

Summaries

PIERRE GUENANCIA

The Distinction and the Union of Body and Soul: Which One Is More Cartesian Than the Other?

In this paper two problems are analysed: one is the problem concerning the union of the body and the soul, the other is the problem concerning the passivity of the soul in this union in Descartes. I try to formulate the question of the compatibility between the union and the distinction of two substances. It seems that these two affirmations are inseparable and it is impossible to comprehend the one without the other. But the order between the two substances is not only lexical. Even if metaphysics goes from the knowledge of the distinction to the knowledge of the union, Descartes claims that the knowledge of the distinction of the substances goes against the primitive feeling of the union.

VINCENT CARRAUD

Before Cartesianism? The Peronian Descartes: the *Studium bonae mentis*

If we only use the word « Cartesian » for what Descartes wanted us to know about him and for what was made public by the books he published and the letters he agreed to release, we may follow the example of Pierre Costabel and use the adjective “Peronian” to refer to a more personal –though no less philosophical- expression of Descartes: that of sieur du Péron, a gentleman from Poitou, revealing views that remained unknown to his contemporaries. This article presents the *Studium bonae mentis*, which is an unfinished work that seemingly exemplifies the distinction between the Cartesian Descartes, a dogmatic, and the Peronian Descartes, who is still looking for his own path. An unfinished and fragmented work, the *Studium* introduces Descartes to philosophy, a new field for him, and is thus decisive in its own doubts and failure: there, Descartes lays out a theory that will be brought to fruition in the *Regulae*, the theory that order requires one to begin with the very beginning, which is our very own understanding.

GÁBOR BOROS

On the Intellectual Emotions in Descartes

In *The Passions of the Soul*, Descartes introduces the concept of “intellectual emotion” or “the inner emotion of the soul”. The distinguishing feature of this emotion is that its origin lies in the will as the active faculty of the soul instead of the body’s active influence on the soul. There are, however, some serious problems concerning this concept. In attempting to solve the difficulties, I propose to distinguish three layers within Descartes’ concept of intellectual emotion. I call “rational” the emotions Descartes mentions in Part 4 of *The Principles*: the emotions aroused in us when our minds decode the message of a book, a theater play etc. These emotions can be called “rational” based on our rational faculties being at work when separating the symbolic message from its physical carrier. I call “intellectual” the emotions whose objects are presented to us by our intellect, like the philosophical concept of God analyzed in Meditation 3, which results in Descartes’ inviting himself and the reader to contemplate and adore God. Finally, I call “purely intellectual” the emotions the reflection on the first- or second-order intellectual emotion – “rational”, “intellectual” – arouses in us. In my view, this is the clue to the right interpretation of Descartes’ example of the husband mourning his wife while feeling a secret joy.

DAN ARBIB

Contributions to the History of Cartesian Scotism

Our hypothesis is that being a Cartesian philosopher meant at first being a Scotist. We shall put this hypothesis to the test on the concept of infinity (I). Descartes actually inverts the Aristotelian determinations of infinity, repeating the Scotist attitude through his conception of actual infinity, infinity as a mode and entitas as quantifiable (II). To be sure, other authors (Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, e. g.) may be associated to Descartes and Scotus, but their negative interpretation of the idea of infinity takes them away from it (III) and reveals the primacy of representation and the Scotist and Cartesian refusal of apophatism (IV). Nevertheless, the scoticism of Descartes shows an indecision in Cartesian metaphysics between two rival assertions, that of a univocity of being without disjunction, and that of a disjunction without univocity (V-VI). By opting for the first one, the Cartesian posterity will play a certain Cartesian Scoticism against the another one.

TAMÁS PAVLOVITS

The Priority of the Infinite in the Order of Perception in Descartes

In Cartesian philosophy the idea of the infinite is the clearest, the most distinct and the truest idea. Descartes claims that this idea has priority in the order of perception in relation to all other ideas. In this paper I examine the meaning of this priority. I argue that in Descartes there are two different perceptions of the infinite: an implicit and an explicit. The implicit perception of the infinite precedes all perception and it

is the transcendental condition of perception. In this case the object of the perception is not an idea. We have to analyse how the implicit perception of the infinite becomes explicit perception, i.e. a perception of the idea of the infinite. Descartes explains this procedure in his responses to the objections. I argue that the idea of infinite is not one innate idea among the others, but a specific idea which constitutes the basis of all perception in Descartes.

MIKLÓS VETŐ

Fénelon or the Power of the Idea of God

In this paper various interpretations of Cartesian philosophy are analysed in general, and Pascal's discourse on the self in particular. I argue that Pascal's concept of "amour-propre" is developed on the basis of the Cartesian concept of "générosité". Pascal uses this concept both in a negative and a positive sense. On the one hand, the generous is presented as the opposite of the "hateful self" (*le moi haïssable*), on the other hand it represents the perfect fraud. This opposition will be interpreted as two figures opposite honesty.

LAURE VERHAEGHE

The Example of the First Cartesian: Pascal's Interpretation of Generosity

In this paper we examine certain interpretations concerning the Cartesian philosophy, in particular Pascal's discourse on the self. I argue that Pascal's concept of "amour-propre" is developed on the base of the Cartesian concept of "générosité". Pascal uses this concept in a negative and a positive meaning. On the one hand, the generous is presented as the opposite of the "haiteful self" (*le moi haïssable*), on the other hand it represents the perfect fraud. We interpret this opposition like two figures opposite of honesty.

ALBERTO FRIGO

Descartes and Scholastic Love: Remarks on the Definition of Love in *Passions de l'âme*

The definition of love given by Descartes in the *Passions of the Soul* (art. 79-84) has never stopped puzzling commentators. If the first Cartesian textbooks discreetly evoke or even fail to discuss Descartes' account of love, Spinoza harshly criticizes it, pointing out that it is "on all hands admitted to be very obscure." More recently several scholars have noticed the puzzling (or even paradoxical) character of the articles of the *Passions of the Soul* on love and hate. In this paper we would like to propose a reassessment of the definition and the phenomenology of love provided by the *Passions of the Soul* and the *Letters* to Elizabeth and Chanut. By tracing back Descartes' scholastic sources (namely Aquinas' treatises on passions and charity in the *Summa theologiae*), we will demonstrate how Descartes builds up his definition of love by displacing or subverting the meaning of several major elements of the thomistic *vulgata*. Hence a significant part of the obscu-

rity of the definition given by the *Passions of the soul* possibly finds its ultimate rationale in this attempt to recover some traditional questions of the scholastic debate on love, while advancing new answers to them.

BÉLA MESTER

Hungarian Cartesians in the Mirror of the Historiographical Narratives

The paper offers an overview of the Cartesians in the light of the narratives developed in the history of Hungarian literature, history of science, history of education, church history, and history of philosophy, focusing on the second half of the 17th-century Hungarian culture. The first part outlines the cultural, institutional, and religious background; the second provides a presentation of the controversies of three generations of Hungarian Cartesians and anti-Cartesians. In the third part I analyse the long Hungarian debate on Cartesian thought within the framework of the European history of philosophy of the same epoch, focusing especially on the Dutch connections, which had the most important influences on early modern Hungarian thought. Finally, I discuss relevant problems of historiography as well as the methodological innovation that were required for carrying out the present research.

ANDREAS BLANK

Animals and Immortality in the *Monadology*

In the *Monadology*, Leibniz claims that all animals can begin their life only at the beginning of the world and end their life only through divine intervention. Immediately before formulating this claim, Leibniz outlines his theory of perspectival representation, and the present article argues that this theory is relevant for understanding the grounds for Leibniz's claims concerning animal immortality. To substantiate this claim, the role of the theory of perspectival representation in Leibniz's adoption of the scholastic theory of incomplete entities in his response to François Lamy is explored. Even if the theory of incomplete entities is not mentioned in the *Monadology*, it indicates a sense in which an animal soul can be understood to be incomplete without other simple substances that constitute its organic body. This is why the role of other simple substances in perspectival representation specifies a sense in which animal souls are naturally inseparable from organic bodies.

ANDRÁS KORNAI

Realizing Monads

We reconstruct monads as cyclic finite state automata whose states are what Leibniz calls *perceptions* and whose transitions are automatically triggered by the next time tick he calls *entelechy*. This goes some way toward explaining key aspects of the *Monadology*, in particular, the lack of inputs and outputs (§7) and the need for universal harmony (§59).