

## Oscar Jaszi and the “Hungarian Problem:” Activities and Writings during World War II

N.F. Dreisziger

If it is fair to say that Oscar Jaszi's life can be divided into two halves, the Hungarian and the American, it can also be said that World War I and II were the respective plateaus of these two half-lives. Much has been published on Jaszi's activities, as well as the evolution of his ideas, during the Great War,<sup>1</sup> but very little on what he was doing—or thinking—during World War II. Undoubtedly, this imbalance in the historical literature on Jaszi's career is a reflection of the fact that 1914 to 1918 constituted the zenith of his political career; moreover, he was in the prime of his life, full of energy and intellectual vigour. And though he must have been displeased by negative reception of many of his ideas in his country, by the failure of some of his political ventures, and by the outbreak of the war itself in 1914, the greatest disappointments of his life were still ahead of him.

By the Second World War Jaszi's circumstances had changed. In particular, his political prospects had greatly diminished. He, along with his 1918 platform to reform Hungary, had been rejected. Even his career as an émigré statesman had come to an end by the early 1920s, and he had become a political exile, an émigré academic. There were other profound disappointments behind him as well by this time, including the mistreatment of his nation by the peacemakers in 1919–1920, and his own rejection by the statesmen of the Successor States soon after the conclusion of the postwar peace treaties.<sup>2</sup> Jaszi's spirit had not been crushed, however. Despite the setbacks he had suffered, he retained a fair reservoir of hope for the future. With whatever strength and energy he could muster—he was approaching retirement age—he continued to work for his beliefs and ideals throughout the Second World War and after.

Jaszi's political aim during the Second World War was very much the same as it had been during the First: a thoroughgoing reform of Hungarian

politics and society, and the establishment of a confederation of the peoples of the Danube Valley. How Jaszi wanted to achieve these, kept changing with the evolving political and strategic situation, just as he had grasped at different political constellations during the First World War while working toward a democratic Hungary, at peace with its neighbours. But a few elements of his strategy remained constant and remind one of his endeavors during World War I. He never missed a chance to denounce his native country's conservative ruling élite and their alleged or real reactionary policies, and he lived an active public life.

As we know, Jaszi's efforts in the early 1940s were just as, or even more, unsuccessful than his earlier ones had been. Not only did history deny him — even more profoundly than in 1918 — a chance to implement his ideas, but the end of the new war brought renewed disillusionment, equal perhaps to what he had felt after the First World War. Jaszi's reactions to the events of World War II, his activity during the conflict, have never been fully documented. Neither have his writings of the period been analyzed or reprinted. This paper will begin to redress this gap in the historical literature.

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As war clouds gathered on the European horizon during the mid-1930s, Jaszi experienced still another of his frustrations with the post-World War I situation in East Central Europe. In 1935 he crossed the Atlantic again to tour this part of the world once more. Prior to his visit, he was under the impression that the only feudalistic and militaristic country in the region was Hungary, and cherished the hope that a thoroughgoing reform in that country would lead to a general reconciliation among the peoples of the Danube Valley. His visit to Czechoslovakia and, especially, to Rumania and Yugoslavia, left him far less optimistic about the prospects of East Central Europe. What he found there was inter-ethnic tensions, hate-mongering, xenophobia and the undue influence of "unbalanced intellectuals" in politics. He concluded that the Successor States were plagued by the same nationality problems and intra-national antagonisms as the old Habsburg Empire before 1918.<sup>3</sup> The outcome of the visit was his even stronger conviction that the postwar division of East Central Europe into independent small states had been a failure and that their only hope for the future would be the creation of a federal structure, "combined with a complete cultural and administrative autonomy of the variegated national minorities. . . ."<sup>4</sup>

Jaszi and his fellow exiles were slow to make political moves in response to the outbreak of the Second World War, primarily because Hungary did not get involved in the conflict until 1941. In fact, it was the conservative camp of the Hungarian immigrant and émigré community in the United

States that took the initiative in wartime organizational work.<sup>5</sup> Much of this activity was inspired by the regime in Budapest. Throughout the interwar years, the Horthy regime had cultivated contacts with the patriotic elements in North America's Hungarian community. The leading political institution for Hungarians in the United States was the American Hungarian Federation, an organization which to some extent owed its existence to the ruling élite in Budapest.<sup>6</sup> After the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, Hungary's government redoubled its efforts at strengthening its influence in the Hungarian-American community. Part of the reason for this policy was Prime Minister Pál Teleki planned to create of a wartime government-in-exile in case Hungary fell under Nazi domination.<sup>7</sup> Obviously, such a government, whether established in the United States or in another of the North Atlantic democracies, would need the support of influential ethnic community organizations such as the American Hungarian Federation.

In November 1940, János Pelényi, the Hungarian Minister to Washington, and several members of his staff, resigned their posts and sought asylum in the United States. As political refugees they could expect to have a freer hand in directing the activities of the patriotic wing of the Magyar-American community. Indeed, two months later, in January 1941, Hungarian-America's leading personalities gathered at a conference in Washington to lay the foundations for a free Hungarian government in the West, should fate require its establishment.<sup>8</sup>

To head a Hungarian government in the free world, Hungary's political élite decided to send one of its members into voluntary exile. Their choice fell on Tibor Eckhardt who secretly left Hungary through still neutral Yugoslavia in early March. Though by the late-1930s Eckhardt had moved to the centre-left of the Hungarian political spectrum, his selection as a spokesman for the Hungarian diaspora in the West proved to be a mistake. The fact was that during the post-World War I turmoil, Eckhardt had been a vocal right-winger, a fact which had made him *persona non grata* with the leftist faction of the Hungarian emigration in the United Kingdom and the Americas.<sup>9</sup> Jaszi, in particular, loathed Eckhardt with singular vehemence.

Eckhardt encountered many obstacles and delays in making preparations for his assumption of the leadership of a free Hungary movement in the West. Soon after his departure from East Central Europe, dramatic events began to unfold. A pro-allied military coup in Yugoslavia precipitated Hitler's decision to postpone his planned invasion of the USSR until after the danger to his flank in the Balkans could be eliminated. Pressure was brought upon Hungary to abandon her neutrality and allow German troops to cross the country on their way to Yugoslavia. The situation raised the spectre of a British declaration of war against Hungary. Prime Minister Teleki tried to deflect this threat by taking his own life, to demonstrate that his country had been coerced into involvement in Germany's Balkan

venture. War with Britain was averted for the time being, but enough damage had been done to Hungary's stature to preclude the possibility of Eckhardt going to the United Kingdom to launch his planned Free Hungary Movement. Nevertheless, he managed to embark for the still neutral United States, after dodging Gestapo agents all the way from the Balkans to Egypt, and from there to South Africa.<sup>10</sup> Eckhardt's appearance in the United States in August 1941 finally prompted the left-wing elements of the Hungarian-American community into action.

The Hungarian-American left, unlike the right which tended to concentrate around the American Hungarian Federation, was by no means a cohesive community. There were divisions in its ranks along ideological and class lines, and there were differences in outlook between the "old" immigrants and the more recent arrivals. There were also regional rivalries, exemplified by the lack of cooperation among groups centred around various metropolises such as Cleveland, Chicago, and New York. Actually, in discussing the Hungarian-American left, especially the non-communist left, it might be more accurate to talk of prominent individuals rather than of organizations. Some of these people had achieved their fame or notoriety in Hungary, others in America, and a few — like Jaszi — in both. Many of them had stayed away from immigrant organizational life until the wartime crises prompted them to political action. Perhaps the best-known among these luminaries was the film actor Béla Lugosi, Hollywood's own "Count Dracula."<sup>11</sup> One of Lugosi's close allies was László Moholy-Nagy, the Chicago-based avant-garde artist and lifetime devotee of Károlyi.<sup>12</sup> Then there was Lajos Tóth, described by one of his contemporaries as "an internationally recognized authority on accounting," who would lead the New York Council of Hungarian Americans for Victory.<sup>13</sup> Somewhat less known but similarly active leftist Hungarian-American personalities were two recent arrivals to America, László Fényes (a member of the Hungarian parliament during the First World War) and Pál Kéri. Both of these men had lived in European exile before their arrival in the USA, and both had been implicated in the murder of wartime Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza during the early days of the Károlyi revolution. Fényes was acquitted at a trial held in 1920, while Kéri was convicted — he was released from prison several years later and went into exile. Still another prominent Hungarian who would play an important role in the wartime politics of the Hungarian-American left was Rusztem Vámbéry. Also a recent arrival in the US, he, like his friend Jaszi, was a publicist, scholar and university teacher; unlike Jaszi however, Vámbéry had never held high political office in Hungary. He was a professor of criminology at the University of Budapest where, during the Károlyi regime, he had been a dean. After the revolutionary interlude of 1918–19, Vámbéry continued his teaching career in Hungary until 1938 when he emigrated to the United States. There, despite his age

(66), he resumed teaching by accepting a post at the New School of Social Research in New York City.<sup>14</sup>

A bitter conflict between the Hungarian-American left and the right should not have been inevitable at this time or, at least, not between Eckhardt and Vámbéry. These two men had been prominent members of Hungary's legal profession and were acquaintances. They had had a meeting when Eckhardt visited the United States in 1940 and discussed the question of starting a movement for a free Hungary in America should it become necessary. There seems to have been no evidence at the time that the two could not collaborate in such a venture.<sup>15</sup> After Eckhardt returned to the United States in August 1941, he met with Vámbéry again and outlined his plans for the movement. While the two agreed that there was a need for such action, they now came to the conclusion that they better pursue their aim of rallying Hungarian Americans to the anti-Nazi cause through separate organizations. Eckhardt believed that the majority of "patriotic Hungarians" would not support a movement in which Vámbéry and his associates took part, while Vámbéry felt that he was no longer in a position to cooperate with Eckhardt. Nevertheless, the two apparently agreed not to obstruct each other's work.<sup>16</sup>

Soon after his meeting with Vámbéry, Eckhardt completed his preparations for the launching of his "Independent Hungary" movement and issued a manifesto outlining its aims. The declaration began by arguing that Hungary's independence had been "destroyed" when that country had been "tricked" into the war as Germany's ally. Hungarians living in free countries had "the sacred duty to give voice to the genuine convictions of the Hungarian people and to take up the fight against Nazi domination." The proclamation's authors also declared that the existing Hungarian government did not represent the aspirations of the Hungarian nation. Next, the statement announced the establishment of an executive committee to lead the fight for an "Independent Hungary," and called on all Magyars living in freedom to endorse this movement.<sup>17</sup>

No sooner than Eckhardt's plans became public knowledge, personal attacks on him started, some of them by Vámbéry's own associates. The change in the Vámbéry group's attitude toward Eckhardt and his movement probably had a lot to do with the activities of Mihály Károlyi in England—the other aspirant to the leadership of Hungarians in the free world. Ever since Hungary's involvement in the war against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941, Károlyi had contemplated launching a movement of free Hungarians living in Britain and the Americas. The 66-year-old former statesman, politically isolated and not in the best of health, needed allies. To help him with organizational work, he chose Count Károly Lónyai, a man with close links to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile.<sup>18</sup> The two of them turned to Jaszi and Vámbéry to organize the American branch of the movement. In

a message addressed to Jaszi, Károlyi outlined its requirements and aims. The immediate goal was to separate the true anti-fascists from the “Trojan horse crowd” congregating around Eckhardt, by denouncing Horthy for selling out Hungary to Hitler. The long term aim would be the building of a democratic Hungary: the ending of feudalism and capitalism, radical land reform, the establishment of producers’ cooperatives and so on. Such a program, Károlyi believed, would be welcomed by progressive Hungarians everywhere, but would be unacceptable to Eckhardt’s potential followers.<sup>19</sup>

In response to Károlyi’s plea, the American Federation of Democratic Hungarians (AFDH) was brought into being in September at a meeting in Cleveland, Ohio. On its executive were Vámbéry and Jaszi, as well as Ignác Schultz, a recent arrival from occupied Czechoslovakia.<sup>20</sup> The organization’s headquarters were established in New York City. Its news organ became the bulletin, *Harc* [Combat], but it was also supported by another newsletter, *Igazmondó* [The Truth Teller].<sup>21</sup>

The AFDH leadership’s attitude to Eckhardt was illustrated by an article that Schultz published at the time in the periodical, *The Nation*. This front-page declaration, entitled “Budapest’s Fake Mission,” denounced Eckhardt as an anti-Semite and anti-democrat and an agent of the “feudal coterie which rules Hungary by the grace of Hitler.” Schultz then went on to paint a black picture of the regime in power in Budapest.<sup>22</sup> The AFDH’s platform was couched in less vituperative language, but was equally strident. “We make no difference,” began the document’s second paragraph, “between Hitler and Horthy.” It called on members of Hungary’s armed forces “to go over to the enemies of Hitler and Hungary,” and on the Hungarian population to sabotage the Axis war effort. It also rejected the alterations to Hungary’s boundaries that had taken place since 1937. Concerning the country’s future, the AFDH’s platform called for a democratic postwar Hungary at peace with its neighbours, and demanded the abolition of the monarchy and the dissolution of the nobility’s and the churches’ estates.<sup>23</sup>

The AFDH, together with the Hungarian-American communist press, managed to frustrate Eckhardt’s efforts to mobilize the Hungarian immigrant community behind his Independent Hungary Movement. More importantly, the AFDH and their allies helped to cast enough doubt over Eckhardt’s figure in the eyes of Allied authorities to make his movement a stillborn venture.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, the Jaszi-Vámbéry coalition was unable to rally the Hungarian-American community behind its efforts. So, the search for the creation of a credible lobby to represent Hungarian Americans had to continue. This effort followed a two-pronged approach. One was aimed at the creation of a new organizational structure for the Hungarian-American left that was more acceptable both to the Hungarian immigrant community and the authorities in Washington, especially the State Department. The other aspect of the search was the attempt to reach

an accommodation with the less “compromised” members of Eckhardt’s entourage.

To realign the organizational structure of the Hungarian-American left, the AFDH, at its annual meeting in New York City in September 1942, launched the movement New Democratic Hungary (NDH). NDH was to step into the shoes of Eckhardt’s Independent Hungary movement which had suspended its activities during the summer. The leadership of the AFDH evidently believed that with their conservative rivals in disarray, they could bring into being a lobby under whose umbrella a wide range of Hungarians opposed to the Axis could gather. They also cherished the hope that NDH would be able to achieve effective cooperation with émigré groups from other Central European countries, and that through creating a high-profile movement, they would be in a better position to further the cause of Mihály Károlyi. The executive of the new organization was made up entirely of recent arrivals: Vámbéry became its president and László Fényes its vice-president.<sup>25</sup>

The time seemed propitious for attracting converts to the NDH. With the demise of Eckhardt’s movement, it should have been easy to draw some of its prominent followers. The prime target of the AFDH’s effort was Antal Balásy, one-time deputy head of the Hungarian legation in Washington. Balásy, who had sought diplomatic asylum in the United States in November 1940, was known in Allied diplomatic circles as an honest man with a liberal outlook. Though for some time he had been a follower of Eckhardt, he still managed to retain his reputation as a professional diplomat of impeccable credentials. He could have been a solid asset to the organization, even though his following among Hungarian immigrant masses was very limited. Negotiations with Balásy had been initiated before Eckhardt’s resignation from the Independent Hungary Movement. At the time, the purpose of the discussions was a possible reconciliation between the patriotic and the progressive Hungarian camps in America. On 15 April 1942, Vámbéry and Balásy met, but failed to achieve concrete results. Vámbéry was unhappy with Balásy’s disinclination to condemn the Horthy regime, while the latter was doubtful of Vámbéry’s ability to command respect among Hungarian Americans, and, especially, among Hungarians in general, or even to control others in his group.<sup>26</sup> Contacts with Balásy were resumed after Eckhardt’s resignation as leader of the Independent Hungary Movement, but, unfortunately for the people behind the NDH, the attempt to recruit Balásy failed.<sup>27</sup>

Another man the NDH planned to approach was the recently arrived renowned composer, Béla Bartók. While Balásy’s joining the new movement would have increased its credibility in the eyes of the State Department, the winning of Bartók to the movement’s cause would have elevated the NDH’s profile in Hungarian-American circles and with the broader

American public. Regrettably for the NDH, Bartók remained an elusive target. He, in fact, was soon recruited by those members of the Hungarian American Federation who sought to breathe new life into Eckhardt's discredited Independent Hungary Movement.<sup>28</sup>

Still another project for the newly launched NDH was the continuation of efforts to bring Mihály Károlyi to the United States. This undertaking had its origins with Károlyi himself. In the late summer of 1941 he had come to the conclusion that if he were to lead "democratic" Hungarians outside of Hungary effectively, he would have to transfer his operations from the United Kingdom to the United States. Accordingly, in September of that year he asked his American supporters to plead with the State Department to grant him a visa.<sup>29</sup> Unfortunately for Károlyi, the State Department showed no interest in letting him come to America. Nor did authorities in Washington change their mind when the AFDH officially endorsed the cause of Károlyi's planned move and began campaigning for his admission.

The failure of these efforts was to have a damaging effect on the prospects of a Vámbéry-Jaszi coalition. Already during September 1942, a number of influential members of the movement expressed dissatisfaction with the leadership of the AFDH especially in regard to its inability to secure a visa for Károlyi.<sup>30</sup> This group, lead by László Moholy-Nagy and a few of his Chicago associates, decided to go it alone and undertake their own vigorous campaign to bring Károlyi to the United States. In time, they would establish a separate organization, the Hungarian-American Council for Democracy.<sup>31</sup>

The launching of the NDH then did not solve the problems of the Vámbéry-Jaszi group. Authorities in Washington were correct in their initial assessment that "the formation of the New Democratic Hungary movement [left] the situation largely unchanged."<sup>32</sup> The movement did not gain the desired wide-scale support for its leaders; on the contrary, it lead to a further proliferation of anti-Axis Hungarian organizations, and to the fragmentation of community leadership. Furthermore, the conservative wing of the Hungarian-American community had not been neutralized. Even though Eckhardt had been driven from prominence, nothing could prevent him from continuing his diplomatic maneuverings behind the scenes, and from wielding considerable influence in Hungarian émigré affairs.

For the balance of the war, America's "democratic" Hungarians would expend much time and effort to influence both Hungarian-American and Allied opinion, and would continue to launch new organizational undertakings to this end. They would win some skirmishes in their war against the "patriotic camp," but would never see their work crowned by substantial success.



Jaszi's precise role in this work, both before and after 1942, has not been documented. Both contemporary and latter-day commentators refer to him as the leader, or one of the leaders of the Hungarian-American democratic left. This assessment seems appropriate in view of the facts that he had been one of the founders of the AFDH — and later became its president — and he had helped to launch the movement for a New Democratic Hungary. He held no office on the NDH's executive only because the State Department frowned upon the participation of American citizens in organizations of recent political refugees. Even some members of the patriotic camp of the Hungarian émigré community in North America acknowledged Jaszi's abilities as a leader and organizer. In a conversation with then American secret serviceman Allen Dulles, Balásy described Jaszi as the "ablest of the Vambery [*sic*] group . . . idealist and honest [though] pretty well discredited because of his connections with Károlyi. . . ." <sup>33</sup> Indeed, throughout this period, Jaszi was one of Károlyi's chief contacts in the US. One of his acquaintances described him as an "uncompromising though not uncritical friend" of the Count. "He knows the erratic mind, and all the other faults of the former Hungarian President, but, rightly or wrongly" believes Károlyi to be "the man" to lead a "Free Hungarian movement." <sup>34</sup>

Aside from supporting Károlyi's cause and involvement in the work of the AFDH and the NDH, Jaszi continued to write on Hungarian subjects. Much of what he produced appeared in the North American English-language press, but Jaszi also joined the ranks of those experts who reported on Hungarian affairs to America's wartime intelligence agency — the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Large fragments of one of his studies have survived in the OSS records. It is an essay on the "Hungarian Problem" that Jaszi wrote in the spring of 1944, evidently in response to a journalistic report that appeared in the British press at the end of March, assessing the Hungarian situation after the occupation of Hungary by the *Wehrmacht*. The report came from the pen of Noel Panter, a former special correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph* stationed in Budapest. Panter disagreed with those journalists who, after the German occupation, tended to portray Hungarian Premier Miklós Kállay "as a liberal minded man fallen victim to Nazi malevolence," and reminded his readers that in 1942 Kállay went around "making speeches emphasizing Hungary's duty to the Axis." Panter concluded his report by saying that "Hungary's occupation [was] but the natural development of a policy pursued during the past twelve years. . . ." [*The Daily Telegraph*, 31 March 1944]

Jaszi was evidently impressed by Panter's analysis. So much so that he wrote a lengthy memorandum, entitled the "Hungarian Problem," in support of it. <sup>35</sup> On the question of Hungary's German orientation, which

Panter had emphasized, Jaszi offered a different explanation. "This German orientation," Jaszi argued, was not of recent origin as Panter indicated, but it had been a "well thought out policy of a series of Hungarian governments. . . . since the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which guaranteed the leading role of the German bourgeoisie in Austria and the feudal classes in Hungary. . . ." By "at least the beginning of the 20th century," he continued, "it was evident to all," that this system "was collapsing." Progressive thinkers throughout the monarchy "recognized that the growing crisis could only be cured by the introduction of universal equal suffrage with secret ballot . . . [and the replacement of] the dualistic structure of the monarchy . . . by a kind of federalism giving equal rights to the Slavs and the other nationality groups."

The Austrian bourgeoisie was not the prime barrier to such reforms, according to Jaszi. Indeed, universal suffrage by secret ballot was granted in Austria in 1907. The "greatest obstacle" to reorganizing the Monarchy and to introducing universal suffrage in Hungary, was the "Hungarian feudal parliament." This legislature, in Jaszi's words, was "absolutely dominated by the landed aristocracy" and capitalists "utterly at the disposal of the lords." This "feudal system" sought to maintain the latifundia and "the great economic privileges which [it] enjoyed. . ." and to safeguard "the exclusively Magyar character" of Hungary. "The very idea of a federal structure," Jaszi continued, "was regarded as treason, and even the acknowledgment of the existence of the nationality problem was punished by social and political ostracism." Moreover, "feudal" Hungary continued to impede the solution of the Monarchy's nationality problem even during the war. "When it became evident in 1917 that the war was lost, the young emperor Charles made . . . efforts to appease the disgruntled national minorities of Austria by the promise of federalism, but . . . he did not dare to promote the same thing in Hungary, afraid of the ire" of the Hungarian ruling élite. The emperor's efforts were in vain, and the Monarchy "broke into pieces."

Next, Jaszi outlined the efforts of the government that he had served over two decades earlier:

In Hungary, the government or Count Michael Károlyi. . . , tried to undo the vices of the past. The most needed democratic reforms were immediately voted: universal suffrage, dismemberment of the large estates, and national autonomy for the minorities. Unfortunately, economic collapse, social unrest, and the military occupation of the country made the execution of these laws impossible, and the national minorities of the country repudiated the idea of federalism and preferred to build up their own states with their brethren beyond the frontiers. Economic misery and national despair provided fertile soil

for the Bolshevik emissaries. At the same time, the feudal forces of the country. . . , regained their vitality and began to plot with the reactionaries of England and France against the People's Republic [*sic*] of Károlyi. . . .

After the postwar peace settlement, Jaszi went on, there were "two roads open" to Hungary's governments. One was "to follow the policy initiated by the Republic," and the other was "to disregard and to undermine the peace treaty . . . to foment the spirit of irredentism, to concentrate all the energies of the country for the restoration of the old frontiers and to maintain the privileges of the feudal oligarchy. . . ." All post-1919 governments in Budapest, Jaszi asserted, had pursued the "second road without the slightest endeavor for democratic reforms or for bringing about a tolerable compromise" with the Successor States.

In subsequent text Jaszi turned to an analysis of the policies of the Horthy regime. Concerning foreign affairs, he pointed out that "the feudal aristocrats of Hungary never liked the parvenu Hitler. . ." but believed that the "danger of Nazism could easily be counterbalanced by the power of Mussolini." In domestic affairs the "feudal aristocracy" lost some of its influence to "Fascist elements." "Already during the shortlived Republic . . . the first signs of a Fascist terrorist system were manifest. . . ."

The "type of Fascism" that developed in Hungary, Jaszi felt compelled to add;

was far nearer to the Nazi than to the Italian type. Several years before the advent of Hitler, a Hungarian type of Nazism grew up quite independently which anticipated many aspects of the Nazi ideology. It was an uncritical, exasperated and romantic philosophy of hatred and revenge. It emphasized the inalienable historic rights of Hungary to her old frontiers. It was a "stab-in-the-back" legend to the effect that Hungary was never defeated, that her collapse was exclusively due to the propaganda of the Allies, the Jews, and the Communists. The fight against the Jewish danger was one of the chief demagogic forces of the movement. . . . A vehement anti-Marxian campaign was carried on . . . Instead of socialism or communism, a "Christian National Social State" [was called for]. A doctrine of racial purity was proclaimed. . . , This mystic racism and wild nationalism paved the way for . . . a rapprochement with Nazism always with the hope that no exclusive pressure could be exercised by Germany . . .

The Hungarian leadership's hope of counterbalancing the influence of Hitler with that of Mussolini met with disappointment, and the country drifted closer and closer to the Third *Reich*. With the coming of World War II, Jaszi continued, "the old secret dream of the irredentist policy seemed

to become a reality: the countries of the Little Entente were destroyed or paralyzed and the dictators began the fulfillment of their promises to restore Hungary's territorial integrity. . . ."

The German orientation, proved to be a mixed blessing. . . . The half million German minority, in the past a politically powerless element, assumed more and more the position of a privileged nationality and the pressure of the German general staff and the Gestapo hurt considerably the interests of the ruling Magyar classes. Hungary became more and more a German colony . . . German competition was painfully felt when Nazis were put into the key positions, whereas the feudal aristocracy was increasingly menaced with subversive activities of the Fascist organizations which began a demagogic campaign for the dismemberment of the large estates.

Jaszi's next paragraphs were devoted to depicting "the misery of the small peasantry and of the landless proletariat" and exploitation of workers and intellectuals by the "Magyar oligarchy and its Nazi allies." To support his arguments, Jaszi cited the works of a "group of young Hungarians, mostly descendants of peasant families. . . , [who] produced an amazingly . . . well documented literature in which the sufferings of the Magyar peasantry were unveiled." Next, Jaszi cited statistics compiled by these populist writers demonstrating that Hungary of the times was indeed the land of "three million beggars." The war and the territorial gains that it brought, he went on, did not alleviate the situation of Hungary's poor, but confounded it as a result of massive deliveries of foodstuffs to Germany, the demands of the war effort on the eastern front and the growth of "hatred between the Magyar and the non-Magyar races . . . in the reconquered territories." Referring to "atrocities . . . committed by the armies of occupation against both the Carpatho-Ukrainians and the Serbs" and the spread of "the spirit of wrath and revenge," Jaszi predicted that "[it] will be a hundred times more difficult to solve the nationality problem after the war than it would have been any time after [1867]. . . ."

In the following section of his essay, the author lashed out at Hungary's wartime leadership. These people were not quislings, "persons who became traitors to the[ir] country through motives of sordid economic interest or base ambition." Jaszi had no doubt that there were "thousands of people in Hungary who belong to this category and who became Nazi servants out of such motives." But Hungary's actual leaders were "conscious promoters and partly even originators of the system under which Europe is suffocating." And he continued:

The Hungarian oligarchy and its capitalistic satellites have followed for a hundred years both a national and international policy that drove

the country ultimately into Fascist servitude. [They abandoned the] tradition of . . . Kossuth . . . and, instead of introducing the necessary social and national reforms . . . they embarked upon a policy of social-economic oppression and forcible denationalization of the alien groups. In spite of repeated admonitions and the lessons of the revolution[s] of 1848 and 1918, they continued to maintain the antiquated privileges of the ruling aristocracy. Because this could not be done without foreign protection, the Magyar oligarchy accepted Hapsburg domination first, the leadership of the German Kaiser during the first World War next, and finally Fascist hegemony, which ultimately led to Nazi supremacy. . . .

The main motive for this was not class or "personal interest as some simplifiers of history state." Though the "economic interest" of the landowners have played an "important role," Jaszi believed that Hungary's leaders "were influenced . . . by a complex of ideologic motives[:] the exaggerated and misguided feeling of patriotism, the haughtiness of an old warrior class, and the belief in their own historical mission."

In the penultimate section of his essay Jaszi turned to the subject of Hungary's future prospects. In his opinion these depended very much on the "international policy of Soviet Russia." The Soviets had already repudiated the "idea of the federalization" of East Central Europe. They had also made it clear that they will not deal with "any government which they cannot trust." Evidently the national "ruling oligarchies" had to be "replaced by new social and political forces which in their very nature would feel a strong affinity with the aims of Soviet Russia." Jaszi never doubted that "old feudal Hungary would be unacceptable to the rulers of Russia" and so it would be eliminated. "The only possibility for Hungary to come to terms with the Soviets and to safeguard her cultural and national independence. . . ," Jaszi concluded, "would be to create a democratic republic of the peasants, workers, and creative intelligentsia which could not be used in fomenting a hostile coalition . . . against Russia." He then added with a touch of pessimism, that the Russian leaders might opt for the "complete sovietization of the whole region" as they had done in the case of the Baltic states. In the end, however, he remained optimistic.

A situation could easily arise in which the Soviet leaders would hesitate to embark upon a policy which would arouse the distrust and the indignation of the Western democracies and of the United States whose economic and technical cooperation will be badly needed in the enormous work of reconstruction of Russia. Furthermore, in the post-war period the air and naval supremacy of Great Britain and the United States will be so thoroughly established that the realistic leaders of the Soviets would not risk a conflict . . . The complete and sincere

democratization of this region would make an aggressive policy [by] Russia unnecessary and would rob it of all ideologic pretexts.

And Jaszi went even further. "It is possible. . .," he argued, that through the reform of Hungarian (and Yugoslav and Rumanian) society, and the "increasing socialization" in the "economic life" of Western democracies, the Soviets could be persuaded to abandon their "objection against a federalization" of East Central Europe. Perhaps Soviet Russia itself might embark on the "democratization" of her own political order. "In order to inaugurate such an evolution," Jaszi concluded, "it would be absolutely necessary to [do away with] the Danubian and the Balkan danger zone . . . Such a transformation could only be the work of the peasants, the workers and the creative intelligentsia of this region."

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Thus ended Jaszi's 1944 analysis of the "Hungarian problem." At the time, many of his Hungarian compatriots would have declared this essay treasonous, while others might have called it an astute and realistic assessment. The treatise remains controversial even from a historical distance of nearly half-a-century. It is not easy to decide whether it is brilliant synopsis or journalistic polemic. Perhaps it is a combination of both. It has its insights, but contains many biased statements. There is also a strain of righteousness and even vindictiveness in its tone. His speculations concerning the future reveal Jaszi as an eternal optimist whose views are tinged with a degree of naivete.

Most disturbing is the very opening of Jaszi's essay, the treatment of Hungary's alleged or real long-term pro-German orientation—subject matter which prompted Jaszi to undertake his analysis of the "Hungarian problem" in the first place. Here Jaszi seems to be especially unreasonable in depicting the Hungarian governments of 1867–1914 as being "pro-German"—especially in the 1944 context of that phrase which implied a pervasive sense of evil. One would have thought that the Hungarian fathers of the 1867 Compromise, in preserving a constitutional link with Austria, rather than being evil or shortsighted, were the epitomes of political wisdom. Rather than serving narrow class or ethnic concerns—which they did in a way, but only coincidentally—they acted in the best interest of all peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy. Nor can we equate Hungarian loyalty—lukewarm at best with many Hungarians—to Emperor-King Francis Joseph with enthusiasm for Hitler.

There is even more to this charge of the Hungarian elite's "pro-Germanness." Jaszi himself can be said to have been tainted with it, a fact which he conveniently forgot or ignored in 1944. In 1915, however, he had

been a supporter of Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* plan, envisaging the postwar union of the lands of the principal Central Powers. True, at this time Jaszi saw in a liberal postwar Germany the force to counteract the influence of an autocratic Russia, and he soon abandoned his dallying with a German orientation. Nevertheless, three decades later, he would condemn interwar Hungary's leaders some of whom saw in a revitalized Germany a potential ally in their struggle to amend the blatantly unjust provisions of the post-1918 peace settlement.

A similar problem exists with Jaszi's accusation that the "feudal elite" of Hungary opposed the federal restructuring of Hungary before 1914, and even during the last year of the war. While this had indeed been the case, Jaszi's record is not such that he can make this charge lightheartedly. Though ever since the 1920s Jaszi has been known as one of the foremost promoters of Danubian federalism, his pre-1919 record is not such that allows him to castigate his aristocratic compatriots. In his famous 1912 book on nationality problem he rejected the idea of the federal reorganization of the Kingdom of Hungary.<sup>36</sup> Even in his 1918 proposal for the federal union of East Central Europe, Hungary (excepting Croatia which had had its autonomy already) remained a single administrative unit.<sup>37</sup> It was only in the late autumn of that year, when Hungary's territorial disintegration had reached an advanced stage, that Jaszi and his associates in the Károlyi government's Ministry of Nationality Affairs came up with plans to turn Hungary into a federation of autonomous cantons, on the pattern of Switzerland.<sup>38</sup>

In dealing with the Károlyi era of postwar history, Jaszi reveals himself as a skillful apologist. In suggesting that the reform efforts of this period were undermined by Hungary's "feudal forces" plotting "with the reactionaries of England and France," he engages in the kind of myth-making which he finds repulsive when used by the conservatives who blame the socialists and their allies for the ills that befell Hungary after the war. In attacking the Horthy regime in general, Jaszi often uses half-truths or outright falsehoods. In suggesting that Hungary's post-1919 regime should have followed the path charted in 1918–19, he ignores the fact that in those years the left of the Hungarian political spectrum had thoroughly discredited itself in the eyes of Hungary's populace. Implicating the Hungarian leadership in the 1934 assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia can today be deemed historical falsification: the real culprit was Mussolini, but the international community at the time refused to blame him lest he be driven into an alliance with Hitler.<sup>39</sup> Jaszi might not have known this fact, which suggests that he was as much a victim of anti-Hungarian propaganda as he was a perpetrator of it.

Jaszi's treatment of the war period also leaves much to be desired for historical accuracy and fairness. In stressing the "atrocities" committed by

Hungarian troops in the reoccupied Hungarian territories, Jaszi ignores the fact that these incidents were the exception rather than the rule in those days of conflict, and can hardly be compared to what was taking place elsewhere in occupied Europe. In especially condemning Hungary's aristocrats, Jaszi makes another omission: he ignores the fact that it was precisely certain members of this class (Prime Minister Count Pál Teleki and former Prime Minister Count István Bethlen, in particular) who opposed the German alliance. To call such people not even "quislings" but "the conscious promoters . . . of the system under which Europe is suffocating," is at best complete insensitivity and at worst, slander.

In assessing future possibilities, Jaszi differentiates himself from many left-wing intellectuals of the time. He does realize that the Soviets might ride roughshod over the countries of East Central Europe and impose Soviet-style authoritarianism on them, but is naive enough—easily said with the benefit of hindsight—to believe that Moscow might end its opposition to a federation of East Central Europe. It was even more naive for Jaszi to hope that the Soviets, rather than imposing Stalinism on this part of the world after the war, would begin the democratization of Russia—especially if the countries of Eastern Europe, and even those of the West, would embark on building socialist societies. As this socialist transformation of the West never happened (or, at least, not in the manner Jaszi had in mind), we cannot know whether if it had, Soviet Russia would have started along the path to democratization after the war, as Jaszi had predicted. Knowing the nature of Stalin's regime, however, we can now call this prediction profoundly simplistic.

The democratization of Russia was to begin four decades later, mainly for reasons that Jaszi could not have foreseen. Interestingly enough, the elimination of the "Danubian and Balkan danger zone" in Europe did not precede that democratization. In fact, that sore spot only intensified in the wake of political changes in Russia. It may well be that Jaszi is still correct in his prediction that the elimination of this "danger zone" remains a precondition of the successful completion of Russia's democratization. Whether Jaszi's other, final prophesy—that the solution of the Danubian and Balkan problem can be only the work of the "peasants, the workers and the creative intelligentsia"—is valid, only time will tell.

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Much research remains to be done if we are to arrive at a comprehensive and fair assessment of Jaszi's activities and thinking during the Second World War. Without this research, historical evaluations of this subject must remain tentative. Nevertheless, such sources of information as archival



collections—such as records of the Office of Strategic Services and those of the State and Justice departments in Washington—as well as Jaszi’s own publications and the limited historical literature that deals with this period of his life, allow us to begin a stock-taking of his wartime work and draw some preliminary conclusions about his reactions to the Second World War and, in particular, to Hungary’s involvement in it.

The years 1941 to 1945, not unlike the years from 1914 to 1919, seem to have been a period of intense organizational and intellectual activity for Jaszi. He corresponded, mediated, organized and, above all, wrote about subjects close to his heart. His situation was, of course, vastly different during these two critical phases of his life. During the First World War he had been a well-known figure in Hungary, a prolific publicist, a respected scholar and an aspiring opposition politician. He could look forward to a future in a postwar world which he believed would be brighter than that which had preceded the war and laid the seeds for its inevitable outbreak. In contrast, during the Second World War he was an émigré academic with little influence with the general public of both his adopted and native lands. In fact, he was isolated even from the masses of Hungarian Americans; and, as a resident of Oberlin, Ohio, he had limited influence in such centres of Magyar émigré life as Chicago and New York.

By the early 1940s, moreover, Jaszi was past his prime, a fact which influenced not so much his capacity to work, but his intellectual vigour. In the years prior to 1919, he was much more likely to come up with original analysis of complex issues. In those days his work and outlook seem to have been oriented towards the future. During the Second World War he did exhibit a degree of interest in looking ahead, but in thinking and writing about what the postwar era might bring, Jaszi kept looking to the past, to the year 1918 when—as he no doubt believed—opportunities had been missed and history had taken a wrong turn adversely affecting both his country’s evolution and his own fortunes.

Even a cursory examination of Jaszi’s World War II work and writings reveals that his immediate post-World War I experience had a profound and lasting effect on him. The collapse of the regime he had served, the rejection of his own program for the reorganization of East Central Europe and the emergence in Hungary of a political system almost diametrically opposed to his ideals had dealt Jaszi an emotional blow from which he seems not to have recovered. It is this mind-set that helps to account for his relentless opposition to the regime in Budapest, and which explains why the struggle against this regime preoccupied his spirit and consumed his energy during the war years of 1941–45. The more he saw his enemies in Hungary on the verge of political collapse and moral bankruptcy, the more strident his attacks on them became. In certain respects, it seems then that when he wrote his essay on the “Hungarian Problem” in 1944, Jaszi

was continuing a fight that he had lost—but in his view only temporarily—in 1918–19. As a result, this work is not so much the kind of incisive analysis that we associate with Jaszi the scholar of the pre-1914 period, but the polemic of a disappointed, elderly man. In observing Jaszi's wartime assault on the reputation of the Horthy regime, one is also tempted to wonder if for him fighting German Nazism had not taken second place to combating Hungarian "feudalism."

Jaszi's work and writings during World War II, not unlike what happened during World War I, had no immediate impact on the final outcome of the war and the evolution of postwar Danubian Europe. There are those who would argue that his writings in particular had a lasting negative effect on Hungary's reputation. Although targeted at the "feudal coterie" that he perceived as ruling his country throughout his lifetime, his polemical observations probably reflected on the whole Hungarian nation, and gave ammunition—and continue to do so even today—to those who wish to discredit Hungary and Hungarians in general. The aim of a patriotic statesman is to serve his nation. The person who forgets his aim and redoubles his effort is a fanatic, to paraphrase George Santayana. One is tempted to wonder to what extent Jaszi's relentless tirades against "feudal" Hungary make him a true leader of the Magyars, or a political zealot.

Whether Jaszi's—and Vámbéry's, Károlyi's, Fényes's, etc.—diatribes against Horthyite Hungary had significant impact on Allied policies during the war is doubtful. Most Allied statesmen and officials knew enough to take the arguments of the Hungarian "progressives" with a grain of salt. London's and Washington's anti-Hungarian stand, as manifested in their rejection of Eckhardt as a spokesman for Hungarians of the Atlantic democracies, was based on other considerations: that the Horthy regime—and anyone even vaguely associated with it such as Eckhardt—was not acceptable to the Czech government-in-exile, which, after all, was an ally in the war against the Axis. In rejecting the Horthy regime then, Jaszi and his associates were, on the "side of the angels" in World War II. Unfortunately for them, even this stand failed to ensure them a measure of lasting success.

The post-1945 era was to bring new disappointments for the septuagenarian Jaszi. Under occupation by the Red Army, Hungary's future remained as uncertain as ever. What saddened him even more was the political outlook adopted by the countries of East Central Europe regarding minorities. This manifested itself through intolerance, discrimination against and the wholesale deportation of ethnic groups. These were the very policies that, in the 1941–44 context, Jaszi deemed to have harmed relations among the peoples of the region in a way never experienced during the life of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. What hurt Jaszi the most was the fact that these attitudes surfaced even—one might say especially—in Czechoslo-

vakia, a country that for him had been a beacon of hope in the post-1919 period. For Jaszi then, World War II ended very much the way the First World War had a quarter century earlier. It brought him anguish mixed with excitement and hope, but in the end and above all, disappointment.

## NOTES

The author is indebted to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Department of National Defence of Canada, for providing him with research grants over the years that made research on this and other World War II subjects possible.

- 1 See especially Béla K. Király, "The Danubian Problem in Oscar Jaszi's Political Thought," *Hungarian Quarterly* V (April-June 1965), pp. 120–34. Also, Péter Hanák, *Jászi Oszkár dunai patriotizmusa* [The Danubian patriotism of Oscar Jaszi] (Budapest: Magvető, 1985), pp. 59–80.
- 2 See the conclusions to the paper by György Litván in this volume.
- 3 N.F. Dreisziger, "Central European Federalism in the Thought of Oscar Jaszi and his Successors," in *Society in Change: Studies in Honor of Béla K. Király* eds. S.B. Vardy and A.H. Vardy (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1983), p. 545.
- 4 One of Jaszi's wartime publications cited *ibid.*
- 5 On the origins of the Hungarian community of the United States see Julianna Puskás, *Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Államokban, 1880–1940* [Immigrant Hungarians in the United States, 1880–1940] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1982).
- 6 N.F. Dreisziger, "Bridges to the West: The Horthy Regime's 'Reinsurance Policies' in 1941," *War & Society* 7 (May 1989), pp. 4f.
- 7 *Ibid.*, pp. 2–4.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- 9 *Ibid.*, pp. 5f.
- 10 Eckhardt says relatively little on his journey in his book, *Regicide at Marseille: Recollections of Tibor Eckhardt* (New York: American Hungarian Library, 1964), pp. 245f. His trip is described in fair amount of detail in an intelligence report: "The Hungarian problem in Europe and the United States," by Hans Habe, 10 Feb. 1942, OSS Records, RG 226, No. 15181, Regular Series, National Archives of the United States (NAUS).
- 11 Lugosi had had a promising acting career in pre-Horthyite Hungary, and managed to continue it in America of the 1920s and 1930s. By the 1940s, however, his fortunes had declined—he was being hopelessly typecast and had problems with substance abuse—but that did not prevent him from assuming a leading role in the efforts to support Mihály Károlyi's quest for the supreme leadership of anti-fascist Hungarians in the West. On Lugosi see Robert Dremer, *Lugosi: The Man Behind the Cape* (Chicago: Henry Regeny, 1976), and Arthur Lennig, *The Count: The Life and Films of Bela 'Dracula' Lugosi* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1974).
- 12 On Moholy-Nagy see Oliver A.I. Botar (editor and contributor), *The Early Twentieth Century Avant-Grade*, a special issue of the *Hungarian Studies Review* 15

- (Spring 1988).
- 13 Lengyel, *Americans from Hungary*, p. 177.
  - 14 For Jaszi's comments on Vámbéry see his introduction to Vámbéry's 1942 publication, *The Hungarian Problem* (New York: The Nation, 1942), pp. 7f. See also, Paul Nadanyi, *The "Free Hungary" Movement* (New York: Amerikai Magyar Népszava, 1942), pp. 13–14, 33–34.
  - 15 Nadanyi, pp. 83f.
  - 16 Copy of memorandum by Tibor Eckhardt to the State Department, 11 Feb. 1942, The Papers of Tibor Eckhardt, Vol. 1, file 4, Hoover Institution Archives. In this memo Eckhardt accuses Vámbéry of breaking his promise of not obstructing the work of the "Free Hungary" movement very soon thereafter. According to information received by Allen W. Dulles at the time, Vámbéry acknowledged his associates' attacks on Eckhardt, did not consider them wise, but felt that he had no way of preventing them. "[T]his was a free country [Vámbéry said] and he had no control over what his associates said or did." Memorandum, A.W. Dulles to Hugh R. Wilson, 16 April 1942, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Entry 106, Box 14. National Archives of the United States.
  - 17 For a copy of the proclamation see the Tibor Eckhardt Papers, Box. 5. Hoover Archives.
  - 18 According to historian Tibor Hajdu, Károlyi's biographer, Lónyai was an unfortunate choice. See Hajdu's *Károlyi Mihály. Politikai életrajz* [Mihály Károlyi: A Political Biography] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1978), p. 475.
  - 19 *Ibid.*, pp. 478–79.
  - 20 Schultz was a former member of the Prague Parliament, but was not associated with the group of deputies in that legislative assembly that accepted the leadership of János Eszterházy and were known to represent the Hungarian minority of the country. For more on Schultz, see Nadanyi, pp. 46f.
  - 21 "Hungarian Groups in the United States," memorandum by Hodza, (Jan. 1942), Foreign Nationalities Branch of the Organization of Strategic Services (hereafter FNB), HU–17, Records of the OSS, National Archives of the United States.
  - 22 *The Nation: America's Leading Liberal Weekly since 1865*, 27 September 1941.
  - 23 "Hungarian Groups in the United States," *loc. cit.* (FNB HU–17).
  - 24 Dreisziger, "Bridges," 10–12.
  - 25 "Hungarian Politics in the United States," FNB memorandum, 30 Sept. 1942, OSS Records, RG 226, Regular series, file 21786, NAUS.
  - 26 Both Balásy and Vámbéry reported on this meeting to OSS officials in Washington. See the memos exchanged by H.R. Wilson and Allen Dulles, 16 and 17th April, 1942, the "new" OSS Records, Entry 106, Box 14, NAUS. For fragments of the Vámbéry-Balásy correspondence of the spring of 1942 see Allen W. Dulles to H.R. Wilson, 27 May 1942, FNB Records, HU-73.
  - 27 One source points out that at one point Balásy and Jaszi had agreed to meet in person in Washington, but Jaszi did not show up for the meeting. "Hungarian politics. . ." 30 Sept. 1942, *loc. cit.* In England, Károlyi was more successful, as he managed to recruit to his cause another former Eckhardt supporter, Antal Zsilinszky. See Hajdu, *Károlyi*, p. 480.
  - 28 The idea of replacing Eckhardt with Bartók as the leader of the Independent Hungarian movement had originated with Eckhardt himself. See the FNB memo-

- randum "Independent Hungary Movement in the United States," 11 Aug. 1942, FNB Records, HU-212.
- 29 Hajdu, *Károlyi Mihály*, p. 478.
- 30 FNB memo 30 Sept. 1942, *loc. cit.*
- 31 Besides Moholy-Nagy and the above mentioned Lugosi, this organization would count among its leaders Hugo Rony, who had been Minister of Health in Károlyi's government, and Sándor Vince, another high-ranking functionary of that regime.
- 32 FNB memo, 30 Sept. 1942, *loc. cit.*
- 33 Dulles to Wilson, 16 April 1942, *loc. cit.* Balásy apparently had a less favourable opinion of Jaszi's associates: Vámbéry liked to "agree with everyone" and had "no particular fighting qualities" and possessed "very little control over . . . [the] others in his group," and Kéri was decidedly "not well viewed in Hungary." *Ibid.*
- 34 M.W. Fodor, reporting to the FNB of the OSS, 16 March 1942, FNB Records, HU-48. According to Fodor, the opponents to Károlyi's coming to America within the AFDH were Vámbéry and his New York associates. Hajdu, Károlyi's biographer, explains that Vámbéry was reluctant to advocate an idea that was not favoured in the State Department. Hajdu, *Károlyi*, p. 482.
- 35 The text is given in the Appendix. Its source is the files of the OSS, NAUS. Jaszi's name is not to be found on the document, no doubt because the 1st page of his essay is missing. The index card to the document that had been prepared by OSS officials during the war, identifies Jaszi as its author.
- 36 Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* (Budapest, 1912). Jaszi's book has been recently re-published in abbreviated form in Hungary: Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok. . .*, György Litván ed. (Budapest: Gondolat, 1986). See also the postscript to Jaszi's 1918 work: Oszkár Jászi, *A monarchia jövője, a dualizmus bukása, és a dunai egyesült államok* [The Future of the Monarchy, the Failure of Dualism, and the Danubian United States], (Budapest, 1918), by József Galántai, in a recent re-issue (Budapest: AKV-Maecenas, 1988), p. 125.
- 37 Galántai's postscript to Jaszi's 1918 book, p. 128.
- 38 László Szarka, "A méltányos nemzeti elhatárolódás lehetősége 1918 végén" [The Possibility of Equitable Settlement of the Ethnic Question at the End of 1918], *Regio: Kisebbségtudományi Szemle* (Regio: Review of Ethnic Studies) I (January 1990), pp. 49-56. See also Thomas Spira's paper in this volume.
- 39 Bennett Kovrig, "Mediation by Obfuscation: The Resolution of the Marseille Crisis, October 1934 to May 1935," *The Historical Journal* xix (1976), pp. 207ff. See also Eckhardt's *Recollections*, cited in note 10.