
Conditions of Minorities

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Collective Identity in Transylvania as Reflected by Social Structure

Introduction

The study aims at analysing the features characteristic of the collective identity of Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania on the basis of their positions in the social structure. We have sought to explore those features that accentuate the differences specifically connected to the various social strata within both ethnic groups.

The empiric data upon which the study is based derive primarily from the database of the “Carpathian Basin” project”, carried out by the Minority Research Department of the Institute of Sociology of Eötvös Loránd University and the Research Centre for Inter-ethnic Relations of the Babes-Bolyai University. The writer of this study was also among the members of this research group¹.

During the analysis, I used, to a lesser extent, also the results of another, personal research concerning the ethnic minority identity of the Hungarians in Kolozs (Cluj) and Kovászna (Covasna) counties. The data was collected in March 1996 with 702 cases forming the sample. The sampling procedure was similar to the one used in the above-mentioned research, with the exception that I used an ethnographic micro-region instead of the third stratum².

In the case of this study, the analysis of features regarding the collective identity of the Hungarian minority will receive a greater emphasis, since the manifestation of identity is always more problematic in a minority situation. We considered this of primary importance already during the preparations of the research and this is why the Hungarian sub-sample is larger than the Romanian.

What confirms the importance of this subject in the first place is that national and ethnic conflicts can often be retraced to the fact – as pointed out by A. D. Smith – that various nationalities in relation with each other conceive geograph-

¹ The figures are representative of the Hungarians in Transylvania with a standard margin of error of 2% and are based on 1841 personal samples (1126 Hungarian and 724 Romanian). The data survey was conducted in November 1997. The main theme of the research was the examination of national minority identification and stereotypical way of thinking. Stratified sampling was the sample-selection method, where the type of settlement, the numerical proportion of Hungarians and the geographic-historic region formed the strata. That our sample element numbers somewhat differ from the survey data of the Csepeli-Örkény-Székely study published in *Szociológiai Szemle* 1999/3–4. stems from the fact that we completed the sample we used with a few cases in order to have a better representation with respect to the sub-regions (Székely Land, Partium etc.).

² I always indicate the use of the results of this survey in the study, especially when some difference can be perceived in comparison to the survey carried out on the level of Transylvania.

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ical space and the political situation differently in their collective consciousness, moreover they also symbolise differently the various events of a past they lived through together. In other words: different national and/or ethnic consciousnesses imply differing behaviour or social actions.

The scientific research of the problem area has a huge professional literature. It is not possible to comment on all of it because of the limits of this study. Therefore, only the source of the most important frameworks and concepts can be described here³.

The theory of E. Hobsbawm, according to which nation is a product of modernity, served as one of the theoretical frameworks. While Central and Eastern European nations have evolved on a linguistic-cultural basis, as so-called ethno-cultural nations, in Western Europe the nation-state or civic nationalism are the characteristic forms of identity. These latter ones are based on citizenship and a centuries-long common statehood. The experience of the past years has shown that given the fact that by today, Central and East European nations also have had a several-decade-long, in certain cases almost one-century-long (in the case of the Hungarians and Germans it is longer but certain ethnic groups of theirs broke off from this common statehood) national statehood of their own, elements of the civic nationalist identity have started to appear slowly among Central European citizens as well. The research of A. Nedomová – T. Kostecky carried out in the Czech Republic indicate this: there, citizenship is the third most important criterion after identity and mother tongue, and preceding several other components characteristic of the cultural nation. At the same time, they have shown that the difference between Czech nationality and citizenship is not perceived as significant (Nedomová – Kostecky, 1997: 79–80). The investigations conducted by György Csepeli, Antal Örkény and Ildikó Szabó in Hungary have revealed similar tendencies – although a bit differently – starting from the mid–90s. These tendencies can be observed, and especially among the Romanian population, on the basis of our research as well, but we shall come back to this later.

The identity of individuals who belong to ethnic minority communities becomes manifest in a complex manner if we consider that, in theory, national identity is a result of the operation of national ideology in society and it shapes the system of views of the individual and serves as a basis of comparison (after Csepeli, 1992). Hungarians in Romania, in the modern sense, became a nation in the course of the 19th century and lived in the very same state with the rest of the Hungarian nation up to 1918. Today, they do not live in the same state and the country in which they live at present has a different national ideology – that is, where they live, the ideological establishment of the Romanian and not that of the Hungarian nation is going on. In the case of an ethnic minority like them, the question emerges somewhat differently. For this reason, I started out from a hypothesis,

³ The issues discussed in the study are part of my PhD thesis (under preparation), which offers adequate space for a detailed critical analysis.

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which is enforced, to a certain extent, by the theories of Will Kymlicka (1995) and William Bloom (1990). According to it, we can talk about an existing national identity in the case of an ethnic minority community if at least one of the two conditions below is true:

1. It participated independently or as a part of a community in the nation-forming process of the modern ages in a way that it had either its own independent statehood or autonomy.
2. It has its own cultural-political or administrative entity, which has a chance to take upon and spread its own collective (national) ideology among the members of the community, with the majority of them accepting this, too.

In the case of the Hungarians in Romania, currently both conditions are met, while only the first one was true in the decades preceding 1989. Moreover, the first condition determines the second one and they both give rise to the minority strategy, which Henri Tajfel calls the second minority strategy. According to this, the traditions and the history of the community motivate the members to reach, in some way, a "majority" position: to create institutions and administrative units in the framework of which they have the possibility of deciding about their own fate and happenings in life (Tajfel, 1978). The programme of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) also includes these kinds of elements, the majority of the Hungarian population also shares them and this has also been emphasised by the results of our research.

The definition of the concept of national identity becomes problematic when the basically culturally conceived nation concept of a national community that forms the majority in a state becomes mixed with more and more elements of the nation-state, moreover when the minorities accept, to a certain extent, both the discourse of the majority nation and their "own" national discourse – no matter whether this latter comes from within or outside the borders. The introduction of the concept of the *collective identity* seems useful in resolving these peculiar situations. Under it, by community we mean those larger social groups, which have a relevant role with respect to the social identity of a given person. In the present case, the following communities can be considered during the research: the ethnic Hungarians in Romania as the Hungarian cultural nation, the Romanian cultural nation as the community of the Romanian citizens and, conditionally, the population of Transylvania. These communities, with the exception of the group of the citizens, are imagined communities in the Benedict Andersonian sense, since the "limits" of belonging to the community cannot be indicated clearly. In the study, we will try to find answers to the "who is an ethnic Hungarian in Transylvania?" and "who is a Romanian?" questions with the help of sociological analysis.

The conceptual delimitation of Will Kymlicka in connection to national communities helped in the definition of the above-mentioned concept. Kymlicka has conceived a convincing synthesis regarding the circumscription of minority national collective identity and ethnic identity. The manner, in which the given

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minority is present in a state, is of crucial importance with respect to the nature of the identity of the members of the given minority group. Cultural-ethnic diversity can develop in a state basically in two ways.

1. First, when a larger state annexes a smaller territory, the inhabitants of which have ethno-cultural characteristics that differ from those of the majority nation. Kymlicka calls these co-opt cultures national minorities.
2. Second, multiculturalism can appear as a result of immigration. Usually, the members of these immigrant minorities seek to assimilate into and adapt to the majority society in a typical manner.

In the first case, which forms the basis of the multinational state, we define the less numerous national communities as national minorities, while those, who are the most numerous, form the majority nation (Kymlicka, 1995: 10–11). However, questions still remain: in these states, what nation is denoted by the concept of national and ethnic identity and where does the role of the state appear with regard to identity in relation to nationality? Properly speaking, collective identity resolves the contradictions of these questions. Moreover, it makes it possible for a wider and more dynamic identity concept to include particular situations as well. According to this, in the typology of Kymlicka, the members of the immigrant ethnic groups mentioned under point 2, in theory, accept identification with a new national community and citizenship. Moreover, their origins and previous citizenship also have a place in their new identity although the structure of this identity will probably be different from that of the “indigenous” population.

In Central and Eastern Europe, it is a common feature of most of the national communities that they are in a majority in one state, while a smaller group of theirs forms an ethnic minority in other states. However, we could see that identification based on citizenship has also gained ground with respect to identification based on the cultural nation concept. The new concept of identity is wider than the national identity concept we used up to the present: collective identity has two components – cultural national identity and civic identity. In certain cases, collective identity can coincide with national identity among peoples like the French or the Dutch who have a nation-awareness close to the nation-state model. The other extreme point of the theoretical scheme of the concept is that the two components are completely different and they are in a discordant relationship with each other. In the case of a few national communities of special situation, the component of the citizenship might even temporarily be missing from their collective identity (e.g. among part of the Kurds). When we consider Central and Eastern European states, we can see that persons who belong to the majority nation are the members of the nation that forms the given state, while in the case of national minorities the cultural nation differs from the state-forming nation. The two components are usually in a dissonant relationship even in the majority situation. However, should it be in the interest of the state and should it be willing to construct an ideological base for this, it would be possible for the individuals to reconcile them in their mind.

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The situation according to the social stratification, in the function of which I examine the collective identification mechanisms, is an adaptation of the models of Erickson-Goldthorpe and Bourdieu. Its detailed description and sociological characterisation can be found in a work soon to be published⁴. With the help of the various dimensions of collective identity, we examine what differences can be perceived among persons in situations differing in the social space from an economical and/or cultural point of view, and what influence these differences have on the development of inter-ethnic relations.

Our general hypothesis is that *the higher status a person has the more the cultural nation identity component will be dominant in his case. Accordingly, we infer that the cultural factions of the stratum scheme indicate a closer connection with the nationalist form of identity. The higher the level of education is the more the negative attitudes and stereotypes against the other national community dominate.* The starting point of our hypothesis is that the ideological package of knowledge, which shapes the cultural dimension of collective identity, increases in direct proportion to the quantity of cultural capital. This ideological knowledge group is, however, burdened by an ethnocentric attitude in Transylvania to such an extent that the increasing general knowledge and intellectual level do not go hand in hand with a rational way of coping with problems. Therefore, those in possession of a higher cultural capital are more biased too as compared to the average population.

The components of collective identity: the occurrence of cultural and civic criteria

As a first step, let us analyse the criteria of belonging to Hungarians or Romanians.⁵ These criteria indicate how the reference community of the cultural nation component in the collective identity of the Transylvanians is determined, moreover how important the citizenship component is in the case of the Romanians. It was not possible to measure the identity components of those in minority simultaneously with this question.

The criteria, as values of observed variables, present the following distribution (see Table 1).

We used factor analysis to evaluate the data. We examined identity concepts of what profile could be observed among the Hungarians and Romanians of Transylvania and in what way the elements of the cultural nation and nation-state concepts were combined. The principal component procedure was chosen for this, while the Varimax method was used for the rotation. The procedure worked rather well and the presentation of its results follows next.

⁴ The influence of social status on social relationship networks in Transylvania in the volume "Etnikumközi viszonyok Erdélyben [Inter-ethnic Circumstances in Transylvania]". Ed.: István Horváth.

⁵ The respondents placed the criteria on the Lickert scale graded from 1 to 4, on the basis of how much they agreed with it and, therefore, how important they found the given criteria.

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Table 1

(Question: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
In order to count as a Hungarian/Romanian, you need to...)

Identity criteria	Proportion of the "I agree in part" and "I fully agree" answers	
	Hungarians	Romanians
Live among Hungarians/Romanians most of your life	44	62
Be a Hungarian/Romanian citizen	18	77
Be born in Hungary/Romania	9	77
Be of Hungarian/Romanian mother tongue	93	85
Belong to a church where the language of service is Hungarian/ Romanian	82	69
Consider yourself a Hungarian/Romanian	96	92
Have at least one parent of Hungarian/Romanian origin	86	79
Feel you belong to the Hungarian/Romanian culture	94	87
Honour the Hungarian/Romanian flag	85	88

According to the majority of the values of the correlation matrix, there is significant correlation between the observed variables. Communalities are good, with values ranging between (0.39, 0.7).

The procedure highlighted two factors. The own value of the first is 2.8 and it accounts for 31.5% of the variance; the own value of the second is 1.8 and it accounts for 20.1% of the variance.

To see the position of the factor weights of the observed variables, go to the appendix (Tables 1A, B). Accordingly, the variables are situated on the factors as follows:

- I The first factor contains *Hungarian mother tongue, belonging to a Hungarian-language service church, self-qualification, having at least one parent of Hungarian origin, the sense of belonging to the Hungarian culture, and honouring the Hungarian flag*, that is, the national symbols.
- I The second factor contains the *living among Hungarians, being a Hungarian citizen and being born in Hungary* criteria.

The first factor grasped the so-called identity concept of the cultural nation. In this, the emotional identification with the Hungarian culture is the strongest factor. However, it intertwines with self-qualification, that is, this cultural identifica-

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tion can be chosen, which is even more pronouncedly true in a minority situation. After all, not everybody can become a Hungarian – as is the case in Romania –, one of the parents have to be of Hungarian origin.

The other factor is in connection to the identity concept of the nation-state. No matter how strange it might seem, a smaller part of the Hungarians in Romania agree with the identity definition on the basis of citizenship, since this factor explains one fifth of the variables.

The same can be perceived in the case of the Romanian population as well. The first factor, which explains 42% of the variables, supports the determination of identity on the basis of self-qualification, the cultural nation concept. The same criteria are connected to the given factors, and the formulation of the “Romanian” name of their people and Romania as a state in the case of the Romanian population as well.

We analysed the distribution of the values of these factor weights by counties and regions with the method of the comparison of average values and the T test. Our hypothesis was proved: the factor scores assumed a different distribution among Hungarians in a majority situation and those in a numerical minority even by localities, in Arad (Oradea) or Kolozs counties.

The data reveal that Hungarians living scattered or in a numerical minority define themselves more markedly on a cultural nation basis and reject the nation-state model (which would mean Hungary) (See the negative values of Factor 2). In Szeben (Sibiu) county, where the proportion of Hungarians is the smallest, the score value is the highest on the first factor and the smallest on the second. In any case, the only relevant value of the factor referring to the second, nation-state identity, comes from the Székely Land.

There are significant regional differences among Romanians in Transylvania as well. Their regional classification was somewhat different: Northern and Southern Transylvania, Bánát (Banat) and Körösvidék-Máramaros (Maramures) (Partium). There are no fundamental differences according to Factor 2, with regard to the nation-state component of their collective identity. However, a divergence can be perceived with respect to their cultural nation self-qualification criteria. Accordingly, criteria in connection to lineage are more stressed among those in Northern Transylvania than those in the Partium, while they are even less significant among those in Southern Transylvania and the Bánság (Banat), in this order. These criteria are: belonging to a “Romanian church”, having at least one parent of Romanian origin, and Romanian mother tongue. The national self-definition of the Romanians is of a more exclusive nature, as compared to elsewhere, exactly in those areas where also Hungarians live. This phenomenon shows exactly the opposite of what has been revealed separately by Bútorová and Huncik in Slovakia, where the population of the Slovak block areas is more rejective towards Hungarians (Bútorová, 1997).

With respect to the position within the social structure, significant differences can be perceived in the case of both ethnic communities and it is primarily the

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extent of the nation-state identity component's acceptance that differs. The lower the social position of the given person is the more he accepts the nation-state criteria of identification. In the case of the Romanians, the proportion of those who accept it is higher than among the Hungarians. Romanian farmers almost all accepted the nation-state criteria of identification but even Hungarians were in twice as many to accept it than the intellectuals.

To sum it up, the lower social position an individual has, the narrower definition of collective identity he has: these persons consider both the civic and the cultural nation identity criteria very important. Various reasons can account for this attitude. First, it can be that the strata with a lower level socialisation in the nation culture cannot see the contradictions among the criteria. Second, a nationalist approach of the second period of Romanian Communism also enhanced this attitude: it tried to make people forget about Romanian national communities beyond the border and, simultaneously, strengthened the cultural nation criteria through its propaganda hostile to minorities.

Table 2

National/collective identification criteria	Agree in part or fully					
	Romanian			Hungarian		
	Intellectual	B-c. worker	Farmer	Intellectual	B-c. worker	Farmer
Live among Hungarians/Romanians most of your life	50	70	80	37	46	56
Be a Hungarian/Romanian citizen	66	85	95	10	19	20
Be born in Hungary/Romania	68	80	90	5	7	4
Be of Hungarian/Romanian mother tongue	83	89	90	93	91	96
Belong to a church where the language of service is Hungarian/Romanian	52	80	89	82	82	95
Consider yourself a Hungarian/Romanian	88	93	100	96	95	100
Have at least one parent of Hungarian/Romanian origin	74	87	89	85	84	91
Feel you belong to the Hungarian/Romanian culture	93	94	84	96	92	100
Honour the Hungarian/Romanian flag	85	94	100	82	84	100

When the distribution of the intellectuals' identity criteria is observed, it turns out the least important criteria among Romanians are: belonging to a church where the language of service is Romanian⁶ and live among Romanians most of one's

⁶ In Romanian: apartenență la o biserică românească.

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life. The first indicates that they are more open to accept linguistically assimilating minorities. The second points to the belief that one can remain a Romanian even in a diaspora. The main characteristic of Hungarian intellectuals is that they refuse to accept the definition of nationality based on citizenship.

In the following, let us examine the emotional side of the attitude toward ethnic origin and national affiliation. As known, national pride is an important component of positive collective identity. We analysed the question with the following variables⁷:

Table 3

Emotional attitude	Agree in part or fully	
	Romanians	Hungarians
Makes one proud	53	47
Makes life easier	82	89
Indifferent	20	17
Implies an advantage	45	37
Makes one ashamed	9	3
Implies a disadvantage	26	40

As the examined variables are not very numerous, we tried to carry out factor analysis with the principal factors method⁸. For the most part, there is significant correlation between the variables. With respect to communalities, the value of the shame variable is too little: it is under 0.2.

The method preserved 3 factors among both Romanians and Hungarians:

The own value of 1 is 1.7 and it accounts for 28.4% of the variance⁹;

The own value of 2 is 1.4 and it accounts for 23.9% of the variance;

The own value of 3 is 1 and it accounts for 16.7% of the variance.

In total, they account for 69.2% of the variance in the case of the Hungarians.

Variables indicating the positive character of living as a Hungarian are at the first factor, and in particular in a formulation with a utilitarian, advantage-implying meaning. The reciprocal value of pride and shame can be found at the second, which means that they are important. Therefore, this is a positive emotional factor.

If we analyse the relationship of the variable by clustering as well, we can observe mostly the same result that we can receive with factor analysis.

We conducted clustering with the nearest neighbour method. (For the groups of the dendrogram, see Appendix 3). The results grouped with cluster analysis dif-

⁷ The results were recorded at the 4-value Lickert scale with the following being the introductory question: "The fact that I was born a Hungarian/Romanian... makes my life easier" etc.

⁸ Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) – the principal factors model is not identical with the PCA – principal component analysis.

⁹ The factor weights refer to Hungarians.

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fer somewhat from those of the factor analysis method. Namely, here the feeling of indifference is connected with negative ways of experiencing ones nationality: with shame and, rather weakly, with disadvantage. Those with a utilitarian approach to the positive way of experiencing it form one cluster. At last, the positive emotional way of experiencing one's Hungarian identity, pride behaved the most differently as compared with the rest. However, data based on basic distribution, according to which the proportion of those who attach negative characteristics to their life as Hungarians is 2–3%, must not be forgotten.

The intensity of the civic identity component and the territorial attachment of Hungarians

It can be observed that the boundary between the nation-state and cultural nation identity components is blurred when we are talking about the homeland and the concept of the home as accepted by the respondents. The more realistic territory they indicate – which is also clear as far as the affiliation to a state is concerned – the more the concept of the homeland can be interpreted as a part of the civic component of their collective identity. We assumed that the more the Hungarians in Transylvania subjectively accepted Romania as their homeland, the more the civic dimension became important within their identity. In this sense, a change can be perceived at several levels. First, the proportion of those who declared Romania to be their homeland increased significantly between March 1996 and November 1997: 47% of the Hungarians of Kolozs and Kovászna counties declared Romania to be their homeland and 39% said it was Transylvania in 1996. At the time of the survey of November 1997, the proportion of those declaring Romania to be their homeland was around 70% in both of these counties as well as in Transylvania as a whole as opposed to the 20% who said it was Transylvania. Although a slow change can also be perceived on the level of age groups, the young accept Romania as their homeland increasingly more. In such a short time, there can be only one main reason to explain this change: the fact that DAHR entered the government in the autumn of 1996 improved the general condition of the Hungarians in Romania. However, it could be perceived simultaneously that the proportion of those accepting Romania as their homeland has started to decrease again among those under 18 (by 10% as compared with the average). The reason is probably the own “national educational” programme (result of the work of the more or less organised teachers who preferred to accept the national ideology of their own free will) of the Hungarian public education network in Romania which has gained a rather extensive autonomy).

No significant relationship can be observed between choosing one's homeland and the social position in a stratum or the level of education. Instead, it seems that the subjective concept of the homeland tends to reveal relevant regional differences. The greater the proportion of the Hungarians is in the region, the less

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
they declare Romania to be their homeland to the advantage of Transylvania – although the difference between those who declare Romania their homeland in Székely Land and Bánság does not exceed the 20%¹⁰ (see Appendix 5).

It is to be stressed during the examination of the concept of the homeland that the respondents do not make a significant distinction between homeland and native country (this is true especially of those of low level education and those working in agriculture). I touched upon this in more detail in a previous study of mine (Veres V., 1997: 29–30.). In this case, 55% of the respondents indicated Transylvania as their native land, while only 20% Romania. The answers differ regionally (see the Appendix). Two thirds of those in Székely Land indicate Transylvania as their homeland, while those in Central Transylvania pointed to an ethnographic area or locality above the average. However, it is strange that a great part of those in Bánát (49%) indicated Romania as their homeland although the regional self-consciousness of “Bánát” is supposed to be the strongest exactly here. Can it be that this is true for Romanians only?

While differences are not significant with respect to the concept of the homeland, they are relevant according to social stratification when it comes to indicating ones native land.

Figure 1

The concept of the native land by social strata



Note: We indicated Székely Land and the Partium by Region. Kalotaszeg, Aranyosszék (Arieş), Erdővidék (Bazinul Baraolt), Csík (Ciuc) etc. are ethnographic zones. The “Else” category includes the name of the locality or the “where I was born” answers.

The main difference is that the higher a person’s status is the larger the area of the native land he indicates becomes (but it does not go beyond Transylvania). That is, according to this trend, it is mostly the intellectuals (67% of them) who indicate Transylvania as their native land. Those in leading position, the white-collar workers and the blue-collar workers indicated Romania to be their homeland in a pro-

¹⁰ There is a significant difference on the basis of the hi square test, on level 0.0001.

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portion above the average. Workmen and independent farmers indicated their ethnographic zone or, in certain cases, their native village or town in a proportion above the average. Two tendencies prevail here: one is that the ideological characteristic of indicating one's native land increases with education. The other is that the more one is "in the service" of the state – earns his living by working to it, like a part of those in a leading position and the white-collar workers – the more he identifies with Romania as with a native land as well. Intellectuals, although generally they too work in the public sector, they do so mostly in a Hungarian environment and in the framework of particular Hungarian institutions, so it is the first tendency that predominates in their case as opposed to the second one.

We have other possibilities to analyse the extent to which Hungarians are emotionally tied to Romania. One of the groups of questions inquired whether they would be willing to move abroad should they have a chance. 28% of the Hungarian respondents would emigrate and go to Hungary but also 7% of the Romanians would be willing to do so. 23% of the Hungarians and 33% of the Romanians would emigrate and leave for Western Europe. All in all, at this level, Hungarians in Transylvania feel emotionally tied to Romania almost as much as the Romanians.

I tried to make the homeland concepts set forth by Csepeli, work along rationality and the collective character in connection to the attitudes regarding emigration.

The following typology can be developed on the basis of why the given person would leave Romania or stay there¹¹:

Table 4

Axes (%)	Individual	Collective
Irrational	20 (3)	30 (2)
Rational	25 (1)	22 (4)

The irrational-collective concept of the homeland dominates, which fits the cultural nation concept of the identity. However, the proportion of the other types of concepts of the homeland do not fall much behind either.

The character of the concept of the homeland differs primarily depending on whether Hungarians form the majority locally. For instance, those in the Székely Land declared the individualist-rational concept, which would support emigration, in proportions below the average (18%). At the same time, the collective-rational

¹¹ We measured the typology with the following question: If you were allowed to move to a Western European country, what would you do? 1 – I would leave, I would not leave because 2 – My home can be here only where I was born 3 – It is better here because I am with friends 4 – I feel myself better among people of my own nationality and in my own culture.

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concept of the homeland is at the first place in their case with 29%, which is 7% higher than the average. This means that it is worth living in Székely Land much more than anywhere else in Transylvania even when looks at it rationally, at least according to the subjective evaluation of those who live there.

There are significant differences regarding the proportions of the homeland concept occurrences according to stratification as well. At one end, there are the intellectuals who acknowledge the irrational-collective concept of the homeland the most. Those in a leading position, the white-collar workers and craftsmen are at the opposite end of the scale. They perceived the world in a more pragmatic way and opted for the individualist-rational concept of the homeland. Workmen and farmers preferred the collective-rational concept of the homeland. This was true especially for the majority of the farmers (52%), which is probably the result to their strong – precisely rational – ties to the land. Intellectuals are very likely to prefer the collective-irrational concept of the homeland because they possess the “knowledge regarding the nation” at the highest level, that is, this concept of the homeland is a “result of the operation of national ideology within society¹²”.

The distribution according to education underpins this, since the education level and the proportion of the occurrence of the collective-irrational concept of the homeland increase in direct proportion and its proportion doubles starting from 15% between the two endpoints of the educational level scale. The relation between ethnocentrism and the identification with the citizenship can even be a contradictory phenomenon in a minority situation. Therefore, its multivariable analysis is of special importance. The categorised distribution of the values of the observed variables included in the analysis is as follows:

Table 5

Ethnocentrism criteria	Answers: agree in part or fully	
	Romanians	Hungarians
A) I prefer being a Romanian citizen to being the citizen of any other country	73	45
B) The world would be better if the inhabitants of the other countries would be like the Romanians	54	10
C) The world would be better if the inhabitants of the other countries would be like the Hungarians in Romania	16	52
D) People have to stand up for their country even if it makes mistakes	92	76
E) There are a few things in Romania I feel ashamed of	42	73

¹² Csepeli, György. *Nemzet által homályosan [Dimly through the nation]*. Budapest, 1992. (Chapter on the definition of national identity).

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As you can see, identification with Romania is considerable in the case of the Romanians even if the state (the leaders of the institutions representing it) commits mistakes – however, only little more than half of them would shape the world in their own image. This is of the same extent that we found among the Hungarians in Romania in connection to the same question. The feeling of shame cannot be discarded in the case of any of the national communities. Among Hungarians, almost three fourth of the respondents feel it but they still find the support of their country important.

In order to reveal more complex relations among the answers of the Hungarian sub-sample, we again tried to conduct factor analysis, more exactly, the method of the principal factors.

The own values of the two emphasised factors and the explanation proportions of the joint variance are the following:

Table 6

	Own value	Proportion of explained variance
1.	1.6	33.3
2.	1.1	22


We could not find a sensible explanation to the factor structure, not even in the case of the rotated matrix. We tried another factor analysis method (GLS) but the result was a very similar factor structure. Following it, we attempted the ALSCAL method of multidimensional scaling, with more success¹³.

We could evaluate these results much better. The first dimension measured Hungarian ethnocentrism and the positive attitude toward Romanians. The second revealed the character of the identification with the state in a negative form (higher values show refusal). The higher left part of the field records those who have a negative attitude toward the Romanian state and are ethnocentric from a Hungarian point of view. In reality, those who express Hungarian ethnocentrism are around mid-field, while the others who express an attitude toward the Romanian state and the Romanians, are distributed in various directions along a circle. That is, the respondents judge the above-mentioned factors separately. According to my interpretation, they judge the relationship to their own state as such (their own native land and Transylvania) on the one hand, which is present in their life rather positively. On the other, they pass a rather negative judgement on the Romanians and their leaders. This accounts for the fact that the values are situated almost at the same distance from each other.

¹³ A two-dimensional solution was found after the ALSCAL 16 iteration, where the value of the Stress variable is 0.00695 and the RSQ = 0.99961. For the Stress values of the separate iterations go to the appendix.

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Figure 2



On the basis of the status in the social hierarchy, the attitude of Hungarians to the Romanian citizenship results to be different. The higher status they have, the less positive their attitude toward Romanian citizenship is. Farmers are the most emotionally related, since 77% of theirs agree fully or in part with the criteria “I prefer being a Romanian citizen to being the citizen of any other country”. As opposed to them, only 45% say this on the average. We can presume that their relationship to the land can be a motivation factor in this case as well. The same tendencies can also be perceived in the case of the Romanians, obviously, with a greater proportion of them identifying with the Romanian state. Regionally, the Romanians of Northern Transylvania excel in connection to emotional ties to Romania.

National symbology in Transylvania

According to Benedict Anderson, national symbols stand for the existence of a national group in an imagined space. In the case of national symbols, no sharp boundaries can be drawn between the cultural nation and the civic components of collective identity. However, it becomes obvious which level is symbolically more important.

Symbols are of a peculiar Romanian and Hungarian character in the case of Transylvanians, so we chose to consider them as elements of the cultural nation

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identity during the operationalisation of the problem. Indirectly, however, our assumption came to be proved as well. We enquired about national symbology through open questions so that we could map the extension of the symbolic sphere of identity with the help of spontaneous answers.

For Romanians in Transylvania, merely the red-yellow-blue flag has a clear symbolic value, with 40% of the respondents mentioning it. The rest of the official symbols of the state, the national anthem and the code of arms were mentioned less frequently, but generally following the flag. Their proportion when mentioned separately is under 5%. The national dress and traditions also have a symbolic value according to 5% of the respondents. A few percent mention various personalities, like Eminescu, Avram Iancu, the church, the cross, elements of the old Moldavian and Wallachian codes of arms, as well as the date and scene of the unification in 1918 (see Appendix 6). Identification with official symbols is the strongest in Northern Transylvania, where 60% of the respondents mentioned the flag as opposed to Bánát, where only 17%. There, various symbols of cultural character were cited instead, like the works of Brancusi, namely the "Endless Column". It can be clearly seen that the varieties of national identification show well the area of ethnocentric attitudes. Surely, the success of the Romanian National Unity Party and nationalist political mobilisation in general was not accidental in Northern Transylvania. When we consider the social strata, those of a higher status accept the unified, official symbolism more as opposed to those of a lower status. The symbolic value of the unification of 1918 is higher than the average among those in a leading position.

On the basis of the valid answers, from among the symbols of belonging to the Hungarians, 52% of the Hungarians in Transylvania indicated the red-white-green flag, followed by the Hungarian "Holy" crown with 11% and various Transylvanian monuments and statues with 8%. Elements of the folk culture (national dress, folk products), the turul bird, the Hungarian anthem of Kólcsey and the DAHR tulip received a few percent (see Appendix 6).

For Romanians in Transylvania, Mihai Viteazul is the leading personality with more than one fourth of the valid answers from among the representative historic personalities of their nation. He is followed by Stefan cel Mare with 22% and Avram Iancu with 18%. It deserves attention that almost 5% of the respondents mentions Iancu together with Horea, Closca and Crisan. Avram Iancu and Horea and his companions receive much greater percentages among Romanians living in villages than those in the towns. Almost 5% mentioned A. I. Cuza, 4% Horea and his fellows, and another 8% cited various princes, especially Vlad Tepes and Mircea cel Batran. The first three historic personalities were often mentioned at the second place among others. The results reveal that Romanian national integration was successful with respect to Transylvania. Moreover, it can be considered complete, since a consensus has evolved about the national "Pantheon", in the forefront of which one can find the representatives of all of the three great provinces. The Ceausescuian Communist national policies played a major role in the shaping of the list of national "heroes". This is clearly revealed by the fact that

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the great politicians and kings of the 19th and 20th centuries did not receive more than 1–2%, while a total of 3% indicated the Dacian kings and Emperor Traian as Romanian heroes. When we analyse the answers by the regions, we can observe that Avram Iancu and Horea and his fellows are preferred in Northern Transylvania and the Partium¹⁴ to a much greater extent than in the Southern regions, where princes were mentioned with a frequency above the average (see Appendix 7). Although we do not know the preferences in Romania as a whole, it can be presumed that the peculiar Transylvanian “provincial” feature of the Northern Transylvanian regions can be observed in the honouring of the Transylvanian folk heroes, which was intensified by the “plebeian” tendency of the communist national ideology. Data categorised by age reinforce this, since Avram Iancu and Horea are less popular among those under 18 and the oldest, most of whom received their education before or after the Communist era. The popularity of folk heroes is the same among intellectuals and blue-collar workers, while the preferences of the leaders follow the national standards more and they like princes more.

The national heroes of the Hungarians in Transylvania concentrate even less than those of the Romanians. It turned out during a survey conducted among secondary school students that the symbology of the national heroes of the Romanians is more fully developed than that of the minority Hungarians. The main reason is that the institutionalised teaching of their own history is lacking and, therefore, a national minority ideology, accepted as official, cannot be effectively mediated. However, collective integration and the identity structure cannot be considered complete without this.

Sándor Petőfi is at the head of the list of Hungarian national heroes with 19% followed by King Saint Stephen (17%) and King Matthias and Kossuth (13–13%). John Hunyadi, the Rákóczi and Széchenyi received 3–4% and Árpád and Attila were mentioned by a notable proportion. Other Transylvanian princes taken all together received less than 2%. Several local features emerge in a regional analysis: the belief in the Hun-Hungarian kinship and the veneration of Attila is unusual in the Bánság, while they are almost alone in considering Dózsa – quite understandably – a leading national hero. Petőfi and Árpád are more popular in the Székely Land, where also Áron Gábor appears, especially in Kovászna county, in memory of the Székely war of independence of 1848. In general, those in Inner Transylvania like the Rákóczi and the Transylvanian princes less. In Partium, the early kings, King Saint Stephen and Saint Ladislas are mentioned more frequently than the average (see Appendix 7).

The preferences of the intellectuals usually differ from the average results. Saint Stephen is at the head of the list with 22%, followed by Kossuth (15%), King Matthias (14%), Árpád (11%), Petőfi (10%), Hunyadi (7%) and Attila (5%). The heroes’ list of the intellectuals emphasises the archaic features of the cultural nation identity components of the Transylvanians even more: Attila, king of the Huns, Árpád and Saint Stephen, as conquerors and founders of the state have a significant role,

¹⁴ In Romanian: Crisana-Maramures.

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while the answers of intellectuals in Hungary indicated personalities of the modern ages in 1989: Gyula Illyés, Endre Ady, Széchenyi (Csepeli, 1992, 147–154). Not to talk about the disquieting fact that the intellectuals believe in the legend of Hun-Hungarian continuity more than those with a lower level of education. (On the archaic features of the identity of Transylvanians, see also Veres Valér 1997: 49–50). We made a separate enquiry about personalities of symbolic value in the course of the survey in Kolozs and Kovászna counties in 1996. Petőf was named at the first place but in a much greater proportion: 44%. Those who followed him were Transylvanians: András Sütő (32%) and Kányádi (21%). This result indicated that Hungarians in Romania consider Hungarian culture homogeneous but there exists a secondary level in the field of culture, on which minority characteristics do emerge. The roots of its evolution can be found in the teaching of literature for Hungarians in Romania, which has a particular role in the shaping of the identity: Hungarian literature and especially that of the 20th century is taught “Transylvania-centrally”. We can observe this peculiarity in the field of historic identity: Transylvanian princes and personalities hardly received a few percentages on the “top list”, since no Hungarian history teaching existed in Transylvania with the exception of the past 1–2 years. Therefore, the historic identity of the Hungarians evolved in an ad hoc manner, influenced by romantic historical novels or romantic stories on the origins made up in the last century. The history of the modern ages had almost no effect on it. Teaching one’s own history does not necessarily develop a “stronger” national consciousness or makes Hungarians more nationalistic. It should, in the first place, present a more modern view and a feeling of security based on knowledge through which healthy historic self-criticism is also present when one thinks about the community.

Honouring the national holidays, being familiar with their “script” and – for certain individuals – taking part in them is an important part of the symbolic universe. We asked in connection to several modern or historic Romanian and Hungarian holidays, how much these days were considered important. The basic tendencies of the attitude towards holidays were published in the studies of both Csepeli-Örkény (and colleagues, 1998) and Culic (1999). It can be added to these that, on the basis of the results of the research of 1996, religious holidays, especially Christmas, are regarded as more important than the national holidays. On the other hand, it turned out thanks to the open questions and interviews we used to reveal the importance of the holidays, that August 20, the day of King Saint Stephen is not considered a holiday widely: its popularity cannot be compared to that of March 15. However, when we actually enquired about it, many found it “rather important”, since they know about it from Hungarian TV broadcasts. Yet, knowing about a holiday cannot be considered the same as observing it. Identification with December 1 is rendered difficult not only because of the fact that it is a Romanian national holiday but also because many feel that it is against them (Transylvania was “detached” from Hungary and the unification with Romania was proclaimed at the Romanian National Assembly in Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia) on December 1, 1918.). From this respect, May 10 is a more plausible date for a national holiday and it would be easier to

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reach a consensus in connection it than about December 1. While there are no significant differences according to strata among the Romanians, they are indeed significant among the Hungarians.

Table 7

The attitude of Hungarians in Transylvania toward holidays by strata (answers: rather and very important)

Strata	Holidays				
	Dec. 1.	March 15.	Aug. 20.	May 1.	May 10.
Leaders	25	100	97	25	21
Intellectuals	15	89	77	24	12
White-collar workers	15	84	67	29	6
Craftsmen	18	76	65	30	9
Blue-collar workers	25	80	56	36	12
Farmers	14	71	58	38	6
Total	20	80	63	30	10

It can be observed that Hungarian national holidays are more important for the intellectuals, while then their importance decreases in direct proportion with the lower status. Those in a leading position and the blue-collar workers valued Romanian national holidays, especially December 1, higher than the intellectuals. The white-collar workers and the farmers found it less important than the others. Those in a higher status considered the two Romanian national holidays more important than the others among the Romanians as well.

In the second half of the 20th century, members of the national team participating at international sports competitions also obtained a symbolic value. We asked the Hungarians interested in sports which side they would prefer to win in the case of a Romanian-Hungarian match (in the favourite sport of the respondent): out of 799 valid answers 89% would support the Hungarians and 11% the Romanians. It can be seen that when a position to be taken slips into the sphere of national symbology, it is the cultural nation identification of the Hungarians in Transylvania that prevails.

National “character” and the image of the enemy

G. W. Allport emphasises that ethnic stereotypes form a particular sub-type among stereotypes. The members of an ethnic or national group accept certain stereotypes about a given other ethnic or national group related to them in a characteristic way. If the two groups are in conflict, the so-called hetero-stereotypes formed about the other contain negative elements. The stereotypes formed about their own group are

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made up of positive elements, except in the case of those ethnic minority groups that, being subordinated or at the mercy of the mass media, adopt a few stereotypical images that the reference group has about them. In these cases even the so-called self-hatred, that is, the opposition to one's own group or the repudiation of the group can happen. In other cases, the defenceless subordinated situation and discrimination serve as a basis for the strengthening of national-ethnic auto-stereotypes (Allport, 1977). Certain authors, among them Csepeli, talk about national character with respect to the examination of national auto-stereotypes. Considering that a national group has no clear or particular features in complex societies, the enumerated characteristics can be ascribed as characteristic features of a group only in a projective way. Moreover, they are not valid for the members of the group, so I prefer to use the more neutral concept of the national auto-stereotype.

In the following, the features of the attribution of national auto- and hetero-stereotypes will be examined. The respondents were asked to tell how much they thought the various characteristics were true for the Romanians and the Hungarians. In this case, we used the attributives of the closed version of the semantic differential scale: aggressive, intelligent, lazy, helpful, incompetent, tolerant, a competitive spirit. We also analysed stereotyping with open questions but this will be discussed later.

The simple distribution of the percentage values referring to the characteristics is not suitable for analysis except when the average values are considered.

Table 8

*Attribution of ethnic stereotypes in Transylvania
(the average of percentage values)*

Attributives	Average of attributives assigned to Romanians ¹⁵		Attributives assigned to Hungarians in Transylvania	
	Romanians	Hungarians	Romanians	Hungarians
Aggressive	26	43	49	32
Intelligent	60	41	46	56
Lazy	44	49	30	25
Selfish	39	45	56	37
Helpful	55	43	51	54
Incompetent	27	39	27	28
Tolerant	56	36	31	50
A competitive spirit	53	40	51	54

¹⁵ On the analysis of stereotypes, including Moldavians and Hungarians as well, see also the study of Csepeli-Örkény-Székelyi-Csere (1998).

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Analysing the answers with this method, the conclusion is that the ethnocentric view characteristic of the groups can be observed. However, given that only a part of the group could be characterised with this method, the respondents found a part of the negative, critical features characteristic of a part of their own group as well, and especially in the case of the Romanians who said that 44% of them was lazy and 39% was incompetent. Hungarians revealed less self-criticism but they attributed negative characteristics to the Romanians all the more. If we accept the moral and performance characterisation of Csepeli and his colleagues, it seems that Romanians condemn the Hungarians in Transylvania more because of moral questions (aggressive, selfish), while Hungarians consider Romanians weaker in the field of performance (lazy, incompetent). The fact that Romania is behind Hungary with respect to economic performance and the living standard seem to be caused by the lower performance ability of the Romanians according to the majority of the Hungarians in Romania. On the other hand, they believe that the performance in Hungary is to be looked upon as a merit of all of the Hungarians. This fact strengthens the positive charge of the self-image of the Hungarians in Romania.

Results received with ALSCAL multidimensional scaling are more interesting¹⁶. First, we examine the stereotypical image the Hungarians in Romania have on Romanians.

The following values were received after 20 iterations:

Stress variable: 0.01742, RSQ = 0.99897. For the distribution of the characteristics in the bi-dimensional field, go to Appendix 8.

The method placed the characteristics well in the bi-dimensional field. The positive characteristics can be found in the upper left and the negative ones in the upper right corner. Incompetence is the only one situated in the direction of the lower right corner. The horizontal axis implies a positive-negative moral value judgment, while the vertical axis represents some dimension of motivational performance. This is why incompetence can have such a different, low value. The positive characteristics of the Romanians appear with a negative sign, that is, few are those who can be characterised by them. Negative features are much more characteristic.

In the following, we will examine the features of the stereotypical self-portrait of Hungarians in Romania applying the same method. The data fit in a way that the ALSCAL stopped after 3 iterations (Stress = 0.04343; RSQ = 0.99215).

¹⁶ I counted the values of the distance matrices as Euclidian distances between the values of the variables; the percentage values were recorded at a 10-value range between 0 and 100%. The data of those who did not answer remained missing data because they were numerous and would have distorted the results. Still, some 800 data remained to us for the analysis.


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Figure 3

MDS – Derived stimulus configuration on the self-portrait of Hungarians

Euclidian distance model



The self-portrait of Hungarians in Romania seems to be very positive and we know this already from the average values. There is a smaller group that says Hungarians are rather aggressive and selfish. Therefore, Hungarians can be neither helpful nor tolerant according to them, so these values are in a contrasting field as compared to the aforementioned characteristics. For that matter, the positive characteristics are in the left and the negative ones form a group in the right field. The horizontal axis is reversed, that is, indicators of a high proportion are in the negative field and this expresses a moral behaviour. The other axis is reversed as well and it is in connection to the readiness to act. Therefore, Hungarians perceive themselves as rather incompetent, meek and tolerant, and this can be the reason why Romanians could gain ground above them in the past 200 years.

According to the social composition of the society, differences are not significant in the case of several characteristics. Among Romanian respondents, intellectuals perceive 40% of the Romanians egoists, while those working in agriculture only 29%. The inclination to self-criticism increases in proportion with social status in the case of Romanians, while they are more indulging with the Hungarians when it comes to performance: they perceive 22% of the intellectuals as incompetent and 25% as lazy in the case of Hungarians. These proportions reach the 35% and 42% among respondents working in agriculture, while blue-collar workers find Hungarians helpful some 7% less. Ideology prevails in one field in the self-portrait of Romanian intellectuals: on the average, they see themselves less

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aggressive and much more of them tolerant as compared with those of a lower status, especially the blue-collar workers. According to these latter, 51% of the Romanians are tolerant, while intellectuals believe the average is at 67%. Differences are not significant in the case of the other characteristics.

Among Hungarian respondents, we can find differences with respect to the moral characteristics of Romanians: as compared to both farmers and blue-collar workers, intellectuals say about some 10% less Romanians (on the average) that they are aggressive and selfish. Blue-collar workers perceive Romanians some 8% more competitive than the intellectuals (34% of whom stated this). Similar to the Romanians, Hungarian intellectuals in Romania also perceive their own nationality more tolerant and less aggressive than the results among those of a lower status. It seems that those of a lower qualification and status of either of the two peoples failed to internalise the phrase “we are a peaceful people and others handle us roughly and resort to violence” in proportions parallel with those of the intellectuals and the leaders. Therefore, the general hypothesis is proved with regard to this as well, since intellectuals acknowledge ethnocentric views much more than the blue-collar workers with respect to the stereotypical characterisation of linguistic groups delimited by the cultural nation criteria.

The perception and future prospects of the national group's dimensions

The number and demographic processes and their changes play an important role in the collective identity of minority ethnic groups but even in that of the majority as well. As far as the number of Hungarians in Romania is concerned, there is no consensus about it among Hungarians either. This question is peculiarly related to the cultural nation aspect, since we have more or less trustworthy official reports at our disposal on the number of the citizens.

A part of the professionals accept the results of the 1992 Romanian census as realistic. According to this, 1.64 million persons of Hungarian mother tongue and somewhat less persons of Hungarian nationality live in Romania, the 98% of which live in Transylvania. Many, especially the nationalists, reject this figure and consider 2–2.2 million as realistic.

Thorough demographic analyses can reveal that the effect of emigration and assimilation to the Romanians was of such a great extent “among the Hungarians in the 80s that even on the basis of the most optimistic calculations, the number of persons related to the Hungarians in some way does not exceed the 1.7 million in Romania (Veres, 2000)”. The phenomenon of the so-called demographic stress might arise in connection to communities in a tense relationship with each other. Under it, one community overestimates the size of the other and thus presents it as a greater danger than what it involves in reality. This is not the case in the context of the Romanian–Hungarian relationship in Romania. Instead, it is much more an “ideological contest” that is going on here: “we are in more in reality than what they think” or, mostly in the Romanian parts, “we are in a lot and they are in a few, so what do they want?”. In Northern Transylvania,

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where anti-Hungarian sentiments are stronger among the Romanians, the number of the Hungarians is overestimated to a much larger extent than anywhere else.

We formed four categories of the data with respect to the number of the Hungarians. We considered those under 1.5 million underestimated, those between 1.51–1.8 million more or less realistic, those between 1.81–2.2 million overestimated, and those above 2.2 million highly overestimated data. Merely 8% of the Hungarians and 2.5% of the Romanians indicated more or less realistic values. Hungarians usually overestimated the population of their own community, with most of them (35%) indicating the lower, so-called ideological number, represented by the number 2 million. Two tendencies prevail when we look at the strata. The more important one is that the strata with a higher qualification could answer this question in higher proportions: 95% of the intellectuals and 61% of those employed in agriculture could give an answer. However, the proportion of the respondents does not mean that they replied “correctly”, since, de facto, the correct answer is incorrect ideologically, given that the majority of the DAHR leaders did not accept the results of the 1992 census. 15% of the intellectuals indicated the truly correct number but most of them (38%) indicated the “ideologically correct” number, which is around 2 million. Those in a leading position are the ones to underestimate the number of Hungarians the most. They include those leaders of the community who frighten the others and sound the alarm in connection to the fate of the Hungarians. In general, the proportion of overestimation is very high in the case of all of the Hungarian strata and it even increases among the respondents of lower status. It seems that ideological discourses regarding the community have reached every strata of the society.

Table 9

*Estimation of the number of Hungarians in Transylvania by strata, in percentage**

Strata	Underestimates it		Guesses more or less correctly		Overestimates it	
	Romanians	Hungarians	Romanians	Hungarians	Romanians	Hungarians
Leaders	56	29	0	8	25	63
Intellectuals	52	23	2	15	24	57
White-collar workers	30	15	2	8	23	65
Craftsmen	33	19	11	4	6	62
Farmers	11	13	0	0	16	49
Blue-collar workers	33	18	1	7	19	57
Total	32	17	2,5	8	20	59

* The difference of the sums by rows (by nationalities) and the 100% indicates the “I do not know” answers. 45% of the Romanians and 16% of the Hungarians indicated this answer.

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We grouped the answers with respect to the number of Romanians in Transylvania as follows: it was underestimated under 4.1 million, more or less correctly guessed between 4.2 and 6.5 million, and overestimated above 6.6 million. Their actual number is about 5.5 million. It can be observed that the number of Romanians in Transylvania does not really give ground to ideological debates among either of the communities.

Hungarians underestimate, guess correctly and overestimate the number of Romanians in balanced proportions. A greater number of those of a higher status indicate the relatively correct value than those belonging to other strata. That is, the influence of education prevails here through the actual knowledge of this number than through any ideological saturation. Merely 33% of the Hungarians working in agriculture could indicate this figure with the majority of them underestimating the number of the Romanians.

For Romanians, the number of either of the communities is an important question, which is clearly indicated by the proportion of the "I do not know" answers amounting to 45% in both of the cases.

Romanians, just like the Hungarians, are inclined to overestimate the size of their own community but to a smaller extent. Moreover, there is not so much at stake for them in connection to this question.

Table 10

Estimation of the number of Romanians in Transylvania by strata, in percentage*

Strata	Underestimates it		Guesses more or less correctly		Overestimates it	
	Romanians	Hungarians	Romanians	Hungarians	Romanians	Hungarians
Leaders	9	29	31	37	37	25
Intellectuals	7	24	31	39	44	23
White-collar workers	9	24	20	33	25	20
Craftsmen	11	28	17	25	22	21
Farmers	0	21	5	7	21	5
Blue-collar workers	9	29	20	24	23	18
Total	9	25	20	27	26	29

* The difference of the sums by rows (by nationalities) and the 100% indicates the "I do not know" answers. 45% of the Romanians and 16% of the Hungarians indicated this answer.

The way people perceive the future and survival of the community is an important component of collective identity. We enquired how the change in the num-

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bers of the Hungarians, Romanians and Gypsies was perceived in the next 100 years (see the Appendix).

Table 11

Change in the numbers of ethnicities in Transylvania in the next 100 years

Sub-sample	Decreases or disappears			Remains unchanged (Stagnates)			Increases		
	Romanian	Hungarian	Gypsy	Romanian	Hungarian	Gypsy	Romanian	Hungarian	Gypsy
Romanian respondents	18	18	7	32	38	9	48	30	72
Hungarian respondents	15	62	5	25	12	6	55	11	84

There are no significant differences in connection to the number of the Romanians. The Hungarians who said their number will increase were 7% in more than the Romanians with the same answer. However, their majority (80%) indicated the “it will moderately increase” option in both of the cases. The Hungarians have a rather pessimistic view about the change in the size of their community: 62% said it would decrease or disappear altogether. Only less than 2% opted for the disappear option and 17% indicated that it will decrease significantly. The most numerous group of the respondents (44%) indicated the most probable “it will moderately decrease” option. According to the majority of the Romanian respondents, the number of the Hungarians will stagnate or increase to a small extent.

The representatives of both nationalities perceived a growth tendency in the number of the Gypsies; 84% of the Hungarians believed that it would increase. It seems that the Hungarians feel their own position more threatened by the increasing number of the Gypsies than the majority Romanians. This results probably from their minority status.

When we look at the status occupied in the social hierarchy, we can see that the higher status a Hungarian has the more pessimistic that person is: 75% of the leaders, 72% of the intellectuals perceive a drop in the number of the Hungarians, while not more than 54% of the blue-collar workers indicated this. Two factors are at work here: even if the more educated stratum does not accept the currently known size of the Hungarian population in Transylvania in a manifest manner, they know it and have taken notice of the downward tendency. At the same time, the ideological attitude toward the question also increases the number of pessimistic opinions. This is clearly revealed by the fact that more than 20% of the leaders believe that the number of the Hungarians will decrease

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markedly, while 16% of those in the agriculture think the same although the marked decrease is less probable than the moderate drop in their numbers. There are no significant differences according to social strata as far as the number of the Romanians is concerned. The general hypothesis is proved in this subchapter as well, since the results by strata are significant among the Hungarians, for whom the size of the groups is relevant, while in the case of the Romanians it seems that the issue has no ideologically based importance and the connection with the social strata is not significant.

Minority identity and DAHR

There is one more dimension with respect to the collective identity of Hungarians in Romania, which is in connection to minority awareness. As we could see in the introduction, we can talk about national minority in the case of a minority group when it complies with certain conditions. One of these requirements concerns the question of the political entity that the Hungarians in Romania can identify with the most and which is the main ideological establisher of their identity. According to our observations, this is clearly the DAHR and neither the Hungarian nor the Romanian government can rival it. This is proved in various ways. First, 91% of the respondents voted for the list of the DAHR at the last Chamber of Deputies elections. Only 2% of the attitudes opposing the activities and aims of DAHR are clearly negative and rejective ("I do not agree with these at all"), while the rest all agree with it to some extent.

The other "power source" of minority awareness is that 75% believe that the Romanians are in conflict with the Hungarians (something the majority of the Romanians does not believe in) and, as it is well known, being conscious about this conflict strengthens collective identity and cohesion. We had a chance to examine the possible conflict resolution methods during the research conducted in Kolozs and Kovászna counties in 1996. The response option "the Romanian state should satisfy the claims laid by DAHR" distinguishes itself from among these methods as opposed to the more forceful intervention of the Hungarian government, which was chosen by a few only. The "DAHR should give up its exaggerated demands" was the second option in order, but three times less people chose it than the number of those indicating the first option in the case respondents identified with the claims of DAHR¹⁷.

Quite understandably, there are significant differences in the field of identification with the goals and activities of DAHR when we consider the social strata. The higher one's status is the more that person identifies with DAHR. Moreover, this person would be much more willing to become active in this regard than those in a lower status (see Appendix 9). Interest in DAHR does not drop under 50% in either of the social strata although the level of education counts a lot in

¹⁷ See also my article published in *Regió* 1997/3–4. 23–25.

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this case. It can be seen, therefore, that our framework hypothesis evolves according to this aspect as well, since identification with DAHR is a particular aspect of the cultural nation identity. Accepting DAHR ensures exactly one's belonging to the Hungarian cultural nation, which is included both in its programme and activities together with its participation in Romanian political life.

Summary

The general hypothesis – according to which the higher the status of a person is the more the cultural component of collective identity prevails – seems to be proved. As the cultural nation identity component means primarily awareness of being a Hungarian in the case of the Hungarians in Romania, it becomes evident that the Romanian school system makes the socialisation of the Hungarian intellectuals possible with an eye on the “Hungarian cultural nation” despite their minority situation. For the educational system plays the primary role in the training of intellectuals and the family has a smaller role – and we can hardly talk about the role of this latter in the case of first generation intellectuals.

Although the cultural nation identity component is in connection to a higher level of education, analysis by strata reveals some specific differences among those at the same average educational level. As opposed to the intellectuals, Hungarian ethnic leaders – most probably because in certain cases they represent the state or the economical leaders who are often in a close relationship with them – more readily identify with the symbols of the Romanian state and, from a cognitive respect, with Romania as their home.

The reduced role of the nation state identity component is manifest not only among minority Hungarian intellectuals but also among their Romanian counterparts. This indicates that it is not some peculiar reason – for example, that they were more frequently discriminated against on an ethnic basis – that strengthens the cultural nation components. Instead, a higher-level knowledge of the national identity, which contains ethnocentric elements in plenty, results in this.

With respect to hetero-identification, we can declare that the “image on the other”, as the image of the enemy, is characterised predominantly by negative characteristics. However, the intellectuals see the other community in a less negative fashion in the case of both the Romanians and Hungarians. The self-image of the Romanians contains more self-criticism than that of the Hungarians.

The question on what the relation between the two components of collective identity is when we look at the strata, is raised theoretically but we can try to find the answer empirically. Our analyses indicate that those in a higher status can see the ideological contradictions between the cultural nation and nation state identity components in the case of both of the peoples. The Hungarians, and especially the intellectuals try to resolve this by not identifying with Romanian citizenship almost at all. They also indicated Transylvania as their homeland in greater proportions. In the case of the Romanians, those with a higher qualifica-

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tion preferred to indicate cultural nation criteria with regard to the criteria of belonging to the Romanians. Those in a lower status did not perceive the above-mentioned ideological contradictions and they assembled their identity in a more harmonic way from cultural nation and nation state elements. The Romanians identify with cultural nation and nation state criteria as well and, in their case, these two add up. The Hungarians are in a different situation. Besides their awareness of being Hungarians, they also identified with their Romanian citizenship in greater proportions than those in a higher status. Moreover, they perceived contradictions between the two identity components less.

The perception of the dimensions of their own and the other nation's group is more important for the minority than the question of the cultural nation identity, while it does not seem important to the Romanians. The Hungarians overestimate the size of their community both with respect to the context of Romania and the whole of the Hungarian nation. Yet, they – and the intellectuals in particular – seem rather pessimistic as far as the future is concerned.

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APPENDIX

1. Factor weights of identity criteria

A) Hungarians

Component Matrix	Component	
	1	2
living among Hungarians	0.158103	0.698347
Hungarian citizen	-0.1107	0.83235
to be born in Hungary	-0.21725	0.744041
Hungarian mother tongue	0.600939	0.068518
to belong to a church with service in Hungarian	0.71158	0.199182
to qualify oneself a Hungarian	0.625893	-0.03155
have one parent of Hungarian origin	0.611329	0.122805
to feel to belong to the Hungarian culture	0.784317	-0.12459
to honour the Hungarian flag	0.712949	0.004002

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

B) Romanians

Component Matrix	Component	
	1	2
living among Romanians	0.222161	0.72767
Romanian citizen	0.068889	0.80157
to be born in Romania	0.172919	0.800696
Romanian mother tongue	0.616123	0.378977
to belong to a church with service in Romanian	0.576886	0.494584
to qualify oneself a Romanian	0.74427	-0.01475
have one parent of Romanian origin	0.590151	0.335297
to feel to belong to the Romanian culture	0.806415	0.095174
to honour the Romanian flag	0.673145	0.191103

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

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2. Factor weights of motional attitude


Hungarians

Rotated Factor Matrix			
	Factor		
	1	2	3
Makes my life easier	0.654191	0.05292	0.060503
Pride	0.163399	0.699809	-0.04567
Indifferent	0.065966	-0.51258	0.124357
Advantage	0.692131	0.063828	-0.01824
Shame	0.036344	-0.15743	0.327708
Disadvantage	-0.43202	0.23135	0.381033

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.


3. The results of the cluster analysis on the emotional experience of national identification

Hungarians – Dendrogram




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4. The distribution of the concept of the homeland by regions



5. The distribution of the concept of the native land by regions



* The "Else" category contains the "where I live", "where I was born" answers.

6. National symbols in Transylvania

ROMANIANS*		HUNGARIANS**	
Symbol	Proportion	Symbol	Proportion
Flag(red/yellow/blue)	40	Flag(red/white/green)	52
Personalities	9	Crown	11
Folk traditions	5	Statues	8
Date of the unification	4	Turul	5
Code of arms	4	Folk culture	4
Bull head, eagle	3	National hymn	3
National hymn	3	DAHR tulip	3
Church, cross	2	Churches	1.5
Else	30	Goulash	1
		Code of arms	1
		Else	10.5

* 56% of those asked did not reply.

** 43% of those asked did not reply.

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7. Historic personalities (heroes) in Transylvania

Romanian respondents*		Hungarian respondents**	
Romanian national heroes	Proportion	Hungarian national heroes	Proportion
Mihai Viteazul	27	Sándor Petőfi	19
St. Cel Mare	22	King Saint Stephen	18
Avram Iancu	14	Lajos Kossuth	14
Avram I. and Horea	5	King Matthias	13
Horea Closca and Cr.	4	Árpád, chieftains	4
Other sovereigns	8	John Hunyadi	4
A. I. Cuza	5	The Rákóczi	4
Bureb. Decebal, Traian	4	Attila, king of the Huns	3
19th century revolutionist	2	István Széchenyi	3
Romanian kings	1	Princes of Transylvania	2.5
Others	8	Dózsa, Gábor Áron	2.5
		Miklós Zrínyi	2
		Miklós Horthy	1
		Others	10

* 25% of those asked did not answer.

Other sovereigns: Vlad Tepes, Mircea cel Batran.

19th century revolutionist: Balcescu, Kogalniceanu, T. Vladimirescu.

** 33% of those asked did not answer.

8. The picture Hungarians have about Romanians
(MDS model)

 stimulus coordinates

Dimensions

1	AGGRESSIVE	1.3847	.4203
2	INTELLIGENT	-1.2296	.1676
3	LAZY	1.4944	.2297
4	SELFISH	1.4123	.2679
5	HELPFUL	-1.2870	.0935

Conditions of Minorities**9. Identification with the goals and activities of DAHR**

	I am interested and I would do sg for them	I am interested but they are not important...	Indifferent and does not know them	Disagree with them
Leaders	71	25	4	0
Intellectuals	55	34	8	2
White-collar workers	39	43	16	0.5
Craftsmen	37	34	24	4.5
Farmers	30	21	48	0
Blue-collar workers	36	29	30	1.3
Total	39	33	24	1.5