

## **Diplomatic Prelude to the Bombing of Kassa: Reflections and Recollections of a Former Diplomat**

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Though several decades have elapsed since the conclusion of the Second World War many pertinent issues remain unsolved. The best-known one is certainly the unfinished mission of Rudolf Hess. On the eve of the German-Russian war, the Hess affair was a momentous German effort to neutralize the West in order to get a free hand against the Soviet Union. But the Hess mission failed of necessity because by May, 1941, Adolf Hitler's Germany had lost its credibility in the eyes of the West. A few weeks later, the bombing of Kassa occurred and joined the series of unsolved mysteries of this greatest human drama. Like the Rudolf Hess mission, the bombing of Kassa is also surrounded by secrecy. Owing to the very nature of such events no authentic sources—written or printed—have surfaced since. It appears to have been planned and executed in complete secrecy as the natural outcome of long and complex diplomatic developments.

On June 4, 1920, the Treaty of Trianon put an end to the existence of historic Hungary. It meant significant territorial losses for the country and roughly 4 million Hungarian became minorities in the successor states. The minority rights of these Hungarians remained unsettled between the wars as the successor states did not ensure equality for their Hungarian subjects. This development caused Hungarians to be preoccupied with revisionism, which became the cornerstone of Hungary's external policy. Anti-Soviet sentiment was also a prime factor in the country's foreign policy orientation. Since Germany found herself in a similar strategic constellation, revisionism and anti-Communism helped to forge a community of interest between German and Hungarian societies. Due to these circumstances, for years elected governments in Hungary misinterpreted the advent of national socialism, starting with the Nazi takeover on February 1, 1933. On that same day, Prime

Minister Gyula Gömbös, formerly a captain on the General Staff, sent an enthusiastic message to Adolf Hitler, and requested closer cooperation between Germany and Hungary in economic as well as foreign policy matters.<sup>1</sup>

Despite Prime Minister Gömbös' desire to establish closer and more cordial relations with Germany, German-Hungarian diplomatic envoys continued to be mutually suspicious of each other even before the 1938 Sudeten crisis when the Hungarian government refused to participate in military action against Czechoslovakia as Germany's ally. On March 7, 1934, Italy, Austria and Hungary concluded the Rome Pact in order to coordinate their political and economic policies. At the time, both Austria and Hungary looked upon Italy as a natural counterweight to Germany's expansionist designs. This idea proved to be a misconceived one since Italy did not have either the military or economic strength to counterbalance German imperialism. Because of Germany's rising power in Central and Eastern Europe, the Rome Pact was unable to block the *Wilhelmstrasse's* ambitions. As a result, the signatory governments of the Rome Pact soon took Germany's suspicions into consideration and even thought of asking Germany to join the Rome Pact. By doing this the Rome Pact governments admitted that the idea that Italy could serve as a counterweight to Germany was nothing but an empty illusion from the very beginning.<sup>2</sup>

The first major break in German-Hungarian relations occurred in August 1938 as an aftermath of the Bled Conference in Yugoslavia where Hungary and the Little Entente states had just reached an agreement. The Bled Agreement of August 23, 1938, recognized for the first time since the end of the First World War Hungary's right to rearmament. It also renounced the use of force in territorial disputes between Hungary and the Little Entente States.<sup>3</sup> It is interesting to note that the Bled Conference occurred during the state visit of Regent Horthy and other leading Hungarian politicians to Germany. During the visit, Hitler and Ribbentrop in vain urged the Hungarians to commit themselves to military action against Czechoslovakia. These negotiations were summarized fifteen years later as follows:

During these negotiations the Hungarian Government had resisted all the pressure that was put upon them to give a firm promise of military cooperation with

Germany in an attack on Czechoslovakia... Not even Hitler's willingness at this stage, to allow Hungary to acquire the whole of Slovakia and Ruthenia, could tempt the Hungarians, in their disarmed state, to commit themselves to military action against Czechoslovakia. <sup>4</sup>

On November 28, 1938, foreign minister Kálmán Kánya was replaced at German instigation for the role he had played at the Bled Conference. According to the Minutes of the Berlin meeting on January 16, 1939 between the *Fuehrer* and István Csáky, the new foreign minister, Hitler strongly criticized the anti-German behaviour of the Hungarian government and had especially harsh words for Kánya's role at the Bled Conference. Hitler accused Kánya of being an enemy of Germany, and of helping to revive the Little Entente against Germany during Horthy's state visit to Germany. <sup>5</sup>

Ribbentrop's hostile attitude toward the Hungarian government seemed to be evident in the negotiations leading to the Vienna Award of 1938. Ciano recorded his telephone conversations with Ribbentrop on the matter as follows: "The truth is that he (Ribbentrop) intends to protect Czechoslovakia as far as he can and sacrifice the ambitions, even the legitimate ambitions, of Hungary." <sup>6</sup> Mussolini and Ciano wished to utilise Hungary as a barrier against Germany's eastward expansion. The German foreign ministry clearly saw this intention and therefore backed Slovakia against Hungary. In his conversation with Vojtech Tuka on February 12, 1939, Hitler "regretted that he had not known earlier of the Slovak struggle for independence." <sup>7</sup> During those days Hitler showed himself as a protector of Slovakia against Hungarian claims. A.J.P. Taylor was not far from the truth when he stated that, in protecting Slovakia's independence, "Hitler was acting against the Hungarians rather than against the Czechs." <sup>8</sup>

The relationship between Germany and Hungary never improved; on the contrary, it gradually worsened despite Mussolini's and Ciano's interventions to reconcile the two governments. The case of Poland was the next test of the worsening Hungarian-German connection. On July 24, 1939, just a few weeks before the outbreak of the German-Polish war, Prime Minister Teleki wrote two letters to Chancellor Hitler concerning Hungary's role in the foreseeable German-Polish

conflict. In his second letter Pál Teleki strongly emphasized that "Hungary could not, on moral grounds, be in a position to take armed action against Poland."<sup>9</sup> Teleki's second letter caused enormous consternation in Germany's ruling circles. On August 8, 1939, István Csáky received a ruthless answer at Berchtesgaden. Hitler felt mortally offended and declared that Germany did not want Hungarian assistance against Poland because as he said "Poland presents no military problem to us."<sup>10</sup> In order to conciliate German leadership, foreign minister Csáky apologized and withdrew Prime Minister Teleki's letters, explaining that "...unfortunately, they had apparently been misunderstood."<sup>11</sup>

On September 1, 1939, the German attack on Poland began. Hungary did not lend any assistance in this case. In contrast, the army of independent Slovakia joined the German forces and started military operations against her northern Slavic brothers. The Polish-Slovak war was very cruel the Poles even used chemical warfare against the Slovaks.

The Slovak attack on Poland created a cordial relationship between Germany and Slovakia at Hungary's expense. This was demonstrated on several occasions afterwards. As an aftermath of the war, more than 200,000 Poles escaped from their country and found refuge as political exiles in Hungary. From a German vantage point Hungary's hospitality to the refugees appeared to be an unfriendly act, all the more so as it contrasted sharply with the attitude of Slovakia. On October 21, 1939, the Slovak envoy Matúš Černák, was granted an audience with Hitler, during which the *Fuehrer* praised Slovakia's behaviour while sharply condemning Hungary's, and held out the prospect of the revision of the 1938 Vienna Award at the expense of Hungary.<sup>12</sup> In July, 1940, Jozef Tiso, the President of Slovakia, led a government delegation on a state visit to Germany. During the ensuing negotiations, Hitler and Ribbentrop reassured the Slovak leaders that their newly-established country was under the protection of Germany which would see to it that Hungary's hostile intentions against Slovakia would be prevented from materializing.<sup>13</sup>

Germany could not rely on the Teleki government, remembering only too well the uncooperative attitude of the Teleki-influenced government relating to Hitler's actions against Czechoslovakia in 1938 and Poland in 1939. As a result, Germany requested Ciano to secure the Hungarian government's permission to use its transportation system by German troops

destined to invade Greece in 1940.<sup>14</sup> At this time Hungary's military leadership enjoyed a privileged position afforded by Law No.II of 1939 on national defense. This law brought about fundamental changes in the country's political structure and deeply influenced its military and foreign policies in the coming years.<sup>15</sup> Law No.II of 1939 restored universal conscription, compelled all citizens between the ages of 14 and 70 to perform defense work even in peacetime, put under military control the most important branches of civilian administration including all industrial and agricultural production, and established the *Legfelsőbb Honvédelmi Tanács* (Supreme Council on National Defense), an organization which had de facto jurisdiction in important military, domestic, and foreign policy affairs over the regular government.

As a direct consequence of the overambitious implementation of the National Defense Law of 1939, Hungary actually had two governments: civilian and military. Regent Horthy sided with the latter in most of the civilian-military disputes. In these crucial times, on September 1, 1940, Teleki wrote a letter to Regent Horthy complaining about the growing influence of the military over the civilian administration as well as the activities of General Henrik Werth, Chief of the Hungarian General Staff. In this letter Teleki accused Werth and the military of interfering with most branches of the civilian government including the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Commerce, and Industry. The military, he further charged, without the knowledge of competent ministers, concluded agreements with Germany even on export-import matters. Teleki also raised objections against the customary practice of German army (intelligence corps) officers commissioned by the Royal Hungarian General Staff routinely participating in deciphering codes in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs without the knowledge and approval of the Hungarian Foreign Minister.<sup>16</sup>

Regent Horthy, confident in the military, failed again to put an end to this state of affairs. Obviously, the Regent's political philosophy contributed to establishing close military cooperation between his country and Germany. In fact, by the time of the German invasion of Yugoslavia there had been well-established channels of communication between the two general staffs. On March 27, 1941, Hitler summoned the commanders of his air force and the army and while announcing an imminent attack on

Yugoslavia he stated, among others, the following intentions “We will try to get the neighboring states to participate in a suitable way. Actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be asked of Italy, Hungary and in certain respects of Bulgaria too.”<sup>17</sup> At the same meeting Hitler announced territorial rewards for these countries: the Adriatic coast for Italy, the Bánát for Hungary and Macedonia for Bulgaria.<sup>18</sup>

Horthy and his military leaders agreed to the German request, while Teleki and some of his supporters had serious reservations. László Szabó, Hungarian military attaché in Rome and a friend and confidant of Mussolini, belonged to the latter group and confidentially informed his Yugoslav colleague in Rome about Hitler’s intention days before the German attack on Yugoslavia.<sup>19</sup> On March 30, 1941, General Friedrich von Paulus arrived in Budapest to begin negotiations with General Werth, on Hungarian-German military collaboration aimed against Yugoslavia. According to Paulus there were no obstacles in the negotiations which resulted in mutual understanding.

On the same day, March 30, 1941, only days before the start of military operations against Yugoslavia, Károly Rassay, leader of Hungary’s liberal opposition, called on the new foreign minister, László Bárdossy, to protest against the planned military action. Bárdossy defended the country’s participation in the planned military operation arguing that if Hungary did not take part in the action Germany would occupy the country and appoint a government which would fulfill all the wishes of Berlin. At this meeting with Rassay, Bárdossy referred to the extraordinary pressure exerted upon the civilian government by Hungarian military circles to take active part in the forthcoming German-Yugoslav war. These military circles based their judgement on the fact that up to this point the Hungarian army had been mobilized three times without being engaged in action and that if the current mobilization did not culminate in military action, it would destroy the army’s morale.<sup>20</sup>

As the time of Germany’s military confrontation with the Soviet Union approached, German diplomats and generals tried repeatedly to bind Hungary more closely to the Third Reich. On May 24, 1941, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, the German envoy to Budapest, had a conversation with Prime Minister Bárdossy which dealt strictly with military topics and focused on Hungary’s eventual participation in the anticipated German-Soviet war.<sup>21</sup>

Henceforth, high-ranking military officers of Germany desperately strove to obtain a voluntary pledge from the Hungarian government to participate in the coming German-Soviet conflict. Learning from past experience when Hungary refused to follow the German lead—in the Czechoslovak and Polish crises—Hitler and Ribbentrop clung to the principle of voluntary action. They did so because they could not countenance being flatly rejected again. In addition, the German government was rightly afraid of further territorial demands by Hungary which would have seriously complicated Berlin's relationship with its two client states, Slovakia and Rumania, at this stage of developments.

In spite of the insistence of General Werth and some other ranking Hungarian officers, the Bárdossy government stuck to its original standpoint that without the explicit request of the German government, made through diplomatic channels, the Hungarian government would not be willing to participate in the conflict.

Under escalating German pressure, Henrik Werth, Döme Sztójay, and Colonel Sándor Homlok, the military attaché at the Hungarian Legation in Berlin, in vain urged Bárdossy to make a voluntary declaration of a military alliance with Germany in the approaching war. On June 14, 1941, just a week before the outbreak of German-Soviet hostilities, Henrik Werth sent a *Memorandum* to Prime Minister Bárdossy.<sup>22</sup> In it Werth impatiently urged the government to authorize him to enter into negotiations with competent German military leaders with the aim of settling the essential points of military cooperation. In Werth's opinion, Hungary ought to participate in the forthcoming hostilities all the more because "the German armed forces will achieve victory (over the Red Army) and the participation of Hungary will last only for a very short time so that in a few weeks the mobilized Hungarian troops can gradually be discharged and can return home by harvest time." In the *Memorandum*, Werth steadfastly stressed that Hungary's territorial growth depended on the active cooperation of the Hungarian army with Germany's fighting forces, and concluded that the government should make a voluntary offer of a military alliance to Germany.

On June 20, 1941, just two days before the German attack on the Soviet Union, Colonel Homlok prepared a report to Werth emphasizing that:

I hold necessary Hungary's military participation... Military operations will assume the character of a "Blitzkrieg"...According to more cautious estimates the war will be finished in 3 months...I heard such an opinion that after the first great battle the Soviet military might will start disintegrating.<sup>23</sup>

Some simultaneous events rendered Hungary's position very difficult. On June 22, 1941, Italy declared war against the USSR and, on the same day Slovakia severed diplomatic relations with the Soviets. The following day, General Antonescu issued a *Manifesto* to the Rumanian army and the nation to liberate Russian occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. Concurrently Slovakia entered the war while Hungary merely severed its diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union. After the session of the Council of Ministers, Premier Bárdossy asked Károly Bartha, Minister of Defense, what the outlook for the war was. The Minister of Defense predicted total German victory in six weeks time. But German plans for a Blitzkrieg were threatened already during the first days of the war. This is why soon after June 22nd Germany urged some European nations to participate in one form or other in the "crusade" against the Soviet Union. The propaganda machinery of the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei* in particular tried to muster more nations for collective action. Despite these efforts, the Bárdossy government unequivocally refused to offer military aid on a voluntary basis.

During this highly critical period, interesting diplomatic actions and changes in attitude took place in Hungarian-Soviet relations which understandably irritated the diplomats of the Third Reich. It is important to put events into historical perspective. In order to counterbalance Germany's aid to Rumania in its dispute with Hungary, Molotov told József Kristóffy, Hungarian envoy to Moscow, as early as July 4th, 1940 that the Soviet Union considered Hungary's revisionist claims to be well-founded and that she will help Hungary at the peace conference.<sup>24</sup> Somewhat later, on August 25, 1940, Molotov again told Kristoffy that the Soviet Union never acknowledged the Paris Peace Treaties and the Treaty of Trianon because these treaties created a Rumania which was contrary to the interests of Hungary, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria alike. A day after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, Molotov again told Kristóffy

that the Soviet Union has no territorial demands against Rumania, but he, Molotov, wanted to know the Hungarian government's position concerning the ongoing conflict. Because of the circumstances in those days, Kristóffy no longer had contact with his government, therefore Molotov himself gave instructions for the restoration of communication links between Budapest and the Hungarian Legation in Moscow\*. But a chain of occurrences intervened and drastically altered the course of history.

On June 22nd, in a telephone conversation with General Kurt Himer, liaison officer of the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* at the Hungarian General Staff in Budapest, General Alfred Jodl clarified the official German stand by saying "We are accepting every Hungarian aid. We do not want to require anything, but everything which they offer we gratefully accept. It is out of the question that we would not want Hungary's participation."<sup>25</sup> On June 23, 1941, General Franz Halder, Chief of the German General Staff called General Himer, liaison officer in Budapest, on the telephone and stated categorically the following:

Now it is important that the Hungarian military leadership bring into motion the political leadership to offer its voluntary help... We do not raise any demands because one shall pay for those, but we would be grateful for any support especially for fast-moving troops (mechanized army corps).<sup>26</sup>

The Hungarian government showed no sign of accepting the German stand relayed through Henrik Werth's mediation nor was it inclined to change its frequently expressed stand of non-intervention without the official request of the German government. Consequently there followed an appropriate shift in German strategy designed to sweep Hungary into the ongoing war without the delivery of any explicit German request through the usual diplomatic channels.

In retaliation for the Budapest government's unyielding stance this shift occurred very soon. On June 26, 1941 several airplanes

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\*Editor's note: The Soviet message arrived in Budapest only on the 24th. For further comments on these events see the paper by N.F. Dreisziger.

bombed Kassa, Munkács and Rahó, thereby attempting to drag Hungary, the unwilling satellite, into the war. Hungary's military leaders made the most of this opportunity to force the civilian government to declare a state of war against the Soviet Union claiming that Soviet warplanes did the bombing. The question was whether this invented explanation conformed to reality.

In September, 1941, two months after the bombing, I personally met the then Captain Ádám Krúdy, an eyewitness to the incident, in the home of a distant relative of his (at 4 Podmaniczky Street, Budapest). Krúdy adamantly insisted that German warplanes had carried out the bombing. His statement sounded logical, however, I still remember questioning the preciseness of his eyewitness account. It should be noted that the bombing incident remained a much-discussed topic in Hungary and the civilian population overwhelmingly regarded the official stand as at least questionable.

Between October 1943 and March 1944, I frequently met with several members of the Slovak delegation negotiating in Budapest. Interestingly, the name of one delegate was Ladislav (László) Bárdossy from Bratislava. A few of them claimed indirect and very limited knowledge of the bombers taking off from an airfield located in Slovakia. With a great deal of uncertainty, they mentioned the Spišská Nová Ves airfield. In the first year of Slovakia's independence (1938), this airfield had been bombed by Hungarian warplanes which caused strong anti-Hungarian sentiment across Slovakia. I tried to meet with high-ranking Slovak officers who served in Spišská Nová Ves at the time of the Kassa bombing. I knew about one who had been stationed in that town then and whom I had met frequently in Bratislava between June 1946 and November 1948: a certain Doctor J.P. At the time of the Kassa incident he had been a lieutenant-colonel and Chief of the Medical Staff of the Army of the Republic of Slovakia and had been stationed officially in Spišská Nová Ves. He related that a few high-ranking Slovak officers also knew about the German warplanes taking off from Spišská Nová Ves airfield with orders to strike nearby towns recovered by Hungary in 1938 through the Vienna Award of that year.

I tried to confirm this explanation of the Kassa mystery by establishing contact with knowledgeable Slovak military and

civilian individuals. Among them was Dr. Ján Spišiak, Slovakia's one-time envoy to Budapest. He always gave evasive answers. Another was General Ferdinand Čatloš, Minister of Defense of Slovakia. When he returned from Soviet captivity in 1948, I approached him in Bratislava through an intermediary who was a mutual friend, but General Čatloš was unwilling to answer my relevant questions in any form.

Finally, I would like to attach an epilogue to the event. In light of German-Hungarian military cooperation between the June 26, 1941 bombing and the March 19, 1944 German occupation of Hungary, it is clear that even without the bombing of Kassa, Hungary sooner or later would have been forced to join Germany in its war on the Soviet Union. Germany as a totalitarian great power had all the means to impose its will on small nations like Hungary, Slovakia or Rumania—especially in times of crisis. It would have been the case all the more since Germany's adversaries, the Western great powers, happened to be disinterested observers at the outset of Germany's eastward expansion. Lord Halifax, British Foreign Secretary of that period well-summarized the Western attitude toward Germany and the small powers alike in his November 1st, 1938 statement "It is one thing to allow German expansion in Central Europe, which to my mind is a normal and natural thing, but we must be able to resist German expansion in Western Europe or else our whole position is undermined."<sup>27</sup>

## NOTES

1. Document No. 525/T.-133 in Magda Ádám et al, comps., *Magyarország és a második világháború. Titkos diplomáciai okmányok a háború előzményeihez és történetéhez.* (Hungary and World War II. Secret diplomatic documents pertaining to pre-war and wartime history.) (Budapest: Kossuth Publishing House, 1959): 46-7.

2. See documents OL.Küm.po.o., 1934, 21/7t., 820, March 20, 1934; and OL.Küm.po.o., 1934, 21/27 t., 978, March 26, 1934, both published in *Magyarország és a második világháború*, p.47-9. This volume is reviewed by Francis Wagner in the October, 1961 issue of *American Historical Review*.

3. For a documented study of the negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente states, see Robert Kvaček, "Podíl Československa na jednáních Malé Dohody a Madarska v letech 1936-1938," (The role of Czechoslovakia in the negotiations between the Little Entente and Hungary during the years 1936-1938) *Historický Časopis*, XI, 3, (1963): 406-32.

4. *Survey of International Affairs*. London, III, 69. On this see also Thomas L. Sakmyster, "The Hungarian State Visit to Germany of August, 1938: Some New Evidence on Hungary in Hitler's Pre-Munich Policy," *Canadian Slavic Studies*, 3, No.4, (Winter 1969): 677-91.

5. See Document No. 83 in *Magyarország és a második világháború*, pp. 202-9.

6. Ciano, *Diary*, Oct. 22. For a more comprehensive discussion of the topic see Edward

Chászár, *Decisions in Vienna. The Czechoslovak Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938* (Astor Park, Florida: Danubian Press, 1978): 52-5. See also Charles Wojatsek, *From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral* (Montreal: Institute of Comparative Civilizations, 1980) pp. 114, 127, 143, 153, 159, 163, 168; and Theodore Prochazka, *The Second Republic; The Disintegration of Post-Munich Czechoslovakia, October 1938-March 1939* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

7. *German Foreign Policy*, series D.IV., No.168. See also A.J.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1961): 188.

8. Taylor, *The Origins*, pp. 195-6.

9. *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945* (Baden-Baden, 1950-1956), Series D.VI.

10. Taylor, *The Origins*, p. 224

11. *German Foreign Policy*, series D.VI., No.784. See also Taylor, *The Origins*, p. 224.

12. *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*. Series D. Volume VIII, pp. 326-9.

13. For a detailed study see Lubomír Lipták, "Příprava a průběh rokování roku 1940 mezi představiteli Německa a slovenského státu" (Preparation and progress of the Salzburg negotiations in 1940 between the representatives of Germany and the Slovak State) *Historický Časopis*, XIII, 3, (1965): 329-65.

14. Gyula Juhász, *A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája, 1939-1941* (The foreign policy of the Teleki Government, 1939-1941) (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1964): 270.

15. *Magyar Törvénytár*, 1939, II.

16. Országos Levéltár. *Horthy Miklós titkos iratai* (Secret Documents of Miklós Horthy) (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1963 (2nd Edition): 233-52.

17. *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Document no. 217, pp.372-5.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Mr. Plamenatz, a member of the diplomatic staff of the Rome Embassy of Yugoslavia at that time, later a co-worker of mine in the Library of Congress (1953-1961), related these events to me several times adding that the Belgrade Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not believe in Germany's hostile intentions when decoding the message from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rome. Owing to the pressure Germany and the Hungarian military had exerted upon the Budapest government, Prime Minister Teleki committed suicide on April 3, 1941.

20. O.L. Kum. *Szent-Iványi kézirat* (The Szent-Iványi manuscript housed in the Hungarian National Archives) as quoted in Juhász, *A Teleki Kormány*, pp. 302-3.

21. For details, see Döme Sztójay's telegram to Prime Minister Bárdossy, published in *Magyarország és a második világháború*, pp. 367-9.

22. Number 10.563/k.l.vkt.-1941 published in *Magyarország és a második világháború*, pp. 357-61.

23. Number 1248/k.a./368/1941, published in *Magyarország és a második világháború*, pp. 361-4.

24. Kristóffy's telegram describing the meeting with Molotov arrived at the Foreign Ministry in Budapest on 8:00 a.m. on July 5, 1940. The author officially handled these Molotov-Kristóffy documents in his capacity as Slavic (Czechoslovak) expert at the Peace Preparatory Division of the Ministry between October 1945 and June 16, 1946. Dr. Iván Lajos delivered a lecture on the "Hungarian War Responsibility" on March 20, 1946 in Budapest and made use of these sources.

25. *Kriegstagebuch des Deutschen Generals beim Oberkommando der Kgl. Ungar. Wehrmacht*. Bundesarchiv. Koblenz. Quoted by József Kún, "Magyarország második világháborúba belépésének katonai vonatkozásai" (Military aspects of Hungary's entry into the Second World War) *Hadtörténelmi közlemények*, No.1, 1962, p. 29. See also Gyula Juhász, *A Teleki-kormány*, pp. 345-6.

26. See the June 23, 1941 note by General Halder in *Kriegstagebuch*, quoted by Kún, "Magyarország második világháborúba."

27. Halifax to Phipps, November 1, 1938. *British Foreign Policy*, 3rd Series. III, 285, as quoted in Taylor, *The Origins*, pp.190-1.