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A Millennial Retrospection

**Essays on thousand years of Hungarian history
and Hungarian survival by:**

László Veszprémy, Zoltán Kosztoľnyik,
Géza Pálffy, János Barta,
Peter Pastor, and Béla Bodó

with an introduction and a postscript by:

N. F. Dreisziger

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(plus book reviews)

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Preface

Historians usually date the existence of the Christian Kingdom of Hungary from the coronation of Stephen I a millennium ago. Because it is not certain whether this event took place in the year 1000 or 1001 (some medieval chronicles give Christmas of 1000 as the date, while others refer to January of 1001) we feel that we have the perfect excuse to celebrate this anniversary in both 2000 and 2001.

Our commemorative activities in 2000 consisted of two feats. One was the publication of another special volume of our journal (vol. XXVII). It had the title *Thousand Years of Hungarian Thought* and offered translations into English of the writings of two dozen of Hungary's prominent statesmen and thinkers, starting with King Stephen I and ending with several prominent twentieth-century figures. The other event that we had undertaken was the organization of a conference: "Hungary Through the Centuries: A Millennial Retrospection." The meeting was held on September 22-23 at the University of Toronto, on the campus of St. Michael's College. Several dozen scholars were in attendance as paper-givers and session chairmen. The former came from Hungary, Canada, the United States and elsewhere, while the latter were mainly from among the faculty and administration of the host university. The papers presented at the conference dealt with the evolution of Hungary from the late tenth century to the present. The conference was a part of the commemorative celebrations, organized by the Hungarian community of Toronto, of the 1000 years of Hungarian statehood.

In the year 2001 we continue our celebration of the millennium of the birth of the Hungarian state. We do this by publishing a selection of papers from this conference. Our original plan had been the publication of the conference's unabridged proceedings; however, pressures of time, limitations on our resources, and the unavailability of some of the manuscripts, prompted us to abandon our initial intentions in favour of publishing a selection of papers, all dealing with or touching on the theme of the survival of the Hungarian state, and even the Hungarian nation, through the second millennium of historical times. It is our hope that more of the papers given at the conference, including those not yet submitted and

those on which rewriting and translation work has not been completed, can be published by us in our journal in the not too distant future.

In the commemorative activities of the *Hungarian Studies Review* throughout 2000 and 2001 there had been a sometimes calculated and sometimes improvised division of labour between the journal's editors. The year 2000 volume was the result of many years of work by George Bisztray and his students in the University of Toronto's Hungarian studies program, while Nándor Dreisziger's input was confined largely to the preparation of a camera-ready copy. In making the 2000 gathering a reality, most of the myriad tasks of conference organizing and local arrangements were the lot of the Toronto-based member of the team, while the task of writing an introduction and a postscript, and the editing (sometimes the re-translating) of the manuscripts fell on the shoulders of the historian member of the team.

A great many other people and several institutions also contributed to the success of our commemorative ventures. The conference in Toronto had several sponsors and official supporters: the Ministry of External Affairs of Hungary, the National Canadian Conference Committee and the Canadian-Hungarian Heritage Association; and, at the University of Toronto, the Connaught Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Science, the School of Graduate Studies, the Department of History, the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, and the European Studies Program. Dr. Sándor Szakály, of the Institute of Military History in Budapest at the time, acted as one of the academic advisers and counselled on the selection of participants from Hungary, while Mrs. Éva Tomory of Toronto's Hungarian Studies Program, helped with local arrangements. Still others, too numerous to mention, offered encouragement, gave their time and energies to the organizing of the larger community celebrations in Toronto, or assisted with the many mundane tasks of making a gathering of scholars successful.

George Bisztray
Nándor Dreisziger

Thousand Years of Hungarian Survival: An Introduction

N. F. Dreisziger

The perpetual struggle for room and food.
Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834)

If the history of mankind is an unending quest by nations for territory and sustenance then it is inevitable that in this contest there would be winners and losers.¹ Anyone who looks at an atlas of the world produced generations ago will find countries that cannot be located on today's maps. A map of Central Europe, for example, printed in the early nineteenth century, is hardly recognizable to a person today who is not familiar with the region's history. The changes do not suggest that the political entities that exist on the old map and cannot be found on the new one have all disappeared. Some of them united with other states and assumed new names. Nevertheless it is a fact of human evolution that some countries disappear from the map through the course of history while others continue to exist in one form or another.

While states appear on and disappear from political atlases, the same is not quite true of nations — those agglomerations of human beings which social scientists often talk about but rarely define in a satisfactory manner. In this connection Anthony D. Smith's description of an ethnic community, "...a named human group claiming a homeland and sharing myths of common ancestry, historical memories and a distinct culture,"² might as well be the departure point for a definition of the term "nation," to which one should add one more criterion, the possession of national consciousness, something which may or may not characterize an

ethnic community, especially if we talk of such a collection of individuals in bygone times. Whatever definition we apply to nations, we have to add that they tend to be more persevering than states, simply because the latter can be abolished through acts of international or even domestic politics, while nations tend to persist even if they are deprived of a homeland and are denied, *de jure* if not *de facto*, of existence as separate, readily identifiable political entities.

If the birth and survival of states is not a simple process, the emergence and death of nations is an infinitely more complex one. Similarly intricate is the question of why some ethnic groups manage to become state-founding peoples — or, at least, are recognized as such by the international community of their times — while others fail to do so. Furthermore, and this is of immediate concern to us in this collection of studies, there is the query why some nations persevere through the ages while others fail and disappear from the stage of historical evolution.

Even the very process of the disappearance of nations is a complex, multi-faceted and multi-phased development. It may begin with the forfeiture of political independence and continue with the loss of some or all of the usual trappings of nationhood: language, traditions and a collective consciousness. Complicating all this is the fact that the evolution of nations is not a linear process; rather, for most of them historical development seems to resemble not the simple path of rise and decline but more of a roller-coaster ride in which times of greatness are repeatedly followed by political chaos, societal disintegration, foreign conquest or some other great calamity.

Examples for the rise and near demise of nations abound. There are many to be found in Europe alone. In the British Isles we have the Welsh, the Irish and the Scots — all of whom have lost, at one time or another since the Middle Ages, their status as separate political entities, and even to a large extent their language. In the nineteenth century and early throughout the twentieth, they seemed headed for extinction as nations and yet, over the past several decades, they have started on the path of national re-generation and even the rejuvenation of their distinct languages. From the rise of an independent republic in southern Ireland to the "devolution" processes affecting Scotland and Wales we have seen the re-birth of nations that had been deemed by some as nearly extinct only a few generations ago.

In East Central and Eastern Europe the Polish and Ukrainian nations come to mind when we think of these rise-and-decline and rise-

again processes. The former had emerged as a Christian state simultaneously with Hungary around 1000 a. d. and continued to exist as an influential player on the international stage until the eighteenth century. At the end of the seventeenth, for example, the Polish King with his army played a significant role in the saving of Vienna from becoming the victim of the last great Ottoman incursion into Central Europe. In less than hundred years, however, Poland declined and became the object of the expansionist ambitions of its ever more powerful neighbours: Prussia, Russia and the Habsburg Empire. By the end of the eighteenth century the Polish state was no more and the Polish people became ruled by foreign powers. It was only the collapse of the Hohenzollern, Habsburg and Romanov empires under the strain of the First World War that allowed Poland to be reborn as an independent state.³

The history of the Ukrainian state goes back even further. Kievan Rus had emerged in the second half of the ninth century and continued to flourish until the Mongol onslaught in the twelfth. Mongol rule in this region eventually transpired into the hegemony of the Crimean Tatars who in time came under the control of the Ottoman Turks. The setbacks suffered by the Ottoman Empire at the end of the seventeenth century brought trouble for the Tatars. Under these circumstances there was a resurgence of Ukrainian power under their leaders, the most noted of them having been *hetman* Ivan Mazeppa. Unfortunately for the cause of Ukrainian nationhood, this renaissance was temporary and Ukraine fell victim to the hegemonic ambitions of its increasingly powerful northern neighbour: Russia of the Romanovs.⁴ An independent Ukraine almost re-emerged with the collapse of the old empires in Central and Eastern Europe after the First World War, but its aspirations in this direction were thwarted by the rise of Bolshevik power in Russia. Ukrainian independence had to wait for the collapse of the Soviet Empire in the 1990s. In our days Ukrainians are engaged in the building of their nation state for the third, some would say the fourth, time.

Unlike the Polish and Ukrainian states, Hungary did not disappear completely from the map of Europe for a significant period of time. Even during the darkest days of Ottoman occupation of much of the Carpathian Basin there existed a so-called Royal Hungary beyond the reach of the Turks and it enjoyed a varying degree of autonomy within the Habsburg realm. Furthermore, the Transylvania of the times, which was nominally under Ottoman tutelage, was a Hungarian state that enjoyed a high degree of self-rule, sometimes even in external affairs. Furthermore, after the

Turks were driven from East Central Europe and the whole of Hungary came under Habsburg rule, the kingdom did retain some autonomy despite periodic efforts by the court at Vienna at centralization and absolutist rule. Though both the Ottoman and Habsburg occupations had the potential of threatening the survival of the Hungarian nation, a multitude of historical circumstances helped to counteract or short-cut these dangers.

While the persistence of a nation in the heart of East Central Europe for more than thousand years may be deemed a miracle, the fact that the Hungarians did establish a state there is even more of a marvel of historical development. As Dr. László Veszprémy points out in his essay in this volume, no ethnic group or nation had managed to build and sustain for more than a brief period a state in the Carpathian Basin before one was established by the Magyars. Two empires, the Roman and the Frankish, did establish control over the basin's Western regions, but for both of them these lands performed mainly or exclusively the function of military frontier. Between the time of Roman and Frankish rule, this part of Europe was ruled by the Turkic-speaking Huns, then by the Germanic-speaking Gepids, then from the 560s to about 670 by the Avars (who, like the Huns, spoke an Altaic language), and then by what some historians call the Late Avars.⁵ From their Carpathian bases, at times all of these peoples held sway over lands beyond this part of Europe. Nevertheless, the dominion of these nomadic empires beyond the Carpathian mountain ranges, and even inside them, proved ephemeral. The same was true of Frankish control over the Basin's Western approaches which lasted from the time of Charlemagne (ruled 771-814) to the time of the disintegration of his empire under his successors.

Medieval Hungary

When the Hungarians under their ruler Árpád arrived in the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century, they found large areas of the land — marshlands, primeval forests, desiccated areas of the eastern Hungarian Plain and other inhospitable places — unsettled or sparsely populated. Elsewhere they found the ruins of cities and fortifications left by the Romans, and to a lesser extent, by subsequent occupants of the realm. In terms of the populations they encountered, generalizations are more difficult to make, but there can be little doubt that Árpád's people found

the demographic remnants of the previous nomadic ethnic groups, mixed with the ancestors of the peoples we know today as West- and South-Slavs. These Slavic inhabitants may have had economic and even political ties to nascent state formations whose traditional lands and capital cities were situated outside of the Carpathian Basin, in Moravia or Slavonia.⁶

The Hungarian occupation of the Carpathian Basin, unlike the previous occupations, did not prove ephemeral. Under Árpád's successors, the Hungarians established a Christian kingdom which in time became one of Europe's nation states — exactly when it became such, could be the subject of an unending debate by historians. Notwithstanding long periods of foreign occupation, the state established by Árpád's descendants continues to exist to our day, a millennium later. A number of complex factors, both internal and external, have contributed to the emergence and early survival of this political entity. Many of these are discussed in or are alluded to in the first two studies in this collection of papers, in the essays of Dr. László Veszprémy and Professor Zoltán Kosztolnyik.

There can be little doubt that of primary importance in the international context of the age of Hungary's state formation was the politico-religious climate of the times. This was a time of keen competition between Byzantine and Latin Christianity for influence in the region which today we know as East Central Europe. More important than this was the fact that in the very period of the Hungary's conversion to Christianity, the latter of these realms was on an offensive, though not so much in the literal but in the figurative sense of that term. It is not only the actions of the Magyar leaders of Prince Géza and King Stephen that help to account for the founding of a Christian kingdom in Hungary, but those of the Holy Roman Emperors Otto III and Henry II, as well as those of Otto's tutor and confidant, the brilliant Gerbert of Aurillac, later Pope Sylvester II.⁷

Hungary's conversion to Latin Christianity cannot be explained exclusively or even largely by the nature of the international political (one might say religious — in those times the two overlapped) situation of the times. A fortuitous circumstance of Hungarian evolution was the fact that in this critical period, coinciding with the reigns of Otto III and Henry II and their efforts to expand the influence of Latin Christianity, relative stability existed in Hungary under the rule of Prince Géza and his son Stephen I.⁸ Stable rule for over two generations allowed Hungary's great transformation to take root and went a long way to assure the future of

the Christian kingdom that had come into existence during this time. The success of this enterprise was not only the result of the absence of major civil strife or international conflict. Many of Géza's and Stephen's policies greatly contributed to this process.⁹ As Dr. Veszprémy points out in his study, Hungary's two state-founders sought accommodation with the country's neighbours. Furthermore, while they used a firm hand against those elements of Hungarian society that opposed the realm's transformation, they sought peaceful coexistence with, and even the cooperation of, the non-Magyars among their subjects, both of those living inside and those settled on the periphery of the Carpathian Basin.¹⁰

If we ask people who have only a superficial knowledge of Hungarian history what crises constituted the greatest threats to the survival of the state that had been established by Géza and Stephen, they would probably list the wars and conflicts that resulted in the occupation of Hungary by enemy forces: the Mongol conquest, the Ottoman occupation, the rule of the Habsburgs, as well as World Wars I and II. Such an explanation would be an approximation of the reality but it would not be a complete and entirely realistic answer to the question. The first great threat to the survival of the Christian Kingdom of Hungary founded by Prince Géza and St. Stephen came not with the Mongol invasion of the 13th century but as early as the reigns of Stephen's immediate successors.

Two great dangers faced the Hungarian nation in the decades after St. Stephen's death in 1038. One of these was the possibility that the work of the creation of the Christian kingdom would unravel through the resurgence of paganism and re-emergence of old Magyar tribal traditions. The other threat was that the country would be reduced to vassalage by one of its neighbours, most likely by the German realm of the Holy Roman emperors.

As pointed out by Professor Kosztolnyik in his paper, the Árpá-dian kings Andrew I and Béla I struggled relentlessly to avert these threats to Christian Hungary's existence. Although on some occasions they took advantage of their non- or not-yet-Christian countrymen's resentment of German influence in the country to oppose Germanic hegemonic ambitions with regard to Hungary, in the end they thwarted efforts to restore paganism in the Kingdom. They also pursued dynastic and foreign policies that were designed to assure their Kingdom's continued existence as a full-fledged member of Europe's Christian states. To this end they, and especially Andrew I, tried to establish dynastic links with most of Europe's ruling families. At the same time they cultivated friendly ties

with both centres of Christendom: Rome and Byzantium. They also took advantage of the contacts they had made and friendships they had established during their exile in neighbouring Kievan Rus and Poland. They tried to retain, or regain if the circumstances demanded, the good will of the Holy Roman Empire's German rulers; however, if and when they did not succeed in this, they were ready to use military force to repel German military incursions into Hungary. Above all, both of them, but especially Béla I, continued to lay the foundations of a viable Christian kingdom above all through administrative, political and fiscal reforms formulated in consultation with the country's temporal and religious lords as well as with the representatives of the realm's communities.

The successors of Andrew I and Béla I could build on their accomplishments and thereby ensure the Hungarian Kingdom's survival — and even its development into a powerful medieval kingdom by the age of Béla III (ruled 1172-96). It was only under these circumstances that medieval Hungary could face further threats to its existence later, such as domestic disintegration during the reign of Andrew II (ruled 1205-35) or the Mongol invasion in the time of Béla IV (ruled 1235-70), or the extinction of the male line of the Árpáadian dynasty in 1301.

Early in the 14th century the Kingdom of Hungary acquired a new dynasty when Charles Robert (ruled 1307-42) became king after a six-year long succession struggle. He was a member of the Neapolitan branch of the House of Anjou and his grandmother was an Árpáadian princess. Hungary's Angevin rulers would occupy the Hungarian throne almost to the end of the century. Although they kept a keen eye on the dynastic interests of their family,¹¹ they brought to Hungary stability and enhanced international reputation. In particular, Charles Robert strengthened royal power through curbing the power of Hungary's feudal lords, while his son Louis (also known as Louis the Great of Hungary, ruled 1342-82) made Hungary the centre of a dynastic empire encompassing much of East Central Europe. He was followed on the throne by Mary Anjou (ruled 1382-95). She shared the throne with her husband Sigismund of Luxembourg (ruled 1387-1437) who succeeded her upon her death. Being Holy Roman Emperor (1410-37), Sigismund's often focused his attention on the affairs of the Empire and neglected those of Hungary. As a result he could not curb the re-emergence of oligarchic power and dissension within the kingdom.¹²

The second half of the 15th century witnessed the ascent to the throne of Hungary by one her own sons as opposed to a member of one

of Europe's royal houses. Matthias Corvinus (ruled 1458-90), the son of János Hunyadi, the legendary military leader in the struggle against the Ottoman Turks, was the last great ruler of an independent Hungarian kingdom. Under his immediate successors Hungary continued to survive as one of East Central Europe's sovereign states, but this situation was not to continue very long.

The Ottoman Era

The sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries constituted a period of great danger to the survival not only of a Hungarian state, but also of the Magyar nation. The historical origins of this threat can be traced back to the previous two centuries. Throughout the age of Hungary's Angevin rulers, and during that of János Hunyadi and his son Matthias, the Magyar Kingdom continued to enjoy its independence. Most of this time it was blessed by a degree of stability and even prosperity. During the reigns of Louis the Great and Matthias Corvinus in particular, Hungary was a power-broker in East Central Europe. Nevertheless, throughout much of this time, there existed an ever-growing threat to the country's security. This threat was the rise of Ottoman power.

The Ottoman Empire, which constituted an important factor in the politics of the Near East and Europe from the fourteenth century to the twentieth, had its origins in north-western Anatolia (in Asia Minor) in the late thirteenth century. It made its debut on the international scene under the leader Osman I (also known as *El Ghazi*, "the Conqueror" — ruled from ca. 1281 to 1326).¹³ From this base not far southeast of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople, Osman's successors expanded their territory into the rest of western Asia Minor and then into the southern Balkans, reducing the realm of the once-mighty Byzantine Empire to the region around the imperial capital. In 1453 the Ottomans captured Constantinople and turned it into the seat of their state, under the name Istanbul. By this time they had come to control not only a large part of Asia Minor but also most of the Balkans, all the way to the Lower Danube River east of the land formation known as Iron Gates.

During the last decades of the fifteenth century and the early part of the sixteenth, the Ottoman Empire continued to expand. In 1514 the Turks defeated the Persians, thereby eliminating the greatest threat to the eastern flank of their realm. Not surprisingly, the defeat of Persia was

followed soon by the conquest of eastern Anatolia, then of Kurdistan (1515), Damascus (1516), much of Arabia (1516) and Egypt (1517). These victories elevated the state of Sultan Selim I to the status of a superpower in the Middle East and southeastern Europe.¹⁴

The rulers of late medieval Hungary were slow to realize the danger posed to their kingdom by Ottoman expansion. Louis the Great waged numerous wars in the northern Balkans with the aim of extending his influence there. These campaigns resulted in the enlargement of Louis' influence in the region but their long-term effect was not so much the building of a powerful Hungarian bulwark against Turkish expansion but the weakening of the Balkan peoples' ability to resist the attacks of the Ottomans later. Two generations later, in the 1420s, Sigismund did lead campaigns against the Turks, without much success. Thereafter he confined his efforts to the improvement of Hungary's southern defences.

In the 1440s new attempts were made to roll back Ottoman influence in the Balkans. The first of these were led by the above-mentioned János Hunyadi, Hungary's first great military leader to concentrate on the "Turkish danger." The success of his campaigns emboldened Vladislav I, king of Poland and Hungary (ruled in the latter under the name Ulászló from 1440-44), to launch a major crusade against the Ottomans. It resulted in the disastrous defeat at Varna and cost Vladislav his life. More campaigns against the Turks followed with varying success. In 1456, only three years after the fall of Constantinople, the Turks marched on Nándorfehérvár, the Hungarian kingdom's great frontier fortress in the South (today's Belgrade). Here they were defeated by Hunyadi's forces, reinforced by a hastily-improvised "crusading army" composed mainly of peasant volunteers. This important victory gave Hungary — and Christian Central Europe — a respite from the Turkish danger that lasted for two generations. Unfortunately for Hungary, Hunyadi was cut down on the morrow of his victory by the plague that visited the region in the wake of the battle.

The reign of Matthias Corvinus should have been the time when Hungary and, in fact, all of Christian Europe concentrated on the Turkish danger and prepared for the time when the Ottomans would resume their advance. Indeed, Matthias did build an efficient standing army but used it mainly to try to gain the crowns of Bohemia and even that of the Holy Roman Empire. He did obtain the former but the latter eluded him. In the meantime, during his reign no major campaign was mounted against the Turks. Matthias' defenders argue that had his ambition of uniting

Central Europe under one ruler succeeded, Matthias would have been able to concentrate this region's vast resources and inflict a decisive defeat on the Turks. His premature death — he was not yet 50 when he died — prevented him from realizing what he had always claimed to have been his life's ambition.¹⁵

After Matthias' death, the prospects of defending Hungary against Ottoman expansionism rapidly deteriorated. He died without leaving a legitimate male heir. Hungary's magnates, having grown resentful of a powerful monarch who did not tolerate centrifugal tendencies in the kingdom, looked for a weak or absentee monarch to succeed him. They found one in Ulászló II/Władysław (ruled 1490-1516) of the Polish Jagiellonian dynasty who had become king of Bohemia (as Ladislav II) in 1471. Upon his death in 1516, Ulászló was succeeded by his 10-year-old son, Lajos/Louis II (Ludvík I in Bohemia). The task of defending Hungary against the next Ottoman onslaught would fall on the shoulders of this young and inexperienced ruler.

To make matters worse, in 1514 Hungary was shaken by a traumatic experience of a different kind. On the urging of the Pope, preparations were made for a great crusade against the Turks. Before the campaign could get under way acrimony between Hungary's magnates and the assembled army's leaders degenerated into a peasant uprising against the land-owning aristocracy. The rebellion was put down with much cruelty and was followed by wide-spread repression. Under the circumstances it became dangerous for Hungary's rulers to call upon the peasantry to take up arms against the Turkish foe when it again threatened to invade the kingdom.

In the meantime, in the Ottoman Empire Selim I was succeeded by his son Suleiman I, later known as "the Magnificent" (ruled 1520-1566). With the Near East under his control and its riches at the disposal of the Ottoman war machine, the able and ambitious Suleiman turned his attention to Europe. In 1521 his armies took Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade), the fortress that guarded the approaches to the Hungarian Plain. Five years later, Suleiman embarked on another campaign, aimed at continuing his conquests, this time north of the Danube River. The court of King Louis II tried to gather an army to meet the danger but the response to its call-to-arms was disappointing. The forces that set out to meet Suleiman's vast army did not include all or even most of Hungary's military resources, let alone any large contingents from Central Europe's other Christian states. Not surprisingly, Suleiman's army had no trouble in

scattering Louis II and his feudal knights in the famous Battle of Mohács. Louis himself lost his life while fleeing from the battlefield. In the decades following, Suleiman's armies occupied central Hungary and reduced the eastern part of the country, including Transylvania, to vassalage. The rest of the Kingdom (the so-called Royal Hungary) came to be ruled by the relatives of Louis' widow, the members of the Austrian branch of the Habsburg family. Thus began one of the dark ages of Hungarian history, the more than century-and-a-half-long Ottoman occupation.

As Dr. Géza Pálffy points out in his study in this volume, Ottoman rule had many negative consequences for Hungary's evolution, from some of which the country has yet to recover. The most serious political impact was the kingdom's division into three parts. Those who think that this division lasted only for the duration of the Turkish occupation are not quite correct. The formation of a separate principality out of Transylvania, which became a largely self-governing vassal-state of the Ottoman Empire, had lasting consequences for the future of that region. It pre-saged the coming of an age when that part of the Carpathian Basin would no longer be a part of Hungary. What happened was that, after the Turks were expelled from Central Europe, the region's Habsburg rulers continued to maintain Transylvania as a separate administrative unit of their empire. Though for the last third of the nineteenth century it reunited with Hungary, after the First World War the peace-makers deemed it in their interest to detach this land from Hungary and award it to their erstwhile ally in the conflict, the Kingdom of Rumania.

For the duration of the Ottoman occupation, Hungary's division had consequences that went beyond the realm of the governance of three distinct administrative entities. The physical division of the country also resulted in the dividing of Hungarian society into two irreconcilable camps. One of these was made up of those members of Hungary's elite that wanted to oppose further Turkish expansion — and, in fact, roll back Turkish influence — without enlisting foreign help and thereby compromising the little freedom of action that the nation had retained. The other camp comprised of those members of Hungary's nobility who had come to the conclusion that fighting the Turks could not be done without outside help, in fact the help of Central Europe's most powerful dynasty, the Habsburgs. Indeed, Habsburg aid was enlisted and with it came the loss of a large measure of sovereignty for the part of Hungary that was spared of long-term Turkish occupation.

The conflict between the pro-Habsburg and anti-Habsburg camps of Hungary's elite was bitter and long-lasting — it periodically transmuted from a war of words into a civil war. What was worse, as the Reformation spread throughout Europe, this conflict assumed the attributes of a religious war as the supporters of the "Habsburg idea" tended to be Catholics while their opponents were, especially by the seventeenth century, predominantly Protestants. Distrust and hatred between members of the two camps would continue long after the end of the Ottoman rule in the Carpathian Basin.

Equally damaging and long-lasting were the Ottoman occupation's economic and demographic consequences. As Dr. Pálffy points out, the 16th and 17th centuries were times of prolonged and repeated wars in Europe; however, few parts of the continent suffered as much as Hungary. Much of this period saw constant warfare in the country. Even in the periods of nominal peace, low intensity warfare continued with raids and counter-raids taking place in the ever-shifting military frontier between the Ottoman and Christian realms of East Central Europe. Villages were repeatedly razed and some fortified cities changed hands again and again. Livestock were killed or driven away and crops were burned or could not be planted or cultivated. Food supplies and fodder were taken away to feed the armies passing through the region. Many commercial centres declined while a few, usually those beyond the reach of marauding troops, prospered. Overall, economic output greatly declined, price inflation was rampant and trade was disrupted.

The constant warfare and the disruption of economic activity had severe effects on the country's population. Countless thousands fell victim to military action, were driven away to the slave markets of the Near East, or were killed by the epidemics (usually smallpox) that often accompanied the military campaigns. Thousands of others fled the regions that were most frequently affected by warfare. Suffering was inflicted not only by the Turks, but also the Christian armies sent to stop them or, as it happened increasingly in the second half of the seventeenth century, to drive them out from Hungary. In some districts, especially in southern Hungary, and in cities that became Turkish military outposts, nearly all of the original population disappeared. Some communities vanished altogether while in others the original residents were replaced by newcomers, often from Ottoman possessions in the Balkans or beyond. In a study published in an earlier volume of this journal, Professor Oliver Botar observed that by the early years of the seventeenth century, the Magyar

population of Buda had dwindled to a handful of families. At the same time, this royal Hungarian city turned Turkish military fortress remained a cosmopolitan centre, only by this time its population consisted not so much of Magyars, Germans and Jews, but of people from all parts of the Ottoman realm, with the majority being South Slavs from the Balkans.¹⁶

The dramatic change in the ethnic make-up of the population was not confined to the former Hungarian capital. The Ottoman occupation affected the ethnic composition of most regions of Hungary. In some areas, especially in the south of the country, in some former royal cities, and in river valleys along transportation routes, the decline of the original population was the most marked. Eventually, and in some cases only after the expulsion of the Turks, these populations were replenished, but not with the members of the same ethnic groups.

The regions most affected by the Ottoman occupation and the wars of the period, had been populated originally by Hungarians. When the demographic losses of these areas were replenished through the influx of newcomers, it was mainly non-Hungarians that filled the void. From the North, Slovaks and Ruthenians migrated from the periphery of the country that had not been affected by warfare and marauding. From the East came Rumanians, and from the South, South Slav refugees from the Balkans. Dr. Pálffy places the number of those who came during the age of the Ottoman occupation at "at least" half a million, with additional hundreds of thousands coming during and in the wake of the Turks' expulsion from the country during the last two decades of the seventeenth century. In areas where some Hungarian population remained, these newcomers in time assimilated. In other regions where few if any Magyars had remained, or where the newcomers established homogeneous settlements of their own, the ethnic character of the land became other than Hungarian. Whole regions or counties changed their ethnic trait, especially in what then was southern and southeastern Hungary and what today is the southern and eastern parts of the Vojvodina region of Yugoslavia. Dr. Pálffy's conclusions about these changes are worth quoting:

... during the 150-year Ottoman rule in Hungary, the ethnic map of the country underwent fundamental changes. While in the Middle Ages Magyars accounted for approximately 75 to 80 percent of the Hungarian Kingdom's population, during the 16th and 17th centuries they gradually became a minority in their own country. The situation deteriorated further in the 18th

century by the resettlements designed to revive the country's economy and stimulate its demographic growth.

Though these changes did not pose a threat to the unity of Habsburg-controlled Hungary in the eighteenth century, since in those days peoples' ethnicity mattered less than their class status and religion, in the second half of the nineteenth century this ethnic factor became an acute problem that threatened the very existence of a highly multi-ethnic Hungarian Kingdom.

Though the most dangerous long-term consequence of the Ottoman rule in Hungary was this drastic re-shaping of the country's ethnic map, there were other negative consequences that have not been enumerated hitherto. Most of these are outlined in Dr. Pálffy's paper and need not be repeated here in any detail: the negative impact on monastic life, as well as on the arts and on educational and cultural institutions. Collections of manuscripts and art were destroyed, and cultural institutions were closed. In the international arena, the damage to Hungary's status was especially long-lasting. Since the sixteenth century, Hungary has not been able to play, except in an ephemeral manner or under coincidental circumstances, an important role in the political evolution of Europe. Yet, and this should not be forgotten in an evaluation of the total impact of the Ottoman rule on Hungary, the Magyar nation survived the ordeal. As Dr. Pálffy points out in his conclusions, it not only survived but retained one of the traits that had characterized it since the time of the Conversion to Latin Christianity: its orientation toward Europe. The survival of Hungarian trade with Central Europe, the spread of the Reformation to many areas of Hungary (including many Ottoman-controlled territories), and the continuing tradition of young Hungarians attending universities in Central and Western Europe,¹⁷ can be cited as eloquent testimonials to the survival of a Western-oriented Hungarian nation through the ordeal of the Ottoman occupation.

The Habsburg Era

In the region known as Royal Hungary, the Habsburg era of Hungarian history began coincidentally with the onset of the Ottoman rule in the other parts of the country, in the 16th century. In the rest of the Carpathian Basin, Habsburg rule arrived with the expulsion of the Turks, starting

with the 1680s. How long Habsburg supremacy lasted is also difficult to establish because of the circumstances under which it ended. Nominally at least, Habsburg sovereigns ruled Hungary until the proclamation of a republic in 1918, at the end of the First World War.¹⁸ It can be argued, however, that Habsburg control of Hungary came to an end in 1867 with the so-called *Ausgleich* or Compromise, which established the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary and gave the Hungarian half of the realm complete autonomy in internal affairs. Hungarians usually talk of four centuries of Habsburg rule, but in most parts of the country, Austrian dominance lasted only for about a century and three-quarters, and the only century which saw Vienna's rule in Hungary from beginning to the end was the eighteenth. This period is the subject of Professor János Barta's study in our volume.

As has been mentioned above and is explained in some detail by Dr. Pálffy in his paper, one of the lasting effects of the Ottoman occupation of Hungary in the fifteenth century had been the ideological division of the Hungarian nation into two opposing camps. The civil strife of the sixteenth century continued in the seventeenth in the periodic attempts to defend and even expand the self-determination of Hungary, more precisely Royal Hungary, within — or outside of — the Habsburg realm. Attempts such as these usually provoked retaliation from Vienna and experiments in the fuller integration of Hungary within the Empire.

Conflict in Hungarian-Habsburg relations was sometimes the result of misunderstandings. A case in point is the repression that was unleashed by Vienna against its Hungarian subjects in the 1670s. It all started with the Treaty of Vasvár or Esienstadt that the imperial government signed with the *Porte* after the defeat of a Turkish army by imperial and allied forces in the battle of Szentgotthárd (St. Gothard or St. Godard, or the battle of the Raab River, 1 August, 1664). Hungarians, even some of those who had previously supported the Viennese Court, were outraged by the terms of this treaty, which they considered humiliating for Hungary and even for the whole of Christian Europe. They could not understand why, after a victorious battle, the government of Emperor Leopold I had to sue for peace, rather than try to liberate at least those parts of Hungary that had been taken by the Turks in recent times. The event convinced many Hungarians, especially those who were inclined to think this way in the first place, that the Habsburgs were as bad, if not worse

enemies of Hungary, as the Ottomans. The Treaty of Vasvár was soon followed by an anti-Habsburg conspiracy by members of Hungary's elite, which was crushed and resulted in years of severe repression in Royal Hungary and even beyond — wherever the Viennese authorities could reach their real or imagined Hungarian enemies. All this resulted from a miss-judgement of the military situation by the Hungarian public on the morrow of the "victory" at Szentgotthárd. In fact, that victory was a quirk of fate and left a strategic situation in which the continuation of the campaign against the Turks could have easily resulted in unmitigated disaster for the imperial forces.¹⁹

From mutual distrust to misunderstanding and then to conspiracy and repression, was a process that often characterized the story of the House of Habsburg's relationship with its Hungarian subjects.²⁰ The process apparently did not apply to the next major conflict between Vienna and the people of Hungary, the war of liberation led by Ferenc II Rákóczi between 1703 and 1711. There was no misunderstanding on this occasion. After the Turks had been expelled from most of Hungary, the Viennese court treated the lands regained not so much as liberated territories but as conquered enemy lands whose economic output and commerce could be exploited by pro-Habsburg landowners and the imperial treasury. This policy caused resentment and discontent in the regions concerned, which in turn brought retaliation and repression. In 1703, at a time of the outbreak of a continent-wide struggle between the France of Louis XIV and Leopold's Austria over the issue of succession in Spain, the conflict in Hungary turned into a full-blown war between Vienna and Rákóczi's *kuruc* armies.

The war began with Hungarian successes but became a protracted guerrilla-type conflict after it became evident that the Habsburgs were no easy prey for Louis XIV's ambitions. In the end war-weariness prompted some of Rákóczi's followers to end the bloodshed, as well as the suffering of the people of Hungary, by suing for peace. The resulting peace settlement, the Treaty of Szatmár of 1711, was a compromise which served as the basis for Habsburg rule in Hungary, and for the protection of the Hungarian nobility's privileges, for the rest of the eighteenth century and even beyond.²¹

The Thököly war, but especially the bitter and protracted struggle under Rákóczi, constituted still more of those developments in the history

of the Hungarian nation which witnessed much bloodletting, material destruction, the loss of life due to military action, and the malnutrition and epidemics that usually accompanied military struggles. Actually, military casualties from 1703 to 1711 amounted to "only" 80,000, in contrast to the over 400,000 people who died in the epidemics of that period.²²

From the Peace of Szatmár to the outbreak of the War of Independence of 1848-49, no military conflict took place between Hungary and Austria. For nearly fourteen decades war between the Habsburgs and their Magyar subjects did not bring about the bleeding of the Hungarian nation or its demographic decline through the epidemics that 18th and 19th century warfare engendered. The absence of overt conflict did not mean that strife between the two sides was nonexistent during this protracted period. The sources of friction were numerous and complex. They are enumerated in the last part of Professor Barta's study. Though it is nearly impossible to come to generalizations in this connection, it is probably not inaccurate to state that two major factors contributed to the persistence of discord between the Habsburgs and their Hungarian subjects. One of these was the desire of the Viennese Court to reform or modernize the administration of the Habsburg realm, the other was the insistence of Hungary's elite to preserve nobiliary privileges.²³

Historians of this age point out that in the Habsburg treatment of Hungary a sharp dichotomy existed. The trend to respect Hungary's distinct position in the Habsburg realm — her traditions, interests or, at least, the sensitivities of her elites — coexisted with the efforts to rationalize and even to centralize the Empire's administration.²⁴ As Professor Barta points out, these two basically incompatible proclivities often oscillated depending on who ruled in Vienna; and in some cases transmuted even during the time of an individual sovereign — as it did during the second half of the reign of Maria Theresa. Evolving circumstances, as well as a change in the advice a ruler received, often made the difference, and one trend in the Habsburg's treatment of Hungary yielded to the other one.²⁵

Recent historiography, including Professor Barta's findings, make it evident that most of the Habsburg Court's policies tended to — or, at least, were usually intended to — benefit Hungary and her peoples. It was in large measure due to the Habsburgs' military might that, after the last

of the Turkish (and Tatar) wars on Hungarian soil in the early eighteenth century, no enemy forces entered the country for some nine decades. Habsburg economic policies cannot be deemed to have had such undisputable beneficial results for Hungary but as Professor Barta argues, their overall impact was positive. They did more good than harm to Hungary's economy, even though few Hungarian historians have admitted this in the past. The Viennese Court also tried to improve public health throughout the Habsburg realm and the fact that it achieved only meagre results was not for the lack of trying but because of the limitations of contemporary medical knowledge. In the advancement of culture, Habsburg efforts were somewhat more effective. A part of their enduring legacy was the establishment of new schools and even a few institutions of higher learning.

Two policies of the Habsburg government, both byproducts of the age of enlightened absolutism, had negative implications for the long-term survival of Hungary as a distinct cultural community and a viable, autonomous, or at least semi-autonomous, political entity. These were Vienna's drive for the rationalization of the Habsburg Empire's administration, and its efforts aimed at the augmentation of the realm's population — efforts which were pursued often in complete disrespect of the traditional ethnic balance in the regions to which new settlers were directed. These two aspirations of the Habsburg regime caused not only distrust and strife between Hungary's Habsburg rulers and her elites, but resulted in the impairment of the Magyar nation's ability to sustain the prerequisites of its long-term survival. It matters little that these efforts were in many respects counter-productive from the Habsburg point of view also, as they compromised the Empire's unity, and in the end, after the passing of several generations, contributed to its ultimate disintegration.

The beginning of the efforts to reform the Habsburg Empire's administration are usually dated from the reign of Maria Theresa. They first focused on the Habsburg hereditary provinces but were in time extended to that "most ungovernable" part of the Habsburg realm, Hungary.²⁶ The position of Hungary within the Habsburg realm had always been ill-defined and it remained such even after the Peace of Szatmár. As historian Franz Szabo put it, the country's "political institutions and socio-economic structures,... remained largely intact and continued to exercise such control as to make the assertion of the royal prerogative... virtually impossible."²⁷ The limited nature of the monarch's power was best illustrated by the Crown's inability to tax the Hungarian nobility. This situation proved tolerable in peacetime but became unacceptable to

the Monarchy's ruling elite in times of war. Not surprisingly the conflicts of the mid-18th century, the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War, resulted in persistent efforts by the Viennese government to make Hungary shoulder her "fair share" of the cost of the war effort. Since the Hungarian Diet proved recalcitrant to the endorsing of sufficient direct contributions to the imperial treasury, Vienna tied to squeeze funds out of Hungary through revised tariffs. When initial hopes for a quick end to the second of this period's wars were dashed, it became evident that more dramatic measures would be needed. From the point of view of Vienna, the situation had become intolerable: Austria and Bohemia were carrying an ever-increasing share of the fiscal burden of the war, while the land-owning nobility of Hungary was reaping greater and greater profits as a result of the wartime inflation in food prices. Appeals, ultimately made by Maria Theresa herself, to Hungary's estates to accept a greater share of war expenditures, elicited evasive response. As a result, the age of cooperation between the sovereign and Hungary came to an end — the "old politics of consensus" to use the words of Professor Szabo, "had been broken..."²⁸

The solution Vienna devised to remedy these and other problems was the creation in 1760 of the Council of State. Officially, this high-powered committee was established for the Habsburgs' hereditary provinces, but regularly discussed matters relating to Hungary. Because it was an advisory body, it could do so without violating the constitutional tradition that policy pertaining to Hungary had to be agreed to by Hungarians. At the same time, because the government was anxious to maintain the impression that the Council did not deal with Hungarian matters, it did not appoint any Hungarians as its members. Thus it came to pass that one of the Habsburg realm's most influential state agencies had no Hungarian representation on it. This development created a precedent for and in the long-run facilitated Vienna's new policy of keeping Hungarians "in the dark." "The conspiratorial dimension of Habsburg enlightened absolutism" writes Szabo, "was soon to be systematized."²⁹

What emerged was a complex, multi-pronged assault on those institutions of Hungary that the Viennese Court saw as obstacles to a more effective (i.e. centralized) administration of the kingdom. It was orchestrated by Chancellor of the State W.A. Kaunitz, who even developed a secret twelve-point program for this purpose.³⁰ Everything was to be done without admitting that the ultimate goal was the introduction of

wholesale change in the Habsburg Court's relationship with Hungary. In Professor Szabo's words this was a "pragmatic gradualist approach aimed at undermining the society of privilege of feudal Hungary."³¹

Kaunitz's first task was the establishment of the bureaucratic infrastructure capable of implementing this program and staffing it with efficient personnel including a few "reliable" Hungarians. The reform of Hungary's administration was extended to the local level and involved such measures as the imposition of higher education standards for office holders and the introduction of more frequent elections for county officials. Kaunitz hoped that through a regeneration of the Hungarian bureaucracy the ideas of the Enlightenment would spread and the implementation of his enlightened absolutist agenda would be facilitated.³²

Another plank in Vienna's quest for reducing the influence of Hungary's nobility was the drive to regulate peasant-landlord relations. By protecting Maria Theresa's peasant subjects from undue and increasing burdens imposed by their Magyar noble masters, the Viennese Court wanted to kill two birds with one stone: to reduce the Hungarian nobility's power and make sure that Her Majesty's Hungarian regiments would be filled with contented and loyal soldiers. A further motive was the belief, held in particular by Kaunitz, that serfdom was an outdated institution and that the foundation of a prosperous Empire was a prosperous peasantry. In pursuance of these aims a decree was drafted and, after lengthy discussions, a watered-down version of it was promulgated in 1767. As Professor Barta explains, even this emasculated measure was implemented slowly and reluctantly in Hungary — and not at all in Transylvania. In the long run, however, the reform did help to further Vienna's quest: it began the establishment of a more positive relationship between the sovereign and Hungary's peasants — it started the process of making them "subjects of the ruler rather than of the [landlord]."³³

After Maria Theresa's death, the drive to reshape Vienna's relationship with Hungary went into high gear under her son, Joseph II. The whole process, which before had a certain degree of social and humanitarian dimension, now became more of an ideological struggle. As is well-known and as Professor Barta explains, Joseph, who had neither his mother's tact nor her patience, over-reached himself. He had stirred-up resentment in so many quarters that at the end of his reign he felt obliged to annul all but one (the Edict of Toleration) of his reforms concerning Hungary. The reason for this dramatic step on the part of Joseph II was not his recognition of the inequity of his reform program, but his realiza-

tion that its timing had been inappropriate. In the words of one historian of this age, "Joseph hoped that this conciliatory gesture would enable his younger brother and successor, Leopold II, to resume the work of enlightened reform at a more auspicious time."³⁴

Viewed from the historical perspective of two centuries it is evident that the changes initiated during the time of Chancellor Kaunitz posed a greater danger to the prospect of Hungary's survival as a largely self-governing community than the far more radical reforms inaugurated by Joseph II — simply because they were introduced gradually and with circumspection. Yet they, too, had a limited impact and often came to nought during the process of implementation — especially at the local level. The Kingdom of Hungary would continue to be dominated to a large extent by its tradition-bound nobility and the introduction of enlightened (or not so enlightened) royal absolutism remained the not-quite-fulfilled dream of the Habsburg Court.³⁵

At this point the question might be asked what would have been the consequence for the Magyar nation had the Habsburgs' absolutist agenda for Hungary's governance been implemented? We can give only tentative answers to such questions of the might-have-been. A situation might have developed in which Hungary became just one of the Habsburg realm's many provinces. It would have been still dominated socially by an ultra-conservative nobility, one that would have had little political power. In such a land the bureaucracy might have been better qualified and more efficient, and German might have been more widely used in administration, commerce and even in education, especially in the cities. In the countryside, the peasants would have been probably more prosperous and even perhaps better educated; nevertheless, most of them would have continued to speak their ancestral vernacular — in the Hungarian heartland, Magyar. How such a Hungary would have fared in the age of militant nationalism that surfaced in Central Europe in the nineteenth century, is not a question that we can answer.

* * *

While 18th century Habsburg policies regarding the administration of Hungary cannot be deemed to have had a fundamental impact on the prospects of Hungarian survival through the ages, there was one program pursued by the Viennese Court in post-Ottoman times that had serious

negative implications for Hungary's future, especially during the above-mentioned era of assertive nationalism. This program was the Habsburg policy aimed at increasing Hungary's, particularly the former Ottoman-occupied lands', population.

This policy was driven by the mercantilist ideology of the age which prescribed that the wealth of the state was derived from the people and that an increase in population was a precondition for the enhancement of the state's prosperity and power. As both Drs. Pálffy and Barta explain in their respective essays, these policies were pursued by Vienna already during the seventeenth century. They went into high gear during the decades which witnessed the expulsion of the Turks first from central and then from southern Hungary. As Dr. Barta points out, lands recovered from the Ottomans were usually handed over to members of the Habsburg establishment rather than to the descendants of their original Magyar owners. More importantly, the migrants that were enticed to settle these largely de-populated territories were recruited predominantly from outside of the Habsburg Empire. Settlers from the various Catholic states of the German realm were preferred, but peasants from Rumanian or Serb populated regions of Eastern Europe and the Balkans were also accepted even though they were Orthodox in religion — elsewhere in the Habsburg Empire they would have been deemed almost as much a threat to the established "Catholic order" as were the Protestants.

In these lands of new settlement Vienna preferred not to have Hungarians either as landlords or as settlers. Allowing Magyar peasants from other parts of Hungary to re-settle here added nothing to the sum total of the Habsburg realm's population. In this respect the Viennese authorities were consistent: they also discouraged the immigration to the former Ottoman-occupied lands of peasants from the Habsburg hereditary provinces. But the impediments placed before those members of the Hungarian nobility who wanted to reclaim the lands of their ancestors had political motives. The Habsburg court wanted to curb the influence of Hungary's estates not only in the political sphere but also in the geographic sense. Viewed from this perspective, the exclusion of both the Magyar nobility and the peasantry from these regions coincided with the Habsburg regime's quest to expand monarchical absolutism throughout all the Habsburg lands.

The settlement policies introduced for the formerly Ottoman-occupied lands at the turn of the century were continued throughout much of the eighteenth century, especially in the so-called military frontier, the

Hungarian lands administered directly from Vienna.³⁶ The policy was administered with considerable success by the region's military governors in the 1720s and early 1730s: Claudius Florimund Mercy and his successor Johann Andreas Hamilton. The Turkish War of the late 1730s and the War of the Austrian Succession in the following decade halted these activities. In the wake of the latter conflict settlement resumed with newcomers recruited from the Habsburg realm's undesirable populations: criminal elements and deported Protestants. During the Seven Years' War, disabled war veterans and Prussian prisoners of war were offered lands in these regions. After the war more veterans arrived and Protestants were enticed to come by offers of greater religious freedom.

Hungary's estates viewed these developments with misgivings. Some Hungarian noblemen feared that the cost of these settlement policies would be passed on to Hungary's taxpayers (i.e. the Magyar serfs and townspeople) or that it would serve as justification for major tax reforms in Hungary. Other members of the Hungarian nobility complained that the granting of special privileges to the new settlers could create a precedent for the reform of peasant obligations everywhere — or worse, could fuel the demand for such reforms in the Hungarian countryside.

The promotion of new settlements received a boost in 1766 with a reorganization of the administrative machinery for the handling of immigration to southern Hungary. That year saw the establishment of the Population Settlement Commission (*Impopulationskommission*), while the following year witnessed the promulgation of a decree offering both draught and milk-producing animals to newcomers. The success of these measures is illustrated by the fact that by 1772 over 50,000 new arrivals had settled in the southern regions of Hungary. The Habsburg court's efforts in this direction were moderated only when several German states protested Vienna's recruiting propaganda and a few even banned the emigration of peasants.³⁷

Although Hungarian historians have often accused the Habsburgs of deliberately creating mischief for Hungary through these settlement policies, it is difficult to argue that the various administrations in Vienna wanted to do more than increase the Empire's tax-base, curb the influence of the Magyar nobility, and promote the fiscal and administrative restructuring of the Empire. No one at the time could have predicted with any degree of certainty that, a few generations down the road, the immigration of large numbers of non-Magyar settlers to Hungary would pose a threat to the unity of historic Hungary. In the 18th century, and even during the

first decades of the 19th, religion and class determined people's identity and status in society. The idea that ethnicity could become the pre-eminent determinant could not have been suspected, and the ethnic conflicts that the southern (as well as other) regions of Hungary would experience from the middle of the 19th century on, could not have been anticipated.

As we know, as early as 1848, what was unthinkable only a few decades earlier had become the reality. In that very year southern Hungary became the scene of bloody ethnic conflict.³⁸ The struggle subsided after Hungary's defeat in the 1848-49 War of Independence, but such ethnic tensions re-emerged with a vengeance during the First World War. The question by then should have emerged: would Hungary not have been better off abandoning these territories before bloody ethnic conflict could re-surface in them? Some historians answer this question in the positive. The abandoning of these territories, in most cases to states that were hostile to Hungary, would have required a degree of sophistication on the part of Hungary's body politic that did not exist at the time and rarely existed elsewhere in the world at the time, or even today.³⁹ In an age of militant nationalism the shrinking of a nation's territory was regarded as a sign of weakness — and the admittance of weakness, one that could invite an invasion by an enemy country. Most European powers were trying to expand at the time; any Hungarian government that had abandoned "ancient Hungarian lands" to an "enemy" would have faced the ridicule and wrath of the general public — just as governments elsewhere, even today, would do, were they to undertake similar measures. Were it not so, many trouble spots in the world (Kashmir, Kosovo, Chechnia, Turkey's Kurdish provinces, to name just a few) might have long ceased to be places of potential or real conflict.⁴⁰ Perhaps if in 1867 Hungary had opted, instead of the Compromise with Austria, for Lajos Kossuth's plan of a Danubian Confederation, such transfers of land (to Serbia and Rumania) would have been possible, and the potential for ethnic conflict along the Danube could have been reduced. This, however, is a might-have-been of history. The fact is that in 1867 — or in the years before or after — the prospects of the Kossuth Plan's implementation were virtually nonexistent.

Much time has passed between the settlement by the Habsburgs of non-Magyar minorities in Hungary and the final demise of both the House of Habsburg and of the historic Kingdom of Hungary in the "revolt of the nationalities" at the end of World War I. The nineteenth century in

particular witnessed the passing of opportunities for the true reconciliation of the nationalities, and even for the reconciliation of the Empire's two largest nations, the Austrian and the Magyar.

One of these opportunities came in 1848. At the time it seemed that the young Francis-Joseph, one of the heirs-apparent to the Habsburg throne, was quite popular with the public of Hungary. After the revolutionary fever of the "springtime of nations" had spread to Hungary, the embattled Viennese court made extraordinary concessions to the Hungarians. These concessions could have been topped in October of 1848 by the crowning of the young Archduke as King of Hungary as a sign of reconciliation between the Habsburgs and their Hungarian subjects. Such an act might have forestalled a bloody conflict between the House of Habsburg and the new, liberal Hungary. Instead, the Viennese Court annulled all the concessions it had made to the Hungarian reformers six months earlier. It also persuaded Emperor Ferdinand to abdicate, Francis-Charles (Francis-Joseph's father) to renounce his right to succession, and made Francis-Joseph the new Emperor. The new ruler had not made any constitutional promises to the Hungarians; in fact, he had been a minor when those concessions had been made. Nothing, it was believed in Vienna, could hold Francis-Joseph back from crushing the "revolt" in Hungary. The stage was set for another bloody conflict between the House of Habsburg and its Hungarian subjects.

In this conflict the Viennese court actively encouraged the rebellion of Hungary's nationalities, especially of the South Slavs, against Magyar control — in the tradition of the "divide and rule" principle that had served the Habsburgs so well over the centuries. This policy would leave memories of bloody ethnic conflict and fuel ethnic hatred. Like the Habsburgs' earlier practice of settling non-Magyar newcomers in Hungary, it would cause more trouble for the future than for the moment, even though it would greatly complicate the Hungarians' struggle for independence during 1948-49.

Hungary's War of Independence lasted a little over a year. It claimed 50,000 Hungarian lives, not counting the thousands who died in the ethnic violence that the war engendered in regions inhabited in part by non-Magyar ethnic groups, and the people who became victims of a cholera epidemic that accompanied the war.⁴¹

The war was followed by years of repression. Inflicting vengeance on Hungarians began even before that war had ended when Francis-Joseph, determined to "save" the Habsburg Empire and to destroy its

"enemies," appointed General Julius Haynau to deal with the Hungarians, probably because he was known to be a ruthless person. Under Haynau, a reign of terror was unleashed on Hungary. Pleas for the magnanimous treatment of the vanquished came from both within and outside the Empire, but Francis-Joseph and his entourage disregarded these pleas. This period can be seen as the last of Vienna's experimentation with absolutist rule over Hungary. It was not to last very long.⁴²

The Habsburg regime's relationship with its Hungarian subjects began to change in the late 1850s. Several important developments took place beginning with 1859. In that year Austria was defeated by France in a war fought over the fate of Northern Italy. At about the same time, Prince Klemens Metternich and General Josip Jelačić died. They had been great enemies of Hungary and had acted as role models for Francis-Joseph in his youth. In Hungary, there was increasing public display of dissatisfaction with Vienna's autocratic rule. Francis-Joseph reacted to these developments by attempts to appease Hungarian public opinion. The October Diploma of 1861 was followed by the February Patent of 1862. Both offered limited concessions to Hungary, without abandoning the principle of absolutist rule by the Emperor. Neither of these attempts succeeded. Francis-Joseph even offered, for the first time, to be crowned King of Hungary, but not even that suggestion placated Hungarians who wanted their traditional rights and constitution respected by the person who ruled them. In the end, Francis-Joseph reverted to absolutist rule, but it was becoming more and more evident to him that he could not return to the order that had prevailed in the aftermath of 1849.⁴³

The early 1860s witnessed more events that made the Hungarian public more inclined to accept a compromise with the imperial court. Opposition to Hungarian influence kept growing in parts of the Kingdom inhabited by minorities. It was becoming increasingly evident that if the unity of Hungary was to be maintained, the country may need an ally. Most important of all, in 1863 Hungarians saw the Polish nation rise to regain its liberty. Aside from expressions of sympathy, no European government came to their aid when Tsar Alexander II decided to crush the rebellion. In Hungary itself, a number of conspiracies aimed at gaining Hungarian independence were discovered and liquidated. Those involved got lengthy prison terms. To many Hungarians it was becoming more and more obvious that the achievement of independence through confrontation was not a viable political option. Hungary would have to be satisfied with less than complete sovereignty.

While many Hungarians, led by politician Ferenc Deák, gravitated toward accepting a compromise with Vienna, Francis-Joseph was also increasingly under pressure to do the same. His empire faced conflict with an emerging Italy over Venice, which was still under Habsburg rule. In the German realm, the Habsburg regime was confronted with the prospect of an ever-more powerful Prussia. The question was whether the young Emperor would hang on to his chimerical beliefs in absolutist rule and a united empire, or would be willing to abandon these and search for a solution to his empire's problems that had more solid foundations in political reality. The following years would bring events that would prompt Francis-Joseph to make conclusive decisions.

1864 and 1865 witnessed more conciliatory moves by the Emperor: the opening of a new Hungarian parliament, this time in Buda; and more visits by the imperial family to Hungary — with speeches in Hungarian and the dancing of the *csárdás*. Then, in 1866 came two blows to Habsburg great power ambitions: the loss of Venice in Italy, and the defeat at Königgratz in the war with Prussia. The Habsburgs, who had for many centuries ruled parts of Italy and Germany, were now excluded from both.

Despite the very difficult position that the Habsburg Dynasty had been placed into, Vienna took months to accept the compromise offered by Deák and his associates. In the end, the *Ausgleich* or the Compromise of 1867, was accepted by the Habsburg Court. It transformed the Habsburg Empire into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Hungary received its long-coveted autonomy, and shared only foreign affairs, defence, and common customs and revenue policies with the Austrian half of the Habsburg state. Francis-Joseph became Emperor in the Austrian half of the monarchy, and King in the Hungarian one.⁴⁴

The Austro-Hungarian Compromise marked the end of a long period of history in which Habsburg rule posed a direct threat to Hungary's survival as a state or even, to a lesser extent, as a nation. In fact, in Hungary the Compromise ushered in an age of unparalleled progress and prosperity. Association with Austria, as opposed to independence from her, actually helped to prolong the existence of the multinational kingdom that "historic" Hungary had been. From having been a threat to the Hungarian nation, Austria became an ally in preserving the *status quo* in the Carpathian basin.

Though Austrian and Hungarian interest in preserving the post-1867 order coincided, the ghosts of Vienna's earlier deeds continued to

haunt Hungary — and in fact, the entire Dual Monarchy. These sinister legacies of the past were the demographic change, the "ethnic shift" that had transpired in Hungary during the 17th and 18th centuries, and the memories of the bloody ethnic conflict that had taken place during the War of Independence.

The otherwise valuable link to Austria after 1867 posed one more danger for the future of Hungary. This was the possibility that Vienna would drag Hungary into a war, particularly through its territorial ambitions in the Balkans or, as some might put it, as a result of its efforts to preempt Russian expansion into this region. In 1914, this threat became a reality with the outbreak of the First World War. As a result, Hungary entered another period of its history when its very existence as a state, or even as a viable nation, became threatened.

The First World War and the Treaty of Trianon

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries brought many disasters for Hungary. The next two, the eighteenth and the nineteenth, came with mixed blessings. The twentieth century constituted another age of great misfortunes. Only the very end of these hundred years saw developments that suggest that for Hungary the latest age of calamities might be over, but it is too early to tell.

Actually, the twentieth century seems to have started with much promise for the Hungarian nation. The autonomy which Hungary received through the Compromise with Austria in 1867, along with the fact that she remained an integral part of a large Central European economic unit, benefitted Hungary a great deal and paved the way for her rapid though sometimes uneven economic development in the decades following. This age witnessed one of the most remarkable expansions of the Hungarian economy. "From a backward agrarian state," writes historian Ignác Romsics "by the beginning of the 20th century, Hungary had developed into [a country] with an advanced food-processing industry... [one which was] actively involved in exports."⁴⁵ Manufacturing also expanded swiftly. Economic historians Iván T. Berend and György Ránki have pointed out that between 1898 and 1913, the number of factories in Hungary grew from 2,474 to 5,521.⁴⁶ Similarly impressive was the increase in the country's gross national product or GNP. Although independent statistics do not exist for Hungary, it is possible to establish that the country's GNP

in this period grew faster than that of the Habsburg Empire's western regions. Because the entire Empire's GNP grew about as fast as those of Great Britain, Italy, Holland, etc., it can be assumed that Hungary's expanded even faster. On the basis of such calculations, Romsics concludes that Hungary's economic advance between 1867 and 1914 can be deemed "extraordinary," though not unsurpassed by contemporary European standards.⁴⁷

Especially important, according to Romsics, was the expansion of banking, transportation, and communications in Hungary in the decades before 1914. Between 1867 and 1913 the number of Hungarian banking institutions (banks, credit unions, etc.) grew from 107 to nearly 6,000. The length of railways doubled between 1890 and 1913, to 22,000 kilometres. In terms of the length of railways per inhabitants in the country, by 1913 the figures for Hungary were exceeded only by those for France. Hungary's water-borne transportation also expanded, especially on the Danube, but also from the sea-port of Fiume on the Adriatic (today's Rijeka in Croatia). The length of telegraph lines increased in the country tenfold between 1867 and 1914, from 17,000 to 170,000 km. Telephone services were introduced in 1881 — only two years after they had made their appearance in Paris. By 1914 Hungary possessed 500,000 km. of telephone lines, and some 20,000 telephones were in use in Budapest alone. The Hungarian post office that year handled 800 million pieces of mail, up from 51 million pieces in 1873.⁴⁸

Economic growth was accompanied by rapid advances in other facets of national life. The improvement in public education was both a by-product of and an important contributing factor to the country's economic progress. Many authors have pointed out that excellence of some of Hungary's turn-of-the-century schools has been illustrated by the fact that half-a-dozen of this educational system's "products" went on to become Nobel laureates, while several others also gained international acclaim.⁴⁹ Of course, these men attended the best schools, while the vast majority of their compatriots, especially those in rural districts, had to be satisfied with spending a few years in one-room, one-teacher schools which offered only the rudiments of an education. Nevertheless, the increased availability of education resulted in the growth of the country's intelligentsia, the back-bone of the Hungarian middle-class. According to historian János Mazsu, between 1890 and 1910, the number of professionals in Hungary increased from 172,000 to "more than 311,000."⁵⁰

Increasing economic prosperity, the enlargement of the middle class, and the rapid development of urban centres such as Budapest, filled Hungarians with confidence and pride. In such an atmosphere many of the nation's problems, including those that were created by the country's uneven growth — such as poverty and overpopulation in districts and underdevelopment in sectors of the economy by-passed by the new prosperity — tended to be ignored. The nation was in an optimistic, even truculent, mood. It was under these circumstances that Hungarians undertook to celebrate the millennium of their arrival in the Carpathian Basin. The festivities accompanying this occasion encouraged the nation to focus too much on the progress it had made, at the expense of the many tasks that lay ahead in the quest for making Hungary a truly advanced society, one more in line with the norms prevalent in Central and Western Europe. Not surprisingly, Hungary's millennial celebrations were characterized by the overbearing patriotism of a people with excessive pride and a false sense of its national security.⁵¹

The majority of Hungary's Magyars were probably pleased with the way the millennial commemorations turned out — as were the tens of thousands of visitors who came to Budapest for the occasion. Not so satisfied were many of the citizens of the historic Kingdom of Hungary who felt that the celebrations had left them out: the impoverished masses of many regions of the Hungarian countryside, as well as the country's all too numerous non-Magyar minorities. Indeed, the years that followed the festivities were filled with increased tension between the rich and poor, and between the nation-forming Magyar majority and the country's hardly less numerous national minorities.⁵² Of the two problems, that of the national minorities was probably the more menacing from the point of view of historic Hungary's survival. The chauvinistic tone of the millennial celebrations, and the enforced magyarization that the Budapest government had embarked on at the end of the 1890s, contributed greatly to the deterioration of relations between the country's dominant Magyar ethnic group and the national minorities. The rising mutual distrust and ill-feelings would help to prevent attempts at a solution of the country's nationalities problem in the years before World War I, and would result in the problem exploding in the face of the Hungarian nation during the war.

Hungarians of the times, like "most nations," observed historian Géza Jeszenszky not long before he became a member of Hungary's first post-communist government after the collapse of communism, "...believed themselves politically chosen, with a special talent and a 'manifest

destiny'... [but] it was a foolish luxury for [them] in their politically and geographically exposed position, to alienate the people with whom they had lived for centuries in pursuit of illusory national goals...."⁵³

Unfortunately, from the point of view of the survival of a vibrant and potentially powerful Hungarian state, very few Hungarians at the time realized or even remotely suspected that their "impatient nationalism" or "new chauvinism" (to use the words of Géza Jeszenszky and Alice Freifeld respectively), was a "foolish luxury." And the few that did, such as the sociologist Oszkár Jászi, were not listened to by the vast majority of Hungarians, either before the war or after its outbreak.⁵⁴ It should be added here that militant nationalism was not a unique Hungarian phenomenon: it could be observed throughout contemporary Europe and even in the New World.

The war that broke out in Europe in the summer of 1914 proved to be one of the great turning points of Hungarian history. First of all, the war brought huge losses of life and human suffering to Hungary. In absolute numbers, the scale of destruction in terms of lives lost and disrupted was unprecedented in Hungarian history. When calculated in terms of their proportion to the country's population, such losses that had not been experienced since the Turkish Wars of the 16th and 17th centuries. According to Professor Peter Pastor writing in this volume, the Kingdom of Hungary lost 530,000 of its soldiers in this conflict. A much larger number, 1.4 million, were wounded, and 833,000 were taken prisoners of war. Many of these POWs returned only years later, some of them with their health impaired, while tens of thousands never returned at all, having succumbed to disease, malnutrition, and neglect in the POW camps.

Even though the war brought physical destruction only to parts of Hungary (Transylvania in 1916 and 1918, in Sub-Carpathia for brief intervals, and in southern Hungary at war's end), it caused massive economic disruption and damage. Production and investment were diverted from peaceful pursuits to the war economy. Civilian economic activities became regimented to an unprecedented extent. The demands of the war effort and government interference in all aspects of economic life resulted in shortages of goods, inflation, and a steep decline in the standard of living. The result was labour unrest and other forms of societal tensions. 1917 witnessed the beginning of hunger riots. With Hungary's cities going hungry, food shipments to Vienna were curtailed, an act which led to Austrian accusations of a "Hungarian boycott" of the war effort.

Even before the onset of tension between Hungary and Austria — threatening with the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire — friction had started to develop between Hungary's authorities and the country's non-Magyar nationalities. A large part of the problem was the fact that the former suspected the latter of sympathizing and even cooperating with the Allies, in particular with their co-nationals fighting against the Central Powers. Measures taken against the leaders of these minority groups only reinforced the determination of the masses of these nationalities to separate from Hungary. The government in Budapest offered certain concessions to some of Hungary's minorities, but as Professor Pastor points out in his essay, they saw these concessions as not going far enough.

By the fall of 1918 both the social and the ethnic tensions in Hungary had reached a boiling point. Neither disciplinary actions nor government offers of compromises could diffuse the situation. Not surprisingly, the thousand-year-old historic Kingdom of Hungary began disintegrating. In the Hungarian heartland this process manifested itself in political revolution, and on the periphery, in ethnic strife and the triumph of separatism. In Budapest power was gained first by supporters of radical democracy and independence from Austria, and then in March of 1919, by a small group of left-wing socialists and their communist allies who had received their indoctrination in Soviet Russia. What ensued was a series of parallel conflicts, a *bellum omnium contra omnes*, motivated by ethnic, ideological and social agendas. While the Hungarian heartland lived through the Red Terror, foreign occupation (mainly by Rumanian troops), and then the White Terror, the geographic fringes of the Carpathian Basin in most cases witnessed the coming of foreign troops — Czechs, Rumanians, or South Slavs — whom some of the local inhabitants greeted as liberators while others received as enemies. By the time the military conflicts subsided, the historic Kingdom of Hungary was no more, and what remained in the hands of the country's new ("White" i.e. counterrevolutionary) masters, was a pale shadow (93,000 km²) of the great kingdom Hungary had been when the war had started in 1914 (282,000 km²).⁵⁵

The dismemberment of the Kingdom of Hungary was enacted into international law by the post-war peace settlement, the Treaty of Trianon of June 1920. To the vast majority of Hungarians, this treaty has been one of the great tragedies of their history, while to extreme nationalists

among their neighbours, it has been as a callous denial of their "legitimate" rights to even more Hungarian territory.⁵⁶

The Trianon peace settlement was patterned on the Versailles Peace Treaty with Germany. In fact, the vast majority of its clauses were the same or very similar. Hungary's armed forces (like Germany's), for example, were restricted to a tiny fraction of what they had been: 35,000 "volunteer soldiers" with no heavy weaponry, no air power, and not even a General Staff. But it was the treaty's territorial provisions that were the harshest, and were unprecedented in terms of the other peace settlements devised after the war.⁵⁷

The territorial settlement imposed on Hungary and its consequences for the Hungarian nation have been outlined many times. We might want to begin with a description provided by Professor S. B. Várdy, a perceptive student of the psychological impact of this treaty on subsequent generations of Hungarians:

The terms of this treaty were so harsh and punitive that one looks in vain for parallels in modern European history. On the basis of this treaty Hungary lost 71.4 per cent of her territory and 63.6 per cent of her population. Of the four beneficiary states Rumania alone received a larger share... of the country's former territory than that which was left to Hungary.... While some of this loss could be justified on the basis of ethnic-linguistic considerations, this was not true about a sizable portion of the lost territories.historic Hungary's dismemberment also entailed the transfer of large Magyar-inhabited territories, along with close to 3.5 million ethnic Hungarians — fully one-third of the nation — to the new successor states.⁵⁸

The justification or excuse for this territorial settlement was the principle of national self-determination, but in the application of this principle the rights of millions of Hungarians to self-determination were disregarded. Furthermore, Hungarian calls for plebiscites in the territories concerned were ignored, with the minor exception of the case of the town of Sopron/Ödenburg on the Hungarian-Austrian border. As Professor Várdy points out, the irony of the act of dismembering the multinational Kingdom of Hungary was underscored by the fact that the states that benefitted most from this process, and in general from the destruction of

the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, were themselves multi-national, in some cases even more mixed ethnically than Hungary had been before 1918.⁵⁹

With the territorial losses came the loss of resources and infrastructure. To illustrate this point a few examples will have to suffice. As a result of the country's dismemberment, Hungary lost 89 percent of its iron-production capacity, 84 percent of its forests, and 62 percent of its railway lines.⁶⁰ What was left of the country had to rely very heavily on imports of raw materials. Although the country retained most of its food producing capacity, it had to depend on fickle and greatly disrupted export markets to produce any income from exported produce to pay for the imports that became essential for the national economy. Especially hard hit were Hungary's food producers. Having lost most of their traditional markets, the people involved in Hungary's agriculture saw their incomes plummet. Poverty became rampant in the country's villages, just at a time when emigration to the United States ceased to be an option for Hungary's rural poor because of the imposition of the "quota laws" by the American Congress which severely restricted immigration to the US from Eastern Europe.

The treaty also disrupted Hungary's transportation and communication systems. As has been mentioned, most of Hungary's railway lines found themselves in detached territories. Even lines in the Hungarian heartland ended up with parts of them passing through foreign territory. The same happened to some roads and telegraph lines. Water transportation systems were also disrupted. Some navigable rivers that previously were entirely under Hungarian jurisdiction, became either boundary waters (as in the case of the Dráva/Drava River) or international waterways controlled by four different countries (as in the case of the Tisza/Tisa River). The entire previously geographically united Carpathian drainage basin became controlled by four nations. The consequences of this development are still with us today and are exemplified by the prolonged and bitter debate between Hungary and the Slovak Republic concerning the regulation and development of the Danube River, and the controversy between Hungary and Romania over the pollution of the Tisza/Tisa's headwaters in Romania which at one point had resulted in the near-complete extinction of aquatic life throughout the Hungarian section of this waterway.

A further disruptive impact of the Treaty of Trianon had been the mass migrations that it caused. Even though living standards in Hungary

had plummeted as a result of the war, the post-war revolutions, and the economic disruptions caused by the country's dismemberment, Trianon Hungary was still a more attractive place than its neighbour states for many Hungarians whose native communities the peace settlement had left in foreign-controlled lands. During the treaty's gestation period and immediately after, some 426,000 refugees left the successor states and settled in Hungary, often swelling the ranks of the unemployed, especially among the professions and the ranks of the intelligentsia. In the interwar years there would be a further out-migration of Hungarians from the successor states, this time mainly overseas, as many ordinary Magyars found life in these countries — and, especially, service in their armed forces — unpleasant and readily exchanged it for the relative economic and political security of a country such as Canada.⁶¹

By far the most dangerous long-term consequences of the Trianon Treaty, according to a few researchers, were the impact they had on the Hungarian national psyche. The post-1920 generations of Hungarians, especially the upper and middle classes as well as the vast majority of refugees from the "lost lands," were intensely preoccupied with the "tragedy of Trianon" and with schemes for reversing it, and reversing it completely. "Given the shock effect of Trianon," explains Professor Várdy, "Hungarians apparently were unable to follow a path of compromise. They stressed their unwillingness to ever give up the idea of reconstituting historic Hungary, which they embodied into the slogan '*Nem! Nem! Soha!*' (No! No! Never!)." ⁶²

One negative consequence of this type of intense preoccupation with "treaty revision" particularly in the immediate post-Trianon era of the early 1920s, was the tendency to blame all the country's wrongs on the peace settlement instead of looking for other possible causes of national problems and finding solutions to them. Not surprisingly, many of early interwar Hungary's economic and social woes were not effectively debated, analyzed and solved.

There were, however, even more menacing psychological effects of Trianon. As Professor Várdy has observed, the initial Hungarian reaction to Trianon "was emotional, haphazard, misdirected and outright wrong...." What was most misdirected and wrong in these reactions was the tendency to blame Trianon on Hungary's millennium-long ties to Europe. In a way, this type of reaction is understandable. In the destruction of their 1,000-year-old Kingdom many Hungarians saw the betrayal of their nation by Europe, the very Europe to which Hungarians through-

out the centuries had tried so hard to belong to. The national disenchantment with everything Europe stood for led many Hungarians to search for alternative identities, to a reexamination of their roots and history, and to the embracing of their Eastern heritage and cultural connections. It led to the rise of the "Turanian" movement in Hungary with its nostalgia for the pre-Christian values and traditions of the Magyars. It also led to what Várdy calls the rise of the "new-Paganism" i.e. fascism, a political movement that "offered quick, simplistic and often less than moral solutions to the nation's complex and long-standing problems."⁶³

While many in Hungary searched for salvation from the wrongs and humiliations imposed by Trianon in a new, largely un-European national identity combined with right-wing radicalism, the country's leaders sought to reverse the judgement of Trianon through various means. These included sustained efforts to convince the governments of the powers primarily responsible for the drafting of the treaty's provisions, of the injustice of those terms. Hungary's leadership also embarked on a propaganda campaign, conducted both at home and abroad, to rally public support to the cause of treaty revision.⁶⁴ On the international level, the campaign achieved little beyond attracting a few converts to the cause, including the British newspaper magnate Lord H. S. Rothermere (1868-1940). At home the campaign preached to the converted but managed to keep the frenzy of revisionist clamour at a near-constant boiling point.

The Second World War and its Aftermath

Beginning with the late 1930s, the rise of Nazi German power and the formation of the Rome-Berlin axis opened the prospect for the revamping of the territorial regime imposed on Central and Eastern Europe by the Versailles system of peace settlements. Hungary's leaders came to the conclusion that their best chance of achieving revisions to the terms of the Trianon Treaty was through friendship with Italy and Germany and collaboration in the Nazi attempts to revise the territorial provisions of the Versailles Treaty. Some of Hungary's politicians realized the risks that this collaboration implied: entanglement in the Axis web and even possibly involvement in a new war in Europe. For this reason they were reluctant to commit themselves to an overt alliance with Nazi Germany; nevertheless, they continued to try to pry the doors open to the recovery of some of the territories lost in wake of the First World War. They were

successful in this twice, without going to war: in the fall of 1938 and again in the summer of 1940 they manoeuvred Germany and Italy into arbitrating Hungary's territorial disputes with Czechoslovakia and Romania respectively, and through this they regained the largely Magyar populated regions of these countries for Hungary.⁶⁵

Unfortunately for Hungary, these triumphs did not come without cost: in the wake of each of these arbitrations, the Hungarian government had to make economic and other concessions to Nazi Germany. In 1941 there came another opportunity to regain more Hungarian lost lands, when Hitler decided to invade Yugoslavia. He needed permission to move some of his troops through Hungary and even asked for limited Hungarian military help. As an enticement, he offered further revisions of the Trianon territorial settlement. The Nazi dictator's demand for cooperation and proposal for frontier revision precipitated a crisis within Hungary's leadership. Some of Hungary's leaders counselled caution, while others insisted on collaboration even if it cost Hungary's neutrality in the war. On realizing that the latter were about to carry the day, Prime Minister Pál Teleki committed suicide.

Hungary got involved in the war. The search for treaty revision finally drove the country into the arms of Hitler. It is a moot point whether refusing cooperation would have brought with it a German occupation of Hungary, and more importantly, whether a denial of Hitler's offer of more Magyar territory would not have brought about a political crisis in Hungary in which a reluctant government would have been ousted by extreme revisionists and other right-radical groups. After being deluged by incessant revisionist propaganda for more than two decades, the public of Hungary was probably not willing to forgo an opportunity to achieve the country's revisionist aims even if it meant involvement in the war on Germany's side. By 1941, Hungary's best statesmen, including Teleki, had realized this danger, but were impotent to do anything about it.⁶⁶

Hungary's involvement in the Nazi campaign against Yugoslavia was a direct consequence of the Hungarian policy of "revisionism." It brought association with the Nazi German war effort, but not a final and irrevocable involvement in the Second World War on Germany's side. The military operations the Hungarian government undertook were limited in scope — most Hungarian troops served only in formerly Hungarian territories. Unfortunately for the Hungarian advocates of neutrality in the war, Hungary's next military venture, the involvement in Hitler's invasion

of Soviet Russia, proved to be an irreversible descent for the country to the status of an Axis satellite state. There has been considerable historiographical controversy as to why this development came about. Certain historians, including the writer of these lines, have argued that the country became involved in this venture as a result of Nazi pressure or, at least, a misunderstanding. Furthermore, on first examination, the decision of the Hungarian government to become involved seemed to have little or nothing to do with the issue of treaty revision; however, on closer scrutiny of events it becomes evident that a large part of the Hungarian decision to join the Nazi "crusade against Bolshevism" was motivated exactly by the question of territorial arrangements in the Carpathian Basin. To put it briefly, the Hungarian politicians of the time worried that if Hungary stayed out of the war while Romania participated in it, Hitler would never consent to Hungary recovering more Hungarian lands from that country and, in fact, might lose some or all of the lands that she had recovered only a year earlier.⁶⁷ In this manner one tragedy of Hungarian history, Trianon — or, more precisely, the Hungarian desire to expunge it — led to an even greater tragedy, Hungary's involvement in the Second World War.

This war had a more devastating impact on Hungary than World War I mainly because of three circumstances. Unlike during the Great War, when there was only limited destruction on Hungarian soil, during World War II the front passed through Hungary with full force, starting with the Allied bombing of industrial and strategic targets in the spring of 1944 and ending in the occupation of the country by the Red Army from the late summer of that year to the spring of 1945. The second reason for the greater damage inflicted on Hungary in World War II was the fact that the country's occupation at the end of the war, first by Nazi Germany and then by Soviet Russia, proved much more deadly than any of the wartime and post-war occupations after World War I. In fact, the occupation of Hungary by the Soviets did not really end till after the collapse of Soviet empire in East Central Europe in 1989. The third factor that made World War II more costly for Hungarians was the fact that this conflict claimed a far greater number of civilian casualties than the previous one.

Losses suffered by Hungary's military forces were serious enough. Some 350,000 of the country's soldiers perished in the war, and hundreds of thousands (some estimates are as high as 900,000) fell into Allied, chiefly Soviet, captivity. Many of these returned only years later, often with their health permanently impaired, while tens, if not hundreds of

thousands, never returned. Civilian casualties were similar in magnitude. The systematic bombing of cities, the fighting throughout the country, resulted in the deaths and maiming of further hundreds of thousands. The imposition of the "final solution" against the Jews, while the country was in Nazi German hands, brought with it the deportation of over half-a-million of Hungary's citizens (predominantly Jews but also thousands of Gypsies) to labour and death camps in Nazi-occupied Poland.⁶⁸ Furthermore, during the final months of the war, still another wave of deportations took place, this time by Soviet military commanders who collected people for "reconstruction work" in the U.S.S.R., more precisely for captivity in the Gulag. Some time later the post-war government of Hungary, following the example of some Soviet-controlled regimes in Eastern Europe, embarked on still another wave of deportations, expelling a large portion of the country's ethnic German population. And there were other human losses as well. In the first half of 1945 approximately half a million people fled Hungary. These refugees included members of the bureaucracy, the military, and the professions — including technicians, engineers, plant managers and owners — as well as thousands of ordinary working people.⁶⁹ What prompted most of these people to flee were above all rumours of atrocities committed by the advancing Red Army. These fears proved correct. The population that remained was subjected to brutal treatment. Women were specially targeted: thousands of them were raped.⁷⁰

Hungary's involvement in World War II had another casualty which few people ever think of. This little-known but important victim was the prospect of reversing the Treaty of Trianon. Although in the interwar years there was a great deal of opposition to the idea of revising the treaty, there was also some latent — and growing — support for it. Given time, further support could have been garnered internationally — and modest revisions, especially in the case of predominantly Magyar-populated areas adjacent to the Hungarian border, and international near-consensus in the matter might have been achieved. Indeed, it has been argued, that the 1938 revision to the border in the North — today's border with the Slovak Republic — was not a violation of international law and in fact received some sympathy in great power circles. According to Professor Eva S. Balogh, the British government "tacitly" recognized this change in the border as "binding" and the British Foreign Office received this revision of the 1920 Trianon settlement "with satisfaction and even relief."⁷¹

After the outbreak of the war in September 1939, Hungary's prospects for regaining more territory from Slovakia seemed to have improved even further. The newly-created Slovak state was seen as a vassal of Nazi Germany. Furthermore, Slovakia joined the German war against Poland, which Hungary refused to do. "As a result," according to Dr. Balogh:

sympathy towards Budapest,... began to grow both in Great Britain and in France. British diplomats, for example, repeatedly announced that "the British government did not tie herself to Mr. Benes' plans (concerning the restoration of Czechoslovakia) and (that) the main goal of the war... (was) to achieve a lasting peace based on solid foundations," thereby indicating that a Czechoslovakia reestablished within its former borders was not considered to be conducive to peaceful conditions in the area. The French attitude, although on the surface warmer to Benes, was essentially similar to that of Britain.⁷²

Revising the territorial settlement decreed at Trianon in a way acceptable to many elements of the international community was possible, as had been demonstrated in the late 1930s. With careful and patient diplomacy, further changes might have been implemented in such a manner on later occasions. They were not. Hungary's 1940 success in revising the border with Romania gained only limited international support — and, coincidentally, left the country greatly indebted to Nazi Germany. Furthermore, as has been pointed out above, the territorial revisions "achieved" in the spring of 1941 alienated the British government and ended the last vestiges of British sympathy for Hungarian revisionism. Finally, Hungary's involvement in the war against Russia in the summer of the same year stamped Hungary as a Nazi ally. The irony of the situation was conspicuous: Hungary got involved in the war mainly because of the Magyar nation's desire to revise, even to annul the Treaty of Trianon. Involvement in the conflict, however, served to achieve exactly the opposite: to carve the territorial provisions of the Trianon Treaty forever into international law through the peace treaty Hungary had to sign with her erstwhile enemies after the war, in 1947, once again in Paris.⁷³

Whole books could be written about the economic losses suffered by Hungary during and immediately after the war. To begin with, Hungary's transportation infrastructure was left in ruins. From March 1944 on, when Hungary became occupied by the *Wehrmacht*, the country was no longer spared by Allied air forces. In the balance of that year and during early 1945, Hungary's railways, bridges, roads, as well as rolling-stock and motor transport manufacturing establishments were the targets of repeated attacks by the British Royal Air Force, the American Air Force and by Soviet bombers. During the struggle for Hungary between the Axis forces and the Red Army, much additional damage was inflicted. As if this was not enough, further destruction was inflicted by retreating German and Hungarian forces. In their flight westward they blew up most of the country's river and railroad bridges. They ripped up railway tracks in many places and took most of the country's rolling stock to the Third Reich. Many merchant ships were sunk by the retreating forces, while the rest, including all barges and tugs, were taken upriver to Germany. The same fate befell most of the country's automobiles and motor transport vehicles.

With regards to the state of the Hungarian economy during 1945, it might be added that, during the last phase of the war, the German High Command ordered a policy of systematic industrial dismantling and removals with the aim of denying the Red Army the chance of drawing on Hungarian economic resources. The consequence of this policy has been aptly described by economic historian András Göllner:

about 500 important factories not severely damaged by Allied bombs were either wholly or partially dismantled, their equipment requisitioned or scattered around the countryside. Paralleling this action, a considerable quantity of immovable property was destroyed by Nazi demolition experts. The list of removals and destruction is very long indeed, consisting of vast amounts of industrial and agricultural goods. Even the country's entire gold and silver reserves were taken to Germany.⁷⁴

The overall impact of the physical damage combined with the loss of manpower has been described, among others, by economist Dr. Susan Glanz:

Before the war Hungary had been an agricultural and industrial nation. In 1938, the last peace year, 37% of the national income was generated by agriculture and 38% by industry. Due to the demands of war, in the period of 1943-44, the ratio changed to 43% of national income generated by industry and 28% by agriculture. But after the war the destruction of the industrial sector left the country paralyzed. The damage,... caused, amount[ed] to \$4.27 billion — which represented five times the national income of that year and 40% of the national wealth. The country's infrastructure was destroyed, and agricultural activity also almost came to a standstill as the armies moved through Hungary. Over 90% of all industrial plants suffered some damage and nearly all inventories disappeared. Coal mines ceased to function.... The economic situation was made even worse by Hungary's foreign and domestic debt. By September 1945 the foreign debt had amounted to... \$578 million.... [and] domestic debt [had reached] 14.2 billion *pengős* [already on the eve of 1945].⁷⁵

As if the destruction and disruption caused by the war were not enough, Hungary suffered further economic losses in the immediate post-war era, mainly as a result of the occupation regime imposed on it by the Allies and, in particular, the country's occupation by the Red Army.

In the armistice agreement that Hungary's Provisional Government signed early in 1945, the country was compelled to pay a very stiff penalty for its involvement in the war. The terms of this agreement gave Soviet Russia the rights to war booty. Furthermore, all German or Italian-owned assets in the country had to be transferred to Soviet ownership. Moreover, Hungary was denied generous financial and material support from the UNRRA, while some other states in East Central Europe received much help from this agency. And, Hungary was confronted by other burdens, as described by Professor Göllner:

After 1945 the difficulties stemming from the economic havoc wreaked by the war were accentuated unexpectedly by another obstacle: Soviet economic exploitation.... As the Red Army advanced westward through Hungary, all enterprises falling within its territory — some vacated only a few hours earlier by Nazi demolition

experts — were assigned Soviet military commanders. These saw to it that factories still in working order began producing immediately for the war effort against the retreating Germans.⁷⁶

In fact, documentary evidence published in Hungary in the early 1970s describes the overall impact of Soviet military management on Hungary between the early winter of 1944 and the late summer of 1945. In the words of Professor Göllner this "management" resulted in:

1. The complete depletion of economic stocks...
2. Wholesale removal of all liquid assets from Hungarian banks and enterprise safes...
3. Widespread dismantling and removal of equipment from factories;
4. Breakneck production under difficult working conditions, heedless of the need for maintaining equipment;
5. Soviet requisitioning of industrial products without remuneration;
6. The difficulty of ensuring labour supply because of arbitrary street arrests by Soviet patrols and deportation of large numbers of skilled workers to the Soviet Union; and
7. The non-payment of workers' wages by Soviet military managers.⁷⁷

By the time Soviet military management had ended in Hungary during the summer, the country's economy was in worse shape than it had been six months earlier. The firms "managed" by the Soviet military were in "utter chaos." Stocks and tools disappeared, "...and machines [were] left badly damaged." Most of these firms were left "hopelessly in deficit...." In agriculture the situation was similar. The Red Army had requisitioned "vast quantities of agricultural goods without payment, and drove away tens of thousands of cattle, horses, and other livestock...." All-in-all, "Soviet military management," Göllner concludes, "accelerated the collapse of Hungary's private sector,... impoverished millions of Hungarian workers and peasants, and confounded the country's new and inexperienced public administrators." Under such conditions it became necessary to introduce "the most thorough and encompassing central planning." "In 1945," Göllner goes on, "the Communist Party captured a commanding position in economic reconstruction — the Supreme Eco-

nomic Council (SEC). This important instrument enabled it to sever the jugular vein of private capital..."⁷⁸

The situation was exacerbated by the regime of reparation payments which was imposed on Hungary. In compliance with the Reparations Agreement of June 15, 1945, the country was obliged to pay heavy compensation to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The total sum of \$300,000,000 does not seem excessive at first glance; however, when we consider the price structure, the product mix, and the timing of the deliveries, we realize how onerous this regime was for Hungary's postwar economy. The agreement on retribution did not take into consideration the fact that in the summer of 1945 much of Hungary's manufacturing was in shambles. Furthermore, no credit was given for the deliveries Hungary had made to the Soviet Union prior to the signing of the agreement. As a result, "almost 90% of Hungary's heavy industrial production [became] tied down by reparations orders." According to figures produced by the Hungarian General Creditbank — "[by] August 1946, 76,000 out of 95,000 employees in heavy industry were engaged in retribution work,..."⁷⁸ A further problem was the fact that the value of retribution goods delivered was calculated at the level of 1938 dollars, which in effect meant that Hungary had to deliver three or four times as much goods as would have been the case if 1945 dollars had been used to determine their value. Underpricing, however, "was not the only factor substantially raising the nominal costs of the reparations package." The reparation agreement also overvalued the Hungarian currency. The net result, in the words of Professor Göllner, was that "these factors pushed up the reparations bill's real value to about 1.5 billion 1946 U.S. dollars." It is not surprising that in the immediate post-war era Hungary made little or no progress in economic reconstruction and her people experienced widespread privations and even starvation.⁷⁹

There was only limited political freedom in the immediate post-war Hungary, and whatever freedom there was, existed by the grace of the Soviet leadership which was not ready for the time being to try to impose complete control over Hungary. Nevertheless, it did want to create conditions which would facilitate the imposition of complete control later and did not hesitate to use any means in achieving this. Some of the better-known methods used were the domination of such bodies as the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, the country's Supreme Economic Council, as well as the Ministry of the Interior, and through it, the security police forces. At the same time, the media under

Soviet control — as well as military transportation facilities — were placed at the disposal of the Communist Party of Hungary. Concerning the political "agenda" of the Communists in 1945, Professor Bennett Kovrig's words are worth quoting:

Stalin was intent on fostering compatible regimes in his newly acquired sphere of influence, but in the case of Hungary he proceeded more cautiously... Following his advice,... the [communist] party's... leaders developed an incremental strategy... Putting on a conciliatory mask, they called for national unity and set the pace for the implementation of the land reform... At the same time they sought to expand their power base by indiscriminate recruitment, by seizing a dominant position in the Trade Union Council and the police, and by creating a political police to pursue their enemies....

[After their defeat in the elections] the disappointed communists intensified their struggle from above and from below. Control over the interior ministry helped them to purge their opponents from the state administration, to persecute their enemies at large, to disband noncommunist youth organizations, and to harass workers into joining the party.... At the same time, while rejecting Western aid, they could not countenance criticism of Russian pillage, of the heavy burden of reparations, and of disadvantageous commercial deals with the Soviet Union....⁸⁰

The takeover of power in Hungary, accomplished by 1948, was probably the greatest tragedy that the Hungarian nation suffered as a result of the Second World War. Volumes could be written about the immediate and long-term impact of this development, and the many ways it threatened the long-term existence of a Hungarian state and even the Hungarian nation. A few words should suffice, as the total impact of Communist rule, and especially its long-term effects, have not been assessed completely to date, and in fact cannot be evaluated as some of them continue to be with us even today.

Communist takeover resulted in a ruthless and systematic drive to destroy many of the thousand-year-old traditions and fundamental values of Hungarians. The country's new rulers, following the teachings and orders of their Soviet masters, aimed to annihilate Hungary's pluralistic

society and replace it with a one-party, totalitarian system. The country's multi-party parliamentary system (not always free of blemishes) was abolished. The freedoms of speech and of religion were observed *de jure* but never *de facto*. The straightjacket of Marxist-Leninist dogma was imposed on Hungarian society, on economic life, the media, education and even the arts and sciences. Intellectual development was stifled and the country became deliberately isolated (not for very long and never very successfully) from what the country's rulers called "the capitalist West." Hungary's economic potential and her people's energies and talents were harnessed to serve the Soviet leaders' quest for superpower status and world conquest.

Because a great majority of Hungarians found all this frightening and repulsive, they resisted the regime's efforts, and the country's leaders, backed by the presence — and in some cases the active involvement — of Soviet occupation forces, responded by ruthless repression. Despite this, Hungary's "socialist transformation" proceeded, often in an awkward, haphazard manner, and we can only guess what could have happened if the Soviet Empire had not begun to experience serious problems by the last quarter of the 20th century and collapse by the end of the 1980s. Had this not come about, we can wonder for how long Hungary could have avoided the fate of becoming just one of the members of an enlarged Soviet Union — a new community of socialist states under the direct rule of the Kremlin — and how acute the Magyar nation's alienation from western culture and traditions could have become in this process.

Fortunately, the great transformation of 1989 intervened, and we need not contemplate these questions. Since the collapse of communism, Hungary has been returning to most of her pre-1948 traditions and, especially, to her time-honoured European orientation.⁸¹

The Threat of Demographic Decline

The survival of a state or even a nation can be placed in jeopardy not only through the ravages of wars and foreign occupations but also as a result of peacetime developments. We have noted above that devastating epidemics were common in Hungarian history until the nineteenth century and, even on occasion — such as in the case of the "Spanish flue" of 1918-19 — even in the twentieth. Populations can also dwindle as a result of emigration and the decline of birth rates.

Several of the papers in this volume point out that the wars Hungary had been involved in, resulted in extensive out-migrations from parts or all of the country. The Ottoman wars fought on Hungarian soil were accompanied by the fleeing of populations from Turkish-controlled territories, and especially, from zones of frequent and/or intense military conflict. These migrations, however, probably did not result in a net loss of population in the Hungarian homeland, as the refugees of these conflicts more often than not settled in remote, more peaceful regions of the Carpathian Basin.

In the post-Ottoman era, the exodus of people, especially of political elites and soldiers, was also most likely the consequence of wars. The Rákóczi War of Liberation of 1703-1711, the War of Independence of 1848-49, the post-World War I civil turmoil, and the Second World War, all resulted in the departure from Hungary of tens, even hundreds of thousands of Hungarian citizens. An exodus of similar magnitude took place during the communist period when, despite the existence of the "Iron Curtain" — with its barbed wire fences and minefields — tens of thousands of Hungarians risked their lives to flee the country, and in the wake of the Revolution in 1956, over 200,000 did.

At other times no wartime conditions or foreign occupation proved necessary to prompt Hungarians to leave their country. Emigration from Hungary went on during even the most perfect of peacetimes and in the absence of any foreign oppression. The most remarkable of such periods, from the point of view of the magnitude of emigration, were the three decades before the outbreak of the First World War. Over two million citizens of the country left in this period for other lands, both in East Central Europe and overseas, with a large majority of them choosing the United States of America as their destination.

In recent years historians have revised many of the earlier misconceptions about this mass exodus. One of the early "myths" about emigration to the New World was the idea that it was extreme poverty, pure and simple, that drove people from Hungary to other lands, especially to America. Immigration historian Julianna Puskás has emphasized the fact that this emigration took place at a time of rapid economic development in Hungary. In fact, she had pointed out that the peak of Hungarian emigration to the United States coincided with times of the most rapid economic progress in Hungary. In fact it seems that people were driven from the country not so much by poverty but by the fact that economic development in Hungary was uneven and caused dislocations

for a large number of people, for example craftsmen whose skills became redundant as a result of the expansion of factories. The other factor was the rise of expectations that rapid economic development caused. These expectations could rarely be satisfied in Hungary, but could be in the very swiftly developing United States. In fact, Puskás also points out that the peaks of Hungarian influx into the US almost invariably coincided with times of economic prosperity in America.⁸²

Many of the Hungarian citizens who emigrated to the United States were from among Hungary's linguistic and religious minorities. For the longest time the usual explanation given for the departure of many of these people was their being "oppressed" by the Kingdom's Hungarian majority. Julianna Puskás exposes this myth as well. She admits that a few intellectuals might have left Hungary for such reasons, but argues that most of the migrants who went to the United States did so in search of economic opportunities and, in fact, some of them discovered their national identity only there — after being subjected to nationalistic and anti-Hungarian and anti-Habsburg propaganda by enemies of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Puskás points out that the minority of non-Magyar ethnics who were most likely to leave Hungary in this period were Germans and Jews, two groups that were least likely to suffer oppression in the pre-1914 Kingdom of Hungary.⁸³

The most prominent characteristic of the emigration from Hungary in this period, according to recent researches, was its temporary or impermanent nature. People from Hungary, both Magyars and members of the minorities, went abroad not to leave their homeland permanently, but to make some money and return with it to improve their and their families' economic prospects. The "emigration" of people from Hungary, argues Puskás, was a "temporary emergency solution to a problem at home." Because such migration was transient, there was a lot of crisscrossing of the Atlantic by Hungarian "immigrants." It was only the First World War and the subsequent social and economic upheavals in East Central Europe that dampened the migrants' enthusiasm for returning to their homeland "rich" and starting a new life there. As a result, these transients became settlers and began to put down roots in their new North American cultural and social environment.⁸⁴

After the imposition of the infamous American "quota laws" in the 1920s restricting immigration from Eastern Europe, Hungarians could not emigrate there, either as temporary or long-term residents. Because economic conditions in Hungary had become even worse than they had

been before 1914, Hungarians still desired to emigrate, perhaps more likely permanently than had been the case with the pre-1914 migrants. Not being able to go to the United States, they went to Canada or to South American countries such as Argentina or Brazil. We have mentioned the out-migration to these countries, in particular Canada, from the Magyar-populated counties of the successor states. But there was considerable migration from Hungary as well: to Canada alone, over 30,000 immigrants migrated from Hungary in the period from 1924, when the gates were opened to immigrants from former enemy lands, to 1931 when they were shut because of the economic depression that had started in the fall of 1929.⁸⁵

As has been mentioned, the Second World War and its aftermath constituted another period of great demographic losses to Hungary as a result of the exodus of refugees. The two largest waves left the country in 1944-45 and 1956-57 respectively, but there was an outflow of political refugees at other times as well. These losses, when added to the loss of life due to war and the forcible removal of populations, go a long way in explaining the very slow growth of Hungary's population from the 1930s to the 1990s. Illustrative of this is the fact that the country's population passed the 9,000,000 mark some time during the second half of the 1930s, and it passed the next milestone, the 10,000,000 mark, only a generation later, and it has not been able to reach the 11,000,000 figure. In stark contrast stand the population growth statistics of Canada, for example. That country passed the 7,000,000 mark in the first decade of the 20th century, the 10,000,000 one two decades later, the 15,000,000 figure in the early 1950s, and the 25,000,000 mark three decades later. The annual rate of population growth in Hungary has not passed the 1 percent figure since the early 1900, while Canada has experienced annual growth rates as high or almost as high as 3 percent both before World War I (due mainly to immigration) and after World War II (due mainly to high birth rates, i.e. the post-war "baby boom").⁸⁶

Though emigration had contributed to the stagnation of Hungary's demographic growth, it never constituted the great loss to the Hungarian nation that some Hungarian historians have made it out to be. Hungarians who left Hungary, did not leave the Hungarian nation. In fact, they became the builders of the Hungarian diaspora that had been so prominent and active in many countries of the world, especially the Western democracies, during the 20th century. Hungarians in emigration spread knowledge about their country and culture among the receiving populations, and

helped their relatives at home financially. They also served as personal contacts and sources of information for their countrymen in Hungary in times when the country's foreign rulers wanted to isolate the Magyar masses for Western and democratic influences.⁸⁷ Many Hungarian immigrants took their Western-acquired experience and knowledge back to Hungary with them on extended visits or when they re-migrated to their country of origin.

For the past century-and-a-half, the slow demographic growth of the Hungarian nation has been a source of concern to many Hungarians, especially to members of the country's nationalistic elite and intelligentsia. Many of these people complained about mass emigration and a few of them even lobbied for such legislative measures as the curbing of emigration propaganda spread by immigration agents of New World countries eager to recruit prospective settlers.⁸⁸ The efforts of the anti-emigration lobbyists met with limited success. The most effective measure that could have reduced emigration from Hungary would have been meaningful land reform, but opposition to such reform was wide-spread in both pre-World War I and in interwar Hungary. Emigration could not be curbed easily, and it was also difficult to blame the country's poor, especially its landless proletariat, for trying to improve their economic prospects by emigrating to lands where opportunities were more plentiful.

Hungary's concerned elites and patriotic-minded intellectuals also worried about the increasingly low birth rate that their nation began experiencing more or less concurrently with the increase of emigration from the country. Mass emigration in the decades before 1914, huge losses in lives during the Great War, the even greater demographic catastrophe imposed by the Treaty of Trianon, accompanied by declining natural population growth, raised the spectre of demographic extinction for the Hungarian nation. Not surprisingly, the interwar years were times of intense debates about the Magyar nation's survival.

Of particular interest to concerned Hungarian intellectuals and politicians was the spread of the custom of the single-child family in the Hungarian countryside. Called the "*egyke* phenomenon," the practice of peasant families raising only one child, first came to national attention long before the debate about low birth rates reached its zenith after World War I. It was noticed as early as the 1840s in certain counties of southern Hungary. Several decades later demographers and sociologists found the practice widespread in many regions of the country and the debate

about the "threatening" consequences of the *egyke* system became elevated to a burning national controversy.

Those participating in the debate tried to explain the roots of this phenomenon. As Professor Béla Bodó outlines in his study in our volume, these people identified the cause of this practice by references to one or another of the socio-economic trends experienced by contemporary Hungary. Some pointed to the increased influence of women in Hungarian peasant society, others to the growing trend on the part of peasant parents to be indulgent to their children, or to the decline of age-old folk traditions and culture. Still others sought the cause of the increasing use of contraception by peasants in what they perceived to be the decline of morals, especially of sexual morality.

The debate on the "*egyke* question" was more emotional than scientific. For many Hungarian intellectuals, as Dr. Bodó points out, it was fuelled by a fear for the nation's future, and for the racists among them, even an apprehension about the survival prospects of the "white race." The debate, almost inevitably, assumed political overtones. Arguments for, and in most cases against, birth control by Hungary's country folk, became parts of the official or unofficial political platforms of certain parties. The country's Conservatives, Dr. Bodó argues, used the arguments against the *egyke* practice to emphasize the harmful effects of urbanization and the dangers of the spread of urban values to Hungary's villages. At the same time, Hungary's Populists demanded the elimination of the conditions (rural poverty, lack of opportunities for peasant youth, etc.) that in their view gave rise to the single-child families in the countryside. Above all, in their discussions of the *egyke* phenomenon, the Populists called for effective land reforms. The Populists' arguments found no sympathy with the Conservatives, and got little support from Social Democrats and other city-based left-of-centre intellectuals who often envied the literary success of some of the Populist writers and were concerned about the overly nationalistic and sometimes even anti-Semitic overtones of the debate.

In the end little was achieved in the quest for greater population growth among the country's peasantry. The Populists, often confident that their literary accomplishments would pave the way to social and economic reforms, failed to create a political force that enjoyed the support of Hungary's peasantry. Without such a party they made no progress toward meaningful land reform. Furthermore, after 1945 when such reform became viable, the peasant masses of the country lacked a cohe-

sive political movement that might have been able to prevent, or at least delay, a takeover of the country by the Communists. The national debate over population growth not only failed to precipitate increased population growth, but also it failed to deliver the political dividends that the proponents of such growth and the friends of the peasantry had hoped it might bring about.

It is not within the scope of this inquiry to treat in more than the most peremptory manner the population policies of Hungary's post-1948 communist regimes. On the whole, the demographic policies of the country's successive communist governments can be characterized as being the imitation, as in virtually every other sphere of national life, of the "Soviet model." Nevertheless, even the communist era experienced at least one period of great concern for population decline. This was in 1952-53 when the sale contraceptive devices were curtailed and abortion was made illegal in the vast majority of circumstances.⁸⁹ This anti-abortion campaign, however, made only a slight dent in Hungary's birth rate, which continued to stagnate throughout the entire communist era.

Conditions did not change dramatically with the passing of communism in 1989. The deplorable housing conditions of the previous decades, the diminished influence of the churches — and especially, of the Catholic Church — lingered on throughout the 1990s and it was only towards the end of the decade that some slight improvement appeared in regards to the birth rate. The fact that, in the post-1989 age, women on the whole did not feel any more empowered economically or politically, nor better provided for socially, no doubt also contributed to birth rates in Hungary not rebounding in the last decade of the 20th century.⁹⁰

Despite the rather uninspiring experience in regard to demographic growth of the first decade of the post-communist age, Hungary's future prospects appear promising. The economic hardships of the transition from a command economy to a market economy, from an economy dependent on the markets of the "Socialist camp" to one in which Europe and the West have become the country's major trading partners, are being gradually overcome in Hungary and most economic indicators predict a better future. Within a few years the economic inhibitors of faster population growth, such as poor housing conditions and shortages in accommodation, should start disappearing. A concurrent increase in family incomes might also encourage larger families. Only time will tell if the re-emergence of the churches as viable institutions in

a pluralistic Hungary, would also have a positive impact on birth rates in the country.

More important in the opinion of the writer of these lines is the fact that Hungary is undoubtedly on its way to become a country of immigration. With economic conditions in the country considerably better than those in neighbouring countries to the east and south-east, and in many countries of the developing world, and with a stable (or, at least, relatively stable) political situation prevailing in the country, Hungary should be able to attract immigrants of high calibre. The prospect of Hungary's European Union membership should make the country even more attractive to newcomers. And, membership in the EU could make Hungary (already a NATO member, the only one in the middle Danube Basin) a very desirable place to settle in. Judicious immigration policies could materially benefit the country both in the short term, by providing skilled labour and technical expertise, and in the long run, by counteracting the negative effects of slow natural population growth.

Heightening the prospects of effective immigration policies by future Hungarian governments is the fact that there is a large pool of people who would find relocating to Hungary an attractive proposition. The people's of many East and South-Eastern European countries would find Hungary, with its expanding economic opportunities and stable political system, a desirable place. And so would many educated individuals from other places in the world, and even retirees from Western Europe and North America. As these immigrants would come from different countries and would represent people of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds, there is little chance that they would create irredeemable, as the immigrants of the early modern period had created, once they became conscious of their ethnic "otherness" and their cultural *and* political affinities with "their" peoples living on the other side of Hungary's boundaries. Furthermore, Hungary, unlike most other countries in Europe but not unlike West Germany of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, is in position to receive immigrants of non-foreign ethnic background. Just as the West German regimes of the above period actively encouraged the immigration to their country of people of German ethnicity from all parts of Eastern Europe, Hungary should encourage the immigration of people of Magyar stock from the neighbouring countries with Hungarian minorities. Of course, such a policy is bound to be controversial among people who still have lingering hopes of rectifying somewhat the frontier settlement proclaimed at Trianon. However, such hopes are fading, and will

continue to fade as the decades pass and as the position of these minorities will continue to weaken demographically, culturally and politically.

In the 21st century, there are even more arguments for saving Hungarians for the Hungarian nation as opposed to aspiring for some kind of a territorial solution to the problem of the Hungarian irredenta in neighbouring lands. One old argument that without substantial, i.e. populous, Hungarian communities in these countries, autonomous Hungarian regions — with extensive cultural rights and self-government — cannot be established, commands less and less weight. If such autonomous Hungarian cultural communities could not be established on a lasting basis (some existed for shorter or longer periods of time) in the eighty years since Trianon, the prospects for their creation are dim. With the hopes for territorial revisions dashed long time ago, and with diminishing prospects for the creation of autonomous Hungarian cultural districts in the neighbouring countries, Hungarian governments of the immediate future will be confronted with the question: why not save the members of these Magyar communities for the Hungarian nation through their emigration to Hungary? After all, in the 21st century the situation is changing drastically. In the 19th and even in the 20th centuries, territory was more important than populations; today, increasingly the most valuable commodity for a nation are its citizens, e.i. their talents, skills and knowledge.

The Hungary of the future is likely to be an increasingly stable and prosperous place. The arts and learning will no doubt also flourish there with increasing vitality. The prediction of the 16th century Flemish scholar Nicasius Ellebodius, quoted by Dr. Pálffy at the end of his paper in this volume, that a Hungary free of war and turbulence might "become the most suitable place for accomplishing academic plans as well," may come true — after half-a-millennium of delay.

Should political stability and affluence come to Hungary in the 21st century, the Magyar nation will probably grow again, as it often did in times of peace and prosperity in its thousand years of evolution. As it had been often throughout the centuries, it could be a country of immigration again, rather than one supplying settlers for other parts of the world as it did in the 19th and 20th centuries. On the surface at least it seems, the crises of Hungarian survival, so acute often in the past and so gravely threatening in the 20th century, might be behind us at least for the foreseeable future. Not wishing to end the introduction to this volume of essays on a negative note, I left the discussion of some lingering doubts about

Hungarian nation's long-term survival — and, especially, about the survival of Hungarian communities beyond the borders of Hungary, — to the postscript.

NOTES

Several people, most of them contributors of this volume, have commented on all or parts of the text of this introduction. To them I extend my thanks and remind the readers that the responsibility for any errors of fact, interpretation or omission rests on my own shoulders.

A special note on sources: it is not possible for an essay on thousand years of history of a nation to have adequate and up-to-date references to the vast literature on the subject. The selection of sources in such a case is bound to be arbitrary. In the citing of literature, in this introductory essay I gave preference to articles and books that have been published by Canadian authors or to works that had appeared in Canada — in many cases in our journal. A lesser degree of priority was accorded to authors and publications of the English-speaking world. I adopted these priorities mainly to publicize the research that has been done in the field of Hungarian history in the United States, the United Kingdom and, especially, in Canada.

¹ Those who might question the applicability of the Malthusian analysis to twenty-first century conditions should watch the daily news from parts of the world such as Ramallah or Belfast. It must be admitted, however, that in most parts of the world the struggle for territory and resources has taken on an air of apparent civility and transpires not by armed force and not on the frontlines but often through takeovers devised in the boardrooms of giant corporations.

The literature of the emergence and persistence of nations is enormous. A prominent Canadian contribution to this literature is Michael Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (Toronto: Viking, etc.; London: BBC Books, etc., 1993). Other relevant works are: Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations* (London and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, etc., 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1870* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1990); William H. McNeill, *Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); and specifically on the subject of survival, Anthony D. Smith, "Chosen peoples: why ethnic groups survive," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 15 (July 1992): 436–458. A classic Hungarian contribution to the subject of the

rise of the nation-states and nationality problems is Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* [The development of nation states and the nationality question] (Budapest, 1912; a new, abbreviated edition, edited and introduced by György Litván, appeared in 1986, in Budapest, published by Gondolat).

² Smith, "Chosen peoples," 438. For discussions of such terms as "nation," "nationalism" and "national identity," see Thomas Spira ed., *Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Directory and Research Guide* (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1999f).

³ For a detailed history of Poland in English see Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 2 vols.; for a shorter account see the relevant parts of Piotr Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe...* (London & New York: Routledge, 1992); and for a brief overview see Anna M. Cienciala's entry "Poland (History)" in the *Encyclopedia of Eastern Europe*, ed. Richard Frucht (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 2000), 590–617.

⁴ Orest Subtelny, *Domination of Eastern Europe: Native Nobilities and Foreign Absolutism, 1500–1715* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill–Queen's Press, 1986), 130–37.

⁵ Archeologist and historian Gyula László has argued, in the numerous studies and books he published from the 1940s to the early 1990s, that the "Late Avars" were in fact the first Magyar settlers of the Carpathian Basin. They were joined some four generations later by Árpád's Hungarians, in an occupation of this land that some contemporary chroniclers referred to as the *secundus ingressus* or "second coming" of the Magyars into what is now Hungary.

⁶ One legendary Slav principality of the period was Magna Moravia or Great Moravia. According to Czech historians it existed in the lands that later became Moravia in what is now the Czech Republic. Historian Imre Boba (1919–1996) argued that this early Slav principality was situated south of the Danube River, near the ancient city of Sirmium (near the latter-day town of Marava, today's Sremská Mitrovica). Imre Boba, *Moravia's History Reconsidered: A Reinterpretation of Medieval Sources* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1971). This monograph has been reviewed at length in our journal by Veronica Gervers-Molnar (1939–1979): vol. II, no. 2 (fall, 1975): 123–29.

⁷ For recent literature on the external context of this age of Magyar history see Zoltán Kosztolnyik, "Német politikai fejlemények a magyar történet háttérében..." [German political developments in the background of Hungarian history...], *Acta Universitatis Szegediensis* 109 (1999): 3–11. As Dr. Veszprémy hints in his study, in discussing the acts and deeds of these men, we should not forget those (even though not nearly as well documented) of Henry II's sister (and King Stephen's wife), Gisela.

⁸ More than one state or empire owes its emergence to the succession of capable leaders. In Hungary's immediate neighbourhood one thinks of the rulers of Kievan Rus from Sviatoslav to Iaroslav the Wise, spanning almost a century (from the mid-960s to the mid-1050s). One of the most remarkable examples of the succession of able rulers is the first series of sultans of the Ottoman realm, starting with Osman and ending with Suleiman the Magnificent, covering a time-span of over two centuries. The Ottomans were not so lucky with Suleiman's successors.

⁹ These policies, and especially the wise state-building efforts of St. Stephen, are described by historian György Györffy. See his *magnum opus*: *István Király és műve* [King Stephen and his work] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1977). A shorter version of this work of his is available in English: *King Saint Stephen of Hungary* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

¹⁰ It should not be forgotten that the tribes that arrived on the Hungarian Plain under Árpád's leadership at the end of the 9th century included the Kabars, Turkic-speaking Khazar allies of the Magyars. They settled in the midsts of a variety of peoples. Indeed, the Carpathian Basin of the 10th century must have been a highly multi-ethnic society! Furthermore, Árpád's successors, starting with Stephen's grandfather Taskony, regularly admitted refugees to their lands, in most cases fragments of the beleaguered Pecheneg nation. The new arrivals were usually settled on the periphery of Hungary, often in the marshlands guarding the approaches to the heart of the Carpathian Basin. They fulfilled the dual tasks of settling the realm's inhospitable regions and reinforcing its military frontiers. The words of St. Stephen's *Admonitions* to his son are often quoted as evidence of his belief in what we today would call multiculturalism: "For the country that has but one language and one custom is weak and frail."

An English-language monograph that deals with multicultural aspects of post-conquest Hungary is András Pálóczi Horváth, *Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians: Steppe peoples in medieval Hungary*, transl. Timothy Wilkinson, (Budapest: Corvina, 1989). For earlier, Hungarian-language works, see László Rásonyi, *Hidak a Dunán. A régi török népek a Dunánál* [Bridges on the Danube: Ancient Turkish peoples by the Danube] (Budapest: Magvető, 1981); and György Györffy, *Besenyők és magyarok* [Pechenegs and Hungarians] (Budapest, 1940).

¹¹ For one of our journal's articles touching on Louis the Great's involvement in Italian affairs see Carla Corradi Musi, "The Hungarian Military in Northern Italy during the Reign of Louis the Great," *Hungarian Studies Review* 17 (fall 1990): 11–19.

¹² For one of our journal's articles dealing with King Sigismund's interests in the wider affairs of Europe see Norman Simms, "The Visit of King Sigismund to England, 1416," *Hungarian Studies Review* 17 (fall 1990): 21–29.

¹³ Osman's subjects were Turks and were followers of Islam. The outside world came to know them as Ottomans — meaning the people of Osman or

Othman — and the empire they built, as the Ottoman Empire. The term "Ottoman" is in fact a corrupted version of Osman I's name.

¹⁴ The military decline of the Byzantine Empire is outlined in Mark C. Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204–1453* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), while the post-medieval wars of Ottoman expansion are discussed at length in Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman warfare, 1500–1700* (London: UCL Press, 1999).

¹⁵ The circumstances of Matthias' death are examined in L.S. Domonkos, "The Medical History of a Medieval Hungarian King: Matthias Corvinus (1458–1490)," in the *R. Várkonyi Ágnes Emlékkönyv* [The Agnes Várkonyi *Festschrift*] ed. Péter Tusor (Budapest: Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem, 1998), 133–47, especially 141–44; and the same author's "The Tragedy of the Hunyadi Dynasty," *Essays in Church History in Hungary* 3–4 (1999): 19–28. Professor Domonkos prepared a paper, entitled "The Nature of Royal Power in the Age of Matthias Corvinus" for the conference at which the studies printed in this volume were presented. It will be printed in our journal as soon as its notes will be completed.

¹⁶ Oliver A.I. Botar, "From European Capital to Ottoman Outpost: The Decline of Buda in the Sixteenth Century," *Hungarian Studies Review* 14 (Spring 1987): 10. The most dramatic decline in Buda's Magyar population, according to Botar, took place in the wake of the sieges of Buda during the Long War of the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries. Botar cites the report of an Italian traveller to the effect that the language heard most often in the Buda of the time was Croatian.

¹⁷ For an article of our journal that deals with a part of this subject see Péter Sárközy, "Links to Europe: Hungarian Students at Italian Universities in the 13–18th Centuries," *Hungarian Studies Review* 17 (Fall 1990): 45–55.

¹⁸ Francis-Joseph, who occupied the imperial throne in Vienna for the entire second half of the nineteenth century and the first sixth of the twentieth, was for much of this period the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. Though considered an enemy of Hungary at first during his long reign, it has been argued that by the time of the First World War he had become accepted by Hungarians as "their King." See András Gerő, *Emperor Francis Joseph, King of the Hungarians*, translated from the Hungarian by James Patterson and Enikő Koncz (Wayne, N.J.: Center for Hungarian Studies and Publications, 2001; distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.)

¹⁹ In the battle a coalition army made up of Habsburg, imperial (i.e. Holy Roman), Rhenish and French units, numbering hardly over 20,000, battled a smaller contingent of a much larger Ottoman Army that had been able to cross the Rába (in German, Raab) River near the village of Nagyfalva (today's Morgensdorff, in Austria). Though the Turks lost several thousand first-line soldiers in the engagement, the bulk of their army, originally numbering about 80,000, remained intact. Though the Christian forces won, they were in no position to continue the

fight. They had been caught unprepared for the fight on the day of the battle and they ran out of munitions as well as food and fodder by the end of the day. Their losses in the battle were probably lighter than those of the Turks, but they had lost a far larger portion of their total force. The French troops among them had wanted to begin their return to France even before the battle; only some arm-twisting convinced their commander to stay and fight. Risking another battle would have been foolhardy for Raimondo Montecuccoli, the commander of the Christian forces — and he was not the type who would try. We can only guess why, under the circumstances, Grand Vizier Ahmet Köprülü, the leader of the Turks, did not resume his advance. The answer might be that he had lost precious time and realized that he could not arrive near Vienna early enough to undertake a successful siege before the onset of the cold and rains of autumn. Géza Perjés, "The Zrínyi-Montecuccoli Controversy" in *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary*, ed. János M. Bak and Béla K. Király (New York: Social Science Monographs, 1982), 335–49; the same author offers a detailed account in "A szentgotthárdi csata" [The Battle of St. Gothard] in *Szentgotthárd* (Szombathely, 1981), 117–175; and Professor Murphey also makes scattered references to the battle in his *Ottoman warfare* (*op. cit.*). Contemporary accounts of the battle have been written among others by Montecuccoli, the French officer Count Coligny-Saligny, the German writer Johannes Gradelhnus, and Findikli Mehmet Ağa Silahdar.

²⁰ The severity of the repression that followed the discovery of the conspiracy that had been sparked by the Treaty of Vasvár contributed to the outbreak in 1678 of still another anti-Habsburg uprising, led by Imre Thököly, the son of one of the conspirators who had been executed. The fate of his war against the Habsburgs was sealed by the latter's successes against the Turks in the mid-1680s. For an overview of this period see László Benczédi, "The Warrior Estate in the Seventeenth Century with Special Reference to the Thököly Uprising (1678–1685)," in *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi*, *op. cit.*, 351–365.

²¹ A succinct English-language overview of this war can be found in Charles W. Ingrao, "Guerrilla Warfare in Early Modern Europe: The *Kuruc* War (1703–1711)," in *Special Topics and Generalizations on the 18th and 19th Centuries* Vol. I of *War and Society in East Central Europe*, ed. Béla K. Király and Gunther E. Rothenberg (New York: Brooklyn College Press/ Columbia University Press, 1979), 47–65. See also Ingrao's *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618–1815* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 2nd ed., 84–118 *in passim*. For papers relating to Rákóczi's war that had appeared in our journal see Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, "The Rákóczi Insurrection and the Disruption of the Grand Alliance," vol. 5, no. 2 (Fall, 1978): 17–29, and John B. Hattendorf, "The Rákóczi Insurrection in English War Policy, 1703–1711," vol. 7, no. 2 (Fall, 1980): 91–102. For further English-language literature see chapters

22 to 28 of the above-cited volume by Bak and Király (with papers by historians Ágnes Várkonyi, Géza Perjes, Kálmán Benda, Béla Köpeczy, Peter Pastor and others). Szatmár, or Satu-Mare, is part of present-day Rumania.

²² Bálint Hóman and Gyula Szekfű, *Magyar történet* [Hungarian history], 5 vols. (Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1935) 2nd, expanded edition, vol. IV (written by Szekfű), 309.

²³ Even the terminology of this conflict tends to obfuscate the subject. Resistance to Habsburg designs for the elimination of Hungarian nobiliary privileges was offered in the name of the Magyar "nation," but the term "nation or *natio*" in its contemporary definitions denoted the members of the Hungarian estates (primarily the very numerous nobility) and not the *plebs* of Hungary, the multitude of serfs and agricultural and other labourers.

²⁴ The point is emphatically made in the works of R. J. W. Evans, one of the English-speaking world's foremost experts on the Habsburg Empire. According to him, these "two lines of policy... pursued in Habsburg governance of Hungary right down to 1918 — by turns essentially respectful or disrespectful of constitutional tradition — were... first clearly elaborated in the context of [the] Empress's [Maria Theresa] transformation of the whole Monarchy." R. J. W. Evans, "Maria Theresa and Hungary," in *Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe*, ed. Hamish M. Scott (London: Macmillan, 1990), 189. Another of Evans' several relevant works is "The Habsburgs and the Hungarian Problem, 1790–1848," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser. 49 (1989): 41–62; see also his *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550–1700* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). Evans' home base is Oxford, the very place where C. A. Macartney, that other great British expert on the Habsburg Monarchy (and Hungary), had taught some four decades ago. See his *The Hapsburg Empire (1790–1918)* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2nd edition. 1971).

²⁵ The importance of the role of advisors, in particular of the attitudes of Wenzel Anton Kaunitz, State Chancellor from 1753 to 1792, is emphasized by Austrian-Canadian scholar Franz A.J. Szabo. See his *Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism 1753–1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), especially chapter 8 "The Problem of Hungary."

²⁶ The term is used by Evans who points out that it was "the Habsburgs' bad luck that their most ungovernable realm also nursed the deepest sense of grievance." Evans, "The Habsburgs and the Hungarian Problem," 42.

²⁷ Szabo, *Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism*, 303.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 310. Hungarian-Austrian historian Horst Haselsteiner argues that, while the Hungarian nobility might have reneged on shouldering a fair portion of war taxes, Hungary as a whole did carry her share of expenditures, "between 26 and 29 percent" of them. Horst Haselsteiner, "Cooperation and Confrontation between Rulers and the Noble Estates, 1711–1790," in *A History of*

Hungary, ed. Peter Sugar, Péter Hanák and Tibor Frank (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 151f.

²⁹ Szabo, *Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism*, 312.

³⁰ The program included incentives for members of the Hungarian nobility who cooperated and punishments for those who did not, the reduction of the influence of county administrations, the continued separation of Transylvania and the Military Frontier from Hungary (where reforms could be experimented on before their introduction to Hungary proper), support for Hungary's peasants in their disputes with their landlords, as well as the extension of the Crown's influence over the Catholic Church in Hungary (and its estates) which could serve as a precedent for the expansion of the Crown's power over Hungary's civil society. See Szabo, *Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism*, 312f.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 314.

³² *Ibid.*, 318–20

³³ *Ibid.*, 328. These reforms are discussed by Szabo, *Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism*, 325–28; by Evans, "Maria Theresa," 192–94; and by Haselsteiner, "Cooperation and Confrontation," 152–54. Kaunitz also tried to reduce the influence of Hungary's Catholic hierarchy, even at the expense of greater toleration of other Christian confessions. His efforts in this direction were frustrated not only by Hungary's Roman Catholic establishment but by the diffidence of Empress Maria Theresa herself. Szabo, *Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism*, 331f.

³⁴ George Barany, "The Age of Royal Absolutism, 1770–1848," in *A History of Hungary*, *op. cit.*, 175.

³⁵ The fact that Joseph did not give up his aspiration to rein in Hungary is illustrated by the establishment, not long before his death, of the Ministry of Police. Officially, the new ministry's authority was circumscribed in Hungary, but its secret agents would operate there until 1867. These last acts of Joseph further illustrate the duality of Habsburg policies *vis-à-vis* Hungary: reconciliation intermingled or alternating with confrontation. Barany, "The Age of Royal Absolutism," 175.

³⁶ Much of what follows is based on Szabo, *Kaunitz*, 336–40.

³⁷ The threat of these German states losing peasants was compounded by the fact that other states (Prussia, Russia, and even Spain) were also engaged in recruiting prospective settlers. *Ibid.*, 340.

³⁸ This subject was touched upon in one of the papers given at the year 2000 University of Toronto conference. Dr. Róbert Hermann's "The Military Chances of the War of Independence, 1848–49," will be published in a forthcoming volume of our journal, pending the resolution of some problems with translation and presentation.

³⁹ Parallel developments one can think of are the separations between Sweden and Norway in 1905, and the Czechs and Slovaks some nine decades

later, but in these cases the "jettisoned" territories were not about to become parts of potentially powerful enemy states (Norway opted for personal union with Denmark; Slovakia became an independent, non-aligned republic). In any case, these two developments were what we might call "national divorces" and not the transfers of provinces or counties from one state to another.

⁴⁰ Even Canada, an "advanced" country with a supposedly sophisticated electorate, could not contemplate with equanimity the "abandonment" of the province of Quebec to French-Canadian separatists, even though such a development could offer benefits to both sides, above all the abatement of the strife that has existed between Anglo and Franco Canadians for nearly ten generations. Furthermore Quebec could not possibly, after separation, become a part of a country hostile to what remained of Canada. (In listing the "ethnic" trouble-spots of the world, I realize that no two situations are the same and it is somewhat unfair to compare for example Northern Ireland to Chechnia).

⁴¹ István Deák, "The Revolution and the War of Independence, 1848-1849," in *A History of Hungary, op. cit.*, 234. Austrian casualties were about the same. The Russian army that came to the help of the Austrians, lost only 543 soldiers in battle, but over 10,000 to the epidemic. (*Ibid.*) See also István Deák, "The Ethnic Question in the Multinational Habsburg Army, 1848-1918," in *Ethnic Armies: Polyethnic Armed Forces from the Time of the Habsburgs to the Age of the Superpowers*, ed. N.F. Dreisziger (Waterloo, ON.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1990), especially, 21-29; and Deák's *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). For an even more comprehensive treatment of the subject, see the same author's *The Lawful Revolution, Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). An article that has appeared on a related subject in our journal is Peter I. Hidas, "The Army of Francis Joseph and Magyar Public Opinion, 1849-1859," 14, 2 (fall, 1987): 3-19.

⁴² What follows is based mainly on Gerő, *Emperor Francis Joseph, King of the Hungarians*.

⁴³ While the Emperor and his politicians manoeuvred for greater influence, young Empress Elizabeth (Sisi as she was known affectionately) did things that began to endear her to the Hungarian public, including the learning of Hungarian. In time, Sisi would become the darling of the Hungarian public, as much as the rest of her family was seen as its foe. The Hungarians' love for her proved that they could live with a Habsburg, as long as that person displayed empathy for them. (*Ibid.*)

⁴⁴ It took many years for Francis-Joseph to warm to his new role as king of the country he considered rebellious for so many years. Hungarians were also reluctant to embrace him as their sovereign. The ironic fact is that eventually they did come to regard him as their King, but only half-century later, at a time

when war came to Central Europe. It ended in the demise of both the Habsburg Empire and the historic Kingdom of Hungary. For a specialized study of some of the fiscal aspects of the union of Austria and Hungary see the 1982 volume of our journal: Scott M. Eddie, "Limits on the Fiscal Independence of Sovereign States in Customs Union: 'Tax Union' Aspects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 1868–1911" 9, 2 (Fall, 1982): 7–28.

⁴⁵ Ignác Romsics, *Magyarország története a XX. században* [The History of Hungary in the 20th Century] (Budapest: Osiris, 1999), 23.

⁴⁶ Iván T. Berend and György Ránki, *Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th & 20th Centuries* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1974), 128. The growth of all sectors of the Hungarian economy in this period is outlined in this monograph in fair amount of detail: pp. 122–38.

⁴⁷ Romsics, *Magyarország*, 23.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 25–26. Romsics offers a large array of other statistics about the growth of Hungary's economy (see, pp. 23–39 *in passim*).

⁴⁹ Béla Bartok and Zoltán Kodály in music, John Neumann in mathematics, Leo Szilárd and Tódor Kármán in physics, Lord Thomas Balogh in economics, Sándor Korda and Mihály Kertész in film, Károly Mannheim in sociology, are just a few mentioned by Romsics, *op. cit.* 41f. Two other remarkable "products" of early 20th-century Hungary's school system were the Polányi brothers Károly (Karl) and Mihály (Michael). Karl was an economist and sociologist while Michael trained as a scientist but became a philosopher of the first rank. Our journal has featured several articles on the Polanyis, including Lee Congdon, "Polanyi and the Treason of the Intellectuals" (vol. 2, fall, 1975), 79-90; two papers (by Professors Marlene Kadar and Kenneth McRobbie) in vol. 26 (1999), and one (also by Lee Congdon) forthcoming in vol. 29 (2002). Books on outstanding Hungarians are legion. One is Francis S. Wagner, *Hungarian Contributions to World Civilization* (Center Square, PA: Alpha Publications, 1977), and the most recent is Andrew L. Simon, *Made in Hungary: Hungarian Contributions to Universal Culture* (published by the author, 1998). Excellent work has been done on many of the intellectuals of the age in question by Professor Lee Congdon, the latest being *Seeing Red: Hungarian Intellectuals in Exile and the Challenge of Communism* (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001).

⁵⁰ János Mazsu, "The Intelligentsia in Hungary prior to World War I," *Hungarian Studies Review* 24 (1997): 89.

⁵¹ For a discussion of the millennial celebrations in Hungary see Alice Freifeld, *Nationalism and the Crowd in Liberal Hungary, 1848–1914* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 266–78. For a description of intellectual life in turn-of-the-century Budapest see Judit Frigyesi, *Béla Bartók and Turn-of-the-Century Budapest* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: Univer-

sity of California Press, 1998), and Mary Gluck, *Georg Lukacs and his Generation, 1900-1918* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). See also some of the essays in Thomas Bender and C.E. Schorske, eds. *Budapest and New York: Studies in Metropolitan Transformation, 1879-1930* (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1994). This latter book has been reviewed by Béla Bodó in our journal (vol. XXII [1995]): 111-19.

⁵² The ethnic makeup of the Kingdom of Hungary (which did not include Croatia-Savonia, a kingdom that was a part of the Lands of Holy Crown of Hungary but was not a part of the Hungarian Kingdom itself) was complex. Magyars comprised 54.4% of the population, Rumanians (in Transylvania and the Banat) 16.1%, Slovaks 10.7%, Germans 10.4% and Serbs and Croats 2.5% each. Romsics, *Magyarország*, 47.

⁵³ Géza Jeszenszky, "Hungary Through World War I and the End of the Dual Monarchy," in *A History of Hungary* ed. Sugar, *et al.*, 270. One of the consequences of Hungary's lack of respect for the sensitivities of the national minorities, according to Jeszenszky, was the diminution of the country's prestige abroad. On that subject see Jeszenszky's book, *Az elvesztett presztízs: Magyarország megítélésének megváltozása Nagy-Britanniában (1894-1918)* [The lost prestige: the transformation of Hungary's image in Great Britain (1894-1918)] (Budapest: Magvető, 1986).

⁵⁴ Jaszi's book, *A Nemzeti Államok...* has been mentioned. For my observations on this and other works of Jászi, as well as his efforts to solve or moderate the nationality problem in Hungary before and during the First World War, see my studies "Between Nationalism and Internationalism: Oscar Jaszi's Path to Danubian Federalism, 1905-1918," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 19 (1993): 19-29, and "The Evolution of Oscar Jaszi's Political Ideas during the First World War," in *Király Béla emlékkönyv* [Béla Király Festschrift] ed. P. Jonas, P. Pastor, P.P. Toth (Budapest, 1992), 159-67.

⁵⁵ For an overview of the World War I years see Jeszenszky's "Hungary Through World War I," cited above. The early post-1918 years are covered by Tibor Hajdu and Zsuzsa L. Nagy, "Revolution, Counterrevolution, Consolidation," in the same volume, pp. 295-318. Peter Pastor has published nearly two dozen works on this period, most of which are listed in Steven Béla Várdy, *Historical Dictionary of Hungary* (Lanham, MD., and London: The Scarecrow Press, 1997), 788-89. Béla K. Király and Nándor F. Dreisziger, eds., *East Central European Society in World War I* (New York: Social Science Monographs, 1985), contains over a dozen papers related to these subjects. Essays dealing with these themes that have appeared in our journal are: Eva S. Balogh, "Power Struggle in Hungary: Analysis in Post-war Domestic Politics, August-November 1919," 4 (1977): 3-22; Géza Jeszenszky, "István Tisza: Villain or Tragic Hero? Reassessments in Hungary —Verdict in the U.S." XIV, 2 (Fall, 1987): 45-57; Peter Pastor, "Franco-Rumanian Intervention in Russia and the Vix

Ultimatum: Background to Hungary's Loss of Transylvania," 1 (1974): 12–25; Attila Pók, "Jaszi as the Organizational Leader of a Reform Movement," 18 (1991): 17–25; Thomas Spira, "The Reaction of Hungary's German Minorities to Oscar Jaszi's Plan for an 'Eastern Switzerland,'" 18 (1991): 27–42; and Gabor Vermes, "Count István Tisza and the Preservation of the Old Order." 2 (1975): 33–42.

⁵⁶ Some Rumanians complained that the treaty did not extend their greatly enlarged country's borders all the way to the Tisza River, the alleged boundary of the mythical Kingdom of the Dacians who supposedly lived in the eastern half of the Carpathian Basin in Roman times and who had been proclaimed to have been the ancestors of today's Rumanians. At the same time some Czechoslovaks and South Slavs bemoaned the fact that, by being allowed to keep western counties Transdanubia for themselves, the Hungarians managed to deny the Western and Southern Slavs of Central Europe the chance to have a common border. On the matter of the ancestry of Rumanians bitter historiographical debates have raged between Hungarian and Rumanian historians since the 19th century. The best of international historical research places the ancestors of the Wallachian or Vlach people (the term "Romania" is an artificial invention of the 19th century) in the southern Balkans. Paul R. Magocsi, *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), see maps 3 and 4, depicting Eastern Europe in the 7th, 8th and 9th centuries.

⁵⁷ For a brief description of the treaty's general terms see Peter Pastor, "Trianon, Treaty of (1920)," *Encyclopedia of Eastern Europe*, ed. Richard Frucht (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 2000), 807; for more detailed treatments see Béla K. Király, Peter Pastor, Ivan Sanders, eds. *Essays on World War I: A Case Study on Trianon* (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1982); Béla K. Király and László Veszprémy, eds. *Trianon and East Central Europe: Antecedents and Repercussions* (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1995); and Mária Ormos, *From Padua to the Trianon* (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1995). A rather old but still useful monograph on the subject is Francis Deak, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942).

⁵⁸ Steven Béla Várdy, "The Impact of Trianon upon Hungary and the Hungarian Mind: The Nature of Interwar Hungarian Irredentism," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 10 (1983): 21; a revised and enlarged version of this paper has appeared in *Hungary in the Age of Total War, 1938-1948*, ed. N.F. Dreisziger (Bradenton: East European Monographs, 1999; distributed by Columbia University Press), 27–48.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Hajdu and Nagy, "Revolution," 314.

⁶¹ On the migration of Hungarians from the successor states to Hungary see István Mócsy, *The Effects of World War I. The Uprooted: Hungarian Refugees and Their Impact on Hungary's Domestic Politics, 1918-1921* (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1983). The governments of the successor states were often reluctant to see members of the dominant nationality emigrate while they were quite willing to let minorities leave to accelerate their numerical decline. I touch on the subject of emigration to Canada from the successor states in one of my recent papers: "Rallying Canada's Immigrants behind the War Effort, 1939-1945," in *Forging a Nation: Perspectives on the Canadian Military Experience*, ed. Bernd Horn (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 2002), 179f.

⁶² Várdy (writing in 1983), p. 40. Várdy argues that in addition to finding it difficult to accept the idea of regaining only the mainly Magyar-populated areas, Hungary's elite made the mistake of trying to make the case for complete annulment of the territorial provisions of the treaty mainly on the basis of historical arguments. In doing so they neglected to voice the argument that might have carried the most weight: the one based on ethnic and linguistic considerations. "[I]nstead of arguing as to who settled first in Hungary and when," Várdy goes on, "[Hungarians] should have demonstrated to the world that transferring one-third of the Hungarian nation under foreign rule violated the very same principle which the peacemakers used to justify the dismemberment of a long-standing historical state. Naturally, this policy would not have resulted in the re-establishment of historic Hungary, but it may have produced an atmosphere more conducive to partial revision,..." *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ One of the highlights of this campaign was the "Justice for Hungary" ocean flight. I describe the story of this attempt to call attention to the injustices of the Treaty of Trianon in my paper "The 'Justice for Hungary' Ocean Flight: The Trianon Syndrome in Immigrant Hungarian Society," in *Triumph in Adversity: Studies in Hungarian Civilization in Honor of Professor Ferenc Somogyi*, ed. S.B. Vardy and A.H. Vardy (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1988), 573-89.

⁶⁵ On Hungarian diplomacy in the 1930s see some of the works of Thomas L. Sakmyster: *Hungary, the Great Powers, and the Danubian Crisis, 1936-1939* (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1980), and "The Hungarian State Visit to Germany of August, 1938: Some New Evidence on Hungary in Hitler's Pre-Munich Policy," *Canadian Slavic Studies*, 3 (1969): 677-91. Also, Endre B. Gastony, "Hungarian Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya, Hitler, and Peace in Europe, August-September, 1938," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 8 (Spring, 1986): 3-34, republished in Dreisziger, *Hungary in the Age of*, pp. 213-238; in connection with the 1940 revision of the border with Romania see Eva S. Balogh, "Peaceful Revision: The Diplomatic Road to War," *Hungarian Studies Review* 10 (1983): 43-51. A paper dealing with Hungary and the

Second World War was read at the year 2000 conference in Toronto by Dr. Sándor Szakály. We hope that a new rendering of this paper into English can be published in a future volume of our journal.

⁶⁶ For recent treatments of the period of Hungarian neutrality in the war see Thomas Sakmyster, *Hungary's Admiral on Horseback: Miklós Horthy, 1918–1944* (Boulder, CO: Eastern European Monographs; dist., New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), in particular chapter 8, "Armed Neutrality, 1939–1941"; Tibor Frank, "Treaty revision and doublespeak: Hungarian neutrality, 1939–1941," in *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*, ed. Neville Wylie (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002): 150–173; as well as some of my own studies, "Count Istvan Bethlen's Secret Plan for the Restoration of the Empire of Transylvania," *East European Quarterly*, 8, (1974): 413–23; "Civil-Military Relations in Nazi Germany's Shadow: The Case of Hungary, 1939–1941," in *Swords and Covenants: Essays in Honour of the Centennial of the Royal Military College of Canada*, ed. Adrian Preston and Peter Dennis (London: Croom Helm, 1976), 216–47; "The Hungarian General Staff and Diplomacy, 1939–1941," in *Proceedings of the First Banff Conference on Central and East European Studies*, ed. Thomas Priestly (Edmonton, 1977), 247–67; "Bridges to the West: The Horthy Regime's Reinsurance Policies in 1941," *War and Society*, 7 (1989): 1–23; "Az atlanti demokraciák és a 'Szabad Magyarországért' mozgalmak a II. világháború alatt" [The Atlantic Democracies and the Movements for a "Free Hungary" during World War II], in *Magyarország és a nagyhatalmak a 20. században*, ed. Ignác Romsics (Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány, 1995), 149–62, published in English as "The Atlantic Democracies and the Movements for a "Free Hungary" during World War II," in *20th Century Hungary and the Great Powers*, ed. Ignác Romsics (Boulder, Colorado: Social Science Monographs, distr. Columbia University Press, 1995), 185–205; "Miklós Horthy and the Second World War: Some Historiographical Perspectives," in *Regent Miklós Horthy, István Horthy and the Second World War* (Toronto and Budapest: special volume of the *Hungarian Studies Review*, 23 (1996): 5–16; "Hungary and the Second World War," an introduction to *Hungary in the Age of Total War, 1938–1948*, ed. N.F. Dreisziger (New York: East European Monographs/Columbia University Press, 1998), 3–24; "Hungary Enters the War: March–December, 1941," *ibid.*, 61–72; "Miklós Horthy and World War II: New Historiographical Perspectives," *ibid.*, 239–252; "Was László Bárdossy a War Criminal? Further Reflections," *ibid.*, 311–320; "Stalin's Wartime Plans for Transylvania, 1939–1945," in *Hungary's Historical Legacies: Studies in Honor of Professor Steven Béla Várdy*, ed. Dennis P. Hupchick and R. William Weisberger (Boulder and New York: East European Monographs/Columbia University Press, 2000), 146–54.

⁶⁷ On Hungary's declaration of war on the Soviets see C.A. Macartney, *October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, 1929–1945* (Edinburgh:

Edinburgh University Press, 1957, 2nd edition, 1961, 2 vols.) [Published in the United States as *A History of Hungary, 1929–1945* (New York: Praeger, 1957)], vol. 2, chapter 2; also, the same author's "Hungary's Declaration of War on the U.S.S.R. in 1941," in *Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography*, ed. A.O. Sarkissian (London, 1961), especially, 158–165; as well as some of my own publications: "New Twist to an Old Riddle: The Bombing of Kassa (Kosice), June 26, 1941," *Journal of Modern History*, 44 (1972): 232–42; "Contradictory Evidence Concerning Hungary's Declaration of War on the USSR in June, 1941," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 19 (1977): 480–88; "The Kassa Bombing: The Riddle of Adam Krudy," in *Hungary and the Second World War*, ed. N.F. Dreisziger, (Toronto: Hungarian Studies Review, 1983), 79–98; "A Dove? A Hawk? Perhaps a Sparrow: Bárdossy Defends his Wartime Record before the Americans, July 1945," in *Hungary Fifty Years Ago*, ed. N.F. Dreisziger (Toronto: special issue of the *Hungarian Studies Review*, 22 (1995): 71–90; and "Hungary Enters the War," *cit.* 61–72;

⁶⁸ On this subject see Tamás Stark, *Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust and After the Second World War, 1939-1949*, Trans. Christina Rozsnyai (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2000; distributed by Columbia University Press). Stark point out that Jews suffered and often died not only in Nazi concentration camps, but also in the Soviet Gulag. Among the Hungarian POWs who fell into Soviet hands during the war, there were about 15,000 Jewish labour servicemen, a great many of whom never returned. Still other Jews were collected by the Red Army for "reconstruction work" in Russia. The scarcity of accurate statistics prevents Stark from offering his own estimates of the Hungarian Jewry's total losses — he only voices his agreement with the results of recent research that suggest that these, as far as the (enlarged) Hungary of 1944 is concerned, were about 50-100 thousand lower than the 600,000 figure that has been usually given in the past. As to the Jewish losses of "Trianon Hungary," Stark quotes estimates as high as 200,000, and others as low as 110,000. The main reason for the variance in the data is the difficulty of estimating the number of Hungarian Jews who were scattered throughout the world at the end of the war. Stark, pp. 137–38.

⁶⁹ My estimates of Hungary's World War II human losses are based in part on Romsics, *Magyarország*, 267f; Tamás Stark, "Magyarok szovjet fogságban" [Hungarians in Soviet Captivity], *Historia*, 17, 2 (1995), and Susan Glanz, "Economic Platforms of the Various Political Parties in the Hungarian Elections of 1945," *Hungarian Studies Review* 22 (1995): 31 (republished in Dreisziger, ed. *Hungary in the Age of*, pp. 169–84).

⁷⁰ For stories of the fates of Hungarian women in the war see Cecil D. Eby, *Hungary at War: Civilians and Soldiers in World War II* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1998), especially the part "Women" (pp. 249–81) and "Liberation" (283–313 *in passim*), and on the behaviour of Red

Army soldiers, especially p. 292. For a study focusing directly on the rape of women in 1944–45 see Andrea Pető, "Átvonuló hadsereg, maradandó trauma. Az 1945-ös budapesti nemi erőszak esetek emlékezte" [Transient army, lasting trauma. Memories of rape cases in Budapest in 1945], *Történelmi Szemle* 41 (1999): 85–107.

The experience of my family with Russian *officers* billeted with us was on the whole positive. One of them had surprising advice for my father: "get out of Hungary and flee to the West, before the Communists take over!" Alas, my father did not comprehend the full meaning of this suggestion and stayed in Hungary until it became too risky to leave. We left the country in late 1956.

⁷¹ Balogh, "Peaceful Revision," 45. Balogh points out that London recognized the fact that the areas re-attached to Hungary had an "overwhelming Hungarian majority." She explains further that the British had opposed the cession of the region known as the Csallóköz to the new Czechoslovak state even before the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. The Czechs demanded that this purely Magyar-populated land, an island surrounded by branches of the Danube River, on the ground that it was essential to the defence of the new state of Czechoslovakia, and already in 1919 London questioned these arguments. By the late 1930s, according to Balogh, the strategic considerations that had been invoked to take the Csallóköz from Hungary were seen by the British as "absurd." *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.* Balogh cites documents that had been published in vol. 4 of the series *Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához, 1936–1945* [Diplomatic documents on Hungary's foreign policy, 1936–1945] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1962f).

⁷³ On the subject of the post-World War II peace treaty with Hungary see Stephen D. Kertész, *Between Russia and the West: Hungary and the Illusions of Peacemaking, 1945–1947*. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1984.

⁷⁴ Andras B. Gollner, "Foundations of Soviet Domination and Communist Political Power in Hungary: 1945–1950," in *The Hungarian Revolution Twenty Years After*, ed. N. F. Dreisziger (Ottawa: Hungarian Readers' Service, 1976), 76.

⁷⁵ Susan Glanz, "Economic Platforms of the Various Political Parties in the Hungarian Elections of 1945," *Hungarian Studies Review* 22 (1995): 31. This paper has been republished in Dreisziger, ed., *Hungary in the Age of, cit.* Some of the greatest destruction was wrought in Budapest, especially in Buda, as a result of the prolonged siege of that stronghold by the Red Army in the winter of 1944–45. Some of this destruction has been described in Krisztián Ungváry, "The 'Second Stalingrad': The Destruction of Axis Forces at Budapest (February, 1945)." XXII, 1-2 (1995), 13–30 (republished in Dreisziger, ed. *Hungary in the Age of, pp.* 151–168.

⁷⁶ Göllner, "Foundations," 76f.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 77f.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 78–80. For a Hungarian-language overview of the impact of Soviet military occupation on Hungary see Péter Sipos, "A szovjetek és Magyarország, 1945" [The Soviets and Hungary, 1945], *História*, 17 (1995): 3–5. The subject is also discussed, especially with reference to the American view of these events, in László Borhi, "Soviet Expansionism or American Imperialism? American Response to the Sovietization of Hungary," in *20th Century Hungary and the Great Powers*, ed. Ignác Romsics (Boulder, Colorado: Social Science Monographs, distr. by Columbia University Press, 1995), 233–35.

⁸⁰ Bennett Kovrig, *Communism in Hungary: From Kun to Kadar* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 151f.

⁸¹ Papers that deal with post-1989 Hungary in our journal include the following: Sándor Agócs, "The Social Opposition: Labour in Post-Communist Hungary," vol. 23 (1996): 93–108; Chris Corrin, "Gender Politics and Women's Political Participation in Hungary," and Éva Thun, "Women in Hungary in Times of Social and Cultural Transition," both in vol. 26, pp. 9–38 and 39–58 respectively.

⁸² Julianna Puskás, *Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide: One Hundred Years of Hungarian Experience in the United States*, transl. Zora Ludwig (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 2000), 18–23.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 33–34. Puskás also points out that, in the case of out-migration from the Slovak-inhabited regions of Hungary, most migrants came from the East, rather than the West where Slovak nationalist sentiments were the strongest.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* The quotation is on p. 304, for further discussion of the subject by Puskás see chapters 2 and 3, *in passim*.

⁸⁵ N.F. Dreisziger *et al.*, *Struggle and Hope: The Hungarian-Canadian Experience* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), chapters 4 and 5, *in passim*. In some regions of Canada the bad times arrived well before the fall of 1929.

⁸⁶ For the Hungarian data see Romsics, *Magyarország*, table 52, "Hungary's population and population growth, 1900–1996" (p. 467). For the Canadian, see Warren E. Kalbach, "Population," *The Canadian Encyclopedia* III (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1988), 2nd edition, pp. 1719–22. While Canada has always been a country of immigration, until the mid-20th century it was also a source of immigrants to the United States. The balance between emigration and immigration turned decidedly to Canada's favour only after World War II.

⁸⁷ I discuss these themes in the paper "The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: The Legacy of the Refugees," *Nationalities Papers, the Journal of the Association for the Study of the Nationalities of the USSR and Eastern Europe*, 13 (1985): 198–208; as well as in *Struggle and Hope*, pp. 227f.

⁸⁸ Mary Boros-Kazai, "The Emigration Problems and Hungary's Law-makers, 1880-1910," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 8 (Spring, 1981): 25-44; Julianna Puskás, *Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide: 100 Years of Hungarian Experience in the United States* (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 2000), chapter 7: "Emigration and Public Opinion in Hungary."

⁸⁹ On this see Andrea Pető, "Abortőrök és 'bajba jutott nők' 1952-ben" [Abortions and 'women in trouble' in 1952], in *Nők a változó társadalomban*, ed. Beáta Nagy (Debrecen: Csokonai, 1997). A revised, somewhat expanded English-language version of this study is expected to be published in the 2002 volume of our journal.

⁹⁰ For an analysis of women's situation in the Hungary of the post-1989 age see Corrin, "Gender Politics and Women's Political Participation in Hungary," *cit.*; Thun, "Women in Hungary in Times of Social and Cultural Transition," *cit.* (see note 81 above); as well as Katalin Fábián, "The Illusion of Inclusion: The Political Significance of Women's Groups in Hungary," forthcoming in the year 2002 volume of our journal.

Hungary's Conversion to Christianity: The Establishment of Hungarian Statehood and its Consequences to the Thirteenth Century

László Veszprémy

The Carpathian Basin occupies a peculiar place in history. It was the ground where Roman-Germanic world met that of the Slavs and mounted nomad peoples, where no group had achieved sustained unity before the state of Hungary was founded.¹ Its function was more as a kind of channel through which nomadic peoples, like the Ostrogoths, Gepids and Longobards, launched successful drives into the heart of Europe, or failed in the attempt, as in the case of the Huns (420–455), and subsequently broke up. The Huns opened up the road to Europe for the Germanic tribes, and the Avars opened up the Balkans to the Slavs, until the Hungarians finally closed the channel off. The dominion of the Romans and the Huns was confined to certain areas of the basin. The Avars (568–803) took control of the whole of it, while Charlemagne's Frankish empire extended only to Transdanubia, the region's most developed area.

It was here, on the remains of the Roman, Avar, Frankish and Frankish-Slav cultures, that the Hungarians settled in the tenth century. After Árpád and his successors secured the area, they set up the first bishoprics and organized the first counties. This basin can be regarded as a missing piece of an enormous jigsaw, filled in by the establishment of Hungarian power, aided to some extent by accidental events. After the Huns and Avars, the setting up of Hungarian rule was accompanied by consolidation and modernization of the basin, and was assisted by hitherto unknown stability in East Central Europe. The Slav peoples occupying the borders of the German empire were split into two parts that would never reunite. The Northern and Southern Slavs, after being separated, set out on their way to the founding of their states and the discovery of their national identities. The pattern for development was the same everywhere:

multi-centred, i.e. tribe-centred, development had to be replaced by a process of creating a unitary state. This is what took place among the Hungarians, the Czechs and the Poles in the tenth century.² The furthest progress down this road was achieved by the Czechs in Prague, where a secular centre coincided with an ecclesiastical one, whereas in Hungary and Poland at first several ecclesiastical and temporal centres developed in parallel: Esztergom, Székesfehérvár / Gniezno, Poznan, Wroclaw, Cracow. The formation of communities with national identities was not a necessary concomitant, however, and did not occur among the Slavs of the Elbe, for example.

The claim concerning parallelism among Czech, Polish and Hungarian development is not made purely from the considerations of present-day politics. The events in the second half of the tenth century are indeed very close to each other: for example, the Polish king Mieszko I sought relations with Christendom in 963. The establishment of first the bishopric in Prague took place about a decade later. References in the chronicles about Hungarians starting to convert to Christianity appear at the same time. For the ruling elite of these emerging states, taking up the Christian religion presented an excuse for attacking and eliminating their pagan rivals. However, the assumption of Christianity was more than a political tool: the Christian faith was truly the basis of legitimacy for these new state entities. It was the medium through which they could access and become a part of the socially and culturally dynamic world of the Christian peoples, represented by the two "Roman" emperors: the German and the Byzantine, and stretching from the Kievan principality in the East to the land of the Franks in the West, and from Scandinavia in the North to the Mediterranean in the South.³

The enterprise of founding the state of Hungary was undertaken by the Árpád dynasty, under the leadership of the first king's father, Duke Géza, who still bore a pagan name. Specific knowledge of the radical, bloody nature of the process only comes to us from the time of Stephen's rule, apart from the terse reference to the "bloody-handed" Géza in the legend of St. Stephen. Spreading from the top down, conversion was clearly forcible. It was directed not only against pagans but also against every centre of power that defied central — ducal and later royal — power in the name of non-Latin Christianity. Árpád's princely successors on certain occasions brought their might down on both pagans and Christians oriented toward Byzantium (Koppány, Gyula, Ajtony), in the process spreading their dominion to the East (i.e. Transylvania) and the south.⁴

Under Stephen's rule Hungary would be converted to Christianity and the Christian Church would be organized in the country. With the help of the legends of the times, by the end of the eleventh century the memory of Stephen (by then canonized and referred to as Saint Stephen) as the man who had forced Hungary's conversion, had faded.⁵ Part of this process was the relegation of the achievements of Géza, Stephen's father, into the background and the emphasis on Stephen as an apostolic king. One legend claimed that a celestial apparition had prohibited Géza from laying the foundations of Christian Hungary and of the Church, since his hands had been smeared with human blood.⁶ According to this tradition, if there had been bloody measures taken to force Hungary's conversion, they took place during the time of Géza, and King Stephen had no conflict with his people over faith — he only confronted a few rival noblemen whose defeat automatically ensured the victory of the new faith in the country.

Heavenly apparitions, however, were not only characteristic of the legend as a genre, but could also be used to obscure the external circumstances of conversion, its international implications, and above of all, the role of Henry II, German King and (later) Holy Roman Emperor. Who initiated the conversion is an important factor because this act earned him, i.e. Henry, certain right of suzerainty over the converted area and legitimized his influence there.⁷ Not surprisingly, the polemicists in the service of the Holy Roman emperors kept referring to Henry's deeds for centuries. Countering the tendencies emerging from such claims, in the Hungary of the latter half of the 11th century there emerged an emphasis on Stephen as the state- and church-founder and the apostolic king. It has to be kept in mind that at the time the kingdom was in the cross-fire of papal and German political ambitions. It was the legends of the late 11th and early 12th centuries that made the pope and contemporary Europe recognize the apostolic right of the Hungarian king.⁸

The chroniclers of the Hungarian Kingdom's early history treat the subject of the conversion reticently, a fact which indicates that they did not want to depict conversion to Christianity as a radical transformation. They date the history of the Hungarian people from far before the Christian era because a sharp dividing line between the pagan and Christian ages would have questioned the justification of discussing Hungarian prehistory at length.⁹ Hungarian legends treat the subject similarly. This is not surprising in view of the fact that both they and the chronicles were part of, or were inspired by, the Kingdom's court litera-

ture. At the court, those who commissioned works expected the authors to apply the ideological and legal arguments prevalent at the time. The Greater Legend of St. Stephen stresses continuity just as the chronicles do. The former makes explicit mention of the fact that imperial Rome, just as the Kingdom of Hungary, became Christian after a period of paganism. In this manner it justified the ravaging of Christian Europe by the pagan Hungarians — upon divine inspiration — before their conversion.¹⁰ This argument suggested that the German emperors, who professed continuity with the Roman Empire, had no valid ground to reproach the Hungarians for their pagan past.

The best example of this position can be found in the *Gesta Hungarorum*. It was written by an anonymous chronicler around 1200 and is devoted exclusively to the prehistory of pagan Hungarians.¹¹ It depicts these pre-Christian Magyars — the *flagellum Dei* or God's tool for punishing sinners — as being governed by the Holy Spirit even in their raids against the Christians and in their seizure of the land where they settled. The author of this *gesta*, known as Anonymus to Hungarians, consciously searched for evidence of continuity in Hungarian history before and after the settlement. He found such evidence or historical link in the person of Attila, the king of the Huns, whom he inserted in the family tree of Hungary's Árpáadian kings. With his *Gesta Hungarorum* Anonymus laid the foundation of a view prevalent in Hungary up to the nineteenth century. This view held that the occupation of the Carpathian Basin by the Magyar tribes in 896 had been preceded by the capture of the region by the Huns, a fact which legalized and justified the area's subsequent Hungarian settlement. Attila, another "scourge of God", could thus be more easily fitted into the early history of the pagan Hungarians.¹²

The ultimate version of the theory of continuity between the Hungarians' pagan and Christian history was created by the chronicler Simon of Kéza in the 1280s. To him the Huns and Magyars were not merely related peoples but they were identical; accordingly the settlement of the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin in 896 was none other than their second settlement in the region.¹³ Simon of Kéza also derived the origin of the community ("*communitas*") of Magyar noblemen and their claim to sovereignty over the land, from pagan, Hunnish traditions.¹⁴ What partly explains Simon of Kéza's views is the serious controversy into which the king of the period, Ladislas IV, got with the Pope. The author, who was the king's court priest, probably wanted to prove that Hungarian history was guided by divine will even before the conversion

and that the charge of heathendom against Hungarians and their ruler was senseless. As late as 1279 the papal legate to Hungary reminded the Hungarian king, Ladislas IV, that St. Stephen had subordinated his country to St. Peter, that is to the Apostolic See, repeating the papal court's well-known argument — which was consistently rejected by Hungarian elite. This argument had appeared for the first time in Gregory VII's letter to Salamon, the king of Hungary between 1063 and 1074, albeit some modern-day historians suggest that King Stephen himself had offered the country to the Virgin Mary in order to disarm any hegemonic claims to his kingdom by the papal court.¹⁵

The main motive of those who stressed continuity between pre-Christian and post-conversion Hungarian history was undoubtedly the desire to counter foreign accusations that were flung at the Hungarians already in the 11th century. Both the papal and the imperial propaganda questioned several times — not unreasonably in view of the large-scale pagan revolt of 1046 — the completeness or the sincerity of the Hungarians' conversion. A similar situation existed in regard to Poland. In the 11th century German-Polish historiographical polemics, the German writers equated the Poles' refusal to obey the German emperor with rebellion against the Christian church, citing the Poles' alleged or real superficial Christianity as proof.¹⁶ For revolting against the Germans, Thietmar of Merseburg in 1018 called Boleslav the Bold the "foe of all believers," just as 12th century writers Gerhoh of Reichersberg and Otto of Freising found correlation between the Hungarians' anti-German sentiments and their "infidelity" to Christendom.¹⁷ The latter even questioned the sainthood of King Stephen even though he was already widely revered as a saint at the time. These Germans emphasized a certain continuity in the Hungarian history as well: the Magyars' enduring "pagan" and "barbaric" traditions. The arguments of the Hungarian chroniclers and legend writers must be seen in the context of these anti-Hungarian polemics. There can be no doubt that this is why the spokesmen of the Hungarian nation stressed the continuity of Hungarian history, its divinely-ordered nature, as well as the rapid and complete success of Hungary's conversion to Christianity under St. Stephen.

The Hungarian raids that plagued tenth century Europe had been ended through a political reconciliation between Germans and Hungarians. The process started with the arrival of a Hungarian delegation at the German emperor's court in Quedlinburg in 973, and ended with the Hungarian ruler Géza's son marrying Gisela some time in the 990s, the

sister of the future German king and Holy Roman Emperor, the later canonized Henry II.¹⁸ It is clear from the historical evidence that the conversion must have been carried out with German assistance, probably with the substantial support of the Stephan's German wife and her retinue. As in Bohemia and Poland, German influences, chiefly Bavarian, left their mark also in Hungary in the areas of social life, culture and ecclesiastical organization — from the minting coins and making of laws to the producing liturgical books and issuing charters — paving the way for an intellectual revolution in the recently Christianized country.¹⁹

Gizela's marriage to Stephen paved the way for a turning point in Hungarian internal and foreign affairs: it cemented the Magyar nation's orientation towards the West. Under Géza, as recorded by contemporary chronicler Bruno of Querfurt, the first western missionaries (who included St. Vojtěch [Adalbert]), took the Hungarian court only a little away "from sin," and only wreathed the Magyars in the shadow of Christianity: Géza paid homage to both pagan and Christian gods. Around the year 1000, however, an fundamental turn of events must have taken place. This is evident from the founding (in 996?) of the country's first – and still active – Benedictine abbey at Pannonhalma which was followed by the establishment of the first bishoprics in the kingdom. It is important to note that this commencement of ecclesiastical organization in Hungary preceded Stephen's coronation as king.

While medieval Hungarian historiography acknowledged the role of German warriors in the consolidation Géza's and Stephen's temporal power, it refused to admit the existence of any such assistance in the sphere of church organization. The country, it was claimed, was converted by King Stephen I, a real apostle as it were, who also founded the Kingdom's archbishopric and chain of bishoprics. Hungary's medieval chroniclers attribute to no role in this work to Stephen's father; and they give no concrete information about how far Géza got in converting the Magyar people to Christianity.

It is a telling sign that not a single exact date of the early phase of conversion survives in these Hungarian works — including the year of Stephen's baptism or of his wedding. It is most likely that historiography of that time deliberately shunned the subject, reckoning with Hungarian history from the year of the coronation in 1000/1001. Typically enough, the Bavarian version of the St. Venceslav legend (*Crescente fide*) also distorts the facts when describing the very first phase of Bohemia's conversion, keeping silent about the details of earlier Moravian-Slavic

evangelization.²⁰ Not even the names of German missionaries survive in the Hungarian sources, except that of St. Adalbert, mentioned as the bishop of Prague, who became the patron saint of the first Hungarian archbishopric.²¹

Nevertheless, the organization of the church did not become the subject of an open historiographic controversy because — unlike the bishopric of Lund in Scandinavia or that of Prague in Bohemia — Esztergom, the Hungarian ecclesiastic centre, was raised to the rank of an archbishopric parallel with Gniezno in Poland (established around the year 1000). This happened during the early phase of Hungary's conversion when the issue of "German dependency" was not as acute as it was later. The only moot question that remains is whether Stephen converted his people to Christianity out of his own conviction or in deference to his wife's wishes.²²

Several analogies can be cited to exemplify the "converting royal spouse."²³ In the Polish chronicles, Princess Dobrava, the daughter of the Bohemian duke Boleslav I, helped the work of missionaries in Poland. In 965 she married Mieszko, the duke of the Poles, an event that was followed a year later by the duke's baptism. Contemporary German historiographers emphasize the fact that "the poison of inborn heathendom left him [Mieszko] upon the frequent urging of his beloved wife." The missionary role of the royal spouse was accepted in Poland probably because Queen Dobrava's family ties with German imperial family were not close.

The image of the royal spouse as an instrument of conversion was stressed by German chroniclers in connection with the Hungarians as well. Chroniclers of the mid-11th century, Wipo and Herimannus Augiensis, make the pointed remark that Gisela "converted her husband Stephan," and through him, the entire Hungarian nation, by marrying him.²⁴ Medieval Hungarian historiography ignored Gisela's supposed missionary role. Quite the contrary, the Hungarian chronicle makes quite unfavourable mentions of Gisela, attributing cruel deeds to her. Underlying this was more of a wish to blur or discredit her role deliberately than reality itself. German liturgical sources on the other hand — the readings and prayers of the feast of St. Henry — propagated the opposite view. His *vita*, composed for his canonization in 1146, called Emperor Henry II "*apostolus Ungarorum*" who "converted" the Hungarians with the help of his sister.²⁵

This historiographical dispute regarding the identity of the converter of Hungary extends beyond the realms of the Germans and the Hungarians. The fact is that even some chroniclers in Poland commented about evangelizing in Hungary. Being aware of the controversy about the role of Queen Dobrava in the conversion of their own country, they present the converting of the Hungarians as their own achievement. They admit that Hungary's conversion might have been helped by missionaries such as St. Adalbert, whose activity in Hungary during Géza and Stephen was preserved by legends and chronicles alike. In fact in 12th to 15th century Czech and Polish sources he is depicted as the converter of "both *Hungaria* and *Polonia*."

Consequences

All that we know about the first royal coronation in East Central Europe is that Stephen received "a crown and a blessing at the mercy and behest of the Emperor," according to Thietmar of Merseburg, "to establish the bishoprics." Hungarian historical tradition (the *Pozsonyi/Bratislava Chronicle*) dates this to 1000, the *Várad-Oradea/Zagreb Chronicle* to 1001, and prevailing opinion to Christmas or January 1000/1001.²⁶ Other modern-day historians note that Holy Roman Emperor Otto III (ruled 983-1002) was in Rome between August 1000 and February 1001, and then in Ravenna in April, where he would have had occasion to attend to the matter of the Hungarian coronation in consultation with Pope Sylvester II, his former teacher and close confidant, and with the duke of Bavaria.²⁷ Historian János M. Bak recently reminded us that Otto and Sylvester acted several times hand in hand.²⁸ The story of the Hungarian delegation to Pope Sylvester II requesting a crown was written down only at the beginning of the 12th century (the Hartvic legend) on the basis of a possibly true historical tradition that is now completely unknown, and was the subject of an attempt at substantiation around 1630 by means of the fake papal *bull* attributed to Sylvester II.

Unlike previous German emperors, Otto III viewed East Central Europe as an enormous political chessboard or, rather, as a region fantastically favourable for a religious revival, the Roman "*renovatio*" in the strictest sense of that term.²⁹ His vision took in the entire area from the Adriatic to the Baltic Sea, and he planned to spread his empire from Venice, through Prague, to Gniezno, by founding new kingdoms and

archbishoprics.³⁰ For diverse reasons, his efforts had only varying degrees of success. Among the region's new states, only in Hungary was a king crowned during Otto's reign, in 1000 or 1001. Much ink has been expended on the question of why such coronation did not happen in Bohemia and Poland. Among the Poles, it was probably impediments of the canon law that prevented both Gniezno's establishment as an archbishopric and Boleslaw Chrobry's coronation. A contributing factor to Otto's failure to have a Christian king crowned in Bohemia was the intensification German-Czech tensions, the Premyslida-Slavnik conflict and the Czech leaders' anti-Otto and anti-Piast policies. Most important of course, was the untimely death of the "great chess-player."

Otto's successors, Henry II and Conrad II, understood the language of armaments much better than the refined manners of political negotiations. The victims of this turn of events were Poland and Bohemia, whose incipient development as Christian kingdoms came to a temporary halt, as is illustrated by the long wait for the Prague bishopric, which had been founded around 972, to be raised to an archbishopric — which did not actually take place until 1344. The duke of Bohemia assumed the title of king on a continuous basis only in 1197. (Although this did happen earlier on occasions on an individual basis: Vratislav II became king in 1085 and Vladislav II in 1158.) The Poles had to wait until 1025 for the first coronation, and until 1300 their ruler bore the title of king only sporadically. These problems were felt least in Bohemia, which was throughout this period the closest to Western standards: statistical indicators for the country during the Middle Ages — such as population density, the density of parishes, and degree of urbanization — consistently surpassed those of Hungary and Poland.³¹

A key characteristic of Hungarian development was the fact that the Árpád dynasty held sway over the entire country which had been presented to Stephen I as a kind of "*tabula rasa*", that is he was left with a free hand in setting up Hungary's ecclesiastical organization. Stephen founded bishoprics without papal interference throughout his whole life, even if not twelve of them as a legend claims. By virtue of this centralized development and the good relations that prevailed between Hungary and the Holy Roman Empire during the reign of Henry II, the Hungarians were able to stand up to the German armies in 1030 during the first post-1000 Hungarian-German armed conflict, when the attackers were forced back and dealt a humiliating defeat at Vienna.³² The Hungarians were assisted by the swamps and rivers that defended their western frontier.

These wastelands, augmented by castles and water defences, helped to fend off what were in every case militarily much stronger attackers, right up to the last German onslaught in 1108.

The constant border disputes between the Czechs and the Poles were not paralleled in the Hungarians' relations with their neighbours. The country's boundaries along the Carpathian mountain ranges presented effective defense, except for the debacle against the Tartars in the thirteenth century. Another factor that may have reduced the number of conflicts the Hungarians had to cope with was the incomplete settlement of the Carpathian Basin's frontier areas, as a result of which internal population surpluses — as well as the influx into the country of large numbers of refugees — could be accommodated through the process of the settlement of these regions. No lasting military threat arose from the country's immediate neighbours: the Austrian or Moravian dukes, or from those of Galicia, Wallachia or southern Slav areas. At the same time, the vastness of the Carpathian Basin was one of the impediments to the expansionist ambitions of Hungary's rulers: population growth could not be sustained at a rate sufficient to support political and military expansion. Expansion into Galicia (Halic) and the Balkans would only have been viable in the long term if it had been possible to Magyarize the Slav populations there, which was not feasible. Prior to the appearance of the Turkish threat, Hungary's rulers had surprisingly wide strategic and political freedom of movement, sufficient even to enable them to find the means and the time to correct their bad decisions, and win back the territories and fortifications that they had lost.

Despite the challenges to the throne in medieval Hungary, the kingdom was rarely seriously threatened by lasting territorial divisions, and the chiefs of the administrative units along the borders (the Transylvanian or Slavonian officials), more often than not remained loyal vassals of the king. Indeed the extent of the Hungarian king's power was written about with astonishment by the German historian Otto of Freising in the middle of the 12th century.³³ This situation presented some disadvantages. Being a centralized country, in Hungary regional political centres that could have led to the formation of local centres of culture and learning failed to develop. Furthermore, since Hungarian-language literature was associated throughout this age with paganism, the written language of the realm remained Latin. There are only two short Hungarian-language sacred texts that survive from before 1300, although there is some oral record of Hungarian heroic poetry.³⁴

The foundation of the Hungarian state had a determinative influence in the history of what are now the Central European countries of Croatia, Slovakia and Romania, since their present-day territories partly or wholly consist of land that lay within the Kingdom of Hungary. By the end of the 11th century, Hungarian expansion had secured for its kings the crown of Croatia, a country that was coveted by both the Venetian and Byzantine empires and had already adopted the Latin Christian faith. The Croatian crown was retained by the Hungarian kings right up to 1918, but Croatia retained its territorial integrity throughout, largely as the result of the inability of the medieval state of Hungary to bring about the developed coastal areas' full economic and political integration into the Kingdom of Hungary. It is not an unrelated fact that the borders of Latin Christendom in the Balkans have remained coincident with the borders of Croatia right up to present times.

A particular mention should be made of the Hungarian Kingdom's relations with Europe's great powers, or more precisely, with the Holy Roman and Byzantine empires. As a medium-sized power, Hungary could not take up the struggle against either of these with any hope of success; however this did not have to be done often in the period under discussion. In the challenge from the Holy Roman, i.e. the German Empire, the years between 1030 and 1108 were critical: there was a real danger that in the midst of the country's periodic civil warring the German Emperor could reduce Hungary to vassalage.³⁵ Fortunately, Hungary's natural defences, in particular the marshlands of the kingdom's western approaches, often helped to thwart German incursions. When the imperial armies managed to penetrate the kingdom and it came to open warfare, the situation was different. Under these circumstances the Hungarian army never won a significant battle during this period, and indeed in 1044 (at Ménfő not far from the fortified city of Győr), it suffered a spectacular defeat. Crucial to Hungary's success in avoiding subjugation was the intensifying struggle between the emperor and the pope, which relegated the Hungarian front to a second-rank theatre of conflict for the German imperial court.

We can reach a similar conclusion regarding Hungarian-Byzantine relations. During the resurgence of Byzantine power in the 12th century, Hungary had to retreat in the face of Constantinople's belligerent military and foreign policy. An event of major significance was the defeat in 1167 (at Zimony, today in Belgrad) suffered by what was the century's strongest Hungarian army — comprising half of the country's total military

forces and equipped with Western European-type armour and arms. The territory given up to Byzantium as a consequence was only regained by the Hungarians (by King Béla III) after the death of the Byzantine Emperor Manuel at the end of the century. It was partly in response to these events that the above-mentioned chronicler Anonymous felt obliged to deny the justifiability of the Byzantine territorial claims, and to bolster his argument, began tracing the Árpáds' rightful title to the entire Carpathian Basin as far back as the Attila the King of the Huns, thus laying the foundations for a virulent Hungarian political myth that lasted for centuries.

A peculiar and fortunately exceptional event of Hungarian history prior to 1300 was the clash between the Mongol Empire and Hungary. Although the Mongol-Tatar advance did not catch the country unawares, the kingdom's army nevertheless suffered a catastrophic defeat at Muhi (not far from modern city Miskolc), in the spring of 1241. Afterward the invaders took possession of large parts of the country, with the exception of some fortresses.³⁶ The massive demographic losses suffered as a result of this conquest by the kingdom's Magyar ethnic group became a political question only several centuries later, and the Mongol occupation's rather short duration did not undo the country's international reputation. Indeed, the country's reconstruction resulted in economic and social advances and the attainment of a new level of modernity. It was the defeat at Muhi that first generated the idea of seeking Western assistance for the country. In response to the defeat of the Hungarians the Pope and the German emperor started to recruit a Christian army, but their efforts were frustrated by distrust between the two and by the pope's untimely death.³⁷ This would not have been the first instance that an international peace-making force did not get organized in time, and the Mongol victory certainly demonstrates that without foreign assistance, Hungary had little chance against the vast conquering empires emerging from Asia even in the days of its greatest military glory.

Population density figures offer a further insight into the situation in East Central Europe of the times.³⁸ Unfortunately, the data available is unreliable and is somewhat contradictory. The reconstruction of the demographic situation in the Carpathian Basin between the 9th and 13th centuries is very difficult. No censuses were conducted in Hungary until the eighteenth century. The first Hungarian census, that of 1784/87, gave the population of the kingdom as 8,492,000. Estimates for the country's population in 1495 range between 2 and 3.5 million. The first reference to

the numbers of the Hungarians before the conquest comes from the writings of the Arab historian Ibn Rusa, who claimed that around 880 the Hungarians had 20,000 armed horsemen. Some modern-day historians (György Györffy in particular) infer from this that there were 400,000 Hungarians and 200,000 Slavs in the Carpathian Basin at the beginning of the tenth century. Others (Gyula Kristó for example) have recently proposed radically smaller figures, putting the Hungarian population at 120,000, with a local non-Magyar population being about the same size. The calculations rest largely on whether the Hungarians are thought to have been semi-nomads, as in Györffy's view, or full nomads, as in Kristó's, because the population of semi-nomads derived from the number of warriors is estimated using a multiplier that is twice as high. Another recent reassessment challenges the proposition that the Hungarians necessarily required superiority in numbers to assimilate the existing Slav population and to retain the Hungarian language. Of the Carpathian Basin's 330,000 square kilometres, some 200,000 may be taken as being inhabited at that time, which with Györffy's figures gives a population density of 3 per sq. km., and at the end of the 11th century, the population figure of 1 million gives a density of 5 per sq. km, which matches the figures for Poland of the time. The lower estimates put population at the end of the 11th century as only half a million. The comparative figures around 1000 are: Italy, 7 million with a population density of 24/sq. km; Germany, 5.4 million, with 10/sq. km; and Bohemia, 1 million, with a population density of 7.8/sq km.

Conclusions

Even Stephen's contemporaries must have been in awe of the enormous significance of his life's work, because they usually referred to him as a saint long before his canonization in 1083. The turning point from a constitutional point of view came with the rule of the Hungarian king, Andrew I, who came to power after the bloody civil wars that followed Stephen's death. He anchored the legitimacy of his rule directly to the person of Stephen, by seeking out Stephen's coronation jewels when he took the throne. The canonization of Stephen, the first in Hungary, took place during the rule of Ladislas I (ruled 1077-95). Stephen was the first in the ranks of European royal saints who did not suffer martyrdom; he

achieved his elevation by virtue of his distinctions as ruler and spreader of the faith.³⁹

The recognition of Stephen as an apostolic king and a founder of church and state became particularly important to Hungary in the second half of the 11th century, when the kingdom became caught up in the crossfire between papal and German imperial claims. Legends from this time relate the quest for recognition of the Hungarian king's apostolic rights from the pope and contemporary Europe. These legends were the basis for the Hungarian kings' petition for papal recognition of Stephen's virtues, and indeed it was the writer of the third legend of St. Stephen, Hartvic, whose ecclesiastical-legal arguments gained the approval of a later pope, Innocent III, in 1201 — with the exception of the parts most offensive to the papacy. In 1233, King Andrew II ascribed the origin of his power *expressis verbis* to Stephen. The process went in parallel with the cult of St. Wenceslas in Bohemia and partly with that of St. Vojtěch / Adalbert in Poland, where the key figures in the formation of Christian nations became the patron saints of the countries and kings in perpetuity (“rex perpetuus”).

From the time of Ladislas and Coloman (in Hungarian, Kálmán, ruled 1096 to 1116) the source of legitimacy for Hungary's kings was the person and reign of Stephen, and so matters related to him took on a unique significance. Stephen has nearly every virtue of the mythical state-founders of medieval legends: he makes laws, mints coins, makes peace, adopts literacy, founds towns and churches.⁴⁰ Much of court pomp and ceremony is associated with Székesfehérvár, made by the king into the country's sacred centre, on the model of Aachen: from Coloman onwards most Hungarian kings were buried here, they were crowned here, the royal throne was kept here. A condition of legitimacy was that the coronation be carried out with St. Stephen's crown and take place in Székesfehérvár. It was here that the royal archives and treasury were kept. The royal assizes that involved court and legislative sessions were also held here, on the holiday of the sainted king. This date has a particular significance in the history of legislation in Hungary.⁴¹

The beginning of the 11th century marks the end of the first great stage in the process of founding church and state in Hungary. Hungarian Christianity and the kingdom's ecclesiastical and temporal administrations survived the onslaughts of pagan uprisings (in 1046 and 1061) and reached consolidation towards the end of the 11th century, especially under Ladislas I and Coloman when the feudal order was finally estab-

lished, the first saints were canonized, and new dioceses were founded. The canonization of Stephen I constituted the recognition that Hungary had finally arrived among the Western, Latin Christian kingdoms. Even among contemporaries, this process became merged, partly unconsciously and partly by design, with the memory of the first king. By around 1100 it had become widely believed that the state of Hungary and its church had been founded by King Stephen as the single resolution of a sovereign ruler.

King St. Stephen himself regarded the conversion to Christianity to be the main achievement of the age of the Hungarian kingdom's establishment. This is the message of his "*Admonitions*," the earliest "king's testament" in East Central Europe. Written by an anonymous ecclesiastic but attributed to the king, this document expressly links the future of the country with the keeping the Christian faith. In his *Admonitions* Stephen counsels his son, and all his descendants, to act accordingly. The posterity took St. Stephen's advice to heart: his *Admonitions* were embodied in the *Laws of St. Stephen* and remained the basis of the Hungarian *Corpus Iuris* up to the twentieth century.⁴²

In time, the three new states of Hungary, Bohemia and Poland became part of Christian Europe, "*Europa occidentalis*" as opposed to the world of the Byzantine Orthodox Christendom. In medieval times the modern political terminology of "Central Europe" or "East Central Europe" were unknown.⁴³ In the first centuries of these kingdoms' existence, the dynasties of the new states forged close relations with each other and with the ruling houses of their "Western" neighbours through marriage alliances. These three countries also joined the world of the Western, Latin church and accepted its traditions including monastic life. Nevertheless, modern historians have rightly pointed out that the new states that occupied the swathe of land between the Adriatic and the North Sea bear similarities in their statistical indicators which, despite variations, classed them as a group of countries undergoing a shared process of social and economic development. Having started off with clear disadvantages, these countries' social and economic development during the 11th and 12th centuries had brought the region very close to the standards of more advanced Western lands by the following century. Total integration into — and complete catching up to — "Western" Europe was never achieved and the new lands remained a zone of the frontier or periphery. The eleventh century in Europe gave birth not just to new states but to a new region which later became known as East Central Europe.⁴⁴

NOTES

¹ For an overview see Herwig Wolfram, *Die Geburt Mitteleuropas. Geschichte Österreichs vor seiner Entstehung 378–907* (Vienna: Kremayr und Scherian, 1987); András Róna-Tas, *Hungarians and Europe in the Early Middle Ages. An Introduction to Hungarian History* (Budapest and New York: Central European University [hereafter CEU] Press, 1999), 239–265; Gyula Kristó, *Hungarian History in the Ninth Century* (Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1996); György Györffy, "Die Landnahme der Ungarn aus historischer Sicht," in *Ausgewählte Probleme europäischer Landnahmen des früh- und Hochmittelalters*, ed. Michel Müller-Wille and Reinhard Schneider (Sigmaringen, 1994) Part II, 67–80.

² Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom. A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 18–47; Oscar Halecki, *The Millennium of Europe* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963) chapter I.

³ Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe. Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950-1350* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 5–9.

⁴ For a history of medieval Hungary see Gyula Kristó, *Die Arpaden-Dynastie. Die Geschichte Ungarns von 895 bis 1301* (Budapest: Corvina, 1993), 55–61; Ferenc Makk, "Une époque décisive: la Hongrie en milieu du Xe siècle," in *Les hongrois et l'Europe: Conquête et intégration*, ed. Sándor Csernus and Klára Korompay (Paris and Szeged: Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1999), 313–326.

Parts of Hungary, in particular its Transdanubian territories, were subject to the influence of the Holy Roman (German) Empire. Around 997, when the heir to the crown, Stephen, secured the hand of Gisela, sister of the future Holy Roman Emperor Henry II, this zone of influence was extended even further.

⁵ For general information see György Györffy, *King Saint Stephen of Hungary* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Marianne Sághy, "La christianisation de la Hongrie," in *Gerbert d'Aurillac. Actes du colloque d'Aurillac, 1996*, ed. Nicolle Charbonnel and Jean-Eric Jung (Aurillac: Société des lettres, science et arts, la Haute-Auvergne, 1997), 255–262; Richard Marsina, "Christianization of the Magyars between the East and the West," *Studia historica Slovaca* 19 (1995): 37–52, László Koszta, "L'organisation de l'Eglise chrétienne en Hongrie," in *Les hongrois et l'Europe*, 293–312. In this connection see my "Conversion in the Chronicles. The Hungarian Case," in *Christianizing Peoples and Converting Individuals*, ed. Guyda Armstrong and Ian N. Wood (Turnhout: Brepols, in print).

⁶ "The Greater legend of St. Stephen," in Imre Szentpétery ed., *Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum*, vol. 2. (Budapest: Akadémia, 1938; reprint Budapest: Nap Kiadó, 1999), 379.

⁷ Arnold Angenendt, *Kaiserherrschaft und Königstaupe. Kaiser, Könige und Päpste als geistliche Patrone in abendländischen Missionsgeschichte* (Berlin and New York: W. De Gruyter, 1984), 313–14.

⁸ József Gerics, *Egyház, állam és gondolkozás Magyarországon a középkorban* [Church, state and mentality in medieval Hungary] cited hereater as *Church, State* (Budapest: METEM, 1995), 144–64.

⁹ See Norbert Kersken, *Geschichtsschreibung im Europa der Nationes. Nationalgeschichtliche Gesamtdarstellungen im Mittelalter* (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna: Böhlau, 1995), 814–16; László Veszprémy, "Historical Past and Political Present in the Latin Chronicles of Hungary (12th–13th Centuries)," in *The Medieval Chronicle*, ed. Erik Kooper (Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1999), 260–68.

¹⁰ The Greater Legend of St. Stephen, in *Scriptores*, vol. 2: p. 378; also, Gerics, *Church, State*, 158–60.

¹¹ Recent edition by Gabriel Silagi with László Veszprémy eds., *Die Gesta Hungarorum des anonymen Notars* (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1991).

¹² On the subject of Attila, the Huns, the Magyars and the Hun-Magyar kinship, see Róna-Tas, *Hungarians and Europe*, 423–26; as well as Kristó, *Hungarian History*, 71–84.

¹³ László Veszprémy, ed., *Simonis de Kéza Gesta Hungarorum* (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 1999).

¹⁴ Jenő Szűcs, *Theoretical elements in Simon of Kéza's Gesta Hungarorum* *Studia Historica* 96 (Budapest, 1975), a revised translation appears in Veszprémy, ed., *Simonis de Kéza*. Simon of Kéza fails to explain the origins of servitude and social inequality among the Magyars. If the Hungarians were guided by the Holy Ghost from the beginning, the difference between noblemen and non-nobles could simply not stem from the embracing of Christianity. Simon of Kéza argues that those were cast into subjugation were those who failed to turn up when their leaders summoned them to take up arms in defence of the new religion.

¹⁵ *Das Register Gregors VII.*, ed. Erich Caspar (Berlin: MGH reprint, Munich, 1920) nr. II. 13. p. 145. Cited by J. Gerics, *Church, State*, p. 150. By offering the kingdom to the Holy Virgin, i.e. to a "higher dignity," Hungary's ruling elite probably wanted to weaken the papal court's claim to the country.

¹⁶ See Angenendt, p. 313; and Gerics, *Church, State*, 162–63.

¹⁷ Gerhoh, *Iber de Corrupto Ecclesie statu*, ch. 58, P.L. Migne, (reprint, Turnhout: Brepols, 1990–1992. Vol. 194); and Otto of Freising, *Chronica VI*, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990; 5th ed.), 27.

¹⁸ Johannes Fried, *Otto III and Boleslaw Chrobry* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1989), 21–64. It is a well-established view that according to Emperor Otto III's *Evangeliarium of Aachen* (1001–1002) there were two princes admitted by the

Emperor into the family of European Christian peoples: Boleslav the Bold of Poland and Stephen I of Hungary.

¹⁹ Ekkehard Völkl, ed., *Bayern und Ungarn. Tausend Jahre enge Beziehungen* (Regensburg: Osteuropainstitut, 1988).

²⁰ Marvin Cantor, *The Origins of Christianity in Bohemia. Sources and Commentary* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1990), 99, 143–54, 271 (n. 10), 288 (n. 1).

²¹ Thomas von Bogyay, "Adalbert von Prag und die Ungarn — ein Problem der Quellen-Interpretation," *Ungarn Jahrbuch* 7 (1976): 9–36; *idem.*, *Stephanus Rex* (Vienna and Munich: Herold, 1976); L. Veszprémy, "Der Hl. Adalbert im wissenschaftlichen Gespräch ungarischer Historiker," *Bohemia* 40 (1999): 87–102.

²² For Scandinavian parallels see Birgit Sawyer, "Scandinavian Conversion Histories," in *The Christianisation of Scandinavia*, ed. B. Sawyer, Peter Sawyer and Ian Wood (Alsingsås: Viktoria Bakförl, 1987), 88–110.

²³ An overview can be found in Kersken, *Geschichtsschreibung*, p. 815.

²⁴ Gerics, *Church, State*, pp. 71–76., quoted by him Wipo II, 24. On Gisela see János M. Bak, "Roles and Functions of Queens in Árpáadian and Angevin Hungary," in *Medieval Queenship*, ed. John Carmi Parsons (Wolfboro Falls: Sutton Publ., 1994), 14–15.

²⁵ Medieval sources on Gisela have been collected and reprinted by András Uzsoki, *Az első magyar kiráályné, Gizella sírja* [The tomb of Gisela, the first Hungarian queen] *Publicationes museorum comitatus Veszpremiensis* 16 (1982), 125–68.; see also Uzsoki's "Die Echtheit des Grabes der ungarischen Königin Gisela in Passau," in Völkl, *Bayern und Ungarn*, pp. 13–22.

²⁶ Josef Deér, *Die Heilige Krone Ungarns* (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Kl. Denkschriften, Vol. 91, 1966); Kálmán Benda and Erik Fügedi, *Tausend Jahre Stephanskronen* (Budapest: Corvina, 1988).

²⁷ Péter Váczy, "Thietmar von Merseburg über die ungarische Königskrone," in *Insignia Regni Hungariae. Studien zur Machtsymbolik des mittelalterlichen Ungarn*, ed. Zsuzsa Lovag (Budapest: Nemzeti Múzeum, 1983), 29–54.

²⁸ János M. Bak, "Some Recent Thoughts of Historians about Central Europe in 1000 A. D.," *Hortus Artium Medievalium. Journal of International Research Center for Antiquity and Middle Ages* 6 (2000): 65–71.; for earlier literature see Percy Ernst Schramm, *Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio. Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Reichs bis zum Investiturstreit* (2 vols) (Leipzig: Hermann Gentner, 1929; reprint, Darmstadt, 1975).

²⁹ János M. Bak, "Some Recent Thoughts," pp. 65, 68.

³⁰ On his activity see Gert Althoff, *Otto III* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996); also the same author's *Amicitiae und Pacta*.

Bündnis, Einung, Politik und Gebetsdenken im beginnenden 10. Jahrhundert (Hannover: Hahn, 1992).

³¹ For a broader perspective see Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, pp. 19, 39; also, Marie-Madelaide de Cevins, "Les paroisses hongroises au Moyen Age", in *Les hongrois et l'Europe*, pp. 341–58.

³² For a new interpretation of these events see Herwig Wolfram, *Konrad II* (Munich: Beck, 2000); by the same author: "Die ungarische Politik Konrads II," in "...The Man of Many Devices, Who Wandered Full Many Ways..." *Festschrift in Honour of János M. Bak*, ed. Balázs Nagy and Marcell Sebök (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 1999), 460–69.

³³ Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici I* (Hannover 1912, reprint Hannover, Hahn, 1978), 33.

³⁴ Klára Korompay, "Naissance des premiers textes hongrois," in *Les hongrois et l'Europe*, pp. 359–74.

³⁵ Egon Bonshof, "Das Reich und Ungarn in der Zeit der Salier," in Völkl, *Bayern und Ungarn*, 41–63; Csaba Szabó, "Die militärischen Aspekte der deutsch-ungarischen Beziehungen während der Salierzeit," *Ungarn-Jahrbuch* 21 (1993-1994): 1–18.

³⁶ Hansgerd Göckenjan, "Der Westfeldzug (1236–1242) aus mongolischer Sicht," in *Wahlstatt 1241. Beiträge zur Mongolenschlacht bei Liegnitz und zu ihren Nachwirkungen*, ed. Ulrich Schmilewski (Würzburg: Bergstadtverlag W.G. Korn, 1991), 35–76.

³⁷ Peter Jackson, "The Crusade against the Mongols, 1241," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 42 (1992): 1–18.

³⁸ Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, pp. 18–47; György Györffy, "Einwohnerzahl und Bevölkerungsdichte in Ungarn bis zum Anfang des XIV. Jahrhunderts," in *Etudes historiques publiées par la Commission Nationale des Historiens Hongrois* Vol. 1. (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1960), 163–94; and recently, József Kovacsics ed., *Magyarország történeti demográfiája: A honfoglalás és az Árpád-kor népessége* [The population of Hungary in the time of the conquest and the Árpád-age] (Budapest: KSH, 1995).

³⁹ Gábor Klaniczay, "Rex iustus. Le saint fondateur de la royauté chrétienne," in *Les hongrois et l'Europe*, pp. 265–92.

⁴⁰ Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, pp. 269–88; Norbert Kersken, *Geschichtsschreibung*, pp. 811–16.

⁴¹ Joseph Deér, "Aachen und die Herrschersitze der Arpaden," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichte* 79 (1971): 1–56.

⁴² St. Stephen's work is variously translated as "Admonitions" or "Exhortations." Jenő Szűcs, "King Stephen's Exhortations and His State," *New Hungarian Quarterly* 29 (winter 1988): 89–98. An English translation by János Bak and James Ross Sweeney, *ibid.*, pp. 98–105.

⁴³ Jenő Szűcs, "Three Historical Regions of Europe," *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungariae* 29 (1983). For a better French translation see *Les trois Europe* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1985); Frank Hadler, "Mitteleuropa – Zwischeneuropa – Ostmitteleuropa. Reflexionen über eine europäische Geschichtsregion im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," *Slovanské Študie* (1996:1): 14–21.

⁴⁴ It might be significant to add that in his magisterial history of this region Piotr Wandycz covers precisely these three countries and leaves out the states of the Rumanians and the South Slavs. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, *op. cit.*

Dynastic Intrigues and Domestic Realities during the Reigns of Andrew I and Béla I

Z. J. Kosztolnyik

Porro dux Andreas a perturbationibus hostium securus effectus in regia civitate Alba regalem coronam est adeptus.

Chronicon pictum, c. 86.

In the mid-1030s, the cousin of King Stephen I of Hungary, Prince Vazul (the son of Michael, the younger brother of Géza, Stephen's father) conspired to assassinate the elderly and ailing king. The conspiracy was discovered and the king's court had Vazul blinded and his three sons: Levente, Andrew and Béla, banished from the kingdom.¹ Next, a new article was added to the recently promulgated Laws of King Stephen (art. ii: 17) regarding conspiracy against king and country. The article proclaimed that the organizer of such conspiracy may find no refuge in a church. Although this decree shows similarity in concept and wording to the brief entry 5 of the Synod of Mainz (847 a.d.), the phrasing of the Hungarian article is firmer: it outlaws the traitor not only from the community of believers, but from the Church itself.

Upon the death of King Stephen in 1038, his nephew, Peter the Orseolo — the son of one of Stephen's sisters, and the favourite of Queen Gisela, Stephen's widow (and the sister of the Holy Roman Emperor, Henry II) — ascended the Hungarian throne. His tyrannical rule (from 1038 to 1041 and from 1044 to 1046) encountered strong opposition. In 1041 Peter fled the realm after which his opponents elected Sámuel Aba, the Palatine of the country and husband of Stephen's other sister, as their king. Unfortunately for Aba, the German imperial court refused to recog-

nize his election to the Hungarian throne and Emperor Henry III invaded Hungary.²

Henry's armies first seized the frontier fortress of Pozsony (Pressburg, today's Bratislava), then advanced along the left bank of the Danube to the Garam (Hron) River taking possession of nine other Hungarian fortifications. Aba reacted to this invasion by offering peace to the Emperor. Henry refused this offer and embarked on a new invasion this time along the right bank of the Danube. His forces, however, bogged down in the marshes of the Rábca River. In the fall of 1043 Henry concluded peace with Aba, thereby recognizing his royal status.

On the domestic front, however, King Aba's opponents, consisting of Orseolo sympathizers and Church leaders, were gaining strength. The King, fearing another conspiracy, early in 1043 ordered the slaughter of the dignitaries who had conspired against him. The following year the nobles who survived the massacre asked for the Emperor's intervention. Henry III once again entered Hungary with his armies and on July 5 defeated Aba's forces in the Battle of Ménfő (Győr county, in western Hungary). The King fled to the east but was captured and killed by his Hungarian opponents. Soon thereafter Henry entered Székesfehérvár (Alba Civitas or Alba Regia — Árpáadian Hungary's second most important city), where he restored Péter the Orseolo to the Hungarian throne.

Péter's throne rested on shaky foundations. In order to secure his reign and the unqualified support of the Emperor, in the spring of 1045 he offered Hungary as a fiefdom to Henry III.³ And yet, the Orseolo did not feel secure in his kingdom, in spite — or, perhaps, because — of his feudal relationship with the imperial court. Accordingly, he had the district forts garrisoned by German and Italian troops — to the consternation of the Hungarian nobles who, led by Boja and Bonya, formed a conspiracy against him. The Orseolo had the conspirators executed. Thereupon in the spring of 1046, the nobles gathered at Csanád and sent envoys to Kiev to recall from their exile the Árpáadian princes Andrew and Levente (Vazul's oldest sons), to rule over the country.

In the early fall of 1046, the two princes — along with their Kievan auxiliaries — entered the realm, where they were joined by a multitude of King Péter's opponents, led by Vata from the region of Békés who wanted to restore paganism in the land. In order to gain time, the two princes seemingly consented to Vata's demand, thereby opening the floodgates of an anti-Christian uprising all over the land.⁴ Simultaneously, an abortive uprising also broke out in the camp of the Orseolo

at Zsitvatorok (the estuary of the Zsitva stream). The king next tried to enter the city of Székesfehérvár, but the city gates remained shut before him. He was captured at Zámoly and was blinded.

It was Peter the Orseolo's tragedy that he, a ruler of non-Árpád blood, had been unable to comprehend that it was his sole responsibility to maintain the country's public institutions his predecessors had established. It was his personal tragedy that, in spite of the many years he had spent in the country, he was unable to understand the spiritual inner world of the Magyar people.

At the end of September, three bishops who had escaped the bloodbath of the pagan uprising, crowned Andrew I king in the royal cathedral (coronation church) of Székesfehérvár.

The Reign of Andrew I

The invitation of Andrew and his accession to the Hungarian throne proved a mixed blessing to both the nobles who had invited him, and to Andrew himself. During his prolonged stay in Kiev, Andrew had gained the hand in marriage of Anastasia, daughter of Jaroslav the Wise, grand-prince of Kiev, and through this marriage he assured himself of the political — and, possibly, the military — support of the Kievan Empire for the realization of his own dynastic ambitions. The other daughter of Jaroslav, Anna, was the queen of Henry I, king of the Franks, whereby the recently anointed and crowned Hungarian monarch could hope to obtain diplomatic and cultural aid from his Frankish royal brother-in-law. The founding by Andrew of the abbey of Tihany in 1055 in the honour of the Frankish saint, Anian, may serve as proof that the establishment of Franco-Hungarian cultural ties had been realized.⁵

King Andrew's first concern was to restore peace in the land, to put Vata's pagan insurgents into their place, and to fill unoccupied ecclesiastical positions in the country with the twenty-four canons who came to Hungary after their canonry at Verdun had burned down. In the late 1040s, he provided military aid for the Croats against Venice and the Dalmatian cities, and in the early spring of 1050, he staged a counter offensive against Bishop Gebhard of Regensburg who had invaded Hungary's frontier region. When the Hungarian scouts noted that on the German side of the border the Germans were rebuilding the fort of Hainburg, Andrew's border guards harassed the builders and brought construc-

tion to a near standstill. To reach a peace agreement with the Holy Roman Empire, Andrew sent envoys to Emperor Henry III, and dispatched Archbishop George of Kalocsa to Pope Leo IX, who was at that time visiting in Lorraine, with the request that his Holiness intervene at the imperial court on behalf of the peace offer made by the Hungarian monarch.

In 1050, Prince Béla also returned to Hungarian soil with his Polish wife. Andrew rewarded him with a princely share of Hungary's territory that meant, among other things, that Béla had the right to mint money. In his exile Béla had made a reputation for himself as a military strategist and a brave soldier.⁶ In the summer of 1051, King Andrew needed all of Béla's military know-how when German imperial forces gathered at Passau and, led by the Emperor Henry III in person, invaded Hungary and marched against Székesfehérvár. Bishop Gebhard was in charge of the imperial supply ships on the Danube carrying food for the Emperor's troops. The imperial high command had learned a lesson from past mistakes; it organized supplies of food provisions for the troops before actually starting the campaign. But Andrew's men — or Béla's scouts — in a cleverly written mischievous letter had caused the ships to return home prematurely, thereby leaving the German troops heading toward Szekesfehérvár without food supplies. Consequently, Andrew's and Béla's forces easily out-manoeuvred and then defeated the imperial forces at Bodajk near Mount Vértes (Hill of [the lost] Shields).

The imperial court next planned a new offensive. In the following year its forces besieged the fortress of Pozsony for eight weeks — to no avail. The imperial naval vessels on the Danube — it is not clear from the text whether the boats were armed ships, or food supply vessels — were sunk by a clever Hungarian frogman named Zotmund, whereupon the Emperor withdrew his troops. Since Pozsony was located near the German border, and the imperial high command could easily have provided for the needs of its forces by means of land transportation. Actually, Henry III was forced to withdraw his armed forces not so much because of Zotmund's brave deed, but because he had to face domestic troubles: Duke Conrad of Bavaria had revolted against him.⁷

Unfortunately for Hungary, this was the last occasion when Andrew and Béla cooperated with each other. In 1053, a son and heir: Salomon, was born to Andrew, and the king had a Basilian monastery erected at Visegrád to please his Kievan-born Queen Anastasia who had been brought up in Byzantine Christian traditions. In 1054 the schism

between Byzantium and Rome became open. In order to make sure that he did not appear to favour either side in this religious quarrel and that he did not offend the sensitivities of his Queen's sister Anna, the wife of the west-Frankish monarch, in 1055 King Andrew established a Latin-rite monastery in Tihany. Through these acts Andrew sought to have peace and balance between the religious and political interests of the two churches and wanted the Frankish court to know that his realm formed a part of western, Latin Christendom.

Peace had prevailed in the land. Archbishop Benedict of Esztergom and Zach[eus] the Palatine (*comes palatini*) were the country's head officials. In the 1050s, Sarchas, Judge of the King's Court, prepared a census of the personnel serving on the royal estates. It may have been at this time that Edward Aetheling (also known as Edward the Exile) — the son of King Edward's brother, Edmund (known as "Ironside") — who had been banished to Hungary by King Cnut the Great, allegedly married Agatha, a daughter of Stephen I. To quote from the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, Edward "won a kinswoman of the Emperor for his wife," that is, a daughter of Queen Gisela, the sister of Emperor Henry II, but returned to England where he died shortly thereafter. "[H]e so speedily ended his life after he came to England." An explanation for Edward's sudden death may be provided by a remark in the less-known *Florence* manuscript of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*: "for the king — that is, Edward the Confessor — had determined to make Edward heir to the kingdom after him." Perhaps certain individuals at the English court disliked the idea of a prince who had been living abroad for years and had married into a "foreign" royal family, thereby establishing a dynastic blood tie with the Holy Roman imperial court, being allowed to ascend the English throne.⁸

Another entry in this *Florence* manuscript of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* may, however, reveal a further dynastic aspect of this story, that is that Andrew I of Hungary might have made plans with Edward the Exile, heir presumptive to the English throne, to expand the Hungarian Kingdom's diplomatic influence beyond the confines of the Germanic world. In such a manner, through family connections with the Frankish and English royal houses, to which he could add his family ties with the ruling house in Kiev (and the religious-political ties with Byzantium), King Andrew I wanted to bring about a far-reaching dynastic network by arranging for a well placed marriage alliance between his son Salomon and Judith, the sister of the new German ruler, the future Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV.⁹

The dynastic marriage relationship in the making between the House of Árpád and the Franconian dynasty of German rulers — against the background of Árpáadian blood ties with the west-Frankish and English kingdoms, and family and religious ties with the eastern, Kievan and Byzantine, courts — provided a seemingly firm foundation for the position of Andrew I, as well as his son Salomon, in a central Europe.

A well-informed Hungarian chronicler of the times who probably had a clear picture of Andrew's dynastic goals,¹⁰ commented on the case from an entirely different perspective. Blood ties often hinder the truth, he complained. Also, fatherly concern in the heart of Andrew, he wrote, defeated justice, in that Andrew, by now old and invalid — and yet, in a manner unworthy of a king — broke the promise he had made to his younger brother Béla that, upon his death, it will be Béla who shall inherit the Hungarian throne. Instead, Andrew had Salomon, his five-year-old son, anointed and crowned king, “in regem fecit iniungi et coronari.” The chronicler excused the King's behaviour by saying that he had acted out of national interest: the German court would not have consented to the arranged marriage without Salomon's coronation; and yet, the chronicler also pointed out, the king had made a mistake. When Béla found out what really had happened, he justly grew indignant and, what was worse, became suspicious.

Later Andrew once again met his younger brother at the royal hunting lodge at Várkony. There he, without the knowledge of Béla, put his brother to a test. Would the prince accept political reality? Would he be satisfied with his princely title and landholdings, and continue as the realm's military defender during the minority of the child king, Salomon; or, would he reach out for the crown, thereby voiding Andrew's dynastic ambitions? Accordingly, at Várkony, Andrew placed before Béla the crown and a sword and asked him to chose. Béla, following the advice of Nicholas, reeve of the royal court: “Si vitam optas, accipe gladium,” chose, out of fear, the sword, that is, the princely title. After he had made his choice, Béla with his family immediately left the kingdom. Regardless of the fact that he had acted out of fear, the prince, in deciding to flee to Poland, simply refused to identify himself with — and may have decided to undermine — his brother's pro-German game of dynastic chess.

In the fall of 1060, Prince Béla returned from Poland with three divisions of Polish auxiliaries and took up position east of the Tisza river. King Andrew grew concerned, sent his family to safety in Austria, and

asked for German military aid. Through this twofold act the already very ill monarch committed a fatal mistake. He had fully weakened his position on the home front and demolished any prospect of success he could have claimed for his foreign diplomacy. The king was no match for Béla's military know-how, not to mention the fact that the majority of his subjects sided with the prince. Béla deployed his forces in the Tisza region — a region that formed part of his princely territory, whose terrain he knew well, where he could easily provide logistics for his men — and encircled the German troops that had arrived to help Andrew. The King fled to Moson on the western border, was severely wounded in an accident, was captured by Béla's men and, because of incompetent medical treatment, soon died in the royal hunting lodge at Zirc.

A word of explanation will be in order here. In this writer's opinion, King Andrew I must have become overconfident by the prospects of his marriage-bound diplomacy: his links to Kievan Rus, to the Frankish Kingdom, to the Germanic world of the Holy Roman Emperors, and his expected ties to England, blinded him to realities.

In connection with the latter it might be mentioned that there is no record of Edward Aetheling's stay — that lasted well into King Andrew's reign — in Hungary by the Hungarian chroniclers. If, however, Edward did *not* marry one of King Stephen's daughters but only a Hungarian noble woman (an unlikely scenario knowing King Stephen's warm hospitality extended to all "foreigners") the Anglo-Saxon prince, who had lived and raised a family in Hungary, still had to have active contacts with the Hungarian royal court.

King Andrew wanted to crown this complicated and perhaps unrealistic policy with the marriage of *his* son to the sister of the ruling German monarch, the future Holy Roman Emperor, Henry IV — who at the time was still a minor. It was the Andrew's personal tragedy that his overbearing dynastic ambitions lacked political reality. On the one hand, the imperial court's advisors and dowager empress Agnes (Henry II's widow), viewed the proposed marriage between Salomon and Judith as a means to draw the Magyar kingdom back into the sphere of imperial influence, from which it had only recently pulled away. This German-Hungarian marriage alliance sooner or later would have restored the Magyar court's dependency on the Holy Roman Empire. On the other hand, Andrew's diplomacy lacked domestic reality: it ignored his subjects' deep-seated distrust of foreign influences and their attachment to ancient Magyar habits and manner of life. Many in Hungary of the times were

searching for an excuse to revolt — with armed force, if needed — against the “foreign” politics of their monarch.

The Reign of Béla I

In early December 1060, Béla I became king. The Hungarian chronicler called Béla *Benin* (the warrior). Béla entered Székesfehérvár in triumph, where the bishops anointed and crowned him — “regali dyademata... est coronatus,” the chronicler reported. This writer, however, believes that the circlet used at the coronation was not the crown that touched King Stephen’s forehead, but “[the] *ruler’s diadem* with which the bishops, after anointing him, had crowned him.” If this ruler’s diadem happened to be the circlet sent by the *Byzantine* Emperor Monomachos, a diadem that the *Latin-rite* bishops had placed on Béla’s head, the new king through his coronation wanted to signal his determination that during his reign he shall maintain good relations with the *eastern* Greek court, and at the same time also continue the Árpáds’ *western* orientation. The new king’s first task was to deflate once and for all the still vigorous “pagan” revolution in the land. Béla first tried persuasion but made only slow progress; in the end he had to rely upon military force to restore law and order. The chronicler’s statement that the king summoned, countrywide, two *well-spoken men* from every village to his Royal Council to aid him in decision making — “misit etiam rex... per totam Hungariam precones, ut de singulis villis vocarentur duo seniores *facundiam habentes* [italics mine] ad regis concilium” — may refer to this resolution of the monarch. The chronicler’s choice of Latin terms meant that two well-spoken elders invited from every village were, “*facundiam habentes*,” actually *representatives* of the villages in, or before, the King’s Council, whose framework King Béla now expanded from the size the council had earlier been established by King Stephen.

In other words, King Béla I in the early 1060s had — together with members of the high clergy, nobility, and elected representatives of the people — enacted effective legislation, placed the dismal financial problems of the country in order, and realized his clearly set domestic and foreign political aims. It might be pointed out that Béla’s example would be emulated by other European rulers. In Aragon of the 1080s, it would be *rex et regina* who would call upon the representatives of the towns to participate in the discussion of public matters — and enact legislation. In

England, it will be Henry II who, according to the resolutions of his Assize of Clarendon of 1166, through statements taken from the local *legaliores* (who knew of a certain crime, at the certain time, at a certain place) before courts of law, would conduct legal proceedings by the “Justices in the eyre.”

It was through his expanded Council that Béla had successfully handled financial matters, minted money, determined prices and wages, punished black marketeering, supported *laissez faire*, introduced Byzantine gold coins into circulation — his forty silver denars were worth one Byzantine gold coin. This writer agrees with historian Bálint Hóman who, in his assessment of late eleventh century reforms in Hungary, said that the economic-financial improvements in the realm reached back to the days of King Béla I. The fiscal improvements “introduced” by King Salomon, for instance, would not have been possible without the fiscal initiatives under King Béla.¹¹

One cannot leave out of consideration the fact that Béla had grown up in the Polish court, where fiscal reforms had been carried out already in the first half of the eleventh century. Béla had been aware that no matter how important his domestic and diplomatic efforts would be, he could not realize them without at first placing his country’s economic and monetary state on solid foundations. In the spirit of King Stephen, he did this at the beginning of his reign, acting with the full cooperation of the high clergy, the nobility, and the peoples’s *representative* spokesmen in the Council.

It was also with the consent of his spiritual and temporal lords that Béla had, at the beginning of his reign, suppressed the *pagan* upheaval countrywide. This is evident from the remark of the *Chronicle* that it took Béla three days to take action; as soon as he had obtained the consent of his lords, and re-grouped his available army units, he mastered the situation. (The monarch had been aware that it was dangerous to use troops to quell domestic unrest; the experience could have backfired: “Hungaria ad Christum convertita bis ad paganismum versa est.”)

During the summer of 1063, the imperial diet meeting at Mainz decided on a military campaign against Béla in order to restore King Salomon to the Hungarian throne. The king, because he wanted to delay the invasion, or to avoid it by diplomatic means, sent envoys to the German court, but Empress Agnes was (rather, her advisors were) unwilling to negotiate. Béla spent the early fall of 1063 at his hunting lodge at Dömös to prepare for the Germans attack, when his throne literally

collapsed under him — it depends how one reads the sentence in the *Chronicle* as the text also reads "when the roof of the building fell upon him." Was the event a coincidence or sabotage organized from abroad — an attempt upon the king's life? Historians do not know the answer to this question.

Béla never recovered from his wounds. From Dömös he was taken on a stretcher to fort Moson so that he could direct military operations against the approaching imperial forces, but his health did not hold out. He had to be carried semi-conscious to the Kanizsa [Kynisua] Creek, where he died, "et ibi migravit e seculo."

His sons fled to Poland to return with Polish troops by the end of the year. In early 1064, at Győr in western Hungary, the headmen of the realm negotiated a peace between Salomon's supporters and Béla's sons: Géza, László [Ladislav], and Levente. On Easter Sunday, Prince Géza crowned Salomon anew in the cathedral at Pécs. Thereafter, the court of Salomon and his wife Judith revived — one ought to say: implemented — the financial reforms of Béla by establishing a system of monetary exchange of new coins (only) every two years.

Conclusions

King Béla had followed a very successful domestic and foreign policy based on common sense; unexpectedly, and, perhaps, too rapidly, did he achieve success with his military, administrative, fiscal and judicial policies. He had reached his triumphs far too soon for some of his — mostly non-Magyar — adversaries who wished nothing more than Béla's failure while his nephew, Salomon was still alive. Although collapsing buildings, or royal thrones, had buried ruling monarchs before, judged by the overly brief report by the *Hungarian Chronicle* on the reign of Béla I, the dying monarch had been aware that the Franconian [i.e. Holy Roman] court just would not refrain from using any Byzantine political method — including assassination — in removing him from the throne of the Árpáds.

The politics of both Andrew I and Béla I can only be characterized as cautious. Both monarchs passed resolutions, issued directives, undertook no action without the consent of the Council made up of the spiritual and temporal lords, as well as the well-spoken elders *representing* the people's interests. Their diplomacy relied upon marriages, form-

ing blood ties with various ruling families, in order to counterbalance any threat from the imperial Franconian court. Domestically, both had achieved great accomplishments. Because of the tragedies — accidental or premeditated — that cut their lives short, their dynastic policies remained unfinished, unsuccessful attempts.

NOTES

¹ Stephen I (the Saint, ruled 997-1038) is known to Hungarians as Szent István, Vazul is also known as Vászoly, Michael as Mihály, and Andrew as András or Endre.

Vazul's three sons fled first to Bohemia. Later, Levente and Andrew found refuge in the court of Jaroslav the Wise (ruled 1015-53) in Kiev, while Béla, at that of Casimir I (the Restorer, ruled 1038-58), the King of Poland.

For information on primary and secondary sources relevant to this paper see the bibliographical essay at the end of these notes.

² Henry III (b. 1017, d. 1056), duke of Bavaria and of Swabia, German king (1039-56) and Holy Roman Emperor (1046-56), was a member of the Salian or Franconian dynasty of Holy Roman Emperors. Henry was a highly educated and a very religious ruler who devoted much of his energies to serving the interests — as he saw them — of Christianity and the Germanic realm he ruled. He was the last of the emperors who was able to dominate the papacy.

For an overview of the international context of this age see my article "Német politikai fejlemények a magyar történet háttérében..." [German political developments in the background of Hungarian history...], *Acta Universitatis Szegediensis* 109 (1999): 3–11.

³ The odd nature of the situation was depicted by the mid-XIVth century illuminator of the *Chronicon pictum*, which showed the Orseolo receiving the crown while *standing* from the hands of the Emperor who was *sitting* on the throne, as he, presumably, received *the* crown that had touched the forehead of King Stephen so that the Emperor could, upon performing this act, send the crown back to Rome. The return of the crown to the Roman See is witnessed by the testimony of the letter, dated October 28, 1074, of Pope Gregory VII, in the sense that, in that letter, the pontiff laid claim as a papal fief to the Magyar realm of King Salomon (1063–74, son of Andrew I).

One has to assume that the crown used at Peter's coronation (if there ever was a coronation) was the diadem [circlet] sent by Pope Sylvester II to Stephen, if one is to believe the assertion made by Pope Gregory VII in his writ to King Salomon. However, one should remember that the *Chronicon pictum*, c. 71, mentioned no coronation! "Postquam autem Petrus factus est rex" (after they had made him king), the statement does not necessarily imply coronation. In

order to be "crowned" king, one needed the presence of bishops, and the anointment by bishops (like, in the Old Testament, Samuel anointing Saul king of Israel, ca 1025 BC). The "P" initial on fol. 24a of the *Chronicle* manuscript, depicted King Peter dressed in a shirt of mail, holding a sword in his right hand, and in his left a [the] crown. The crown could have been any circlet, perhaps Peter's house-crown. On the other hand, in c. 77, the *Chronicle* recorded that the Emperor, Henry III, upon the defeat of Aba, restored Peter to kingship with the royal insignia of King Stephen; "Petrum regem regali corona plenarie restitutum, et sacris insignibus sancti regis Stephani more regio decoratum." The Emperor could do that to a vassal, as, indeed, in the following year, Peter submitted himself as *vassal*, and his realm as *benefice*, to the Emperor (*Chronicle*, c. 78; and, the drawing in the "S" initial on fol. 27b of the *Chronicle* manuscript, where Peter, *standing* in front of, handed a [the] golden lance to, the Emperor *sitting* on a [the] throne).

⁴ In the meanwhile at the Pest shore ferry on the Danube the pagan insurgents murdered Gerard (known to Hungarians today as Szent Gellért), the bishop of Csanád and Szolnok, a royal reeve.

⁵ During his exile in Kiev, Andrew came under Byzantine religious influence which would accompany him long after he returned to Hungary.

⁶ During his exile in Poland, in a duel Béla had defeated a Prussian duke, an opponent of Casimir I, who had refused to pay feudal dues to the Polish court. As a reward for his deed, Béla was given the whole amount the Prussian duke owed to the King of Poland.

⁷ The insurgent duke later fled to the court of Andrew, and, probably encouraged by Andrew and Béla, the duke's armed men harassed the Bavarian border lands from a base in Hungary.

⁸ This is reported in the D and E manuscripts of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*.

⁹ Henry IV (b. 1050, d. 1106), duke of Bavaria (1055-61), German king (from 1054) and, later, Holy Roman Emperor. Henry IV was second member of the Salian or Franconian dynasty Holy Roman emperors. The most notable development of Henry's long reign was his conflict with Pope Gregory VII.

¹⁰ According to historian János Horváth this chronicler was non other than Bishop Nicholas, the chancellor of King Andrew I, "qui tunc temporis vicem procurabat notarii," whose name appeared twice on the Tihany founding charter (he had witnessed and signed the document).

¹¹ I am aware that some historians argue that the segment of the *Chronicle* which describes King Béla's reforms could be a later addition to the text that summarized fiscal reforms in the realm in the second half of the eleventh century.

A note on sources for the study of the age of Andrew I and Béla I

Related data in the mid-fourteenth century *Chronicon pictum* [Illuminated Chronicle], based on contemporary informative evidence of the 1040s through the 1060s, provide information on the reigns of Andrew I and Béla I, 1046 through 1063; for text, cf. "Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV," cc. 70 to 99, in *Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum*, ed. Emericus Szentpétery, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1937-38; rev. ed. edited by Kornél Szovák and László Veszprémy, Budapest, 1999) [cited hereafter as *SSH*] I, 321ff.; for added comments, cf. *ibid.*, II, 750ff.; also, Dezső Dercsényi, ed., *Chronicon pictum: Képes Krónika*, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1963), vol. I: facsimile, f. 23v to fol. 35r. For an analysis of contemporary evidence, see János Horváth, *Árpád-kori latinnyelvű irodalmunk stílusproblémái* [Stylistic questions in the Latin-language literature of the Árpád age] (Budapest, 1954), 305ff.

The late-thirteenth century chronicler, Simon de Keza, provided some observations in his "Gesta Hungarorum," cc. 45 to 60; cf. *SSH*, I, 173ff.; annalistic entries in the "Annales Posenienses," as, for example, under a. 1041: "Petrus rex elicitur et Aba in regem elevatur;" or, anno 1044: "Aba rex interficitur et Petrus rex in pristinum restituitur;" anno 1047: "... et Andreas rex elevatur;" also, anno 1052: "Henricus imperator Pannoniam ingreditur;" and, anno 1057: "Andreas rex infirmatur et Salamonem filium suum coronavit;" further, under anno 1060: "inter Andream et fratrem suum Bela gravie discordia oritur et rex Andreas moritur," etc., provide brief but valuable historical data — see *SSH*, I, 125, while additional remarks were made in the "Chronicon Zagradiense," cc. 3 - 7, *ibid.*, I, 207ff. For a critical analytical summary of the material, see C. A. Macartney, *The medieval Hungarian historians* (Cambridge, 1953), 111ff., 133ff., 89ff., and 109f., respectively.

The Hungarian royal writs, documents — as, for example, the founding charter of Tihany abbey, 1055 — were carefully logged in Emericus Szentpétery *et al.*, eds., *Regesta regum stirpis Arpadianae critico-diplomatica*, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1923-87), cited hereafter as RA, n. 12; for text, cf. Henrik Marczali, ed., *Enchiridion fontium historiae Hungarorum* (Budapest, 1901), 81ff.; or, Emil Jakubovich and Dezső Pais, eds., *Ó-magyar Olvasókönyv* [Old Hungarian reader] (Pécs, 1929), 19ff.; also, *SSH*, I, 354, 17-19. For papal documents — as, for instance, the writ, dated Oct. 28, 1074, of Pope Gregory VII addressed to King Salomon, logged under ii:13 in the papal Register — see Erich Caspar, ed., *Das Register Gregors VII*, MGH Epp., sel. II, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1920-23), I, 145.

Among the non-Hungarian western Latin sources, one may refer to the *Annales Altahenses*, rev. ed., ed. E. ab Oefele, SSrG (Hannover, 1891), aa. 1041 through 1046, 1050, 1051, 1052, 1053, 1056, 1058, 1060, 1063, etc.; the *Annales Hildesheimenses*, ed. G. Waitz, SSrG (Hannover, 1878; reprint 1947), aa. 1041-

1046; Herriman Contractus, "Chronicon," aa. 1038–46, *Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores*, ed. G. H. Pertz, 30 vols. (Hannover, 1854etc.), cited hereafter as MGHSS, V, 126, 127. Under 1047, the entry records that Henry III would not enter Hungary because of the revolt in Flanders; under 1050; another entry mentions the attempt made by armed Magyar troops to prevent, or to delay, the re-fortification of Hainburg. In 1051, Gebhardt and Bohemian king Bretislav invaded Magyar land north of the Danube, while the Emperor entered Hungarian territory from Carinthia. In 1053, the Germans concluded peace with Andrew at Tribur; in 1060, Andrew, a sick man, sought safety for his family at Melk. Cf. MGHSS, V, 127.

Lamperti Hersfeldensis Opera, ed. O. Holder-Egger, with the Weissenburg Annals, SSrG (Hannover, 1894), records the same event under *anno 1061*, and makes mention of William of Thuringia and Bishop Eppo; William was engaged to the daughter of Béla, but died, and it was Udalrich of Carinthia who had married her. The remark by Cosmas of Prague, "Chronicon Boemorum," that Peter Orseolo — some ten years after he had been captured, blinded and was buried at the cathedral in Pécs (see "Chronicon pictum," c. 85, *SSH I*, 342f) had married the widow of the Czech Brestislav, cf. MGHSS, IX, 78, rests upon shaky ground — cf. J. Loserth, "Kritische Studien zur ältere Geschichte Böhmens," *Mitteilungen des Institutes für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, 5 (1884), 366ff.; or, St. Katona, *Historia critica regum Hungariae stirpis Arpadianae*, 7 vols. (Pest–Buda, 1779–81), I, 991–92.

On the diplomacy of Pope Leo IX, cf. *Acta Sanctorum Bollandiana*, 60 vols. (Paris–Rome, 1864–76), April, II, 661; or, Wibert's "Vita s. Leonis IX papae," in J. P. Migne, ed., *Patrologiae cursus completus, series Latina*, 221 vols. (Paris, 1844–55), cited hereafter as MPL, 143, 496bc; also Hildebert, "Vita Hugonis," ii: 7, MPL, 159, 864cd; Andrew did not comply with the agreement — see Contractus, a. 1052, MGHSS, Vol. 131, 36–43. Johannes Haller, *Das Papsttum: Idee und Wirklichkeit*, 2nd ed., 5 vols. (Esslingen am Neckar, 1962), II, 278ff., spoke of a *deutsches Papsttum*. On relations between Leo IX and Archbishop Gregory — see Ph. Jaffé, *Regesta pontificum Romanorum*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1885), n. 3222. Karl Hampe recognized that Andrew did not regard himself as vassal of the German court; "in Ungarn war die Lehenshoheit des Reiches nichts lange behauptet werden." Cf. his *Deutsche Kaisergeschichte in der Zeit der Salier und Staufer*, 12th ed., ed. Friedrich Baethgen (Heidelberg, 1968), 33.

For the Polish source collection, see the *Monumenta Poloniae historica*, ed. A. Bielowski, 6 vols. (Lvov–Cracow, 1864–93; repr. Warsaw, 1960–61), cited hereafter as MPH, I, 495ff.; of the Russian-Kievan sources, see the *Russian Primary Chronicle*, ed. Samuel Hazzard–Cross and Olgerd P. Sherbowitz–Wetzor (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 136ff.; Antal Hodinka, ed., *Az orosz évkönyvek magyar vonatkozásai* [Hungarian-related entries in the Russian annals] (Budapest, 1916), 52ABff., provide sparse information; also, Gy. Kristó and I. H. Tóth, "Az

orosz évkönyvek néhány magyar vonatkozásáról” [Some remarks on the Hungarian-related references in the Russian annals], *Acta historica Szegediensis*, 103 (1996): 21ff.

On the political background, see George Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia* (New Haven - London, 1948; 7th printing, 1973), 79ff.; Martha Font, *Oroszország, Ukrajna, Rusz* [Russia, the Ukraine, and the Rus] (Pécs, 1998), 41ff., and 70ff. Among the Byzantine sources, Anna Comnena made some pertinent remarks on the Hungarian scene in the 1040s — see her *Alexiade*, ed. B. Leib, 3 vols. (Paris, 1937-45), I, 127-28, partly based on a remark made in Johannes Scylitzes Continuatus, *Historiarum compendium*, ed. I. Bekker, CB, vol. II (Bonn, 1839), 645, 17-22, and on Psellus, *Chronographia*, ed. E. Renauld, 2 vols. (Paris, 1926, 1928), II, 125. For background, cf. Georg Ostrogorsky, *Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1952), 260ff.; Romilly Jenkins, *Byzantium: the imperial centuries AD 610-1071* (1966; repr. Toronto-London, 1987), 333ff.; J. M. Hussey, “The Byzantine Empire in the eleventh century: some different interpretations,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 32 (1950), 71ff.; A. A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire* (Madison, WI, 1952), 351ff.; Z. J. Kosztolnyik, “Similarities between King St. Stephen of Hungary’s Law Code and the Laws of Jaroslav the Wise of Kiev,” *Hungary’s historical legacies: Studies in honor of S. B. Várdy*, ed. D.P. Hupchick and R.W. Weisberger (New York, 2000), 45ff.; Robert Browning’s penetrating, and yet, almost forgotten study, *The Byzantine Empire* (New York, 1980), 92ff., is worth reading. It also carries a picture of the crown of Constantine IX, believed to have been a gift to the Hungarian court (p. 93). On German conditions in the late 1050s, cf. Bertholdi “Chronicon,” MGHSS, V, 271. Lampert of Hersfeld, *anno 1060*, mentioned the confrontation between Andrew and Béla.

On the return to England of *aetheling* Edward — whom King Cnut had banished to Hungary and who supposedly married Agatha, King Stephen’s daughter — see *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, rev. transl., ed. Dorothy Whitelock *et al* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1961), anno 1057, MS “D”; the *Florence MS* added a note to this story providing the reason for Edward’s return: “for the king — that is, Edward the Confessor — had determined to make him heir the kingdom after him” (see *ibid.*, 133, n. 6). Margaret, Edward Aetheling’s daughter — born to King Stephen’s daughter; or, if not (which is unlikely), to a Hungarian noble woman — married a widower, King Malcolm III of Scotland. Cf. her “Vita,” in *Acta sanctorum*, Iunii II, 328; and, W. Forbes--Leith, *Life of St. Margaret of Scotland by Turgot of St. Andrews*, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh, 1896), 19ff.

On King Béla I’s calling upon two *well spoken* elders of every community, see the *Chronicle*, c. 93, *SSH*, I, 393,1-2; on *representation* in the Spanish *cortez*, see H. Mitteis, *Der Staat des hohen Mittelalters*, 8th rev. ed. (Weimar, 1968), 416f.; for the text of the “Assize of Clarendon” (1166), issued by Henry II of England, see William Stubbs, ed., *Select charters of English constitutional*

history, 8th ed. (Oxford, 1900), 143ff. Béla I had died because of the collapsing throne (or, building), the chronicler recorded; a similar accident befell the east-Frankish king Arnulf in 897 — cf. Ernst Dümmler, *Geschichte des oströmischen Reiches*, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1887-88), III, 437. See further Gerold Meyer v. Knonau, *Jahrbücher des deutschen Reiches unter Heinrich IV und Heinrich V*, 2 vols. (1890; rep. Berlin, 1964), I, 189; for his views on the battle at Ménfő, “Pforte des Reiches,” see *ibid.*, I, 198ff.; and, for Knonau’s comments on the death of Béla, *ibid.*, I, 344ff.

German background in Karl Hampe, *Deutsche Kaisergeschichte in der Zeit der Salier und Staufer*, 12th rev. ed., ed. Friedrich Baethgen (Hiedelberg, 1968), 33: “in Ungarn war die Lehenshoheit des Reiches nicht lange behauptet worden;” also, Bruno Gebhardt, *Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte*, 8th rev. ed., 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1954; 6th rev. repr. 1962), I, 224ff., and 235ff., who provides a solid survey; so does Elizabeth M. Hallam, *Capetian France, 987–1328* (London and New York, 1980), 71ff., on Frankish politics and diplomacy. See further, Robert Fawtier’s analytical narrative, *The Capetian kings of France* (New York, 1966), 15ff.

The Hungarian background has been covered in depth — and based on original research! — by Bálint Hóman, *Geschichte des ungarischen Mittelalters*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1940–43), I, 254ff.; György Székely and Antal Bartha, eds., *Magyarország története: előzmények és magyar történet 1242-ig* [Early history, and Hungarian history to 1242] (Budapest, 1984), 835ff., did a clever job; Z. J. Kosztoľnyik, *Five eleventh century Hungarian kings: their policies and their relations with Rome* (New York, 1981), 72ff., and 175ff.

On medieval central European, and Hungarian, financial conditions, see Peter Spufford’s excellent work, *Money and its use in medieval Europe* (Cambridge, 1988), 80f., and 95. Ferenc Makk, “Megjegyzések I. András történetéhez” [Some remarks on the reign of Andrew I], *Acta Historica Szegediensis*, 90 (1990): 23ff.; Zoltán Kordé, “A magyarországi besenyők az Árpád-korban” [The Pechenegs in Hungary during the Árpád age], *ibid.*, 90 (1999), 3ff. Gyula Kristó, *Megjegyzések az ún. “pogánylázadások” kora történetéhez* [Background of the age of the so-called “pagan” uprisings in Hungary] (Szeged, 1965), 36ff., and 49ff.

The Impact of the Ottoman Rule on Hungary

Géza Pálffy

One of the most crucial events of European significance in Hungarian history was the battle at Mohács on 29th August 1526 when the army of Süleyman I (1520-1566) won a decisive victory over Louis Jagello II's (1516-1526) troops. The complete defeat and the death of the king who ruled Hungary and Bohemia brought about fundamental changes in the strategic realities of Central Europe.¹ In the 14th and 15th centuries all significant dynasties of the region, including the Luxemburgs, Jagellonians, Habsburgs and even the Hungarian king Matthias Hunyadi (Corvinus, 1458-1490), aimed at establishing a salient European power in the Middle Danube Basin. After the death of Louis II, Austrian archduke Ferdinand was elected king of Bohemia, (Prague, 23 October 1526), Hungary (Pozsony, [today's Bratislava, Slovakia], 17 December 1526) and Croatia (Cetin, 1 January 1527) and, finally, was crowned emperor of the Holy Roman Empire (Frankfurt am Main, 24 March 1558). Thus, during his reign, the Habsburgs succeeded in gathering under their hegemony more possessions (the Austrian hereditary provinces, as well as the lands of the Czechs, the Hungarians and the Croats) in Central Europe than any of their predecessors. However, they could still not take possession of the entire Carpathian Basin.²

This study is accompanied by two maps. The first, entitled "Ottoman campaigns in Hungary (1526-1683)," is on page 113, and the second, "Fortresses in Hungary about 1582," can be found on page 115.

After 1526, a new participant joined the struggle for European hegemony: Sultan Süleyman I who believed that the time had come to accomplish his world-conquering ambitions and to crush his main rivals, the Habsburgs. From this time on, for more than a century and a half, the presence of the Ottomans in Central Europe constituted a major and constant threat to the whole of Europe. At the same time, their formidable fleet also menaced the provinces of the Spanish Habsburg Crown in the Mediterranean. The advance of the Ottomans, economically strong and boasting the only regular army in the world, could only be contained by a close political, military and financial co-operation among the Habsburg possessions in Central Europe, governed from Vienna.³

The Consequences of the Battle at Mohács

The defeat at Mohács marks the beginning of a new era in the history of Hungary. The decisive factor was not the almost complete destruction of the royal forces but the change in the country's strategic position. From this time on, the fate of Hungary was to be decided almost exclusively in the capitals of the two Great Powers: Istanbul and Vienna. Hungary alone had no chance of resisting the Ottoman Empire for the latter's economic, military and human resources exceeded those of Hungary by far. Under these circumstances Hungary's very existence was at stake.⁴ In 1529 and 1532, when Süleyman marched against Vienna, he assumed that the whole of Hungary would automatically fall under his sway. But after having realised that even his unequalled might was insufficient to achieve his objectives, the Sultan adopted a new strategy: a gradual, piece-by-piece incorporation of Hungary in his empire, which in time would open the way to the Austrian capital. The first step in the realisation of his new conception was the capture in 1541 of Buda, the capital of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom.⁵

With this event the territory of Hungary was torn into three parts for a long time to come. In fact the dismemberment had already started in the months following the battle of Mohács. Contrary to commonly held beliefs, Sultan Süleyman did not completely withdraw from Hungary in 1526 but took the fortresses of the so-called Szerémség (*Sirmium*, the eastern territory of the region between the rivers Drava and Sava) into his possession.

Hungary's nobility became divided over the question as to how to cope with the crisis. A large group of them elected (on 10 November 1526) and then crowned (on 11 November 1526) János Szapolyai, one of Hungary's most influential landowners, king of the country. A smaller group of nobles, who perceived the situation more realistically, elected and then crowned Ferdinand Habsburg (on 17 December 1526 and 3 November 1527 respectively). From the juridical point of view, the double election and coronation was not illegal. Nevertheless, it was an unfortunate development as it enabled Süleyman to take advantage of the division within the Hungarian political elite. While Szapolyai was twice defeated by the troops of King Ferdinand (1527-1528) and then became isolated diplomatically, the *Porte* had no difficulties in making him its vassal. Thus, against his original plans, Szapolyai became the first representative of the Turkish orientation in Hungary and paved the way for Ottoman rule in much of the country.⁶

The political and territorial division of the Hungarian Kingdom constituted one of the most serious and long-lasting effects of the Ottoman conquest. By 1566, a series of military campaigns (1543-1545, 1551-1552, 1554-1556 and 1566) had made it possible for the Ottoman leadership to incorporate about 40 percent (that is to say about 120,000 km²) of the territory of the medieval Hungarian state. This central region, as well as the ones that were conquered later (1596: Eger, 1600: Kanizsa [today's Nagykanizsa], 1660: Nagyvárad [Oradea, Rumania], 1663: Érsekújvár [Nové Zámky, Slovakia]), remained under Ottoman rule. Contrary to his previous plan, Sultan Süleyman did not seize Transylvania and the counties bordering on it in the west (this region soon came to be called *Partium*). Having realised that these territories were of no use to him in any future campaign against Vienna, and also having recognised the advantages that Hungary's division granted him in diverting some of the Habsburgs' military power towards Transylvania, in 1556 he decided to launch the eastern parts on a separate route of development. Thus the Principality of Transylvania came into existence, which remained an Ottoman vassal until the end of the 17th century. The Principality was obliged to pay an ever-increasing yearly tribute to Istanbul and was subordinated to the Sultan in its external affairs. In return, it enjoyed almost total autonomy in its internal affairs and was referred to in Ottoman sources as "Sultan Süleyman's work (invention)." As regards its political, economic and social conditions, Transylvania had always been the least developed region of medieval Hungary, therefore its forced

secession from the other Hungarian territories and the Ottoman rule resulted in its further decline.⁷


In addition to the Ottoman military leadership, the nobility of the considerably diminished Royal Hungary also benefited from the existence of the separate Transylvanian state. From the end of the 16th century onwards, Royal Hungary's Estates realised that their own privileges could be protected from the centralising attempts of Vienna by veiled threats of the transfer of their allegiance to the rulers of Transylvania.⁸ It is worth mentioning as an analogy that the Estates of the Holy Roman Empire, in their negotiations with the emperors over questions of noble privileges, also took advantage of the issue of defence against the Ottomans, which from the middle of the 16th century was invariably on the agenda.⁹ Due to their shrewd policy, in the 17th century the Hungarian Estates succeeded in preserving their privileges and the relative autonomy of the Hungarian Kingdom within the Habsburg Empire. This meant that the country's nobility managed to turn Hungary's dismemberment to their advantage.

This political chess-game had rather grave consequences by the beginning of the 18th century. After the Ottomans were driven out of the Carpathian Basin, Transylvania was not reannexed to Hungary, but was ruled directly from Vienna. Its reunion with Hungary would take place only after the Compromise of 1867. In sum, in the long run the establishment of the Principality of Transylvania had done more harm than benefit to Hungarian national interests. Furthermore, for a long time the separation of Transylvania served as a dangerous precedent for Hungary's further dismemberment. Indeed, in 1682 a new Ottoman vassal state came into being in the northern part of the country, stretching from Gömör county to the Transylvanian border. This was the Principality of Upper Hungary (in Turkish: *Orta Macar*) ruled by Imre Thököly. For a few years (1682-1685) then, the country was in fact divided into four parts.¹⁰

Hungary as a Battleground: The Impact of Warfare

Unlike in numerous regions of the Balkans which had been completely incorporated into the Ottoman Empire, the settlement of Turkish-speaking populations in Hungary was not very successful;¹¹ nevertheless, Ottoman rule in Hungary had long-lasting and very negative consequences. What brought about such results was not so much the division of the Hungarian Kingdom but the fact that, for much of the century and a half, Hungary

OTTOMAN CAMPAIGNS IN HUNGARY (1526-1683)



Turkish-Hungarian-Transylvanian frontier zone up to 1580
 Turkish-Hungarian-Transylvanian frontier zone from 1684

1596 (X) Main battles
 1596 (X) Sultan campaigns and sieges in Hungary: 1521, 1526, 1529, 1532, 1541, 1543, 1566, 1596
 Other significant Campaigns and Sieges led by Great Vessirs and Pashas (with dates)

OTTOMAN CAMPAIGNS:

- 1526: Hungary
- 1529: Vienna
- 1541: Hungary
- 1551: Hungary
- 1552: Hungary
- 1566: Hungary
- 1596: Hungary
- 1600: Hungary
- 1606: Hungary
- 1607: Hungary
- 1610: Hungary
- 1611: Hungary
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
served as a battleground in the struggle between the forces of the great powers. Many of the negative consequences of this struggle would not be erased until long after the Ottomans had left Hungary and some were never eliminated.

Although there was hardly a year in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe that elapsed without a war being fought somewhere, Hungary stands out in this respect: there the military struggle persisted throughout the entire period of the Ottoman rule. From 1521 till the Peace of Adrianople (today's Edirne in Turkey) of 1568, the country endured a great number of Turkish military campaigns and sieges, just at a time when Hungary was on the brink of a civil war due to the ongoing struggle between its two kings. Between 1591/1593 and 1606, during the so-called Long Turkish War, there were conflicts involving large military forces even by European standards. Between 1660 and 1664, as well as during Hungary's War of Liberation from the Ottoman occupation (1683-1699), each of the opposing sides annually fielded armies of almost 50,000 men.¹²

Furthermore, not even the relatively calm periods (1568-1591, 1606-1660 and 1664-1683) that passed between the open conflicts, can be described as completely peaceful. The ongoing wars at the border, as well as the daily raids aimed mostly to collect taxes and to plunder, caused serious damage by disrupting production and settlement networks, by material destruction and by driving away, kidnapping or killing people.¹³ In the 17th century similarly significant losses were caused by the campaigns waged by Transylvanian princes who, using the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) as an opportunity, tried to strengthen their strategic position against the Habsburgs.¹⁴ These campaigns also brought about the threat of a civil war in Hungary. Although recent research pointed out that the population of the country manifested an almost unbelievable ability of regeneration for a long while, regions that were victims of all-out military operations and incursions, were incapable of complete — or, in some cases, even partial — demographic and economic recovery.

The decay of Hungary's southernmost counties had started long before the battle of Mohács, as the Ottomans had already invaded the country's southern parts as early as the late fourteenth century (more precisely, between 1390-1400). By this time they had also looted the Austrian province, the so-called Carniola (*Krain*) region.¹⁵ Later on, in the repeated unsuccessful campaigns to capture Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade) in 1440 and in 1456, as well as during the local clashes which started in

FORTRESSES IN HUNGARY ABOUT 1582



- KAMISZA Centre of Border Fortress Captaincy-General
- Ertau Hungarian-Croatian fortresses
- Jenő Ottoman fortresses
- Border of Fortress Captaincy-Generals

1464 and lasted for more than half a century, the Ottomans gradually destroyed the region stretching from Temes county up to Valkó. The settlements there, which somehow had managed to survive the pre-1526 assaults, were sentenced to annihilation during the Sultan's great campaigns following the battle of Mohács. According to recent research, in the southern part of the country the original population had died out in the astonishing extent of 70 to 90 percent by the middle of the 16th century. With this rate of extinction — and the resulting change in the population — the region's settlement network also suffered immeasurable and irreversible losses.¹⁶

Due to the Ottoman expansion, by the 1560s frontier fights moved from the earlier borders to the central areas of the country. However, according to data at our disposal, in the above-mentioned calmer periods destruction did not go as far as it previously had in the southern parts of the country. This can be explained by the establishment, in the regions not yet conquered by the Turks, of a new defence system consisting of border fortresses. This came into existence in the 1560s and '70s, under the direction of the Aulic War Council (*Wiener Hofkriegsrat*, founded in 1556).¹⁷ However, organising this system in the midst of intermittent warfare imposed a huge financial burden on the whole Central European region. As the income of the ever diminishing Hungarian Kingdom could only cover about a quarter of the pay of the 20,000 to 22,000 soldiers needed to man approximately 120 border fortresses, the rest had to be raised from the Austrian and Czech provinces, as well as from the Holy Roman Empire. The support amounted to approximately 1,000,000 guilders a year, which was about one-and-a-half of all the income Royal Hungary had at that time. This implies that for a 150 years the country survived only on a huge subsidy from abroad.¹⁸

Despite this help, the gradual decay of much of Hungary could not be thwarted. Just to mention some concrete data from a relatively peaceful period: west of Lake Balaton, by the Zala river, on the lands of the so called border fortress captaincy opposite Kanizsa (organised after the fall of Kanizsa in 1600) the Ottomans caused the following damages during their 1633-1649 invasions:

45 villages were attacked
4,207 persons were killed or taken into captivity
4,760 cattle were driven off

66 houses and 2 wine cellars were burnt down and even some beehives were taken away,

while the ferry in Zalahídvég was destroyed on two occasions, and this is only to mention the concrete examples of the devastation that was recorded.¹⁹ Although the frequent destruction of buildings, the means of production, and of other material possessions, caused appalling damage, this kind of losses could sometimes still be repaired, especially in the neighbourhood of the border fortresses. For, in spite of all the difficulties, the inhabitants of the military frontier did not lose heart, but adapted their lifestyle to the constant state of war. After the assaults by Ottoman forces, they would always return from the places where they had taken refuge during the hostilities: castles, woods, or marshlands, in order to re-build their houses, cultivate their fields, and to acquire new animals in place of those that had been stolen. This exemplary ability to persist in the face of adversities, and to regenerate life, greatly contributed to the country's surviving the long Ottoman occupation.²⁰

However, during the time of the frequent great campaigns, the resumption of life in the countryside was often simply impossible. Armies numbering in the tens of thousands every year caused destruction different from that of the usual incursions. The real turning points in the development of Hungary were therefore the Long Turkish War (1591-1606) and the Great War of Liberation (1683-1699).²¹ For wherever the sultan's or the emperor's troops repeatedly crossed for several years running, everything was reduced to ruins. At the same time it is important to realise that in this respect there was no basic difference between the emperor's foreign mercenaries or the Hungarian Haiduks on the one hand, and the Tatars of the Crimea or other Turkish light cavalry formations — referred to in the contemporary Christian sources as “dreaded devastators” — on the other.

Ottoman studies suggest that the Sultan's troops had a better system of supplying themselves with food and basic necessities than did the Emperor's.²² This in part explains the fact that the Christian “armies of liberation” had to rely heavily on forcible requisitions when campaigning in the Hungarian countryside. In fact, European mercenary forces would not have as good a supply system as did the Sultan's, until the following century.²³

The periods of massive campaigns had devastating effects for many regions of Hungary. The production of food in these war-zones

soon became paralysed and sooner or later large areas became completely exhausted. As a consequence, both the troops involved in the fighting and the local population were easily struck by famine. The weakened soldiers and civilians were often decimated to an incredible extent by diseases such as the plague, dysentery, typhoid fever, malaria and even a particular combination of typhoid fever and malaria, the so-called *morbus Hungaricus*.²⁴

Due to the human and natural calamities, the zones of constant warfare became virtually uninhabited and uninhabitable for years, even decades. Just to mention a concrete example: between 1593 and 1595 one of the most important military routes along the Danube in Western Hungary, and the area surrounding this route was totally laid waste and depopulated in the wake of the Ottoman and Christian sieges of Győr and Esztergom. This explains why, after recapturing Esztergom from the Turks in 1595, Miklós Pálffy, the new captain-general of the fortress, had to resettle by force of arms Hungarian and Serbian villages from the territories formerly occupied by the Ottomans (e.g. from around Buda, and even from the remote Tolna and Baranya counties) in order to restore — at least in part — the local settlement network, as well as the population and the economic life of the affected area.²⁵

Similar losses were suffered by other regions of the country during the Great War of Liberation. Many villages in the neighbourhood of the Turkish border fortresses (e.g. Kanizsa, Székesfehérvár, Várad, Gyula), had endured the long Ottoman occupation. However, they were hardly able to survive the billeting of the imperial troops during the winters. Furthermore, the emperor's military leadership on occasion insisted on the temporary resettlement of the local population, in order to assure the imperial forces' security.²⁶ Interestingly, the regional military leaders were not always unsympathetic towards the local population. We know of cases when, during these hostilities, Ottoman military officers warned the Christian population of the neighbouring villages against expected assaults on them by the cavalry of the dreaded Crimean Tatars, the allies of the Turks.²⁷ All in all, the Great War of Liberation had an impact on Hungary similar to the devastation that had been caused by the Thirty Years' War in other parts of Europe. In Hungary, however, the great wars were just the continuation of the type of struggle that had prevailed in the relatively peaceful periods, one that might be described as "static warfare."

Economic and Other Losses

As a result, Hungary's settlement network suffered substantial losses in all but the country's northern counties. The most fundamental changes occurred in the southern and central parts of the country, in particular in the areas adjoining rivers and military routes. In these regions up to 70-80 percent of the original settlements were laid waste — and stayed that way for shorter or longer periods of time. It has been estimated that in the zones of frequent conflict and along major invasion routes, close to 50 percent of the settlements became depopulated.²⁸ At the same time, a few villages and market towns grew in population as people congregated in places that were regarded as relatively safe. By the 18th century this restructuring had resulted in a new type of settlement network that is still typical of today's Hungarian Plain.

The age of the Ottoman rule brought about not only changes in the population distribution throughout the Kingdom's countryside, but also resulted in a dramatic alteration of its urban settlement patterns. Of the seven regional centres that had existed before the conquest (Buda and its twin-city Pest; Pozsony and its subcentre Sopron; Körmöcbánya [Kremnica, Slovakia], Kassa [Košice, Slovakia], Várad, Szeged and Pécs), three (Buda, Pécs and Szeged) became Turkish frontier fortresses, whereas Várad fell under the jurisdiction of the Transylvanian princes. The German and Hungarian town-dwellers — who used to play a major role in the country's economic life — left the royal cities in the affected areas and sought refuge, in most cases, in Royal Hungary.

During the long Ottoman occupation, economic activity in Hungary shifted from the formerly powerful royal cities to second- and third-order centres, in particular to some of the market-towns that came to prosper as centres of livestock-trading. At the same time, the size of Hungary's bourgeoisie underwent a decline in this period. This trend had a negative impact on the evolution of Hungarian handicrafts and cottage industries — which had been underdeveloped formerly. Not all the royal cities suffered a decline. Pozsony, Kassa and Nagyszombat (today's Trnava, Slovakia) — which were geographically peripheral — grew into political and financial centres, precisely because they were on the whole removed from the zones of frequent conflict. Other places, especially some of the market-towns such as Győr and Debrecen, also in areas that were usually spared of fighting, took advantage of their strategic situation, made economic progress and accumulated wealth.²⁹ In spite of all these

changes, in some respects Hungary's economic structure did not change greatly during the Ottoman rule. Agriculture, which had played an important role in pre-Ottoman Hungary, retained — in fact increased — its pre-eminent place in the country's economy. The economic development in Europe, with the West becoming more and more a place for the processing of resources and the East a provider of foodstuffs and raw materials, also increased. This situation had many disadvantages for Hungary but it also had some incidental benefits, which will be mentioned briefly at the end of this study.

The fundamental restructuring of Hungary's settlement network was accompanied by the decay of the courts of the nobility as well as the decline of the centres of religious and cultural life. Similarly to the urban population, by the end of the 1560s the nobility — suddenly and virtually without exception — had left the territories under Ottoman occupation. At the same time the constant warfare doomed the country's monasteries — the centres of spiritual and cultural life in medieval times — even if they happened to be on the Royal Hungarian side of the military frontier. By the 1570s, the approximately 100 medieval monasteries in the diocese of Veszprém had all disappeared, while out of the area's 600 parishes only a few dozen remained functioning.³⁰ By this time it was only the Franciscans (in Jászberény, Szeged, Gyöngyös and in the Transylvanian Csíksomlyó [today's Şumuleu-Ciuc, Romania]), the Paulines (in Slavonia) and the nuns taking refuge in Pozsony and Nagyszombat who succeeded in maintaining — or resettling — some of their monasteries.³¹ The Peace of Karlowitz (Karlóca, today's Srijemski Karlovci, Yugoslavia) in 1699 — that signified the end of the Ottoman rule in most of the Carpathian Basin — came too late to allow a rapid reversal of the substantial losses that Turkish rule had brought for the Catholic Church in Hungary. The truth of this statement is illustrated by the fact that, while in Austria and Italy a rich monastic network is to be found even today, there were only traces of it in pre-1945 Hungary — traces that were then nearly wiped out by the country's communist rulers. It is worth mentioning in this connection that, contrary to common belief, the Ottomans contributed to the rapid spread of the Reformation in the 16th century-Hungary by their having weakened the position of the Catholic Church rather than by their religious tolerance.

Changes in the Demographic and Ethnic Map

The wars of the Ottoman period brought about major changes in Hungary's demographic and ethnic map. While earlier demographic research concluded that Hungary's population had significantly decreased due to these wars, the latest research shows a much more favourable picture. At the end of the Middle Ages the total population of Hungary amounted to 3.3 millions. This further increased to 3.5 millions by the end of the 16th century, and to 4 millions almost a century later.³² This suggests that, in spite of the constant warfare, the number of people did not decrease, but stagnated and, later on, it even increased. However, when placed in a European context and viewed in the light of the large-scale immigration Hungary was experiencing at the time, the situation appears no longer that favourable.

In Europe, the end of the 16th century witnessed a major population boom followed by a sudden stop and a considerable decline in the areas affected by the Thirty Years' War. All in all, in the period between 1500 and 1700 in the Central European countries comparable with Hungary, the increase of population was approximately 120 to 130 percent.³³ Considering this ratio only, the demographic development of Hungary seems to be greatly lagging behind. But it is important to note that while in neighbouring countries the population increased without any replacement, the situation was different in Hungary. Although contemporary sources do not allow us to establish the number of South Slav (Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, etc.), Rumanian and Ruthenian immigrants to the country, we may be safe in estimating their number as at least half a million. We can state that during the 16th and 17th centuries the population of Hungary would have not increased without this immigration. Thus, the European trend of population growth did not reflect itself in Hungary because of the wars that went on for years.

For Hungary the most tragic consequence of the wars was that they affected mainly the Kingdom's Hungarian (i.e. the Magyar) population. At the time of their settlement in the Carpathian Basin the Hungarians occupied the geographically most favourable river valleys and plains. The Ottomans led both their great campaigns and minor expeditions precisely in these territories. The ensuing material losses and human casualties were suffered predominantly by the Magyars. Furthermore, the troops who sustained severe losses in the fortresses of the military frontier were also primarily Hungarian. On the other hand,

the losses suffered by the Kingdom's ethnic minorities — who tended to live on Hungary's periphery, often in more sheltered mountainous regions — were considerably smaller. While Hungary's Magyar population declined during the time of the Turkish wars, some regions inhabited by her minorities even managed to enjoy the population boom that was common to Central Europe of the times.

The wave of South Slav immigrants — themselves refugees from the Ottoman wars — settled mainly in the depopulated regions of southern and central Hungary.³⁴ The first of these immigrants had arrived already before 1526. By the time of the collapse of the medieval Hungarian state in the second quarter of the 16th century, some 200,000 Serbians had settled in the southern parts of the country. The Hungarian landlords there were actually anxious to receive and settle these Serbs on their estates in order to compensate for the loss of their own serfs who had fallen victim to the conflicts with the Turks or had been driven away. In the second half of the 15th century, for example, the well-known captain-general Pál Kinizsi “brought” to his lands thousands of South Slav immigrants from among the troops that had served him in his campaigns against the Turks in Serbia.

The tendency to welcome Serb and other Balkan refugees increased during Hungary's Ottoman occupation. Owing to this, the Temesköz (*Banat*), became inhabited almost exclusively by Serbs within a few decades after its occupation by the Turks in 1552. This development was acknowledged internationally. On the map of Hungary that was published in Antwerp in 1577, the Temesköz appeared under the Latin name of *Rascia*, i.e. the country of the Serbs.³⁵ The devastations caused by the Long Turkish War gave a further impetus to South Slav immigration. As a result of this, by the middle of the 17th century, large populations of Serb Orthodox and Bosnian Catholic refugees had settled in central Hungary, between the Danube and the Tisza rivers, while in the Transdanubian part of the country — up to Tolna and Fejér counties — there came to live the so-called Wallachians, a population of Orthodox faith, related to the Serbs. (They are not to be mistaken for Rumanians, also referred to as Wallachians [lat. *vlachi* or *olachi*] in contemporary sources.) The concentration of this population in certain places is indicated by the fact that in 1585 in Grábóc (close to Szekszárd) a Serb Orthodox monastery was founded in order to cater for these settlers' spiritual needs.³⁶

The religious and cultural traditions of these South Slav newcomers were quite different from those of the Hungarians, a circumstance which made natural assimilation unlikely. During the Great War of Liberation a further wave of South Slav immigrants — about 200,000 people — arrived in Hungary, reinforcing their settlements there and making their assimilation even less likely. As a result, some of the affected Hungarian territories lost their Hungarian character completely.³⁷ Along with the Serbs and Wallachian-Serbs, considerable numbers of Croats, Rumanians and Slovaks also settled in the regions affected by the Ottoman conquest. The Croats came by the tens of thousands to the western part of Hungary in the 1530s, '40s, and '50s, and settled from Muraköz (the region between the rivers Drava and Mura) in the south to Pozsony (Bratislava) county in the north, in a wide zone. As the Hungarian landlords in this part of the country (the Batthyánys, the Nádasdys, the Erdődys, the Keglevicses, the Zrínyis, etc.) were inclined to settle them on lands uncultivated before, more often than not, new villages — or new parts of villages — were established. By the beginning of the 17th century the Croats had also received considerable reinforcements, which hindered their assimilation as well. The extent of the Croatian immigration to these regions is illustrated by the fact that in the Burgenland region of Austria — before 1920 a part of the Kingdom of Hungary — the proportion of the Croatian population amounts to ten percent even today.³⁸

Hungary's landlords played a major role also in settling Rumanians and Slovaks on lands depopulated during the Long Turkish War (a conflict that deeply affected Transylvania as well), Rumanians gradually descended from their mountain habitats to territories previously inhabited by Magyars. At other times the relative safety and prosperity of Transylvania attracted masses of Rumanians from neighbouring Wallachia and Moldavia, a movement that constituted a continuous reinforcement for Rumanians in this eastern part of the Carpathian Basin. As a result, by the end of the 17th century, a relatively unbroken belt inhabited by Rumanians had come into existence both in Transylvania and on its western borderlands (i.e. in the *Partium*).³⁹ In the case of the Slovaks, the migration to and resettlement in central and southern Hungary took place largely after the Great War of Liberation.

To sum up, during the 150-year Ottoman rule in Hungary, the ethnic map of the country underwent fundamental changes. While in the Middle Ages Magyars accounted for approximately 75 to 80 percent of

the Hungarian Kingdom's population, during the 16th and 17th centuries they gradually became a minority in their own country. The situation deteriorated further in the 18th century by the resettlements designed to revive the country's economy and stimulate its demographic growth. It appears that with the exception of minor changes, the ethnic boundaries that existed at the beginning of the 20th century — and which played a part in the decisions made about Hungary by the victorious Great Powers after the World War I — had already taken shape by the end of the Ottoman occupation. It has to be emphasised, however, that in the early Modern Age the coexistence of different ethnic groups did not cause any minority problems in Hungary, as society's demarcation lines at that time were not drawn between ethnic groups but primarily between social strata. In this period all the subjects of Hungarian Kingdom counted as *Hungarus*, whether they knew Hungarian or not. In this respect it is only in the 19th century that things changed and the earlier transformation of Hungary's ethnic map began to threaten with grave consequences.

Considering the Ottoman conquest's numerous and long-lasting negative effects, it is rather hard for the historian to find positive impacts. There is no doubt that Hungarians owe the Ottomans several loan-words, poems written on Turkish melodies, oriental garments, flowers, and last but not least mosques and baths (in Pécs, Siklós, Szigetvár and Budapest) that are rightly considered rarities in Central Europe.⁴⁰ However, the significance of these is hard to compare with the negative effects that determined the country's fate for many centuries. Given this knowledge, we can safely conclude that for Hungary the Ottoman rule had been an unmitigated tragedy.

Hungary and Europe

Having said all this it may seem strange to state that, in spite of its tripartite division, Hungary remained an essential part of Europe both during the Ottoman era and thereafter. Although it would certainly require another study to give a detailed explanation for this generalization,⁴¹ I would like to refer briefly to the fact that it was not only Hungary that needed a yearly financial subsidy from Central Europe in order to survive. The Habsburg Empire also needed the Hungarian Kingdom, first of all as a buffer state against potential Ottoman onslaught,⁴² and secondly as an important source of food supplies. The former role secured Hungary's

place in the Habsburg political-military system. In the latter role Hungary served as the major supplier of meat, i.e. cattle, for the increasing population of Central Europe's Austrian and German territories. In this connection it should be stated that Hungary's partial occupation by the Ottomans — as well as her political dismemberment — did not bring about a large-scale disintegration of trade patterns in the Carpathian Basin, as the Hungarian economy continued to play a major role in the commercial affairs of Europe.⁴³ Due to the spread of humanism, and of the Reformation, as well as to the growing number of Magyar youths attending universities in Central and Western Europe (*peregrinatio academica*), Hungary also retained its place in the cultural and spiritual life of Christian Europe. It appears then that Hungary, although it became subordinated to the will of the region's two superpowers, survived one of the most critical periods of her history in a much more positive manner than might have been expected. For the country achieved almost everything that was possible under the given circumstances. It was by no coincidence that one of Europe's most prominent Aristotle experts, the Flemish humanist Nicasiaus Ellebodus, had settled in 16th century-Hungary, in Pozsony. His words are a testimony to the contemporary Hungarian Kingdom's potential: "Should God grant peace to this country, it may become the most suitable place for accomplishing academic plans as well."⁴⁴

NOTES

¹ Jenő Gyalóky, "Die Schlacht bei Mohács," *Ungarische Jahrbücher* 6 (1927) 228–257; Ferenc Szakály, "The 1526 Mohács Disaster," *The New Hungarian Quarterly* 18 (Spring 1977): 43–63; the same author's *A mohácsi csata* [The Battle of Mohács] (Budapest, 1981; 3rd ed. in the series *Sorsdöntő történelmi napok*, 2); and Géza Perjés, *The Fall of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohács 1526 – Buda 1541* (Boulder, Colorado: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1989).

² Domokos Kosáry, "Magyarország a XVI–XVII. századi nemzetközi politikában [Hungary in international politics in the 16th and 17th Centuries]," in Domokos Kosáry, ed., *A történelem veszedelmei: Írások Európáról és Magyarországról* [Dangers of history: Studies on Europe and Hungary] (Budapest, 1987), 20–27. On Habsburg policies toward Central Europe in the 16th century cf. Victor-Lucien Tapié, *Monarchie et peuples du Danube* (Paris, 1969); Robert A.

Kann: *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1977); and Jean Bérenger, *Die Geschichte des Habsburgerreiches 1273 bis 1918*, 2nd ed. (Cologne, Vienna, Graz, 1996).

³ Winfried Schulze, *Reich und Türkengefahr im späten 16. Jahrhundert. Studien zu den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer äußeren Bedrohung* (Munich, 1978).

⁴ On the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 16th century cf. Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600* (London, 1997), 35–40; Josef Matuz, *Das Osmanische Reich* (Darmstadt, 1985); and *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, ed. Robert Mantran (Lille, 1989), 145–155; and the comparative study of Gábor Ágoston, "Habsburgs and Ottomans: Defense, Military Change and Shifts in Power," *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22:1 (Spring 1998): 126–141.

⁵ Pál Fodor, "Ottoman Policy Towards Hungary, 1520–1541," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 45: 2–3 (1991): 285–305; and the new edition of the same author's *In Quest of the Golden Apple: Imperial Ideology, Politics, and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire*, *Annalecta Isisiana* XLV (Istanbul, 2000), 105–169.

⁶ Gábor Barta, *La route qui mène à Istanbul 1526–1528*, *Studia Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, vol. 195 (Budapest, 1994) and the same author's "A Forgotten Theatre of War 1526–1528 (Historical Events Preceding the Ottoman–Hungarian Alliance of 1528)," in *Hungarian–Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent*, eds. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Budapest, 1994), 93–130.

⁷ Gábor Barta, *Az erdélyi fejedelemség születése* [The birth of the Transilvanian Principality], 2nd ed. *Magyar história* (Budapest, 1984); *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, ed. Béla Köpeczi (Budapest, 1990), 243–268; and Cristina Fenesan, *Constituirea principatului autonom al Transilvaniei* [The making of the independent principality of Transilvania] (Bucharest, 1997).

⁸ Kálmán Benda, "Absolutismus und ständischer Widerstand in Ungarn am Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts," *Südostforschungen* 33 (1974): 85–124; the same author's "Habsburg Absolutism and the Resistance of the Hungarian Estates in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Crown, Church and Estates. Central European Politics in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, eds. R(ober) J. W. Evans and T. V. Thomas (London, 1991), 123–128; and Géza Pálffy, "Der Wiener Hof und die ungarische Stände im 16. Jahrhundert (Eine Zusammenfassung)," *Mitteilungen des Insituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 109:2 (2001) (in press).

⁹ Winfried Schulze, *Reich und Türkengefahr*, and Rosemarie Aulinger, *Das Bild des Reichstages im 16. Jahrhundert. Beiträge zu einer typologischen Analyse schriftlicher und bildlicher Quellen* (Schriftenreihe der Historischen

Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Schrift 18) (Göttingen, 1980), 207–209.

¹⁰ A *Thököly-felkelés és kora* [The Thököly Revolt and its age] ed. László Benczédi (Budapest, 1983) and idem, “Imre Thököly und das oberungarische Fürstentum,” *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 33: 2–4 (1987): 223–227.

¹¹ Gábor Ágoston, *A hódolt Magyarország* [Hungary under Ottoman rule] (=Magyarország Krónikája) ([Budapest,] 1992), 75–82; and Klára Hegyi, *Török berendezkedés Magyarországon* [Establishing Ottoman rule in Hungary] (=História Könyvtár. Monográfiák 7) (Budapest, 1995).

¹² On the wars against the Ottomans in Hungary in generally cf. *Die Türkenkriege in der historischen Forschung* (=Forschungen und Beiträge zur Wiener Stadtgeschichte Bd. 13) (Vienna, 1983), *passim*.

¹³ The Ottoman advance is described by those reports which were prepared by the captains of the border fortresses and the military administration in Vienna. These descriptions of damages by the enemy were then sent to the Viennese ambassadors in Constantinople for the purposes of making complaints to the Sultan. See for example: Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Wien, Türkei (Turcica) Karton 43 Konv. 1, 1580 Nov.–Dez. fol. 25–32 and Kriegsarchiv, Wien, Akten des Wiener Hofkriegsrates Exp. 1589 Aug., No. 88; and, Gustav von Gömör, “Türkenoth und das Grenzwesen in Ungarn und Croatien während sieben “Friedensjahren” von 1575 bis 1582. Nach Quellen des k. k. Kriegs-Archivs,” *Mitteilungen des k. k. Kriegsarchives* 1885, 155–178.

¹⁴ *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, 319–334, and László Nagy, *Magyar hadsereg és hadművészet a harmincéves háborúban* [Hungarian army and strategy in the Thirty Years War] (Budapest, 1972).

¹⁵ Bódog Milleker, *A törököknek első betörései Dél-Magyarországba Zsigmond és Albert királyok idejében és Keve és Krassó vármegyék megszűnése 1393–1439* [The first incursions by the Ottomans into southern Hungary in the time of kings Sigismund and Albert, and the end of the Counties Keve and Krassó, 1393–1439] (Temesvár, 1914); Hans Pirchegger, “Die ersten Türken-einfälle (1396, 1415, 1418),” *Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereines für Steiermark* 18 (1922) 63–73; and, recently, Vasko Simoniti, *Vojaška organizacija na Slovenskem v 16. stoletju* [Military affairs in Slovenia in the 16th Century] (Ljubljana, 1991), 5–23.

¹⁶ Pál Engel, “A török dúlások hatása a népességre: Valkó megye példája [The impact of Ottoman incursions on the population: The example of Valkó County],” *Századok* 134:2 (2000): 267–321.

¹⁷ Gunther Erich Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522–1747* (=Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences 48) (Urbana, 1960); Milan Kruhek, *Krajiške utvrde i obrana hrvatskog kraljevstva tijekom 16. stoljeća* [Border fortresses and defence of the Croatian Kingdom in the 16th Century]

(=Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica: Monografije i studije) (Zagreb, 1995); and the most recent study, Géza Pálffy, "The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against the Ottoman Empire in Hungary (Up to the Early Eighteenth Century)," in *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of the Ottoman Conquest*, eds.: Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (=The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage, Politics, Society and Economy 20) (Leiden–Boston–Köln, 2000), 3–69. On the history of the Aulic War Council cf. Oskar Regele, *Der österreichische Hofkriegsrat 1556–1848* (=Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs Ergänzungsband 1:1) (Vienna, 1949).

¹⁸ Géza Pálffy, "A magyarországi török és királyi végvárrendszer fenntartásának kérdéséhez [The costs of the Ottoman and the Habsburg Border-fortress systems in Hungary]," *Keletkutatás* (spring 1995): 61–86; and idem, "A magyarországi és délvidéki végvárrendszer 1576. és 1582. évi jegyzékei [The registers of the Hungarian and Croatian–Slavonian borderfortresses of 1576 and 1582]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 108:1 (1995): 114–185.

¹⁹ Török vonatkozású iratok [Document connected with the Ottomans] No. 230. folders 168 and 173., in *A herceg Batthyány család törzslévéltára* [The basic archives of the family Batthyány], in the *Batthyány család levéltára* [The archives of the family of Count Batthyány], in the records known as *Családi levéltárak* [Family archives] (P 1313), Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archives] Budapest.

²⁰ Ferenc Szakály, "Die Bilanz der Türkenherrschaft in Ungarn," *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 34:1 (1988) 63–77; idem, *Gazdasági és társadalmi változások a török hódítás árnyékában* [Economic and social changes in Hungary in the period of the Ottoman Conquest] (=História Könyvtár: Előadások a történettudomány műhelyeiből 5) (Budapest, 1994); and István Rácz, *A török világ hagyatéka Magyarországon* [The legacy of the Ottoman rule in Hungary] (Debrecen, 1995).

²¹ On the "Long Turkish War" against the Ottomans (1591–1606) cf. Alfred H. Loebel, *Zur Geschichte des Türkenkrieges von 1593–1606*. Bd. I. *Vorgeschichte* (=Prager Studien aus dem Gebiete der Geschichtswissenschaft Heft VI) (Prague, 1899); Jan Paul Niederkorn, *Die europäischen Mächte und der "Lange Türkenkrieg" Kaiser Rudolfs II. (1593–1606)* (=Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte Bd. 135) (Vienna, 1993); and, recently, Sándor László Tóth, *A mezőkeresztesi csata és a tizenöt éves háború* [The Battle of Mezőkeresztes 1596 and the "Long Turkish War"] (Szeged, 2000). On the War of Liberation in Hungary cf. Ferenc Szakály, *Hungaria eliberata: Die Rückeroberung von Buda im Jahr 1686 und Ungarns Befreiung von der Osmanenherrschaft (1683–1718)* (Budapest, 1987).

²² Caroline Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: the Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593–1606* (=Beihefte zur Wiener Zeitschrift für die

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Habsburg Rule in Hungary in the Eighteenth Century

János Barta

The first century of the Early Modern Period, the sixteenth, brought stormy events to Hungary: defeat at Mohács, the partition of the country into three parts, repeated Turkish invasions, frontier warfare, political intrigues and assassinations. The following century, the seventeenth, turned out to be eventful as well, in which the tripartite division of the country continued, as did the Ottoman wars and the frequent pillaging of the countryside by the Turks and their Crimean Tatar allies. Added to this was the devastation caused by the Hungarian nation's struggles against the Habsburgs for constitutional privileges or for independence.

Compared to the two preceding centuries, most of the eighteenth century seems almost eventless, even boring. The Ottomans were finally expelled from the Carpathian Basin making the re-unification of Hungary possible. The new century witnessed only sporadic attacks by hostile forces. Hungary's political life became stabilized to the extent that the country's leaders, including its military commanders, died natural deaths. Even the principal figures of the 1703-1711 War of Independence, led by Ferenc II Rákóczi, were pardoned. After that war, from amongst Rákóczi's followers, only the wife of János Korponay was executed, but not for any of her deeds during the war, but for having conspired to disrupt the Diet (the assembly made up of the Hungarian Kingdom's magnates and prelates as well as of the elected representatives of the country's nobles and burgers) of 1712-1715.¹

Throughout much of the eighteenth century, the situation in Hungary was more peaceful than it was in some of the Habsburgs' hereditary provinces (for example, Upper Austria, Bohemia), territories which were the scenes of military campaigning during both the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). Furthermore, the elite of Hungary enjoyed the same degree of personal

security as did the high officials living at the Habsburg Court. True enough, these people refrained from leading uprisings against the sovereign and did not organize *coup-d'états*; thus they had no reason to incur the wrath of the ruler. In fact, being closely associated to the ruler proved to be more dangerous, on one occasion at least, than being critical of him. The case in point is the sad story of Prince Adam Franz Schwarzenberg, the Chief Master of the Horse, who died in a hunting-accident in 1732 when he was mortally wounded by a badly aimed shot of Emperor Charles VI (ruled in Hungary as Charles [Károly] III, 1711-1740).² In reality, the headsman's axe — which was traditionally the tool of execution 'reserved' for the members of the privileged class — was rarely used in the eighteenth-century Habsburg Empire.³ This was the reason why, when the leaders of the 1795 Jacobite conspiracy were beheaded on *Vérmező* [Blood-meadow] in Buda, the aged headsman of the city — who had long fallen out of practice — managed to sever the head of Count Jakab Sigray only on the third try.

During this period of relative tranquillity, the Habsburg Empire (including Hungary) witnessed the rule of a handful of outstanding sovereigns. Among them were two or three who took the responsibilities of being a ruler seriously; in fact, they wanted to govern their realm personally. They did not want to spend their energies in military conquests but tried to satisfy their longing for prestige and acclaim through being good stewards of the state and standing by their political principles. These rulers did not isolate themselves within the walls of their palaces but — in their own ways — strove to find contacts with their subjects. They extended the interest of the state to problems previously untouched by government policy — such the issues of serfdom, education and public health. Two of these rulers, Maria Theresa (ruled in Austria as Archduchess and in Hungary as Queen, from 1740 to 1780) and Joseph II (ruled, 1780-1790) brought governmental practices into effect that had never before been imagined let alone implemented. Similar prospects were promised by the accession of Leopold II (ruled, 1790-1792), but could not be attained because of his untimely death.

In Hungary the eighteenth century could have easily been an idyllic era filled with tranquillity, political stability, and energetic rulers full with good intentions. Despite the favourable conditions, this era of peace and prosperity did not materialize. Strife between the Habsburg rulers and Hungary's elite did not diminish, the bitter political debates continued in the Hungarian Diet, and peasant uprisings of various inten-

sity kept breaking out. The government reacted by trying to eliminate the potential centres of resistance. Empress Maria Theresa went so far as to refuse summoning the Hungarian Diet during the last fifteen years of her reign. Joseph II went even further and curtailed the autonomy of the counties.

In eighteenth-century Hungary, conflicts have been explained in diverse ways. Hungarians at the time were motivated by their grievances and accused the Habsburgs of encroaching on their liberties. The scale of Hungarian grievances was quite wide and ranged from the realm of politics to that of the economy. The policies of the Viennese Court elicited protest against the violations of the country's autonomy and against the regime of customs regulations that greatly hurt the local economy. The most vocal complains, however, came as a result of the government's reluctance to protect the privileges of the nobility. The willingness or otherwise of a certain sovereign to respect the nobility's privileges became the standard by which he or she came to be judged. Emperor Charles, who restricted the Protestants' practice of religion in his *Carolina resolutio* but did not touch the nobility's privileges, was criticized less severely than Joseph II who assailed the county system, the institution that protected the self-government of the local gentry. (Joseph's situation was further complicated by the fact that, simultaneously with the assault against the nobility, he had attacked the position of the Catholic Church which was also very protective of its privileges.)

The complaints of the aggrieved contemporaries had greatly influenced the judgements about Habsburg policies made by Hungarian historians. It is a well-known fact that Hungarian history writing has quite often been under the influence of the political atmosphere of the times. Accordingly, historiography alternated between ardent criticism of the Habsburg rulers and being quite lenient towards them. The nineteenth century — with its Revolution (1848), the War of Independence (1848-49), as well as the subsequent years of the neo-absolutism — was conducive to critical appraisals. The nostalgia between the two World Wars for the disintegrated Austro-Hungarian Monarchy prompted the birth of several pro-Habsburg works. In the decades following World War II, on the other hand, Marxist history-writing for a long time made anti-Habsburg attitudes almost compulsory.⁴ Marxist authors held the economic policies of the Vienna government primarily responsible for Hungary's backwardness.⁵

Conditions in Post-Ottoman Hungary

In their criticism, however, the Marxists assumed that after the expulsion of the Turks, Hungary entered the eighteenth century under the same economic conditions as those that existed at the time in the Empire's hereditary provinces, i.e. Austria and Bohemia. Of course, this was not the case. After the expulsion of the Ottomans, Hungary came under Habsburg rule in a sorry state. Large parts of the country were characterized by a declining population, a shattered settlement-network and a disrupted economy. The true conditions of post-Ottoman Hungary are described in contemporary eye-witness accounts. Lady Mary Montagu (1689-1762), the wife of Edward Wortley Montagu, the English ambassador to Constantinople, in 1717 decided to travel to join her husband via the overland route instead of the more convenient naval one, found that the survivors of Ottoman rule were living in abject poverty in the formerly Ottoman-held parts of Hungary: "Their clothing is very primitive, made wholly of sheepskin, even the headgear and the boots...." Elsewhere in her journal, Lady Montagu described the desolation of the lands only recently vacated by the Turks. But it was not only the regions that had been formerly parts of Ottoman Hungary that had been devastated. Similar had been the fate of the areas that had served as the military frontier between the Ottoman and Christian lands, or those through which the Turkish armies (and their Crimean Tatar allies) had moved during the campaigns of 1657-1664, or those that the Princes of Transylvania used in their wars against the Habsburgs, or the counties that witnessed warfare either during the War of Liberation against the Turks or the unsuccessful Rákóczi War of Liberation against Vienna.

According to earlier estimates, the population of early eighteenth-century Hungary (2.5 million) was hardly over half the size of the kingdom's population during the age of King Matthias (about 4.5 million). Recent researches, however, have indicated that Hungary had at least 4 to 4.5 million inhabitants after the expulsion of the Turks. At the same time new researches have adjusted downward the estimates of Hungary's population in the time of Matthias, to between 3 to 3.5 million at the most.⁶ This suggests that the Ottoman occupation did not result in an absolute reduction of population as far as the country's entire territory is concerned, even though there was a decline in the rate of increase in the population — a growth of 1 million inhabitants over 200 years, that is, a growth-rate of only 30 to 33 per cent. The damage inflicted by the

Turkish occupation manifested itself above all in the unbalanced distribution of the population in post-seventeenth century Hungary. In the years 1715-20, out of the country's 413,000 taxpaying households, only a little more than a fifth (90,000, or 22% of the total), could be found in the formerly Ottoman occupied lands — which amounted to over 40 per cent of the country's total territory, or approximately 120,000 square kilometres.

A similar situation is revealed by population density statistics. While in Transylvania this density was 18.6 persons per square kilometre, and for the territory of the former Royal Hungary this figure was 18.4, in the ex-Ottoman territories there were only 8.4 people for every square kilometre. An even more extreme picture is revealed by local data. The population density of Sopron county, in what used to be westernmost Royal Hungary, was 40.6 person per sq. km, while that of Békés county, located in the heart of formerly Ottoman-occupied Hungary, was 3.1 persons per sq. km.⁷

In the sparsely populated areas there was neither the need nor the opportunity for more efficient agricultural practices. In the former Ottoman-occupied territories farming had been replaced by animal husbandry and cultivated fields had been converted to pasture-lands. In making these changes, the inhabitants of these regions had been motivated by the relative ease of hiding cattle from marauding Ottoman troops by driving them to pastures surrounded by marshlands. Ordinarily, in these territories cattle were kept in the summer and even in wintertime on the *puszta*, the vast steppes of the Hungarian lowlands. In time, the cattle were driven on foot to markets at home or abroad. The cultivation of crops remained feasible only in the western counties of the Transdanubian region, in the lowlands north of the Danube (present-day southern Slovakia), and in the great basins of Transylvania. Because of the poor marketing opportunities, even in these regions farming was restricted and was not able to advance beyond the traditional system of crop-rotation in which leaving fallow the lands was the only way to restore the fertility of the soil. In this system plough-lands were used almost exclusively to produce grain; plants that needed hoeing or fodder crops never caught on.⁸

The development of contemporary Hungary's cities and manufacturing was also uneven. Although by the end of the seventeenth century the number of "free royal cities" (those granted royal liberties) had approached forty, thirty of these were in the lands of the former Royal

Hungary. Furthermore, even in the "royal cities" more than half the population was involved in agriculture and only 38 per cent worked as artisans. For the most part, it was only the mining centres of Upper Hungary (in the northern highlands) that could be described as having real industrial character. Most of the rest of Hungary's towns, the so-called market-towns (*oppida*), of which there were at least 400, had agriculture as their main source of income. Most craftsmen in these centres were involved in producing agricultural artifacts.⁹

These conditions were far from those enjoyed by the peoples of the Habsburg's hereditary provinces. Under the circumstances, Hungary could by no means start out in the eighteenth century from the same base as did Austria or Bohemia. Furthermore, we might even say that a century would hardly be enough to put an end to the backwardness of the formerly Ottoman-occupied territories in Hungary. In fact, as far as differences between the western and eastern parts of the country are concerned, the legacies of Ottoman rule can still be observed today in the nature of settlement patterns as well as in economic and even cultural development.

Recovery from Ottoman Rule

The eighteenth century witnessed several changes that lessened the backwardness of the former Ottoman-occupied territories and began to moderate the disparities among Hungary's diverse regions. Evidence of the change can be detected both in the physical appearance of the countryside and in its economy and culture. First of all, the formidable chains of Habsburg and Ottoman military strongholds on the former frontier between the Christian and Islamic realms, began disappearing. Also vanished the often 20 to 25 kilometre-wide no-man's-land that used to exist between the two chains of fortresses, and which had often been utterly devastated by marauding armies. In the towns and castles of the former Turkish occupied territories the mosques (*bethels*), minarets, baths and other public buildings were allowed to fall into disrepair or were sometimes deliberately destroyed as evidences of past foreign conquest. In all communities large and small, the wounds left by wars and alien occupation began healing. In the depopulated regions of the Hungarian lowlands new villages were being born. On the Habsburg and even the Transylvanian side of the former frontier, the ugly, fortified houses of the local landowners, those witnesses to the continual warfare of the past, began

disappearing — they were being replaced by attractive manor-houses built in late Baroque style.

The landscape of the urban settlements also began to change. The walls of the cities no longer had to be guarded. Newcomers to these places, not finding building lots inside the city walls, could now build their — usually larger and more colourful — houses outside of them, often in a pre-determined, regulated fashion. The measure of success for these growing communities was whether they could develop entire citywards full of Baroque buildings, or had satisfy themselves with not much more than a new *Baroque* church and a *Baroque* city hall.

The population began growing. Those regions of the liberated territories that had good soil were attracting settlers from the overpopulated periphery of the Carpathian Basin as well as from neighbouring countries. By the end of the century, Hungary's population had doubled, from between 4 and 4.5 million to 9.5 million. The above-described imbalance between the population densities of the former Ottoman occupied regions and the rest of the country began to disappear. By the end of the century, for example, the population density of the formerly almost totally depopulated Békés county had reached a figure of 19 persons per square kilometre. The most thinly populated counties were now found not in the formerly Turkish-held areas but in the mountainous frontier regions (the density figure for Máramaros County was 8.7 persons/sq. km; for Udvarhelyszék in Transylvania, it was 11 persons/sq. km). At the same time, the country's most densely inhabited areas did reach a density figure of over 50 persons per square kms (Pozsony County had 53.5; Nyitra, 51.3 persons/sq. km). Ignatius Born, a visitor to Hungary, could observe with satisfaction the progress in the re-settlement of the Temesköz region (the *Bánság* or *Bánát*, today's Banat, — a region that at the time was under the direct rule of Vienna). "The villages are laid out in a regular fashion... the houses, because of the lack of wood, are built of adobe and are roofed with reed. Each settler receives a house, farming equipment, a couple of horses and a plot of land..." Many years later the novelist Mór Jókai, who found the gifts lavished on German immigrants to the region almost extravagant, described this process in his *A magyar nemzet története* [The history of the Hungarian nation] with a certain degree of irony: "For the settlers from Germany the lands had already been ploughed, the houses had been built [and] fully furnished... not even the cat watching for mice was missing from the oven-corner."¹⁰

The economy was also making headway. On the Great Hungarian Plain selected areas began to be converted from pastures to plough-fields. While the expansion of agriculture and the introduction of more intensive methods of animal husbandry were easily visible to contemporary observers, the upswing in manufacturing activity was not so obvious to visitors from Western Europe. Foreign travellers saw only towns that appeared to be large villages, full of small workshops operated by members of an outdated guild network. Nevertheless, the increasing number of these shops spoke of the re-awakened zeal for work and zest for life on the part of the craftsmen operating them. Larger manufacturing facilities could rarely be established for the lack of a rich bourgeois class and of adequate investment capital. The few that were brought about, were started by a handful of enterprising aristocrats.¹¹

Some branches of the economy grew faster than others. Mining activity increased mainly as a result of state intervention. Commerce also expanded by leaps and bounds. At first the value of exported agricultural produce far surpassed that of the imported manufactured goods. While this situation persisted throughout the century, the imbalance between the value of agricultural exports and imported products kept decreasing. In the 1730s, for example, the value of exports exceeded that of imports by between 30 to 35 per cent, while by the 1760s, only by 10 to 15 per cent.

There are signs also that there was progress in the realm of the arts and sciences. Some aspects of culture were slow to develop. When compared to other centuries, the eighteenth witnessed only a meagre output in poetry and creative writing. Apparently this age did not produce enough authors and poets and/or did not give adequate stimulus to them to create artistic products worthy of attention. The outstanding literary product of the early part of the century was a collection of letters written by Kelemen Mikes — which was produced in exile. Hungarian literature would only get a real stimulus during the last quarter of the century with the spread of the ideas of the Enlightenment.

The fine arts evolved in a rather uneven manner. The boom in church and palace construction offered many opportunities to the painters of frescoes. At the same time a fine portrait-painter such as Ádám Mányoki, lacking enough patrons at home, had to leave the country in order to make a decent living. Thus it came to pass that the artist who painted the famous portrait of Prince Rákóczi, had to end his career in the service of the Elector of Saxony. At the same time a great number of foreign masters made a good living in Hungary in planning and decorat-

ing the many new Baroque churches and palaces of the aristocracy that increasingly dominated the Hungarian cityscape and the countryside.

There was progress in education and the sciences also. Schools, even though organized on a denominational basis, were providing solid education. They supplied the professions in Hungary with well-prepared members, and the higher educational institutions of Vienna with highly qualified graduate students. The eighteenth century was also the age that saw the publication of Mátyás Bél's *Notitia Hungariae novae historico-geographica, 1735-1742*. This work tried, for the first time, to offer a compendium of knowledge about Hungary's history, geography and ethnography. It was at about this time that popular interest in Hungary's past awakened. 1746 witnessed the printing in book form of the medieval chronicle of Anonymus, the *Gesta Ungarorum*, which recounted the arrival of the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin. The end of the century saw the rise of the idea of kinship between Hungarians and other Finno-Ugric peoples.

Hardships of Life in 18th Century Hungary

In taking stock of Hungary's progress, we have to keep in mind that the peoples of re-united Hungary continued to face certain difficulties. The new settlers in the formerly depopulated regions were often confronted by onerous conditions. In some regions, in flood-plains, moorlands, etc., the breaking of virgin sod usually proved a Herculean task. Projects involving the regulation of the hydrology of large flood-prone regions were out of the question — contemporary technology was inadequate for the task. As a result, flooding in many parts of the country remained endemic. The city of Szeged in southern Hungary, for example, was the victim of floods by the River Tisza almost at regular intervals. Mátyás Bél, in the above-mentioned work, recounts that in 1712 "the city's entire lower town was under water..." In the surrounding villages the peasants complained that their fields and pastures were flooded and vermin thrived.

Throughout much of the eighteenth century epidemics were frequent in Hungary and spared neither man nor animal. The country's population was decimated several times by the bubonic plague. The epidemic that started during the Rákóczi War of Independence and lasted till 1712 cost 400,000 lives, nearly ten per cent of the country's population. Another 300,000 fell victim to the plague of 1738-1741.¹² The

plagues also caused problems by the panic they caused. The Diet of pro-Habsburg members of the Hungarian nobility that opened in 1708 in Pozsony (also known as Pressburg, today's Bratislava in Slovakia) was adjourned three times on account of the 1708-1712 epidemic. Smallpox, the other scourge of the age, did not come in epidemics but was always present and did not spare even the rich and the powerful — it claimed the lives of several members of the ruling Habsburg family. The disease left its scars even on those who managed to survive it, including Queen Maria Theresa herself and several of her children. In the southeast, the inhabitants of the Temesköz region were tormented by malaria. Many sources refer to poor harvests leading to malnutrition and even famines, which in turn caused the outbreak of epidemics in some districts. Not surprisingly, life expectancy in Hungary remained low. For the early part of the 18th century, we only have vague estimates. According to one of these, for Somogy county this figure was not more than 22 years.¹³ By the end of the century, however, life expectancy for the whole of Hungary rose to 35 years. When considering the circumstances of life in the eighteenth century, we have no reason to envy the country's inhabitants.

Habsburg Policies Promoting Progress

The growth of the population, the progress experienced in the economy and in cultural development, did not bring Hungary anywhere close to the standards of Europe's more developed nations by the end of the century. What was achieved was positive and it disproves the arguments that Hungary stagnated throughout this period. Some of the progress was not uniformly advantageous and often threatened with possible undesirable consequences. The growth in the country's population was attained at the expense of increasing the imbalance between Hungary's Magyar and non-Magyar inhabitants: the influx of foreigners threatened to reduce the Hungarian ethnic group to a minority within its own country. In the country's growing economy manufacturing had to take second place to agriculture. In some forms of art and in architecture, foreign masters were dominant. That there was progress overall, however, is indisputable. Yet the question remains, whether and to what extent this progress was due to governmental intervention? Were there Habsburg policies that contributed to Hungary's advancement in the eighteenth century? And, if

these policies indeed benefitted the country, why was it necessary for strife between the rulers and the ruled to continue and give rise to outright conflict? The factors enumerated below can hardly be considered complete, nevertheless they provide at least some conditional answers to these oft-repeated questions. They do this even if on many occasions we have to describe the Habsburg Court's policies as "ambiguous," "contradictory," or "open to interpretation."

National Defence

The preservation of peace is an essential precondition to a nation's growth and progress. The Habsburg state fought several wars in the eighteenth century. The campaigns of the Austrian War of Succession and the Seven Years' War did not touch Hungarian soil. The Empire's Turkish wars were different. The successes of the war of 1716-17 (the liberation of the Temesköz, the occupation of northern Serbia and northern Bosnia) created the false impression that Ottoman power had declined irreversibly and that the Turks' eviction from the Balkans was just a question of time. On the other hand, the incursion of the Turks' allies, the Crimean Tatars, into Transylvania and the trans-Tisza region in 1717 should have driven home the lesson in Vienna that against large light cavalry forces the Empire's armies were helpless. Furthermore, the defeat of the Imperial forces in the 1737-1739 Turkish war (which ended in the loss of Serbian and Bosnian territories), restored the pre-1716 balance of power in the Balkans. This conflict proved that the Ottomans were still a power to contend with in Southeastern Europe. Without the Habsburg Empire, Hungary could have done little against a great power such as the Ottoman state. The fact that between 1717 and the time of the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century no foreign troops penetrated Hungary's borders, was largely due to the presence in the country of those not much appreciated Habsburg troops.

Defence against epidemics and the forces of nature

Natural calamities such as famines, floods and epidemics that had plagued the peoples of 18th century Hungary were familiar to other European

nations as well. Their prevention was beyond the means of contemporary statecraft. To its credit, the Habsburg Court did try to prevent them and worked to this effect as hard as any other European state of the times. Habsburg policies were least successful in combating the periodic floods that afflicted the peoples of Hungary's lowlands. There were plans for wide-ranging flood-control projects but their realization was beyond the technology of the age. Their realization had to await the nineteenth century. The eighteenth century Habsburg state had to be satisfied with building and maintaining roads on certain river banks — which often served the purpose of towing barges and thereby improving river transportation. Vienna also brought in regulations for the maintenance of other roads, of bridges, and of fording places. It also promoted the extermination of pests and vermin that plagued crops.

Viewed from today's perspective, the measures taken by the Habsburg state to protect public health do not appear effective. From the middle of the century on, there was a commission functioning in Vienna that coordinated health policies. Because of the backward state of contemporary medical knowledge, little could be done to curb epidemics. The struggle against the bubonic plague consisted exclusively of measures to slow its spread though the quarantining of the places where it had broken out. In time of epidemics, visitors from abroad, or even from other parts of the country, were isolated before they would be allowed to move on. When in December of 1738 Maria Theresa, her husband Francis of Lorraine, and their retinue of scores of servants and footmen, set out for Tuscany for Francis to be crowned the ruler of that Grand Duchy, they were delayed as they crossed through Verona and were forced to spend fourteen days in quarantine. The Empress would forever retain unpleasant memories of her stay in a poorly heated and overcrowded country house there, but her experience emphasized the need for everyone, even royalty, to obey the rules designed to curb epidemics.¹⁴

By the 1760s the great epidemics of the bubonic plague had started to disappear from Central and Western Europe, and they also began to wane in Hungary. Against smallpox an early type of defence was discovered in eighteenth-century England in the form of a primitive method of inoculation. Empress Maria Theresa, having lost several members of her family to this disease, had all the survivors vaccinated. Several aristocratic families followed her example, but the procedure of this inoculation was so complicated that it was not possible to apply it on a wide scale to protect large populations. Because of this only the top

layers of society came to enjoy protection from this dreadful disease. Nevertheless, there was some progress in public health in the Habsburg lands, including Hungary. Evidence of this is the regulation which compelled counties and municipalities to hire qualified doctors. Each county was also ordered to employ at least one certified midwife.

Demographic policies

The growth of Hungary's population was without doubt positively influenced by the Viennese Court's policies. The promotion of population growth was a part of the popular wisdom of the age and was advocated by such contemporary demographic experts as Johann Gottlob von Justi and Joseph von Sonnenfels. To encourage immigrants to the sparsely populated Hungarian lowlands, settlers were exempted from taxes and labour services for years. An immigration act passed in 1723 exempted craftsmen settling in Hungary for ten years, and peasants for six. The law also provided for advertizing for immigrants throughout the German realm. The Court wanted to attract German settlers of the Catholic faith; however, it forbade the people of the hereditary Habsburg provinces from moving to Hungary. Most settlers came from the southwestern regions of the Holy Roman Empire, often from lands that had been ravaged by the wars with Louis XIV of France.

The re-settlement of people from the periphery of Hungary to the central parts, and the immigration of settlers from Hungary's non-German neighbours was not actively promoted but was tolerated by the Court. True, in 1691 about 25 to 30 thousand Serbs, under the leadership of Patriarch Arsenije Črnjević, received permission to move to Hungary, but such mass immigration was not encouraged thereafter. Policies regarding the Temesvár region in southernmost Hungary were different. In 1718, after the region's recapture from the Turks, Prince Eugene of Savoy, the president of the Defence Council in Vienna, ruled that only Catholic German settlers would be allowed to move there. Hungarian settlers were excluded from the entire Bánát area, a regulation that remained on the books up to the time of Joseph II. Many Magyar would-be newcomers were stopped and turned back by local garrison forces as they tried to cross the Maros River.¹⁵ At the same time, the spontaneous migration of Rumanians and Serbs into the region was not interfered with. By 1787 the population of this region had reached close to 800,000.

Though the immigration of Germans had been favoured, they made up only eighteen per cent of this, and Rumanians became the dominant ethnic group. The Hungarian component of the region's population was negligible, a mere 0.6%. Vienna's policies had certainly contributed to the growth of Hungary's population, but were also responsible for the alteration of the "ethnic balance" in favour of non-Magyar groups.

Economic policies

The impact of Vienna's policies on Hungary's economy is a topic that has been the subject of differing interpretations.¹⁶ The political wisdom of the times favoured state support for economic activities and the government of the Empire tended to heed this advice. The most important aid for the economy was considered to be protective tariffs. In the Habsburg state such tariffs were introduced for the time during the mid-18th century — they protected the interests of producers within the Empire. Unfortunately for Hungary, this type of state intervention did not always serve the best interest of that part of the Habsburg realm. The tariffs established first and foremost served the interests of the manufacturers of the Empire's hereditary provinces. The countervailing duties that the Empire's neighbours introduced in reaction to these tariffs most often struck at the agricultural produce destined for export from Hungary. Historians of previous ages complained most bitterly against the customs legislation of 1754 which made it more difficult for Hungarian produce to enter even the hereditary provinces. These regulations had definite political overtones. The nobility of the hereditary provinces, unlike the nobility of Hungary, paid taxes to the state. By protecting this class from the economic competition provided by Hungarian agriculture, the Court wanted to compensate its members for paying taxes. The duties imposed on Hungarian produce applied even to manufactured products, after all most factories in Hungary were owned by members of the Hungarian aristocracy. Although these regulations made it more difficult for Hungarians to compete on the Empire's markets and reduced their profits, they did not prevent trade — as contemporary trade statistics illustrate. In final analysis, the tariff policies of the Empire managed to provide a certain measure of protection for the producers of Hungary. The expansion of mining and metallurgy in the country was expressly the result of intervention by the Habsburg state.¹⁷

Educational Policies

The Court took great pains to promote culture, especially education. The changes implemented in this respect in Hungary reflected the reforms introduced in the hereditary provinces. In 1749 the Medical Faculty of the University of Vienna was expanded. The same year saw the establishment of the *Theresianum*, a school for the training of administrative officials. In the later part of her reign, Maria Theresa founded a number of new trade and technical schools, and expanded others. This process was responsible for the transformation in 1763 of the mining institute of Selmecbánya (in German, Schemnitz; Banská Štiavnica, in present-day Slovakia) from a secondary to a post-secondary educational institution. Starting in the 1750s, at the University of Nagyszombat (Trnava in present-day Slovakia) changes were brought on the pattern of the reforms of the University of Vienna. The university which consisted of faculties of theology, arts as well as law, now received a medical school — as well as a "Department of Applied Mathematics" for the training of engineers. In 1777 Maria Theresa transferred the university to Buda, to the Royal Palace there. Then in 1784 Emperor Joseph II moved it to Pest.

The Royal Court divided Hungary into eight educational districts, and appointed laymen to head these in all but one instance. Each district was obliged to maintain a secondary school (a so-called superior *gimnázium*) containing all grades. The curriculum was regulated by the Education Decree (*Ratio Educationis*) issued in 1777. This was the first time in Hungary's history that the state asserted its prerogative in education, determining not only the structure of educational institutions but also the requirements of the curriculum. The significance of natural-science-subjects was stressed, but no less importance was assigned to national history, geography etc. Although universal compulsory education was not introduced, all communities and estate-owners were encouraged to establish schools. Further progressive aspect of the *Ratio* was that in elementary education it prescribed use of the mother-tongue in the schools according to the nationality of the students (seven languages were listed specifically: Hungarian, German, Slovak, Croatian, Ruthenian, Serbian and Rumanian). In secondary schools, however, the language of instruction was to be Latin, while the study of the German language was also made compulsory.¹⁸

Habsburg Policies Causing Conflict

Hungarian history-writing has traditionally dealt more with those elements of Viennese policy that engendered conflict between the Court and the Hungarian noble estates than with the measures that fostered progress. While the positive type of state intervention could be discussed in a comprehensive manner for the whole period under examination, the policies that prompted conflict need to be discussed in reference to the rule of individual sovereigns, sometimes in reference to a particular period of his or her reign. This is so because some of the policies of the Viennese Court for the governance of the greatly expanded Habsburg realm were rather unsteady and underwent numerous changes.

Habsburg administration of Hungary

It is common knowledge that the first attempts by the Habsburg Court to establish the administration of the Hungary that had been liberated from Turkish rule did not promise much that was positive for Hungarians. The government of Leopold I (ruled 1657-1705) did not want to see Hungary rising to be a powerful component of the Empire. Not surprisingly under these circumstances, during the reconstruction of the country after the War of Liberation, the Habsburgs displayed no intentions for respecting either Hungary's interests or traditions. The last Hungarian Diet that sat prior to the expulsion of the Turks in 1687 had already declared the perpetual right of the Habsburg dynasty to the throne of the Hungarian kingdom (at least on the male line) and through this deed had revoked the right of the estates to elect a king. The Diet's decree, moreover, abolished the clause of the 1222 *Golden Bull* that entitled the nobility to refuse to obey the king, a clause which was still in force at the time. Not satisfied with these concessions on the part of Hungarians, in the first years of their rule over "liberated Hungary," Leopold I refused to restore in the reconquered territories the pre-Ottoman governmental system. The territories in question were pronounced as imperial properties by virtue of the right of conquest and were subjected first to military, then to direct royal management. The civil administration in these territories was re-established (through the reintroduction of the county system) only years later. At the same time, the territorial unity of the country was not restored. Not only did Transylvania remain as a separately-governed territory, but also

the detached status of the Military Frontier Zones continued to be enforced. What is more, the size of these frontier districts was increased.

The consequences of these policies are well known: the former owners of estates in the "liberated lands" could reclaim their lands only through elaborate documentation of their claims, and through paying a "military redemption payment" for them equivalent to 10 per cent of the value of the lands in question — a sum most landowners were unable to pay. As a result, the bulk of the estates was transferred to new owners: the Catholic Church, imperial army generals, and contractors to the military.¹⁹

It is also a well-known fact that Habsburg governmental system in eighteenth-century Hungary was not the one that had been devised in the late seventeenth century. After having grown tired of Viennese absolutism, the Hungarian nation revolted against Habsburg rule at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The War of Independence (1703-1711), led by Ferenc II Rákóczi, was at long last defeated in the military sense, but in the Peace Treaty of Szatmár (30 April 1711), Hungary managed to come to a compromise with the Court. The treaty restored the former constitution of the country as well as its traditional forms of administration. These measures were formally accepted by Emperor Charles VI and by the Hungarian estates during the Diet of 1712-15.

The sacrifices of the participants of the Rákóczi War of Independence and the resulting compromises reached through the Peace of Szatmár (today's Satu-Mare in Rumania) made a profound impact on the history of eighteenth-century Hungary. The compromise of Szatmár could not have come about without the expulsion of the Turks. The re-attachment of the former Ottoman-occupied territories to Hungary enhanced not only the country's area but also its political importance within the Habsburg realm. With a territory of nearly 300 thousand square kilometres (which grew to 325 thousand square kilometres after the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718) Hungary made up nearly half of the Habsburg lands. A country of this size couldn't be relegated to the role of a frontier zone, as Royal Hungary had been before the 1680s. In a country divided into three parts, Rákóczi's War of Independence would have only increased the number of those uprisings which, leaving the Ottoman part of Hungary untouched, would not have achieved any significant results beyond, for instance, ensuring the privileges of the estates and the tolerance of the Protestant religion. In post-Ottoman Hungary the compromise of Szatmár defined the basic tone of the entire reign of Charles VI. The fact that by

the end of his rule conflict between the Court and Hungary's estates had re-surfaced, was mainly the result of the fact that the interests of Vienna and Hungary's ruling classes continued to diverge.

A new era was launched in eighteenth-century Hungarian history by the political platforms of the two rulers who reigned from the middle of the century onwards: Maria Theresa and Joseph II. Mother and son — though prompted by opposite motives, but no doubt animated by honest intentions and a sense of responsibility — tried hard to remedy what they perceived as the shortcomings of their realm's administrative machinery. The scope of their reforms extended to almost all spheres of state activity. They tried to improve the machinery of government through the establishment of new administrative organs. Maria Theresa set up the *Directorium in publicis et cameralibus* in 1749, and the Council of State (*Staatsrat*) in 1760. Through the so-called 'Haugwitz-reform', introduced in the Hereditary Provinces in 1749, the nobility was compelled to pay taxes.²⁰ Theoretically, Hungary was untouched by these reforms since Hungary was not under the authority of the Council of State for example. In reality, however, since it was not an executive but an advisory organ, the Council's members often voiced their opinions on Hungarian matters as well. Joseph II, by not summoning the Hungarian Diet during the ten years of his reign, paralyzed the work of legislation. Through merging the Hungarian and Transylvanian Chanceries as well as the office of the *bán* of Croatia, the Emperor attained a unified, central institution directly subordinated to himself. He deprived the Council of Lieutenancy (*Consilium Regium Locumtenentiale Hungaricum* — a central administrative and executive body) of its right to express its opinions and issue orders and thereby relegated it to the role of transmitting royal decrees to the county authorities. Furthermore, by dividing Hungary into ten administrative districts (and Transylvania into three) he emasculated the county administrations and deprived them of their traditional judicial and administrative functions.

It is widely known that Joseph II, at the end of his reign, was obliged to annul almost all his orders relating to Hungary. The discontent of the Hungarian estates threatened to bring about the separation of Hungary from the Habsburg state. The more immediate danger, however, was a sabotage of the state's functioning by the aristocratic heads of the country's administrative apparatus. Under such circumstances the Habsburg Court was repeatedly forced to accept compromises. Maria Theresa was obliged to make concessions at the time of the War of Austrian

Succession when she had to ask for the support of the Hungarian nobility. In return for offering their "lives and blood" for their Queen, Hungary's nobles got their sovereign's formal pledge to uphold the laws of the kingdom and to respect the privileges of the nobility. She held to her solemn oath till her death. It was only through such concessions that the continuity of Habsburg administration could be assured in eighteenth-century Hungary and new anti-Habsburgs uprisings could be averted. Had Joseph's policies been continued by his successor, such an uprising would have become a real threat.

Nobiliary Privileges as a Source of Conflict

The likelihood of conflict between the Court and the eighteenth-century Kingdom of Hungary enhanced was by the fact that Habsburg rulers had to face a Hungarian society that no sympathy for them and was even more determined not to extend the Habsburgs any help. The problem was not the hierarchical structure of Hungarian society and the privileges of the nobility since societies elsewhere in the Habsburg realm — and in much of the rest of Europe — were not greatly different. The problem in Hungary stemmed from the particularly high proportion of the nobility in society (5 per cent of the population, surpassed in all of Europe only by the ratio of Polish nobility) and the adherence of its members — especially the impoverished elements — to their privileges. The fact is that more than half of Hungary's nobility had to work for a living. 42 per cent of them owned no estates while a large portion of the rest had some land but had no peasants to work it. It was precisely this element of the nobility that felt most attached to its privileges — after all these privileges were the only thing that separated these poor noblemen from the peasants. The nobleman's "liberties" also accorded to him the illusion of participation in the nation's political life, through the county assemblies. The members of the nobility instructed the representatives of the counties in the Diet and by doing so they were able to prevent the national assembly from implementing change in Hungary's social structure.

The obstinacy of the lesser nobility and the gentry should not have been an excuse for the aristocracy for not discharging their responsibilities. After all it was Hungary's aristocrats who, through their high administrative positions, faced the rulers directly, and whose reluctance to serve their sovereigns faithfully and effectively led to most of the con-

flicts. While the members of the lesser nobility protected their imaginary roles in society, the aristocrats defended their real political clout. They did this with a firm belief in their privileged position and rank — as well as with a solid conviction in the justness of their claim to social superiority. It goes without saying that Ferenc Rákóczi, the leader of the War of Independence who had united almost the whole nation behind himself, expected to be treated with the respect due to a prince and found it entirely natural to appoint only fellow aristocrats to high positions in his army and in the governmental institutions he established. In his memoirs he found it important to stress that, at the beginning of the revolution, the envoys who were delegated by the rebels of the Upper Tisza region to call on him to lead them, had been not peasants but noblemen. He wrote that one of them was a "brave, but poor nobleman." When in 1706 the issue of imposing taxes on the nobility first came up for discussion in Rákóczi's camp, the landowner Sándor Károlyi vehemently protested: "the clearest explanation of liberty requires that he [the nobleman] be exempt from all taxation." The conservative Count József Teleki, who on his journey in Western Europe had visited Voltaire and Rousseau, did not change his views at all under the influence of his enlightened contacts. During the French Revolution, Teleki would denounce the Jacobins and the equality they proclaimed, and voice his satisfaction with the system in which "he could flog his peasant but his peasant could not flog him" — to use the words of the writer Ferenc Kazinczy. Given such views, it is not surprising that Hungary's nobility never showed any willingness to renounce its privileges. After the Rákóczi War of Independence it did not undertake armed action against Vienna, but it refused to offer any assistance to the Habsburg rulers in putting reforms into effect — which in most cases were designed to benefit Hungary.

Under these circumstances there could be no smooth cooperation between the Court and Hungary's estates in the administration of the country. There was not one Diet in the eighteenth-century history of Hungary that did not start with a dispute between the ruler and the estates. The government was unable to have effective control over the Diet's agenda because most of the assembly's discussions were devoted to the nobility's real or alleged grievances. In some cases proposals made by the rulers for reforms (such as the taxation of the nobility or the regulation of peasant services during the reign of Maria Theresa) were not even placed on the agenda. Apart from the very end of the century (the time of the French Revolutionary wars), there was not a single occasion when the

Diet approved the taxes that had been asked for by the Court. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that, in order to reduce conflict, the Habsburg government sometimes dispensed with summoning the Diet. In vain was it fixed by statute that the Diet was to be summoned in every three years, there were four long periods (1729-1741, 1741-1751, 1751-1764 and 1765-1790) when the Diet did not sit. Furthermore, major high offices and ceremonial positions which the Diet filled, for example that of the *Nádor* (Palatine, Viceroy) were left vacant for a long time.²¹ It should be added that, in their opposition to the Habsburg regime, Hungary's estates received strong support from the officials of the medium-level bureaucracy. On the whole it is not unreasonable to conclude that for the members of Hungary's gentry serving the interests of their own class took priority over the fulfilment of the Viennese Court's expectation that the partake in the efficient administration of the country.

The Problem of Landowner-Peasant Relations as a Source of Friction

Strife between the Court and Hungary's nobility was exacerbated as a result of the interference by Vienna in the relationship between peasants and their landlords. At the beginning of the 18th century, the situation was favourable to the former because of the shortage of labour on Hungary's estates. This situation had changed by the middle of the century when the estate owners began placing greater and greater burdens on the peasants. The latter, beginning with the 1750s, started to turn to the imperial Court with their complaints. The Court in turn realised that the prospect of a decline in the state taxes collected from the increasingly impoverished peasants warranted intervention in this matter. For this reason Maria Theresa in 1755 authorized the Council of Lieutenancy Government to investigate the peasants' complaints. The monarch, however, did not receive any real help in redressing the Hungarian peasantry's complaints either from the bureaucracy or from the nobility. During the Diet of 1764-65 the estates refused to enact a law in the matter of the peasant services. The discontented peasants were ready to stage an uprising in the western Transdanubian counties from the summer of 1765 on and came to be a constant threat to the landowners living in the area.

The rumours of an impending peasant uprising posed no real danger to the imperial government; in fact it gave Vienna an excuse to issue a decree regarding peasant-landlord relations. The decree, dated 23

January 1767, had a dual purpose: first to protect the lands in the hands of the peasants (the plot of land held in villeinage under the cultivation of the tenant); secondly, to regulate the services levied on the peasant's plot. Because of the reluctance of the counties the regulation of villeinage services was implemented only in the years between 1770 and 1776.²² In Transylvania the Lieutenancy, the so-called *Gubernium*, managed to prevent the implementation of the decree completely.

Unlike the regulation of villein services, Joseph II's decree for the abolition of serfdom did not bring about a fundamental change in Hungary. Its major articles decreed the abolition of 'perpetual' villeinage (the situation in which the villein was bound to the land and was deprived of the right to move freely), the extension of the right of moving to each peasant, and the freedom for them to learn a trade or to attend school. By this time, however, the major problem of Hungarian peasant society was no longer that they had no right to move but the fact that the villein plots were being divided and thus reduced.²³ This may be the reason why Hungarian nobility were so indifferent about this statute, unlike the others promulgated during the reign of Joseph II.

The Problem of Religious Freedom as a Source of Friction

The measures of the Court in the realm of religious policies constituted another source of conflict, and the most contentious issue was undoubtedly discrimination against Protestants, followed by the curtailment of the liberties of the Catholic Church under the reign of Joseph II. Added to this was the fact that Joseph's policy of religious tolerance, which should have appeased Protestants had the opposite effect because it was judged as not far-going enough by them. King Charles III's dealing with this issue was made easier by the fact that the estates themselves were not united on these issues. It was the disputes over religious matters during the Diet of 1728-29 that enabled the ruler to undertake decisive intervention. The Patent of Religion, the *Carolina resolutio*, issued on 21 March 1731, authorized public religious practice for Protestants but only at places that had been approved for this purpose in 1681. The decree obliged Protestants who were about to take office, including lawyers and judges, to take an oath — the text of which included a reference to the Virgin Mary and the saints! The forcible conversion of Protestants to Catholicism, as well as the expropriation of their church buildings,

actually continued under the reigns of both Charles III and Maria Theresa. At the end of the eighteenth century, almost exactly half of Hungary's population, 49 per cent to be precise, was Roman Catholic.²⁴ This was a substantial increase since the early 17th century when the proportion of the Catholics in the population may have been as low as five or ten percent.

Catholicism in Hungary had many ties to the state. The community of interests between the church and state, however, had its limits. Prelates of aristocratic origin and ecclesiastic officials of lesser-noble background often took the side of the estates in their disputes with the Court. This contributed to the tensions with Vienna since many clergymen took part in the work of the Diets (the bishops in the Upper House, the abbots and canons in the Lower House), but occasionally also in county politics.²⁵

Relations between church and state deteriorated rapidly during the rule of Joseph II. The Emperor's Patent of Tolerance (issued relative to Hungary on 25 October 1781) guaranteed absolute civil equality and freedom of conscience to Lutherans, Calvinists and members of the Greek Orthodox Church.²⁶ Although Protestants had seldom held state offices previously, careers in the administration were in fact opened to them by the Patent of Tolerance. Another decree (issued on 12 January 1782) dissolved those monasteries and nunneries whose monks and nuns did not engage in some form of useful activity such as teaching, nursing etc. (In Hungary there were 140 monasteries and nunneries dissolved.)

Joseph's decrees concerning the church provoked fierce resistance from the Catholic clergy. Pope Pius VI himself had tried to divert the Emperor from his intentions by asking for a personal meeting but he was unsuccessful in changing Joseph's mind. In Hungary the episcopacy made every effort to prevent the orders from being announced and a number of the Free Royal Cities continued to ban Protestants from taking up residence in them. An interesting aspect of the tolerance policy is the fact that whilst Hungary's Protestants received the Patent of Tolerance with a tremendous enthusiasm at the time, from the mid-1780s on they began demanding full equality with Catholics in religious practice.

Habsburg Disrespect for Traditions and Regional Peculiarities as a Source of Conflict

The Habsburg rulers usually showed little understanding of the peculiarities and distinctive character of the territories within their realm, or of the traditions of their populations. It is perhaps only Maria Theresa who was an exception to this generalization. The respect for traditions, though, never kept even her from realizing her ambitions. If and when she showed respect for regional peculiarities, it was usually for the purpose of increasing her popularity with the local population. The Queen strove to make her adherents indebted to her by way of granting titles and dignities to them. The majority of Hungary's aristocrats appreciated her efforts and spent much of the year in Vienna, in the proximity of the Court. The sons of lesser noble families often served for a long time in the imperial city as members of the *Hungarian Guards* established in 1760.

Joseph II was not characterized by the diplomatic finesse his mother had possessed. Because of the distrust he harboured against the Hungarian estates and as a consequence of the firm belief of his in the persuasive force of the Enlightenment, he wanted to make his subjects see reason with the strength of intellect. He had not had himself crowned so as not to be restricted by the oath of coronation in carrying out his future reforms. He had the Crown of Hungary taken to Vienna, which extraordinary action caused a huge shock all over the country. Contemporary memoir-writers noted that the carriers of the Crown were followed by an horrendous thunder-storm, because of which the residents of the imperial city did not want to let the Crown be carried to the *Burg*, to the Treasury.

The introduction of German as the official language of the Empire instead of the outdated Latin would have served the needs of a unified system of jurisdiction and administration. To accomplish this purpose the language of education would have had to be switched to German. What Joseph expected was isolated objections from a few judges and teachers. Instead, it was almost the whole of Hungarian society that protested. Mass protest was also triggered by several of his measures of non-political nature. He had forbidden the burial of the dead in wooden coffins — he prescribed sacks instead, into which lime was to be dusted before the burial. He forbade women to wear fashionable dresses and use make-up. It is not by chance that even his followers, the *Josephinists* — who had rallied under his banner at the outset of his reform program — refused to stay with him in the long run. At the end of his reign, Joseph was obliged to repeal his decrees, except for the Patent of Toleration and the one relating to the peasantry.

Hungary's Return to Europe

In reflecting on the reunification of Hungary in wake of the Turks' expulsion, historians might ask why the country did not resume the role of power-broker it used to have in Central Europe before the Ottoman conquest — some historians might even blame the Habsburgs for this. Theoretically, Hungary's reunification could have led to the country resuming its pre-16th century position in Europe, but this was not to be. After the Turks' expulsion the country found itself a part, a subordinated part, of the Habsburg Empire. Its rulers, despite the repeated demands of the Hungarian Diet, did not move to Buda — and did not formulate their policies in accordance with the interests of Hungary. They did not elevate Hungary to the position of a European great power. They did try to avoid conflict with the country's inhabitants and played an important role in making 18th century Hungary once again a part of Europe.

Hungarians have taken their "return" to Europe as a natural development, one which included the restoration of European-style societal and economic institutions and practices. "Returning" to Europe was a rare privilege in the 18th century which not many of the nations that had come under Ottoman rule could enjoy. In regions of Europe where the Ottomans' despotic rule persisted for a long time, the coming of economic progress, societal renewal, and the creation of a modern, European-style political structure, had to wait for much longer than in Hungary. In the Balkans in particular, the beginning of such progress had to wait for centuries. For Hungary the danger of remaining a part of such a backward world was finally averted only in the eighteenth century.

In trying to answer the question why Hungarians were able to shed many of the legacies of Ottoman rule it is not enough to argue that that rule had been relatively short-lived in Hungary. In answering this question it must be admitted that the new owners of the lands re-gained from the Turks — the Habsburgs — tried to administer them according to European norms rather than in accordance with the un-European practices and traditions introduced by the Ottomans. The Habsburgs reversed the process we might call the "Ottomanization" of these lands. In doing so they prevented the possibility of this process enveloping the whole of Hungary.

NOTES

This paper is a synthesis of the author's researches and views presented in much greater detail in his Hungarian-language articles and monographs, some of which are listed in the notes below.

¹ Madam Korponay, the "white lady of Lőcse" (present-day Levoča in Slovakia) was elevated by Romantic author Mór Jókai into the heroine of a novel. According to the novel, Prince Rákóczi, by then living in exile, planned to prompt his adherents to rise against the Habsburgs through letters that she smuggled to them. On the history of this period see Imre Bánkúti, *A szatmári béke* [The Peace of Szatmár] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1981), 135–36.

² On this affair see Hanns Leo Mikoletzky, *Österreich. Das große 18. Jahrhundert* (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1967), 103.

³ Criminals sentenced to death were usually hanged. In Hungary beheading as a form of capital punishment was abandoned in the 1840s. Károly Vajna, *Hazai régi büntetések* [Punishments in our country in the past] 2 vols. (Budapest: published at the private expense of the author, 1907), II, 199.

⁴ The evolution of Hungarian historiography concerning the eighteenth century is discussed in detail by Domokos Kosáry in his *Művelődés a 18. századi Magyarországon* [Culture in eighteenth-century Hungary] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1980), 28–37. It should be added that the Marxist works of the immediate post-World War II period were characterized by the most vulgar tendencies of Marxist historiography. One of their chief complaints against the Habsburgs was that Hungary in the eighteenth century was lagging far behind the more developed countries of contemporary Europe. While Western Europe enjoyed the abrupt onset of economic growth (agriculture in England, for example, experienced a revival, employing the new methods of the so-called "new agriculture," which was followed by the industrial revolution during the second half of the century), according to Hungary's post-1945 Marxist historians, the economy of the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy stood at best, at a standstill or at worst, was regressing. These historians pointed out that, in the Hungary of the times, the *allodium*-type of manorial farming (a seigneurial agricultural system in which the landowners had a great part of their estates under their own management) was allowed to spread, while the *corvée* (the forced labour by the peasants) was coming into increasing use.

⁵ Critical assessments of the Viennese Court's economic policies were largely based on a work of Ferenc Eckhart that had appeared much earlier: *A bécsi udvar gazdaságpolitikája Magyarországon Mária Terézia korában* [The economic policy of the Viennese court in Hungary in the age of Maria Theresa] (Budapest: Budavári Tudományos Társaság, 1922). Eckhart's later monograph

continued in the same spirit: *A bécsi udvar gazdaságpolitikája 1780–1815*. [The economic policy of the Viennese court, 1780–1815] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1958).

⁶ For literature about eighteenth century Hungary's population see Zoltán Dávid, "Az 1715–20. évi összeírás" [The census of 1715–20] in *A történeti statisztika forrásai* [The sources of historical statistics], ed. József Kovacsics (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Kiadó, 1957), 145–200. There are historians who put the figure of contemporary Hungary's population at 5.5 million. For revisionist estimates of the size of Hungary's population in the late fifteenth century see András Kubinyi, "A magyar királyság népessége a 15. század végén" [The population of the Hungarian Kingdom at the end of the 15th century], *Történelmi Szemle* 38 (1996, 2-3): 135–161.

⁷ For the distribution of the population in eighteenth-century Hungary see the data published by Imre Wellmann: "Magyarország népességének fejlődése a 18. században" [The development of the population of Hungary in the eighteenth century], in *Magyarország története 1686–1790* [The history of Hungary] ed. Győző Ember and Gusztáv Heckenast (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1989), 25–80. We should add that the population density of Sopron county exceeded the contemporary national average for England (36 person per sq. km), while densities similar to that of Békés county could only be found in the more remote, mountainous regions of Europe.

⁸ Imre Wellmann, *A magyar mezőgazdaság a 18. században* [Hungarian agriculture in the eighteenth century] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1979).

⁹ Sándor Gyimesi, *A városok a feudalizmusból a kapitalizmusba való átmenet időszakában* [The cities in the period of the transition from feudalism to capitalism] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1975).

¹⁰ Mór Jókai, *A magyar nemzet története regényes rajzokban* [The history of the Hungarian nation in romantic sketches] 2 vols. (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1969), II. 275.

¹¹ The first such industrial works were founded by Sándor Károlyi and János Pálffy, two magnates who had signed the Peace Treaty of Szatmár, which ended the War of Independence of 1703–1711. Not less famous were the textile manufacturing plant of Sasvár (today's Šaštinké Stráže in Slovakia) and the maiolica factory of Holics (present-day Holič in Slovakia), both established by Emperor Francis I (also known as Francis of Lorraine), the consort of Maria Theresa. While Francis I was (Holy Roman) "Emperor" and Maria Theresa "only" an Archduchess (and Queen of Hungary), she was the actual ruler of the Habsburg Empire at the time. On the subject of contemporary Hungary's textile works see Walter Endrei, *Magyarország textilmanufaktúrái a 18. században* [Textile-industry manufactures in Hungary in the eighteenth century] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1969).

¹² Data supplied by Wellmann: "Magyarország népességének fejlődése..." pp. 38–39.

¹³ Zoltán Kováts, *Somogy megye népessége a XVII-XVIII. század fordulóján* [The population of Somogy County at the turn of the 17–18th centuries] (Kaposvár: Somogyi Almanach, 1969) in the Somogyi Almanach series, no. 12.

¹⁴ Alfred Arneht, *Maria Theresia* (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, k.k. Hof- und Universitätsbuchhändler, 1863), vol. I, 48.

¹⁵ Győző Ember, "A gyarmatosító Habsburg abszolútizmus kiépülése Magyarországon, 1711–54" [The development of the colonizing Habsburg absolutism in Hungary, 1711–54] in *Magyarország története 1526–1790* [The history of Hungary, 1526–1790], ed. Éva H. Balázs and László Makkai (Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1957), 299.

¹⁶ For the course of the debates see Kosáry, *Művelődés a 18. századi Magyarországon*, 31–35.

¹⁷ Gusztáv Heckenast, "Bányászat és ipar manufaktúra-korszakunk első szakaszában" [Mining and industry in the first period of our industrial age], in: *Magyarország története 1686–1790*, 985–1022.

¹⁸ Ernő Fináczy, *A magyar közoktatás története Mária Terézia korában* [The history of Hungarian education in the age of Maria Theresa] 2 vols. (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1899), vol. I.

¹⁹ In addition to these developments, there was a plan (*Einrichtungswerk*) developed by Leopold Kollonich, the Archbishop of Kalocsa, which envisaged a further limiting of Hungary's rights to autonomy. The plan was never put into effect. János Varga, "Habsburg berendezkedési kísérlet Magyarországon a XVII. század végén. Az 'Einrichtungswerk'" [A Habsburg attempt at providing administration for late seventeenth-century Hungary. The 'Einrichtungswerk'] in: *Habsburgok és Magyarország a XVI-XVIII. században* [The Habsburg-dynasty and Hungary during the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries], ed. János Barta (Debrecen, 1997), 33–42.

²⁰ Mikoletzky, *Österreich*, 207–08.

²¹ The government found a solution for the absence of a *nádor* in the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor. This office was held first, after the death of Palatine Miklós Pálffy in 1732, by Francis of Lorraine, the consort of Queen Maria Theresa. Then, after the death of Palatine Lajos Batthyány in 1765, the post was filled by the Queen's son-in-law, Albert, the Duke of Saxony-Teschen.

²² Károly Vörös, "Az 1765/66-i dunántúli parasztmozgalom és az úrbérendezés" [The Transdanubian peasant movement of 1765–66 and the regulation of villein services] in: *Tanulmányok a parasztság történetéhez Magyarországon 1711–1790* [Studies concerning the history of the peasantry in Hungary from 1711 to 1790] ed. György Spira (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1952).

²³ János Barta, *A felvilágosult abszolútizmus agrárpolitikája a Habsburg- és Hohenzollern-monarchiában* [The agrarian policy of the enlightened absolut-

ism in the Habsburg- and Hohenzollern Monarchies] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1982), 112.

²⁴ During the reign of Maria Theresa no new act or decree pertaining to religion came into being.

²⁵ The Catholic church voiced its opposition even against the *Carolina resolutio* of 1731 which had given very limited rights to Protestants.

²⁶ Elemér Mályusz, *A türelmi rendelet. II. József és a magyar protestantizmus* [The Ordinance of Tolerance. Joseph II and Hungarian Protestantism] (Budapest: Magyar Protestáns Irodalmi Társaság, 1939).

Hungary in World War I: The End of Historic Hungary

Peter Pastor

Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia on July 28, 1914, was received with unbounded enthusiasm by street crowds in Budapest. During those heady days the people welcoming war on Pest's Oktogon Square, or on Buda's St. György Square,¹ had no idea that instead of the expected short and glorious conflict, it would be a war that would last for four years and would threaten the very existence of Hungary. Within three days the local conflict between neighbours evolved into a world war, a development which was received by the crowds with similar enthusiasm in all belligerent capitals.

The pretext for Austria-Hungary's decision to start a war against Serbia was the latter's subversive activities culminating in the assassination of the Habsburg heir, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and his wife.² The archduke was no friend of the Hungarian establishment, as he considered the Hungarians as having too much influence within the Empire, and to change the status quo, he wanted to turn the dualistic system into a triallistic one by giving the Czechs, Poles, or South Slavs equal power to that of the Hungarians and the Austrians.³ The last of these choices would have altered not only the Empire, but historic Hungary as well.

The real reason for the war, however, was Austria-Hungary's concern with the territorial growth of Serbia, which since 1908 had doubled its imperium. The South Slav state, with its irredentist Greater Serbian vision, threatened with further expansion, this time at the expense of Austria and Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian leaders saw the international revulsion to Francis Ferdinand's assassination as the opportune moment to start an assumedly quick and victorious war to end the Serbian

threat by reducing Serbia's territory and making it a puppet state. They also assumed that if they missed this opportunity in the summer of 1914, in the future the international military constellation would be less advantageous for the Monarchy to fight a war against Serbia as other powers were more likely to come to that country's aid.⁴

Accordingly, at the meeting of the common Cabinet Council on July 7, 1914, in Vienna, the crucial decision for war was agreed upon, though the Hungarian Prime Minister, István Tisza, objected. It was not that he opposed the elimination of the Serbian threat, since it was he who had proposed to the Council the dismemberment of Serbia in the first place. He was against the annexation of any Serb territory to the Monarchy. He was also concerned that a war against Serbia had not been diplomatically prepared and therefore would not attract adequate international support. He was also worried about Russia, which had acted as a protector for Serbia in the past, and Romania, which he saw as a potential enemy if the war could not be localized. For these reasons, he proposed a harsh diplomatic *démarche* to Serbia, but the kind it could accept. He also believed that since some *causus belli* could always be found, the war should be postponed to a more propitious time, when Russia would be preoccupied with Asian expansion. The Cabinet, whose bellicose stance was abetted by German Emperor William II, disregarded Tisza's admonitions about Russia, and dismissed its possible involvement in the war. It was reasoned that in case it did enter, it was to the Monarchy's advantage, as Russia was deemed to become a greater threat in the future.⁵ As a compromise, therefore, the Cabinet agreed to the sending of the type of demands to Belgrade that the Serb government would most likely deem unacceptable, thus justifying the use of force, but not angering Russia in the process. Tisza accepted this approach though he insisted on approving the ultimatum before it was sent in order to ensure that it did not make the goal of its framers too obvious.⁶

Tisza's opposition to the use of force changed only on July 10, after he received information from Foreign Minister Count Leopold Berchtold that William II, who was pressing the Monarchy for a "blitzkrieg," had made strong representations to King Carol of Romania to stay out of the coming conflict. This put Tisza's mind at ease about a possible Romanian attack on Transylvania.⁷ On July 14, when he returned to the imperial capital, he went on to support the military solution to the Serbian crisis.⁸ At the Cabinet Council meeting of July 19, 1914, when the ultimatum to Serbia was approved, Tisza also suppressed his fears about

Russia, stating that Russia would possibly stay out of the war if Austria-Hungary expressed its intention not to annex Serb territory.⁹ To appease Tisza, the Council approved the "no annexation" policy, which also intended to allay Tisza's fear of more Slavs being added to the Monarchy, thereby shifting the Empire's demographic balance in favour of the Slavs at the expense of the Hungarians.

This concession to Tisza's sensitivities was soon altered. Although before the war spread, Count Berchtold had instructed his ambassador to St. Petersburg to declare that "so long as the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia remains localized, the Monarchy does not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions of any sort,"¹⁰ after Russia entered the war, planners at the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry began to think about territorial gains at the expense of Russian Poland. The inclusion of additional millions of Slavs in the Empire would have probably led to the introduction of some kind of "trialist" solution for the Dual Monarchy which would have ended the existing Austrian-Magyar joint hegemony.¹¹ It is clear, therefore, that in order to solve the "Serb crisis" of the summer of 1914 and to maintain Magyar influence in the Empire and supremacy in the Kingdom of Hungary, Tisza, instead of calling for the dismemberment of Serbia, should have proposed territorial concessions to Serbia. In particular, he should have offered to transfer some of the South Slav inhabited areas of Hungary to Serb sovereignty. Yet in royal Hungary no statesman, politician, or scholar was willing to think of territorial concessions as a way of preserving the Habsburg Monarchy and, in fact, the Hungarian Kingdom.¹² Instead of making such concessions, war was chosen, which led to the Monarchy's destruction and Hungary's dismemberment. Rather than offering to transfer land inhabited by Serbs to Serbia, by October 1915 the Hungarian government presented its view to the common Cabinet Council demanding "parity": If Austria wanted to annex parts of Russian Poland, Hungary would demand Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia.¹³

The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia was transmitted to Belgrade on July 23, 1914, and in spite of the harshness of the ultimatum, the Serb reply was conciliatory though evasive.¹⁴ It could have served as basis for negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian demand for the right of its officials to seek out the culprits in Belgrade was rejected on the ground that it was a violation of the principle of sovereignty. This rejection provided Vienna with the excuse to break diplomatic relations with Serbia. Next, mobilization orders followed and war was declared.¹⁵

Miscalculations and Disasters

For the Monarchy, the war started disastrously. On July 29, the chief of the General Staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, in accordance with his country's war plans, ordered the troops to be transported on trains south, to the Serbian front, even though it was likely that a major attack would come from Russia in the north. On July 31, in response to Russian mobilization, Conrad ordered the rerouting of some of those troops to the north, in anticipation of a two-front war. He was told by the military's railway authorities, however, that the preset time-tables did not permit this, and such an action would abort the war plans against Serbia. Thus troops destined to be shipped to the Russian front first had to reach their debarkation points in the south before they could re-embark to be sent back north to Galicia. All in all about 180 trains were unnecessarily sent south. The consequence of this blunder was that many of the troops did not arrive in time to the Carpathians and Galicia to stem the Russian offensive that came at the end of August. Some of the divisions did not reach the northern front until January and February 1915.¹⁶

These developments clearly indicated the fallacy of the concept of the "short war" which was in part based on the smoothly functioning rail transportation of troops to the front to bring about quick and decisive victories. Instead of attaining success, the Austro-Hungarian forces had to abandon the Bukovinian capital Czernowitz (Chernovtsy) on August 31; Lemberg (L'viv), the key city of Galicia, fell on September 3; Przemyśl came under siege on August 13, and Jarosław was evacuated on the 21st. The retreat was stopped only at the Tarnow-Gorlice line, 230 kilometres west of Lemberg, putting eastern and central Galicia under Russian occupation. These initial battles of the war proved to be the bloodiest, with casualties of 350,000 in the opening phase of the conflict. From October to December, an additional 800,000 were wounded, killed, went missing, or were captured.¹⁷

The Austro-Hungarian defeat on one front was accompanied by the failure of the punitive war against Serbia on the other front. The casualty rate in the south approached 300,000.¹⁸ The Dual Monarchy was never able to recover from this great blood-letting.¹⁹ In 1916, the year of the famous Russian Brusilov offensive, there was another surge of huge losses amounting to 1,061,091 troops.²⁰ During the course of the war the Dual Monarchy mobilized 9 million men between the ages of eighteen

and fifty-three. Of the 9 million, 3.4 million came from Hungary and Croatia. Of the men in Austro-Hungarian uniform 1.1 million died, 3.6 million were wounded, and 2 million became prisoners of war. 530,000 of the dead, 1.4 million of the wounded, and 833,000 of the POWs, were Hungarian.²¹

The Habsburg armed forces, which besides the common Austro-Hungarian Army included the Austrian Landwehr and the Hungarian Honvéd, were not adequately trained and lacked sufficient firepower. In terms of manpower, Austria-Hungary was behind the other great power belligerents. Because of the lack of funds, only about thirty percent of its manpower pool was drafted, and many recruits were given only two months of training.²² The Dual Monarchy had forty-eight infantry divisions, while Russia had ninety-three, France eighty-eight, and little Serbia eleven. The Empire's field artillery, in the process of replacement, was mostly obsolete. In the Habsburg armies, only forty-two pieces supported an infantry battalion as opposed to forty-eight pieces for a Russian battalion, and fifty-four for a German one. As a German military specialist noted, the Habsburg army was "adequate for a campaign against Serbia, but inadequate for a major European war."²³ If the Austro-Hungarian leaders had started the war to prevent their enemies from overtaking them as a military power, the war in 1914 indicated that it was already too late to use force to reestablish the equilibrium. For Austria-Hungary the expectation of victory was as much an illusion as was the hope of a short war — based as it was on the cult of the offensive, the notion which was shared by all belligerents.²⁴

For Prime Minister Tisza, who mistook the initial enthusiasm of his countrymen for the war as a sign of approval of his leadership, there existed an additional illusion. He came to believe that the war, when it came, could and would lead to national reconciliation and the advent of unity among Hungary's nationalities. Yet there was no favourable response coming on this matter even from the county and government officials,²⁵ much less from the nationalities who saw the war as an opportunity to press their demands for additional minority rights. At the outbreak of the war, in order to win over the nationalities, Tisza's government made a number of concessions. It issued an amnesty to political prisoners. It ordered public schools to teach non-Hungarians not only in Hungarian but also in their mother tongue. It permitted the displaying of national colours along with the Hungarian ones, as long as these were not the same as the enemy's. Tisza also offered the leaders of the Romanian

minority educational reforms, concessions on language use, and the formation of electoral districts favouring the Romanian population, but these offers were not received as going far enough.²⁶ The ethnic Romanians in Transylvania began to look toward the Romanian kingdom for military liberation. The appeasement of Romania and the Romanian irredenta in Hungary would have required some territorial concessions, but Prime Minister Tisza refused to concede any territory. In 1915, when the fence-sitter Italy could have been brought to the Central Powers' side with territorial concessions by Austria, Tisza refused to support such a deal, fearing that it would lead to demands that Hungary make similar concessions to Romania in Transylvania. Even following the entry of Italy on the side of the Entente in May 1915, Tisza refused to contemplate even some limited territorial concessions to Romania as a price for her continued neutrality.²⁷ The territory that could have been sacrificed at the time was minuscule in size when compared to the Hungarian lands Romania gained by siding with the eventual victors of the war.

In the second half of 1915, the Romanian ethnic press in Hungary (i.e. in Transylvania) became vigorously persecuted.²⁸ In the summer of 1916, Romania attacked Hungary and briefly invaded Transylvania. The sympathetic reception of enemy troops by the indigenous Romanian population led to the hardening of Hungarian attitudes. Consequently, two to three thousand pro-Regat intellectuals were interned in the western Hungarian city of Sopron.²⁹ Soon thereafter eighty thousand Transylvanian Romanians fled their homes — when the Romanian army retreated from Transylvania — and sought refuge in the Kingdom of Romania.³⁰ In 1917, Minister of Education Albert Apponyi had the Romanian teachers' colleges closed, indicating a return to a policy of forced assimilation.³¹ Other nationalities, the Ukrainians and the Serbs, also suffered because of the fighting. Because they lived in the war zone, they were often mistreated by the military on the suspicion of being spies for the enemy.³²

The Entente Powers' appeal in 1917–1918 to the Dual Monarchy's national minorities to undermine the Austro-Hungarian war effort also contributed to the Budapest authorities' viewing Hungary's non-Magyar populations as a potential fifth-column. A government edict issued at the end of 1917 reflected this attitude. According to the new rule, estates could not be sold (or even leased for more than ten years) without government approval. If the government did not approve of the buyer, it had the right to select another. Ostensibly, the policy aimed at

assuring that land could be acquired by war veterans or their widows, but in reality it aimed to prevent the acquisition of land by members of Hungary's national minorities.³³ The government's inability to handle the nationalities question under the stress of war acted as a catalyst and contributed to the secession of the minorities from Hungary when the Dual Monarchy collapsed in October 1918.³⁴

Another of Tisza's illusions was his belief that the war could bring about the enhancement of Hungary's influence within the Monarchy, which would lead to full parity with Austria. In fact during the war efforts to enhance Hungary's power within the Dual Monarchy led to increasing tensions and a weakening of dualistic cohesion, which before the war had served as the best guarantee of the Hungarian state's survival.³⁵

The War's Impact on Hungary

The war's outbreak seemed to bring radical changes to Hungarian politics. In the long turbulent Hungarian Parliament there were signs of a budding truce among the major political parties, particularly between István Tisza's governing Party of Work and the opposition Independents. The Social Democratic Party, the only mass party in Hungary, and which had no parliamentary representation, also supported the war out of patriotic duty, just as its sister parties in France and Germany did. Nationalism thus carried the day over working-class internationalism. As a result of the nationalist war fever in Hungary, for the first time since his coronation in 1867, the Habsburg monarch Francis Joseph came to be recognized as a truly Hungarian king among the Hungarian populace.³⁶ At the time of his death in 1916, conservative and liberal writers alike eulogized him as such. The liberal writer Hugó Ignótyus remarked: "It is no exaggeration to state that Hungary has not had a national king like Francis Joseph since King Matthias."³⁷

The bubble of the "short war" illusion burst in December 1914, the date which, according to the pre-war military planners, was to mark the war's end, as it was assumed that the huge national armies of the belligerents would run out of logistical supplies. This problem was overcome and the war effort continued through the mobilization of the civilian population for the production of military supplies. Industrial and agricultural production began to be coordinated by the state. This practice later became known as total war, though at the time it was called "war

socialism," as the practice undermined the prevailing economic model of *laissez faire* capitalism and increasingly resembled the command economy model favoured by the socialists.³⁸

The degree of mobilization and regimentation of the civilian population for the war effort was unparalleled in modern times. The practice gave birth to the "home front," which not only denoted the application of authoritarian measures to civilians, but also connoted the need to create the kind of social cohesion that existed among the soldiers in the trenches. Governments employed social, political, and economic measures and propaganda to that end. In Hungary the establishment of a home front brought about radical changes that prepared the ground for the political, economic, and social programs that were introduced by the revolution that started on October 31, 1918.³⁹

The increased power of the state in wartime Hungary had its legal underpinning in the emergency law, the War Services Act, which had been drafted in 1912 during the Balkan crisis. According to this law, in the event of war, emergency power was to remain in the hands of the civilian government; even military requisitions were to be implemented by civilian authorities. The Hungarian home front therefore tended to resemble more that of Great Britain than those prevailing in Germany or Austria where the war led to the ascendance of the military over the civilian administration.⁴⁰

The first major intervention in Hungary's *laissez faire* economy came on August 1, 1914, three days after the declaration of war on Serbia. It was a fourteen-day moratorium on loans and debts. It was intended to prevent a run on the banks by worried depositors. The life of the moratorium was extended in one form or another for a year. Later the government, using the War Services Act, placed all defense-related industries under military discipline by drafting workers under fifty into militia labour battalions, which were then placed in designated factories. Other government edicts also drafted some women, and men over fifty, but they were not put under martial law.⁴¹ The war economy placed more and more workers in areas defined as war-related. By October 1, 1915, in addition to the mines, rail yards, flour mills, and food processing companies, 263 firms were put under military justice. A year later their number increased to 615, and by the end of the war to 900. It is estimated that by war's end between 500,000 and 800,000 thousand workers were engaged in war-related production. In addition to these workers, 140,000 troops were also employed in factories.⁴²

The flow of production was assured by centralized, government-controlled monopolies. In mid-1915 the War Produce Corporation was set up. Financed by state and bank investments, the firm had a monopoly on the acquisition and sale of grain. Other monopolies that were established included the so-called centres for metals, textiles, sugar, and others. By the end of the war there were 291 such centres. A number of committees made up of government officials and trade specialists were also involved in the coordination of production and distribution.⁴³ The control over distribution aimed to fill the needs of the war front first. This meant that food items and consumer goods for the home front were restricted and price controls were introduced on food stuffs. Food rationing was introduced in the spring of 1915 and in January 1916 ration cards made their debut. As the war progressed and food shortages increased, the authorities reduced the rations.⁴⁴

Another consequence of the war on the home front was the increase of female and adolescent labour. Women entered the labour market not because of the manpower draft, but as a consequence of economic necessity caused by the absence of the traditional male wage earner. While there are no statistics available for the women employed in the consumer-product and service industries, but in the manufacturing sector — where women were hired in large numbers during the war — statistics are telling enough of the increase. In December 1914, 137,075 women were employed in this sector; by May 1916, their number had reached 209,833.⁴⁵ Since the wages of female workers were traditionally lower, their increased employment led to the decline of wages paid to men, though never to the level of women wage earners. In fact during the war only teamsters earned less than women.⁴⁶

Female labour also increased in agriculture. Agrarian labour laws issued at the beginning of the war granted financial support to the soldiers' dependents, but not to their able-bodied family members. This law forced not only women, but also adolescent children and the elderly to perform agricultural labour.⁴⁷ In spite of this involuntary mobilization of villagers, labour shortages persisted. There was an attempt to solve the problem by giving leaves at planting and harvest time to peasant soldiers who were performing non-frontline duties. Military labour battalions and some 300,000 Russian and Serb POWs were also assigned to agricultural work.⁴⁸

A command economy geared to fighting the war led to serious shortages in consumer products. A price freeze failed to slow down the

inflation caused by the shortages. The slow rise of inflation during the first eighteen months of the war gave way to galloping inflation, as there was an attempt to finance the war by printing more money. Between 1914 and 1917 the cost of household goods increased by 268.17 percent and that of clothing by 1,230.32 percent. It is estimated that 63–80 percent of the labourers' wages had to be spent on food, leaving very little money for clothing and shelter.⁴⁹ The consequent decline in the standard of living was reflected in a poll taken in Budapest in May 1918. This revealed that the 682,548 respondents (out of a population of 962,435) owned 800,000 pairs of shoes. About 291,000 owned one pair, 241,000 two pairs, and only 150,000 owned three pairs. Those who owned three pairs, however, indicated that their shoes were repaired or were beyond repair.⁵⁰

Economic hardships led to wildcat strikes by 1916. The government responded to the unrest by setting up grievance committees, which were to arbitrate between workers and their employers. Most of the decisions favoured the workers,⁵¹ indicating the seriousness of the plight of the workers as well as the government's concern about the decline of morale on the home front. Since the workers were represented before the grievance committees by the unions, their importance and membership also increased. From December 1916 to December 1917 membership in unions rose from 55,588 to 212,222.⁵²

Another circumstance that contributed to low morale on the home front was the shortage of coal. Output declined because of the labour shortage in the mines and the scarcity of rolling stock. By 1917 this situation had resulted in industrial slowdowns, and in some factories, in a complete halt to production. Responding to the problem, the government prohibited the temporary lay-off of workers from these factories and on the initiative of the Ministry of National Defense, offered "coal aid" to those workers who were idled by the coal shortage. This unemployment benefit amounted to seventy-five percent of the worker's wage, half being paid by the treasury and half by the employer.⁵³ For the first time in Hungarian history, the state rather than private insurance companies paid unemployment benefits. The war, therefore, was responsible for the dawn of the welfare state in Hungary. The diminution of *laissez faire* economics was also demonstrated by the introduction of rent controls, and rent moratorium for the dependents of the conscripted soldier.⁵⁴

The war also forced the lawmakers and some churchmen to pay attention to the plight of the peasants, who constituted 62.22 percent of

Hungary's population of twenty-one million. In 1916 there were discussions in the country and even in Parliament about land reforms, including the distribution of homesteads by the state to soldiers who were smallholders, sharecroppers, or agricultural labourers in civilian life.⁵⁵ While the war brought about a sixty percent increase in the agricultural labourer's wage, inflation more than wiped out this gain. In 1916 a day labourer earned 1,050 kronen for three hundred days' work. In contrast to this figure, the annual cost to the treasury of feeding and housing a POW was estimated at 1,333.9 kronen.⁵⁶

Moderately well-off and well-to-do peasants were also experiencing hardship because of the war, as there were price-ceilings established for agrarian products, while much of the industrial goods needed by the peasantry were selling at inflated prices. The peasants responded by withholding produce and hoarding it for the black market. In some cases there was a reduction of output. The government responded with military raids of the granaries, which did not bring about a resolution of the problem. In spite of the hardship experienced, the peasants, unlike the workers, did not respond with strikes. Since agrarian unrest was minimal and land reforms were not seen as leading to increased production, the government failed to take up the cause of land reform.⁵⁷

The difficulties of agriculture were not the consequence of patterns of ownership but were due to weather conditions and to the impact of the war, which created shortages of draft animals and farm machinery. The cutoff of Romanian grain imports in 1916, which had supplied 30 percent of the Dual Monarchy's needs, further exacerbated the situation.⁵⁸ By 1918, the wheat harvest had declined by 37 percent, rye by 32 percent, barley by 57 percent, potatoes by 40 percent, and sugar beets by 54 percent. The shortages contributed to the decline of the morale of the home front and hunger riots erupted in 1917 in various parts of the country.⁵⁹ The decline of food production led to a reduction of supplies sent to Austria, where the situation was truly critical.⁶⁰ Consequently, the Austrian newspapers, seeking scapegoats, accused the Hungarians of bad faith and setting up a "Hungarian blockade."⁶¹ The Hungarian press responded in kind, accusing the Austrians of siphoning off much needed food provisions, and called on the government not to comply with Vienna's requests for produce.⁶² The quarrels over food supplies contributed to the drifting apart of the two halves of the Monarchy.

The government tried to counteract the sagging of national morale by reviving discussion on electoral reforms. The re-surfacing of the suffrage question, however, only caused the collapse of the parliamentary truce. The renewal of acrimony over the issue of suffrage was in part due to the fact that in Hungary, alone among the belligerents, a national government — a wartime "grand coalition" of all or most parties — never materialized.⁶³ On June 21, 1915, the five-year term of Parliament expired, but elections were postponed to six months after the signing of a peace treaty. At the same time, however, Parliament was not prorogued: rather, it was to sit and debate the nation's affairs as usual until the end of the war.⁶⁴

In the spring of 1915, the opposition parties reopened the debate on suffrage on a patriotic note, calling for voting rights for front-line soldiers over twenty. Soon after, Count Mihály Károlyi, a leader of the Independents, renewed his call for universal manhood suffrage. Debates continued into 1917, when war weariness, shortages, and labour unrest, coupled with the news of the Russian Revolution, forced the lawmakers to resolve the parliamentary deadlock on the issue. On July 19, 1918, a compromise law broadened the right to vote from 7.7 percent of the population to 13 percent. The modest reform failed to satisfy either the opposition parties in Parliament or the Social Democratic Party outside of it,⁶⁵ but for the first time the government conceded the right to all political parties, including the Socialists, to organize without restraints.⁶⁶

Parliamentary peace was again broken by Count Mihály Károlyi when on July 17, 1916, he caused the Independence Party to split over the question of fighting the war on the side of Germany. A new party came into existence, called the Károlyi Independence Party. It demanded an independent Hungary linked to Austria only through a personal union, a disengagement from the German alliance, and an end to the war with a separate peace that did not compromise Hungary's integrity.⁶⁷

The Russian revolutions of 1917 not only influenced Hungarian parliamentary politics but they also had an important impact on Hungarian POWs in Russia. It is estimated that of the 1,600,000 to 2,110,000 troops of the Austro-Hungarian army in captivity, 500,000 to 600,000 were Hungarians. Of the 300,000 who died in the Russian camps a large proportion was also Hungarian. The tsarist Russian government divided the captives into camps according to their nationality. Slav, Italian, and Romanian POWs were sent to camps in European Russia, while German, German-speaking Austrian, and Magyar-speaking Hungarian POWs were

sent to the more inhospitable areas of the Russian Empire: to the Urals, the White Sea area, Siberia, or to Russian Central Asia. Most of the 300,000 Austro-Hungarian POWs who died in Russian captivity were from camps in these regions. Some observers noted that conditions to which the Hungarian captives were subjected were among the worst of that time. Because of their ill treatment, which continued during the administration of the revolutionary Provisional Government of Alexander Kerensky, many of the prisoners became attracted to socialist ideas, and later fell prey to Bolshevik agitation. This was especially true of those who were already acquainted with social democratic ideology before they donned the uniform of their country. The Bolsheviks called for the humane treatment of the POWs, as their leader, Vladimir Ilich Lenin, expected these soldiers to carry the bacilli of Bolshevism back to Eastern and Central Europe at war's end.⁶⁸

Following the Bolshevik Revolution of November 7, 1917, which led to the withdrawal of Russia from the war, Russia's new rulers improved POW camp conditions. About 100,000 Hungarians joined the Red Guards — and soon after, the Red Army in the Russian Civil War — in order to escape life in the camps and to make their way home. In May 1918, the Hungarian Red Guards in Cheliabinsk clashed with the entrained Czechoslovak Legion troops, erstwhile POWs, who were destined to fight for the Entente on the western front and whom the Hungarians wanted to disarm. Thus the nationalities conflicts of the Dual Monarchy spilled into Siberia. The civil war among the Habsburg nationalities helped to touch off the Civil War in Russia.⁶⁹ Consequently the Czechoslovaks remained in Russia and joined the Russian anti-Bolsheviks in a vain attempt to set up a government that would bring back the eastern front against the Central Powers. Though defeated in Russia, the Czechoslovak Legion's activities there contributed in a major way to the Entente's decision to support the creation of a Czechoslovak state,⁷⁰ which required the territorial dismantling of both Austria and Hungary. If the cause of the war related to the preservation of the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, it is significant to note that its own drafted men, the Czechs and Slovaks, contributed to its demise.

The leading Hungarian POW champions of the Bolshevik cause, foremost among them Béla Kun, joined the Russian Communist Party and on November 4, 1918, a day after the Padua Armistice had been signed, they formed the Hungarian Communist Party in Russia.⁷¹ These leaders were then transported to Hungary in order to foment a communist type

revolution there. They were able to profit from the chaos that followed defeat and managed to come to power for a brief period on March 21, 1919. Thus the war represented another turning point for Hungary through the agency of the former POWs who brought Soviet power to East Central Europe. Because the Soviet government of Béla Kun was defeated as a result of foreign intervention, the episode also had long range impact. The Hungarian communists, who grabbed power again in 1948 and relinquished it only in 1989, attempted to legitimize their rule by harking back to the first Commune.

Because roughly seventy percent of the Soviet Republic's top officials were of Jewish origin, the brief communist interlude provided the counter-revolutionaries with a pretext for a vigorous anti-Semitic campaign. This would leave its imprint on the interwar years, even though most of Hungary's Jews had not favoured communism either during the war or during its aftermath.⁷² In fact, when the war had broken out in 1914, Hungary's Jewish population supported the war with enthusiasm, seeing in it the coming defeat of the official anti-Semitism of tsarist Russia. The Hungarian Jews exemplified the role that Tisza hoped the country's nationalities would assume by rallying around the Hungarian tricolour. Not surprisingly, the Jewish population in turn expected that the war would accelerate their march to complete acceptance.⁷³ The popular plays written in response to the war seemed to reflect this perspective. Jews, in contrast to their prejudiced portrayals before the war, were depicted as being as patriotic as the country's Magyar citizenry. In one play a Jewish banker's son joins the hussars and eventually becomes a lieutenant. In another, the Jewish grocery-store owner, by volunteering for military service, becomes accepted by Gentile gentlemen as their equal.⁷⁴ In real life not only grocers but, as noted by István Deák:

Jewish writers and journalists did signal service as war propagandists, and thousands of Jewish reserve officers willingly assumed command of their troops. Never again would Jews be allowed to play such a dignified role in the history of German-Austrians, Magyars, and Slavs. Thereafter their role would be increasingly that of victims.⁷⁵

This victimization began during the war as the deprivations and hardship led to the increase of anti-Semitism proving that for the Jews of Hungary the war also brought about an unexpected turning point in their lives.

A recognition of the problem of victimization was evidenced in May 1917, by the radical journal *Huszadik Század* under the editorship of the sociologist Oszkár Jászi. It distributed a questionnaire among sixty Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals who were interested in the "Jewish Question." Their reply was published in the same year.⁷⁶ On August 7, 1918, in his parliamentary speech, the ex-prime minister István Tisza, assailed in the strongest terms the spread of anti-Semitism and the insinuation that Jews were war profiteers. Rather, he hailed the bravery of the Jewish officers at the front.⁷⁷ His admonitions, however, were not sufficient to put the Genie back into the bottle. The impending defeat made scapegoating a sign of the times.

Defeat and its Consequences

On September 29, 1918, an exhausted Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey agreed to appeal to Washington to initiate armistice negotiations on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. To save his crumbling realm, the Emperor Charles issued a manifesto on October 16, proclaiming the federalization of Austria. This declaration was tantamount to an admission of defeat. The following day Tisza admitted in Parliament: "We have lost the war."⁷⁸ The Italian front, which had been barely holding up since the last and unsuccessful Habsburg offensive on the Piave in June 1918, cracked in the wake of these admissions. The near collapse of authority at the top created a power vacuum that was soon filled by forces that only recently favoured change without revolution. The rise of a revolutionary government in Hungary on October 31, 1918, only three days before the Armistice of Padua, indicated that the military representatives on the Italian front signed a cease fire agreement in the name of the Dual Monarchy that had already ceased to exist.

The armistice, *de facto* if not *de jure*, brought the war to its end. With the Empire falling apart into its national components, there was no chance for its return to the battlefield upon being offered unacceptable peace terms. The war brought about radical changes that fashioned the prewar years into the bygone years that could never be recaptured — "the years of peace." The introduction of total war mobilized Hungary's civilian population who therefore saw more reason to share a voice in national decision-making through the ballot box. It also led to étatistic solutions of the economy, undermining the liberal principles of *laissez*

faire. With Hungary fighting nation-states, such as the Kingdom of the Serbs and Kingdom of the Romanians, the co-nationals of these peoples living in the Monarchy came to see themselves as irredenta — the unredeemed ones — whose future belonged with the “enemy.” The dismantling of the Hungarian kingdom therefore became corollary to the solution of the nationality problem.

The privations caused by the war created social conflicts among the peasantry and the workers, making them more willing to resort to illegal measures, such as riots and strikes. These actions prepared public opinion to accept a revolution that on November 16, 1918, dethroned the Habsburgs and promulgated for the first time a republican government in Hungary. The stress of war also caused the resurfacing of wide-spread anti-Semitism, and the sufferings of Hungarian prisoners of war in Russia led to the introduction to the Hungarian experience of the virulent form of Marxism: Leninist communism.

For Hungary the war was supposed to preserve the status quo. Instead, it led to a great many hardships during the war and social strife, foreign occupation, and civil war after its conclusion. In particular, Hungary’s defeat led to the harshest of the peace treaties that were signed in the environs of Paris, the dictated Peace Treaty of Trianon. From the terms and spirit of this treaty, Hungarian society has yet to recover.

NOTES

I wish to thank Professor Gábor Vermes for his comments on the first draft of this essay.

¹ Alice Freifeld, *Nationalism and the Crowd in Liberal Hungary, 1848–1914* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 306; Dániel Szabó, “A magyar háborús lelkesedés az első világháború kitörésekor” [Hungarian pro-war sentiments at the outbreak of World War I], in *1918, Korszakvég-korszakkezdet* [1918, The end of an age – The start of an age], ed. Cornel Grad and Viorel Ciubota, (Zalau: Lekton, 1998), 75–78.

² *The Austro-Hungarian Red Book*, www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/papers-red1.htm; István Deák, *Beyond Nationalism. A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 75.

³ Gábor Vermes, *István Tisza, The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of a Magyar Nationalist* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1985),

94; Imre Gonda and Emil Niederhauser, *A Habsburgok. Egy európai jelenség* [The Habsburgs: A European phenomenon] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1977), 292; C.A. Macartney, *Hungary. A Short History* (Chicago: Aldine, 1962), 201.

⁴ Ignác Romsics, *Magyar történeti szöveggyűjtemény 1914–1999* [Documents on Hungarian history, 1914–1999], vol. 1 (Budapest: Osiris, 2000), 20.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 17–21.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁷ Vermes, *István Tisza*, 225–227; József Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989), 35, 45; Norman Stone, “Hungary and the Crisis of July 1914,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 3:1966, 160; for Germany’s interest in a *Blitzkrieg*, see Fritz Fischer, *World Power or Decline. The Controversy over Germany’s Aims in the First World War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 29.

⁸ Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., “Vienna and July 1914: The Origins of the Great War Once More,” in *Essays on World War I: Origins and Prisoners of War*, ed. Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Peter Pastor (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1983), p. 26; Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 200.

⁹ William Jannen, Jr. “The Austro-Hungarian Decision for War in July 1914,” Williamson and Pastor, *Essays on World War I*, 58.

¹⁰ *The Austro-Hungarian Red Book*; Count Gyula Andrassy, the last foreign minister of the Dual Monarchy claimed that the “no annexation” pledge aimed to avoid a world war. See Gyula Andrassy, *Diplomácia és világháború* [Diplomacy and World War] (Budapest: Gönczöl-Primusz, 1990), 43

¹¹ Williamson, “Vienna and July 1914,” 26.

¹² Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, 204.

¹³ József Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989), 153.

¹⁴ Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, 204.

¹⁵ *The Austro-Hungarian Red Book*.

¹⁶ Kálmán Kéri, “Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia vasúthálózata 1914-ben és felhasználása az első világháborúban” [The Austro-Hungarian railway network in 1914 and its utilization in World War I] *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 32 (1985:2), 259–263; Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, 206; J. Robert Wegs, “Transportation: The Achilles Heel of the Habsburg War Effort,” in *The Habsburg Empire in World War I, Essays on the Intellectual, Military, Political and Economic Aspects of the Habsburg War Effort*, ed. Robert A. Kann, Béla K. Király, and Paula Fichtner (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1977), 123; Graydon A. Tunstall, Jr., *Planning for War against Russia and Serbia. Austro-Hungarian and German Military Strategies, 1871–1914* (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1993), 176–188.

¹⁷ Jay Luvaas, "A Unique Army: The Common Experience," in *The Habsburg Empire in World War I*, ed. Kann, Király and Fichtner, 96; Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War*, 90–93; László Szabó, *A Nagy Temető (Przemysł ostroma 1914–1915)* [The great cemetery: The siege of Przemyśl, 1914–1915] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1982), 163.

¹⁸ Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War*, 93.

¹⁹ Ignác Romsics, *Magyarország története a XX. században* [The History of Hungary in the 20th century] (Budapest: Osiris, 1999), 103; Ferenc Julier, *1914–1918: A világháború magyar szemmel* [1914–1918: The World War through Hungarian eyes]. This study has been published on the internet website: [http://www.mek.iif.hu/porta/szint/tarsad/tortenelem/mo_1867/julier/html/3_2.html], 9.

²⁰ Rudolf Jerábek, "The Eastern Front," in *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary. Essays in Political and Military History 1908–1918*, ed. Mark Cornwall (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990), 111.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 104; Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 192–193.

²² Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage, 1987), 217.

²³ As quoted by Gunther E. Rothenberg, "The Habsburg Army in the First World War: 1914–1918," in *The Habsburg Empire in World War I*, ed. Kann, Király and Fichtner, 74.

²⁴ József János Szabó, "A katonai gondolkodás főbb vonásai az első világháború alatt" [The main lines of Hungarian military thought during the World War], in *A magyar katonai gondolkodás története* [The history of Hungarian military thought], ed. Tibor Ács (Budapest: Zrínyi, 1995), 122.

²⁵ Vermes, *Tisza István*, 244–45.

²⁶ Peter Pastor, "The Transylvanian Question in War and Revolution," in *Transylvania, The Roots of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. John F. Cadzow, Andrew Ludányi and Louis F. Éltető (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1983), 156.

²⁷ Peter Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin: The Hungarian Revolution of 1918–1919 and the Big Three* (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1976), 15.

²⁸ Tibor Zsuppán, "The Hungarian Political Scene 1908–1918," in *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary*, ed. Cornwall, 71.

²⁹ Tibor Hajdu, *Az 1918-as magyarországi demokratikus forradalom* [The 1918 Democratic Revolution in Hungary] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1968), 13; Mark Cornwall, "The Dissolution of Austria Hungary," in *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary*, ed. Cornwall, 134. A recent Hungarian publication claims that the Transylvanian Romanians demonstrated no enthusiasm toward the victorious Romanian occupiers. See István Eördögh, *Erdély román megszállása (1916–1920)* [The Romanian Occupation of Transylvania] (Szeged: Lazi, 2000), 15. This assessment disregards certain evidence and is politically motivated. Its aim is to

prove that the nationalities in Hungary were satisfied and the official dismemberment of Hungary at the Trianon Palace in 1920 as part of the Versailles peace settlement, was the work of the victorious Entente powers. Therefore with the demise of the two creations of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (greater Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) today's Hungarian revisionist could call for border changes by stressing that in multinational Hungary the nationalities were satisfied and, as a result, the breaking-up Hungary was unjustified. It may be significant to note that István Eördögh's publication was financed by the Hungarian Ministry of Education and by Hungary's Twentieth Century Institute, which is also financed by government monies. In István Diószegi *et al.*'s *Twentieth Century World History*, the claim is made that "in multinational and multireligious Hungary toleration was dominant," and that in the Dual Monarchy fifty million people were part of a "common market." The authors thus ingeniously insinuate that the fate of the Monarchy was not dependent on the peoples of the empire, but on the victorious Great Powers of World War I. See István Diószegi *et al.*, *A 20. Század egyetemes története* [The World History of the 20th century] (Budapest: Korona, 1995), 61.

³⁰ Cornwall, "The Dissolution of Austria-Hungary," in *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary*, 134.

³¹ Tibor Hajdu, "A nemzetiségi kérdés és az 1918–1919-es forradalmak: A dualizmus nemzeti politikájának csődje és a monarchia felbomlása," in *A magyar nacionalizmus kialakulása és története* [The development and history of Hungarian nationalism], ed. Erzsébet Andics (Budapest: Kossuth, 1964), 236; András Siklós, *A Habsburg Birodalom felbomlása* [The disintegration of the Habsburg Empire] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1987), 82.

³² Zsuppán, "The Hungarian Political Scene," in *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary*, 71.

³³ Dezső Pap, *A magyar szociálpolitika a világháborúban* [Hungarian social policies in the World War] (Budapest: Grill, 1934), 233–34.

³⁴ Cornwall, "The Dissolution of Austria-Hungary," in *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary* 140.

³⁵ Pap, *A magyar szociálpolitika*, 243, 258–260.

³⁶ András Gerő, *Emperor Francis Joseph, King of the Hungarians*, translated from the Hungarian by James Patterson and Enitő Koncz (Wayne, N.J.: Center for Hungarian Studies and Publications, 2001; distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 2001), 228–229.

³⁷ Matthias Corvinus or Matthias Hunyadi (r. 1458–1490), under whose reign the Kingdom of Hungary experienced its last age of greatness and national independence. The quotation is from Ivan Sanders, "Hungarian Writers and Literature in World War I," in *East Central European Society in World War I*, ed. Béla K. Király and Nándor Dreisziger (New York: Social Science Monographs, 1985), 147; for an overview of the impact of war on writers, see Joseph

Held, "Culture in Hungary during World War I," in *European Culture in the Great War. The Arts, Entertainment, and Propaganda, 1914–1918*, ed. Aviell Roshwald and Richard Stites (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 176–192; Dániel Szabó, "Magyarország nem volt, hanem lesz. Háborús lelkesedés a populáris színelőadások tükrében," in *A pesti polgár. Tanulmányok Vörös Károly emlékére* [The citizen of Pest: Studies in memory of Károly Vörös], ed. Gábor Gyáni and Gábor Pajkossy (Debrecen: Csokonai, 1999), 185–194; Eva S. Balogh, "The Turning of the World: Hungarian Progressive Writers on the War," in *The Habsburg Empire in World War I*, 185–201.

³⁸ Peter Pastor, "The Home Front in Hungary, 1914–18," in *East Central European Society in World War I*, 124; according to François Furet, the term total war was first used by Ernst Jünger in 1930. See François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion. The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), 506, n. 28.

³⁹ Pastor, "The Home Front," 124.

⁴⁰ József Galántai, "A háborús állam: A 'kivételes hatalom' kodifikálása és alkalmazása 1914–1916-ban" [The state at war: The codification and implementation of "Special Powers" in 1914–1916], in *A magyarországi polgári államrendszerek (Tanulmánykötet)* [Political systems in bourgeois Hungary (Essays)] ed. Ferenc Pölöskei and György Ránki (Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1981), 199–200.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 201–02.

⁴² Irén Nevelő, *A háború és a magyarországi munkásság 1914–1917* [The war and Hungary's workers, 1914–1917] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1980), 74–76; Pap, *A magyar szociálpolitika*, 131; Julier, *A világháború magyar szemmel 1914–1918*, p. 2. For the web address, see note 19.

⁴³ Emma Iványi, ed., *Minisztertanácsi jegyzőkönyvek az első világháború korából* [Minutes of cabinet meetings from the First World War] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1960), 340–341; József Szerényi and Jenő Ladányi, *A magyar ipar a világháborúban* [Hungarian manufacturing during the World War] (Budapest: Franklin Társulat, 1933), 148–51.

⁴⁴ Károly Vörös, *Budapest története* [History of Budapest], vol. 4, *Budapest története a márciusi forradalomtól az őszirózsás forradalomig* [The History of Budapest from the March Revolution to the Revolution of Michaelmas Roses] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1978), 740; Dániel I. Szabó, "The Social Basis of Opposition to the War in Hungary," in *East Central European Society in World War I*, ed. Király and Dreisziger, 139.

⁴⁵ Béla Katona, *Magyarország közgazdasága: Pénzügyi és közgazdasági évkönyv 1916. évről* [Hungary's economy: Financial and economic annual for the year 1916] (Budapest: Athanaeum, n.d.) 539; Pap, *A magyar szociálpolitika*, 127.

⁴⁶ Nevelő, *A háború*, 187; Pap, *A magyar szociálpolitika*, 129.

⁴⁷ Pap, *A magyar szociálpolitika*, 109–114.

⁴⁸ Katona, *Magyarország közgazdasága*, 367–71; Peter Hidas, “The Dance of Death: World War I and the Hungarian Peasants,” in *The Modernization of Agriculture: Rural Transformation in Hungary, 1848–1975*, ed. Joseph Held (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1980), 176; Pap, *A magyar szociálpolitika*, 115–116.

⁴⁹ Marc Ferro, *The Great War 1914–1918* (London: Routledge, 1974), 171; János Teleszky, *A magyar állam pénzügyei a háború alatt* [The financial affairs of the Hungarian state during the war] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1927), 345–346; Nevelő, *A háború*, 107.

⁵⁰ Vörös, *Budapest története*, 744.

⁵¹ Sztérényi and Ladányi, *A magyar ipar*, 85.

⁵² Pap, *A magyar szociálpolitika*, 95; János Kende, “Az 1917-es oroszországi forradalmak magyarországi hatásáról” [The consequences in Hungary of the 1917 revolutions in Russia] *Párttörténeti Közlemények* (March 1983), 155.

⁵³ Sztérényi and Ladányi, *A magyar ipar*, 72 and 156; Iványi, *A minisztertanácsi jegyzőkönyvek*, 359–360.

⁵⁴ Teleszky, *A magyar kormány pénzügyei*, 365.

⁵⁵ Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War*, 173–175; Jenő Gergely, *Prohászka Ottokár “A napba öltözött ember”* [Ottokár Prohászka, The man dressed as a sun] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1994), 158–159; Hidas, “Dance of Death,” 183.

⁵⁶ Pap, *A magyar szociálpolitika*, 119.

⁵⁷ Prince Lajos Windischgrätz, *My Adventures and Misadventures* (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1966), 105; András Siklós, “Adalékok az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia belső helyzetéhez 1918 tavaszán és nyarán” [Data on the internal situation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the spring and summer of 1918], *Történelmi Szemle* 26 (1983): 5; Hidas, “Dance of Death,” 182–183; András Siklós, *A Habsburg birodalom felbomlása 1918* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1987), 69–70.

⁵⁸ Glenn E. Torrey, *Romania in World War I* (Iasi: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1998), 176; Clifford F. Wargelin, “The Economic Collapse of Austro-Hungarian Dualism, 1914–1918,” *East European Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (September, 2000): 271.

⁵⁹ Nevelő, *A háború*, 160; Wargelin, 278.

⁶⁰ Cornwall, “The Dissolution of Austria-Hungary,” in *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary*, 125–126.

⁶¹ Siklós, *A Habsburg birodalom*, 81.

⁶² Arthur J. May, *The Passing of the Habsburg Monarchy 1914–1918*, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), 703.

⁶³ Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), 127.

⁶⁴ Pap, *A magyar szociálpolitika*, 92–94.

⁶⁵ Gábor Vermes, "Leap into the Dark," in *The Habsburg Empire*, ed. Kann, Király and Fichtner, 41.

⁶⁶ Kende, "Az 1917-es oroszországi forradalmak," 151.

⁶⁷ Zsuppán, "The Hungarian Political Scene," in *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary*, ed. Cornwall, 72.

⁶⁸ Peter Pástor, "Hungarian POWs in Russia during the Revolution and Civil War," in *Essays on World War I: Origins and Prisoners of War*, ed. Williamson and Pastor, 149–152; for the hardship endured by POWs, see the original letters of POWs on CD-ROM: Györgyi Kalavszky and Péter Illésfalvy, eds., *Üzenet a frontról. A Monarchia nagy háborúja levelezőlapok tükrében 1914–1918* [Message from the front: The Great War of the Monarchy in the mirror of postal cards, 1914–1918] (Budapest: Media21 KFT, 1999).

⁶⁹ Pastor, "Hungarian POWs in Russia during the Revolution and Civil War," 155.

⁷⁰ Josef Kalvoda, *The Genesis of Czechoslovakia* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1986), 377–378.

⁷¹ Peter Pastor, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Rise and Fall of the First Hungarian Communist Party, 1918–1922," in *The Effects of World War I: The Class War after the Great War: The Rise of Communist Parties in East Central Europe, 1918–1921*, ed. Ivo Banac (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1983), 90.

⁷² István Deák, "Strangers at Home," *The New York Review of Books*, July 20, 2000.

⁷³ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 195.

⁷⁴ Szabó, "Magyarország nem volt, hanem lesz," 191.

⁷⁵ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 195.

⁷⁶ "A zsidókérdés Magyarországon" [The Jewish question in Hungary], in *Zsidókérdés, Asszimiláció, Antiszemitizmus* [The Jewish question, assimilation, anti-Semitism], ed. Péter Hanák (Budapest: Gondolat, 1984), 15–115; Vera Ránki, *Magyarok–Zsidók–Nacionalizmus. A befogadás és kirekesztés politikája* [Hungarians–Jews–Nationalism: The politics of inclusion and exclusion] (Budapest: Új Mandátum, 1999), 70–72.

⁷⁷ Vermes, *István Tisza*, 430.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 444–445; Márton Farkas, *Katonai összeomlás és forradalom 1918-ban* [Military collapse and revolution in 1918] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1969), 259, 261.

Progress or National Suicide: the Single-Child Family in Hungarian Political Thought, 1840-1945

Béla Bodó

The carnage of the Great War and the relatively slow population growth in its aftermath placed the issue of contraception and family planning in the forefront of public discussions in most European states.¹ In Hungary, the debate focused on the origins and the effects of the *egyke* on individual peasant communities, and the nation. Between the wars, the term *egyke* both described a spoiled and overprotected child and denoted a form of family planning that allowed the survival of only one offspring. Beside these meanings, however, the contemporaries used this phrase as a metaphor. For some, the *egyke* symbolized the survival and continuing strength of feudal political and social structures. For others, the *egyke* embodied what they considered the negative features of modern civilization such as increasing secularization, women's emancipation and the spread of bourgeois values and urban lifestyle. Still others viewed family planning through the prism of modern racism: they perceived falling birth rates as the sign of the biological exhaustion of the Hungarian nation, the end of European supremacy and the decline of the white race.

How the *egyke* came to incorporate so many contradictory messages is the subject of this paper, which has been conceived as a contribution both to Hungarian demographic and intellectual history. In the first part, I outline the historical origins of the *egyke* debate. In the second part, building on the works of Rudolf Andorka, Ildikó Vasary and others, I explore the merits and the weaknesses of the *egyke* as an anthropological concept. In the third part, I look at the *egyke* as a cluster of literary techniques employed by a group of talented writers and committed

humanitarians seeking to convince the wider public about the necessity of social and political reforms. Finally, after exploring the literary models and philosophical ideas that gave birth to the concept of the single-child family, I examine the outcome of the debate. Why did the discourse on the single-child family fail to lead to any improvement in the social and political status of peasants? What kind of role, if any, did the *egyke* debate play in the polarization of Hungarian intellectual life between the wars?

The Controversy over Contraception before 1914

The discourse on the spread of contraception among peasants had its roots in nineteenth-century Hungarian intellectual history. Already in the 1840s, M. Hölbling, the Chief Physician of Baranya county in Transdanubia, noticed that Hungarian peasant women in the Ormánság, an agrarian region situated in the southwestern corner of the country, tended to give birth to only one child. Hölbling explained this strange custom by the vanity of Hungarian women, who allegedly paid more attention to the preservation of their youthful figures than they cared about the well-being and future of their families. Beside female narcissism, Hölbling added, the poverty of the rural population and fear of social decline also contributed to the spread of the *egyke* among Hungarian Calvinist peasants. The custom produced disastrous results: the *egyke* led to the complete extinction of hundreds of Hungarian peasant families in the Ormánság. Their lands, Hölbling warned his readers, were taken over by German settlers, who slowly changed the ethnic makeup of this once purely Hungarian region.²

While the public generally ignored Hölbling's writings in the mid-nineteenth century, it began to take a greater interest in the spread of contraception among peasants from the 1880s on. With growing public interest in social questions, the number of publications increased rapidly in the decades before the outbreak of the First World War. The most important contributor to the debate at the turn of the century was the sociologist and social reformer, Dezső Buday, who, for the first time, used church records analyzed with the help of modern statistics to demonstrate the harmful effects of contraception on the peasant population. Buday compared three notoriously *egyke* regions, such as the predominantly Calvinist and Hungarian Ormánság, the mainly Catholic

and German Mecsekalja, the religiously and ethnically mixed area around the town of Mohács in southern Hungary and proved that the practice of family limitation had nothing to do with religion or ethnicity. He reasoned that because only France failed to increase her population in the nineteenth century as compared to the rest of Europe, French soldiers must have introduced the custom of the single-child family in Hungary during the Napoleonic wars. However, this alien custom, Buday continued, could take root in Hungary because the circumstances favoured it. The lack of available land, the practice of partible inheritance, the fear of social decline as the result of the fragmentation of peasant farms, the underdevelopment of the commercial sector, substandard living conditions, the low cultural level of the agrarian population and peasants' growing appreciation of comfort all contributed, in Buday's opinion, to the development of the system of single-child family.³

Even though Buday's books and articles were well researched and passionately argued, they failed to achieve the desired results. Preoccupied with constitutional issues, public opinion in Hungary hardly took notice of the growing literature on family limitation among peasants. The problem of the *egyke*, even more than the mass emigration of peasants, remained a marginal political and intellectual issue in Hungary before 1914.

The *Egyke* Debate between the Wars

All this changed, however, after the First World War. The human and material losses of the military conflict, the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the mutilation of the Hungarian nation by the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 put the problem of declining birthrates in certain parts of the country into a different perspective. According to Ildikó Vasary, over 280 books, pamphlets, novels and newspaper articles were written on the subject between the wars.⁴ The composition of the participants in the debate also changed. While pastors, doctors and social workers had almost completely monopolized the discourse before 1914, prominent writers, politicians and social scientists dominated the debate on contraception in the interwar period.⁵ The turning point in this regard came with János Kodolányi's memorandum, *Lying Kills*, which he addressed to the Deputy Prime Minister, Károly Huszár, in 1927.⁶ At the prompting of his friend, Protestant pastor and art historian Lajos Fülep, another important writer, Gyula Illyés also visited the Ormánság and

wrote a passionate article on the phenomenon of the single-child family in the celebrated journal, *Nyugat* (the West) in 1933.⁷ Other famous writers, such as the nationally known poet and translator of European classics Mihály Babits, soon followed suit.⁸ In 1935, a group of students and young scholars from the disciplines of demography, history, ethnography and music spent a few weeks in the village of Kemse in Baranya County. They described their experience in a short but highly influential book.⁹ Finally, in 1941, a doctor and amateur sociologist, János Hídvégi, wrote the first truly comprehensive work on the custom of the single-child family. In his book, he summarized previous research and examined the phenomenon from the perspective of modern social hygiene.¹⁰

Even though no commentator blamed the spread of contraception among peasants on a single factor, writers did not ascribe the same importance to each cause. While Conservatives emphasized moral decline among peasants as the root cause of the *egyke* system, people on both ends of the political spectrum held material and structural causes responsible for the declining birthrates. Besides condemning modernity, which allegedly fostered the desire among peasants for a more comfortable life, some Catholic intellectuals used the issue to discredit Protestantism. Antal Pezenhoffer, for example, argued that Protestantism, by undermining true religious and patriotic sentiments among peasants and by reinforcing capitalist greed, was indirectly responsible for the introduction of the *egyke* in the Hungarian countryside. Drawing the obvious conclusion from his diagnosis, Pezenhoffer concluded that Protestants should take advantage of the Pope's generosity and apply for membership in the Catholic Church in order to prevent greater catastrophes.¹¹

Kunó Klebelsberg, the Minister of Education in the late 1920s and 1930s, also ascribed some responsibility for the spread of the custom of single-child family both to Protestantism and to the underdevelopment of infrastructure in rural communities. However, his main targets were women, who, Klebelsberg believed, played a vanguard role in spreading urban values and degenerate lifestyles in the countryside. Klebelsberg divided women into two groups. Mothers who have given birth to at least three children, he contended, deserve our greatest respect. However, women who do not take motherhood seriously represent a danger to society, he continued, and therefore they should be treated as enemies. Women have to take motherhood more seriously, otherwise, Klebelsberg warned his readers, the Hungarian race will soon disappear from the Carpathian basin.¹²

Protestant intellectuals rejected the charge that their faith had anything to do with the spread of custom of the single-child family. If the *egyke* has its roots in declining morality, Lajos Simon argued, then the greedy and narrow-minded elite are fully responsible. By preserving the *latifundia* (thus depriving peasants of the land they needed to succeed in the new capitalist economy), the Hungarian elite short-changed the ex-serfs in 1848; the same group of people have kept the rural communities in the state of medieval backwardness ever since. Simon accepted the oft-repeated argument that the custom of the single-child family distorted peasants' morality. However, Simon, unlike his Conservative counterparts, perceived peasants' selfishness as a product rather than the cause of the *egyke*. Peasants were only victims and the elite alone should take full responsibility for the falling fertility rates in Hungarian villages.¹³

While most writers condemned selfishness as either the major or a minor cause of the *egyke*, at least one author viewed egotism in a more favourable light. Elemér Simontsits, an amateur sociologist, argued that the laws of the jungle had historically determined family planning. In earlier periods, the size and structure of the average family, like the human population at large, reflected the expansion and contraction of natural resources. Parents who did not possess enough resources did not hesitate to kill their infants, especially in the times of crisis. Nature, especially human nature was cruel, Simontsits argued, but cruelty was not without a function: it ensured the survival of the human race. Egotism came to defy the laws of nature only in the modern age. Modern man no longer uses contraception and infanticide because he cannot feed his family but only because he wants more comfort. Simontsits also had a pessimistic outlook on the future. Since they reflect both man's eternal nature and his more recent obsession with comfort, he argued, falling birthrates cannot be reversed. Although some states may attempt to change the course of history, their efforts will inevitably fail because laws and regulations cannot change the nature of modern man.¹⁴

The doctor János Hídvégi, who had worked for years in the Ormánság, was the first scientist who examined the spread of contraception among peasants in both national and international contexts. While most writers limited their attention to peasants, Hídvégi examined both the rural and urban manifestation of the same custom. He listed a number of factors such as the human and material losses of the Great War, the end of overseas migration, the rise of the national liberation movement in the Third World, urbanization, the success of feminism and widespread

unemployment that, in his opinion, led to a decline in fertility rates in most European states after 1918. Important as these factors were, he argued, they do not explain the widespread use of contraception in modern society. The *egyke* was the product of liberalism and predatory capitalism, both of which originated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was a manifestation of neo-Malthusianism, that is “the philosophy of easy life,” which has created an “unheroic” type of individual both incapable and unwilling to accept the responsibilities of raising large families.

Recognizing that birthrates had actually increased in most places since the advent of capitalism, Hídvégi had a hard time explaining why this extreme form of family limitation was practised only in a few regions in Hungary. In an attempt to square the circle, he combined economic arguments with notions borrowed from the fields of eugenics and social hygiene. Showing susceptibility to racist theories, he argued that the Hungarian nation was composed of the Turanian and Eastern Baltic races. The Turanian race, Hídvégi contended, was susceptible to certain illnesses such as goiter. The isolation of the Turanian race in certain regions such as the Ormánság exacerbated existing health problems, by preventing it from intermarrying with other groups. Living amidst rivers and swamps, the Turanian race in the Ormánság also developed immunity against malaria by constantly exhibiting its symptoms, such as lethargy and a lack of sexual appetite. Thus inherited and acquired characteristics, combined with inadequate diet, especially the lack of vitamins, disturbed the normal functioning of sexual hormones and lowered birthrates among peasants in the region.¹⁵

Hídvégi's work enjoyed great popularity among the Populists, who played an important role in the cultural and political life of interwar Hungary. The Populists were social scientists, writers and artists who drew their inspiration from folk culture and, at the same time, sought to improve the social and political status of peasants. Politically, Hungarian populism was a complex phenomenon: even though most Populists saw themselves as members of the political Left, they also borrowed many ideas from the Conservatives and the extreme Right. With a few notable exceptions, the Populists rejected the ideological rigidity and totalitarian political practices of the Soviet and Hungarian communist parties. They wanted to create a state that, in contrast to the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat,’ would ensure social justice without, however, destroying parliamentary democracy and abrogating civil rights. Unlike the Communists

and Social Democrats, the Populists saw themselves as nationalists who considered the support of Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring states as one of their priorities. Like most Hungarians in the interwar period, the Populists advocated the revision of Hungary's borders. Unlike the extreme nationalists both inside and outside of the government, however, the Populists wanted peaceful revision and only to the extent that the new frontiers would more closely correspond to the existing ethnic lines. Some, especially in the face of the Nazi threat in the 1930s, supported close cooperation between, and even the federation of, the small states of East-Central and South-Eastern Europe. While many Populists harboured prejudices against ethnic and religious minorities, especially the Jews, they sought to assimilate rather than exclude them. Significantly, the Populists, with a few notable exceptions, fought against racial discrimination in the late 1930s and early 1940s.¹⁶

In regards to the origins of the custom of the single-child family, the Populists, like most Conservatives, blamed the *egyke* on the 1848 Revolution. Unlike the Conservatives, however, the Populists did not regret the passing of feudalism. The *egyke* spread, they argued, not because peasants were liberated but because liberation was not accompanied by a more equitable distribution of the land. The remnants of the feudal past survived in the form of the large estates, which prevented the expansion of small family farms. Since Hungarian customs demanded the equal division of the land among children, peasants in many places began limiting the size of their family in order to avert the fragmentation of their land. Already a serious issue before 1914, the *egyke* became a pressing concern after the Great War. The lost war, the end of migration to North America and the slow recovery of industrial production at home exacerbated existing tensions in the countryside. High tensions, Populist writers continued, should have normally produced a major political upheaval, a kind of peasant war not seen since the Dózsa uprising in the early sixteenth century. Modern Hungarian peasants, however, were no longer in the position to openly challenge the power of the elite. The new capitalist economy, combined with the excessive power of the modern state, as demonstrated by the defeat of the revolution in 1918, had broken the back of the Hungarian peasantry. Exhausted by centuries of struggle and controlled and manipulated by the modern state, the only rebellion that peasants were still capable of waging was a "silent revolution." According to the Populist writer Imre Kovács, "the silent revolution" of peasants in the interwar period took four forms: some continued to head for the

Americas; others found consolation and peace among the members of revivalist religious sects; still others escaped into right-wing political fanaticism. Finally, some peasants chose to limit the size of their families drastically not only to preserve the integrity of their farms but also to hasten the destruction of the peasant way of life by eliminating its human carriers.¹⁷

The spread of the custom of the single-child family was particularly dangerous, the Populists continued, because it produced cultural changes that, within a few generations, brought entire communities to the verge of destruction. The introduction of the *egyke* increased the power of women, especially that of the mothers-in-law (*szülék*), who replaced patriarchy with a matriarchal system in their villages. The Populists writers portrayed the *szülék* as heartless and quarrelsome old women, who tortured young wives both to avenge their past suffering at the hands of their own mothers-in-law and to put the daughters-in-law in their place. The *szülék* owed their power, at least in part, to tradition. In Hungarian peasant households, Populists writers argued, the power of the *szülék* almost equalled that of their husbands. While the young wives worked in the fields, their mothers-in-law remained at home to cook and to look after farm animals and small children. If the daughters-in-law became pregnant, it was the mothers-in-law who customarily decided the fate of the fetus. Aging and overburdened by work, the *szülék* were naturally opposed to large families, especially when a second or third child threatened the integrity of the family farm. Supported by other elderly women, who made public opinion in the villages, the mothers-in-law could easily force the new wives to undergo abortion. The husbands usually took the side of their mothers; they abused and frequently expelled their wives if they dared to oppose the *szülék*'s decision.¹⁸

The custom of the single-child family not only preserved the power of the *szülék* but it also benefited younger women at the expense of their husbands. Since property in Hungarian villages was distributed equally among children irrespective of their gender and age, Populist writers argued, single girls were groomed from an early age to become the future managers of their households. Spoiled as children by their parents, girls grew into willful and promiscuous young adults. Since there were not enough available unmarried men in the *egyke* communities, young women were often forced to import their husbands from the neighbouring villages. However, these outsiders could never become the masters of their households. Their native wives not only made all the

important decisions, but, as a sign of their excessive power, often cheated on and physically abused their husbands. As if the low status of important men was not a big enough scandal, the custom of the single-child family also reduced the status of men born in the *egyke* villages. Dominated by their mothers and sisters as children, boys in the *egyke* communities failed to develop a strong interest in the opposite sex. Many of them became homosexuals or had no sexual desire of any kind. These “perverts” and “weaklings” created a culture far inferior to the male culture of healthy peasant communities. Instead of cultivating their land, men in the *egyke* villages switched to less masculine occupations, such as petty trade, which required less stamina, dedication and physical strength but promised quicker returns. Laziness went hand-in-hand with greed and cowardice: bachelors and adult men in the *egyke* villages would never engage in brawls or draw out their knives to defend their honour. In short, men in these communities were a pitiable lot, a shame to their gender and social group.

Child-rearing practices in the *egyke* villages further contributed to gender inequality and the distortion of peasant culture. In a frequently cited example, a boy’s parents would not let him play with his friends lest he ruins his expensive clothing or they would beat him up. Overprotection prevented the peasant boy from committing the mischiefs necessary to test the boundaries of the adult world and his own evolving character. Because, as a child, he spent too much time with his parents and grandparents, the *egyke* never learned the virtues of sharing, renunciation and the love of struggle. Thus the overprotected and precocious *egyke* grew into a cynical and selfish young adult. Not equipped to compete successfully with healthier men, he soon lost his property and found himself on the margin of society. Thus, the introduction of the custom of the single-child family ultimately proved self-defeating; it could not prevent, but rather hastened the destruction of peasant farms.¹⁹

The process of “degeneration,” Populist writers continued, manifested itself in every aspect of village life. The once hard-working and frugal peasants gave themselves over to ostentation and excessive consumption. While men spent their days in the tavern, women gorged themselves on cakes and sweets at the local cafés. Farmers, whose parents and grandparents had lived in small but tasteful huts constructed in traditional style, now built huge gaudy mansions in order to impress their neighbours and fellow villagers. Peasants in the *egyke* villages abandoned traditional culture; in a very short time, they lost their traditional dances,

songs, proverbs, fairy tales and ballads. The citizens of *egyke* communities neglected their civic responsibilities: they used every trick in the book to avoid paying local taxes necessary for the smooth operation of the local administration and the maintenance of roads and public buildings. To avoid paying Church taxes, many people left the established churches to become Unitarian or Baptist or they abandoned the Christian faith altogether. People in these communities had no respect for priests, teachers and any other authority figures. In such communities, class arrogance was particularly acute; it manifested itself even in the Reformed Church, where pews were assigned to families on the basis of their property. Social prejudices went hand-in-hand with a lack of respect for the elderly. Old people in such communities could not enter the sanctuary to attend church services, but were forced to sit outside the church on a bench placed at main entrance. They were extremely shy and felt a constant need to apologize for being alive.²⁰

By the mid-1930s, at least among people who cared about the fate of the peasantry, the Populists' image of the *egyke* village became generally accepted. Contemporaries continued to disagree, however, not only on the causes of the *egyke*, but also on the solution to what they perceived as a very serious social problem. With a few notable exceptions, Conservatives meticulously avoided the question of land reform: instead of a more equitable division of agricultural land, they advocated increased bureaucratic control of the rural population. They believed that improved midwife training and the employment of better doctors, more dedicated priests, pastors and teachers, combined with enhanced discipline in schools and the removal of spinsters and bachelors from teaching positions, would suffice to reverse the demographic decline. The Populists generally accepted the Conservatives' recommendations but wanted more comprehensive reforms. Some supported the introduction of primogeniture to prevent the further division of family farms. Others wanted to set the normal family size at four children per couple; each child would inherit one fourth; if there were only one or two heirs, the rest of the land would revert to the state. All sought some form of land reform that would give the peasant more land and remove the iron ring of *latifundia* around peasant farms. The Populists also advocated the creation of cooperatives both to produce and sell agricultural products and to build small but comfortable houses for young peasant families. They wanted cheap long-term loans for farmers, especially those with large families, better trained and dedicated doctors and nurses, well-equipped regional hospitals, health

insurance for peasants and agricultural labourers and the creation of a tax system favourable to large families. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, some Populists came to accept racist ideas, such as the redistribution of the *latifundia* on the basis of racial purity and family size. They hoped that these measures would stop the influx of peasants into the cities and eradicate the custom of the single-child family with all its negative effects from Hungarian soil.²¹

The *Egyke* in Modern Scientific Discourse

The Russian occupation of Hungary at the end of the Second World War put the issue of contraception among peasant in a very different perspective. After the Communist takeover of power in 1947, the Populist writers were either silenced or expelled from the country or gave up their views in exchange for political power in the new Communist state. The destruction of the large estates in the second half of the 1940s and then collectivization and increasing mechanization of Hungarian agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s pushed the issue of the single-child family into the background. Only in the early 1970s did demographers like Rudolf Andorka begin to raise anew the question of family limitation among peasants. Using family reconstruction methods and household structural analysis, as developed by English and French social scientists, Andorka examined demographic changes in two villages in the Ormánság and one in the nearby region of Sárköz.²² While Andorka paid his respect to the Populist writers, he also challenged their conclusions on two important points. Since peasants had started using contraception as early as the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries, Andorka argued, the roots of the single-child family should not be sought in the omissions of the 1848 revolution. Second, the extreme form of family planning could be called a “system” only with reservation. While fertility rates in the *egyke* villages were certainly lower than in most parts of the country, Andorka contended, most women continued to give birth to two or more children. While in most families only one or two children reached maturity, one could still find large households with as many as six or eight children even in these communities.²³

Building in part on Andorka’s works, in the late 1980s Ildikó Vasary took an even closer look at the concept of the single-child family. In a well researched and argued article, she challenged the Populists’

contention that the absence of primogeniture played a major role in the fragmentation of peasant farms and the origins of the custom of the single-child family. She argued that, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the equal division of land among peasant children did not necessarily retard population growth. On the contrary, by expanding marriage opportunities, partible inheritance fuelled the demographic revolution in Eastern Europe. In any case, Vasary continued, inheritance systems should be seen as "limits and opportunities rather than determinants for strategies and goals." Even though Vasary accepted the Populists' thesis on the impact of the survival of large estates on peasant farms, she also argued that the continuing existence of the *latifundia* was only one of the many factors that pushed peasants to limit the size of their families. Besides the survival of large estates, Vasary argued, the peasants' attitudes to modernization, the villages' proximity to the closest city, the state of local infrastructure, changing agricultural techniques and the presence or absence of employment opportunities in the industrial and commercial sectors influenced demographic patterns.²⁴

Andorka and Vasary raised important questions about the usefulness of the concept of the *egyke* in modern demographic research. However, their critique failed to expose other contradictions in the Populists' argument and explain these contradictions in the context of Hungarian cultural and political history. The first contradiction concerns the Populists' view of modernization in general and the spread of individualism among peasants in *egyke* communities in particular. The Populists noted, and decried, the growth of individualism in Hungarian villages. At the same time, they argued that public opinion was stronger in the *egyke* villages than elsewhere. Similarly, contemporaries drew attention to the declining power, and increasing neglect, of the elderly in these communities. However, this argument collided with their earlier statements about assertive mothers-in-law and the power of elderly women in setting community standards and dominating public opinion. Moreover, Populist and fascist writers who accepted anthropological theories failed to explain why environmental and racial factors worked differently on men and women: why the custom of the single-child family increased promiscuity among women but lowered sexual appetite among men. Although many noticed that sexual license was a general feature of their age, they still liked to overemphasize the role that the custom of the single-child family had allegedly played in the destruction of women's morality.²⁵ In the same vein, contemporaries attributed the increased power of women to

the excessive use of contraception rather than to more general trends such as the impact of the Great War on peasant families and communities.

My own research into the social history of Nagyrév, a hamlet in the region of Tiszazug, which became infamous after the discovery of a murder epidemic in 1929, suggests that the model of the *egyke* community, as established by contemporary intellectuals, did not necessarily correspond to local circumstances. For example, here was no matriarchy in Nagyrév.²⁶ Men, especially older men, continued to make the most important decisions both in their families and in their community. Inheritance in the village was passed down in the male line, even though equal division of land among all children (including girls) became increasingly common in the interwar period. Patrilocality remained the rule, despite the relatively high number of imported husbands. Church records clearly demonstrate that local parents continued to neglect their children. Mortality rates both among infants and older children remained high: frequent accidents such as drowning prove that parents were far from overprotective. Local people told me that strict discipline reinforced by physical punishments for the slightest mistakes continued to characterize child-raising practices of peasant families irrespective of their size. Therefore, we should not confuse the single child with the “spoiled brat” whom we encounter in the works of the Populist writers. In short, the village must have looked very different from the image that contemporaries had of the *egyke* communities between the wars.²⁷

The Sources of the *Egyke* as a Cultural Concept

The image of the *egyke* community has to do, first and foremost, with the professional and political agendas of their proponents and with contemporary ideas about changing gender and social relations and only secondarily with actual circumstances. The weaknesses of the *egyke* as an anthropological/sociological concept speak volumes about the Populists’ lack of training in these disciplines. The historian Gyula Borbándi has noted that the Populist writers, with the possible exception of the sociologist Ferenc Erdei and the agrarian expert Mátyás Matolcsy, knew very little about contemporary sociology. Perhaps the majority never read the pioneering works of Émile Durkheim.²⁸ What they did read, like the works of the founder of family sociology in France in the nineteenth century, Frédéric Le Play, was considered as a *passe* by most Western sociologists by the

1920s. Ironically, Le Play was first introduced to the Hungarian readers by neo-conservative agrarians, who wanted to preserve rather than destroy the *latifundia*. The authoritarian and anti-egalitarian messages implicit in Le Play's idealization of the pre-industrial stem family (*famille souche*)²⁹ appealed to the Hungarian neo-conservatives, who disliked both international capitalism and parliamentary democracy. The first monographs on rural life appeared in the conservative *Magyar Gazdák Szemléje* (Hungarian Farmers' Review) and *Erdélyi Gazda* (Transylvanian Farmer) at the turn of the century.³⁰ The Populists adapted not only the neo-conservatives' methods but also retained many of Le Play's ideas. Like Le Play, they continued to valorize patriarchy until its image lost any connection to its historical manifestations but still provided an important vantage point from which the weaknesses of the capitalist economic and social order could be observed and criticized.

While Le Play continued to assert a strong influence on both the Conservatives and the Populists, the key elements in the image of the single-child family, like degeneration and matriarchy, did not come sociology. Novelists like János Kodolányi borrowed them from contemporary philosophy and literature. The notion of degeneration was most likely a German import. George Mosse tells us that it was originally a medical term: physicians used it to describe patients who departed from the so-called normal human type. They diagnosed the causes of degeneration in shattered nerves, inheritable diseases and lewd lifestyle and sexual excesses. Ironically, it was a Liberal physician, Max Nordau, who first applied this medical term to social and cultural phenomena. In his famous book *Degeneration* (1892), Nordau condemned both the social and the artistic manifestations of decadence because they violated the principles of bourgeois culture: harmony, respectability, self-discipline and natural laws. Nordau's book must have touched a nerve in German society, because, by the outbreak of the First World War, all major political parties incorporated the fight against decadence in their program.³¹

By the early twentieth century, many intellectuals, especially those who sympathized with the political Right, came to see liberated women as both the manifestations and symbols of decadence. In Vienna, the young Jewish philosopher, Otto Weininger, went a step further: he infused anti-women sentiments with racism. Working under the influence of Freud, Weininger acknowledged that female and male did not exist in pure forms and that everyone possessed both male and female qualities. Unlike Freud, however, Weininger sharply distinguished between the male and female

characteristics, assigning positive qualities only to men. People, like the Jews, in whom the female elements dominate, Weininger argued, always remain children; both are, by nature, irrational, potentially anti-social and prisoners of their own sexuality. The more male characteristics dominate, Weininger continued, the less the person cares about sex. True men are rational and care little about sex because they are preoccupied with the higher aspects of life such as politics, science, commerce and religion. Men alone possess a highly developed moral sense, while women and Jews have only sexual passion. While the Romantics at least acknowledged that women also had positive qualities such as charm, sensitivity and motherly love, Weininger perceived only negative traits. Women, he believed, were irrational, capricious and hysterical; like Jews, they could never progress beyond their present state.³²

By the 1920s, the notion of degeneration, tied to the presumably unchangeable character of women and the negative effects of matriarchy, came to permeate public debates on human progress. In Germany, the rejection of matriarchy formed the basis of Gerhart Hauptmann's widely acclaimed novel, the *Island of the Great Mothers*. In this novel, first published in 1925, the great German naturalist writer tells the story of a group of female travellers stranded on a tropical island. Left to their own devices, the mainly upper-class European women were not only able to survive but they also created a harmonious society free of the exploitations and injustices of the old patriarchal order. Convinced that men posed a mortal threat to this perfect world, the leaders made gender segregation the most important law on the island. In order to avoid future complications, they sent all school-aged male children to a remote part of the island. There, under the supervision of their father, the only surviving male from the shipwreck, the boys grew into skilful artisans and fearless warriors. They also established a society that was the exact opposite of the female utopia: reason rather than faith, competition rather than compassion and dynamism rather than stagnation formed its main features. Incensed by the women's desire to use them as sex-slaves, men finally revolted against their mothers and destroyed matriarchy on the island.³³

While many of the key elements of the image of the *egyke* community are originally of foreign origin, it was nowhere so fully developed as in Hungary. Moreover, at least some of the imported concepts, such as the notion of decadence, had taken deep roots in Hungary long before the spread of contraception in the countryside became a national issue. At the turn of the century, Hungarian intellectu-

als, like Endre Ady and Gyula Krúdy exulted decadent lifestyle as part of both their protest against bourgeois hypocrisy and their discovery of the libido. It is true, however, that, even before 1914, the majority of Hungarian intellectuals tended to interpret the same notion very differently: they denounced decadence as both unhealthy and unpatriotic.³⁴ By the early 1920s, this negative interpretation of decadence had clearly won the day. After the war, a national consensus emerged on the nature of decadence (it became seen as a serious social illness and a barrier to national revival) and on the need to combat every form of degeneration. However, disagreements soon emerged on the issues of how the revival of the nation and the regaining of country's historical borders should be accomplished and what forms a national revival and the fight against decadence should take. The proto-fascist elements, mainly young officers who had participated in the White Terror, wanted to rebuild Hungary on the basis of wartime experience. They saw themselves as a new elite: they believed that the war had cleansed them of everything bourgeois, sentimental and feminine and that the new society should be based on wartime values such as merit, character, virility and courage rather than inherited wealth, empty titles, egotism and sexual perversion. The Populists shared the proto-fascists' dislike of the bourgeoisie and its decadence culture. However, they were also keenly aware of the negative aspects and ultimate futility of war. Like the proto-fascists, the Populists also wanted to rebuild the country but not on the basis of lessons learned during the Great War but on the basis of traditional peasant values. It was in this context of national emergency that the image of the *egyke* community emerged and came to dominate public discourse. The Populists and many Conservatives believed that much more than the fate of individuals and their villages was at stake: the spread of contraception in the countryside posed a mortal threat to the survival of the nation.

The paranoia about racial suicide explain in part the gap between the Populists image of *egyke* villages and real circumstances. The key elements of this image were borrowed from sociology, contemporary literature and philosophy. At the same time, the speed with which the new concept became generally accepted speak volumes both about the Populist writers' talent and their view on modern science and politics. Dénes Némédi argues that the Populists adopted "sociography" as their favourite genre because they disliked positivist science, characterized by overspecialization and the use of scientific jargons.³⁵ The Populists' shift from sociology to sociography and to naturalist novels disclosed their desire to

re-politicize intellectual life. The Populists wanted to reconnect culture with politics; they wanted to use art and science to solve the nation's most pressing social and political problems. The Populists also denied that art and science were transnational enterprises. Nations not individuals create culture, they argued. National cultures express the aspirations, embody the talent and vitality and serve the interests of an ethnic group. Some, like the writer László Németh, went so far as to advocate the creation of a new branch of science, which would combine the various branches of knowledge into an organic whole. He called this new science *hungarológia* or the "science of Hungarianness." The goal of *hungarológia*, Németh argued, was to discover, spread, preserve and strengthen true Hungarian values. *Hungarológia* would make Hungarians conscious of their national character; it would help them preserve their unique culture in the rapidly changing modern world.³⁶ While many Populists doubted the viability of *hungarológia*, with very few exceptions, they all believed that certain branches of social science, art and literatures, such as socio-graphy, ethnography, folk music and naturalist novels, played a greater role in the preservation of the nation than the ideologically less loaded natural sciences. These genres were very important, the Populist argued, because they linked urban intellectuals to the repository of all national values, the peasants. Writing about peasants and their social problems was a political deed of the highest order, they believed, since the future of the nation depended on the welfare of this social group. Researching the lives of, and writing about, peasants would lead to the creation a new elite, knowledgeable, deeply rooted in the Hungarian soil and fully committed to the program of national rejuvenation.³⁷

Besides the Populists' view on the relationship between culture and politics, the position of intellectuals in Hungarian society also influenced the great outpour of sociographies in the interwar period. The conservative and liberal sections of the Hungarian elite and middle class were never able to overcome the memories of the democratic and communist revolutions. Always quick to equate reform with revolution, the Horthy regime, from its establishment in 1921 until the end of the Second World War, deliberately followed an authoritarian path. Since it relied mainly on the bureaucracy, the clergy and the army for political support, the Horthy regime paid little attention to the traditionally anti-government Hungarian intelligentsia. Constantly frustrated by the government's disregard for their political advice, reform-minded intellectuals turned to journalism, easily assessable types of literature and popular

social science both to vent their frustration against the regime and to create a political forum for themselves. Thus sociography and realist novels came to function as a substitute for party politics for the progressive intelligentsia in Hungary between the wars.

The image of the *egyke* became generally accepted because the Populists were talented writers and dedicated social reformers. They were the masters of what Thomas W. Laqueur described as “the humanitarian narrative.” According to Laqueur, humanitarian narrative, as a product of the empiricist revolution of the eighteenth century, relied on detail as a sign of truth. By describing in great detail the suffering of others, it sought to create a “reality effect,” which in turn called forth “sympathetic passions” in the readers. Humanitarian narrative, Laqueur argues, exposed the cause of the specific wrong and recommended specific action as both possible and morally imperative. In this updated version of ancient tragedy, the readers were invited not only to feel for the suffering of the protagonists but also to take part in their liberation. Thus, unlike the ancient tragedy, the humanitarian narrative was able to “bridge the gulf between facts, compassion and action” by compelling the readers to push for specific social reforms.³⁸

Laqueur described the realist novel, autopsy, clinical report and parliamentary inquiry as belonging into the genre of the humanitarian narrative. It is my contention here that the Populist discourse on the single-child family contains all the basic elements of the humanitarian narrative. For example, the graphic details of degeneration served to shake comfortable readers out of their complacency. The authors’ outrage was to engender compassion for subjects of so much mistreatment and to turn passive readers into active participants in social reforms. The discourse exposed the alleged cause of social disease (the survival of the large estates) and offered concrete remedies in the forms of land reforms and improvements in infrastructure.

The Debate's Outcome

The conscious use of literary strategies and the almost complete monopolization of humanitarian narrative turned the Populist writers into the most potent force in Hungarian literature in the late 1930s and early 1940s. However, their success came with a price. Whereas the humanitarian narrative attracted impressionable high school and university

students, it created discomfort among other sections of the educated middle classes and the elite. The liberal and socialist sections of the urban, and predominantly Jewish, intelligentsia came to resent and increasingly felt threatened by the Populists' appeal to instinct and nationalist sentiments. It comes as no surprise that these 'urbanites' rather than Conservatives were the first to notice the logical inconsistencies in the Populists' analysis of the single-child family. They dismissed the Populists' works as unscientific and the whole discourse on declining birthrate as a product of post-war nationalist paranoia.³⁹ Thus the debate on the single-child family contributed to the increasing polarization of the regime's opposition into 'urbanist' and 'Populist' factions. Mutual suspicions fed by derogative remarks, personal animosities and the tendency of intellectuals to exaggerate real differences in opinion and style made cooperation between the two groups on social and political issues difficult.⁴⁰

The Populists' appeal to compassion was best suited to gain followers among the half-converted and among people who had no direct interests in the maintenance of the large estates and the political status quo. However, the humanitarian narrative was unlikely to find recruits among the more conservative sections of the middle class and the elite. Instead of gaining more converts, the moralizing tone and quasi-revolutionary rhetoric of many Populist writers tended to alienate the more influential sections of the middle classes and the elite. Ironically, however, the Populists writers needed both the middle class and the elite to realize their plans. Lacking strong political support among peasants, in the 1930s the Populists tried to convince the government about the necessity of land reform. The founding of the National Peasant Party (*Nemzeti Parasztpárt*) in 1939 signalled a change in strategy: it showed that the Populists realized that reform from above, or at least in the form they had envisioned it, was an illusion. It also showed that at least some Populists recognized that they had to organize themselves politically if they had wanted to achieve more than literary success. However, the old problems remained: the majority of the Populist writers could not make up their mind whether they were politicians or writers and whether they should establish a political party or remain members of a loosely organized movement. Many continued to ignore the call of party politics altogether and showed only a perennial interest in political affairs. Thus it comes as no surprise that the National Peasant Party remained an insignificant political force during the Second World War. The failure of the party to

become popular among peasants and to introduce reform on their behalf contrasted sharply with the continuing high esteem that Populist writers enjoyed among the members of the educated middle class. Ironically, their success as writers presupposed the failure, or at least came at the expense, of agrarian reforms. Thus the failure of land reform before 1945 should not be exclusively attributed to the strength of conservative forces in Hungary: it was also the results of the misplaced efforts and political inexperience of their Populist opponents.

NOTES

I would like to thank my friend, Dr. Szilárd Borbély, for helping me to locate some of the contemporary articles and books that I used in researching this study.

¹ See Robert N. Proctor, *Racial Hygiene: Medicine under the Nazis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), esp. 19–21; Mary Louise Roberts, *Civilization without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917–1927* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

² M. Hölbling, *Baranya Vármegyének orvosi helyirata* [Medical survey of Baranya County] (Pécs, 1845). Cited by Ildikó Vasary, “The sin of Transdanubia: the one-child system in rural Hungary,” *Continuity and Change* 4 (1989): 434, 464.

³ See Dezső Buday, *Az egyke Baranya vármegyében* [The system of single-child family in Baranya County] (Budapest: Taizs, 1909), 165; also Dezső Buday, “Az egyke,” in *A szociológia első magyar műhelye* [The first workshop of Hungarian sociology], ed. György Litván and László Szűcs (Budapest: Gondolat, 1973), Vol. 2, 136–151. Cited by Rudolf Andorka, “Az ormánsági születéskorlátozás története” [History of family limitation in the Ormánság], *Valóság* 6 (1975): 60.

⁴ For a short survey of the contemporary literature on the *egyke* see, Andorka, “Az ormánsági születéskorlátozás,” 53–54; Vasary, “The sin of Transdanubia,” 431–434.

⁵ Pastors and doctors continued to play an important role in the debate. Many of the participants such as the academic eminence Lajos Fülep and the sociologist Géza Kiss were Protestant pastors. Lajos Fülep served in Zengővárkony, a small village in the Ormánság. His articles on the single-child family, which he published in the liberal-conservative daily, *Pesti Napló*, reached a nation-wide audience in 1929. Géza Kiss worked as a Calvinist pastor in the

village of Kákics in the same region. In his passionately written book, Kiss examined the demographic evolution of forty-five villages over two centuries. See the interviews with Lajos Fülep in *Pesti Napló*, November 10, 17, 26, December 4 and 15.

⁶ See János Kodolányi, "Hazugság Öl: memorandum Huszár Károlyhoz, a Képviselőház alelnökéhez" [The lying kills...], in *Baranyai Utazás* [Travel in Baranya county], ed. János Kodolányi and János Kodolányi, Jr. (Budapest: Magvető, 1963). As a child, János Kodolányi spent some time among peasants in the Ormánság. He remained a keen observer of peasants' lives and wrote several novels on the topic of single-child family between the wars.

⁷ See Gyula Illyés, "Pusztulás. Útirajz" [Devastation: travelling notes], *Nyugat* 17–18 (1933): 189–205.

⁸ Mihály Babits, "Elfogy a magyarság" [Hungarians are disappearing], *Nyugat* 19 (1933): 270.

⁹ Péter Elek, ed., *Elsüllyedt falu a Dumántúlon, Kemse község élete* [A vanished village in Transdanubia: the story of Kemse] (Budapest: Sylveszter, 1936).

¹⁰ János Hidvégi, *Hulló Magyarság* [Vanishing Hungarians] (Budapest: Athénum, 1941).

¹¹ Antal Pezenhoffer, *A demográfiai viszonyok befolyása a nép szaporodására* [The impact of demographic relations on the increase of the population] (Budapest: Athénum, 1922), esp. 243–247.

¹² Kunó Klebelsberg, "A tiszazug" [Tiszazug] *Pesti Napló*, August 25, 1929.

¹³ Lajos Simon, "Az egyke és az erkölcs" [The system of the single-child family and morality], *Református Élet* 34–35 (1934): 261–263.

¹⁴ Elemér Simontsits, *Az egyke demológiája* [The demology of the system of the single-child family] (Budapest: published by the author, 1936), esp. 37–60, 99–110, 158–164.

¹⁵ Hidvégi, *Hulló Magyarság*, esp. 85–110.

¹⁶ See Dénes Némedi, "Remarks on the Role of Peasants in Hungarian Ideology," *Journal of Popular Culture* 29 (1995): 67–75; Gyula Borbándi, *Der ungarische Populismus* (Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler Verlag, 1976), esp. 132–143, 226–232, 496–508.

¹⁷ See Gyula Illyés, *Magyarok: Naplójegyzetek* [The Hungarians: travel notes] (Budapest: Nyugat, 1940), Vol. I, 11–43, 62–67, 71–94, 146–150; Péter Elek *et al.*, *Elsüllyedt falu*, pp. 38–39; Ferenc Erdei, *A magyar paraszttársadalom* [Hungarian peasant society] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1978), 177; Imre Kovács, *A néma forradalom* [The silent revolution] (Budapest: Cserépfalvi, 1937).

¹⁸ In a short story, Kodolányi vividly describes the sufferings of a young wife who refuses to abort at the hands of the village midwife because she is afraid that she would lose her life in the process. During a heated exchange of

words with her mother-in-law, who tells her in uncertain terms that she does not want more children in the household, she brings up the old woman's unsavoury past. Angered by his wife's disrespect for his mother, the young husband knocks his wife down. Her mother-in-law, supported by other old women, including the heroine's mother, carries out the abortion on the half-conscious wife, who dies in the process. The short story discloses the heartlessness of old peasant women, who, during the wake, talk about the virtues of the departed and the health of farm animals in the same breath. See János Kodolányi, "Sötétség" [Darkness]. It was originally published in the literary journal, *Nyugat* in 1922. In János Kodolányi, *Fellázadt gépek* [Machines unbounded] (Budapest: Magvető, 1961), 5–33.

¹⁹ Kodolányi, "Hazugság öl," 20–22.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 16–18. Kodolányi wrote two more works that dealt with the same topic: *Földindulás* [Earthquake] and the *Testament*. On Kodolányi's life, see Tibor Tüskés, *Kodolányi János*, 2nd ed., (Pécs: Pro Patria Kiadó, 1999).

²¹ Hidvégi, *Hulló Magyarország*, 110–136.

²² Andorka cites Edward A. Wrigley and M. Fleury as his models: E. A. Wrigley, *An Introduction to English Historical Demography* (London, 1960); and M. Fleury and L. Henry, *Nouveau manuel de dépouillement et exploitation de l'état civil ancien* (Paris, 1965). See Andorka, "Az ormánsági születéskorlátozás," 59.

²³ Rudolf Andorka, "Születésszabályozás az Ormánságban a 18. század vége óta" [The history of contraception in the Ormánság since the end of the eighteenth century] *Demográfia* 1-2 (1970): 73–85; Andorka, "Az ormánsági születéskorlátozás," esp. 50–51.

²⁴ Vasary, "The sin of Transdanubia," 429–468.

²⁷ Contemporary writers such as Zoltán Szabó noted, for example, that in the northern part of the county the new sexual mores subverted traditional forms of entertainment such as spinning bees and village balls, which, contrary to their original functions, became veritable hotbeds of promiscuity. The situation was the most serious in villages close to the capital, Szabó argued, where parents regally pressured their children into prostitution at an early age. See Szabó, *A tardi helyzet* [The situation in Tard] (Budapest: Cserépfalvi, 1937), 179–181; *Cifra nyomorúság* [Gaudy Misery] (Budapest: Cserépfalvi, 1938), 103–104.

²⁶ According to the anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown, a "society may be called patriarchal when descent is patrilineal (i.e. the children belong to the group of the father), marriage is patrilocal (i.e. the wife removes to the local group of the husband), inheritance (of property) and succession (to rank) are in male line, and the family is patripotestal (i. e. the authority over the members of the family is in the hands of the father or his male relatives). On the other hand, a society can be called matriarchal when descent, inheritance and succession are in the female line, marriage is matrilocal (the husband removing to the home of his wife), and when the authority over the children is wielded by the mother's

relatives." See A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, "The Mother's Brother in South Africa," in *Structure and Function in Primitive Society*, ed. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (Glen-coe, Illinois: Free Press, 1952), 22.

²⁷ Béla Bodó, *Tiszazug: Social History of a Mass Epidemic* (New York: East European Monographs – Columbia University Press, 2002). Interview with Mária Gunya, maiden name, Mária Balogh, on 21 May, 1998.

²⁸ Borbándi, *Der ungarische Populismus*, p. 126.

²⁹ Historians have long refuted Le Play's arguments. They have shown that family patters changed little during industrialization and that the peaceful and inherently stable patriarchal family never existed. For a good introduction to Le Play's work see Michael Mitterauer and Reinhard Sieder, *The European Family: Patriarchy to Partnership from the Middle Ages to the Present* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), 24–27.

³⁰ On the impact of Le Play on Hungarian neo-conservatives see Péter P. Tóth, "A hazai agrár- és faluszociológiai kutatások 1900–1945 között" [Sociological research in agriculture and village life between 1900 and 1945], in *Agrár-szociológiai írások Magyarországon 1900–1945* [Works in Agrarian Sociology in Hungary 1900–1945] ed. Péter P. Tóth (Budapest: Kossuth, 1984), 11–12, 24.

³¹ George L. Mosse, *The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism* (New York: H. Fertig, 1999), 25–26, 186.

³² See Otto Weininger, *Geschlecht und Charakter* (Vienna: W. Braumüller, 1903), esp. 106–107. On Weininger see, among others, Allan Janik, *Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1985); Nancy A. Harrowitz and Barbara Hyams eds., *Jews and Gender: Responses to Otto Weininger* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995); and Hans Kohn, *Karl Kraus, Otto Schnitzler, Otto Weininger: aus dem jüdischem Wien der Jahrhundertwende* (Tübingen, 1962). For a good summary of Weininger's argument, see George L. Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe* (New York: H. Fertig, 1985), 145.

³³ Gerhard Hauptmann, *Die Insel der grossen Mutter* (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1994).

³⁴ See John Lukacs, *Budapest 1900: A Historical Portrait of a City and Its Culture* (New York: Weindenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), 160–168.

³⁵ Like sociology, sociography sought to disclose the structural causes of social injustices. Although the sociographer also used statistical information, his techniques resembled more those of travel writers and journalists than those of the sociologist. While the sociologist usually preferred statistical models, the sociographer tended to grasp reality intuitively by drawing his conclusions from individual examples. He couched his message in a passionate and politically charged language rather than in the more abstract and detached jargons of the sociologist and ethnographer. All these features brought the sociography closer to literature than to social science.

³⁶ Németh's position in the Populist movement is rather ambiguous. Often he denied that he was a Populist at all. However, he maintained close ties with the leading members of the movement and shared both their positive ideas and social ethnic prejudices. I thank Professor György Bisztray for drawing my attention to the difficult relations between Németh and other Populist writers. Németh borrowed many of his ideas from German conservative and fascist writers and scientists, such as Philipp Lenard and Johannes Stark, who sought to create an 'Aryan' science in the 1920s and 1930s. See Alan D. Beyerchen, *Scientists under Hitler: Politics and the Physics Community in the Third Reich* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 79–140.

³⁷ Dénes Némedi, *A népi szociográfia 1930-1938* [The populist sociology 1930-1938] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1985), 17–18, 42–45, 51–52, 116–121, 124–132.

³⁸ Thomas W. Laqueur, "Bodies, Detail, and the Humanitarian Narrative," in *The New Cultural History*, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 176–205.

³⁹ See Robert Braun, "Pusztul-e a magyarság" [Are Hungarians dying out?] *Századunk* 8–10 (1933): 252–256.

⁴⁰ On the quarrel between 'urbanists' and Populists see Némedi, *A népi szociográfia*, 93–103.

Hungarian Survival — in Hungary and Beyond the Borders: a Postscript

N. F. Dreisziger

... every nation will survive while it has some message to communicate to the rest of humanity. Hungary has yet to tell her message...
Zoltán Kodály (1882-1967)

Closely related to the problem of the survival of the Magyar nation is the question of the continued existence of Hungarian communities beyond the borders of the Hungarian state. This subject is composed of two parts. The first and the more important one is the issue of the persistence of Hungarian minorities in the states bordering on Hungary. The other is the question of the survival of the Hungarian diaspora, the scattered Magyar communities that had come about during the past century-and-a-half as a result of emigration, whether voluntary or forced, of Hungarians from their homelands in East Central Europe.

The question of the survival of Hungarian culture outside of the state of present-day Hungary is a relatively recent one. Its origin can be found in the First World War and the post-war peace settlement, which truncated the historic Kingdom of Hungary. The origin of the Hungarian diaspora scattered throughout parts of the Old World and the New, is also fairly recent, dating from the last decades of the 19th century. Of course, there had been emigrations from Hungary before, but nothing on the scale and with the permanence of those that resulted in the rise of the present Magyar diaspora. After every war of liberation against the Habsburgs, a new emigration resulted, but in terms of numbers and long-term viability, they were on the whole insignificant. In regards to mere numbers, this generalization does not hold true as far as the emigres of the War of

Independence of 1848-49 are concerned, but it does regarding permanence. In the wake of the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 a great many of the "forty-niners" returned to Hungary. Because most of the others were also in position to return, their activities as political emigres lost a great deal of their legitimacy. For these reasons the beginnings of the Hungarian diaspora in North America can best be dated from the coming of the masses of Magyar economic migrants during the last decades of the 19th century.

The post-World War I territorial settlement, proclaimed by the Treaty of Trianon, had much more drastic consequences. Not only did it result, in time and rather indirectly, in the emigration of tens of thousands of additional Hungarians from the Carpathian Basin, it also brought about the birth of very large Hungarian minorities in Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The history of these ethnic communities constitutes a large subject that defies adequate summation in an overview such as this one. Accordingly, a few comments will have to suffice along with brief references to general trends and future prospects.

Survival in the Neighbouring States

The Treaty of Trianon sanctioned the transfer of territories with 1.6 million Hungarians to the greatly enlarged post-World War I Romania, 1 million to the newly-created state of Czechoslovakia, and half-a-million to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the future Yugoslavia.¹ For these Hungarian communities the following eight decades would be characterized by minority status in highly nationalistic societies whose leaders and even members usually considered them their traditional opponents and probable future adversaries. The eight decades following the Treaty of Trianon also brought the erosion of the Hungarian presence in these countries, along with the diminution — or, at least, the relative diminution — of the size of the Hungarian minorities. Though greatly diminished in relative demographic terms, the Hungarian communities of Hungary's erstwhile neighbours — Czechoslovakia (today's Slovakia and the Subcarpathian region of Ukraine), Yugoslavia (today's Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia) and of course Romania — constitute collectively present-day Europe's largest ethnic minority.²

Comprehensive treatments of the evolution of these minority Hungarian communities in the Carpathian Basin are rare,³ especially in

Hungarian, as the topic was virtually taboo during the communist era in Hungary. The situation changed with the passing of that age in 1989. Not surprisingly, the early nineties witnessed the publication of works on this subject, the most prominent of which was a book designed for secondary and post-secondary students, *Magyarok a határon túl* [Hungarians beyond the borders].⁴ Though the basic purpose of this survey's authors, Károly Kocsis and Eszter Hodosi Kocsis, was to acquaint Hungary's youth with the Hungarian-inhabited lands in the vicinity of Hungary (the book doubles as a tourist guide), it also offers an overview of the demographic evolution of the Hungarian minority communities of the Carpathian Basin.

According to the book's authors, there were both general causes of the demographic erosion of the Hungarian communities of the neighbouring states, the so-called Successor States, and causes that were specific only to some — and, in some cases, to one — of these countries. Life in a culturally and politically alien environment, where official discrimination was often accompanied by hostility on the part of the local "state-forming" population, was not conducive to the maintenance of a Hungarian identity. To avoid harassment and maltreatment (which was especially blatant sometimes in the armed forces of these states), many Hungarians, especially members of the younger generations, simply assumed the identity of the majority: spoke their language (especially in public), attended their schools, frequented their cultural institutions, and in some cases even changed their names. Even manifestations of good relations between minority Hungarians and members of the majority community could speed the diminution of Magyar culture: inter-ethnic marriages also contributed to the process of assimilation, as the children of such marriages were more likely to acquire the majority culture — and majority ethnic identity — than the offspring of Hungarian parents.

Especially rapid was the de-Magyarization of formerly Hungarian-speaking non-Hungarian minorities. Magyar-speaking members of certain ethnic or religious communities, such as Jews, Germans and Gypsies, often abandoned the Magyar language quite rapidly and assumed trappings of the majority culture with less reluctance than did Hungarians. When it came to a declaration of their ethnic identity, they were more likely than Magyars to identify themselves as members of the national majority. A further decline in the number of Hungarians in the official censuses conducted in these countries was caused by the fact that members of these minorities, even those who spoke Hungarian at home, were usually listed as members of the majority nationality.⁵

Specific causes of the decline in the size of these Hungarian communities were many and diverse. They were often the byproduct of wars or domestic political strife. The Second World War had taken an enormous toll on the Magyar-speaking Jewish community of most of the Carpathian Basin. In the Hungarian controlled parts of the region, the most damage occurred during the late spring and early summer of 1944, after the Nazi occupation of Hungary. Elsewhere, in pro-Axis Romania, Slovakia and Croatia, the Holocaust of the Magyar-speaking Jews had started earlier, but claimed fewer victims, mainly because by 1940 most Hungarian Jews were in Hungarian-controlled territory. Despite this and somewhat ironically, it was the Jewish population of truncated, "Trianon" Hungary, that survived the Holocaust in greater numbers and larger proportion than the Magyar-speaking Jewish population of the neighbouring states. The explanation, of course, lies mainly in the fact that in July of 1944 the planned deportation of the Jews of Budapest was blocked by Admiral Miklós Horthy, the Regent of Hungary.⁶

Other examples of war-related diminution of the number of Magyar or Magyar-speaking peoples in the neighbouring states of Hungary have to do with events that befell ethnic Hungarians rather than peoples of multiple ethnic identity. Most such examples have to do with the expelling or deportation of Magyars from their ancestral communities that took place during the Second World War and its aftermath, but a few happened before then or after, such as the expelling of tens of thousands of Hungarians from Yugoslavia in the wake of the crisis that followed the assassination of that country's king in Marseille, in 1934.⁷ Such deportations took place perhaps on the largest scale after World War II in Czechoslovakia, where an even larger number of Magyars were forced from their towns and villages. Some were transferred to the territory vacated after the German population of the Sudetenland was expelled, while others were sent to Hungary after a "voluntary" exchange of populations. Those who wished to avoid being relocated, could do so if they renounced their Hungarian identity.⁸ Though probably affecting proportionately fewer people but claiming thousands of lives, the post-war treatment of the members of the Magyar minorities in Romania and Yugoslavia contributed to the sudden demographic diminution of their particular communities.

The demographic statistics available to the authors of the textbook in question, covering the whole six decades after Trianon, speak volumes about the decline or stagnation of the Hungarian population in the neigh-

bouring states of the Carpathian Basin. In the region that was transferred to Romania in 1920, about 1,658,000 Hungarians had lived at the time of the last (pre-war) Hungarian census. For 1980, the corresponding figure is 1,651,307. For the territory of present-day Slovakia, these two figures are 881,326 and 559,801 respectively. For the South Slav states (Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia combined) there is also a decrease, from 658,247 to 419,412.⁹ The full implication of these decreases becomes evident only when we look at the population growth statistics of these countries themselves. For example, in the same period (from the early 1920s to the early to mid-1980s), the number of Slovaks in what is now the Slovak Republic had increased from about 1,688,000 to 4,393,000; and that of the Rumanian population of Transylvania, from 2,930,813 to an estimated 5,500,000.¹⁰

The decline of the Hungarian presence in the neighbouring states has been documented not only by Hungarian textbooks published in the immediate post-communist era when Magyar nationalism had undergone a certain degree of reawakening. It has been remarked earlier that during the communist era the subject of the fate of Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring socialist states had been taboo, especially for authors writing for popular audiences in Hungary. The country's leaders, however, had an interest in the subject. In fact, on one occasion at least, they commissioned a major study of an important aspect of this subject, the fate of the Hungarian minority ethnic press in these countries. The study was to be circulated among the communist faithful, and was produced by one of the period's most prominent historians, academician Magda Ádám.¹¹

Ádám was not reluctant to stress the important role that the media, especially the printed media i.e. the ethnic or minority press, played in the lives of the Hungarian communities of Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. She was also not reluctant to point out the difficult conditions under which the Hungarian "ethnic press" tried to exist in these countries. Its problems were numerous. One of the most persistent ones was the isolation of Hungarian journalists and writers from other journalists and writers, whether citizens of Hungary or residents of the other neighbouring states. This isolation was deliberately fostered by the authorities of the countries concerned. Another problem, especially in Romania and Czechoslovakia, was the lack of state support for Hungarian cultural activities, including the press. The excuse for this was the claim that the Hungarian government promoted Hungarian culture throughout the region, and that Hungarians everywhere in the Carpathian Basin were

"reading" press products published in Hungary, and were viewing Hungarian television broadcasts. The problem with this claim, according to Ádám, was the fact that the entry of Hungarian publications into, for example Romania and even Czechoslovakia, and their distribution there, was impeded by the national and local authorities. With their press not receiving state support (and without state support in socialist countries, the operations of the press were well-nigh impossible), and Hungarian press products not being accessible, minority Hungarians had to rely on the non-Hungarian media for information and entertainment.¹²

The situation was somewhat better in Yugoslavia, Ádám admitted. There the principle of socialist "self-management" occasionally provided opportunity "for the establishment of a network of institutions which rendered minority rights (also theoretically existent in Czechoslovakia) attainable in practice." "In contrast," Ádám explained that in Romania no such situation existed and every effort was made by the country's authorities "to impede or make impossible contact with Hungary" contact that was vital to the Hungarians of Transylvania. "The aim [of this policy]" according to Ádám, was "clearly to speed up" the assimilation of Hungarians in Romania.¹³ With regard to Czechoslovakia, Ádám had similar conclusions:

[The minorities policy] in Czechoslovakia already boasts significant results: the weakening of ethnic consciousness amongst the ranks of the Hungarians living in Slovakia has reached a stage when, even in the short run, it may corroborate the Slovak and Czech claims that the nationality question no longer exists in Czechoslovakia....¹⁴

No specific mention has been made so far of the Hungarian minority of Subcarpathia, or Transcarpathia as the region is also known, a piece of territory that before 1920 belonged to Hungary, in the interwar years to Czechoslovakia, in the Cold War era to the U.S.S.R, and which presently is a part of the independent republic of Ukraine. Yet, such mention is in order as this region, in particular that portion of it that is a part of the lowland known as the Hungarian Plain, is the home of a Hungarian population numbering close to 200,000.¹⁵

Though there has not been an absolute decline in Subcarpathia's Hungarian population since the World War I period, there has been a rather steep relative decline: from constituting about 30 percent of the region's inhabitants in 1910, the Hungarian community had declined to

about 15 percent by the end of the 1970s.¹⁶ The story of this demographic diminution has been told in our journal by Professor S. B. Várdy in 1989,¹⁷ and is not at all untypical of the fate of Hungarian minorities in the territories detached from Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon.

It all started by the land reforms that Czech administrations imposed on the region following the formation of Czechoslovakia. These reforms came at the expense of Hungarian landowners in the region, but benefitted predominantly the local non-Magyar population. At the same time, educational and other reforms also favoured the Slavic groups as funds were made available to them for building schools, while the large Magyar ethnic group in the region was served by a single secondary school throughout the 1930s. Throughout this time, Várdy remarks, "Hungarians... had to suffer mistreatment at the hands of the increasingly intolerant... Slovak and Ukrainian nationalists."¹⁸

The Soviet takeover of the region was motivated by strategic considerations. The possession of Subcarpathia gave the U.S.S.R. a military staging-area within the Carpathian Basin, a convenient entry point to Central Europe. Not surprisingly, the aim of early Soviet ethnic policy in the region was to reduce the size and influence of "unreliable" minorities, especially the Hungarian one. Thousands of Magyar men (and even women) were deported to other parts of the U.S.S.R. and all Hungarian schools were closed. Years later, some deportees were allowed to return and during the mid-1950s the schools were gradually reopened. The region's Ukrainian nationalists as well as the Russians who had been "imported" into the region by the Soviet authorities, tended to make life miserable for the local Magyar population. Not so the Rusyns, who detested both the Ukrainian chauvinists and the Russian "carpetbaggers" and viewed Hungarians a fellow victims of Soviet rule.¹⁹

The last three decades of Soviet rule in Subcarpathia did not bring dramatic events to impact negatively on the Hungarian minority there; nevertheless, they still witnessed the erosion of Hungarian culture. Children who had attended local Magyar schools were disadvantaged in their search for employment, which fact contributed to the decline of enrolment in these schools. State support for Hungarian cultural institutions, including the schools with declining enrolment, dwindled; fewer and fewer priests could be found to administer to the community's religious needs, and in general, the size of the Hungarian community's intelligentsia declined. Though the late 1980s brought some improvements, especially in the increased contacts Hungarians were allowed with

their co-nationals in Hungary, the prospects for long-term cultural survival did not improve substantially. A number of factors, according to Várdy, had saved the Hungarian community of Subcarpathia from total assimilation: "self-isolation, rural existence, lack of geographical mobility, and resistance to intermarriage...."²⁰ Although these factors have no doubt continued to work after the fall of the U.S.S.R., there can be little doubt that the erosion of Hungarian culture has continued since the collapse of the Soviet Union and will continue in the foreseeable future.

The situation of the Hungarian communities of the northern Balkans (of Yugoslavia and its successor states), is not substantially different. The fate of these Magyar ethnic islands in the lands of the South Slavs has been outlined in a number of articles written by Professor Andrew Ludányi, one of which had appeared in our journal.²¹ Only the briefest summary of this study can be given here, but even that will give a taste of the difficult lives that Hungarians had lived at times in the country that was originally called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and later became known as Yugoslavia.

Although interwar Yugoslavia was perhaps Europe's most multi-ethnic state, toleration of minorities was rarely practiced there. Instead of fostering ethnic equality, what characterized Yugoslavia was the existence of a hierarchy of nationalities. The dominant group was the Serbian one. Croats and Slovenes constituted citizens of secondary rank, while Hungarians were somewhere near the bottom of the "ethnic ladder" — partly because of the fear many South Slavs had of potential Hungarian designs for the dismantling of the post-World War I territorial settlement. For this reason, according to Ludányi, the Belgrade authorities adopted a two-pronged policy to weaken the Magyar minority politically. One prong of these policies was outright repression, the other was the more "sophisticated" policy of playing off other minorities against the Hungarians. Manifestations of the policy of repression were the exclusion of Hungarians from the country's civil service, the insistence that they use Serbo-Croatian in their dealings with the authorities, and the banning of contacts — even purely cultural contacts — between the Magyars of Yugoslavia and citizens of Hungary. There was also economic discrimination against them. As had been the case in all the other detached territories, the Serb authorities embarked on "land reforms" which in most cases meant the distribution of the land of Hungarian landlords among the South Slav peasants of the area in question.²²

The situation of the Hungarian minority of Yugoslavia dramatically deteriorated in the wake of the Second World War. Hungary's involvement in that struggle on the side of Nazi Germany designated the Magyars of Yugoslavia as "collaborators" and set them up, along with the so-called Danube Germans, for a vicious campaign of retaliation at the end of the war. The number of Hungarian victims has been estimated to have been in the tens of thousands (German victims exceeded 100,000). Unfortunately for Hungarians, within half-a-decade after the war's conclusion, they once again became regarded as a potentially dangerous political minority. What happened was that, as a result of the break between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary (a loyal Soviet satellite at the time) greatly deteriorated with unpleasant consequences for the former country's Hungarian residents. In between these "times of troubles," and after an improvement of relations between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaderships, the Hungarians of the South Slav state managed to enjoy modest respites from persecution as Tito's communist dictatorship, whenever not motivated by the spirit of revenge or the fear of foreign invasion, tried to transcend the inter-ethnic strife. Not surprisingly, throughout most of the 1960s, 1970s and into the 1980s, in certain respects the situation of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia was better than that either in Czechoslovakia or in Romania. The immigration of South Slav (mainly Serb) settlers into areas of Hungarian settlement, however, continued at greater or slower pace throughout these decades.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s marked the return of "times of troubles" for the Hungarians of the South Slav lands. As Professor Ludányi pointed out in a paper published in 2001, this fact was largely lost on the world's media, which focused on the main contestants in the civil strife: the Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and, by the end of the decade, the Albanians of Kosovo.²⁴ This latest assault on Yugoslavia's Hungarian communities started with the disintegration during the late 1980s of the "old" communist order and the resurgence of Serbian nationalism under the administration of Slobodan Milošević. One of its important events was the cancellation of the autonomy of Vojvodina, which was accompanied by the installation of many Serbian nationalists (Milošević supporters) into positions of influence in the region. When the war of words among Yugoslavia's major ethnic groups turned into a civil war, the gradual ethnic cleansing of Hungarian towns and villages started. The process had a lot to do with the military draft. Magyar men of

military age, both conscripts and reservists, were more reluctant than ever to fight for the Serbian cause in Yugoslavia's military. Thousands — according to some reports, tens of thousands — of them fled the country, most of them to Hungary. Their families became victims of retaliation, ranging from threats, beatings and evictions. The homes of evicted Hungarians or those abandoned by them were offered to Serbian refugees of Yugoslavia's civil wars. In some regions, according to Ludányi, Serb nationalists resorted to even more blatant methods to make sure that Hungarians fled their homes so an ample supply of accommodation was provided for Serbs expelled or forced to flee from other parts of the disintegrating Yugoslav state. As a cumulative impact of this process of Hungarian exodus and Serbian influx, the proportion of the Hungarian population of Vojvodina decreased during the 1990s from 17 percent to just 13 percent of the region's total.²⁵

The exodus further weakened the Hungarian community both demographically and politically. It also had cultural implications. With decreased numbers, their quest for the maintenance of Magyar ethnic schools was threatened, as diminished numbers gave ample justification for the closing of such schools. Ludányi does not see an end to the process of gradual ethnic cleansing, though he suggests that with peace in the region it might continue in a "more subdued fashion." "Grim" is the word he uses for the future prospects of Vojvodina's Magyar minority.²⁶

The region where the prospects of the Hungarian minority's cultural survival should be the best is in Romania, in Transylvania. Here they live in large numbers (nearly two million, according to some estimates) and often in fairly compact communities. The fate of Hungarians in Transylvania was the focus of one of the papers given at the year 2000 University of Toronto conference. Its author, Dr. László Diószegi of Hungary's Teleki László Institute, traced the gradual decline of this minority from 1920 to the 1990s and pointed out why, despite the above-mentioned positive demographic and geographic factors, the prospects for the survival of Transylvania's Hungarian communities are not better, or not much better, than of those in the other states of central Eastern Europe.²⁷

According to Dr. Diószegi, what characterizes above all the eighty years of history of Romania's Hungarian minority is the absence of minority rights, a seemingly hopeless ethnic strife and, at times, even atrocities committed against the members of this community. Although the size of the minority did not decrease in absolute numbers, its propor-

tion in Romania's general population did. Nevertheless, because a large portion of Hungarians live in compact settlements, they still manage to achieve solid representation in the Parliament of contemporary Romania. In a democratic Romania of the future, the country's Hungarians might wield some influence, a fact that distinguishes them from the Hungarians of the other states of the region.

The wielding of some political, economic, and cultural influence has always been problematic for Romania's Magyar minority, especially in times of authoritarian, or even totalitarian, rule in that country — that is to say, throughout much of the eighty years since Trianon. The Hungarians' grievances were numerous from the very beginning: some of them had difficulties in obtaining Romanian citizenship; all of them were forced to use Romanian in dealing with the country's authorities, in the courts, and even in commercial transactions; Hungarian landlords, including the denominational churches, lost their lands in a "land reform" that rarely benefitted any Hungarian peasants. With the Hungarian denominational churches having lost much of their income, they could no longer fund the schools they used to support. At the same time, the Hungarian public schools received less and less funding from the Romanian state — a process which, according to Dr. Diószegi, resulted in the "systematic Romanization" of Transylvania's educational system.²⁸

The Second World War brought much grief to Transylvania's residents of all nationalities. The re-attachment of Northern Transylvania to Hungary through the so-called Second Vienna Award in August of 1940 brought hope to a great many Hungarians — and disappointment to the about million Rumanians who suddenly found themselves once again residents of Hungary. It also brought disappointment to the tens of thousands of Magyars who were left in Romanian lands. Nationalistic emotions rose as did ethnic hatreds. Before the war was over, the substantial Jewish community of the re-attached lands became victim of Hitler's "final solution," with the authorities of Nazi-occupied Hungary at best turning a blind eye, and at worst, cooperating in the enterprise. With the end of the war approaching, the wrath of Romanian chauvinists was visited upon Transylvania's Hungarians who were denounced as "Nazi collaborators," ignoring the fact that until its defection from the Axis camp in August of 1944, Romania — or at least, its government under Marshall Antonescu — was one of Hitler's staunchest allies.

The war's end brought the imposition of communist rule in Romania. From then on, Hungarians there were under the double yoke of

communist and Romanian rule. Communist rule was not an unqualified curse. As in the case of Tito's Yugoslavia, communist nationality policies were moderated by the idea of the brotherhood of socialist peoples. In Romania such moderating influences did not last long, not much beyond the first half decade of communist rule.²⁹ Despite the communists' lip-service to socialist internationalism, the imposition of their rule had a predominantly negative impact on the status of minorities in Romania. Some of the most damaging ones were the nationalization (i.e. expropriation) of the properties of the denominational churches, and the strengthening of the state's monopoly over education. Both of these trends benefited the interests of the country's majority (mainly Orthodox) Romanian population. The communist era also witnessed the increased mobility of labour in Romania. Many Hungarian towns and cities lost their "Magyar character" with the mass influx of Romanian workers. Later, the exodus of Germans from the Saxon towns of southern Transylvania (predominantly to West Germany) also helped to tip the demographic balance there further in the favour of Romanians, as homes abandoned by these emigrants became occupied by Romanian newcomers to the region.

The situation of the Hungarian minority began deteriorating in the 1950s. The Revolution in Hungary in 1956 gave a big push to this trend, as the Bucharest regime looked upon this event with fear and horror and used it as an excuse to abolish many of the collective rights the Hungarians in Transylvania still enjoyed. Those who thought that the situation couldn't get much worse were taught a lesson during the regime of Nicolae Ceaușescu — especially in the 1980s, during the height of this leader's totalitarian dictatorship.

The ultimate aim of the Ceaușescu regime was to create an ethnically uniform, "Romanian" Romania. To achieve this aim a systematic assault was conducted against Transylvania's Hungarian minority. Schools where the language of education was exclusively Hungarian, in predominantly Magyar districts, were closed. Elsewhere, Hungarian teachers were let go from bilingual (Magyar-Romanian) schools and were replaced by Romanians. Outstanding Hungarian intellectuals were encouraged to emigrate to Hungary, and a few did, to avoid harassment and to escape the great poverty that characterized Ceaușescu's Romania. Cultural contacts with Hungary were impeded, and the importation of magazines and books — foremost of all, children's books — from Hungary was banned. Young Hungarian university graduates, especially teachers, were given employment only in Romanian-populated communities, while young

Romanian intellectuals were encouraged to settle in Hungarian towns and villages. All this was topped by the policy of eradicating the memory of things Hungarian through the physical destruction of many Hungarian historic sites. The process was to culminate in the wholesale demolition of entire Hungarian villages and their replacement with communities featuring "modern" apartment houses and industrial buildings.³⁰

The most damaging of this totalitarian regime's policies, however, was the deliberate scapegoating and demonizing of the Hungarian minority,³¹ done in no small measure with the aim of deflecting general dissatisfaction in Romania with the steep decline in living standards in the 1970s and 1980s. The after-effects of this campaign of vilification were definitely felt in the years after the demise of Ceaușescu's regime, when Hungarians were often attacked and beaten by Romanian crowds imbued with anti-Magyar hatred. Such feelings often re-surface even today especially when Hungarians ask for greater cultural rights for their communities.

Despite all this, the post-communist era has brought new hopes for the Hungarians of Transylvania. The gradual restoration of a pluralistic society, private property, a greater freedom of travel and the resumption of contacts with the cultural institutions and the people of Hungary, have brought much relief to the Magyars of Romania. An increasing number Romania's leaders realize that their country's chances of establishing closer economic and political links with the rest of Europe — and, especially, with the European Union — will depend to no small extent, on Romania's adoption of European standards and values in the matter of the treatment of minorities. Nevertheless, it is not likely that all the problems of the Hungarian minority in the country will be solved any time soon. As Dr. Diószegi feels compelled to point out, the disappearance of xenophobic sentiments in Romania, and a French-German type of national reconciliation between Hungary and Romania, are not in the cards.³² Unfortunately for the Hungarian minorities of such neighbouring states as Slovakia and Serbia, the same is undoubtedly true. The long-term survival of these ethnic communities is still in the balance.

In connection with the treatment of Hungarian minorities in the Successor States one might ask the question: What would have been the situation if circumstances had been different and it had been Hungary that possessed large Slav and Romanian minorities throughout the past eight decades. The answer is suggested by the treatment of these minorities in pre-1918 Hungary and again, to a lesser extent, during 1940-1944. The

Hungarian record in this respect is certainly not unblemished, though it never reached or even approximated the depths that the handling of unprotected and disfavoured ethnic groups attained during the Balkan wars of the 1990s.³³ It has also been pointed out in favour of Hungary that that country's regimes, though not necessarily all members of the general public, dealt with the members of their Slav and Romanian minorities much more generously ever since the end of World War II than the regimes, and often the state-forming populations, of the Successor States did with their Magyar residents.³⁴ Hungary's Slav and Romanian minorities, however, were small in number and did not constitute, and could hardly have been accused (by demagogues anxious for the support of the chauvinistic masses) of constituting, a threat to the Magyar nation. What would have happened if the Hungary of the 1990s had a region, an "ancient Magyar land," populated predominantly by Romanians or Serbians who mounted a campaign of terror against the local Hungarian authorities and the few Hungarian local residents? In other words, could "a Kosovo" have happened in such a Hungarian state? We think not and, fortunately, we need not speculate about the answer to this "might have been" of history: Trianon has "saved" Hungary from such fate. For this turn of events, however, Hungarians, and especially Hungarians in the Successor States, paid — and continue to pay — a very high price.

Survival in the Diaspora

In any discussion of "Hungarian survival" a few words should be said about the persistence of Hungarian communities beyond the original homeland of the Magyars in the Carpathian Basin. The matter of the survival of the ethnic islands of Hungarians in the countries they had migrated to in the past dozen decades is rarely an issue of great concern to Hungarians in Hungary, but it is one in the Magyar diaspora itself. Some members of these isolated Magyar communities feel confident about the future — after all, in some parts of the world Hungarian culture has been present more-or-less continuously ever since the last decades of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately for Hungarians everywhere, this attitude reflects a great deal of misplaced confidence. The reality is that, although Hungarian culture in the diaspora is not facing the type of persecution that it faced in the states bordering on Hungary, the islands of Magyar culture are confronting a future which is even more uncertain

than that of the Hungarian minorities "beyond the borders" of Hungary in the Carpathian Basin.

The surveying of the state of Hungarian diaspora is a onerous task which is made even more difficult by the lack of accessible literature on the subject.³⁵ For scholars working in North America the "terra incognita" of this field are the Hungarian communities of Australia and Latin America. Fortunately, there is some literature that is readily available and offers some glimpses of the situation. One of these, a fine monograph by historian Egon F. Kunz, reports on the fate and prospects of the Hungarian communities of Australia as they existed in the early 1980s.³⁶

While Kunz paints a picture that proclaims the vitality of the community activities and lives of Hungarian immigrants to Australia in the decades after the Second World War, he is quite pessimistic about their prospects as an identifiable, organized ethnic group. The pre-World War II and immediate post-war arrivals, according to Kunz, "who have contributed much to Australian intellectual and artistic life,... [are] gradually disappearing from the scene." The later newcomers, the Displaced Persons and the Fifty-sixers, "are still around," but Kunz predicts that without the arrival of a new wave of Magyar immigrants, "the continuation of organized ethnic life on its present scale cannot... survive, much after 1990...;" only "a loose network based on shared values,... and a sense of belonging will prevail."³⁷

The Hungarian immigrant experience has had a similarly vibrant past in that other great overseas country, Brazil. There, Hungarian economic migrants of the early decades of the 20th century established colonies in such places as Matto Grosso, Árpádfalva, Londrina, Jacutinga, Ceboleiro, Arapongás, Rolandia, Apucarana, Marialva and Maringa. Later newcomers settled in the cities, in Rio de Janeiro and especially in São Paulo. In these metropolitan centres, but mainly in the latter, a dynamic Hungarian ethnic life existed in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and even the early 1980s. What happened thereafter we have to gather from fragmentary evidence. From a study published in 1990 we learn that, for example, São Paulo's Hungarian "Free University" was still functioning, mainly as a forum for guest-lectures, but only barely.³⁸ Other sources suggest that a similar fate awaits most of Brazil's other Hungarian institutions. In fact, a keen observer of Brazilian-Hungarian life has summed up the current situation in this way: "...the colony's social and cultural activities... have declined greatly in recent years. This is the result of the ever dwindling numbers of the immigrant generation — due to out-migration, ageing and

death — and the ever increasing assimilation of the members of the subsequent generations."³⁹

The largest and most important Hungarian community overseas is undoubtedly that of the United States of America. The history of this ethnic group is better known and better documented than any of the Hungarian expatriate immigrant communities discussed above. Last year alone, two massive monographs appeared on the subject. One of them was Julianna Puskás's *Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide: One Hundred Years of Hungarian Experience in the United States*,⁴⁰ and the other Béla Várdy's *Magyarok az Újvilágban: Az észak-amerikai magyarság rendhagyó története* [Hungarians in the New World: the irregular history of the Hungarians of North America].⁴¹

Both of these books are massive and extensively documented surveys of the history of the Hungarian community of the United States — the title of Várdy's book notwithstanding. Yet they are quite different works. Puskás, the Hungarian scholar, published a book in English, intended mainly for North American scholarly audiences; while Várdy, the Hungarian-American scholar, wrote a book in Hungarian, mainly for the general reading public of Hungary.⁴²

Neither of these monographs delves deep into the subject of the prospects of the Hungarian ethnic group in the USA. Puskás emphasizes instead the great changes that America's Hungarian communities had undergone in the past and are undergoing even in our days. She points out that we can hardly talk of an ethnic identity among the Hungarian immigrants to the USA before World War I. Because the "emigration" of these people was a "temporary emergency solution to a problem at home," they did not think of themselves as members of an American ethnic community — more likely, they considered themselves sojourners. Only the post-war period saw the transformation of America's transient Hungarian communities into ethnic ones. At first, this Hungarian-American immigrant culture flourished, but then came times of accelerated assimilation and inter-generational conflicts, all against the backdrop of the Great Depression and World War II. The coming of new waves of Hungarian immigrants (with very different social and ideological backgrounds) after the war, according to Puskás, did little to retard the start of the "vanishing of the Hungarian identity in the United States."⁴³

It is not only "Hungarian identity" that has been vanishing in the USA. Hungarians, in particular first generation immigrant Hungarians, are also disappearing from the statistics. The American census has the

tradition of listing the 20 most substantial ethnic groups for each of the country's states. While in the 1970 and 1980 censuses Hungarians occupied respectable places in many of these lists, by the time of the 1990 census, in most of them they had moved closer to the bottom, or had disappeared altogether. Only in Florida did they hold their place, suggesting that for a lot of Magyar-American retirees that state is the favourite choice of residence. This disappearance from the census data, of course, is caused not only by the decreasing size of the Hungarian-American community, but by the growth of other American ethnic groups. Nevertheless, it is clear that in the 21st century, Hungarians will probably constitute a small, almost inconsequential ethnic group within that great melting pot that is the United States.⁴⁴

The situation is not much different in Canada; however, in that country the "vanishing of the Hungarian identity" (to use the words of Julianna Puskás), did not start during the Great Depression or the Second World War. More precisely, the decline in community activity and solidarity that became evident then, was more than compensated for by the resurgence in the group's vitality after the war. The explanation for this difference in the evolution of the Magyar communities of the US and Canada lies in the different histories of the two groups. The demographic foundations of the former had been laid before the First World War with the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Magyar newcomers. In Canada the demographic base of that country's Magyar ethnic group was only started before 1914, and was completed only in the interwar and post-World War II periods. While the "golden age" of the Hungarian-American community was the 1920s,⁴⁵ that of the Hungarian-Canadian ethnic group it was the decades following the arrival of the Displaced Persons and of the Fifty-sixers, i.e. the 1960s, the '70s and the '80s.⁴⁶

By the 1980s, however, the signs of the "vanishing Hungarian identity" were evident in Canada too, especially in those parts of the country where the post-war newcomers did not replenish the Hungarian colonies that had been established during the first decades of the 20th century. In Saskatchewan, which only a century ago was known by many Magyars and Canada's "Little Hungary" and where even during the interwar years many Hungarian farming colonies thrived, only faint echoes of Magyar community life remain: a few abandoned churches and a few of the early colonists' children still speaking Magyar — in local nursing homes. Census statistics confirm this situation. Although recording a large number of people (ca. 15,000) with multiple ancestry that

includes Hungarian, the 1991 census revealed that those with "Hungarian only" origin numbered only 7,920 in the province. The same census also disclosed that fewer than 350 people in the province used Hungarian as the "only" language in the home. Evidently, by 1991 Saskatchewan's Hungarian community had been made up predominantly of third or fourth generation Hungarian-Canadians. Despite the valiant efforts their first and second-generation predecessors had expended in the cause of culture maintenance, the community's cultural identity had eroded.⁴⁷

Elsewhere in Canada, the 1991 census painted a picture that ranges between that which characterized the still fairly unassimilated Hungarian community of Ontario and the largely assimilated one of Saskatchewan. But decline in the size of the first-generation Hungarian population, and especially in the numbers of those who use Hungarian as the only language of the home, is significant. All this is not surprising, since the last time Hungarians entered Canada in large numbers had been almost half a century ago. The Hungarian-Canadian group as an immigrant community, with its attachment to most facets of the ancestral culture, is in decline in many areas of Canada. Two of its greatest achievements had been the establishment in the late 1970s of the Chair of Hungarian Studies at the University of Toronto and the creation of the Toronto Hungarian Cultural Center — a massive building with a large auditorium, as well as a dining hall, classrooms, exercise rooms, etc. It speaks volumes that, at the time of the writing of these lines, the future of both of these institutions is in grave doubt.

The likely future of Canada's Hungarian community has been summed up in the following paragraph:

For more than a century now, the members of various waves of Hungarian newcomers have been establishing in Canada their... clubs, churches, press organs, and other community institutions.... Time and again, new waves of immigrants took over the maintenance of these, or established new ones. As a result, Hungarian-Canadian culture and community life flourished or, at least, survived. For four decades now, no new wave of Magyars has come to Canada. The implications of this circumstance are clear. Unless another one will arrive within the foreseeable future, the prospects for the Hungarian-Canadian community's continued existence — with its distinct cultural characteristics and institutions — will be bleak.⁴⁸

No one desires the coming of still more trauma to East Central Europe that would drive thousands of Hungarians from their ancestral communities in the Carpathian Basin. Without the coming of a new wave of Magyar immigrants, however, the Hungarian identity in Canada will continue to wither away, just as it had started to do so in the United States soon after the mass immigration of Magyars to that country was terminated by the so-called Quota Laws of the 1920s. The process of complete identity loss may take a long time, and may never reach its ultimate conclusion.⁴⁹ But the dynamic community life that characterized some centres of Canada from time to time in the 20th century, will no doubt vanish, as it has vanished in most great cities (and smaller settlements) of the United States, Brazil, Australia and elsewhere.

Survival in Hungary: Conclusions

In most discussions of the survival of the Hungarian nation prominent place is given to the conquests and foreign occupations Hungary endured throughout the centuries. Indeed, such events have often had disastrous consequences for the country and its inhabitants. It should not be forgotten, however, that calamities of similar magnitude had been inflicted on the Magyar nation by Hungarians themselves — in internecine struggles, civil wars and through their tradition of becoming politically divided when facing external danger. The introduction to this volume — and, especially, several of the papers printed therein — cited many examples of Hungarians fighting Hungarians, or elements of the Magyar nation siding with one of Hungary's assailants in order to fight their countrymen who had decided to support another. No doubt, volumes could be written about internal strifes and civil wars in Hungary, which resulted in loss of life, material destruction, and, ultimately, in the weakening of the Magyar nation.

Discord and internal conflict were not the only self-destructive behaviours that at times characterized Hungarians throughout the centuries. Less perceivable but also damaging in the long run have been their attempts at the limiting of natural population growth. In times of great economic hardship, recurrent warfare, or oppressive foreign rule, such practices might seem justifiable to today's observers. Unfortunately, the limiting of the size of families was sometimes practiced — and is still sanctioned by some even today — in times of relative peace and prosper-

ity. Indeed, slow demographic growth constitutes one of the greatest threats to the long-term survival of the Magyar nation.⁵⁰

As has been suggested in this volume's introduction, Hungary should be able to counteract this threat to its existence through judicious immigration policies, just as the loss of lives as a result of wars, epidemics and natural disasters was often compensated for in the past by the influx of newcomers into the country. Hungary could even encourage, even more than it had done in recent years, the immigration of Hungarians from those regions of neighbouring states where the prospects of the long-term survival of Hungarian culture have become next to non-existent. True, such immigration policies might do damage to these countries, as they might reduce their chances of remaining multi-ethnic nations and becoming the kind of members of the international community in which diversity is tolerated and the contributions of all ethnic groups are valued. However, since the prospects of most of Hungary's neighbours becoming such progressive nations within the foreseeable future are — unfortunately — slim, Hungary's lawmakers might well put aside any reservations about the negative implications of their immigration policies for these countries.

Although demographic stagnation can be counteracted to some extent by judicious immigration policies, it may be more difficult to ward off the long-term threat of the ultimate assimilation of Hungarians in a prosperous European Union.⁵¹ Staying outside the EU seems hardly an option, as it would deprive Hungary's citizens of the prospects of a better life. Nevertheless, in such a union there will be labour and other mobility resulting in the mixing of populations on an unprecedented scale, and there will be increased pressure on the country's young to master one or more of Europe's major languages. When everyone who wants to have ready access to Europe's knowledge-based labour market will learn English and German, what will be the incentive to mastering Magyar? There can be little doubt that in Hungary's villages Hungarian will be spoken at the end of the 21st century, but will the country's large urban centres be able to resist the pressures of economic and cultural internationalization?

To put the conundrum in a different way: Hungary can enter the circle of advanced, progressive nations only if her youth acquire knowledge of the Europe's leading languages. However, if everyone who aspires to be economically and socially mobile will know English for example, the need to learn more than rudimentary Hungarian will disappear. We need not be overly pessimistic however. A small segment of Hungary's

population had faced this challenge (i.e. the need to learn German, French, etc.) in the past, The Hungarian aristocracy of the 18th and 19th centuries was confronted by such pressures. Most of its members responded to it by becoming multi-lingual, by mastering two, three or even more of Europe's leading languages, without necessarily abandoning Magyar. We would like to believe that this is the future that awaits Hungary's economic and cultural elite and not the loss of the ancestral tongue and cultural assimilation in an all-European culture.

In contemplating the future, Hungarians must remember the resilience that their culture has demonstrated in the past. Time and again, the nation suffered great losses, yet the Magyar identity survived. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the "Magyar bloodline" did not persist through the ages. There may be few if any direct descendants of Árpád's people living in Hungary today. The population of the seven Hungarian tribes that entered the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century (already multi-ethnic in composition) has been decimated by the invasions and other calamities of the past eleven centuries. Their "blood" has intermixed time and again with that of non-Magyar newcomers to Hungary. Recent examinations of the genetic characteristics of Hungary's population attest to this. The results of scientific tests show that Hungarians, as far as their genetic makeup is concerned, are indistinguishable from their neighbours.⁵² Accordingly, if "Magyar blood" is a prerequisite for belonging to the Magyar nation, it can only be putative blood that fulfils this requirement. Pure "Magyar blood" or pure "Magyar ancestry" for the most part exists only in the imagination of romantic nationalists — and in families from whose family trees non-Hungarians had been expunged by the over-zealous nationalists of later generations. Fortunately, most Hungarians — and, especially, most of Hungary's leading intellectuals — subscribe to "civic" rather than "ethnic" nationalism.⁵³ For them, belonging to the Hungarian nation is not a function of lineage but a manifestation of more or less successful efforts at the acquisition of a particular culture. To paraphrase that great Hungarian, Zoltán Kodály, the Hungarian culture is not a birthright for Hungarians, but the result of strenuous efforts at culture acquisition.⁵⁴

Although the blood-line of Árpád's Magyars has disappeared — or, more precisely, has become submerged through centuries of demographic intermingling — Hungarian culture has persisted. It persisted precisely because of the conscious or unconscious efforts of millions of people throughout the centuries to acquire the Magyar tongue and

Hungarian customs and traditions. Unquestionably, Hungarian speech and culture have changed in the process, but not enough to erode their uniqueness. How this culture — and the people who possessed it, as well as the state they had established — fared and survived during the past thousand years, was the main theme of the studies in this volume. What the prospects for the survival of the Hungarian culture and identity are — in Hungary, in the Hungarian homelands that had been detached from Hungary, and in the countries where Hungarians had settled in large numbers over the past dozen-or-so decades — was discussed in this volume's introduction and postscript.

The historiographical debate on the subject of Hungarian survival will no doubt continue in the decades to come, as will the discussion of the future prospects of Hungarian culture and identity. Opinions will no doubt vary and they will be expressed predominantly by the people most concerned, the Hungarians. The author of these lines hopes that this discussion will persist for a long time not only in Hungary but wherever Hungarians live in large numbers today, for the continuation of the debate will be the best indication of the survival of Hungarian culture and identity in these places.

NOTES

The quotation from Zoltán Kodály at the beginning of this essay continues thus: "[Hungary] has not communicated [its message] especially in the realm of culture: [it could not do so] because throughout the centuries [it] was forced to keep arming in defence of its mere existence. And as we know, the mission of peoples can gain lasting expression only through the works of peace." Cited in László Eőszé, *Kodály Zoltán élete és munkássága* [Zoltán Kodály's life and work] (Budapest: Zeneműkiadó, 1956), p. 153. My translation. Because Kodály's proze almost defies accurate translation, I cite the whole statement in the original Hungarian: "Hisszük, hogy minden nép megél addig, amíg van mit mondanía embertársainak. A magyarság pedig még nem mondta el mondanivalóját. Nem mondta el különösen a kultúra terén: hisz századokon át fegyverkezésre kényszerült pusztá élete védelmében. Márpedig a népek küldetése csak a béke műveiben jut maradnadó kifejezésre." I have received valuable advice regarding Kodály's opinions on "Hungarian survival" from Mrs. Éva Kossuth as well as Drs. Julie Adam and Lynn Hooker.

¹ Ignác Romsics, *Magyarország története a XX. században* [The History of Hungary in the 20th Century] (Budapest: Osiris, 1999), 125. Lands that had between sixty to seventy thousand Hungarian inhabitants were transferred to Austria. Italy received the port of Fiume (Rijeka in today's Croatia), which had a few thousand Magyar inhabitants, and a small strip of land in the North, with a few hundred Hungarian inhabitants, was transferred to the newly re-established Polish state.

² In absolute numbers. In relative terms, only the proportion of Albanians living in minority status in neighbouring states (in Macedonia, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and the region of Kosovo), exceeds the proportion of Hungarians living in minority status.

³ The most useful and relevant English-language works on the subject are Stephen Borsody, ed., *The Hungarians: A Divided Nation* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Center for International and Area Studies 1988), and N. F. Dreisziger and A. Ludanyi, eds., *Forgotten Minorities: The Hungarians of East Central Europe* (Toronto: Hungarian Studies Review, 1989).

⁴ The exact publications details are: *Magyarok a határokon túl — a Kárpát-medencében* [Hungarians beyond the borders — in the Carpathian Basin] (Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1991). See also the even briefer but more authoritative study by Ferenc Glatz, *A kisebbségi kérdés Közép-Európában tegnap és ma* [The minority question in Central Europe yesterday and today] (Budapest: Europa Institut, Historical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1992) a supplement to the periodical *História*, (Nov. 1992). Glatz is one of Hungary's most prominent historians; one of his administrative posts has been the directorship of the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. See also the publications of the Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad, edited in most cases by Tibor Szabó and printed in Budapest in 2000. These pamphlets include: *A Kárpát-medencén kívül élő magyarság* [Hungarians living beyond the Carpathian Basin], *Romániai magyarság* [The Hungarians of Romania], *Szlovákiai magyarság* [The Hungarians of Slovakia], *Vajdasági magyarság* [The Hungarians of Vojvodina], *Ukrajnai magyarság* [The Hungarians of Ukraine], *Ausztriai magyarság* [The Hungarians of Austria], etc.

⁵ Kocsis and Kocsis, pp. 11f

⁶ See my discussion of this subject in the Introduction. Also, Tamás Stark, *Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust and After the Second World War, 1939-1949*. Trans. Christina Rozsnyai (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2000; distributed by Columbia University Press). On Horthy and the fate of the Jews of Budapest see Thomas Sakmyster, *Hungary's Admiral on Horseback: Miklós Horthy, 1918-1944* (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1994), 342-54.

⁷ The assassins were members of the Ustaša, a Croat separatist-terrorist organization. They were alleged to have had their training in Hungary. Italian

authorities might have had a greater hand in supporting the Ustaša but the international community was reluctant to blame the Italian government lest Mussolini be driven into the arms of Hitler. On this affair see Bennett Kovrig, "Mediation by Obfuscation: The Resolution of the Marseille Crisis, October 1934 to May 1935," *The Historical Journal*, 19, 1 (1976): 191–221.

⁸ Kocsis and Kocsis, p. 25. For more detailed treatments of the subject of Hungarians in post-war Slovakia see Kálmán Janics, *Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority, 1945–1948* (New York: Social Science Monographs/Columbia University Press, 1982), and the same author's paper in Borsody, *The Hungarians*, pp. 159–90.

⁹ Kocsis and Kocsis, table 4 (pp. 12–13). Though giving precise numbers, these statistics are not strictly scientific as some of them are based on such criteria as "mother tongue," while others on "ethnic origin," "national identity," or "language spoken."

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, tables 6 and 13 (pages 22 and 46 respectively).

¹¹ Magda Ádám's best-known work is probably the monograph: *Magyarország és a Kisantant a harmincas években* [Hungary and the Little Entente in the 'thirties] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1968). She, along with historians Gyula Juhász and L. Kerekes, edited the volume of documents: *Magyarország és a második világháború* [Hungary and the Second World War] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1966 [third edition]). She also collaborated on the editing and publication of a much more voluminous series of secret Hungarian diplomatic documents: *Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához* [Diplomatic Documents on Hungary's Foreign Policy] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1962f).

¹² A part of Ádám's report was published in our journal: "The Hungarian Minority of Czechoslovakia and its Press," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 16, 1–2 (1989): 47–56; see especially p. 55.

¹³ *Ibid.* (p. 55).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Kocsis and Kocsis, p. 31. The rest of Sub-Carpathia, a predominantly mountainous territory, is populated mainly by Rusyns. Some people consider Rusyns to be Ukrainians speaking a different dialect, others deem them to be a separate ethnic group. Perhaps the most prominent among the latter is Professor Paul Robert Magocsi of the University of Toronto. One of his publications that presents this viewpoint is *Our People: Carpatho-Rusyns and their Descendants in North America* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1984).

¹⁶ Kocsis and Kocsis, table 10 (p. 34).

¹⁷ S. B. Vardy, "Soviet Nationality Policy in Carpatho-Ukraine since World War II: The Hungarians of Sub-Carpathia," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 16, 1–2 (1989): 67–91.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 71f.

²¹ "The Hungarians of Yugoslavia: Facing an Uncertain Future," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 16, 1–2 (1989): 93–119.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 96–98. The restrictions on the influence and activities of the non-Orthodox churches also had a negative impact on Yugoslavia's Hungarian communities and their ability to school their children in their own language.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 100–03. Tito himself was not a member of his country's dominant Serbian ethnic group, and his Partizan movement, in theory at least, aspired to a multi-ethnic ideal.

²⁴ Andrew Ludányi "The Fate of Magyars in Yugoslavia: Genocide Ethnocide or Ethnic Cleansing?" *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 28 (2001): 127–39.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 128–36, *in passim* (the demographic data is on p. 133). Ludányi tells the story of a home, from which the Hungarian residents were temporarily absent, being expropriated for use by refugees.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

²⁷ László Diószegi, "History of the Hungarians in Romania between 1919–1998," manuscript. We hope to publish Dr. Diószegi's paper after problems with its translation and documentation are solved.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Hungarian-Transylvanians associate this age with the name of Petru Groza, Romania's first post-World War II leader (from 1945 to 1952). He was a Transylvanian who had been educated in Budapest and spoke Hungarian fluently. Under him some Magyar theatres, and even schools, were reopened. Years later, when these cultural institutions were again closed, Hungarians recalled the Groza epoch with nostalgia. Diószegi points out that the favouring of the Hungarian minority in 1946 and 1947 was also necessitated by the need of the Communist Party for Hungarian support, and the wish of the Bucharest regime to cultivate the image of Romania as a civilized and tolerant nation before the signing of the peace treaty with the Allies. For an overview of the nationality policies of the early post-war years see Sándor Balogh, "A Groza-kormány nemzetiségi politikájának történetéből (1945–1946)" [On the policy of the Retru Groza government towards national minorities (1945–1946)]," in *Tanulmányok Erdély történetéről* [Studies about the history of Transylvania], ed. István Rácz (Debrecen: Csokonai Kiadó, 1987), 181–94, with an English summary on pp. 291–93. Also, Gábor Vincze *et al.* (eds.) *Revízió vagy autonómia? Iratok a magyar-román kapcsolatok történetéről (1945–1947)* [Revision or Autonomy: Documents on the history of Hungarian-Romanian contacts (1945–1947)] (Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány, 1998).

³⁰ The regime collapsed before these plans could be completed.

³¹ On this subject see Louis J. Elteto, "Anti-Magyar Propaganda in Rumania and the Hungarian Minority Transylvania," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 16, 1–2 (1989): 121–136; and, Moses M. Nagy, "Emile M. Cioran Looks at

Rumanians and Hungarians: Characterization or Caricature?" *Hungarian Studies Review*, 19, 1–2 (1992): 69–75.

³² Diószegi, *op. cit.*, see the conclusions.

³³ The exception to this generalization might be what is known to historians as the "Novi Sad massacres" of January 1942. This event has been described by Professor Ludányi as an "overreaction" by Hungarian military authorities in the face of relentless partizan attacks on Hungarian occupation units in the Vojvodina. The number of victims of summary trials and executions is given as 3,309. Most of the victims were Serbs, but there was a large number of communist activists and/or Jews executed too. Ludányi points out that the officers in charge of this retaliation were soon thereafter court-martialed in Hungary, and only escaped the possible death penalty by fleeing to Germany. They were extradited to Yugoslavia in 1946 and were put to death.

³⁴ On this subject see the work of the Israeli scholar Raphael Vago, "Nationality Policies in Contemporary Hungary," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 11, 1 (Spring, 1984): 42–60. See also several of the papers in Ferenc Glatz, ed., *Hungarians and Their Neighbors in Modern Times, 1867–1950* (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1995).

³⁵ An outline of the historiography of the Hungarian ethnic islands spread throughout the New World (and not just the United States as the title suggests), can be found in my study "Towards a History of the Hungarian Ethnic Group of the United States," an online paper posted on the website of the Hungarian American Resource Center: <http://www.hungarianamerica.com/harc/> (2001).

³⁶ Egon F. Kunz, *The Hungarians in Australia* (Melbourne, ME Press, 1985); see also the same author's *Displaced Persons: Calwell's New Australians* (Sydney: Pergamon Press, 1988).

³⁷ Kunz, *The Hungarians*, pp. 135f. Most of the pre- and immediate post-World War II arrivals to Australia were Jewish refugees of the Holocaust.

³⁸ Lajos Kutasi Kovacs, "A São Paulo-i Könyves Kálmán Szabadegyetem negyven éve" [Forty Years of the Könyves Kálmán Free University of São Paulo], *Nyelvünk és Kultúránk* [Our Tongue and Culture] (Budapest), 79 (Sept. 1990): 31–33. Kovács wondered if it would survive for another decade. See also Gyula Borbándi, *A magyar emigráció életrajza, 1945–1985* [The Biography of the Hungarian Emigration, 1945–1985] (Munich: published by the author, 1985), 75–76 and 331–32. For the very interesting story of Hungarian film-makers in Brazil, see Ágnes Judit Szilágyi, "The One Who Could Photograph the Soul: Rudolph Icsey and Hungarian Filmmakers in Brazil," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 12, 1–2 (1994): 77–90.

³⁹ From a letter by Tibor Cseh to the author, quoted at length in N. F. Dreisziger, "Hungarians in Brazil," serialized in the journal *Kaleidoscope* (Toronto) starting in Jan. 2000 (vol. 3). Interestingly enough, a recent work on the

Hungarians of Argentina does not offer such a pessimistic conclusion. There, according to the study's author, Judit Kesserű Némethy, the children and grandchildren of the original immigrants continue to maintain the community's school, scout organization, club, newspaper, choir, dance group, etc. Judit Kesserű Némethy, *Az argentínai magyar emigráció, 1948–1968* [The Hungarian emigre community of Argentina, 1948–1968], doctoral thesis, József Attila University, Szeged, 1999, pp. iv–v. I am indebted to Dr. Némethy for lending me a copy of this dissertation.

⁴⁰ Translated by Zora Ludwig (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, Ellis Island series, 2000), 444 pages.

⁴¹ In the West, Béla Várdy publishes under the name Steven Bela Vardy. His book was published in Budapest, by the International Association of Hungarian Language and Culture (A Magyar Nyelv és Kultúra Nemzetközi Társasága).

⁴² There are other differences as well. Puskás's book is more detailed and sophisticated in its discussions of the early Hungarian emigration to and settlement in the US, while Várdy's book is more knowledgeable and comprehensive when it comes to the discussion of ethnic politics of the Hungarian emigre community in that vast country.

⁴³ Puskás, *Ties that Bind*, 302–04. Várdy's observations on the prospects of the Hungarian diaspora, and in particular the prospects of the Hungarian community of the United States, are made not so much in his book but in an article that appeared in Hungarian in Hungary. He is quite pessimistic. In his estimate the preservation of the Hungarian identity and culture succeeds for three generations at best — in the case of the fiftysixers and the more recent arrivals, not even that long. Béla Várdy, "A magyar öntudat és a magyar megmaradás kérdése" [The question of the Hungarian identity and Hungarian survival], *Nyelvünk és Kultúránk*, 110 (April–June, 2000): 74–76.

⁴⁴ N. F. Dreisziger, "Rose-gardens on Ice-floes: A Century of the Hungarian Diaspora in Canada," *Hungarian Journal of English and American Studies*, 6 (fall, 2000): 258 (n. 33).

⁴⁵ On this subject see also Zoltán Fejős, *A chikagói magyarok két nemzedéke, 1890–1940: Az etnikai örökség megőrzése és változása* [Two generations of the Hungarians of Chicago, 1890–1940: The preservation and transformation of the ethnic heritage] (Budapest: Közép-Európa Intézet, 1993).

⁴⁶ See N. F. Dreisziger, "Toward a Golden Age," chapter seven of Dreisziger *et al.*, *Struggle and Hope: The Hungarian-Canadian Experience* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), as well as pp. 220–28 (of chapter 8).

⁴⁷ These data are cited in Dreisziger, "Rose-Gardens," 253 (see also pp. 257f, n. 32). The relevant results of the 2001 census will not be available until late 2002. They are likely to reveal an even more discouraging situation.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

⁴⁹ There will always be third and even fourth-generation Hungarian-Canadians or Hungarian-Americans who will undertake the effort to re-acquire their Hungarian identity and culture. For a book that describes the quest of one such individual see Richard Teleky, *Hungarian Rhapsodies: Essays on Ethnicity, Identity, and Culture* (Seattle: University of Washington Press; Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997).

⁵⁰ Várdy, "A magyar öntudat és a magyar megmaradás kérdése," pp. 75f. Professor Várdy argues that large nations can afford a low birth rate but small ones cannot.

⁵¹ Not to mention great catastrophes such as pandemics, nuclear wars, massive environmental degradation, climate change, etc.

⁵² The result of such tests have been reported by Judit Béres, "Népünk genetikai rokonsága" [The genetical relationship of our people], *Élet és Tudomány* [Life and Science] no. 38 (2001).

⁵³ Civic nationalism embraces the entire citizenry of a state regardless of ethnic origin. Ethnic nationalism is exclusivist and is rooted in beliefs in real or mythical "blood-lines" and collective historical experiences of "blood-letting" in defence of a particular ethnic group and its "sacred" homeland. For a discussion of civic vs. ethnic nationalisms, and the role of the mythology of "blood" in the latter, see Michael Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (Toronto and London: Viking Press, BBC Books, etc. 1993).

⁵⁴ One of Kodály's statements to this effect reads as: "Culture cannot be inherited. The culture of the ancestors evaporates fast if every generation does not acquire it for itself.... Only that is ours for which we have laboured, possibly [even] suffered...." (my translation, NFD). Zoltán Kodály, *A zene mindenké* [Music belongs to everyone] (Budapest: Zeneműkiadó Vállalat, 1954), 97. I am indebted to Éva Kossuth for finding the source of this Kodály statement for me. On this subject see also Zoltán Kodály, *Folk Music of Hungary* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1987; originally published under the title *Magyar népzene* (Budapest: Corvina, 1960). For more of Kodály's writings see *The Selected Writings of Zoltán Kodály*, ed. Ferenc Bónis (London: Boosey & Hawkes, 1974).

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