The War for Wilson's Ear: Austria-Hungary in Wartime American Propaganda

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Much has been written about First World War propaganda and it is generally understood that the years between 1914 and 1918 saw the emergence of propaganda as an important means of influencing major political decisions. Anti-Habsburg and anti-Magyar propaganda enjoyed significant support in France and Great Britain, and Stephen Borsody has suggested that "the Trianon peacemaking was above all the triumph of propaganda." It is the aim of the present study to examine the major trends and promoters of propaganda regarding the Habsburg Monarchy and, where possible, Hungary, to decide whether this was true of the United States as well. A considerable amount of propaganda directed against the Habsburg Monarchy promoted the concept that the Magyars were responsible for the minority problems of the Dual Monarchy, with the primary aim of justifying certain territorial claims against Hungary. This is why discussions on Hungary and Magyar policy towards ethnic minorities are given special attention in this study.

When hostilities began the United States quickly established herself as the major neutral provider of war supplies, and by 1917 it had also become clear that American intervention would be a decisive if not the deciding factor in the final outcome of the war. Studies of World War propaganda in the United States reveal that the attack on the Central Powers focused largely upon Germany. However, both pro- and anti-Habsburg campaigns were also launched as early as the autumn of 1914, though some of the methods applied successfully against Germany were either simply dropped in the Habsburg case or, due to lack of credibility, failed to work. As Jeszenszky points out, the Bryce Report type of atrocity stories,³ although used by all the nationalities of the Monarchy and allied propagandists alike, did not carry sufficient conviction and were received with very limited interest.⁴ These stories were less sensational than the atrocities supposedly committed by the public enemy number one, Germany, against neutral citizens, women, and children.

Most World War I propaganda was printed material. Besides the press, cartoons, posters, maps, pamphlets, and books were extensively used

while films and oral propaganda were hardly ever utilised in relation to Austria-Hungary. Successful foreign and domestic propaganda in America may have influenced the Wilson administration indirectly through public opinion; yet the further we move away in time from the war the more difficult it becomes to give an accurate account of the actual scope, methods, and effect of these efforts. Proof of the American circulation of books and pamphlets cited hereafter has been established in a variety of ways, from the survey of the libraries of the University of Chicago, the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, and the Imperial War Museum in London, to consulting contemporary and subsequent secondary sources. Nonetheless, in certain cases it has been impossible to establish further details of the authors' identity.

During the neutrality period there was no official federal propaganda agency in the United States. Wilson's call for neutrality "in thought as well as in action" received general approval. The President remained the chief propagandist of the whole period although some prominent politicians discussed the war and the necessity of American intervention. Austria-Hungary, if mentioned at all, was treated as a vassal of Germany and not a single American author dealt with her extensively. In National Strength and International Duty (1917) former president Theodore Roosevelt expressed sympathy for "the mass of men of different races to whom liberty is denied by the dual tyranny of the Germans and Magyars of Austria-Hungary." He concluded that the "war has shown that Austria has become a subject ally of Germany and an enemy of freedom and civilization. Unless we resolutely intend to break up Austria and Turkey, and insist on liberty for the subject races in the two countries, our talking about 'making the world safe for democracy' is a sham." Seorge D. Herron, one of the President's personal agents in Europe, revealed a similar attitude to the Monarchy: "We may now rest assured that no peace will be made with the Hapsburgs or the Hohenzollerns. . . over the Central Empires she [the United States] sees the rule of that Oriental and anachronistic absolutism which had so long perverted mankind — so long prevented the true progress and self-expression of the people."6 In some contrast with these pieces, S. Ivor Stephen questioned the neutrality of the American press because of certain aspects of its news presentation regarding the Central Powers.

The few American pamphlets which at least mentioned Austria-Hungary carried similar generalisations and reflected no particular interest. James M. Beck, for example, "a prominent Republican lawyer and one of his [Wilson's] bitterest opponents and critics." hardly ever mentioned Austria in his widely circulated pamphlets. At the same time, the author of *The Great Illusion* Norman Angell, referred to Austria as a German power which must be opposed by international cooperation in *America and*

the Cause of the Allies (1916). George Louis Beer, later American Peace Commissioner in Paris, remarked that the Central Powers were in a sense right when protesting against the British blockade which denied them equal access to neutral, i.e. American, war supplies. In accordance with this tendency, domestic American newspapers paid little attention to dismemberment propaganda. Herbert A. Miller, who was a close friend of Thomas G. Masaryk (then leader of the Czech independence movement), noted that "in the early years of the war there was scarcely any reference in the newspapers to central Europe. In fact it was not until the spectacular march of the Czechoslovaks across Siberia at a moment when other war news was scarce that attention finally became focused on the issues created by the Czechoslovaks." 10

Of all foreign propaganda in the United States prior to April 1917 the British was by far the most effective. Conducted "unofficially" from Wellington House, London, by the very gifted Sir Gilbert Parker, this campaign proved to be highly successful, not least because the American public was simply not aware of the involvement of the British government in it. With every pamphlet mailed to some 260,000 American addresses a personal letter from Parker was also enclosed. 11 The British, having cut the German underwater cables to the United States during the first month of the war, practically had a monopoly of news, although the Germans continued sending their news via South America, and by wireless or telegraph, through neutral capitals. 12 The next steps were to put the entire blame on Germany for starting the war and to present her in the worst possible light. A major success was scored with the Bryce Report on German atrocities in Belgium which became the model for this type of propaganda. With Germany defined as the main enemy, Austria-Hungary did not have a place in the front line of British government propaganda. Historian James D. Squires published a list of Wellington House pamphlets sent to America in 1935: out of 231 items only five dealt with the Monarchy in detail.¹³ In his writings Lewis B. Namier, a member of the Foreign Office, introduced the Czechs and Slovaks as branches of the same nation ruthlessly oppressed by Germans, Austrians and Magyars alike. In The Case of Bohemia (1917) he approached the question through the problems and threats posed by a German Mitteleuropa. In The Czecho-Slovaks. An Oppressed Nationality (1917) he presented it in a historical perspective from the cooperation of "Teuton Huns" and "Magyar Huns" over the centuries to the Czechs fighting for Allied victory in the war. Written by the "neutral" Prof. R. A. Reiss of Lausanne University on the special request of the Serbian Prime Minister Nicola Pasič, How Austria-Hungary Waged War in Serbia (1915) is no more than a piece of atrocity propaganda. Member of the Foreign Office A. W. A. Leeper's essay on Greater Rumania, influenced by R. W. Seton-Watson's (then a British journalist and leader of a pro-dismemberment group centred around his periodical, *The New Europe*) ideas, ¹⁵ was also circulated by Rumanian-Americans. The fifth pamphlet in Squires' list was written by Take Jonescu, a prominent Rumanian politician, later Rumanian peace commissioner. His *The Policy of National Instinct* (1916)¹⁶ was quoted in *Magyar and Rumanian in Hungary*, 16 a recommendation produced by the Inquiry, Wilson's peace planning research group: ¹⁷ "Either the Hungarians are to occupy the heights of the Carpathians and from that position to dominate us, or we are to establish ourselves in the citadel of Transylvania and from that position to dominate the plains of Hungary. There is no third possibility." It must be emphasized that there is not a single pamphlet by Seton-Watson or Henry Wickham-Steed, another New Europe propagandist and journalist, in Squires' Wellington House list, which proves that British government propaganda did not promote the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy at that stage.

A few other British pamphlets must have reached the American public via other channels. One route was through church connections, which was probably the case with Pearson's *The Nemesis of Germany and Austria*, an emotionally overheated piece with several references to "the whole rotten fabric of the detested Austrian monarchy." Another possibility was simultaneous publication in both countries like in case of Beaven's *Austrian Policy Since 1867* (1914) and *What Is at Stake in the War* (1915), a rare Seton-Watson pamphlet circulated by the British in America before April 1917. Both *The Austro-Servian Dispute* (1914) and Woods' *War and Diplomacy in the Balkans* (1915) discussed the road to Sarajevo and Austria's role in the outbreak of the war. Serbia featured in two more British pamphlets: while Lady Paget's *With Our Serbian Allies* is practically insignificant, Lipton's *The Terrible Truth about Serbia* is the report of a 1915 Red Cross mission.

French propaganda in the United States against the Monarchy is hardly worth mentioning at all. Even the chief advocates of the Czech case, like Ernest Denis, Ernest Lavisse, Emile Durkheim and Henri Bergson, failed to join the American campaign. The two really significant French contributions were the release of Benes' *Détruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie!* (1916), and the writings of André Chéradame, the chief French propagandist of dismemberment in the United States. Chéradame spoke out against the Monarchy as early as 1901 when his *L'Europe et la Question D'Autriche* was published in Paris. In his wartime writings, three of which were published in the United States, he argued that the break-up of the Monarchy and the liberation of the peoples of Central Europe (including the Magyars) were the only means of containing pan-Germanism. 19

The Italian campaign was even less productive with one single piece of atrocity propaganda. Austrian Barbarity Against Italian Churches in-

cluded 16 dated photographs and 8 pages of text. The fact that the latest picture was taken in December 1917 suggests that the release of this pamphlet was inspired by the American declaration of war on Austria-Hungary.

German propaganda in the United States focused on three things: (1) winning the German-Americans for the cause of their homeland, (2) rejecting responsibility for the outbreak of the war and (3) denying atrocity stories. This propaganda, organised and run by Dr. Derenburg and Ambassador von Bernstorff, had serious shortcomings: the open campaign started in the early days of the war was simply out of place in neutral America, support from Germany remained ineffective, and the pamphlets circulated were stylistically very poor and carried the emblem of the Imperial German Government. Only two pamphlets, both printed in Germany, dealt with the Monarchy: the first one was a collection of articles on the Monarchy surveying her ethnic, economic and financial conditions while the other one was not even translated into English.

Austro-Hungarian propaganda in America was conducted by the embassy and the consulates (especially the ones in New York and Cleveland). Besides subsidising Hungarian-American papers for carrying pro-Habsburg articles, the New York consulate (lead by von Nuber) published a 64-page general pamphlet, very similar to the first German one mentioned above. A small book, Ernest Ludwig's Austria-Hungary and the War (1915) was published with Ambassador Dumba's introduction and was translated into Hungarian as well. This was the only attempt to justify Austria's case, a fact proving that lack of interest was mutual between the two countries (i.e. The United States and the Monarchy) all through the period of American neutrality. Ludwig claimed that with the defeat of the Allies "England will lose her German and Austro-Hungarian customers to a very large degree and . . . this trade will shift to other countries, preferably to the United States." This rather weak appeal was complemented with references to the friendly relations between the two countries before the war and to Hungarians fighting in the American Civil War.²¹

As the British blockade cut off American war supplies from the Central Powers their respective American embassies tried to sabotage or, at least, hinder the manufacturing of munitions in America. Both ambassadors issued statements that, for German or Austro-Hungarian subjects, working in American munition factories might result in capital punishment on returning to the home country, which was the aim of many immigrants. Dumba's other move was a call for a strike by Hungarian-American workingmen. It appeared in *Szabadság* (Liberty), a Hungarian-American paper published in Cleveland. He later claimed that it was the editor of *Szabadság* who approached Consul-General von Nuber with the idea, and that he (Dumba) just gave his consent to it.²² Dumba sent his report to Foreign Minister Burian by an American journalist, James Archibald. On the way

to Vienna Archibald was arrested by British authorities acting upon information coming from Emmanuel Voska, a member of the Bohemian National Alliance.²³ The captured documents were published and Wilson and Lansing immediately demanded Dumba's recall, declaring him *persona non grata*. This so-called Dumba affair became a standard feature in all war fact handbooks and had grave consequences. The Czechs scored a major success: Dumba's successor, Count Tarnowski, was not allowed to present his credentials to Wilson. Clearly, the Monarchy's prestige had been impaired.

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The American declaration of war on Germany and the Habsburg Monarchy proved to be a turning point in World War I propaganda in America. The British abandoned Parker's covert campaign for a sweeping and overt one organised by Lord Northcliffe, while German and Austro-Hungarian propaganda slowly died away as financial support vanished with the closing of the Embassies. Meanwhile, immigrant groups from the Monarchy started canvassing openly for the independence of their respective homelands and the Committee on Public Information, an official federal agency, was set up to conduct American propaganda both at home and abroad. By the end of 1917 pro-Habsburg, and for that matter pro-Magyar, statements disappeared.

The increased American interest in the war prompted various people to step forth and satisfy this need. One contributor to American, but not government controlled propaganda was former president Theodore Roosevelt who published a series of articles for the Kansas City Star between October 1917 and his death in early January 1919. He reacted mainly to the events of the war but he also lent considerable support to dismemberment propagandists.²⁴ The National Security League, basically an interventionist organization led by former Secretary of State Elihu Root, issued a Handbook of War Facts and Peace Problems (1918), which discussed German and Austro-Hungarian activities in America and analyzed Czech. Rumanian and Yugoslav territorial claims. The Review of Reviews Company released a collection of Two Thousand Questions and Answers about the War (1918), with a large section on nationalities. John Price Jones in The German Spy in America (1917), published with an introduction by Theodore Roosevelt, devoted a whole chapter to Dumba's activities. Two books, both published in early 1918, revealed opposing views about Hungarians. Former ambassador to Germany, James W. Gerard's Face to Face with Kaiserism, despite the author's family relations to prominent Hungarian politician Count Sigray, presented Austria-Hungary as the "Kaiser's vassal state." An entirely different view was presented in Mrs. Bullitt's diary of a visit to Hungary in the company of her husband, William C. Bullitt, later American Peace Commissioner, in 1916. Published two years later, Mrs. Bullitt's diary revealed her high opinion of Hungarians.²⁵

British government propaganda in the meantime reached new heights. Working in a co-belligerent state, Northcliffe's agency had a relatively easy task. The volume of anti-Habsburg propaganda did not grow significantly, but its content underwent radical changes as the New Europe group was given a free hand.²⁶ Steed's Austria and Europe, written on the occasion of Emperor Francis Joseph's death in November 1916, was reprinted from The Edinburgh Review. The author proposed the total dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy along ethnic lines. These new nation-states would include a diminished Hungary while the Austro-Germans would join Germany. It was Seton-Watson who introduced the distinction between Hungarian and Magyar, the former referring to all inhabitants of the Kingdom of Hungary, the latter depicting the ethnic group. This distinction was widely used both in war propaganda and Peace Conference rhetoric. According to Arday, it is also due to his influence that the word "Magyarization" came to imply the adjective "ruthless."27 Seton-Watson was co-author of The War and Democracy, first released in 1914 and reprinted twice in 1915. It was a collection of nine essays with eight maps discussing the causes and problems of the war. In German, Slav, and Magyar (1916) Seton-Watson devoted an entire chapter to "Magyar racial policy." In Rumania and the Great War, published in 1915, he introduced the concept of Daco-Rumanian continuity to the general public, elaborated upon Rumania's aspirations and explained her position in the war. His pamphlets available in the U.S. were equally informative and wellpresented. In The Spirit of the Serb (1915) he called attention to the sufferings of Serbia, both past and present, and suggested the creation of a united South Slav state. In The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic (1915) he reiterated that Germany must be defeated through the destruction of her ally, the road to Berlin — he argued — led through the Balkans. In What Is at Stake in the War (1915) he wrote: "The dissolution of Austria-Hungary — an event which is only conceivable if Germany should be completely defeated — would include a complete regrouping of Central and South-eastern Europe." The main features of the proposed reorganisation, besides Polish independence, were the creation "of an independent Bohemia — including not merely the Czechs, but their Slovak kinsmen in Northern Hungary," and of a Greater Rumania "including the Roumanian populations of Hungary and the Bukovina"; the foundation of "a new Southern Slav state, composed of the present kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, the ancient but dormant Triune Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern Istria and perhaps the Slovene districts of Austria," and the establishment of "an independent Hungary, a national state shorn of the races whom she has so long and so grossly misgoverned, and herself set free for a new era of democratic development." He also insisted that no race should be "handed over to an alien rule without [being] previously consulted."28 Two further pamphlets were also circulated by the British. The War of Liberation (1917) called for the freedom of all subject races in the world. More important was Headlam-Morley's (later British Peace Commissioner) The Dead Lands of Europe (1917) which was written for Americans.²⁹ He too suggested the creation of independent nation states in Central Europe and explained the Allies' reply to Wilson's peace note of December 1916. British propagandists also used cartoons on a large scale to promote their ideas. The American press was flooded with the works of Louis Raemakers, a Dutch artist. A three volume collection of his cartoons was released in 1918-1919 and he had an exhibition in Chicago. 30 Overall, British government propaganda gained new dimensions and liberties with American intervention and Northcliffe's agents took full advantage of the situation.

Meanwhile, the nationalities of the Habsburg Empire were also industriously promoting their ideas. The Polish campaign for liberation produced one of the few pro-Monarchy manifestations of all nationality movements. Felix Mlynarski, a delegate of the Polish Supreme National Committee to America, remarked in his book on peace problems (1916) that the "entire world looks at Austria-Hungary's part through the spectacles of hatred against Germany. This is the reason Russian diplomacy was able to make the idea of a partition of Austria-Hungary generally popular." The core of his argument was that in case Austria-Hungary was dismembered "the German provinces of the Hapsbourg [sic] empire would naturally fall to Germany" which, "from the point of view of national evolution . . . would mean a triumph for Germany and national unification would be a balm on the defeat." Mlynarski's position is clear: the main enemies are Germany and Russia; Austria-Hungary — with South Slav trialism — could guarantee Polish independence.

The discussion of the aims and strength of the Czech-Slovak movement in America would extend beyond the scope of the present study. Suffice it to say that it was by far the most organised one and propaganda was seen as one of the obvious means of realising its ultimate goal: securing American support for the creation of a new state of Czechs, Slovaks, and Carpatho-Ruthenians. Yet, America's overall ignorance and lack of interest rendered the task of Czech propagandists extremely difficult.³² The whole campaign was launched in London, on the 500th anniversary of the burning of John Hus, who was one of the forerunners of the European Reformation.³³ The Czech campaign is best known for two books. An extended version of Benes' *Détruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie!* was published

as a small volume in English with an introduction by Steed in 1917, while Masaryk summed up his earlier thoughts in The New Europe (The Slav Standpoint) in 1918. Benes argued that it was the Monarchy who had started the war, the triggering force being Magyar ethnic policy represented by Premier István Tisza. According to Benes, the Monarchy was the most dangerous tool of Germany and the Magyars were the most loyal allies of the Germans. He accused Magyars of historic crimes: the Slavs, democratic and peaceful, had been ruthlessly oppressed by the German-Magyar alliance since medieval times. Consequently, Austria-Hungary deserved nothing short of destruction while the creation of independent Slav national states in the "heart of Europe" would have the double benefit of hitherto unexperienced development in the region on the one hand, and the containment of German eastward expansion on the other. Released in 1918. Masaryk's The New Europe (The Slav Standpoint) was possibly the most important propaganda publication about the Habsburg Monarchy. Masaryk too pointed to the necessity for the destruction of Austria-Hungary: she was an outpost of Germany, an "artificial state," whose partition would be in accordance with the will of her peoples and would remove the German threat to Russia by eliminating their common boundaries. In the new order thus created, a United Poland and Yugoslavia but, above all, a strong and democratic Czechoslovakia, would act as a buffer zone. Therefore, the creation of a non-German, anti-German, Slav national Central Europe was in the interest of the whole democratic world. After the present war, for which he too blamed the Magyars, this New Europe would be the key to European peace and prosperity.³⁴

With the guiding principles set by Benes and Masaryk, the Bohemian National Alliance (hereafter B.N.A.), seated in Chicago, started its campaign in America.³⁵ According to Vojta Benes, Edvard Benes' brother and B.N.A. activist, by December 1916 they had circulated some 20,000 pamphlets in the United States.³⁶ These included Seton-Watson's The Future of Bohemia (1915), and several works by Masaryk, which formed the basis of The New Europe. The Problem of Small Nations (1915) was his inaugural speech at the School of Slavonic Studies, King's College, London; his The Slavs Among the Nations (1916) was reprinted from the March 15, 1916 issue of Ernest Denis' La Nation Tcheque; The Declaration of the Bohemian (Czech) Foreign Committee (1916), also by Masaryk, was one of the first B.N.A. publications and Austrian Terrorism in Bohemia (1916), with Masaryk's introduction, was the Czech version of atrocity propaganda. The most productive Czech propagandist in America before Masaryk's arrival in May 1918 was Charles Pergler, originally a lawyer from Iowa. Pergler was vice-president of the B.N.A., head of the Czech-Slav Press Bureau, Masaryk's American secretary, Czechoslovak envoy in Washington during the Armistice period and the new republic's first ambassador to Japan. His first pamphlet was Bohemia's Claim to Independence (1916), a transcript of his speech delivered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 25, 1916. This was followed by three more publications which were further elaborations on the aims of the Czechs. The only pamphlet circulated in America going beyond the Benes-Masaryk line of propaganda was Pergler's Should Austria Exist? (1918), reprinted from the Yale Review. Its first paragraph was so uniquely extreme that it must be quoted: "Metternich once called Italy a mere geographical expression. This statement was never really true of Italy, but it may be applied to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Who ever heard of anyone calling himself an Austrian? Even Francis Joseph, the late Austrian Emperor, once asserted that he was a German prince. There is no Austrian language, no Austrian literature, no Austrian nationality, no Austrian civilization. Still, states do not come into being without the aid of powerful social, economic, and political factors. Austria's main justification for existence may be found in Asiatic invasions, that is, of the Huns (Magyars) and later the Turks." Three book length works of propaganda were also circulated in America by the Czechs. Edited by Thomas Čapek, Bohemia Under Hapsburg Misrule (1915) consisted of eight studies on Czech and Slovaks. Vladimir Nošek, the head of the Czech Press Bureau in London, gave an account of the Czechoslovak movement in *Independent* Bohemia (1918). The third book was Schwarze's The Life of John Hus, which appears to be the only separate piece of Hus-propaganda in America. Two journals, the Bohemian Review and the Bohemian Correspondence were also published regularly in Chicago, while Pergler's Press Bureau circulated the Czecho-Slovak Bulletin in New York City. Badges and postcards were also used to promote the Czech case. Around the signing of the Armistice, a detailed map of Central Europe, with the Czecho-Slovak ethnic boundaries highlighted, was publicly exhibited on 5th Ave., New York. Public meetings, especially after Masaryk's arrival, were also held, and Bohemian-American artist Voitech Preissing prepared some recruiting posters for the Czechoslovak Legion.³⁷ Masaryk crowned all Czech efforts with the Declaration of Czecho-Slovak Independence in Paris and Washington on October 18, 1918.³⁸

By contrast with Czech, Rumanian propaganda activities remained rather limited all through the war period. With the possibilities inherent in an organization like the B.N.A. lacking, it was the members of the Transylvanian mission who conducted propaganda in the United States. The mission included Vasile Stoica, Ion Mota, and the Rev. Vasile Lucaciu, father of the Rev. E. Lucaciu, mentioned below. They arrived in America in June 1917 to win support for Greater Rumania plans and to establish a Transylvanian Legion.³⁹ Stoica met Theodore Roosevelt on several occasions and secured his support. Rumanian-Americans, especial-

ly the Rev. E. Lucaciu, were also involved in counter espionage activities but, unlike the aforementioned Voska, they failed to score any major success. It was not until the Rumanian National League of America was founded (July 5, 1918) that a major Rumanian-American organization declared the education of American public opinion to be its main objective. Public meetings in Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, New York and Washington, D.C. were held, some under the auspices of the Committee on Public Information. To secure greater publicity, Stoica and Nicolae Lupu (of Bucharest University) supplied Boston, New York, Cleveland and Washington papers with information, and the League's own magazine, the Periscope, was published, although no Rumanian Press Bureau was established. Some 6,000 copies of 6 pamphlets and some maps were circulated. Stoica's Suffering in Transylvania and the Book of Sorrow (1917), edited by E. Lucaciu, were pieces of atrocity propaganda directed against the Magyars. Mitrany's Greater Rumania (1917) and Leeper's Justice of Rumania's Cause (1917) both attempted to justify Rumanian territorial claims against Hungary. Lupu's Rumania and the Great War consisted of a short account of Rumanian aspirations, her reasons for joining the Allies and her war sacrifices while Queen Marie of Rumania supplied the sixth piece. The circulation of three books dealing with Rumania, including Seton-Watson's Rumania and the Great War, was largely due to British efforts. Magnus' Rumania's Cause and Ideals (1917) contributed but little: besides discussing population statistics and enumerating various methods of "forced Magyarization," the author elaborated upon the Rumanian aspects of the German Mitteleuropa plan. Hirst's book was written for the British public but was released in America as well. A forth book briefly mentioned the Transylvanian mission working in the United States.40

South Slav propaganda in America was divided over the Pan-Serb versus Yugoslav issue. By early 1918, when immigrant propaganda was likely to have some influence, the Yugoslav idea became the preference of both the South Slav Americans and the Wilson administration.⁴¹ It appears that the British circulated more pamphlets in America about Serbia than the Serbians themselves, mainly because the South Slav immigrants in America came almost exclusively from the Monarchy where the Pan-Serb idea was not very popular. An extended version of Professor Reiss' account of Austro-Hungarian atrocities in Serbia was circulated as a book. Velimirovič's Serbia's Place in Human History (1915), dedicated to Seton-Watson, was the only Serbian pamphlet definitely circulated in America. Tučič's The Slav Nations (1915),⁴² one of the Daily Telegraph War Books, was published in the United States as well as in England. Another rare piece of pro-Habsburg, yet at the same time anti-Magyar, propaganda in America came from a Croatian-American, the Rev. Krmpotič. In Are

Italy's Claims Justified (1915) he rejected the "Pan-Serb illusion" and argued: "If after this war the Austro-Hungarian empire is desmembered [sic], of which, so far, there is not the slightest indication, the only successful adjustment among the Southern Slavs would consist in a federalization of the states on the basis of equality, and in not allowing any one state to absorb any other." He went on to discuss what he considered to be the more likely outcome: "If, on the other hand, when the cloud of war has cleared, Austro-Hungarian sovereignty and monarchical integrity is not broken down, it is most certain that a new policy of federation must be carried out, which will give the Slavs in the Monarchy full power in the government of their respective countries." He put the blame on the Magyars for the lack of trialism in the Monarchy, and also warned that "democracy is coming; she shall break the Magyar oligarchy. The price for the long existing oppression of Croats by the Magyars is to be paid."

The arrival of Hiňko Hiňkovič and Bogumil Vosnjak revitalized Yugoslav propaganda in America. 44 Hiňkovič, a former Croatian member of the Hungarian parliament, was sent to America by the Serbian Premier, Nicola Pasič. During his stay in the United States Hiňkovič abandoned the Pan-Serb programme and came to represent Ante Trumbič's Yugoslav Committee. Vosnjak, a Slovenian by birth, was sent to America by Trumbič to promote the Yugoslav idea. Evidence proves that at least three Yugoslav Committee pamphlets (all published in England) reached the American public. 45 Austro-Magyar Judicial Crimes (1916), released in a slightly altered version by the Yugoslav Committee in North America as well, was the South Slav contribution to the atrocity propaganda campaign against the Monarchy. In The Jugoslavs In Future Europe Hiňkovič discussed "Magyar misrule in Croatia" and argued for dismemberment on the grounds that if Austria-Hungary, "this monstrous phenomenon," survived the war it would "repeat itself in yet another war." He also echoed the German-Magyar conspiracy theory: "The Magyars have always sought and found in Berlin support for their Imperialistic fancies just as, on the other hand, in Germany they have always been considered a most important pawn in the Hamburg-Bagdad game." He summed up the Yugoslav idea in the following words: "That ideal is the unity in one single State of all the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, who are one nation, with the same language, and the same tendencies, and whom only adverse fate has divided."46 The Jugoslav Problem (1918), reprinted for circulation from the World Court, a New York magazine, followed the same line of thought in many cases with word for word correspondence. Vosnjak's Jugoslav Nationalism (1916) was another lengthy discussion of the South Slav question, while in A Dying Empire (1918) he introduced new arguments as well. An independent Yugoslav state, argued Vosnjak, would be the key factor in the economics of the Balkans. Yugoslavia would also contain German eastward expansion by cutting her off from the East and frustrating her plan to connect the Rhine and the Danube (which would be the guarantee of German economic and political domination in Central Europe). Vosnjak called the making of Hungary "one of the most striking sociological processes." He claimed that "historical research will prove the great share of Slavdom in the foundation of the Hungarian State." Of all Slavs the Slovenes "taught the Magyars the art of peace-agriculture, industry, and statecraft." The Magyars were "warriors and nomads bearing their home and their constitution on the backs of their horses. Slav civilization changed them, and gave them more Western notions." Still the Magyars refused to admit their indebtedness to the Slavs. They were always a minority in their own country and they "began with brutal denationalization" in the late eighteenth century to change this situation. The only Magyar to be respected was Kossuth who suggested the creation of a Danubian Confederation based upon the equality of nations in the region. Instead, the Ausgleich of 1867 secured Magyar domination in the Eastern half of the Monarchy and the Magyars "became worse than Prussians, their ideology became more [than] Prussian."⁴⁷ Not surprisingly, he called for the establishment of an independent South Slav State and Bohemia at the expense of reducing Hungary to her ethnic boundaries. In A Bulwark Against Germany (1919) Vosnjak introduced the Slovenes to the American public and gave arguably the best contemporary account of the Yugoslav movement.

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To promote his ideas, President Wilson created the Committee on Public Information (hereafter C.P.I.), an official ministry of propaganda, by an executive order on April 4, 1917. It consisted of the Secretaries of State (Lansing), Navy (Daniels) and War (Baker), and George Creel. 48 Creel was a pro-Wilson progressive journalist and his appointment as chief of the C.P.I. had a rather reserved press reception. Financed from a special Presidential fund, the C.P.I. achieved considerable success in mobilizing American public opinion for the war.⁴⁹ Creel had supervision over the publication of war news though he denied the existence of any kind of censorship.⁵⁰ The Official Bulletin was published daily from May 10, 1917, reaching a monthly circulation of 118,008 by August, 1918. For further education of the public no less than 75,117,178 copies of 94 pamphlets were circulated. The Division of Films produced approximately 20 films, including Pershing's Crusaders, Under Four Flags, America's Answer, and an official weekly War Review.⁵¹ Donald M. Ryerson organized the first group of the so-called Four Minute Men in Chicago, then contacted Creel. The C.P.I. chief liked the idea, embraced it and, by the end of the war, 75,000 government agents had delivered 755,190 four-minute long speeches (hence the name, besides its reference to the Revolution) to a total audience of 314,454,514 people in American cinemas before the show of the main feature films. To the 47 *Official Bulletins*, 3 Army-, 4 Junior Four Minute Men-, and 6 News Bulletins were added.⁵²

By early 1918 Creel believed that the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy was necessary and inevitable. Yet, at the same time he had to secure the loyalty of enemy aliens including the Hungarian Americans. On the initiative of Frank I. Cobb (editor of The New York World) Creel entrusted Alexander Konta, a New York banker of Hungarian birth and a personal acquaintance of the President, with the organization of the American-Hungarian Loyalty League in January, 1918.⁵³ In May 1918 the Division of Work Among the Foreign-Born was established with Miss Josephine Roche as its director and Konta was replaced by Arthur Markus as head of the Hungarian Bureau. Creel's final report on the C.P.I. revealed that: "54 articles based on Government material were released by the bureau and published in practically all the 28 Hungarian papers extensively."54 Establishing control over the Hungarian-American press was justified by the fact that it had supported the Monarchy in return for financial aid during the early years of the war and its involvement in the rather awkward Dumba affair. Furthermore, the C.P.I. supervised the meetings of the League and printed Liberty Loan posters and a pamphlet, A Message to American-Hungarians (1918), both in English as well as in Hungarian.55 The Division of Work Among the Foreign-Born also had a Czechoslovak Bureau which was in regular contact with Bohemian-American organizations and the Czech-Slav Press Bureau. The Yugoslav Bureau, besides its routine work, lent support to South Slav relief organizations, and Hiňkovič also helped the work of the Bureau. 56 Surprisingly, no Rumanian and Carpatho-Ruthenian bureaus were created. Only a very small percentage of this, in some respects impressive, American propaganda effort was devoted to the Monarchy, and the dismemberment of Hungary was never even mentioned. There was not a single C.P.I. poster about the Administration's approach to Austria-Hungary. Nor did the Four Minute Men Bulletins or the C.P.I. pamphlets deal with the question extensively. The War Encyclopedia (1918) carried references to Austria-Hungary, Magyarization, Count István Tisza and Transylvania. Wilson's 1917 Flag Day Address, and Four Minute Men Bulletins Nos. 14 and 31 (August-September 1917, and May-June 1918 respectively) reflected the President's well-known views of the Monarchy in general terms.

In striking contrast with its rather lacklustre propaganda effort as far as the Monarchy was concerned, the C.P.I. was actively involved in the organization of the Mid-European Union (hereafter M.E.U.). In

September 1918 Creel entrusted Herbert A. Miller with the creation of a league involving all the advocates of the reorganization of Central Europe. Membership of the M.E.U. ranged from representatives of the nationalities (Masaryk, Paderewski, Stoica, and Hiňkovič) to prominent Americans (expresident Taft, Senators Lodge and Hitchcock). Nevertheless, heated arguments over regional interests (Czech vs. Polish, Italian vs. Yugoslav) destroyed the M.E.U. within three months.⁵⁷ The actual importance of the organization of the M.E.U., however, must not escape attention: for the first time ever in American history a Federal Agency not merely financed but created an organization aiming to destroy and replace a significant European power. The administration's involvement with the M.E.U. also indicated that Wilson had irrevocably abandoned Point X of the Fourteen Points by the fall of 1918.

Propaganda may have come of age in the First World War but propaganda regarding the Monarchy, at least in America, remained rather limited in scope as well as in effect. In terms of scope the output is unconvincing: four years of activities yielded some 100 posters, pamphlets, and books most of which were released and circulated by immigrant organizations. The books were hardbound, pocket-sized (with a very few exceptions), relatively cheap and due to their physical appearance they carried more authenticity than the best pamphlet, being an obvious piece of propaganda, could ever achieve. A quick check of the list of pamphlets and books in the Appendix reveals that most of this propaganda material was released through some half a dozen publishers: Nesbit and Co., George Allen and Unwin Ltd., and Hodder and Stoughton in Britain; G.B. Putnam's Sons, E.P. Dutton Co., Fleming H. Revell Co., and George H. Doran Co.(the American branch of Hodder and Stoughton) in America. The B.N.A. alone released or circulated almost one fifth of all these publications.

To a large extent propaganda produced by immigrant groups was informative: the Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, etc. had to be introduced to the American public. The pattern was quite simple: a presentation of (sometimes invented) historical facts was followed by an extensive list of grievances, and the bases for the argument for creating national states were the right to self-determination and the containment of Germany, both reflecting Wilson's rhetoric. These introductions, more often than not, went hand in hand with anti-Magyar propaganda. Hungary and the Magyars were presented as Germany's main allies and the archenemies of minority groups and democratic institutions not least because, unlike in the case of Germany, a clear distinction between the People and the Government was denied to the Magyars in Wilsonian rhetoric. All through the war, calls for dismemberment overwhelmed pro-Habsburg and pro-Hungarian propaganda. Austria and Hungary were not listened to partly

because of their obvious enemy status but mainly because they did not have much to say.

In terms of efficiency French and Italian efforts were hardly worth mentioning. A significant contribution came from Britain, though not primarily in the form of government propaganda but through a handful of intellectuals, the *New Europe* group, who enjoyed considerable government support only after the United States had entered the war. They managed to reach the Inquiry and the American public but failed to influence the President himself. Actual dismemberment propaganda was promoted by immigrants, spearheaded by the Czechs with considerable support from Britain. However, it was not the Czech campaign for independence that opened the way for Masaryk and his team to the White House but an issue of high politics: when Wilson needed the Czechoslovak legion in the Russian intervention the American press (under C.P.I. control) "discovered" the heroic struggle of these legionaries. This was a golden opportunity for propaganda but the underlying image of the conflict between "democratic Slavs" and "autocratic Germans and Magyars" did not allow for an attack on Soviet Russia. Rumanian-American efforts, due to ineffective support from home and the country's prewar record (tariff disputes with the U.S., and anti-semitism), proved even less successful. Yugoslav propaganda was similarly fruitless, although for different reasons. Divided in language and religion as well as over the form of their future government, no coordination was exercised by any South Slav authority. Domestic American, especially C.P.I., propaganda hardly ever carried any reference to the future of the Monarchy, but when it did, it favoured dismemberment. Creel's involvement with the M.E.U. demonstrated that the American decision regarding the future of the Habsburg Monarchy was final and irreversible. It also indicated that the Wilson administration was willing to go all the way with dismemberment despite all the obvious difficulties which were carefully avoided by immigrant propagandists but which surfaced immediately with the first attempt at putting theory into practice.

Anti-Habsburg and anti-Magyar propaganda in the Allied countries proved to be extremely successful due to the fact that it enjoyed the support of governments and pressure groups alike. In the entirely different setting of the United States this was not the case. President Wilson's final decision in favour of dismemberment was the result of military and diplomatic developments during the last year of the war. Hence, it can be said that the war for Wilson's ear was never won on the battlefield of American propaganda.

NOTES

The author would like to take this opportunity to thank Drs. Robin Okey and Callum A. MacDonald for the guidance and help they had extended to him while he was a graduate student of theirs at the University of Warwick.

See for example Charles Roetter, Psychological Warfare (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1974); M. L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda During the First World War, 1914-1918 (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982); Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927). Further references are given in the footnotes below.

²Stephen Borsody, "Hungary's Road to Trianon: Peacemaking and Propaganda," in *Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, A Case Study on Trianon*, Bela K. Kiraly, Peter Pastor, and Ivan Sanders, eds., (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1982), p. 26.

³On the Bryce Report see Arthur Ponsonby, Falsehood in War-Time. Containing an Assortment of Lies Circulated Throughout the Nations During the Great War (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1928); H.C. Peterson, Propaganda for War. The Campaign Against American Neutrality, 1914-1917 (Norman, OKL: Oklahoma University Press, 1939), pp. 55-70; James Morgan Read, Atrocity Propaganda, 1914-1919 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1941. Reprint. New York: Arno Press, 1972), pp. 51-63. It is obvious that most of the stories were either invented or forged.

⁴Géza Jeszenszky, Az elveszett presztízs. Magyarország megitélésének megváltozása Nagy-Britanniában, 1894-1918 (The Lost Prestige. The Change in the Image of Hungary in Great Britain) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1986), pp. 277-278.

⁵Roosevelt, *National Strength*, pp. 89, 91. The Appendix at the end of the present study lists all the propaganda material cited hereafter. Books and pamphlets are listed separately with full bibliographical references where available.

⁶Herron, Woodrow Wilson, p. 142. Herron's book is actually a collection of articles, the one quoted here appeared first in the March 4, 1917 issue of *Il Giornale d'Italia*, a Rome daily.

⁷Joseph P. Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him* (London: William Heinemann, 1922), p. 364.

⁸A collection of Beck's speeches and pamphlets was reprinted in *The War and Humanity*, which appeared with an introduction by Theodore Roosevelt.

⁹Beer, America's International Responsibilities, pp. 1, 12-13.

¹⁰Herbert Adolphus Miller, "What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia," in *Czechoslovakia*, Robert J. Kerner, ed., (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CAL: University of California Press, 1949), p. 74. These "issues" included the dismemberment of the Monarchy.

¹¹On Parker's American connections see Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, pp. 169, 171-172. A letter by Parker is reprinted in Peterson, *Propaganda for War*, facing p. 52.

¹²Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, p. 171; Robert W. Desmond, *Windows on the World. World News Reporting*, 1914-1920 (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1980), p. 293. Neutral capitals involved in German news transfer were Amsterdam, Berne, Copenhagen, Stockholm and The Hague.

¹³James Duane Squires, British Propaganda at Home and in the United States from 1914 to 1917 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), appendix.

14The word "Hun" requires some explanation: in the usual tendency of scapegoating British propagandists put the label "the Hun" on Emperor William II because of his infamous speech delivered to German troops sent to put down the Boxer rising in China in 1900. On the other hand, it is one of the popular misconceptions of Hungarian history, dating back to Medieval chronicles, that the Hungarians were descendants of Attila's Huns. This coincidence was also noticed and abused by Czech propagandists.

¹⁸Lajos Arday, *Térkép. csata után. Magyarország a brit külpolitikában* (1918-1919) (Map After the Battle. Hungary in British Foreign Policy) (Budapest: Magyető, 1990), p. 48.

¹⁶This pamphlet is a transcript of two speeches delivered by Jonescu in the Rumanian Parliament on December 17 and 18, 1915.

¹⁷Inquiry Document No. 240, by Max Handman. See: National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group 256. On the Inquiry see: Lawrence Emerson Gelfand, *The Inquiry. American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963).

¹⁸Durkheim and Bergson do not need introduction, Lavisse was President of the French Academy while Denis, a well-known historian of Bohemia, was appointed as chief of the Comite d'Etudes, one of the French peace preparation committees.

¹⁹Arthur J. May, *The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy*, 1914-1918, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966.), 2: 554.

²⁰Roetter, *Psychological*, pp. 37-41, 54-59; Squires, *British Propaganda*, p. 45; Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique*, pp. 146-149.

²¹Ludwig, Austria-Hungary, pp. 187-188, 192-194.

²²Constantin Theodore Dumba, *Memoirs of a Diplomat* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1933), pp. 256-258. The journalist involved in the Dumba affair was Martin Dienes.

²³On Voska's activities see: Emmanuel V. Voska and Irwin Will. *Spy and Counterspy* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1940); Arthur Willert, *The Road to Safety. A Study in Anglo-American Relations* (London: D. Verschoyle, 1952.), pp. 22-31; Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, p. 201.

²⁴Theodore Roosevelt, Roosevelt in the Kansas City Star. War-Time Editorials by Theodore Roosevelt (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921).

²⁵Bullitt, Uncensored Diary, pp. 254-268.

²⁶The New Europe group has been sufficiently studied; this essay focuses exclusively on their American propaganda. For further details in English see Harry Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary During the First World War. A Study in the Formation of Public Opinion (London: Oxford University Press, 1962): Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe. R.W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1981). In Hungarian see Arday, Térkép, pp. 32-71, 112-119; Jeszenszky, Elveszett presztízs.

²⁷Arday, *Térkép*, p. 312, elaboration on footnote 6 from p. 113.

²⁸Seton-Watson, What Is at Stake, p. 12.

²⁹Headlam-Morley, *Dead Lands*, p. 6: "The United States of America have been founded to maintain the principle of government of the people by the people for the people," is a typical statement. This version was published in the U.S. only.

No The exhibition, back in 1916, was a failure, but by the end of the war 2,224 Raemakers' cartoons were printed in American papers. See Sanders and Taylor. *British Propaganda*, pp. 176-177.

³¹Mlynarski, *Problems*, pp. 57, 80.

³²Miller, "What Woodrow Wilson," pp. 71-72.

³³This was the best possible choice for two reasons: (1) Masaryk had been in touch with Scton-Watson for almost a year; (2) besides Comenius, Hus was the only Czech known in the West and both his role in paving the way for the Reformation and his martyrdom had high emotional appeal.

³⁴For a comparison of Masaryk's plan and Oscar Jaszi's Danubian confederation idea (discussed in *The Future of the Monarchy*, Budapest, 1918) see: Borsody, "Hungary's Road," pp. 37-38, footnote 12.

³⁵On Czech propaganda in America see: Thomas Čapek, The Čechs [Czechs] (Bohemians) in America: A Study of Their National, Cultural, Political, Social, Economic, and Religious Life (Boston and New York: Houghton and Mifflin Co., 1920), pp. 265-278,

Charles Pergler, America in the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence (Philadelphia, PA: Dorrance and Co., 1926.), pp. 11-34; Miller, "What Woodrow Wilson," pp. 71-76.

³⁶Robert William Seton-Watson, *Masaryk in England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), pp. 96-100.

³⁷On posters see War Posters Issued by Belligerent and Neutral Nations, 1914-1919, Martin Hardie and Arthur K. Sabin, eds., (London: A. & C. Black Ltd., 1920.), p. 42; Čapek, Čechs in America, p. 273.

³⁸Otakar Odlozilik, "The Czechs," in *The Immigrants' Influence on Wilsonian Peace Policies*, Joseph P. O'Grady, ed., (Louisville, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), p. 221.

³⁹On discussion of Rumanian propaganda see *Unification of the Rumanian National State. The Union of Transylvania with Old Romania*, Miron Constantinescu and Stefan Pascu, eds., (Bucharest: Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1971); Thomas A. Devasia, *The United States and the Formation of Greater Romania*, 1914-1918 (Ph.D. Thesis. Boston Coilege, Boston, MA, 1970); Victor S. Mamatey, *The United States and East-Central Europe*, 1914-1918. A study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).

⁴⁰Halsey, Balfour, p. 111.

⁴¹George J. Prpić, "The South Slavs," in *Immigrants' Influence*, O'Grady, ed., p. 188.

⁴²Tučič was co-editor of the *Southern Slav Bulletin*, published in London. See Hanak, *Great Britain*, p. 81.

⁴³These sections were reproduced in Inquiry Document No. 38.

⁴⁴Prpič, "South Slavs," pp. 176-177, 180.

⁴⁵Austro-Magyar Judicial Crimes, and one each by Hiňkovič and Vosnjak.

⁴⁶Hiňkovič, Jugoslavs, p. 51.

⁴⁷Vosnjak, Dying Empire, pp. 140-145.

⁴⁸On the C.P.I. see, George Creel, How we Advertised America (New York: Harper and Brothers Co., 1920. Reprint. New York: Arno Press, 1972); James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words That Won the War. The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939); Stephen Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines. Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).

⁴⁹George Creel, Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information, 1917:1918:1919 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920), pp. 8-10.

⁵⁰George Creel, Rebel at Large. Recollections of Fifty Crowded Years (New York: G.B. Putnam's Sons, 1947), pp. 156-165.

51Crcel, Complete Report, pp. 15-18, 47-61, 63-67.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 32-43. See also *The Four Minute Men of Chicago* (Chicago, IL: privately published, 1919); Alfred E. Cornebise, *War As Advertised: The Four Minute Men and America's Crusade*, 1917-1918 (Philadelphia, PA: American Philosophical Society, 1984).

⁵³Mock and Larson, Words, pp. 220-225; Creel, Complete Report, p. 91; Creel, How We Advertised, pp. 184-200. On Cobb's initiative see also The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Arthur S. Link et al., eds., 66 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966 onwards), 45: 241. 54. Creel, Complete Report, p. 91.

⁵⁵For the programme of such a meeting see Mock and Larson, *Words*, p. 224. The same book also features a Liberty Loan poster in Hungarian on p. 220, 35,000 copies of the pamphlet were released. See Creel, *Complete Report*, p. 91.

⁵⁶On the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Bureaus see Creel, *Complete Report*, pp. 88-89, 93-94 respectively. On cooperation between Pergler. Hiňkovič, and Creel see: Creel, *How We Advertised*, pp. 186-187.

⁵⁷Arthur J. May, "The Mid-European Union," in *Immigrants' Infuence*, O'Grady, ed., pp. 250-271.

APPENDIX

A list of World War I Pamphlets and Propaganda Books Circulated about Austria-Hungary in the United States

PAMPHLETS

- Angell, Norman. America and the Cause of the Allies. London: Union of Democratic Control, National Labour Press, 1916.
- Austria-Hungary and the War. New York: Austro-Hungarian Consulate General, 1915.
- Austrian Barbarity Against Italian Churches. Florence: Istituo Micrografico Italiano [no date].
- Austrian Terrorism in Bohemia. London: The Czech National Alliance in Great Britain, 1916.
- Austro-Magyar Judicial Crimes. Persecution of the Jugoslavs. Political Trials, 1908-1916. London: H. Howes and Co., 1916; Chicago: The Jugoslav Committee in North America [no date].
- The Austro-Servian Dispute. London: Macmillan and Co. 1914.
 Beaven, Murray. Austrian Policy Since 1867. London, Edinburgh,
 Glasgow, New York, Toronto, Melbourne, Bombay: Oxford
 University Press, 1914.
- Beck, James. *The United States and the War*. New York: The Pennsylvania Society [no date].
- Beer, George Louis. America's International Responsibilities and Foreign Policy. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1916.
- Benes, Edvard, Détruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie! Le martyre des Tchéco-Slovaques a travers l'histoire. Paris, 1916.
- Cserny, Karl von. *Deutsch-ungarische Beziehungen*. Leipzig: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1915.

- Headlam[-Morley], J. W. *The Dead Lands of Europe*. New York, George H. Doran Co., 1917.
- Hiňkovič, Hiňko. The Jugoslav Problem. New York, 1918.
- _____. The Jugoslavs in Future Europe. London: The Near East Ltd. [no date].
- Jonesco, Take. *The Policy of National Instinct*. London: Sir Joseph Canston and Sons Ltd., 1916.
- Krmpotič, M. D. Are Italy's Claims on Istria, Dalmatia and Islands Justified: On Greater Serbia. 1915 [no further details].
- Leeper, A. W. A. The Justice of Rumania's Cause. London, 1917.
- Lipton, Sir Thomas. *The Terrible Truth about Serbia*. London: The British Red Cross Society, 1915.
- Lucaciu, Rev. E. ed. The Book of Sorrow. 1917 [no details].
- Lupu, Nicolae. Rumania and the Great War. [no details].
- Marie, Queen of Rumania. My Country. [no details].
- Masaryk, Thomas G. Declaration of the Bohemian (Czech) Foreign Committee. Chicago: Bohemian National Alliance of America, 1916.
- -----. The New Europe (The Slav Standpoint). London, 1918.
- -----. The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis. London: Council for the Study of International Relations, 1915.
- -----. The Slavs Among the Nations. London: The Czech National Alliance in Great Britain, 1916.
- Mitrany, D. *Greater Rumania: A study in National Ideals*. London. New York, Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917.
- A Message to American-Hungarians. Washington, D.C.: C.P.I., 1918.

 Namier, Lewis B. The Case of Bohemia. London: The Czech National Alliance in Great Britain, 1917.

- -----. The Czecho-Slovaks. An oppressed Nationality. London, New York, Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917.
- Paget, Lady. With Our Serbian Allies. London: Serbian Relief Fund [no date].
- Pearson, John J. The Nemesis of Germany and Austria. According to the Scriptures. London: Christian Globe Office [no date].
- Pergler, Charles. Bohemian Hopes and Ambitions. Chicago: Bohemian National Alliance of America. 1916.
- -----. The Bohemians (Czechs) in the Present Crisis. Chicago: Bohemian National Alliance of America, 1916.
- -----. Bohemia's Claim to Independence. Chicago: Bohemian National Alliance of America, 1916.
- -----. The Heart of Europe. Chicago: Bohemian National Alliance of America, 1917.
- -----. Should Austria-Hungary Exist? [reprint from Yale Review].
- The President's Flag Day Address. With Evidence of Germany's Plans. Washington, D.C.: C.P.I., 1917.
- Reiss, R. A. How Austria-Hungary Waged War in Serbia. Personal Investigations of a Neutral. Paris: Libraire Armand Colin, 1915.
- -----. The Kingdom of Serbia. Infringements of the Rules and Laws of War Committed by the Austro-Bulgaro-Germans. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1919 [2nd ed.].
- Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages, Presided over by the Right Hon. Viscount Bryce. London, 1915 [no publisher].
- Seton-Watson, R. W. *The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic*. London: Nisbet and Co. 1915.
- ----. The Future of Bohemia. London, Nisbet and Co. 1915.
- ----. The Spirit of the Serb. London, Nisbet and Co. 1915.

- -----. What Is at Stake in the War. London, New York, Toronto, Melbourne, Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1915.
- Steed, H. W. Austria and Europe. [no details].
- Stoica, Vasile. Sufferings in Transylvania. [no details].
- Velimirovič, Nicholas. Serbia's Place in Human History. London: Council for the Study of International Relations, 1915.
- Vosnjak, Bogumil. Jugoslav Nationalism. London, 1916.
- War Cyclopedia. Washington, D.C.: C.P.I., 1918.
- A War of Liberation. New York: George H. Doran Co., 1917.
- Woods, H. Charles. *War and Diplomacy in the Balkans*. London: The Field and Queen Ltd. 1915.
- The Work and Wealth of Austria-Hungary. A Series of Articles Surveying Economic, Financial and Industrial Conditions in the Dual Monarchy During the War. Berlin: Continental Times, 1916.

BOOKS

- Allison, J. Murray ed. *Raemakers' Cartoon History of the War.* 3 vols. New York: The Century Co., 1918-1919.
- Angell, Norman. America and the New World State. A Plea for American Leadership in International Organization. New York, London: G.B. Putnam's Sons, 1915.
- Beck, James M. The War and Humanity. A Further Discussion of the Ethics of the World War and the Duty of the United States. New York, London: G.B. Putnam's Sons, 1917.
- Benes, Edouard. *Bohemia's Case for Independence*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1917.

- Bullitt, E. D. An Uncensored Diary from the Central Empires. London: Stanley Paul and Co., 1918.
- Can Germany Win? The Resources and Aspirations of Its People. By an American. London: C. Arthur Pearson Ltd., 1915 [5th ed.].
- Čapek, Thomas ed. Bohemia Under Hapsburg Misrule. A Study of the Ideals and Aspirations of the Bohemian and Slovak Peoples, as they relate to and are affected by the great European War. New York, Chicago, Toronto, London: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1915.
- Chéradame, André. The Pangerman plot Unmasked. Berlin's Formidable Peace Trap of the "Drawn War". New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1917.
- -----. Pan-Germany: The Disease and Cure. Boston, 1918.
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