

## **Appendix**

### **Document 1**

## **The Hungarian Problem**

Editor's notes:

The following document is reproduced from the records of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (RG 266, regular series, 1941–45, doc. no. 79021), deposited in the National Archives of the United States (NAUS). The document's first page contains an excerpt from a March 1944 press report by Noel Panter. Its second page is the second page of an essay, apparently entitled "The Hungarian Problem." The first page of this essay has not been located. The OSS index to RG 266, regular series, identifies Oscar Jaszi as the author of this essay, and gives July 1, 1944 as the time of its receipt by the agency. The document was declassified, at the request of N.F. Dreisziger, on 25 Feb. 1991. (Authority NND 750140). N.F.D. is indebted to the staff of NAUS for declassifying this (and other) OSS document(s) for him, and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for providing him with a research grant that made his research in Washington and elsewhere possible during 1990–91.

In the reprinting of this document, the original spelling of certain words was retained, even though this is unconventional (e.g. Jugoslavia instead of Yugoslavia) or is not used by our journal (e.g. Hapsburg instead of Habsburg).

Declassified

## The Hungarian Problem

The essence of the Hungarian situation was admirably stated by an Englishman, Noel Panter, for several years a special correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post* stationed at Budapest who wrote in the March 31, 1944 issue of his paper the following introductory remarks to a careful and well informed article:

“Hungary’s occupation is but the natural development of a policy pursued during the past twelve years. To do the rulers of Hungary justice they never concealed or camouflaged their intentions or predilections. They were and are revisionist and pro-Axis. Leaders of a nation which cannot forget, which has ‘No, no, never’ as its watchword, and much of whose misery and discontent was born of defeat could not well have acted otherwise.

Kállay, whom there is just now a tendency to represent as a liberal minded man fallen victim to Nazi malevolence, was in May, 1942, engaged making speeches emphasizing Hungary’s duty to the Axis and threatening ‘with whip and gallows’ all those who failed to appreciate the sign of the times. . . .”

[the rest by Jaszi, starting on p. 2 of his essay]

### The Hungarian Problem

#### II

This German orientation, however, which Mr. Panter describes, did not originate after the first World War and the dismemberment of Hungary but it has been a well thought out policy of a series of Hungarian governments. *This policy was a logical and inevitable continuation of the dominant currents of Hungarian Public life since the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which guaranteed the leading role of the German bourgeoisie in Austria and the feudal classes in Hungary.*

By at least the beginning of the 20th century it was evident to all unbiased observers, both Hungarians and foreigners, that the Dual System, established by the Compromise of 1867, was collapsing. Both the Austrian and the Hungarian parliaments were paralyzed by obstructionism. The national minorities in both countries which constituted the majority of the population in the Hapsburg monarchy, accused the system of giving unjust advantages to the Germans and Hungarians to the detriment of the other national groups.

All the progressive elements in both parts of the monarchy recognized that the growing crisis could only be cured by the introduction of universal

equal suffrage with secret ballot which would make an end to the domination of the German and the Magyar oligarchies. The resistance of the leading German bourgeoisie was not very strong, for the parliamentary reform was advocated by labor, the national minorities, and even very influential elements around the court and in the general staff who understood that the Hapsburg monarchy, without popular support, must necessarily succumb. Under the pressure of all these groups who found great support in the energetic personality of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, universal, equal, and direct suffrage was introduced in Austria in 1907. *It became more and more a common opinion of advanced thinkers that the dualistic structure of the monarchy must be replaced by a kind of federalism giving equal rights to the Slavs and the other nationality groups.*

The greatest obstacle to this reform and to universal suffrage was the Hungarian feudal parliament. Its Upper House had a strictly medieval character and the Lower House was absolutely dominated by the landed aristocracy and the financial capitalism utterly at the disposal of the lords. This feudal system had two main objectives. One was to maintain the *latifundia* and the great economic privileges which feudal agrarianism enjoyed by its predominance in the dualistic set-up. Its second main objective was to safeguard the exclusively Magyar character of the state against the will of at least one half of the population. The very idea of a federal structure with the other nationality groups, especially the Slavs, was regarded as treason, and even the acknowledgment of the existence of the nationality problem was punished by social and political ostracism.

### III

The reactionary forces in Hungary, under the leadership of Count Stephen Tisza, made a parliamentary reform in Hungary impossible and the nationality tension in the monarchy assumed more and more dangerous features in the form of the various *irredentas*. Especially the gravity of the Southern Slav problem grew continuously and led to the assassination of the heir apparent, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. *The clash between Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism became inevitable.* Following the German suggestion Vienna used the assassination of Francis Ferdinand as a pretext for starting a war to crush Serbia, the leader of the Southern Slav movement.

When it became evident in 1917 that the war was lost the young emperor Charles made some desperate but belated efforts to appease the disgruntled national minorities of Austria by the promise of federalism, but even in the last hour he did not dare to promote the same thing in Hungary, afraid of the ire of the Hungarian feudalism. In vain did the last Hapsburg invoke the principle of self determination in the Wilsonian sense and ask the people

of Austria to form their own governments and to confederate. None of the peoples, not even the loyal Germans, heeded the imperial manifesto.

The Austro-Hungarian monarchy broke into pieces in a few days, each national unit establishing its own government. In Hungary, which soon became a republic, *the government of Count Michael Károlyi, returning to the traditions of 1848, tried to undo the vices of the past.* The most needed democratic reforms were immediately voted: universal suffrage, dismemberment of the large estates, and national autonomy for the minorities. Unfortunately, economic collapse, social unrest, and the military occupation of the country made the execution of these laws impossible, and *the national minorities of the country repudiated the idea of federalism* and preferred to build up their own states with their brethren beyond the frontiers. Economic misery and national despair provided fertile soil for the Bolshevik emissaries. At the same time, the feudal forces of the country, alarmed by the immediate danger of the expropriation of their estates, regained their vitality and began to plot with the reactionaries of England and France against the People's Republic of Károlyi. The illfamed note of the allied powers presented by Col. Vyx to the Budapest government, shifting the line of demarcation laid down in the armistice and compelling the Republic to evacuate purely Hungarian territories, aroused such nationwide indignation that the Károlyi government abdicated and gave place to a socialist government that immediately compromised with the Communists. A Soviet Republic was proclaimed (March, 1919) which soon collapsed under the bayonets of the Rumanian army.

#### IV

After the dismemberment of Hungary, carried out long before the Treaty of Trianon went into effect, *there were only two roads open to the subsequent governments.* One was to follow the policy initiated by the Republic: to democratize the country, to carry out the agrarian reform, to lay the foundation for a free peasantry, and to establish an honest compromise with the neighboring states tending toward a future federal structure. The other was to disregard and to undermine the peace treaty negotiated by the Horthy government itself, to foment the spirit of irredentism, to concentrate all the energies of the country for the restoration of the old frontiers and to maintain the privileges of the feudal oligarchy and its satellites.

*All the governments after the fall of the Republic pursued constantly the second road without the slightest endeavor for democratic reforms or for bringing about a tolerable compromise with the Succession States. . . .*

[T]he most significant fact of the new regime was the treaty of friendship with Italy, April, 1927, which meant the closest relationship with Fas-

cism. . . . For years Italy was glorified as the chief protector of Hungarian irredentism and when the Nazi power began to grow, the Hungarian leaders were convinced that the danger of Nazism could easily be counterbalanced by the power of Mussolini. As a matter of fact the feudal aristocrats of Hungary never liked the parvenu Hitler and his crude demagogic method. They cherished the old type alliance with the Prussian Junkers but regarded the Nazi regime with a certain amount of distrust, even disgust.

## V

The chief aims of [Prime Minister] Count [István] Bethlen, however, were only incompletely realized. The feudal aristocracy lost its former political leadership to the advantage of Fascist elements. Already during the short-lived Republic under Károlyi the first signs of a Fascist terrorist system were manifest. The violent "Awakening Magyars" (under the leadership of the then little known Tibor Eckhardt) and similar secret organizations caused a considerable amount of bloodshed among workers and Jews. In this connection an important fact must be emphasized. The type of Fascism that developed in Hungary was far nearer to the Nazi than to the Italian type. Several years before the advent of Hitler, a Hungarian type of Nazism grew up quite independently which anticipated many aspects of the Nazi ideology. It was an uncritical, exasperated and romantic philosophy of hatred and revenge. It emphasized the inalienable historic rights of Hungary to her old frontiers. It was a "stab-in-the-back" legend to the effect that Hungary was never defeated, that her collapse was exclusively due to the propaganda of the Allies, the Jews, and the Communists. The fight against the Jewish danger was one of the chief demagogic forces of the movement. The slogan "Third Hungary" was coined, which would bring unity and the restoration of the old frontiers to the country. A vehement anti-Marxian campaign was carried on; hated books were burned on the streets. Instead of socialism or communism, a "Christian National Social State" should be established. A doctrine of racial purity was proclaimed, which found a glorification in the Turan myth. Regent Horthy himself organized a Knight Order of feudal character (the so-called *Vitézek*), the members of which received hereditary landed property for the defense of the country against "subversive elements."

This mystic racism and wild nationalism paved the way for many leaders of the oligarchy toward a rapprochement with Nazism always with the hope that no exclusive pressure could be exercised by Germany, because of the prominent influence of the glorious Duce. The successor of Bethlen, Julius Gömbös, of an extreme Fascist and anti-Semitic type, introduced promises of vast social reforms, opposed the restoration of the Hapsburgs, but made cooperation with Fascist Italy even closer. When Hitler came to power and

much Nazi propaganda and money came into the country, Gömbös visited Berlin in June, 1933, and in July he journeyed to Rome. His main objective was to gain both Fascist and Nazi support for the territorial claims of Hungary. This policy assumed an openly inimical character against the Little Entente in the signing of the Rome Protocol, and culminated in the assassination of King Alexander and Foreign Minister Barthou at Marseilles in October of the same year, leading to serious international complications as the connivance of the Italian and of the Hungarian governments in the organization of the plot was well known. Very soon, however, the influence of *the German dictator prevailed and the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in October, 1936, signified the surrender of Austria.* This was effectively carried out in March, 1938, and in the February of the next year *the government of Paul Teleki joined the anti-Communist pact of Germany, Japan, and Italy.* In the increasingly aggressive policy of the Nazis, Hungary shared in the loot of Czechoslovakia, occupying Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian territories.

With the beginning of World War II the Hungarian policy for the Axis became even more accentuated. With the war the old secret dream of the irredentist policy seemed to become a reality: the countries of the Little Entente were destroyed or paralyzed and the dictators began the fulfillment of their promises to restore Hungary's territorial integrity. Half of Transylvania and a part of the Yugoslav kingdom were returned to the Crown of St. Stephen. The German orientation, however, proved to be a mixed blessing for the country. The half million German minority, in the past a politically powerless element, assumed more and more the position of a privileged nationality and the pressure of the German general staff and the Gestapo hurt considerably the interests of the ruling Magyar classes. *Hungary became more and more a German colony both from the political and economic point of view.* German competition was painfully felt when Nazis were put into the key positions, whereas the feudal aristocracy was increasingly menaced with subversive activities of the Fascist organizations which began a demagogic campaign for the dismemberment of the large estates.

## VI

Behind these various developments the old wound of the country was still open. The *latifundla* system exercised the old-time pressure upon all the energies of the country: *the misery of the small peasantry and of the landless proletariat remained unaltered* and the industrial working class and the intelligentsia of the towns and cities suffered under the exploitation of the Magyar oligarchy and its Nazi allies. A group of young Hungarians, mostly descendants of peasant families, introduced a movement which has

much resemblance to the Narodniki movement of Czarist Russia in the 19th century. They produced an amazingly prolific and well documented literature in which the sufferings of the Magyar peasantry were unveiled. This literature is a flaming protest against existing conditions. Though not daring to acknowledge it, and camouflaging their propaganda by national and racial slogans, they returned to the main objectives of the October revolution of 1918. The essential causes of the Hungarian sickness remained practically the same and the Narodniki literature never tired of reiterating them. On the basis of the statistics of Hungary under the Trianon frontiers they asserted that: *1,232 large estates (over 1,400 acres) representing 0.1% of the total number of separate agricultural holdings, cover 30% of all the land. The average size of a large estate is 5,618 acres. The 1,142,294 small properties (under seven acres), representing 71% of all agricultural holdings, cover an area of 2,486,838 acres; i.e., 11% of all the land. A small proprietor has an average holding of 2.13 acres. Forty per cent of the agricultural population has no landed property at all; and if one adds to this number the category of small proprietors, mentioned above, who cannot live on their minute lots, but eke out a starvation wage as occasional workers on the large estates, one reaches a figure of around 3,500,000 out of an agrarian population of about 4,500,000. That is to say, almost 80% of the total agrarian population lives on the outer fringe of proletarian existence. This situation has given rise to the oft-repeated slogan: "the three million beggars of Hungary."*

## VII

*The adventurous foreign policy of the Magyar oligarchy and its territorial gains did not bring any relief to the oppressed classes of Hungary. On the contrary, the administrative and economic pressure has grown in direct proportion to the regained provinces. Enormous amounts of foodstuffs were taken to Germany, workers were transferred for convict labor, and thousands of soldiers perished in the offensive against the Russians. And, what is even worse, the hatred between the Magyar and the non-Magyar races grew enormously in the reconquered territories. Unheard of atrocities were committed by the armies of occupation against both the Carpatho-Ukrainians and the Serbs. The whole area is full of the spirit of wrath and revenge. It will be a hundred times more difficult to solve the nationality problem after the war than it would have been any time after the *Ausgleich* of 1867 and to protect the truly Hungarian interest, both economic and cultural, will be an even harder task than it was after Trianon.*

If we look over this whole story it will be evident how erroneous it is to speak of *Hungarian Quislings*. By quislings we mean persons who became traitors to the country through motives of sordid economic interest or base

ambition. It cannot be doubted that there exist many thousands of people in Hungary who belong to this category and who became Nazi servants out of such motives. These people, however, are only the personal subordinates of the chief actors of the drama. *The real actors are not quislings of the Germans, but the conscious promoters and partly even originators of the system under which Europe is suffocating.* The Hungarian oligarchy and its capitalistic satellites have followed for a hundred years both a national and international policy that drove the country ultimately into Fascist servitude. The tradition of the great Hungarian liberal of the period of 1848, of Kossuth and his collaborators, was abandoned and, instead of introducing the necessary social and national reforms in favor of the peasants, the proletariat and the national minorities, they embarked upon a policy of social-economic oppression and forcible denationalization of the alien groups. In spite of repeated admonitions and the lessons of the revolution of 1848 and 1918, *they continued to maintain the antiquated privileges of the ruling aristocracy.* Because this could not be done without foreign protection, *the Magyar oligarchy accepted Hapsburg domination first, the leadership of the German Kaiser during the first World War next, and finally Fascist hegemony, which ultimately led to Nazi supremacy and to World War II.*

It would be unfair to assert that the responsible leaders of this policy were primarily or exclusively motivated by selfish, personal interest as some simplifiers of history state. Though in their policy the economic interest[s] of the great landowners have played an important role, it cannot be doubted that they were influenced above all by a complex of ideologic motives. Among these were the exaggerated and misguided feeling of patriotism, the haughtiness of an old warrior class, and the belief in their own historical mission.

## VIII

In the light of the previous analyses it is clear that no better future for Hungary can be expected without introducing the following fundamental reforms: 1) thoroughgoing democratization of its antiquated political and administrative structure; 2) a democratic land reform on the basis of the distribution of the large estates and in building up a free peasant class on a cooperative basis; 3) a reasonable compromise with the neighboring states with the elimination of irredentistic agitation, paving the way toward a federal structure.

It is equally clear that the plan of a *Danubian confederation is utterly utopian as long as the present Hungarian economic and social structure continues; the feudal lords of Hungary and their Fascist followers will*



*never cooperate with countries which have a really democratic structure.* Similarly, a military dictatorship in Yugoslavia and the corrupt dynastic structure in Rumania or the military absolutism which followed it, would never accept the idea of a Danubian cooperation. It is significant, however, *that whenever the peasantry of the Danubian region found genuine leaders the idea of federation was immediately proclaimed.* So Kossuth after the collapse of the Hungarian war for independence, the Croat Radic, the Bulgarian Stambolisky, and the Rumanian Maniu after the first World War, unfolded the flag of a Danubian confederation, further expanded by Benes in the hour of the Czech disaster towards the program of a European federation.

## IX

With the smashing military victories of the Soviet Union which will make it in all probability the strongest continental power in Europe *the future of Hungary and of the Danubian states will depend to a large extent on the international policy of Soviet Russia.* Two things are already sufficiently clear in the foreign policy of the Soviets: One is that they repudiate the idea of the federalization of the small states with the argument that the social and political structure of these countries are so different that there is no possibility whatsoever for the establishment of a solid and stable federal structure among them. *The idea of federalization could only follow the necessary readjustments in the social-economic structure of those countries.* The other fundamental point in the Russian foreign policy is their claim that they will not recognize any government which they cannot trust. *The states of the Danube and the Balkans should not follow a foreign or military policy hostile to the Soviets.* Therefore, the former ruling oligarchies which through their continuous intrigues were always instrumental in creating hostile coalitions against Russia, must be eliminated and replaced by new social and political forces which in their very nature would feel a strong affinity with the aims of Soviet Russia.

*It cannot be doubted that old feudal Hungary would be unacceptable to the rulers of Russia and they would try to crush them either by military means or by fomenting social revolution.* It would be easy for the Soviets to use the unsolved agrarian problem of Hungary for the complete sovietization of the country—the same thing which they did in Russia after the revolution. The only possibility for Hungary to come to terms with the Soviets and to safeguard her cultural and national independence following her Western traditions would be *to create a democratic republic of the peasants, workers, and creative intelligentsia* which could not be used in fomenting a hostile coalition, *cordon sanitaire*, against Russia.

The leaders of the Soviets have expressed repeatedly these ideas concerning Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania. They have promised that under these conditions they would respect the free and independent political, cultural, and economic life of those countries. It is very probable that they will accept this point of view. A renitent [*sic* ?] Hungary would be either crushed by a hostile alliance under Russian leadership or it would be only tolerated as long as its final collapse would not emerge automatically through bloody social convulsions leading to some form of proletarian dictatorship.

## X

Whether this point of view of the Soviets is a sincere one or simply a transitory tactical position before the complete sovietization of the whole region, is a controversial issue which will depend primarily on the final outcome of the World War. It is sure that Russia made the same promises to the Baltic states and she disregarded them incorporating those countries completely into the Soviet structure. Yet the problems of the Danubian and Balkan regions are quite different both from a geographic and a political point of view. *A situation could easily arise in which the Soviet leaders would hesitate to embark upon a policy which would arouse the distrust and the indignation of the Western democracies and of the United States whose economic and technical cooperation will be badly needed in the enormous work of reconstruction of Russia.* Furthermore, in the post-war period the air and naval supremacy of Great Britain and the United States will be so thoroughly established that the realistic leaders of the Soviets would not risk a conflict for the rather ideologic advantage of the sovietization of Central Europe. *The complete and sincere democratization of this region would make an aggressive policy of Russia unnecessary and would rob it of all ideologic pretexts.*

In this way the remolding of the antiquated social and economic structure of Hungary, Jugoslavia, and Rumania would be the essential prerequisite for the establishment of an at least transitorily stable and peaceful Danubian and Balkan region. In this new atmosphere many things could happen toward a final stabilization. It is possible that the basic ideologic and economic differences between the democracies and the Soviets could be substantially mitigated, that Russia could abandon her objection against a federalization of the smaller nations whose friendliness could be tested and that a common cooperation with the other states in an international organization could give to the Soviets a new impetus for common efforts in the solution of the German and the Japanese problems. Besides, there can be no doubt that *mighty currents are developing in Soviet Russia toward the democratization of her own structure, the limitation of the autocratic*

tendencies of the dictatorship, and the realization of an effective bill of rights. At the same time *the inevitable trend in the Western democracies toward increasing socialization of their economic life* would all contribute to make the antagonism between the two worlds less acute.

In order to inaugurate such an evolution it would be absolutely necessary to make an end to the Danubian and the Balkan danger zone, to that keg of dynamite which has already twice exploded, driving the whole world into turmoil and disaster. Such a transformation could be only the work of the peasants, the workers and the creative intelligentsia of this region.

## **Appendix**

### **Document 2**

**Editor's note:** The following document is Oscar Jaszi's introduction to Rusztem Vámbéry's 1942 pamphlet *The Hungarian Problem*. A copy of this publication can be found in the library of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

## **The Hungarian Problem**

**by Rustem Vambery**

Introduction  
by OSCAR JASZI  
Professor of Political Science  
in Oberlin College

Published by THE NATION

TEN CENTS A COPY

[1942]

## Introduction

BY DR. OSCAR JASZI

In such cataclysmic times as these past history becomes living history. Everyone feels that, without understanding the past, reasonable and responsible men cannot plan for the future. This is the reason why every group or individual who tries to shape the future endeavors to prove that the policy which he favors is in the line of historical development.

This is the reason why the forgotten history of Hungary becomes again interesting reading. Books and pamphlets are written exclusively to show that the shameful role of the present Hungarian government, in being a vassal of the Axis, has nothing to do with its sins, or the sins of those who shaped the politics of the last four generations: but that it was simply imposed upon the present rulers by a fate for which they are not responsible.

This thesis masks for the benefit of the Allied democracies a double-crossing game. Should the Axis win, feudal Hungary will enjoy all the territorial gains made with the help of the dictators. Should the Axis be crushed, the so-called Free Hungarians will establish an alibi by reiterating: "Poor democratic and liberal Hungary was compelled by armed force to join the Nazis, and Admiral Horthy and his government have carried out this policy with bleeding hearts."

In the essay which follows, Professor Vámbéry raises his voice against the falsifications of history which are involved in the previous argument. Nobody is more qualified to do this than he. One of his chief merits is the fact that he has never been a politician. Somebody has rightly called him the Voltaire of Hungary. He has been interested mainly not in the changing trends of the political game but in the supreme values of human dignity and liberty of thought. As a noted criminologist he has studied the Calvary of the human race, and he has felt that it is not enough to write textbooks and learned treatises, that one must always attack the eternal citadels of servitude: the ignorance of the many and the entrenched privileges of the few.

He was suffocating in the atmosphere of his country, the last bulwark of European feudalism, where the extravagant luxury of the rulers was in painful contrast to the starving misery of the masses. Not revolutionary critics but supporters of the Horthy system coined the slogan of the "three million beggars of Hungary"—out of a population of eight millions at that time. Vámbéry felt that *man must act*, and so he did.

And when the critical date of recent Hungarian history came in 1918, after the defeat of the Central Powers, he wholeheartedly embraced the cause of the so-called October Revolution. This name is somewhat mis-

leading if we mean by "revolution" an act of conspiracy carried out by violence. There was no fight and no resistance in this short-lived upheaval. It was a by-product of the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy. There was no government either in Vienna or in Budapest which could claim a single atom of authority. The popular forces were simply liberated by the collapse of the Dual system, and the soul of the country returned almost automatically to the traditions of the Revolution of 1848, to the spirit of Louis Kossuth.

But the dawn of liberty was a very brief one. The accumulated misery and hatred of the war could not be appeased in a short time. The national minorities, mindful of the past, repudiated the extended hand of the Hungarian Republic; all the beneficiaries of the old system were engaged in fifth column activities; the emissaries of Moscow spread successfully the ideas of a Communist revolution; the reactionary delegates of the Western democracies humiliated intentionally the new regime; the illegal dismemberment of the country against the stipulations of the armistice heated the age-old nationalism of the country to the boiling point; and hundreds of thousands of refugees from the occupied territories flooded the capital, blaming the republic for their sufferings.

The immature Communist Revolution which ousted the democratic republic gave to all the counter-revolutionary forces a welcome pretext for organizing a common front for the restoration of the old feudal order. Admiral Horthy gained power with the help of the Western democracies and under the protection of Rumanian bayonets.

And silence and order reigned again in Budapest . . . All the instruments of terror, of concentration camps, of racial mythology and persecution had been used systematically long before Hitler and the Nazi ideology; and all the achievements of the October Revolution were crushed, its leaders calumniated, and the feudal rule restored in an orgy of extreme nationalism and an officially fomented irredentism. Most of the leaders of the October Revolution were compelled to flee. Many of those who remained were imprisoned.

The only man who could maintain his personal liberty in the country conquered by the counter-revolution was Vámbéry, because he had never accepted office during the Revolution, and because his connections with influential British circles were generally known. He had inherited many British friends from his distinguished father, Armenius Vámbéry, who had played an important role in the English diplomatic policy in the East and been honored by the personal friendship of the King of England. Rustem Vámbéry has maintained and enlarged this precious legacy.

During the reign of the White Terror, Vámbéry fulfilled a very important

role. He criticised courageously the regime as far as the tight censorship would permit. He became a kind of ambassador for the oppressed people. After having received the blue-prints of the Horthy press bureau and its multiple little favors (ably administered by Mr. Eckhardt during the heyday of the system), every distinguished and intelligent foreigner who tried to understand the situation of Hungary went into the Vámbéry home to hear the real story of the past, of the intricate machinations of the counter-revolution, and of its diplomatic repercussions.

In spite of insults and threats of every kind from his enemies, Vámbéry remained at his post until the final Nazi invasion. When he saw that the intimate cooperation of the Horthy regime with Fascism and Nazism had become a real alliance, and that Hungary had finally assumed all the features of a vassal state of Hitler, he left the country.

Now, here in America, in noble poverty and unaided by the mighties of the land, who favor the Habsburgs and hidden exponents of the Horthy system, he continues the fight with youthful fervor.

As a true liberal and democrat, he cannot be other than a Free Hungarian in the real sense. As a matter of fact he has been a Free Hungarian for fifty years, even in times when such a movement did not exist. Attacked by the pseudo-Free Hungarians, the adherents and emissaries of the Horthy system who are trembling for that tottering regime, Vámbéry has recapitulated in his pamphlet the past history of Hungary and exposed its repercussions in the present struggle. He conclusively shows that no future peace is imaginable in the Danubian Basin without a solution for the two fundamental problems of this region: the agrarian and the nationality problem.

His logic, his conviction, and his sincerity will surely impress all unbiased readers of the essay. His passion and irony are natural results of his life as a fighter. He may overstress here and there the economic-social interpretation of the present Hungarian mentality, and perhaps underestimate its sentimental and historical background, but no impartial observer will deny that his diagnosis of the Hungarian tragedy is correct, and that the remedies he offers for the ills of the Hungarian people are based on real facts and a true analysis of the conflicting forces.

I ardently hope that all friends of democracy and fighters for a stable world order, based on cooperation and justice, will give careful attention to his ideas.

Oberlin, May, 1942.

## Appendix

### Document 3

Editor's note: The following document is from the records of the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the OSS.

### **The Platform of The American Federation of Democratic Hungarians**

–May 23, 1943–

I. We shall aid the war of the United States and the United Nations against the Axis Powers sincerely and honestly. We make no exception with respect to any member state and by all means at our disposal, deeds, words, writing we will endeavor to help the common struggle of the United Nations against the Axis to an early victory. We shall not permit that in the press under our influence, there should appear any writing that has a double meaning, is defeatist or besmirches any member of the United Nations. We shall do everthing to make sure that the Hungarians of the United States will individually and with their united force in every way do their duty in the interest of a successful conclusion of the war, in the first place as soldiers in the United States army, as workers in war industries and factories where they should be examples of diligence and punctuality, and by buying War Bonds and serving in the Red Cross and Civilian Defence.

II. We make no difference between Hitler and Horthy nor between the regimes of the two countries. We equally condemn both and fight against their politics, aims and goals. We call upon the soldiers of the Hungarian army everywhere, whether fighting on Russian soil or performing the duties of maintaining order, to lay down their arms, to go over to the enemies



of Hitler and Horthy, or to join those who as free troops or guerillas fight against Hitlerism. We call upon the people of Hungary to do all they can against the war made by Hitler and Horthy: to hide their grain, the meat, the feed-stuffs from the Nazis and to sabotage the work in shops, plants and factories.

III. We desire that Hungary after the war shall be a democratic country patterned after the western democracies, that its people shall have general, secret and equal rights to vote, that its peasantry shall partake in a complete redistribution of land, that its workers should have a part in social security and justice and its intellectuals in complete freedom of its spirit and culture. We desire that Hungary's future politics shall be built upon cooperation. In its economic, financial and military relations it shall be based first of all upon cooperation with neighboring peoples, the Czechoslovaks, Jugoslavs, Rumanians, Austrians, Polish, Bulgarian and Greek populations, upon close alliance with them as an equal among equals. Hungary shall endeavor sincerely to make up with its neighbors without any mental reservation, and to live together with them. As a precondition to this we assert that the system of large estates of the so-called "historical class," its privileges and advantages must be liquidated in favour of the Hungarian people. Similarly we take stand against that propoganda aimed at the Habsburg restoration which from the beginning was designed to influence in a one-sided way the decision of the Hungarian people regarding the form of government.

IV. We recognize nothing of what was established by the gangsterwars of Hitler and Mussolini with the shortening of certain state boundaries or lengthening of others. But with complete faith in the principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter as well as in the prospective peace negotiations after a victory by the Uited Nations, we believe that Hungarian people will be neither punished nor deprived and that they will share as equal among equals in justice and brotherhood.

V. In carrying on the war there can be no difference between us who make the victory of the United States and its Allies over the Axis Powers and their gang our goals. And because of this we desire that the population of the United States of Hungarian descent without regard to their religion and their political convictions should cooperate along the same line in the interest of the earliest possible victory of the United States and its Allies. In regard to questions which will emerge after the war, especially concerning Hungary's future, we do not believe cooperation is possible because the size and gravity of the issues demand that we should be able to present our principles to the masses in their entire austerity.

"The American Federation of Democratic Hungarians."

## Appendix

### Document 4

Editor's note: The following document is a confidential printed report of the Foreign Nationalities Branch (FNB) of the OSS. These reports can be found both in the records of the FNB, and in the various other record collections of the OSS, all at the NAUS. Hungarian diacritical marks were not used in these reports and are not reproduced below.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH  
September 30, 1942

#### MEMORANDUM:

#### Hungarian Politics in the United States

The American Federation of Democratic Hungarians, which has steadfastly set itself against Tibor Eckhardt's Independent Hungary Movement, achieved at least one of its objectives at its annual meeting in New York, September 19 and 20, by bringing forth a movement to be called New Democratic Hungary. This will probably be closely allied with the Federation and will be headed by Rustem Vambery, noted Hungarian criminologist resident in the United States. The other objectives, apparently unreachd, were said to be: (1) to bring together a wider representation of Hungarians against Hitler than has hitherto been possible under the leadership either of Eckhardt or the Vambery-Jaszi group of the American Federation of Democratic Hungarians; (2) to lay the basis for effective collaboration of anti-Hitler Hungarians with other Central European representatives; (3) to develop closer relations with the movement headed in London by Count Michael Karolyi, onetime Hungarian prime minister. Meanwhile the Hungarian press in the United States indicates that despite the "temporary sus-

pension" of his Independent Hungary Movement last July, Tibor Eckhardt is still a political force on the Hungarian scene. Indeed the fact appears to be that Eckhardt remains pre-eminently the strongest individual among the Hungarian political refugees, and his ostensible retirement as a result of the doubts cast on his political motives has left a considerable void.

The New Democratic Hungary organization excludes American citizens from its line-up. With Dr. Vambéry as president and Laszlo Fenyés, former member of the Hungarian Parliament, as vice-president, the organization will maintain relations with the American Federation of Democratic Hungarians through Dr. Vambéry's participation in the Federation's meetings. Dr. Oscar Jaszi, an American citizen of Hungarian origin, professor at Oberlin College, retains his presidency of the Federation.

Leaders of the Federation are reported to have hoped that a wider representation of Hungarian elements might be secured through contacts with Anthony Balasy, formerly counselor to the Hungarian Legation in London, and Bela Bartok, the noted musician who has sometimes been mentioned as a figure about whom all factions could unite. For some reason, however, Jaszi is said to have failed to keep an appointment which he had made with Balasy in Washington; and the leaders of the Federation cooled in their feeling toward Bartok when it was charged that he was in close contact with Victor Bator, formerly chief economic adviser to the Commercial Bank of Budapest and lately an associate of Eckhardt's.

Balasy's current position is one of aloofness from political activities while he professes to be ready to join any movement uniting all individuals who are both Hungarian and anti-Hitler.

The leaders of the Federation are reported to have hoped also that representatives of other Central European countries would be on hand at their annual meeting in New York and that a basis might be laid for cooperation between the various groups. However, Charles A. Davila, chairman of the Free Rumania Council, refused to participate on the grounds that one of the Federation's officers was in the service of the Czechs. Further attempts were abandoned.

A certain faction of the Vambéry-Jaszi Federation has been insistently advocating the admission to this country of Count Michael Karolyi, now in London. Recently Dr. Alex Vince, Dr. Hugo Rony, and Mr. L. Moholy-Nagy all of Chicago, resigned from the Federation on the grounds that it had not supported Karolyi with sufficient energy. These Chicagoans are now engaged in gathering ten thousand signatures which they plan to present to the Department of State to bolster their plea that Karolyi be granted a visa.

It is reported that Professor Vambéry had been in communication with Karolyi recently and at the latter's request agreed to adopt New Democratic

Hungary as a name for the organization which Vambery now heads. This name is also used by the pro-Karolyi organizations in London and South America, but it is understood, nevertheless, that the three organizations will maintain complete independence.

Observers of the Hungarian-American political scene feel that the formation of the New Democratic Hungary movement leaves the situation largely unchanged. An organization which can draw all Hungarian individuals together for political purposes and the cooperation with other European groups still waits to be formed. . . .

## Appendix

### Document 5

Editor's note: The following document contains a description of Oscar Jaszi by one of his Hungarian-American contemporaries, Emil Lengyel, in the latter's *Americans from Hungary* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1948). pp. 260-61.

Hungarian literati did come to the United States in the early post-First World War years but not in large numbers. One was Oscar Jászi. In pre-war Hungary he had tried to raise alarm over the problem of national minorities which did not exist at all to the average Hungarian. Hungary was Hungarian and that was all; the Magyar closed his eyes to the fact that the highlands all around Hungary were inhabited by several nationalities, spilling into the plains. The then Hungarian governments, too, sought to "settle" the nationality problem by pretending that it did not exist. Jászi knew that such "solutions" could only be temporary and that Hungary's future could not be assured unless she reached agreements with her minorities which almost formed a majority. He contended most emphatically that as a unational State Hungary was an absurdity and that she must be transformed into a multi-national country. Not far distant from Hungary's western marches he saw a successful solution of this problem. Switzerland was inhabited by four different nationalities speaking as many languages, drawing from four different traditions, German, French, Italian and Romansch, often antagonistic to one another. In spite of this, Switzerland was prosperous and the very image of peace. Instead of fighting each other, the four nationalities were engaged in amicable competition. Here was a ready-made example for Hungary and, possibly, some of her neighbors. The idea of "Eastern Switzerland" was born. Each "canton" of Eastern Switzerland would be delimited along ethnic frontiers and would possess a large measure of self-government. An ideal blend would result by combin-

ing the constructive qualities of these peoples who in the past had defeated their own aims by working at cross purposes. Before the war, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was a political monstrosity, since it took no account of the most dynamic force of the age, nationalism, while at the same time it was an economic necessity because it united a variety of interdependent regions producing most of the essentials of economic life. Oscar Jászi followed in the traditions of Lajos Kossuth, who, in later life, saw the solution of the Southeastern European problem in the formation of a Danubian federation of friendly States, dependent upon their own strength rather than serving as cat's-paws for foreign interests.

Under the First Hungarian Republic, headed by Count Károlyi, Oscar Jászi served as Minister of Nationalities. Hungary had been defeated and the remedies that might have helped when the minorities were begging for concessions were of no use whatever now that they held the whip hand, and not even Jászi's earnest endeavors could turn the scales. He personally had numerous friends among the nationalities, but Hungary's friends were few. The former servants in mistress Hungary's mansion now had become mistresses themselves. Jászi went into exile after the downfall of the Hungarian democratic Republic and, preceded by high reputation in scholarly circles, eventually reached the United States. Here he accepted a position on the faculty of Oberlin College in 1925, became professor of political science, and taught there for fully seventeen years, his fame reaching into many corners of the United States. He wrote a standard book, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* and made many notable contributions to books and scholarly periodicals. After the Second World War he saw his ideas about Hungary's future vindicated, as it became crystal clear that the region of the mighty Danube was a unit.

## Appendix

### Document 6

Editor's note: The following document is the text of the introductory remarks made at the Oscar Jaszi Memorial Conference at Oberlin College by Curtis L. Kendrick:

When Oscar Jaszi joined the faculty of Oberlin College in 1925, he had a distinguished reputation as an Hungarian scholar and statesman. He had been one of the founders of the Hungarian Sociological Society, and for about twenty years, editor of the monthly review, *Twentieth Century* (Huszadik Század). He had taught at the Universities of Kolozsvár and Budapest, and published many books and articles. He had been a bold advocate of political and economic changes in the pre-war Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; as Minister of Nationalities in the liberal Károlyi government of 1918, he had worked for a democratic federal solution to the problem of national minorities and for basic agrarian reforms.

Exiled from his native land by the Communists and by the reactionary Horthy regime, he continued his fight against dictatorship and war. Liberal emigres from many European countries have paid tribute to the value of his counsel and support. Oberlin takes pride in the fact that his most famous book, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, was completed in the early years of his Oberlin professorship. This book, which earned the admiration of American scholars, was followed by a stream of articles and lectures on the explosive problems of Danubia and on the urgency and difficulties of effective international organization. During the Second World War, he made several broadcasts to Hungary for The Voice of America.

Oscar Jaszi quickly became, and remained, an important member of the faculty community of Oberlin College. He had an accurate grasp of Oberlin's problems and potentialities, and a deep loyalty to its welfare. He

carried conscientiously and effectively the large and small responsibilities of a professor and a department chairman. He had an influential voice in the making of college policy, to which he brought both practical judgment and clearly thought-out principles. Few men have been less concerned with the trivialities of the academic vocation; perhaps none have been more concerned with the essentials.

For seventeen years Oscar Jaszi was one of Oberlin's greatest teachers. His forceful character, his pungent humor, and his urbane courtesy won the affection of his students; the substance of his teaching assured their immediate interest and their lasting respect. At a time when American study of government was still largely legalistic and descriptive, he introduced his students to a different type of study. He took them beyond the regions of familiar liberal constitutions into the new and troubled regions of Fascist and Bolshevik rule. He insisted that no student could hope to understand the government of a country without learning something of the sociological background of its constitution and of the international equilibrium in which the country was involved. He taught his students to try to assess the nationalist and socialist tendencies that were in varying degrees affecting the development of all continental countries. At a time when many Americans innocently debated over disarmament, the League of Nations, neutrality legislation, and the Oxford Pledge, his students had clear warning of the harsh social, political, and economic forces that were driving the world to a crisis that no international machinery could prevent and no isolationism could avoid. His teaching, like his scholarship, was an indissoluble blend of responsive realism and stern idealism. His skepticism about quick and easy cures was combined with a deep faith in traditional liberal values and in the moral capacity of free men. His students learned not only to look realistically at the world they must live in, but also to understand something of the conflict of values beneath the surface of events. His teaching was a continual challenge to their sense of moral responsibility. . . .