

Summaries

Schicksalsereignis (Fateful Event) and Narrative Identity

ISTVÁN M. FEHÉR

Two of László Tengelyi's books, published in Hungarian, have in their title the word *Schicksalsereignis* (Fateful Event): *Guilt as Fateful Event* (published in 1992), and *Life History and Fateful Event* (published in 1998). The concept of *Schicksalsereignis* provides for Tengelyi also a possible answer to the problem of narrative identity. This fact explains how the two concepts, occurring in the title of this paper, are connected to one another. The main thesis of the present paper lies in the claim that both the theory of narrative identity (especially in the form Paul Ricoeur has given it) and Tengelyi's critical, and indeed, polemical, replacement of it by the idea of *Schicksalsereignis* are but weakened versions of Heidegger's theory of authenticity. On the one hand, Ricoeur himself characterizes his interpretation of Heideggerian hermeneutics as a 'retreat' with respect to Heidegger's existential-ontological turn of hermeneutics, and Tengelyi also develops his criticism of Heidegger by avoiding direct confrontation with Heidegger head-on, that is, with Heideggerian texts, on the other. Both Ricoeur and Tengelyi take seriously and develop Dilthey's concept of 'the connectedness of life', while Heidegger considers Dilthey's position as one to be dissolved rather than solved. History is, from Heidegger's radicalized perspective, something to be made rather than being known. The theory of narrative identity is, therefore, insufficiently radical, in that life history is something to be narrated in turning to the past, rather than being lived ahead of yourself, turning to the future. The issue for Heidegger is further the way you are supposed to be true to your-*self*, rather than being true to your identity, the latter being for Heidegger a metaphysical concept to be destructed. Tengelyi's polemical development of his concept of *Schicksalsereignis*, understood in terms of an event the subject is to undergo without freedom, is claimed not only to be implausible in itself, but, in any case, to sharply contrast with the position assumed in *Guilt as Fateful Event*, in which freedom was rightly declared to be indispensable for making something such as guilt possible.

Metaphysics and the Infinite

LÁSZLÓ KOMORJAI

The article surveys the possibilities of using the notion of the infinite in contemporary phenomenology and metaphysics. It fulfills this task first of all by analysing the relevant parts of László Tengelyi's recent book, *Welt und Unendlichkeit*. This latter work contrasts the Cantorian with the Aristotelian and Husserlian notion of the infinite and, at the same time, tries to build a 'phenomenological metaphysics' on the latter notion. The present article does not only close read and interpret Tengelyi's train of thought, but also gives a critical assessment of it by pointing to certain dubious moves in Tengelyi's and Marc Richir's Cantor interpretation. Finally, it suggests another way in which certain problems, tackled by Tengelyi, can be solved more appropriately. The solution suggested in the article is not so much based on Cantor's original insights, but uses certain ideas from non-well founded set theory, which was worked out at the end of the twentieth century.

Kant's Possible Role in a Phenomenological Ethics

NÓRA SZEGEDI

In my paper I examine a central topic of the phenomenological ethics discussed by Bernhard Waldenfels and László Tengelyi. The problem focused on concerns the transition from 'wild responsibility' à la Emmanuel Levinas to the moral order associated with the Kantian moral law. In the first part I present the reasoning of Waldenfels and Tengelyi, with particular regard to the point where their arguments diverge. In the second part I try to support Waldenfels' train of thought, in order to elaborate, in the third part, on an important aspect of Kantian ethics, which a phenomenological ethics measuring itself against real moral experience should not overlook.

Emergence-Occurrences and Original Facticity of the Sense-Formation

A Phenomenological Metaphysics in László Tengelyi's Writings

GÁBOR TORONYAI

Almost at the same moment in the summer of 2014 when László Tengelyi so tragically and suddenly departed, his great work *Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik* was published! This essay makes an attempt to unfold the conceptual scheme of László Tengelyi's writings concerning the possibility of a phenomenological metaphysics from two interrelated thoughts. The new normal form of the phenomenon revealed itself in the New French Phenomenology – a third one after those given by Husserl and Heidegger – has opened the way for phenomenology to think of itself as 'another first philosophy' (Marion): that is to a phenomenological reinterpretation of the traditional *metaphysica generalis*. The very same radically new understanding of the phenomenality provides that general background, against which it becomes possible for us to grasp the phenomena given in the phenomenality in a distinctively new way. The

insight concerning the utmost original phenomena – Tengelyi relies on Husserl's notion of 'original facticity' (*Urtatsachen*) – leads us to the phenomenological rethematization of the traditional problems of the *metaphysica specialis*.

System, Form and Medium

Philosophical and Aesthetic Concepts in the 1920s (Zalai and Lukács)

CSONGOR LŐRINCZ

The paper focuses on basic theoretical concepts ('medium', 'system' and 'form') in the work of the two most important Hungarian philosophers in the early 20th century. Several differences are investigated concerning the significance and the systemic role of these concepts in the thinking of Lukács and Zalai, from the point of view of linguistic mediality. The historical-archaeological and the theoretical approach complement one another to show the potential importance of these thinkers, mainly of Zalai, for recent theories of language and mediality.

Language, Materiality and Mediality in the Work *General Theory of Systems* by Béla Zalai

HAJNALKA HALÁSZ

This paper discusses the language-theoretical aspects of systems theory of the Hungarian philosopher, Béla Zalai. Zalai's main work, *General Theory of Systems* (1913-14) is based on an epistemological problem: Zalai makes an attempt to redefine the question concerning the conditions of cognition by the concept of system and the general problem of the form. The solution of the problem and the method of investigation cannot be distinguished from the way of phrasing the question. According to Zalai, form, system and language are immanent and constitutive factors of problem solution. Due to this mutual dependence the question of epistemology transforms gradually into a problem of language theory. The hypothesis of this paper is that the novelty of Zalai's systems theory resides in the recognition of the profound relationship between thinking and language.

Psychedelic Experience as a Tool for Phenomenological Research in Philosophy and Psychology

CSABA SZUMMER

The study presents the psychedelic experience as an artificially boosted variety of the imagination. The author explicates four theses. (1) Experience in the normal awake states of consciousness is a process controlled by rigid schemes and routines, so it is a reduced, impoverished way of experience. (2) For a couple of hours psychedelics are blocking the usual categories of the normal state of consciousness, so they let emerging the vivid openness of the primary experience. One can reconstruct psychedelic experi-

ence as an artificially induced phenomenological reduction. (3) One can connect psychedelic experience and the ‘brute world’ or ‘brute Being’ outlined by the late Merleau-Ponty. (4) In his *Nausea*, in the scene of Roquentin’s revelation under the chestnut tree, Sartre presents a pathological form of the spontaneous phenomenological reduction.

Psychical Causation in Plotinus (*Enn.* IV. 5 [29]).

ÁGOSTON GUBA

In my paper I offer an interpretation of *Ennead* IV. 5 [29], the primary aim of which is to explain the connection between the eye and the sense-object regarding sensory affection. According to Plotinus’ argumentation in IV. 5, the idea that the medium plays a causal role in the process of sight is incoherent, thence he arrives at the conclusion, without further reasoning, that the functioning of sight is based on the sympathetic character of the cosmos as a living being. The problem of the medium gets more comprehensible after the exposition of the Plotinian ontological categories in IV. 2 [4]: the divisible nature of the medium poses a problem for attributing it a role in the transmission of affection (just as for all bodily entities). In the soul, however, due to its special qualities (i.e., it is united with itself in sympathy) these problems do not occur. The examination of the different qualities and the unity of the body and the soul relates to the level of the individual living being. Applying these results to the cosmic living being, I explain the relation of sight to cosmic sympathy described at the end of IV. 4 [28], and to the lower part of the soul, the nature (*physis*). I will show that the causal role of the soul squares with Plotinus’ hierarchical metaphysical explanation.