Middle Class and Bürgertum in Hungary. In Löwe, Heinz D – Tontsch, Günther H – Troebst, Stefan (eds.): *Minderheiten, Regionalbewußtsein und Zentralismus in Ostmitteleuropa*. Wien: Bohlau, 2000.

grams throughout Europe due to their wide acceptance among majority populations, nationalities, and state-authorities. Having the largest social basis (membership) among mass-organizations, cooperative movements gained political interest once electoral reforms came upon the political agenda.[13] Cooperatives movement integrated ordinary people into the public sphere by granting them voting rights long before the general electoral reform instituted a universal vote.[14]

The national elites proved to be sensitive to the opportunities offered by the cooperative movement as a channel for reaching the masses.[15] National intelligentsia coordinated the national program, being present in almost all areas of national, public life and the institutional system and held the monopoly of leading the cooperative movement.[16] Cooperatives were usually promoted by or inside the elder institutions (agricultural organizations or financial institutes, churches, cultural associations, political elite and intelligentsia); thus they reproduced and diffused the national ideology of parent institutes. National intelligentsia and press deliberately encouraged the autonomy of national organizations, sometimes to the point of boycott, but rarely the segregation. Banks and cooperative centers, those intermediary institutions that used the economic and social benefices accorded by rural cooperatives in regaining rural masses, became a dissemination channel not only of economic modernization, but also of political and cultural ideas. Even if Hungary did not introduce universal suffrage, national leaders and government considered cooperatives an excellent channel of political influence and mass-mobilization. This aspect of cooperatives became highly politicized around the turn of the century and intensified after nationality politicians abandoned political passivism for activism.[17]

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13 Bruckmüller, Ernst: *Landwirtschaftliche Organisationen und gesellschaftliche Modernisierung. Vereine, Genossenschaften und politische Mobilisierung der Landwirtschafts Österreichs vom Vormärz bis 1914.* Salzburg, 1977.

14 Gerő, András: Az *elsöprő kisebbség.* [The overwhelming minority] Budapest: Gondolat, 1988. 12, 16–21. 23–24; Miskolczy Ambrus, Szász Zoltán (eds.): *Erdély története.* Vol. III. [History of Transylvania] Budapest, 1986. 1632.

15 Kirschbaum, J.M.: The Cooperative Movement in Slovakia, 1845–1948. In Balawyder (ed.): idem, 23–48. Cujes, Rudolf. *Slovenia: Land of Cooperators*. Willowdale, Ont., 1985.

16 Hagen, William W: National Solidarity and Organic Work in Prussian Poland, 1815–1914. *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 44, 1972, 38–64.

17 *Erdély története*. Vol. III., ibidem, 1642–1646. Béla Köpeczy (ed.): *History of Transylvania* Budapest, 1994. 584–585.

The ethnic public: target group of national economy

Friedrich List delimited the 'nation' as the target group of economic policy. Since the Czechs, the Romanians, the Serbians had a clear sense of national identity early at the half of the 19th century, enshrined in national programs (1848, 1861); their national economy was inherently coterminous with the area of national community or territory.[18]

The correspondence of the first Romanian bank-directors and the minutes of administrative boards prove that financial institutions and cooperatives were to be restricted to co-ethnics. The language of press organs also excluded other language-speakers, while delimited the target-group of potential shareholders, cooperative members. The organizing committee of the biggest Romanian bank, the *Albina Credit and Savings Institute*, published articles advertising their initiative to constitute a 'Romanian bank' exclusively on the pages of Romanian newspapers. The target-group of potential shareholders and proprietors was clearly defined in the title of the announcement for share-subscription: "To the Honored Romanian Public".[19] The announcement continued as follows:

> "We /the organizing committee/ call the attention of the honored Romanian public to this announce of vital interest for the entire 'Romanianship', the announcement for the share-subscription of the Albina Institute for Credit and Savings. It will contribute to the multiplication of the economic force of all strata: poor and wealthy, worker and craftsman. It is obvious that the Romanian intelligentsia, especially the intellectuals and schoolmasters from villages to enlighten the people about the aim of this institute, about the majestic idea of its founders."

Besides the general duties of combating usury by offering cheaper agricultural credit, the project emphasized national motives too: "It would be a sin against the principle of self-conservation, if we would neglect the terrain of national economy."[20]

Other foundations also had national attributes and motivations. Visarion Roman, executive director of the Albina, considered cooperative credit unions promoted by Albina, the capillary vessels of banks reaching the masses and

18 Sked, Alan: *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815–1918*. Longman, 1993.
19 *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, Nr. 53, 1871. *Telegraful Român*, Nr. 63, 20 august, 1871.
20 *Compas românesc. Anuar financiar pe 1893/1894*. [Romanian Compass. Financial Annual]. II.year. Sibiu, 1.

channeling savings towards, and credit from, the bank.[21] The Albina explicitly formulated the program of promoting the constitution of credit cooperatives in Romanian villages.[22] In order to disseminate the know-how of founding credit unions, the director and the administrative board of the Albina kept up continuous correspondence with important villagers, mostly priests and schoolmasters, who became the local agents of the bank.[23]

The wave of co-operatives founded by Albina lasted only a short time as the rural population didn't have a well-developed sense of saving, and wasn't yet prepared for market-production and being highly self-sufficient. Instead of promoting new credit unions, the banks began consolidating existing credit unions.[24] Despite its ephemeral success, the principles of credit union networking did inspire other Romanian bank-strategies, too, aiming to "gain control over a region and re-gain the Romanian public from the sphere of influence of non-Romanian finances".[25]

The Albina encouraged the establishment of other Romanian banks and cooperatives in towns massively populated by Romanians by delegating its functionaries and share-packages in new, Romanian banks. The number of Romanian banks skyrocketed in the second half of the eighties partly because of financial conjuncture, partly as a reaction to the constitution of the Transylvanian Hungarian Cultural Association (Erdélyi Magyar Közművelődési Egyesület – abbreviated EMKE) adept of magyarization.[26]

The Romanian banks, sustained by wealthy Romanians, reassessed their national function. A secret invitation to a confidential conference for the establishment of a Romanian credit institute, for example, expressed: "it is imperative to constitute in Orăștie (Szászváros, Broos) a Romanian national

21 Romanian National Archives DJAN Cluj – Visarion Roman's personal fond (Fond 230-VII/132).

22 *Federațiunea*. Pesta, an. V., Nr. 33. 1872. 2.

23 Romanian National Archives DJAN Cluj – Visarion Roman's personal fond (Fond 230-II/49).

24 Petra, Nicolae: *Băncile române din Ardeal*. [The Romanian Banks from Transylvania]. 1936. 22.

25 Lapedatu, Al.: *„Ardeleana" institut de credit și economii 1885–1910*. [Ardeleana, institute for credit and savings] Sibiu, 1912. 58, 60.

26 In 1885, Transylvanian Hungarian elite with the help of government-subsidies created EMKE; 1% of the county budget was transferred to EMKE. But, because EMKE was active in magyarization, these public subsidies provoked the indignation of Romanian political elite. Az *EMKE megalakulása és negyedszázados működése, 1885–1910*. [The establishment and the activity of the Transylvanian Hungarian Cultural Association] Kolozsvár, 1910. Szarka László: *Szlovák nemzeti fejlődés – Magyar nemzetiségi politika 1867–1918*. [Slovakian national development – Hungarian nationality policy 1867–1918]. Pozsony, 1995. 138, 142, 146, 177, 188–189.

credit institute; it should satisfy the need of capital at our people, and should free them from the alien influence and economic slavery, from the shameful role to be always the debtor of alien capital".[27]

Cooperatives for credit and savings were mentioned in several statutes of regional banks, some of them constituting special funds for the promotion of cooperatives. As Ioan Mihu, the director of the Ardeleana Bank from Orăștie, formulated in the revisited statutes, the network of cooperatives enlarged the financial basis (the possibilities of allocation) and warrant of the bank. At the same time, "they had the duty to regain the Romanian peasants out of the sphere of influence of Hungarian and Saxon banks".[28]

Concerning density and geographic saturation, financial statistics ('Romanian Compass') remarked that from 1892–1894, each important Romanian center (market town) had established its own Romanian bank – in total 45 institutes.[29] A decade later, Hungarian authorities and ministries were concerned about this 'dense net of Romanian banks'.[30] Reserving the credit unions for peasantry, the Romanian middle-class developed its financial network mostly in the form of banks.[31] In 1892, there were 40, and in 1900, 73 Romanian banks in Transylvania.[32] Between 1901 and 1914, Romanians established, in total, 175 financial institutes, 102 joint stock banks and 73 credit unions. In 1914, there were total 221 Romanian banks and credit cooperatives in Transylvania.[33]

Coordination and mutual support among national economic institutions

Prior to World War I, the Albina functioned as a peak institute promoting the constitution of new banks by subscription of important stocks and informally coordinated their activity and was present in several other banks' administrative boards. The Furnica, from Fogaras, was founded on the initiative of the Albina director, Visarion Roman in 1883. These two institutes had interlocking directorates: Partenie Cosma was director of both banks, and

27 Lapedatu, Al., idem, 161.
28 Lapedatu, Al., idem, 44–45. Statutes. 191–194. Referee on the motives of creating rural Savings cooperatives.
29 *Compas românesc. Anuar financiar pe 1893/1894*. [Romanian Compass. Financial Annual]. Sibiu, 1894. 72.
30 MOL K 26. 603.cs. 1904 -XIV-741. 64–68.
31 Ábrahám Barna: The Idea of Independent Romanian National Economy in Transylvania. In Trencsény, Balázs et al. (eds): *Nation–Building and Contested Identities. Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies*. Budapest–Iași, 2001. 209–226.
32 Petra, idem, 22.
33 Petra, idem, 22. 22–42.

the bookkeeper of the Albina was on the Supervisory board at Furnica. The establishment of young banks and cooperatives were greatly aided by subscriptions made by big Romanian banks as 'incubator institutes': Albina, Ardeleana, Victoria, Economul were major stockholders in the banks or branches throughout their county or sub-region.

A strong hierarchy of Romanian banks developed with Albina at the top and a few, regional, bigger banks in the middle. These regional banks played an active economical and political role in the county by assisting smaller Romanian banks (morally and financially), and a network of credit unions. A clear geography of Romanian financial institutes was drawn in a short time. The main banks delimited their territories, the Ardeleana, for example, shared Hunyad county with the Hunedoara Bank, by setting boundaries north and south to Maros River. Ardeleana conserved its influence over its network of rural credit unions by retaining half of their capital, and controlling them with her agents. [34]

Revisers at the Albina were delegated to audit the balances of partner institutes.[35] Coordination thus started informally on the basis of monitoring and mutual information warranted by personal unions and interconnections. Romanian banks established their own statistical annual (*Romanian Compass*) since 1893. It published the data and balances, as well as articles on general finances, audit, and legislature concerning economic and financial activities.

In order to give an institutionalized form to the informal coordination, Parteniu Cosma, the director of the Albina Bank, invited all Romanian Bank directors to coordinate their activities. A conference of bank directors called the "Delegation of banks" reunited every two years since 1898, where Romanian bank-directors and representatives of credit and savings cooperatives discussed actual financial problems, and adopted common strategies.[36]

The director conferences that started in 1898, and continued in 1901, 1903, 1905, received a permanent status with the establishment of "*Solidaritatea*" (Solidarity, Association of financial Institutes) in 1907. This bank union integrated all Romanian financial institutions, especially the banks, rendering audit and financial services to its 68 members (banks and cooperatives).[37] The Romanians took advantage of the right to autonomous

34 Lapedatu, Al., idem, 161.
35 Lapedatu, Al., idem, 165; Petra, dem, 66–67.
36 O conferință a băncilor române. [A conference of Romanian Banks] *Anuar financiar și economic pe 1898*. [Financial and Economic Annual] Sibiu, 1899.
37 Petra, idem, 95.

self-control prescribed by the Austrian and Hungarian laws that made annual control compulsory in 1903.[38] They followed the paradigm of the Saxon financial institutes, which established their Revisionsverband der Provinzkreditanstalten early in 1903.[39] The directors of the Saxon and Romanian peak financial institute, Karl Wolff and Parteniu Cosma were in the same time elected at the head of their national bank union. Both unions were registered as cooperatives and formulated analogous goals in their statutes: periodical and professional auditing, consulting of member institutions by common specialists (revisers), and development of strong connections between the member institutions. Savings banks, individually, and jointly, via their union, were actors in implementing national economic programs and implicitly promoters of cooperative movement.

The reorientation of target group towards peasantry and rural cooperatives

After having developed a strong network of joint stock banks, urban middle class, some Romanian and Saxon intellectuals reoriented their interest towards peasantry that was confronted with the severe consequences of the agricultural crisis of 1880s and 1890s. This reorientation was not only motivated by social and political interest, but also by industrial and financial reasons. Mortgage institutes and savings banks tried to increase their sphere of influence (placements, savings) using the cooperative network, while industries were also interested in enlarging the uphill basin of raw material production and the downhill market for consumer goods. The leader of the Saxon cooperative movement, Karl Wolff expressed the interrelatedness of interests among nationality institutions early in 1885, when he started the cooperative propaganda as the director of the Hermannstädter Allgemeine Sparkasse and became the president of the Saxon cooperative union established in 1886.[40]

As the leader of the Saxon Popular Party, he also won the majority of Saxon deputies and personalities for the political program (*Volksprogram*) of

38 A *Solidaritatea pénzintézetek szövetsége mint szövetkezetnek alapszabályai*. [The Statutes of Solidaritatea] Nagyszeben, 1901.

39 Rösler, Rudolf: *Die Kreditorganisation der Sachsen in Siebenbürgen*. Hermannstadt: Krafft, 1914.

40 Wolff was the president of the Saxon Popular Party, director of the Hermannstädter Allgemeine Sparkassa (1885–1919), Siebenbürger Vereinsbank and Revisionsverband. From 1886 until 1928, he was the leader of the cooperative movement, as the president (Anwalt) of the Verband Raiffeisenschen Genossenschaften established in 1886. Drotleff, Dieter: *Taten und Gestalten. Bilder aus der Vergangenheit der Rumäniendeutschen. II. Band.* Hermannstadt: Hora, 2002. 106–110.

institution-building and socially sensitive politics (*Aufbauarbeit*).[41] The fifth paragraph of the political program adopted at the Second Saxon National Assembly in 1890 formulated the political responsibility for promoting modernization, urbanization, the development of cooperative movement, crafts and industries.[42]

The good sense of political compromise and personal relationship with government could help implementing economic programs by integration in the general economic policy. The political realism of Wolff for example was manifested in the fact that he made wise compromises with the government on the terrain of rhetorical nationalism in order to gain practical advantages (for example, the development of rail routes in Saxon regions). Criticized by rhetorically oriented, nationalist Saxon politicians, he insisted that institutionalization and modernization was a more efficient and stable way of nation building, one superior to symbolic nationalism. Wolff and liberal Saxons had good relations with the Ministry of Agriculture, count András Bethlen, himself an adept of political conciliation with the Saxons.[43]

Being the director of the Hermannstädter Allgemeine Sparkasse,[44] Wolff searched for an institutionalized answer to the current economic problems of rural population. The Savings Bank inaugurated an active financial and economic investment strategy, including widening savings and financial placement areas. The directory board of the savings bank decided to promote Raiffeisen rural cooperatives. Personal credit was introduced to rural populations through Raiffeisen savings and credit cooperatives. The Savings bank was to be called the mother-institute ('Mutter-anstalt') of Saxon co-operatives. According to the press-articles and statutes, co-operatives were designed to safeguard the rural population from usury, but also to advance economic prosperity and such social and national goals as the defense of Saxon properties and settlement.

Because the Romanian elite was in defensive against the political attacks of the Hungarian nationalist press, the Romanian political programs did not explicitly articulate the promotion of cooperative movement, rather they expressed the general need of modernization. The Romanian press and the pro-

41 Wagner, Ernst (ed.): *Quellen zur Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen 1191–1975*. Wien: Böhlau, 1976. 242–245; *Hermannstädter Zeitung*. Nr. 140. 19 June, 1890.

42 Heimberger Filip: *Cooperația săsească tip Raiffeisen din Transilvania.* [The Raiffeisen type Saxon cooperatives in Transylvania] Cluj, 1939. 30.

43 Göllner, Carl (ed.): *Die Siebenbürger Sachsen 1848–1918*. Wien, 1988.

44 Wolff, Karl: *Die Geschichte der Hermannstädter Allgemeine Sparkassa während der ersten fünfzig Jahre ihres Bestandes (von 1841 bis 1891). Jubiläums Festschrift*. Hermannstadt, 1891.

grams of Romanian agricultural and cultural association instead were more active in cooperative movement and rural modernization. The low level of market integration of Romanian peasantry disfavored Romanians in cooperative movement. Those regions (Szeben county) flourished that were close to bigger consumer (urban or industrial) centers or were traditionally wealthier (Banat, Krassó, Beszterce county) in economics and national culture (Fogaras, Hunyad county).[45]

Partnership of agricultural and cooperative organizations

On July 19, 1886, the Raiffeisen credit co-operatives elected Wolff president (Anwalt) of their cooperative union, *Verband Raiffeisenschen Genossenschaften als Genossenschaft.*[46] Due to the personal union between the Verband and the Sparkasse, the latter remained their refinancing source, while the staff of the savings bank for some years also carried out the yearly auditing.[47] The cooperative union organized a yearly Congress (*Verbandstag*), with representatives of basic cooperatives, representatives of the Savings bank, and the Consumer Cooperative Center (1906) participating.[48]

Aside from the personal union and interlocking of staff between the cooperative union and the savings bank, the Verband cooperated closely with other Saxon institutions as well. The Saxon agricultural association (Siebenbürgisch-Sächsischer Landwirtschaftsverein) cooperated in the field of agricultural modernization and the development of the dairy-industry, as well as in training and propaganda. According to the agreement among the two organizations, both decided to co-operate closely on different levels in order to realize a share of labor: the organization of credit cooperatives was consigned to the Verband, while dairy cooperatives were promoted in common.[49] At the highest level of leadership, one representative of the agricultural association was elected to the Administrative Board (Anwaltschaft) of the Verband, while the representative of cooperatives became a member on the directory board of the Landwirtschaftsverein. These personal unions, along with the mutual representation of leaders on each other's boards, aimed explicitly at a more effi-

45 Drecin, M.: Economul – Instituție națională a românilor din Nordul Transilvaniei. [Economul – National institute of Romanians from North-Transylvania] *Istorie financiar bancară*. [Financial-bank history] Vol. I. 94.

46 Schuller, Georg Adolf: *Festschrift aus Anlass der 25. Jahreswende seit Gründung der ersten Raiffeisengenossenschaften in Siebenbürger Sachsenlande (1885–1910)*. Hermannstadt, 1910.

47 Idem

48 Wehenkel, Günther.: *Deutsches Genossenschaftswesen in Rumänien*. Stuttgart, 1929.

49 *Neunzehnter Verbandstag der ländlichen Spar- und Vorschußvereine und Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften*. Hermannstadt, 1905. 8. (hereinafter Verbandstag…)

cient labor sharing, and avoiding duplication. Between 1905 and 1910 the *Landwirtschaftliche Blätter* became the common review of both organizations.[50] Members of basic, organizational circles (Bezirksvereine, Ortsvereine, respectively Spar- und Vorschussvereine) were encouraged to become members in both organizations. Mutual support, joint programs, economic actions, festivals and assemblies were encouraged as well. Basic co-operatives were encouraged to create micro-partnerships based on geographical proximity or common interest (common purchase, promotion of interests, etc.). The cooperatives were grouped in 25 circles (Kreise), with 2–10 cooperative societies each.[51]

Beginning in 1887 with its first general assembly, the cooperative union published the minutes of general assemblies in a special brochure, which contained the yearly report (*Jahresbericht*), statistics, balances, and speeches. Celebrating 25 years since the establishment of first Saxon cooperatives and 25 years of Wolff's directorship at the head of the Hermannstädter Allgemeine Sparkasse 1910 was a jubilee year, both for the cooperatives and their mother-institute, the Savings bank. Several jubilee-festivals were held and two jubilee volumes edited. This year marked also the success of cooperative movement; statistics registered the qualitative and quantitative results: saturation of the 'Vereinsgebiet' (the area of the cooperative union), density of cooperative network. Saxons celebrated that they had the best indicators compared to Hungarian and one of the best compared to Germany's average. More than one third of Saxon population (15883 cooperative members computed as heads of families, total 79415 persons) was related to 206 Saxon cooperatives.[52]

The Romanian agricultural association and the Cultural Society as promoters of Romanian rural cooperatives

While the Saxon cooperative movement was characterized by continuity, the Hungarian cooperatives were promoted autonomously by the capital county credit cooperative (Pest megyei Hitelszövetkezet). Since 1898, the cooperatives affiliated to the Hungarian Central Credit Cooperative Society benefited of state-subsidies and facilities, and in Transylvania a special department of the Ministry of Agriculture promoted cooperatives in favor of Hungarian speaking communities.[53] The tutelage of the cooperative central insti-

50 *Landwirtschaftliche Blätter.* Organ der Siebenbürgisch-Sächsisches Landwirtschaftsverband und des Verbandes Raiffeisenschen Genossenschaften als Genossenschaft 1905–1910.
51 Kreiseinteilung der Raiffeisenverbandes. *Siebenbürger Raiffeisenbote*. Vol. 2, Nr. 22, 1911. 149–151.
52 Wehenkel, 24ter Verbandstag, 1910. 70–76.
53 *Rural credit and cooperation in Hungary.* Budapest, 1913.

tute made nationality cooperatives suspicious against state-control, thus they refused to join it. Saxon cooperatives overtly manifested against state influence in public meetings.[54]

The Romanian cooperative movement was less continuous. The Romanian Association for Agriculture, respectively the Literary and Cultural Society of the Romanian People of Transylvania launched the second, respectively the third wave of Romanian cooperatives. Established in 1888, the Romanian Association for Agriculture from Sibiu County initiated the modernization of agriculture through education and training, distribution of quality-seeds and breeding animal, as well as the promotion of agricultural associations, and Raiffeisen-type co-operatives for savings and credit.[55] Under its guidance 72 Raiffeisen cooperatives with unlimited liability were organized in two decades (1893–1914) throughout Transylvania in Romanian villages.[56] Based on personal unions among the cooperative leadership, on a side and the administration of the agricultural association, on the other side, they established their own financial and coordinating organs.[57] They were refinanced and controlled by the Sălişte Savings Bank and its reviser. On April 26, 1914, they formed their own cooperative union, the Înfrăţirea ("Brotherhood") Alliance of Rural Credit Cooperatives.[58]

The "Asociaţiunea Transilvană pentru literatura română şi cultura poporului român" (Literary and Cultural Society of the Romanian People of Transylvania, abbreviated to ASTRA) inaugurated the third wave of Romanian cooperatives. The ASTRA, founded in 1861, reunited Romanian intelligentsia and became an important factor in the diffusion of Romanian national culture. On the field of economics, it organized 'national fairs and exhibitions' in 1862, 1881 and 1905 which left a lasting political impact. ASTRA had a wide network of regional and local departments where economic, cultural and national lectures were held. These decentralized, national cells played a role in the diffusion of national ideas among the Romanian peasantry. The 'Economic department' of the ASTRA, under the presidency of

54 Neunter Verbandstag... 1895.

55 Boia, Lucian: *Eugen Brote*. Bucharest, 1977. Matlekovits Sándor: *Magyarország közgazdasági és közművelődési állapota ezeréves fennállásakor*. II.k. [The economic and cultural state of Hungary] Budapest, 1898. 485–492.

56 Centrala Cooperativelor. [The center of cooperatives] *Revista Economică*. 1914. 30, 198, 213, 242, 248, 263.

57 *Tovărăşia*, Nr. 1, 1911. 3–4.

58 Chestiunea centralei Cooperativelor. [The problem of the cooperative center] *Revista Economică*. 1914. 30; *Magyar Compass,* 1917–1918. [Hungarian Compass] Budapest, 1918.

Cosma (in the same time president of the Romanian National Party since 1881, director of Albina since 1885, and president of Solidaritatea), morally supported the cooperative movement, but in fact had done little until 1912. After a scholarship was offered by a wealthy Romanian, for the study of different models of co-operative systems, the ASTRA launched the cooperative propaganda. Vasile Osvadă, to whom the scholarship was consigned, had a great deal of experience with cooperatives being the editor of the cooperative, associative review, *Tovărășia*for five years (1906–1911). The results of his study on cooperative systems from Austria-Hungary (e.g. Bukowina) and Romania were presented to the Central Committee of ASTRA and published in its official review, the *Transilvania*[59] His report also contained a project on the development of the Romanian cooperative movement in Transylvania. He presented cooperatives as complementary institutions to well-established, Romanian banks. This idea was based on the statutes of the venerable Albina, which from its birth supported the idea of cooperation. The paradigmatic cooperative systems were presented with an accent on promoter-organizations, and the diffusion of ideas ('propaganda') via the press, brochures and itinerant teachers. His project was concentrated around propaganda, coordination and control, and the refinancing of cooperatives. On the basis of his experience, Osvadă asked for the moral and financial support of the three main components (the cultural, financial and ecclesiastical) of the Romanian institutional system for the promotion of cooperatives- referring to them as the protectors of the Romanian cooperative movement. On the basis of other nationalities' (Slovakian, Serbian, Suabian, Romanian from Bukowina) experience, he favored the autonomy of movements against state-support or influence. [60]

Based on Osvadă's project, ASTRA launched the third wave of Romanian cooperative movement. ASTRA had strong relations with local political and economic leaders. In 1912, the Association had 74 local 'departments' disposed proportionally on the map, in almost all of the most important Romanian centers.[61] Its decentralized network proved to be an important, institutional channel activated during the third wave of the Romanian cooperative movement and coordinated by the Association, which offered its official organ, *Transylvania*, for cooperative, propaganda articles. 80 ASTRA-depart-

[59] Osvadă: Mișcarea cooperatistă. [The Cooperative Movement. Report] *Transilvania,* Nr. 1, 1912. 1–38.

[60] Osvadă, idem, 14.

[61] *Transilvania*, 1912. 352–353.

ments received the type-statutes and propaganda brochures and, 25, model, credit cooperatives conceived as diffusion cells for other cooperative-initiatives in the county, were organized by the itinerant cooperative teacher.

Even if several influential persons were mutually represented in the Agricultural Association, the Solidaritatea and the cooperative staff of the ASTRA, there remained a continuous dispute over the leadership of Romanian cooperative movement, that hided the plurality of economic and political interests among Romanian intelligentsia. The Agricultural Association took over the initiative by establishing the Romanian cooperative union in 1914. In 1915 there were already 73 Romanian cooperatives with 7593 members.[62] Romanians also had 150 joint stock financial institutes and 24 commercial societies.[63]

The statistics of national economy and the symbolic representation of the national economy

An important attribute of a national economy was its accountability: statistics ('compass'), maps, and balances. In 1893, the first 'Romanian Compass' (statistical annual) appeared edited by the cashier of the Albina, Petra-Petrescu. The annual compass published the current balances and nomenclature of the administrative and supervisory boards of Romanian banks and cooperatives. In its second year, the compass gave a short historical presentation of each institute, emphasizing the role of local Romanian intelligentsia and middle class in the constitution of capital. Literates, politicians, schoolmasters, teachers and priests, lawyers and craftsmen were the majority among the functionaries.[64]

Other, symbolic representations of national, cultural and economic autonomy included fairs and jubilee festivals, books, and exhibitions. National fairs manifested the national pride, and offered an opportunity to gather and represent all components of the national entity. National fairs were held in 1861 at the establishment of the ASTRA, in 1881 (the same year as the constitution of Romanian Royalty), and in 1905, the year of the activists' electoral success.[65]

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62 *Tovărășia*, Nr. 1, 1911. 3–4. Statistica băncilor din Ungaria. [The Statistics of Banks in Hungary] *Revista economică,* Nr. 1, 1899. 29–31. Însoțirile de credit. [Credit cooperatives] *Revista economică,* Nr. 1, 1899. 15.

63 *Anuarul Băncilor Române.* [Annual of Romanian Banks] 1915. 265–264.

64 *Compas românesc. Anuar financiar pe 1893/1894*. [Romanian Compass. Financial Annual]. II.year. Sibiu, 29.

65 Ábrahám, dem, 31–33.

Bank directors participating at the Delegation of Banks were leaders of cultural society as well, and as a consequence the annual congress of the ASTRA was usually held in common with the directors' conference.[66]

Jubilees played an important role in the communicative memory of the Romanian generation. The first directors' conference celebrated 25th anniversary of the Albina Bank. Its cashier, Petra-Petrescu, editor of the Romanian statistical annuals, published a jubilee monograph of the paradigmatic credit institute.[67] Another book was published presenting *The Romanian Banks from Transylvania and Hungary*.[68] Next year, the secretary of the Albina and of the ASTRA edited the first *Romanian Encyclopedia*.[69] The encyclopedia was awarded a gold medal at the Scientific Exhibition held in Bucharest, in 1903. The attention of Romania as a benevolent external homeland was accompanied by the mutual diffusion of cooperative organizational models, for example from Transylvania towards Bukowina and Romania. The series of jubilee volumes continued with the 25th anniversary of the Ardeleana in 1910.[70] In the same year, the Saxons organized the jubilee festival and edited two volumes celebrating 25 years under the directorship of Karl Wolff, and 25 years since the establishment of the first Saxon, Raiffeisen cooperatives and Saxon cooperative union. Transylvanian Hungarians also celebrated that year, the 25th anniversary of the constitution of the Transylvanian Hungarian Cultural Association with a jubilee volume.[71] While the nationalities proudly published statistics and balances of their economic success, Hungarian public opinion lamented the failure of forced magyarization, and the lack of economic pragmatism of the EMKE. It was obvious that there was a continuous competition among national programs and nation building strategies. Their success massively depended on social acceptance, popularity and pragmatism.

The eponyms of Romanian banks were also related to communicational memory and collective identity. Some names as the Albina (bee) and Furnica

66 HNA K26–1904-XIV-152. 58–61. The minutes of the third conference of Romanian bank directors (1903).

67 Petra-Petrescu, Nicolae: *Monografia Albinei*. [The Monograph of the Albina] Sibiu, 1897.

68 *Băncile române din Transilvania şi Ungaria* [The Romanian Banks from Transylvania and Hungary]. Written by Constantin Popp, functionary at the Albina central at Sibiu; Sibiu, 1897.

69 *Enciclopedia Română*. [*Romanian Encyclopedia*]. 3 volumes. Edited by C. Diaconovich, published by *the ASTRA.* Sibiu: W. Krafft, 1904. Diaconovich, was a professor at Bucharest University and a member of the Romanian Academy (Visarion Roman and Lăpedatu were also members of the Romanian Academy). Boia, idem.

70 Lapedatu, Al., idem.

71 Az *EMKE megalakulása és negyedszázados működése, 1885–1910*. [The establishment and the activity of the Transylvanian Hungarian Cultural Association] Kolozsvár, 1910.

(ant) expressed the perseverance and diligence of these insects. Other names were related to concepts taken from the cooperative vocabulary (help, fraternity, thrift), and several were influenced by historical myths and Latin origins of Romanians (Iulia, Ulpia, Decebal) or patriotism (Patria: native land, Victoria: victory, Concordia, Minerva). The majority of names had geographical origins, reproducing mountain, river, town, county, and ethnographic regional names. The most expressive were the names of the Solidaritatea (Solidarity) and Înfrățirea (Fraternity) bank and cooperative unions. The titles of annuals – *Romanian Compass*, *Annual of Romanian Banks* – clearly expressed the ethnic affiliation of institutions. 'Transylvania' was a brand name taken by all national entities. The official organ of the Romanian Cultural Society had the title *'Transilvania'* since 1861. The Saxon insurance company (Transylvania Versicherungsanstalt A.G.), the Hungarian Transylvania Bank (1872) and the Ardeleana (the Transylvanian 1885) are illustrative in the sense that Transylvania as a historical and political entity was a common ideal and eponym for Romanians, Saxons and Hungarians. The net of Romanian banks and cooperatives (most of them having feminine names) thus realized a psycho-geography of the 'national economy'. Hungarian and Saxonian institutes were less innovative in name-giving compared to ideological Romanian denominations.

The economic nationalist press and the role of external homelands

Romanian politicians and economists from Transylvania stood on the basis of the federalization of the Monarchy and the idea of an independent Romanian National economy inside Austria-Hungary.[72] Activist nationality intelligentsia even encouraged deliberate segregation, or more appropriately the 'self-organization of a proper economy'.[73]

The director of the Agricola Bank from Vajdahunyad (Hunedoara), Vasile Osvadă published the economic review *Tovărășia*(Associationship), as a supplement of the activist political journal *Libertatea* (freedom). Since its first issue, the review expressed a strong, economic, nationalist program. The first article *Ținta noastră* (Our aim) formulated the "program to be followed by us, Romanians, primarily in the consolidation and development of our national economy". This program was motivated to affirm the idea of competition with other nations. "Because we Romanians want to live and be-

72 *Tovărășia, Nr. 4. 27–28.Neatârnarea economiei*. [The Independence of the Economy] See more on this in Ábrahám Barna, idem, 209–226.

73 Ábrahám Barna, idem, 209–226.

come strong factors in the fight of life, our sacred duty is to wake up economically and to be prepared for the economic actions. A people that want to live and realize its ideals must have its strong weapons of the economic wealth". All components of the economic and national institutional system were called to cooperate to attain the wealth of the nation. His review promoted the development of associative and cooperative life, and the solidarity of all components of the national economy.[74] Without a doubt, "pioneers" were key people capable of organizing their village, or at least of influencing the opinion of the village community. Romanian intellectuals highlighted the role of "our functionaries", and the value of village "pioneers".[75] His review introduced new themes and notions inspired by other nationalities' experiences in economy and politics.

Several articles written by Osvadă are illustrative in this sense. The "Romanian to Romanian" article summoned Romanian consumers to devote themselves to the Romanian shops by boycotting the non-Romanian shop in the village.[76] Economic organizational patriotism was encouraged in articles and statistics presenting the Romanian institutional system from Austria-Hungary: the Romanian villages, the Romanian territory, "our banks", commercial firms, "our insurance company", our cooperatives and the agricultural, professional associations.[77] Romanians were called to support these institutions wholeheartedly. As the article "The nationalism in economy" proved, the Romanian intelligentsia intended to boycott any cooperation with Hungarians.[78] According to Osvadă's theory, influenced by Friedrich List and other Romanian nationalists (Eugen Brote), "different cultural factors had their own laws and interest, and were incompatible inside mixed associations. Instead, the state should promote the well being of all of its cultural factors, thus allowing all nations of the country to give rise to the country's power." His articles were consequent in distinguishing the notions of state and nations. He never used national for countrywide institutes, reserving it to genuine cultural nations. He noted that Romanian public opinion

74 Funcționarii noștri. *Tovărășia,* 1906. 6.

75 Organizația noastră economică. [Our Economic Organizational System] *Tovărășia,* Nr. 1, 1906. 4–5.

76 Român la Român. [Romanian to Romanian] *Tovărășia,* Nr.1. 1907. 3.

77 Organizația noastră economică. [Our economic institutional system] *Tovărășia,* Nr. 1, 1906. 4–5.

78 Naționalismul în economie. [The nationalism in economy] *Tovărășia,* Nr. 2, 1911. 3. Boycott movements from Austria-Hungary are presented by Albrecht, Catherine: Pride in Production: The Jubilee Exhibition of 1891 and Economic Competition between Czechs and Germans in Bohemia. *Austrian History Yearbook.* Vol. 24, 1993. 101–118. Judson, Pieter M.: Not Another Square Foot! German Liberalism and the Rhetoric of National Ownership in Nineteenth Century Austria. *Austrian History Yearbook.* Vol. 26, 1995. 83–97.

and press always emphasized the self-organization of Romanians. He was convinced that "each people had the right for organizing its economic life on national basis. The state should help the initiatives of each people of the country, because only in that way, built on national foundations would strong cultural factors develop and contribute to the wealth of the whole country." Instead of cooperation with other nations, the article prescribed self-help and self-organization: "we (Romanians) must organize the economic life *through us* and for us.[79]

Saxons were also adepts of self-help and independency. When, following Karl Wolff's presentation of the "autonomous land-estate policy" of Saxons at the first congress of the Alliance of Cooperatives in Hungary,[80] the Hungarian Government expressed its intention to found a common settlement-bank with Saxons against Romanians, the Saxon leaders refused.[81] They wanted to carry on their own "land-estate battle" and their autonomy to place subsidies in exclusively in favor of their own national community. After constructing, regaining and controlling the own resources of the nation, elites had to allocate these resources efficiently. New concepts, as 'national property', 'land-estate policies' and 'self-assessment' came to the agenda, as a defensive response to the Hungarian government led settlements and magyarization.[82]

The relationship of nationalities with their external homelands was important both culturally and economically. Slovenian and Slovakian politicians and intellectuals were socialized and trained at Bohemian Czech universities and high schools. The German area, at its turn, was a source of financial know-how both for Saxon and Romanian intelligentsia from Transylvania. In the same time, prominent Romanian economists and cooperators often participate in the creation of new financial institutes (National Savings Bank) at Bucharest or cooperative congresses held in Romania. Many Transylvanian Romanian intellectuals were elected members in the Romanian Academy. External homelands as a consequence offered alternative paradigms, upward mobility or even diplomatic support for national emancipation.[83]

79 „Să ne cunoaștem". [Let us know ourselves] *Tovărășia,* Nr. 4. 1906. 26. and Nr. 5. 1906. 34.

80 A Magyarországi Szövetkezetek Szövetsége első kongresszusa. Budapest, 1910. [The first congress of the Alliance of Cooperatives from Hungary] Kongreß der ungarländischen Genossenschaften als Genossenschaft. *Siebenbürger Raiffeisenbote,* Nr. 1, 1910. 7.

81 Romsics Ignác: Az agrárkérdés nemzeti-nemzetiségi aspektusa 1890–1918 között. [The national-nationality aspects of the agrarian issue during 1890–1918] *Forrás,* Nr. 1, 1986, 26–30.

82 *Erhaltung und Vermehrung von liegendem Besitz durch Raiffeisenvereine. Siebenbürger Raiffeisenbote* 1910. Nr. 3. 21–22; Bárdi Nándor, idem.

83 Galánthay (ed.): Nagy Magyar Compass. [Big Hungarian Compass] Budapest, 1912/13; 1917/18.

Nevertheless, Romanian economists were members of the financial elite of Austria-Hungary. Their articles appeared in the financial and economic press (*Magyar Pénzügy*) from Budapest (Popp Constantin, Ion I. Lăpedatu), Vienna and Bucharest. They often worked at the banks in these capital-cities.[84] Both as bank-directors and nationality politicians they had cordial relations with other nationality intelligentsia of the Monarchy (Czechs, Slovaks, and Serbs), especially after 1895 and 1905 when nationalities formed the Club of Nationalities in the Hungarian Parliament, and acted in solidarity in the legislature. The bigger Romanian banks (Albina, Victoria, Ardeleana) had financial relations with the Czech and Slovak Banks.[85]

In World War I, during the Romanian offensive against Hungary, several Romanian bank-functionaries left Austria-Hungary and expatriated to Romania.[86] The Albina also played an important role in the process of transferring the administration of Transylvania into the hands of the Romanian National 'Ruling Council': the Banks not only financed it, but offered its offices in Sibiu as headquarters to the Council.[87]

The results and national efficiency of nationality cooperatives

Contemporaries regarded the density of the co-operative network as a sign of efficiency. The political effectiveness of nationality cooperative movement has to be considered even more important than quantitative success. Even if not as dense as the Saxon cooperative network, the institutional system of Romanian banks and cooperatives, together with the media and cultural organs they sustained, achieved a Romanian public sphere, which permitted the continuous flow of ideas and programs upward and downward from elite to masses. Functions and voting rights exercised in cooperatives and general assemblies, educated and trained future, active citizens. These community members received a chance to enter the census by acquiring land-estate parcels or higher income via the cooperatives. Relying on human relations and cultural resources was one of the innovations practiced by

84 Drecin, Mihai – Dronca, Lucian: Relația dintre bănci și cooperația românească de credit din Transilvania (1867–1918). [The relationship of Romanian banks and cooperatives in Transylvania]. In: Văcărel, Iulian (ed.): *In memoriam Gromoslav Mladenatz. Teoria și mișcarea cooperatistă în secolul XX. Studii.* [The cooperative theory and movement in the 20th century]. Bucharest, 2002. 115–123.

85 Boia, Lucian: *Relationships between Romanians, Czechs and Slovaks, 1848–1914*. Bucharest, 1977.

86 MOL K 26. 527.cs. 1901. XXX.

87 Gyárfás Elemér: Az erdélyi románok hitelszervezetei. *Magyar Kisebbség,* 1924. 71–79. Iancu, Gheorghe: *The Ruling Council 1918–1920*. Cluj, 1995.

nationality banks and cooperative networks. By according subsidies and becoming involved in communal programs, they gained the affection and devotion of the ethnic national public.

Some nationalities in Austria-Hungary recognized the importance of the economy in the national question much earlier than state authorities.[88] While the nationalities developed a sense of immunity and reaction against bureaucratic assimilation by organizing their proper institutions, Diaspora Hungarians entered in a phase of spontaneous assimilation being dispersed among the nationalities. As the ministerial reports confessed, the bureaucratic policies forcing cultural assimilation proved to be less efficient compared to the self-defense of nationalities via economic institutions.[89] Economy started to play an important role in the life of nationalities, which based their political programs on strong economic institutions.[90] Only a few Hungarian politicians recognized the failure of grammatical assimilation and the higher efficiency of economic affiliation to a nationally institutionalized community.[91] In inter-war Romania, after a historic switch of roles, the Hungarian minority from Transylvania realized this, trying to replicate some features of these two diachronic models of interactive economic nation-building.[92]

The paper illustrated two conscious nation building strategies articulated in political manifestos and realized in entrepreneurial statutes and economic programs. The length of the paper did not permit to develop the aspects of national property defense and self-assessment components of economic nationalism.[93] Only the interactive side of economic programs was emphasized, without accentuating the policies of government and central cooperative institutes, better known in historiography.[94] The paper rather focused on the efficient share of labor and coordination inside a national entity through the constitution of personal unions, interlocking directorates, com-

88 Băncile din Ardeal. [The Banks from Transylvania] *Tovărășia,* Nr. 11–12, 1906. 84–85.

89 MOL K26–603.cs. 1904-XIV-152.

90 MOL K26–603.cs. 1904-XIV-741. 24–29.

91 *Magyar pénzügy* [Hungarian Finances]. 1903. august 6. and 1903. august 13. Băncile din Ardeal. [The Banks from Transylvania] *Tovărășia* Nr. 11–12, 1906. 84–85.

92 Bárdi Nándor: A romániai magyarság kisebbségpolitikai stratégiái a két világháború között. [Political strategies of the Hungarian minority in Romania between the two World Wars] *Regio,* Nr. 2, 1997. 32–67.

93 Hunyadi Attila: Romániai magyar gazdaságpolitika 1918–1940 [Hungarian Economic Policy in Romania 1918–1940]. *Magyar Kisebbség*. 2000. 2. 322–341; Hunyadi Attila: Nemzetépítés és szövetkezeti politika. [Nation building and cooperative policy] *Székelyföld*, Nr. 5, 2002. 81–129.

94 Szász Zoltán: Banking and nationality in Hungary, 1867–1914. In Teichova, Alice (ed.): *Universal Banking in the Twentieth century* Aldershot. 1994. 32–43.

mon media organs, joint propaganda, fairs and festivals, since these factors seemed to constitute the components of 'interactive nationalism'.[95] While they reassured the collaboration of institutions inside a national group, they were also serving to prevent the transgression of ethnic borders. The main functions were to be autonomous and national economy was to be coterminous with the boundaries of the national entity. Self-image opposed to the image of the other designed these imagined boundaries.[96] Jubilees, fairs were components of the communicative memories reassessing national collective identity. All these were not accidental, but voluntarily created and articulated (mémoire volontaire) by the intelligentsia. Since national and political conflicts tended to overlap economic concurrence, economy, commodities and finances were voluntarily ethicized.[97] Symbolic economic nationalism became inherent with institutionalized nation building.[98]

95 Brubaker, Rogers: Nationalizing states in the old 'New Europe' and the new. *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* Vol. 19. Nr. 2, 1996.

96 Weber, Max: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Tübingen, 1947. 221.

97 Good, David F.: National Bias in the Austrian Capital Market before World War I. *Explorations in Economic History*, Vol. 14, 1977. 141–166.

98 Halbwachs. Maurice: *La mémoire colléctive*. Paris, 1950; Nora, Pierre: *Les lieux de mémoire II: La Nation*. Paris, 1986.

GÁBOR LAGZI

The Ukrainian Radical National Movement in Inter-War Poland – the Case of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)

In the 19th century, the Ukrainian ethnic territories were divided between the Russian Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Under the Habsburgs rule in Galicia the Ukrainian national movement had more opportunities than in tsarist Russia. At the beginning of 20th century, Galicia was considered a Ukrainian Piedmont, or territory, which in the future could be the basis of an independent state.[1] During and shortly after World War I, efforts can be observed to create an independent and united Ukrainian state („samostija i soborna ukrajins'ka derzhava"). In the territory of the Monarchy, the West Ukrainian People's Republic (Zachidno-Ukrajins'ka Narodna Respublika, ZUNR) was defeated by the Polish Army and Eastern Galicia was incorporated into a newly reborn Polish state. Near the Dnipro river, the Ukrainian People's Republic (Ukrajins'ka Narodna Respublika, UNR) could not beat back the Bolshevik's (and the White Russian's) attack. As a consequence, after World War I, the ethnic Ukrainian territories were divided into four countries (Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania [Bukovina], and Czechoslovakia [Carpatho-Ukraine]). Yet, the main goal of the national movement- to create an independent and sovereign state persisted.[2]

In interwar Poland (1918–1939), the Ukrainian community (approx. 5 million persons, in 1931 16% of country's population) proved the largest na-

1 See Ivan L. Rudnytsky: The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule. In Andrei S. Markovits – Frank E. Sysyn (eds.): *Nationalbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism. Essays on Austrian Galicia*. Cambridge, Mass. 1982. 23–67.

2 Taras Hunczak (ed.): *The Ukraine 1917–1921. A Study in Revolution*. Cambridge, MA, 1977.

tional minority. In the early 1920s, the antagonism between the Polish State and the Ukrainian population (mostly in Eastern Galicia where the national as well political and economic consciousness was advanced) remained strong. Ukrainians relused for many years to recognize themselves as subjects of alien ruled.

Of course, the Ukrainian community in Poland was forced to consolidate post-war losses. But in the 1920s, neither the government, nor the Ukrainian parties could work out a program of coexistence, a kind of *modus vivendi*, satisfactory for both sides. The legal sector of the Ukrainian policy in Poland absorbed the largest part of the minority's life – the representatives of the Ukrainian parties (for example the Ukrajins'ke Natsionalno-Demokratychne Objednannia – UNDO or Ukrajins'ka Sotsial-Demokratychna Partija-URSP) were working in Parliament in Warsaw. The field of co-operatives movement and culture-education also proved successful (especially the „Prosvita" or „Ridna Hata").

Aside from the legal aspects of Ukrainian political life, an illegal sector also formed, which did not intended to accept the regime's political mechanism. This radical national movement rejected Polish rule in Galicia, and worked out a unique form of nationalism; so called "integral nationalism".[3]

One of the foremost experts on this issue, American historian, John A. Armstrong, defined Ukrainian integral nationalism in the following way: "a belief in the nation supreme value to which all others must be subordinated; glorification of action, war and violence as an expression of superior biological vitality of the nation; and an expression of the „national will" through the charismatic leader and an elite of nationalist enthusiasts organized in a single party."[4] Another American historian, Alexander J. Motyl added to this list of characteristic features: the exaltation of militarism and imperialism; will and faith as the motive forces of history; rejection of Marxism and communism; totalitarian national ideology and totalitarian political elite.[5]

We can state then, that the Ukrainian national movement was born from the defeat of the Ukrainian revolution in 1917–1921 and the national-liberation fight following World War I. This movement was born out of the pursuit for new political activity among younger generations. Representatives of Ukrainian

3 "Integral nationalism" was born in France in the beginning of 20th century as an answer to liberal nationalism of the 19th century. "Integral nationalism" mixed monarchism and totalitarianism. See Heorhij Kasjanov: *Teoriji natsiji ta natsionalizmu*. Kyjiv, 1999. 318.

4 John A. Armstrong: *Ukrainian Nationalism*. 3rd Edition. Englewood, Col. 1990. 25–26.

5 Alexander J. Motyl: *Turn to the Right: the Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929*. New York, 1980. 163–164.

national thought had discovered the impasse of the dominant political orientation at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century (a legalist and non-Marxist socialist orientation). The nationalists did not intend to use conventional methods in their struggle. As the well known, Ukrainian émigré historian, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyj, wrote in his essay on Ukrainian nationalism, "the nationalists believed that the new era requires new revolutionary actions, which could pass the enemy's test in the matter of ruthlessness and firmness".[6] On the other side, Ukrainian nationalist historian, Petro Mirchuk's claimed „Ukrainian nationalism is a spiritual and political movement, which arose from the inner nature of the Ukrainian nation at the time of its violent struggle for the foundation and goals of creative existence".[7]

Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973), the spiritual father of the Ukrainian nationalism, was born in Melitopol (near the Black sea), and began his career as a social democratic journalist. The time of the revolution (1917–1918) found him in Kyiv. After the defeat of aspiring Ukrainian independence, he moved to L'viv (Lwów/Lemberg,Poland), where he worked as editor for the „Naukovo-Literaturnyj Vistnyk" („Scientific-Literary Herald") and „Zahrava" ("Glowing embers")- both (radical) national oriented.[8]

Probably the most significant work of the Ukrainian national movement was written and published by Dontsov, in L'viv in 1926, under the simple title: „Natsionalism" („Nationalism").[9] In this work he did not construct a coherent program, but rather he entered into a controversial debate with humanistic and democratic writers of 19th century (for example with Myhajlo Drahomanov). Regarding this debate, Dontsov pointed out, that only the stronger wins, and the weaker perish in the struggle of nations. He was thus telling Ukrainians to turn away from compromised ideologies (democracy, socialism, and humanism). This short message insisted on a permanent fight for survival.

6 Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyj: Natsionalizm. In idem: *Mizh istorijeju a politikoju. Statti do istoriji ta krytyky ukrajins'koji suspil'no-politichnoji dumki*. München, 1973. 234, 236.

7 Petro Mirchuk: *Narys istoriji Orhanizatsiji Ukrajin'skych Natsionalistiv. Pershyj tom 1920–1939*. München-London-New York, 1968. 94.

8 Mychajlo Sosnovs'kyj: *Dmytro Dontsov. Politichnyj portret* New York, 1974.; Tomasz Stryjek: Dmytro Doncow (1883–1973), czyli naród w perspektywie wszechogarniającej teorii polityki. In idem: *Ukraińska idea narodowa okresu międzywojennego. Analiza wybranych koncepcji*. Wrocław, 2000. 110–190.

9 Dmytro Dontsov: Natsionalizm. In: idem *Tvori*. Vol. 1. *Heopolitichni ta ideolohichni praci*. L'viv, 2001. 243–425.

During the interwar period, Donstov did not join any political party, but his works shaped the thoughts (and actions) of young Ukrainian nationalists, and thus strengthened Ukrainian national consciousness.[10]

In the beginning of the 1920's, the illegal Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrajins'ka Vijs'kova Orhanizatsija, UVO), founded by colonel Yevhen Konovalets in 1920 proved the most influential right-wing organization on the Ukrainian political scene in Poland. In fact, UVO was not *sensu stricto* a political party, but – as stressed by Stepan Lenkavs'kyj, an activist of the national movement – the secret army of the Ukrainian state fighting for national rights and independence.[11] Members were recruited from Sich Sharpshooters (Sichovi Striltsi), who had fought in World War I on behalf of the Austro-Monarchy's army against the Russians. The main goal of the organization was to achieve an independent and united Ukrainian state. Their methods, however, differed from those of the legal parties. UVO fighters took up arms against the „Polish occupation" (against administration as well as Polish landowners and colonist) of Eastern Galicia. "Betrayers of the Ukrainian national idea", persons which collaborated in some way with Polish authorities were also murdered (for example, Sydor Tverdohlib in 1922, who did not want to boycott parliamentary voting in Eastern Galicia).

In the beginning of the 1920's UVO was very active, with two assassination attempts: Marshall Józef Piłsudski in 1921 and the president of Republic, Stanisław Wojciechowski in 1924. In 1922 alone, 2300 acts of sabotage took place in Eastern Galicia.[12] "Expropriations" (attacks against post offices and postmen) provided supplementary operational funds.[13]

The Ukrainian national movement's military wing proved too weak on its own, and elicited foreign supporters. The UVO found this (financial, organizational) support in those states facing political confrontation with Poland (i.e. Germany, Lithuania, and Czechoslovakia).

Among the UVO's activity, contact with Weimar Germany held a special place. The "Ukrainian question" was not unknown in Berlin: before, and especially during World War I, German politicians and army officers noted the great potential of Ukrainian lands (see Brest-Litovsk peace, or the Pavlo Skoropads'kyj Hetmanate in 1918, supported by the German army). After

10 Alexander Motyl: The Turn to the Right…, 84–85.

11 Stepan Lenkavs'kyj: Natsionalistichnyj ruh na ZUZ ta 1-ij konhres ukrajins'kyh natsionalistiv. In Yevhen Konovalets ta joho doba. München, 1974, 396.

12 Ryszard Torzecki: *Kwestia ukraińska w Polsce w latach 1923–1929*. Kraków, 1989. 62.

13 Alexander J. Motyl: Ukrainian Nationalist Political Violence in Inter-War Poland, 1921–1939. *East European Quaterly*, Vol. 19, Nr. 1, 1985. 49.

the war, Germany was defeated, and deeply humiliated in the Versailles peace conference. Ukrainian national aspirations were crushed by Poland, which cooperated with Antant states. Logically, cooperation would have benefited both sides. The German authorities were ready to support the biggest national minority in Poland to hinder the consolidation of the „Saison Staat", and Hoffered support from the Reichswehrministerium (RWM), and especially the intelligence section (Ahwehr-Abteilung, AA). The (limited) German-Ukrainian cooperation was based on pragmatical, and not ideological motives and focused its actions against Poland. [14]

The real cooperation between UVO and German RWM began in 1923, when the Western Great Powers in the League of Nations, accepted Poland's Eastern borders. Konovalets hoped that this cooperation would strengthen the UVO local organization, and awaken the interest of influential German circles to the "Ukrainian question".[15]

In May 1923, Konovalets and Friedrich Gemp, the chief of RWM AA signed an agreement in which the UVO would carry out intelligence work for Berlin (providing political, military and economic information), while the German side provided financial aid, as well military equipment (weapons and ammunition), for „revolutionary activity". Between 1924 and 1927, the Ukrainian Military Organization received 9.000 Reichsmark from the German intelligence service. The Germans also supported military training in Eastern Prussia. And, the Free City Danzig (Gdańsk) played an important role as a transit place for money, arms and ammunition. After 1928, when Germany could carry out official intelligence work, its ties with UVO weakened. By the end of the year the Minister of War, Gen. Wilhelm Groener, and chief of AA, Col. Ferdinand von Bredow, ordered to stop to finances supporting the Ukrainian nationalists.[16]

In 1926, students in L'viv formed national oriented circles. The largest of which, the Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (Sojuz Ukrajins'koji

14 Werner Bencke: Polityka Gustava Stresemanna a mniejszość ukraińska w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (1922–1930). *Studia Historyczne*, Nr. 2, 2002. 179–180, 197.

15 Andrii Bolianovs'kyi: Cooperation between the German Military of the Weimar Republic and the Ukrainian Military Organization, 1923–1928. *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Nr. 1–2, 1999. 73–74.

16 Ibidem, 75–81. The UVO members never denied the coopetaration with the German military circles. In their opinion these contacts were not deep nor wide. This cooperation was compared to the alliance between Józef Piłsudski and Polish Military Organization (POW) with German and Austrian authorities against Russia during World War I. Cf. Osyp Boidunnyk: Jak dijshlo do stvorennja Orhanizatsiji Ukrajins'kych Natsionalistiv. In Yevhen Konovalets…, 370–371.

Natsionalnoji Molodi – SUNM) saw any cooperation with legal Ukrainian parties as a "national betrayal".[17]Outside Poland, national groups were organizing, like the Galician officers and soldiers in internment camps in Czechoslovakia who founded the Group of Ukrainian National Youth (Hrupa Ukrajins'koji Natsionalnoji Molodi – HUNM) in 1922. This organization focused on their „own forces" declaring that "the enemy could be not only outside, but also inside the nation".

Another group was organized in Podebrady in 1925. The League of Ukrainian Nationalists (Liga Ukrajins'kych Natsionalistiv – LUN) overcame the orientation according to which the Ukrainians should seek the inspiration in the Ukrainian history, culture and tradition. Their slogan, "Thoughts are thoughts, but swords are swords", was so characteristic for the European radical right.[18]

In 1926, in Paris, a Soviet agent murdered the head of Ukrainian emigration, the former UNR's ataman Symon Petlura. During the Shlomo Schwartbard's trial, it became clear no Western European country seriously (with exception of Germany) took Ukrainian matters seriously. National feelings were whipped up on the 10th anniversary of ZUNR's takeover in L'viv, in November 1928, with a violent confrontation between the police and hundreds of Ukrainian demonstrators, as well as Polish and Ukrainian students.

In February 1929, a congress brought together the organizationally and geographically sparse Ukrainian national movement's representatives (UVO, HUNM, LUN, SUNM) during which the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsija Ukrajins'kych Natsionalitiv – OUN) was founded. Col. Konovalets acted as the head of OUN until his death in 1938.[19]

The OUN wished to represent the entire Ukrainian nation, and considered a „rightist" organization. Organized in a military and totalitarian structure, OUN leaders declared that their struggle continued against the occupiers (especially Poland) and for an independent state. The organization's military orientation obviously marked its structures: the smallest OUN-cell consisted of 3–5 persons (living for example in villages), 3–5 villages created the pidrayon (subdistrict), above that was the rayon (district) which usually made up the administrative unit, and then the povit (county, in Polish:

17 Alexander J. Motyl: The Turn to the Right…, 140.

18 Janusz Radziejowski: Kształtowanie się oblicza ideowego radykalnego nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego (1917–1929). In Wrzesiński *Polska – Polacy – mniejszości narodowe.* Wojciech Wrocław (ed.): 1992. 316–318.

19 Petro Mirchuk, idem, 88.

powiat). The rayons made up the okruh (province). Poland had 10 provinces led by the Home Executive in Western Ukrainian Lands (Krajova Egzekutyva na Zachido-ukrajins'kych Zemljach, KE na ZUZ).

OUN cells existed in many countries (Czechoslovakia, Romania, Germany, Lithuania, USA, Canada), but bore the greatest influence and were best organized in Poland, which quickly became part of Ukrainian legal life by infiltrating minority society's circulation (political parties, education, co-operative movement, etc.).[20]

The OUN adopted terrorist methods (sabotage, killings, and repudiations) from the UVO. These methods, on the one hand, were used to mobilize Ukrainian society, and on the other to confuse occupiers and to make the administration, and the Polish citizens in East Poland feel unsafe. Furthermore, the terror reminded Ukrainians that the struggle against the occupiers was not over and that they should prepare for the final clash. It should not be forgotten that OUN members, if granted the opportunity, continued political-ideological education within the Ukrainian masses, preparing them to accept the idea of „permanent revolution" and the final reckoning with the enemy at the "appropriate moment".[21]

It should also be mentioned that this illegal and radical orientation became a destructive movement, and thus endangered Ukrainian minority's achieving success in political, economical and social fields in an organic and constructive way. Although the leaders of the biggest Ukrainian party, UNDO opposed OUN's terrorist methods, they shared the same overlying goal – to achieve an independent, national state.

A journalist for "Dilo", the largest Ukrainian daily, Ivan Kedryn knew well both legal and illegal Ukrainian political life, and wrote in his memoirs:

"The underground revolutionary movement's leaders […] thought that the worse is nation's situation, the better for them, because it could lead to the revolutionizing the whole nation. It seems to me, that the most characteristic feature of the Ukrainian underground was the stronger emotional factor instead of rational. This was the logical consequence of the defeat of Ukrainian independent movement and the Polish minority policy."[22]

At the same time, the legalpolitical scene needed OUN's illegal action. Kedryn stated in another article: "The Polish authorities knew well, that I – and also the most of responsible [Ukrainian] politicians – in general had

20 Alexander J. Motyl: The Turn to the Right…, 150.
21 Osyp Boidunnyk: idem, 359–360.
22 Ivan Kedryn: *Zhyttia, podiji, l'udy. Spomyny i komentari.* New York, 1976. 144.

a positively attitude towards existence of the revolutionary underground movement, but negatively towards OUN's structure and methods in 1930s. […] Once Roman Smal-Stoc'kyj, who in the eye of youth was "polonofil" mentioned to me in cafeteria in Warsaw during our often breakfasts: 'If there wasn't OUN, we would have to create it – but in another appearance, as it is today'".[23] It is worth mentioning, the organization, at first, was more radical in words than in actions. Furthermore, Polish authorities did not hinder its development, as OUN seemed to counterbalance the Ukrainian communists and to neutralize the sovietfil movement.[24]

From July to November 1930, 191 acts of violent (arson of warehouses and cereal fields, damaging telephone cables, railways and state institutions, blowing up bridges, etc.) took place in Lwów, Tarnopol and Stanisławów viovodship where the Ukrainian minority was the majority.[25] Burning and damaging property owned by Poles, according to the logic of the perpetrators, maintained the Ukrainians' "revolutionary attitude" and strengthened the OUN's position in Ukrainian society. But as a consequence, neither the Poles nor Ukrainians felt safe. Poles feared their neighbors, and Ukrainians feared the Polish authorities' strike back. From the government's point of view, these acts of terrorism called the international public opinion's attention towards the Ukrainian question in Poland while disrupting the security of Polish citizens.

The authorities responded quickly. The Prime Minister, Józef Piłsudski stressed to the Minister of the Interior, Felicjan Sławoj-Składkowski to apply adequate means against the perpetrators (and their civilian supporters) while avoiding the term "uprising".[26] The "pacification" of Polish authorities lasted from September 16 to November 30 1930.

One thousand policeman and a few army units took part in restoring the order. According to official data, 450 Ukrainian villages, in 16 districts (powiat), were pacified. The Polish authorities arrested Ukrainian activists, made several, brutal house searches, confiscated ammunition, and dissolved some local institutions ("Sokil", "Luh", and co-operatives). The government

23 Ivan Kedryn-Rudnyts'kyj: Vydatna indyvidualnist'. In Yevhen Konovalets…, 351.

24 Ryszard Torzecki: Kwestia ukraińska…, 265. On the Ukrainian communist movement in interwar Poland for more details see: Janusz Radziejowski: *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine 1919–1929*. Edmonton, 1983.

25 Andrzej Ajnenkiel: *Polska po przewrocie majowym. Zarys dziejów politycznych Polski 1926–1939*. Warszawa 1980. 199.

26 Grzegorz Mazur: Problem pacyfikacji Małopolski Wschodniej w 1930 r. *Zeszyty Historyczne*, Vol. 135, 2001. 6.

held the entire Ukrainian minority in Eastern Galicia responsible for the radical nationalist's sabotage.

The OUN's terrorist actions, and the authorities repressive contractions showed, that there could be no constructive dialog between the Polish government and the Ukrainian radicals. And, though the Ukrainian population became ever more vocal, no coexistence with the regime provided even minimum, minority rights. As a consequence of pacification, nationalists strengthened their positions and influence in Ukrainian society.

In the aftermath of pacification, OUN members assassinated Tadeusz Hołówko, the deputy leader of BBWR, the ruling government bloc, and the specialist in minority issues in August 1931. Prominent OUN activists blamed Hołówko, who at that time was working in the Ministry of Interior as the director of the Department for Minorities, for the pacification and the colonization of Eastern Galicia. In addition, this Polish politician wrote the OUN hagiographist Petro Mirchuk, "poisoned the Ukrainian society's life with the idea of conciliation".[27] This murder slowed down the reconciliation process between the Polish government and the legal Ukrainian parties (mainly UNDO).[28]

A second OUN assassination occurred in Warsaw in June 1934. Bronisław Pieracki, the Minister of the Interior, and the man then responsible for the security of Poland, was killed in broad daylight, in the heart of the capital.[29] A few days after the event, OUN made an official announcement taking responsibility for the murder. They declared Pieracki the main person responsible for organizing and executing the pacification, calling him the "hangman of the Ukrainian nation".[30]

The Polish authority's answer was quick and determined. Shortly after Pieracki's murder, the President, Igancy Mościcki, signed a government's decree creating an internal camp in Bereza Kartuska (Polesje voivodship). Here, the Polish government could isolate, without trial, any person considered politically dangerous, including Ukrainian nationalists. From July 1934 to September 1939, the camp held approximately 3000 persons, 4% from

27 Petro Mirchuk, idem, 282, 284.

28 Iwan Kerdyn stressed (idem, 226 – 227), that murders were provocated by Polish circles, which opposed Polish-Ukrainian overtures. At the same time, Marshal Piłsudski assumed, that the murder could be on the border-line between the Ukrainian nationalsim and Bolshevik's influence. See Kazimierz Świtalski: *Diariusz 1919–1935*. Warszawa, 1992. 621.

29 Andrzej Ajnenekiel, 313–314.

30 Petro Mirchuk, idem, 375.

OUN.[31] Both nationalist and communist historiography treated Bereza as a concentration camp, but the camp bore little resemblance to Soviet or Nazi concentration camps.

The minister's assassination also led to the unprecedented arrests, detainment or trial of 800 OUN-members. This repression also affected higher leadership, paralyzing the organization's activity for a month.[32]

The "process in Warsaw" lasted from November 1935 until January 1936, and peaked when the twelve accomplices (all OUN-members) to Pieracki's murder came to trial (the killer managed to escape from the country).[33] Their trials developed into a major political event receiving much internal and external publicity. The Polish government evidently wanted to abolish the minority's radical and dangerous nationalist movement for public order. But, Ukrainians wanted to demonstrate to not only their own community, but to foreign public opinion, that truth was on their side.

In the end, three men (Stepan Bandera, Mykola Lebed' and Jaroslav Karpynets) were sentenced to death (their sentences were later changed to life in prison), the others received life sentences but served only 7 to 15 years.[34]

Following the Munich conference in September 1938, an autonomous region was formed on the territory of Czechoslovakia; Carpatho-Ukraine led by Msgr. Augustine Voloshyn (15 September 1938–13 March 1939). This gave hope to Ukrainians in Poland that their dream of independence could become a reality. It also motivated OUN in 397 demonstrations, 47 sabotages, and 34 terrorist actions in Eastern Galicia. The growing activity of Ukrainian nationalists was also a response to the trials of OUN-leaders in 1934, which popularized the organization. Moreover, in 1938 Stalin ordered the communist party in Poland, and thereby the Ukrainian section- KPZU, to dissolve. Consequently, with the removal of the great antagonist, the Ukrainian nationalists could move more freely.[35]

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31 Wojciech Śleszyński: Analiza struktury osadzonych w obozie odosobnienia w Berezie Kartuskiej (1934–1939). *Zeszyty Historyczne*, Vol. 143, 2003. 170–186.

32 Roman Wysocki: *Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów w Polsce w latach 1929–1939. Geneza–struktura–Program–ideologia*. Lublin, 2003. 299, 304, 307.

33 About the investigation and the process see: Władysław Żeleński: *Zabójstwo ministra Pierackiego*. Warszawa, 1995.

34 Petro Mirchuk, idem, 389–396.

35 Roman Wysocki, idem, 336, 342. For a case study of these changes compare Wołyń voivodship where communists dominated in the 1920s, but nationalists asserted themselves in the 1930s the. See Alexander Motyl: The Rural Origins of the Communist and Nationalist Movements in Wołyń Województwo, 1921–1939. *Slavic Review,* Vol. 37, Nr. 3, 1978. 412–420.

The May 1938 assassination of Yevhen Konovalets, in Rotterdam, however, was a big loss for the OUN. Today we know that Stalin personally ordered his death, which was carried out by a NKVD-agent. It seems the Ukrainian national movement threatened the Soviet government.[36]

It is still debated; in what respect interwar Ukrainian nationalism can be treated as a Fascist movement in Europe. In the literature, three orientations are known regarding this issue. According to the first, Ukrainian nationalism had nothing in common with Fascism (authors connected to National historiography: Petro Mirchuk and Volodymyr Kosyk, share this point of view). The second orientation stresses that European Fascism strongly influenced Ukrainian Nationalism, but differed in its main objectives (John A. Armstrong, Alexander J. Motyl, and Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts' kyj in his earlier works). According to the third „school", radical Ukrainian nationalism *was* part of the European Fascist movement in the interwar period (Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyj, in his later works, Kost' Bondarenko).[37]

Fascism surely had some influence on Ukrainian Nationalism during the interwar period. The first person to popularize fascist ideology in Ukrainian lands was Dmytro Dontsov. According to him, only another dynamic, and nationalism-oriented ideology could compete with communism. Shortly after Adolph Hitler's takeover in Germany, Dontsov wrote: "The most essential item for us in Hitlerism is that it wishes to make the final showdown with communism. It is significant, that such a regime was born in Europe, which has an attitude to Bolsheviks – in a Bolshevik manner."[38] It is worth mentioning, that Dontsov published, among others, Benito Mussolini's „Doctrine of Fascism" and some fragments from Hitler's „Mein Kampf". Aside from this, Dontsov – as I mentioned before – gave a nationally oriented, anti-communistic and totalitarian character to Ukrainian nationalism. It is not accidental that Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyj, stressed in his later article, Dontsov "with his all authority directed the Ukrainian nationalism into the channel of Fascism".[39]

Furthermore, Dontsov's "active nationalism" differed from the "organized nationalism" represented by OUN. The former was an ideology full of emotions, but not an organized doctrine. The latter was an ideology and a political movement, which worked out an extreme program, and had a sys-

36 See Pavel Sudpoplatov: *Special Tasks* Boston–New York–Toronto–London, 1995, passim.

37 Oleksander Zajtsev: Fashizm i ukrajins'kyj natsionalizm (1920–1930-ti rr.). *Jiji. Nezalezhnyj kul'turolohichnyj chasopys*, Nr. 16, 2000. 87.

38 Citeted in Oleksander Zajtsev, ibidem, 93.

39 Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyj: Natsionalizm i totatalitarizm. (Vydpovid' M. Prokopovi.). In ibidem Istorychni ese. T. 2. Kyjiv, 1994. 493. (Originally published under the same title in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 7, Nr. 2, 1982. 80–86.)

tematic *Weltanschauung*. At the same time, it is not sure that OUN would have been as successful if Dmytro Dontsov had not promoted its ideology.[40]

It should not be forgotten, that the Ukrainian nationalists during the interwar period, with few exceptions, did not consider themselves Fascists. Integral nationalism did not simply copy or borrow from European Fascism, but Ukrainian nationalists knew the German and Italian national totalitarianism. The main difference between these ideologies as that Fascism and Nazism were born and evolved in (more or less industrialized) nation-states, while Ukrainians sought an independent state (which was the main goal of both legal and illegal Ukrainian parties in interwar Poland). So, Ukrainian integral nationalism was first of all, in Oleksander Zajtsev's opinion, an ideology of a subjugated and stateless nation, a national-liberation movement, and only afterwards, a kind of totalitarianism.[41]

The OUN was founded in Vienna, but the organization was really formed in Czechoslovakia among Ukrainian (military student) émigrés. This organization could be rooted and develop wherever Ukrainian indigenous (Romania, Czechoslovakia) lived, or among emigrated populations (USA, Canada, South-America, Germany, France, etc,). It is worth underlining that OUN, in the territory of the Soviet Union did not take shape, due to the totalitarian and repression character of the Soviet state. It is difficult even to estimate the OUN's number in Poland during the interwar period. According to the young Polish historian, Roman Wysocki, right before World War II they counted 8–9 thousand, but the members of OUN's youth section (Yunatstvo), and the few thousand sympathizers could be added to this.[42]

In Poland, where the Ukrainian national minority counted as one sixth of the country's population, the OUN found a particular breeding ground and here, the organization was most radical and dynamical. Undoubtedly, the Polish government's policy toward the Ukrainian minority contributed to the spread and strengthening of radical Ukrainian nationalism.[43] Warsaw usually did not keep its promises (autonomy for Eastern Galicia, an independent Ukrainian university in L'viv, etc.), and in several fields (education, administration) Ukrainians

40 Heorhij Kasjanov, idem, 319.

41 Oleksander Zajtsev, idem, 101–102.

42 Roman Wysocki, idem, 337. Other authors from this time estimate OUN's membership at 20 000. See Orest Subtelnyj: *Ukrajina. Istorija*. Kyjiv, 1991. 385, and Andrzej Chojnowski: *Ukraina*. Warszawa, 1997. 87.

43 Andrzej Chojnowski: *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej rządów polskich w latach 1921–1939*. Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk, 1979, and Robert Potocki: *Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w latach 1930–1939*. Lublin, 2003.

were seriously discriminated against. It should not be forgotten that Poland's political scene had changed – in 1926 a (weak and immature) parliamentary democracy was replaced by the „sanacja" regime, and following Józef Piłsudski's death in 1935, the regime moved towards authoritarian political methods and Polish nationalism. The shoddy economic situation in interwar Poland (over-population in agricultural sector, unemployment of intelligentsia) also benefited Ukrainian nationalists. The OUN could not follow the example of the neighboring totalitarian soviet system, which – mainly in the 1920's – seemed to be so attractive for the Ukrainian minority in Poland (korenizatsia). Stalin's brutal policy in Ukrainian SSR in the 1930's (man-made famine, purges, liquidation of intelligentsia), however, dispersed all such illusions.[44] Ukrainians in Poland at the end of the interwar period could depend on neither Poland, nor the Soviet Union, as both countries strongly disagreed with an independent Ukrainian state.

At the beginning of World War II, the OUN (which split into two factions [OUN-Bandera and OUN-Melnyk] in 1940) hoped to restore Ukrainian independence with the help of Nazi Germany.[45] Hitler had no plans for such a state. During the war, Ukrainian nationalists were struggled against both the Soviet and German army. After 1944, it fought against the communist regime in the Soviet Union (and in Poland). The small group of nationalists managed to escape to Western Europe and eventually North America. Since that time, radical Ukrainian nationalism has had no spectacular successes in emigration, or in independent Ukraine.[46]

44 On the korenizatsia see James Mace: *Communism and the Dillemas of National Libaration. National Communism in Soviet Ukraine 1918–1933*. Cambridge, MA, 1983; on the famine see Robert Conquest: *The Harwest of Sorrow. Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine* Oxford, 1986; Oksana Procyk – Leonid Heretz – James Mace: *Famine's in the Soviet Ukraine Nineteen Thirty-Two to Nineteen Thirty-Three*. Cambridge, MA, 1986.

45 See *Yury Boshyk. (ed.): Edmonton, 1986. Ukraine during World War II. History and its Aftermath. A Symposium*.

46 About continuation of radical nationalism in Ukraine see Andrew Wilson: *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s. A Minority Faith.* Cambridge, 1997, and Taras Kuzio: Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine before and after Independence: the Right and its Politics 1989–1994. *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 25, Nr 2, 1997. 211–236, Taras Kuzio: Nationalism in Ukraine: towards a New Theoretical and Comparative Framework. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol. 7, Nr. 2, 2002. 133–161.

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

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